AN/FPS-108 COBRA DANE
The image above depicts the COBRA DANE radar installation on Shemya Island in the Alaskan Aleutian Island chain. COBRA DANE is a large phased array radar (LPAR) employed in a monitoring capacity. The radar is situated to observe Russian ICBM and SLBM trajectories and eventual impacts on the Kura test range located on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The radar is also capable of monitoring the various impact zones in the Pacific Ocean where foreign ballistic missile flights terminate, most commonly those of Russia. COBRA DANE could potentially serve to predict erratic flight paths to impact, allowing operators to direct USN salvage assets to the area in order to collect specimens for analysis. Such analysis is useful in an ABM capacity, as it allows the designers of such weapon systems an insight into the materials employed in the creation of potential threat ICBMs. Having this knowledge allows a weapon designer working on, for example, a laser system to match the power output of the weapon to the structural components of the threat system, creating a weapon ideally suited to burn through the materials used in a threat ICBM or SLBM.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.
SOURCES
-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
The image above depicts the COBRA DANE radar installation on Shemya Island in the Alaskan Aleutian Island chain. COBRA DANE is a large phased array radar (LPAR) employed in a monitoring capacity. The radar is situated to observe Russian ICBM and SLBM trajectories and eventual impacts on the Kura test range located on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The radar is also capable of monitoring the various impact zones in the Pacific Ocean where foreign ballistic missile flights terminate, most commonly those of Russia. COBRA DANE could potentially serve to predict erratic flight paths to impact, allowing operators to direct USN salvage assets to the area in order to collect specimens for analysis. Such analysis is useful in an ABM capacity, as it allows the designers of such weapon systems an insight into the materials employed in the creation of potential threat ICBMs. Having this knowledge allows a weapon designer working on, for example, a laser system to match the power output of the weapon to the structural components of the threat system, creating a weapon ideally suited to burn through the materials used in a threat ICBM or SLBM.ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.
SOURCES
-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
6 comments:
Still waiting for your article on whether the american ABM which is planned for Europe has the capability to stop a russian counter attack in the event of a first US nuclear strike.
@ Raul: In short, no, as there are far more Russian ICBMs and MRBMs than there are GBIs. In the event of a Russian first strike, which is what Americans think most likely, the system would do nothing. However, there exists the slight chance that an American first strike, if it landed before the Russian missile launched, could destroy enough Russian ICBMs to prevent the US from being nuked, especially with the dismal condition of the current Russian SSBN fleet.
There are currently(or were until recently) 10 Ground Based Interceptors planned to be deployed in Poland capable of intercepting ICBMs aimed for the US. It seems foolish to base the survival of your nation on the chance that you will find and kill 99% of all Russian missiles in your first strike, and then depend on each of the 10 notoriously unreliable GBIs to function correctly, especially given the fact that Russian ICBMs are stored in fortified silos or moved from location to location, and that there are also many which can launch within the time it takes for a missile to impact.
Of course, only a madman would launch a full-out nuclear preemptive strike in the first place, even if assured of success. But chances are (to me) that 10 GBIs in Poland could not stop a retaliatory strike. Of course, the 140 SM-3s might be able to if in the right spots, especially as they have been notably successful, and the Patriot PAC-3s that I think number 100 or so around the GBIs would probably take down anything aimed at Warsaw anyway, but Noone is raising a stink over either of those systems so...
Hi,
Nice blog.
I'm just writing a long post on Cobra Dane and Have Star on my blog (+ other interesting radar sites related to NMD).
Keep in touch
Cactus
http://intelcenter-blog.blogspot.com
I've just posted the 1^ part. Hope you''enjoy it.
Keep in touch
Cactus
http://intelcenter-blog.blogspot.com
@asdfsdf So tell me, why is Poland and Chech Republic the best place to base this ABM system if Russia isn't a threat? Why this system isn't deployed in Turkey? I think the US is testing the russions. First there will be 10 GBIs. Then, if Russia doesn't complain, there will be more 20. Before you know it, the power balance has shifted and some mad american president may consider a preemptive strike (at least he/she has that option on the table).
Um, if you are trying to stop missiles from Russia heading to the US Poland/Czech Republic is the WORST place to put the interceptors.
Open up Google Earth and use the measuring thingy to fly from a Russian ICBM base to the US - you don't even go near Poland/Czech Republic.
But if you are flying an ICBM from Iran, then you go right over those places.
Besides, the new Russian Topol ICBMs have countermeasures to defeat all of the missile defense methods the US is even thinking about using.
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