Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Iranian Missile Silos

INTRODUCTION

There has been a great deal of recent open-source reporting dealing with a purported missile site near Tabriz in northwestern Iran. While these reports may or may not be true, they have all failed to note the presence of another missile facility in the region. The difference is that this facility can be identified with much greater certainty: this facility houses Iran's first missile silos.

TABRIZ MISSILE BASE

Situated approximately 10 kilometers southwest of Tabriz, Iran, is a missile facility unique outside of the world's nuclear powers. For the first time, such a nation has chosen to operationally deploy ballistic missiles inside of silos. Granted, some non-nuclear nations deploy silo-based missiles, but these are all defensive weapon systems. The Tabriz facility represents the first silo-based deployment of offensive weapons outside of the world's nuclear powers.

The Tabriz missile facility is a relatively expansive site consisting of four primary areas. Apart from the silo location, there are areas for both administrative and support functions, missile storage, and an unoccupied HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE) SAM site.

An overview of the Tabriz missile facility can be seen in the image below:



The missile silos at Tabriz appear to be a new development, but the facility itself appears to have been home to Iranian surface-to-surface missiles for some time. The unoccupied HQ-2 site appears to be home to a number of SRBM TELs. These vehicles appear to be Shahab-1 or Shahab-2 TELs, based on the dimensions of the weapons they can be seen fitted with. A possible Shahab-3 TEL can also be seen in the area. The TELs are located adjacent to a large structure which appears to have sliding roof segments. A storage facility such as this would allow any TELs stored inside to raise and fire without leaving the facility, hiding any missile fueling or warhead mating activity from foreign reconnaissance assets. This is obviously advantageous, as it prevents an enemy from knowing the operational status of the missiles located inside the facility. The facility appears to be divided in half, with each half appearing to be long enough to house a Shahab-3 TEL. If needbe, the former HQ-2 launch rail revetments could also serve as launch sites for any TELs located at the facility as well.

The Tabriz HQ-2/SSM site can be seen in the image below:



SILO DETAILS

In the center of the Tabriz missile facility lies the silo complex. The complex can be located at the following coordinates: 37°58'18.48"N 46°10'41.53"E There are two missile silos present. Each silo complex consists of a sliding door covering the silo itself, a track for the door to retract for missile launch, and two exhaust vents, which suggest that a hot-launch method is used.

The Tabriz missile silos can be seen in the image below:



The silos themselves appears to be very robust. It is likely that the silos were developed to provide a much more survivable deployment strategy for Iranian missiles than the aforementioned facilities located on the grounds of the former HQ-2 site. Even a near-miss by a cruise missile or gravity bomb could cause severe damage to the TEL garage and the weapons contained therein. The silos, in comparison, appear to be far more survivable. Each silo is covered by a massive sliding door measuring 7 meters by 15.3 meters. One potential occupant, the Shahab-3, is only 1.38 meters in diameter, meaning that there is plenty of space available for a very hardened and therefore survivable silo.

The following image depicts a circle representing the diameter of a Shahab-3 MRBM superimposed over one of the silo doors:



As can be seen by the image above, a missile far larger in diamter than the Shahab-3 could potentially occupy the silos. Anything with a diameter of up to approximately 4.5 meters could conceivably be fitted inside of the silos. However, most modern ICBMs do not even have diameters much greater than 2 meters. That fact alone suggests that the dimensions of the silo are likely much smaller than 4.5 meters, leading to the conclusion that the facility is extremely hardened.

OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY

Given the location of the Tabriz missile silo complex and the locations of potential targets, it is likely that SRBMs are not fitted inside of the silos. That leaves Iran's MRBM and IRBM inventory as the most likely source of the occupants. Shahab-3 activity at the site has already been hinted at by the presence of a possible Shahab-3 TEL at the former HQ-2 site. With the Shahab-3 in operational service and the Shahab-3A and Shahab-3B undergoing testing, one of these MRBMs is likely to be found inside each of the Tabriz silos. The dark horse candidate for silo basing at Tabriz is the North Korean Musudan IRBM. Musudan has a diameter of 1.5 meters and would certainly be able to fit inside of the silos hidden under the massive sliding doors.

The following image depicts the maximum ranges of the potential occupants of the Tabriz missile silos. Shahab-3, with a range of 1300 km, is denoted by a red circle. Shahab-3A, with a maximum range of 1800 km, is denoted by an orange circle. Shahab-3B, with a maximum range of 2500 km, is denoted by a blue circle. The Musudan IRBM has a maximum range of 5000 km, and is not depicted, although it would be able to range all of Europe as well as all of India and the entire Middle East.



The graphic above depicts the maximum quoted range for each missile system as listed in Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems. In most cases, the range was expressed as being between two figures, and for the purpose of this article the maximum quoted range was used. Range sourcing aside, it can be seen that a 1300 km weapon has the ability to reach Tel Aviv, with an 1800 km weapon having the ability to range the majority of the Middle East, including the locations where the majority of American and Coalition forces are based in the region.

CONCLUSION

The Tabriz SSM facility provides Iran with its first survivable missile base. The weapons inside the silos provide Iran with the ability to launch a potential retaliatory strike against aggressors in the region. It is likely that more silo complexes will be constructed in the near future, to allow Iran to possess a survivable missile deterrent against future aggression. The presence of a survivable, retaliatory missile force inside of Iran is something that must be taken very seriously by any nation considering military action against the Persian nation.

SOURCES

-All imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-Missile ranges and diameters taken from Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems