IMINT & Analysis

January I&A

2012-01-02T18:01:00.000-05:00

Here are the topics in the works for the upcoming January issue of I&A:

-The importance of IMINT
-The DPRK's SAM Network
-An overview of DF-31 bases (notice that there wasn't too much attention to the details of relevant facilities in the December 2nd Artillery Corps piece-that was done to allow me to do longer, more in-depth overviews like this in the future...plus it kept the PDF from being 500 pages)
-Something odd about HQ-9 SAM sites (as in sites designed for the HQ-9, not hybrid or other sites simply hosting an HQ-9 battery)
-A contributor piece by Christopher Biggers on Bandar-e-Abbas

Newsflash: there have been many issues with and complaints about the Google Documents format. Some people can't always get the links to work. Sometimes the system itself does weird things, like giving me the link to the wrong issue, or only allowing Google account holders to view the documents. To address these problems, beginning with the January issue I&A will be distributed via Mediafire. That's the same hosting site that I used to distribute the 2011 collection of back issues, as well as the PDF I wrote on the Falcon missile family. As far as I know, there aren't any issues using Mediafire at the present time. If there are any, let me know now! As a warning, being that it's a file hosting site, it remains to be seen if some e-mail providers will filter out the download link. If that happens I'll re-attack the problem.

I&A December

2011-12-21T16:13:00.000-05:00

I&A's December issue will start to go out tomorrow. If you got an e-mail tonight, Google Documents did something weird and I managed to re-send everyone the November issue.

Oops. Sorry about that!

I did at least manage to send everyone the right KML file.

Update:

The correct download link just went out to the first set of subscribers. Everyone else will get the download link and the KML file tomorrow.

I&A in 2012

2011-12-20T14:58:00.000-05:00

By this point many of you have a good idea of what I&A is all about. The goal for 2012 is to continue to increase the scope and depth of the content. Ergo, here are a few items to bring to your attention:

1. Additional contributors are always welcome. If you think you have something to say, send me an e-mail with "Contributor" in the subject line. While imagery analysis will always play a big part of I&A, other features are certainly welcome as well.

2. I'm starting to prepare a general outline of topics for 2012 to begin getting things organized. To that end, feel free to reply here with a comment if there is a subject area or specific topic that you want to see covered. As the list grows I'll add them at the bottom of this post.

3. The large-size image format received an upgrade in the December issue. I'll be toying with a few more templates over the next few weeks, and will post some examples here to see which one you believe works out the best overall.

Potential Topics For 2012
Air Defense - The DPRK
Air Defense - Japan
Facility Analysis - The RoK's ADD complexes
Facility Analysis - individual 2nd Artillery Corps garrison complexes
Software Review - Falcon View
Strategic Warfare - European SSBN Facilities
Tech Notes - The S-500

I&A Volume 1 (2011)

2011-12-20T14:47:00.000-05:00

Below you will find a link allowing you to download all eleven issues of I&A from 2011, containing over 400 pages of analysis in total. At the end of each year, my plan is to make the previous volume available in this fashion to allow anyone unfamiliar with I&A to take a look and potentially subscribe. Recent subscribers can now enjoy access to the back issues as well. They have all been formatted in a manner allowing them to be employed as source material for research. The issues are contained within a standard Windows .zip file, hosted at Mediafire.

Click here to download Volume 1

Here are the major contents of each issue, in chronological order. Articles authored by contributors are noted with the author's name following the title. All issues also feature a Links article looking at various relevant websites, a complete list of references for each article, and the What Is It? analysis exercise on the back cover.

Download! Print! Read! Distribute! And if you haven't already, subscribe. It's free!

February 2011 (V1N1, 17 pgs)
Overview - Feature Overview
Overview - I&A: What Is It?
Tech Notes - The J-20's Real Impact
Current Events - The J-20 In Imagery
Air Defense - Nagorno-Karabakh
Historical Perspective - Analysis Over Time

March 2011 (V1N2, 33 pgs)
Current Events - Latakia Port Facility
Air Defense - China's Hybrid SAM Sites
Historical Perspective - OTH-SW Deployment in China
Strategic Warfare - Iranian SSM Facilities
Software - Facility Drawings in GIMP
Reading List - High-Tech Reading List

April 2011 (V1N3, 51 pgs)
Current Events - The Libyan Lesson
Air Defense - The S-300P/S-400
Air Defense - Contact Line (Masis Ingilizian)
Strategic Warfare - War of the Weird
Historical Perspective - SAM Modernization in China
Facility Analysis - The Price of Nuclear Rennaissance (Raj Kumar)
Reading List - Military Classics

May 2011 (V1N4, 23 pgs)
Current Events - Pakistan and Bin Laden
Air Defense - Armenian Air Defenses (Masis Ingilizian)
Strategic Warfare - Pakistani Nuclear Facilities (Raj Kumar)
Historical Perspective - SAM Site Analysis
Book Review - Ken Alibek's Biohazard

June 2011 (V1N5, 45 pgs)
Current Events - PRC NAVAIR Developments
Imagery Highlight - Algerian FLANKERs
Air Defense - China's Strategic SAM Network
Strategic Warfare - Soviet/Russian ABM Systems
Software Review - Google Earth
Reading List - Tools for the IMINT Analyst

July 2011 (V1N6, 26 pgs)
Current Events - Iranian Silos "Unveiled"
Imagery Highlight - Shenyang
Facility Analysis - Karachi Port Facility (Daniel Videre)
Tech Notes - China's New AAM
Air Defense - Azerbaijan (Masis Ingilizian)
Strategic Warfare - Soviet/Russian BMEW
Tech Notes - IADS Classification

August 2011 (V1N7, 26 pgs)
Current Events - Azeri Favorit Spotted
Imagery Highlight - Zhukovskiy
IC Analysis - ODNI's New Mission (Marv Gordner)
Facility Analysis - Tabriz Silo Complex
Air Defense - Taiwan
Historical Perspective - Warsaw Pact SAM Sites
Software Review - SpaceEye

September 2011 (V1N8, 20 pgs)
Current Events - Varyag Begins Sea Trials
Tech Notes - The RVV-BD
Air Defense - PLA Airborne Surveillance (Raj Kumar)
Strategic Warfare - Assessing China's Type 094 SSBN Force

October 2011 (V1N9, 79 pgs)
Air Defense - Russia
Strategic Warfare - Space Surveillance in Russia
Strategic Warfare - Russia
Historical Perspective - Former Soviet ICBMs
Facility Analysis - Ashuluk
Facility Overview - Zhukovskiy
Reading List - Russian Aviation

November 2011 (V1N10, 21 pgs)
Current Events - Umm Aitiqah AB (Christopher Biggers)
Facility Analysis - The Playing Field (Daniel Videre)
Imagery Highlight - Vietnam's Vostok-E
Tech notes - Iran's Nahang SSC (Christopher Biggers)
Facility Analysis - Denial and Deception at Bandar-e-Abbas (Christopher Biggers)
Conflict Analysis - Deepening Tides of War (Masis Ingilizian)

December 2011 (V1N11, 68 pgs)
Strategic Warfare - The PLA's 2nd Artillery Corps
Strategic Warfare - PLA Ballistic Missile Launch Sites
Strategic Warfare - The PLAN SSBN Force
Air Defense - PLA SAM Modernization

November/December I&A, Future Plans

2011-11-15T15:30:00.000-05:00

The November I&A has begun to filter out to subscribers. Expect to find it in your inbox today or tomorrow.

The December I&A will feature numerous topics related to the PLA, similar to what was seen in October for Russia. Topics being worked on so far incldue the following:

-The PLA's 2nd Artillery
-PLA Ballistic Missile Launch Sites
-The PLAN's SSBN Force
-Current Chinese SAM Developments
-Iranian Ghadir SSC Production

Once the December issue goes out to subscribers, I will make the 11 issues completed to date available for download here, along with the KML files distributed with each issue. I'll also post a list of the complete contents of each issue.

Worldwide SAM Site Overview

2011-11-10T13:11:00.000-05:00

Click here to download

Current as of: 10 November 2011 (6827 locations, +77)

Asia

China: 3 EW, 96L6E, historic HQ-6D sites added
Turkmenistan: EW site added
Vietnam: inactive S-300P site added

Europe

Cyprus: 2 OTH sites added
Czech Republic: 6 EW sites added
Denmark: 2 inactive Nike radar sites added
Germany: 4 Patriot, inactive Patriot site, 7 Patriot garrisons added
Hungary: 16 EW, 2 inactive SA-2 sites added
Macedonia: EW site added
Romania: 3 EW sites added
Russia: 3 EW, 4 36D6, S-300PS, S-300PM, 2 inactive SA-2, 2 inactive S-300P sites added
Serbia: inactive SA-2 site, 2 SA-6 garrisons added
Slovakia: 2 EW sites added
Switzerland: 3 EW sites added

Middle East

Iran: HQ-2, SA-6, SA-15 sites added
Iraq: EW, 3 historical SA-3 sites added
Israel: Patriot site added
UAE: EW, 5 Skyguard SHORAD sites added

North America

Cuba: SA-3 site added

-Various site status changes incorporated

This reference work contains the locations of SAM sites and related air defense facilities identified in open source imagery, presented as a collection of Google eEarth placemarks. The downloadable file found above contains four separate folders: SAMs by country, SHORAD SAMs, Historical Sites, and Target Range SAMs. There is a fifth folder, Range Rings, which may be downloaded here: Range Rings. This is a link to where the file is hosted, right-clicking and selecting "Save As" might not work.

SAMs by country: This folder is at first organized identically to the Range Rings folder. Each geographic area features a folder populated by subfolders for each nation. A nation's subfolder will contain up to four folders of its own, depending on the types of systems or facilities identified therein: Active (containing subfolders for each active SAM system), Inactive (containing all inactive sites), Facilities (containing EW radar sites, SAM garrisons, and other related facilities), and Low resolution (containing SAM sites and known support facilities not visible in high resolution). Clicking on the folder name for a continent or a nation will cause a pop-up window to appear displaying the inventories of that continent or nation. Different icons denote different types of facilities. These are as follows:

Squares: facilities such as garrisons, test and training centers
Diamonds: EW radar sites
Circles: 36D6 and 64N6 radar sites, or other fire control radar sites associated with a non co-located SAM battery, such as Tien Kung LPARs or NIKE-HERCULES fire control sites.
Triangles: SAM sites

The icons in the SAMs by country folder as well as the representative range rings are color coded as follows:

Dark red: SA-2 and HQ-2
Bright red: S-300P series, PATRIOT, Tien Kung series, NIKE-HERCULES, Arrow II, 64N6 radars
Dark blue: EW radar, to include 36D6 radars
Faded blue: 55Zh6 radars
Bright blue: SA-3, Pechora-2M, HQ-7
Bright green: SA-6
Faded green: SA-4, SA-11
Lime green: HQ-12
Orange: HAWK, HQ-9, S-300V
Yellow: HQ-6D
Purple: SA-5
White: an unoccupied location
Brown: a general facility or garrison

An active S-300PS site will therefore display as a red triangle. An S-300P garrison will display as a red square, denoting the facility's affiliation. The placemark names are hidden for clarity, but will display when an individual site is clicked on in Google Earth, along with the identified components at each site and any other significant details. By manipulating the individual folders for each nation and employing the color scheme above, users should find this to be a useful visual representation of the available data.

SHORAD SAMs: This folder is populated with subfolders arranged similarly to the SAMs by country folder. This folder contains placemarks identifying various SHORAD SAM emplacements that have been identified, such as Rapier and Crotale positions. Range rings are not provided, given the short ranges involved.

Historical Sites: This folder is populated with subfolders arranged similarly to the Range Rings and SAMs by country folder. The intent is to separate SAM site locations pertaining to systems which are no longer in active service in respective nations from the main database. For example, two folders are present containing placemarks for the inner and outer SA-1 SAM locations surrounding Moscow. SA-1 sites containing other systems such as SA-10 or SA-20 batteries will remain marked as to their current occupant within the main portion of the database.

Target Range SAMs: This folder contains subfolders arranged by country. Each folder contains the locations of SAM-site configured targets on bombing and electronic combat ranges. Many of these sites employ emitters or actual hardware to simulate a given system.

Range Rings: This folder contains representative range rings generated for all SAM sites which are currently active. The folder is divided into various subfolders. First, there is a subfolder for each geographic area. This folder is divided into subfolders, one for each country in that area featuring identified SAM systems. Each country folder will contain various subfolders for each type of active SAM system or identifiable EW radar system. These folders contain the color-coded range rings. The range rings are color coded using the same system described in the next section. The ranges were taken from Jane's Land-based Air Defence and other industry-affiliated publications. System modifications such as the Pechora-2M, which increases the SA-3's range to 35km, have not been taken into account as these systems cannot be identified as of yet in Google Earth imagery. Also, ranges for the SA-2 and SA-5 are representative of either the system's maximum ranged variant (SA-5: 300 km), or the most common variant (SA-2: 43 km). A subfolder is also included where necessary containing range rings for low-resolution sites believed to be active.

Key Contributors

Various individuals have provided SAM site locations for inclusion into this database, and their help is greatly appreciated. These individuals include Lex2 and ChristianNL from the Google Earth Community, Hpasp, RoAF, p_shadow, and Planeman from the IMINT & Analysis forums, Tim Brewer, and all the readers who have posted site locations in the comments to this article.

Additional Discussion

Feel free to discuss the content of this file at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the SAM Site Overview discussion thread found here.

Past Updates

Information regarding previous updates to this database has been archived in the comments page attached to this post.

I&A November Update

2011-11-02T23:21:00.000-04:00

With the tehnical problems involving the distribution of October's issue in the past, I'm already putting together the November issue. The November issue is going to be largely contributor-driven, thanks to a large number of submissions waiting in the wings for Red October to get out of the way!

Topics being prepared by contributors are as follows:

Current Events: Umm Aitiqah AB, Libya (the lack of airstrikes)
Facility Analysis: SLOCs in the South China Sea
Tech Notes: Iran's Nahang SSC
Conflict Analysis (a new area): Nagorno-Karabakh
Facility Analysis: Denial and Deception at Bandar-e-Abbas

I may or may not insert the obligatory air-defense related piece. Right now, the issue doesn't seem to need it, but if I get a good idea there may be one stuck in there by the time the issue is released.

At any rate, November is looking very good so far! I'm very pleased with the work the contributors are doing to date, and I hope to see more from them in the future.

Oh, and sometime later this week, I'll update the SAM Site Overview file again.

October's I&A

2011-10-28T09:45:00.001-04:00

...has finally begun distribution. I ran into a few delays related to underestimating how long it would take to create the graphics, and real-life things to deal with (namely, the things I actually get paid for!).

November's I&A is shaping up nicely, with a host of contributor pieces and a few other interesting features. The good news is that lots of contributor features means that I can get started early on the centerpiece of December's I&A, a look at the PLA's 2nd Artillery.

EDIT: Yes, I know the link is broken. This is a problem with Google Documents, and apparently a common one following their "upgrade". However, I have defeated Google and figured out how to fix this. Everyone who got the link today will get the corrected version tomorrow, with the remaining subscribers getting the link on Sunday. Now, do I add "computer programmer" to my resume, or do I call it something else?

September's I&A

2011-09-15T23:07:00.002-04:00

September's I&A has begun to go out to subscribers. If you did not get it in today's mailing, you will get it in tomorrow's. Remember to check your spam folder if you don't see it right away!

And what's this? I actually got one out on the 15th? Everyone head to your respective basements, as the end of the world is surely upon us!

I&A September Update, Other Notes

2011-09-13T10:46:00.000-04:00

I&A's September issue has seen a few content changes to accomodate some things I've had going on around here, and is still on schedule to go out by the end of this week.

Here are the current topics being finalized:

-Current Events: The ex-Varyag goes to sea (and the implications thereof)
-Air Defense: China's Airborne Surveillance Platforms (a contributor piece, you'll get a charge out of this one!)
-Tech Notes: The RVV-BD (Russia's new BVR AAM, complete with fun graphics)
-Historical Perspective: China's Type 094 Force (assessing the force strength)

The October issue is still going to be Russian-centric. It will feature an air defense overview (including space surveillance and the fighter force), a nuclear forces overview (including bombers and SSBNs), facility analyses of Sary Shagan and Zhukovskiy (moved from September), and a historical look at former ICBM sites. The first two articles are already in progress, and will not be small!

In other news, expect a SAM Site Overview update to be posted later this week. Over 80 new sites have been incorporated, making this the largest update of the year by far.

Lastly, I am getting repeat requests for I&A subscriptions. If you think you've already subscribed, make sure you are checking your spam folder when I announce that the issue has gone out. Your e-mail provider might think I&A is spam since it is a mass e-mailing. Rest assured I add everyone who subscribes, so the problem shouldn't (in theory) be at my end.

I&A August Update, Notes

2011-08-18T00:20:00.000-04:00

I&A's August issue just began distribution. If you didn't get it today, you'll get it tomorrow. Topics include Taiwan's SAM network, an analysis of the Tabriz S Silo Complex, and a new contributor piece by Lt. Col. (Ret.) Marv Gordner on intelligence integration.

A few other relevant notes:

1. Please stop asking for back issues when you subscribe! I don't have the time to process every single request, and you'll soon discover that when you get each month's subscription info, you get links to all of the back issues as well.

2. That being said, if you have a legitimate request for information, such as for doctoral or professional work, send me a separate e-mail outlining your request and I'll be happy to assist. I'm just trying to avoid a hundred people all asking for the back issues each month, when you're going to get them all anyway!

3. September topics: I haven't sorted out most of the content areas yet, but there will be a facility analysis of Zhukovskiy, and a software review piece on FalconView.

I&A: Subscribing & Contents So Far

2011-07-24T21:32:00.000-04:00

It seems that the subscription info for I&A manages to be one of the most-requested items around here, so here it is again for those interested:

-Send an email to imintandanalysisATgmail.com with Subscribe PDF in the subject line.

That's it!

Every month you get a link to download the current PDF file through Google Documents, with additional links to download all of the previous issues for those who weren't among the initial group of subscribers.

Here's an overview of the major features published in the last six months, broken down by content area:

Air Defense
-Armenia
-Azerbaijan
-China's Hybrid SAM Sites
-China's Strategic SAM Network
-Contact Line: Armenia/Azerbaijan
-Nagorno Karabakh
-The S-300P/S-400

Current Events
-Iranian Silos "Unveiled"
-The J-20 in Imagery
-Latakia Port Facility
-The Libyan Lesson
-Pakistan and Bin Laden
-PRC NAVAIR Developments

Facility Analysis
-Fukushima
-Karachi Port Facility

Historical Perspective
-Analysis Over Time
-OTH-SW Deployment in China
-SAM Modernization in China
-SAM Site Analysis

Software
-Facility Drawings in GIMP
-Google Earth

Strategic Warfare
-Iranian SSM Facilities
-Pakistani Nuclear Facilities
-Soviet/Russian ABM Systems
-Soviet/Russian BMEW
-War of the Weird

Tech Notes
-China's New AAM
-IADS Classification
-The J-20's Real Impact

I&A's Six Month Review

2011-07-23T22:35:00.000-04:00

It occurs to me that I&A has now existed as a PDF version for about six months! With that in mind, I set my brain to work and I came to a few decisions about some of the PDF topics earlier today.

First off, the August air defense feature will cover Taiwan's SAM network. This will be an updated and expanded version of what I did here a while back. I've got a few updates and new site locations, and will rehash the old information to expand it and clarify a few things.

Additionally, future nationwide air defense topics may or may not showcase an individual nation. There are some clusters of nations where SAM sites are few and far between, predominantly in Africa. I plan to do a lot of them at once in a large feature. Or, they may all technically be listed separately, but I'll do a bunch at once for a given issue.

I'm still looking for additional content areas. Air Defense, Strategic Warfare, Facility Analysis...all are great focus areas, but I can always use more. That'll enable me to broaden the scope of each issue. So, if you have any ideas, let me know. Or better yet, write one and send it in!

This brings me to my next point: contributors. I'm extremely grateful for the effort put forth by I&A's current contributors, and hope they will continue to sumbit articles in the future. That being said, I'm certainly open to incorporating new authors into the system. Articles don't even need to have an imagery theme; the current issue has an article describing the PLAAF's new BVR AAM, for example. As long as it relates to either a military theme, or an application of imagery technology or analysis, it's more than welcome. You can even take a stab at the Links or Reading List content areas if you wish. So, if you have any ideas, contact me and we'll get talking.

As it stands now, the PDF has survived the first six months, and speaking for myself I'm definitely pleased with the results. My only two major gripes at this juncture are that 1) I could really use a bit more graphic design brainpower to, I don't know, give it a decent cover (and maybe an official I&A logo?), and 2) I need to try and make things more consistent in terms of length. Adding more features or additional topics in a given content area like Facility Analysis will help that, and I'm working on it. I'm also working on number 1, but don't hold your breath on seeing results anytime soon. Frankly you guys are lucky I can generate profile views of weapon systems, actual serious graphic design is another beast altogether!

That about sums everything up. Hopefully you're as pleased with everything as I am to this point. And if you aren't, drop me a line. As I mention in each issue, comments are always welcome and encouraged!

Oh, you may have noticed that the SAM Site Overview actually got updated yesterday...don't worry, it's still an active project and will always remain so. It's just that fewer and fewer new sites are being found, making it less important to update it every month when only, say, ten new EW sites have been ID'ed.

July/August PDF updates

2011-07-20T23:04:00.000-04:00

The July I&A PDF is being finalized right now and will begin distribution tomorrow afternoon. I'm basically working through the issue adding placemarks to the supplementary KMZ file right now.

August topics in the works so far are as follows:

-Facility Analysis: the Tabriz silo complex (far more detailed than what was presented in March)
-Software Review: SpaceEye
-Historical Perspective: Former Warsaw Pact nation SAM Sites
-Air Defense: Taiwan, maybe? The DPRK? Any other ideas?

More will be added as the process continues, but apart from the Tabriz piece and maybe the AD piece don't expect a gigantic amount of content. The idea is to actually get back on the "release these around the 15th of the month" schedule.

I'm also planning ahead for October, which I've decided will be a Russian-themed issue. That one will have a Facility Analysis of Sary Shagan, the Russian SAM Network, and the RVSN all in one gigantoid issue. I will probably keep the Russian SAM Network in October, updating it each year, with a different significant Facility Analysis.

Iranian Silos Unveiled

2011-06-28T21:28:00.000-04:00

So Iran is conducting another wargame, Great Prophet 6. No big deal, everybody does it. Apart from the military and political benefits, they present fun opportunities for politicians and military officials to make bold, asinine, and non-credible statements to the press. Plus, you often get nice videos showing things like missile firings.

Speaking of videos and Iranian exercises, here's a link to a Youtube video purportedly showing some of the Great Prophet 6 exercise footage:

Youtube

Pay attention to what shows up at the 15 second mark: that'd be the inside of an apparent Iranian missile silo. Iran claims that the silos are automated, allowing remote firing of the weapons.

For amusement, let's quote Lebanon's Daily Star:

"An officer in Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guard, which is in charge of the missile program, said Tehran has constructed “numerous” underground missile silos which satellites can’t detect."

Except, you know, for the ones near Tabriz.

Another Lebanese source, Al-Manar, claims that the silos were used on the 27th.

What does all of this mean? First off, it means that Iranian silo-based missiles should certainly be considered an operational element in the ballistic missile force. Additionally, it raises a few questions about Iranian silo-building capabilities. Why did it take this long for the capability to be revealed? Were there issues with the communication and control system? Will this prevent a more widespread deployment of silo-based weapons? Or was Iran merely taking its time to work everything out, prior to initiating a large-scale silo-based deployment system?

Whatever the answers, perhaps Iranian silo-based deployment concepts, including coffin-launched systems elsewhere in the nation, will now get more attention. Look for more on this to appear here in the future.

June I&A PDF Update (again...)

2011-06-23T14:49:00.000-04:00

All:

The June PDF is now being distributed. Depending on where you are on the list, you'll get it today or tomorrow. The delay was caused by an error in the PDF conversion process, requiring me to go back and recreate some of the graphics.

I&A June Update, July topics

2011-06-16T18:35:00.000-04:00

I&A's June issue is being finalized today and tomorrow and should begin to be distributed on Saturday.

July topics are shaping up as follows:
Air Defense: Azerbaijan
Facility Analysis: The PN port in Karachi
Tech Notes: A new IADS classification methodology

More content will be incorporated into the July issue as soon as I decide what to include.

New I&A Features?

2011-05-27T14:10:00.000-04:00

I&A subscribers: the April issue of I&A was pretty big. The May issue, not so much. The June issue is going to be bigger than the April issue, potentially by a significant margin, thanks to both the Soviet/Russian ABM feature and the Chinese Strategic SAM Network feature.

I'd be interested to hear any ideas for new feature types. Not specific topics (although those are also always welcome), but different feature types like Historical Perspective or Current Events.

My goal is to bring in a few new feature types to help flesh things out a bit and keep the issues "fuller". I don't want to type just for the sake of meeting a pagecount, or half-ass something to have something published. And yeah, some topics are just by nature going to be huge, like the two mentioned above, or the S-300P/S-400 feature from April. But some new features would be a nice set of additions to keep things a bit more interesting and help offset the times when the content just isn't going to be that huge.

One idea I will be debuting this month is basically similar to the old Image of the Week. My tentative title is Imagery Highlight. The idea is to focus on one specific image (maybe two if a comparison is in order), with a small bit of text describing the significance of what you see.

Any other ideas?

I&A May Update and June Topics

2011-05-17T14:49:00.000-04:00

I&A's May PDF is being finalized and will begin to be distributed on Wednesday. The text is complete, right now I'm annotating and inserting imagery. There's been one change: the Soviet/Russian ABM piece has been pushed back to the June issue. I was basically faced with the choices of rushing it and not really doing anything substantial, or pushing it back to allow it to be fully developed. Fortunately one of I&A's contributors submitted an article on Armenian air defenses to replace the ABM piece, so the overall content of the May issue will not suffer.

The June issue is shaping up nicely (and will be released on time and on target around the 15th of June) and should feature the following topics:

Current Events: Chinese Naval Air Power developments
Air Defense: China's Strategic SAM Network
Strategic Warfare: Soviet/Russian ABM Systems
Historical Perspective: undecided for now
Software Review: Google Earth
Reading List: Resources for the IMINT Analyst
And the usual extra bits.

Some of you might ask why I'm doing a software review of Google Earth, a program that should at this point be well known to everyone. The reason for doing Google Earth first is to establish a baseline for comparison. In the future I'll start reviewing and examining some other programs and tools, and being able to compare them to Google Earth will make their usefulness and unique features far more apparent. Plus, evaluating a well-known program first will allow me to focus more on the format and content of the Software Analysis piece, making future entries that much easier to generate.

I&A May 2011

2011-05-07T14:54:00.000-04:00

The May I&A PDF may be a week late due to the fact that it's the end of the semester here. I've been giving exams and am now due to work on submitting final grades and whatnot. Add to that the fact that I've had exams of my own, and it's been a bit busy! That being said, I'll do my best to get everything done on time, and this won't affect the release of the June PDF.

Here are the current topics for the May PDF:

-Current Events: seriously, do you need to ask?
-Air Defense: Russian ABM systems (prepare for this one to be large, it's covering current and historical systems, deployment, performance, etc)
-Strategic Warfare: Pakistani Nuclear Facilities (contributor feature)
-Historical Analysis: SAM Site Analysis
-Book Review: Biohazard
-May 2011 Links, Source List, and What Is It?
-May 2011 PDF

I&A April 2011

2011-04-16T22:19:00.000-04:00

The April PDF is in the process of being distributed. I have now found a whole new problem: GMail limits the number of messages I can send in a 24 hour period. So, about half of the subscribers got it today, and about half of you will have to wait until tomorrow. Next month I will try and figure out how to do this using YET ANOTHER method, to get around GMail's rule. Someone suggested Google Groups as an option, that may work but may be a bit irritating to have to deal with multiple Google whatsits just to send out a web link. If you've got any ideas, let me know. I can't simply host the PDF file here or release it for open download through Google Docs as it'd evaporate my bandwidth limit in about 0.2 seconds.

Anyway, here's what the April issue ended up containing:

-Current Events: The Libyan Lesson
-Air Defense: The S-300P/S-400
-Air Defense: Contact Line (Contributor Feature)
-Strategic Warfare: War of the Weird
-Historical Analysis: SAM Modernization in China
-Facility Analysis: Fukushima (Contributor Feature)
-Reading List: Military Classics
-April 2011 Links, Source List, and What Is It?
-April 2011 KML file

All for now. Back to trying to figure out GMail.

The Falcon Missile

2011-04-04T20:23:00.000-04:00

A while ago I mentioned that I was working on a history of the Hughes Falcon missile family. Well, after about a decade or so of (gradual) research and writing, I now have a finished product.

Anyone interested in this facet of Cold War history can download the PDF file here: click

April I&A PDF Update

2011-04-02T20:04:00.000-04:00

Just a brief update regarding the April I&A PDF. The S-300P feature looks to be longer than the March issue all by itself! As for Current Events, I decided to actually look at Libya, but from a different perspective. The Current Events feature will focus on the need for nations like Syria and Iran to upgrade their IADS after witnessing how easily the UN forces took down Libya's network.

Furthermore, I&A will feature its first two contributor-authored pieces in April. These will consist of a current look at Nagorno-Karabakh in light of some recent political developments, and an analysis ofthe damage to the Fukushima reactor complex in Japan. Hopefully these will be the first of many contributor-authored pieces!

Media amusement

2011-03-24T10:06:00.000-04:00

According to US Army (R) Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who was just spotted on FOXNews while flipping through the channels on the TV, TLAM is a term meant to describe "putting iron on target". Seriously? He just described TLAMs and Tomahawks being used "to strike 20 targets" in Libya. For those of you who aren't familiar with the term, TLAM is Tomahawk Land Attack Missile. Translation: it's a Tomahawk used to target ground targets, as opposed to the UGM-109B TASM, or Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile. It's not a big deal, but I did find it funny. Maybe next time it'd be a good idea to ask someone more likely to have a clue what they're talking about to deal with current operations. What a terrorism expert can offer about direct action between nation states is beyond me, and in this case it was very little. The best part is that not five minutes later a reporter accurately referred to TLAM Tomahawks!

So, the lesson for today is to take whatever you hear from an "expert" with a grain of salt. I'm not removing myself from that category either; if you found me describing something outside my own fields of study, I'd expect to be treated the same way.

Other Updates

2011-03-21T23:43:00.000-04:00

Here's a few other relevant updates:

1. For the time being, Libyan SAM systems will remain in the SAM Site Overview file. Yes, most of them have probably been obliterated by now. But, my policy has always been to base the file on available overhead imagery, not speculation. As newer post-strike imagery filters into Google Earth, Terra Server, and other online sources, I'll adjust the sites in the file accordingly. Given Google's quick release of GeoEye imagery relating to the crisis in Japan, that may happen sooner rather than later.

2. Here are the forthcoming topics for the April issue of the I&A PDF:

Current Events: undecided at this point. Will not deal with Libya as the issue has been dealt with extensively here, and frankly it won't be truly current by the mid-April release date anymore.
Air Defense: The S-300P/S-400 This is an expanded, updated version of this feature.
Historical Perspective: SAM Modernization in China A chronological look at the modernization of China's SAM network as newer systems became available through import or native development.
Strategic Warfare: War of the Weird Presenting a look at two thoroughly different development paths intended to field a survivable cruise missile during the latter stages of the Cold War. This will compare and contrast the US SENIOR PROM and the USSR's Meteorit.
Reading List: Military Classics Self-explanatory, really. I'll be providing an overview of selected military classics such as Clausewitz's On War, Guderian's Achtung! Panzer, and others.

The obligatory Links, Sources, and What Is It? features will also appear. If you wish to subscribe:

-Send an e-mail to imintandanalysis AT gmail.com
-Enter Subscribe PDF in the subject line
-Non-US readers may subscribe, but bear in mind that the product will be produced in the English language.

3. What's missing from the last time I posted subsription info? US .gov and .mil e-mail addresses may now subscribe to the service. In order to do this, enter Subscribe PDF MIL in the subject line of your e-mail. I'm going to try this out by keeping a separate mailing list. One of the reasons these addresses were initially "banned" was because I used to have one! Often e-mail links were deleted and certain websites could not be acessed, potentially preventing a subscriber from a) receiving the download link or b) accessing the download site. By keeping them separate, I can try this out and then manage a separate distribution system should it be required (currently Google Documents is used, and I have no clue if a .gov or .mil user would be able to access the site). Plus, by doing this now, the major influx of initial subscriber e-mails has already been processed, saving me the trouble of having to sift through hundreds of e-mails.

Lastly, welcome to all of the new readers here. As various media outlets and websites linked to the Libyan analysis pieces, site traffic has exploded over the last four days, resulting in a month's worth of traffic since Friday. Even more amusing is the #1 search result for Libyan NFZ in Google!

Libyan Update

2011-03-21T22:58:00.000-04:00

Following the initial cruise missile strikes on 19 March, the Pentagon released a document illustrating the general areas where targets were attacked. As expected for an attack on Libyan IADS architecture, the strike locations corresponded to regions with deployed EW assets and S-75, S-125, and S-200 missile batteries.

The graphic below illustrates the post-strike state of the Libyan IADS, presuming that all SAM systems were disabled in regions targeted by cruise missile strikes.

While the Qaddafi regime is no longer assessed to control operational strategic SAM batteries in the NFZ region, numerous EW facilities still remain. These facilities allow the regime to maintain a degree of situational awareness, provided they are not under constant electronic attack. Furthermore, no effort was made to strike S-75 or S-125 batteries deep inland. Sabha is still defended by an S-75 and S-125 battery, and contains a garrison facility which could be used to reconstitute SAM units damaged or destroyed in the March 19th attacks.

If the coalition is unwilling to strike targets outside the established NFZ, the Qaddafi regime may be able to transport SAM components to its periphery. This would theoretically enable targets operating in the southern portions of the NFZ to be engaged, creating an interesting scenario where the coalition would have to either restrict flight in sections of the NFZ or attack targets outside of the NFZ to maintain its integrity. Such a course of action could potentially see increased protest from nations such as China and India, bringing into question the continued value and effectiveness of the NFZ as a whole. Also, Western nations attacking targets outside of the NFZ could result in a significant loss of support from the Arab League.

If there is a lesson to be learned from the March 19th decapitation strikes on Qaddafi's IADS, it is that nations relying on Soviet-era SAM systems no longer pose a significant threat to a modern, well-equipped military arm. While current-generation Russian-made SAM systems rank among the most sophisticated and capable in the world, the era in which nations could rely on elderly Soviet-era systems such as the S-75 or S-200 to provide a credible degree of air defense capability has decisively ended. Claims by the Pentagon that Libya possessed a high-threat IADS network were technologically unfounded, in much the same way that the same claims made about iraq in 1991 were also proven to be extreme exaggerations.

Libya Update; Graphing

2011-03-20T00:14:00.001-04:00

As we are all aware by now, UN-backed military action is being taken against Libya. As predicted earlier, the opening salvo consisted primarily of cruise missile strikes against the air defense network, opening the door for allied aircraft to operate over Libya in a lower threat environment.

In an amusing development, here's CNN's John King saying pretty much the exact same thing I did once he gets around to talking about the air defenses: VIDEO Readers have already noted that the range rings and color schemes used to identify Libyan SAM sites are the same ones I used in the SAM Site Overview! It appears that my SAM Site Overview file is now a CNN media source, they even used the native system designators that I do rather than the more common Westernised names usually found in the Western press and media when dealing with Soviet-era systems. My attempts to control the world are clearly moving ahead as planned. Seriously, if anyone else notices something like this, let me know. I do track stuff like this, in part to make my resume more amusing and in part because it adds credibility when I am asked to provide organizations with information.

In an unrelated note, who knows of a good graphing program? I want to make a graph showing SAM system engagement envelopes similar to the HQ-2 graph done here that I used a while back:

What I want to do (ignoring the text bits) is show the engagement zone as an area graph, but be able to overlay multiple zones on top of each other. Picture the blue part of the above HQ-2 zone overlaid on top of a different colored HQ-9 zone, for instance, showing the disparity in capabilities. Using a graphing or charting application will allow me to do this in much less time than having to draw the entire thing manually, which is what I did for the HQ-2 graph. Either MS Excel is not cooperating, or I have no clue what I'm doing. Either one is possible. So if you have an idea of a program that I can use to graph areas like that, with set minimum and mazimum values in the X (range) and Y (altitude) axes, let me know. Just don't bring up gnuplot; I tried that one and it made my programming-illiterate brain hurt.

Libyan NFZ: The SAM Threat

2011-03-19T02:37:00.000-04:00

LIBYAN SAM THREAT TO UN OPERATIONS

On 17 March 2011 the UNSC voted to enforce a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Libya, in response to the conflict between Qaddafi's regime and separatist forces. The Libyan military operates numerous Soviet-era strategic SAM systems which represent the most likely threat to allied aircraft enforcing the NFZ. Libyan SAM systems include the S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON). Numerous AAA, MANPADS', and tactical SAM systems are also operated, but represent a considerably reduced threat given their limited effectiveness above 20,000 feet.

LIBYAN SAM DEPLOYMENT

The graphic presented below illustrates the pre-conflict state of Libyan strategic air defenses. Major military airfields, active EW radar sites, and operational strategic SAM coverage zones are marked. It should be noted that the graphics presented here depict identified dedicated EW facilities. Many SAM batteries possess their own organic EW elements; simply targeting the known EW facilities does not necessarily prevent the SAM force from receiving the target track data necessary to prosecute an engagement.

The majority of contested territory is along the northern coastline of Libya, shown in the graphic below. This is advantageous to any allied aircraft entering the theater of operations, as they do not have to travel deep into Libya to enforce the NFZ in support of separatist forces. Furthermore, ISR and support aircraft can be operated offshore under the protection of CAPs and naval air defense systems.

Separatist forces are concentrated along the eastern coastline of the nation from Benghazi to Tobruk and the Egyptian border. As the air defense forces in these regions are likely no longer under Qaddafi's control, the graphic below indicates the likely pro-Qaddafi SAM threat picture facing NFZ operations.

Numerous SAM garrisons and unoccupied, prepared strategic SAM sites present an opportunity for pro-Qaddafi forces to reinforce their positions prior to the start of NFZ operations. Reinforcing the strategic SAM network in this fashion will present an increased SAM threat to allied aircraft and offer increased overlapping coverage zones around key military installations. A potential reinforced pro-Qaddafi SAM network is illustrated in the graphic below.

The majority of the command and control facilities for the pro-Qaddafi regime, as well as the seat of power, are consolidated in and around the capital of Tripoli. The following two graphics depict the current operational SAM network around Tripoli, as well as a potentially reinforced network employing currently inactive positions.

ENFORCING THE NFZ

The true nature of the SAM threat to NFZ operations will become apparent when operations commence. Should allied forces choose to enforce the NFZ over the entire region, it is likely that SEAD or DEAD operations will commence against the bulk of identified pro-Qaddafi SAM sites. However, should NFZ enforcement be limited initially to protecting separatist-controlled areas in the eastern portion of the nation, it is possible that few of the pro-Qaddafi SAM sites would be targeted as they would be unable to engage allied aircraft.

The exception to the latter scenario is the S-200. The S-200 enjoys a 250 km range against cooperative targets such as ISR and support aircraft. Given that allied aircraft will likely be based out of European territories or operate from USN CVNs, heavy use of inflight refueling should be expected. Eliminating pro-Qaddafi S-200 batteries would enable allied ISR and support aircraft to operate much closer to the Libyan coastline.

Should allied forces choose to enforce the NFZ over the entire nation and consequently engage active S-75 and S-125 SAM batteries, the capability of the pro-Qaddafi SAM network could be significantly degraded with a relatively small number of sorties. The Libyan SAM inventory is constrained by the reliance on Soviet-era systems. The S-75, S-125, and S-200 are limited by the fact that each engagement radar can only prosecute a single target. S-200 batteries are often bolstered by multiple 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars to allow the battery to engage multiple targets, but the single-target limitation significantly reduces the effectiveness of the network as a whole. Furthermore, over-reliance on aging technology places the network at significant risk for electronic warfare interference. The US military, for example, has faced the S-75 and S-125 over Iraq and the former Yugoslavia and is well-versed on countertactics and electronic attack procedures to mitigate the threat posed by such systems. While measures may have been taken to allow the S-75 and S-125 to remain viable in Libyan service, at this point they do not present significant risks to a modern military force. That is not to suggest that they present no risk whatsoever, but rather that they are no longer considered to be high-threat systems based on their age and known technical performance.

Aerial attacks against separatist positions appear to have been curtailed in favor of ground assault and artillery bombardment. In this light, the provision of the NFZ calling for protection of civillian under threat from pro-Qaddafi forces could allow operations over regime-controlled areas. A potential military campaign could begin with strikes against SAM positions and EW facilities, followed by strikes against pro-Qaddafi forces threatening or engaged with separatist forces, particularly those near Benghazi. Given the limited number of SAM sites located in territory held by the Qaddafi regime, it is likely that the capability of the strategic SAM network to prosecute targets could be significantly curtailed within 24 hours. Cruise missiles could be employed to strike identified SAM sites, forgoing the expense of a significant SEAD or DEAD operation and allowing combat aircraft to be tasked to protect separatist forces.

CONCLUSION

With the decision to enact a NFZ over Libya, the strategic SAM network represents the most significant threat to allied aircraft tasked with its enforcement. However, due to the single-target engagement capability of Libyan S-75 and S-125 batteries, the network is far less capable than it appears at first glance. Libya negotiated for the purchase of S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE) advanced SAM systems from Russia in 2010 but at this date no sale has been completed and no deliveries have been reported. Had Libya moved to upgrade its air defense network in recent years, the issue of allied aircraft enforcing a NFZ could have become a far more complicated task. Once again, a nation relying on an aged air defense network will potentially be at risk in large part because it failed to upgrade its capability. As an interesting footnote, it will be important to monitor Iran following the cessation of action against Qaddafi's regime. Perhaps the destruction of yet another aging air defense network will be the final catalyst pushing Iran to modernize it's own defenses.

SOURCES

Positional information derived from Google Earth. Range data used to create engagement zones sourced from Jane's Land-Based Air Defence. Graphics created using GIMP 2.0.

Libyan No-Fly Zone

2011-03-18T01:48:00.000-04:00

Apparently, I seem to have once again been useful. Back in 2010, I wrote about Libya's SAM Network. Over the past week or so media outlets all over the world have picked it up as a source regarding the then-potential UN No-FLy Zone. One reader even noticed it mentioned live on the air on Al Jazeera. In light of the fact that there aren't any other significant references out there yet, I'm working on something which will be posted here later Friday (much later, it's almost 2AM right now...expecting to see something in two hours will result in disappointment) dealing with the potential impact of Libya's SAM systems on a NFZ.

This is taking a little bit longer as I am generating all of my own amusing images for this one from scratch. As a preview, here's an example:

Check back later on today (maybe late tonight/early Saturday, I teach Friday evenings) to see what I can come up with.

Type 094 in PLAN NSF

2011-03-17T18:51:00.001-04:00

TYPE 094 OPERATIONAL IN NSF

A recent Google Earth imagery update indicates that the Chinese Type 094 SSBN may have reached operational service with the North Sea Fleet of the PLAN. The imagery, captured in August of 2010, decpicts a Type 094 SSBN dockside at Jianggezhuang Submarine Base near Qingdao. Previously, the sole operational Type 094 hull was reportedly based at a submarine facility on Hainan Island with the PLAN's South Sea Fleet.

At least three Type 094 hulls have been constructed, with one based at Hainan and two others remaining pierside at Huludao in imagery dated March of 2010. A Type 094 SSBN has been sighted in imagery at Xiaopingdao SLBM test facility as recently as April of 2009, likely in conjunction with JL-2 SLBM trials.

The presence of a Type 094 hull at Jianggezhuang rather than Xiaopingdao indicates that the hull is operational with the North Sea Fleet. The bulk of China's nuclear submarine force, including the sole Type 092 SSBN, resides at Jianggezhuang. The Type 092 was recently noted in imagery to be undergoing refit or repair using the installation's drydock, occupying the drydock between 2005 and 2007.

SOURCE

-Imagery courtesy of Google Earth

I&A March 2011

2011-03-15T02:11:00.001-04:00

The March 2011 issue of the I&A PDF has now been released to subscribers. Following on the request of numerous people joining the mailing list following the release of the first issue, both issues are available for download. The previous issues will always be available for download each month, until the new calendar year when Volume 2 begins. So, if you sign up late, you won't ever have to worry about missing anything! Well, until the end of the year. At that point I will compile the entire year's worth of issues into a separate volume and release it to the global community rather than the subscribers.

Here are the features found in the March issue:

-Current Events: The Latakia Port Facility
-Air Defense: China's Hybrid SAM Sites
-Historical Perspective: OTH-SW Deployment in China
-Strategic Warfare: Iranian SSM Facilities
-Software: Facility Drawings in GIMP
-Reading List: High-Tech Warfare
-March 2011 Links, Source List, and What Is It?

Also, a supplementary KML file is being sent with the download link to allow readers to view the locations discussed in the March issue. This will be a standard feature from now on.

Lastly, yes, I am still going to update the SAM Site Overview file. Preparing the Chinese Hybrid SAM Sites article actually led me to discover some errors that needed to be corrected, apart from the usual adding of new sites. I've got the file compiled, it will be uploaded tomorrow morning here, along with the update information. And now that I have the whole PDF thing sorted out, you'll start to see some more content here as well. My intent was never to get rid of this site entirely, just to change things up a bit!

I&A PDF Launched

2011-02-16T22:13:00.001-05:00

The first issue of the new I&A PDF monthly publication is in the process of being distributed to subscribers! Once I finish entering the latest batch of subscribers to the mailing list, everything will be finished and cleared for launch.

All the topics mentioned yesterday made it into the issue. Some are a bit longer, some are a bit shorter, but expect the content to expand in the coming months now that I've figured out a preliminary layout and method of presentation. This first example was all about getting the kinks out of the system and allowing a bit of time for the mailing list to populate, so it should be vastly improved with #2!

Brief Update

2011-02-14T22:22:00.000-05:00

Just a quick update. I've been busy preparing the first PDF edition for release, and working on a few other info requests. The contents of the first PDF edition, to be distributed within the next few days, are as follows:

-Feature Overview
-I&A, What Is It?
-Tech Notes: The J-20's Real Impact
-Current Events: The J-20 In Imagery
-Air Defense: Nagorno-Karabakh
-Historical Perspective: Analysis Over Time
-February 2011 Links
-February 2011 Sources
-February 2011 What Is It?

Beyond that, I do have an updated SAM Site Overview file to upload here as soon as the initial PDF issue has been distributed. One interesting new location is an S-300V deployment near Vladivostok in the Russian Far East.

All for now!

IMINT & Analysis via PDF

2011-01-22T03:42:00.000-05:00

IMINT & Analysis is moving to a monthly, PDF-based system. The new format will entail the monthly distribution of a PDF publication featuring numerous articles of interest. Topics covered will include:

-Latest analysis of military systems development and deployment
-Imagery-based analysis of:
--Worldwide SAM Network overviews
--Strategic Warfare Systems
--Military Facilities
--Various other topics warranting an imagery-based analysis
-Historical analysis of military systems deployment and/or development
-Updates to features previously posted online
-Links to pertinent or interesting source material online

The PDF format will enable the use of far more editing and formatting options than the limited system used online, and allow for the inclusion of more extensive analytical pieces with greater ease.

The current goal is for the premiere issue to be published in mid-February 2011, containing a representative sampling of topics leading to the first full issue's dissemination in the first week of March of 2011. Corresponding issues will be produced on a monthly basis, with mailings taking place during the first week of each month.

Individuals or organizations interested in subscribing to the IMINT & Analysis PDF format should do the following:

-Send an e-mail to imintandanalysis AT gmail.com
-Enter Subscribe PDF in the subject line
-At this time, US .gov and .mil addresses will be denied subscription to the service. Queries can be directed to the e-mail address above, but do not enter "Subscribe PDF" in the subject line to ensure a timely reply.
-Non-US readers may subscribe, but bear in mind that the product will be produced in the English language.

Individuals wishing to serve as monthly, annual, or recurring contributors are asked to send an e-mail to the address provided above with "Contributor" in the subject line to open discussions regarding the type and frequency of content. Content is not required to be in the form of imagery-based analysis provided it serves the interest of the readers, relating to a relevant military analysis issue.

E-mail addresses will not be released to any outside party, and products will be mailed to subscribers using a blind copy to preserve privacy.

Some Changes Being Made

2011-01-22T03:17:00.000-05:00

Some of you might have figured out that there hasn't been an update since last year! Well, apart from either getting stuck in weather or having to get organized to start teaching and going back to class, I've been working out a few changes around here.

First off, no SAM Site Update yet, because there's apparently been no Google Earth imagery update yet this year. Nowhere new to go snooping around, you know how it is.

Second, I'm working on moving from web publishing to PDF publishing via a subscription system. No, it won't cost anything, I know what you were thinking there. This is going to basically entail a monthly publication via PDF format, distributed using a mailing list. More to follow on this later, but basically you'll still get the standard monthly content, just in an easier to read format. The thin-style Blogger format is getting old, and I'm getting more adept with the PDF thing. This will work just like the SAM Site Overview mailing list worked a while ago when I was having download issues. Certain things will still be published here, certain things will show up in the monthly PDF file. As a result you'll notice that a lot of things are being pulled from this site to undergo updating and PDF formatting. I think the end result will be a far more polished product, one that you can more easily retain for future reference.

Third and final, I'll be uploading a text-based piece analyzing the J-20 from a rather different perspective, either today or tomorrow, whenever I get it finalized. See, I haven't just been sitting here watching you all visit the site and wondering where the updates are! I'll also upload details for the mailing list/subscription thing shortly so I can start building the address list, in anticipation of getting something out for February.

Questions or comments, post 'em in the Comments section below.

The Saudi Arabian SAM Network

2010-12-19T17:38:00.000-05:00

INTRODUCTION

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contains what is arguably some of the most valuable real estate on the face of the planet. The massive oil reserves have turned Saudi Arabia into an economic powerhouse in the late 20th Century. It should come as no suprise that a portion of the Kingdom's profits were spent on military systems to defend the Kingdom from regional aggressors.

ORGANIZATION

Encompassing a vast amount of relatively barren territory pockmarked by population centers primarily situated along the coastlines, Saudi Arabia employs a point-defense oriented SAM network. The bulk of Saudi Arabia's defensive assets have come from the United States and the United Kingdom via a series of multi-billion dollar weapons contracts.

Air defense assets are controlled by the Royal Saudi Air Defense forces. This service branch was separated from the Saudi Army in 1981, and is headquartered in the capital of Riyadh. The air defense forces operate the EW facilities and strategic SAM systems.

EW NETWORK

Twenty nine EW sites have been identified in Saudi Arabia, four of which were inactive in the most recently available imagery. The primary EW radars are the AN-TPS-43, AN-TPS-63, and AN/TPS-77, most of which were delivered in the 1980s. EW sites are situated along the border of the nation, with multiple sites providing additional coverage of the nation's interior. The only area devoid of significant EW coverage is the barren southeastern region, bordering the UAE and Oman.

The following image depicts the locations of Saudi Arabian EW sites:

PATRIOT

The MIM-104 PAC-2 Patriot represents the most capable strategic SAM system operated by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia initially ordered the Patriot system in 1990, and to date has received a total of twenty one batteries. Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in acquiring the ATBM-optimized PAC-3 ERINT system, but a contract has yet to be signed.

Saudi Arabia currently fields eleven operational Patriot batteries. A total of fifteen Patriot deployment sites have been identified, with four remaining unoccupied in the latest imagery. The majority of Saudi Arabian Patriot batteries are deplyed at prepared, hardened facilities. These facilities feature hardened revetments for the TELs and a raised berm for the AN/MPQ-53 engagement radar.

A Saudi Arabian Patriot site near Dhahran can be seen in the image below:

The locations and coverage zones of Saudi Arabian Patriot batteries can be seen in the image below. Note that the bulk of the systems are consolidated along the northeastern coastline, defending the major oil export facilities and the Dhahran metro area.

HAWK

HAWK missile systems have served in Saudi Arabia since the 1960s. Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, Saudi Arabia received the improved I-HAWK system and re-built ten HAWK batteries to the same standard.

There are currently eighteen active HAWK batteries in Saudi Arabia, with a further six inactive HAWK sites. HAWK batteries are typically deployed to provide close-in air defense for Patriot batteries.

The locations and coverage zones of Saudi Arabian HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:

CAPABILITIES

Overall Coverage

Arrayed in a point-defense layout, the Saudi Arabian strategic SAM network represents a formidable obstacle to any potential aggressor. The Kingdom has deployed strategic SAM systems in a manner designed to defend the most critical locations in the nation. Unsuprisingly, a large concentration of SAM systems are positioned in the northeastern portion of the nation, along the coastline facing Iran.

The following image depicts the nationwide strategic SAM coverage in Saudi Arabia:

Primary Locations

There are five primary SAM concentrations, with each location defended by no fewer than three active batteries. These locations are the capital of Riyadh, the metropilotan areas surrounding Dhahran and Mecca, and the military facilities at King Faisal AB and King Khalid Military Complex. HAWK batteries also protect other locations, such as King Khalid AB.

The following image depicts the deployment of air defense assets near the capital of Riyadh. Note the positioning of an active HAWK battery and an EW facility near the military complex southeast of Riyadh at Al Kharj.

The following image depicts the deployment of air defense assets near the city of Mecca. SAM assets are deployed along the western coastline to provide clearer fields of view for associated radar systems. While the HAWK batteries near the coastline cannot defend the skies directly over Mecca, the Patriot battery can range over both areas, including King Fahd AB to the east, which is also defended by a HAWK battery.

The following image depicts the deplyment of air defense assets near the city of Dhahran:

Given Dhahran's economic importance to the Kingdom, it is defended by the highest concentration of strategic SAM assets found in the nation. These SAM batteries, currently consisting of six active Patriot and four active HAWK batteries, are arrayed to provide overlapping fields of fire throughout the area. The multiple target engagement capability of the Patriot system makes this the best-defended piece of real estate in the entire nation.

The following image depicts the overlapping fields of fire of the deployed Patriot and HAWK batteries near Dhahran:

The following images depict the deployment of air defense assets near King Faisal AB and King Khalid Military Complex, respectively. Each location is defended by multiple SAM batteries.

The Air Element

With a high percentage of Saudi Arabia remaining sparsely populated, the Kingdom also relies on the Royal Saudi Air Force to defend its skies in conjunction with the deployed strategic SAM assets. Current air defense aircraft include the F-15C and EF-2000, with the multi-role F-15S also fully capable of performing the task if required.

Air defense capable aircraft are currently deployed at four locations. A fifth location, Prince Sultan AB near Riyadh, is home to the RSAF's E-3 AWACS fleet. These aircraft can serve as gap fillers in the air defense network's EW system, or can direct air defense aircraft to targets. In the same fashion, the air defense aircraft can serve to defend the Saudi skies unprotected by SAM systems.

The following image depicts the locations where air defense aircraft are based. Red icons indicate the presence of combat aircraft, while the blue icon represents the Saudi E-3 base.

LIMITATIONS

Combining strategic SAM systems and a capable air force ensures that Saudi Arabia is relatively well defended. However, there are certain limitations to the network. Reliance on the aging HAWK SAM system reduces the effectiveness of the network in certain areas, particularly those with the HAWK as the primary defensive system. A potential aggressor such as Iran, with acess to the HAWK in its own inventory, would be well-versed in the capabilities, limitations, and effective counters to the system.

Furthermore, the point-defense layout of the network leaves large portions of the nation undefended by strategic SAM assets. While aircraft can be called upon to defend these areas if required, the presence of large gaps in the nationwide air defense picture leaves numerous vulnerabilities open to exploitation by a foreign aggressor.

CONCLUSION

All things considered, the Saudi Arabian strategic SAM network is logically arrayed to defend key religious, industrial and military locations. With the potential acquisition of the PAC-3, the network will enhance its ability to intercept inbound tactical ballistic missiles, possibly forcing an aggressor to rely on airpower rather than missile strikes alone to engage targets. Considering the strength of the SAM network around likely targets, and the presence of the capable RSAF, this could turn out to be a losing proposition for all but the most capable air arms.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

SIPRI

SAM Site Update: How It Works

2010-12-17T14:15:00.000-05:00

Given that the SAM Site Overview update took a while to process this month, I thought I'd explain how it works.

During the course of a given month, I am always looking for new and interesting locations to include in the file. Many of the new locations are also provided by IMINT & Analysis readers, whose help is always appreciated! I file these new sites away in a folder, and generate any necessary range rings. They also get added to an Excel spreadsheet which compiles all of the inventory numbers you see when you click on the Continent or Country folders. When Google Earth updates its imagery, which typically happens twice a month these days, they also release a .kmz file which outlines the new imagery. The .kmz file usually follows the imagery update by two or three days. When I get these files, I go through and check existing locations to see what has changed. Things I look for include active sites becoming inactive, and a change in site equipment. For example, the current update features a Chinese S-300PMU-2 site, which was formerly occupied by an S-300PMU-1 battery.

All of this takes a little bit of time, but is relatively straightforward and uncomplicated. The problem this month was a delay in Google Earth releasing the .kmz file of the latest imagery update. I wanted to wait until it was available to get the most accurate product out, especially since I figure that they may not do another update this year due to the holidays.

So, now you know how it works! And hopefully you can see that the delay this time was really a technical issue, and not another example of my outstanding ability to procrastinate.

Speaking of which, yes, the Saudi Arabia feature will still be posted tomorrow!

Image of the Week: Kadena Raptors

2010-12-17T14:04:00.000-05:00

OKINAWA RAPTORS

The image above depicts six F-22As from the 27th FS, 1st FW at Langley AFB, Virginia. The Raptors were deployed to Kadena AB, Okinawa for a 120-day theater security deployment over the first quarter of 2010. The Raptors imaged above are seen prior to departure from Kadena, as evidenced by the presence of external fuel tanks carried for long-range travel. The external fuel tanks are often used to support deployments. They have also been noted underwing of Alaska-based F-22s performing intercept missions against Russian strategic bombers, likely providing an additional fuel reserve for overwater sorties.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

December Schedule

2010-12-04T15:56:00.000-05:00

Here's the current theoretical December schedule:

Week 1: SAM Site Overview update (late next week, after the next Google Earth imagery update)
Week 2: Saudi Arabia's SAM network
Week 3/4: update to China's 2nd Artillery; I'll be gone for part of the time for the holidays, so only one update over this week.

I'll also be gone the first week of January, so the January schedule will also be slightly altered, with the SAM Site Overview update being posted during the second week along with a yet-to-be-decided SAM Network analysis piece.

Image of the Week: Rafales

2010-12-04T15:51:00.000-05:00

LANDIVISIAU RAFALES

The image above depicts the ramp space at Landivisiau AB in northwestern France, occupied by two Rafale M multirole fighters. Landivisiau is located close to Brest, home to one of the French Navy's major port facilities (and France's SSBN base). Landivisiau serves as the land-based home to the French Navy's carrier-based combat aviation units, with three squadrons of fighter aircraft in residence. Two of these units operate the Super Etendard Modernise, with the third operating the Rafale M. The Rafale series, including variants operated by the French Air Force, represents one of the more advanced 4+ generation combat aircraft currently in service. Current plans call for the replacement of the Super Etendard with further examples of the Rafale in the 2015 timeframe. At sea, the French Navy's Rafale M sqaudron operates from the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN) Charles de Gaulle, and the aircraft have seen operational service as part of the NATO mission over Afghanistan.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Sidetracked

2010-11-16T00:34:00.000-05:00

Sorry for the lack of activity over the past few weeks, I've been sidetracked with a lot of stuff to do. I teach, and I'm working on a third degree, and so I got a bit buried for a bit there. Everything is OK now though, so we're back to something resembling normal activity. My plan for the rest of the month is to get back to the Images of the Week, update the SAM Site Overview, and probably drop an article or two. Then I'll return to business as usual in December with a posted schedule and all that. Anyway, back to work.

The Indian SAM Network

2010-09-12T21:08:00.004-04:00

INTRODUCTION

One of the most populous nations in the world, India has engaged in numerous regional conflicts in the past. The threat environment led to the creation of a point-defense oriented EW and SAM network designed not to protect the skies over India, but to protect the military units tasked with such a role. This ultimately led to the creation of a number of EW and SAM units within the Indian Air Force.

OVERVIEW

Indian air defense elements, to include EW assets, SAM systems, and interceptors, are subordinate to the Indian Air Force (IAF). This allows the IAF to coordinate both sensors and weapons, allowing for a maximum degree of target deconfliction. SAM units are organized as squadrons, with radar units being organized as either signal units or transportable radar units, depending on the assigned types. These units are in turn subordinate to the five operational commands in the IAF.

The Indian SAM network follows a point defense layout. The primary SAM system employed by the IAF is the S-125M (SA-3B GOA). These systems are deployed at various airbases in the northern and western portions of India. EW assets are deployed primarily along border regions, with the highest concentration being present along the northern and western borders with Pakistan.

EW ASSETS

Fifty four EW sites have been identified in India. The primary assets are THD-1955, P-12/18 (SPOON REST), and 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radars. Thirteen THD-1955 radars arrayed primarily along the border region from Pakistan to Myanmar provide a significant amount of EW coverage. EW coverage is enhanced by fourteen 36D6 radar sites, arrayed primarily along the border with Pakistan. The 36D6 is significant as it can provide both target track data to SAM batteries as well as GCI support for Russian-origin fighter aircraft such as the MiG-29 (FULCRUM) or Su-30MKI (FLANKER-H). P-12/18 radar sites are scattered throughout the region, as are indigenous Indra-II radar units. The net result is an EW network that is heavily oriented towards potential threats.

The following image depicts the locations of identified Indian EW facilities. Dark blue diamonds represent basic EW sites, typically manned by P-12/18 or Indra-II radar systems, while light blue diamonds represent THD-1955 radar facilities. Blue circles represent 36D6 radar facilities. The range rings given for the 36D6 sites represent the 165 km acquisition range against a typical fighter-size target. Each radar system is capable of target detection at greater ranges depending on the target RCS and altitude, with the THD-1955 typically employing a range of 400 km.
The following image depicts a typical THD-1955 site. These large radars are sited atop dedicated structures. This site is located south of Shillong in eastern India.
The following image depicts a deployed 36D6 radar at Pune AB in western India. This radar likely serves as both an EW and GCI asset, given its co-location with Su-30MKI fighters.
India does possess the 40V6 series of masts for mounting the 36D6, although their use appears to be relatively infrequent. The following image from February 2008 depicts a 36D6 mounted atop a 40V6 mast assembly at Nal AB. Imagery captured four months later indicates that the 36D6 is still deployed but has been removed from the 40V6. Only thee 36D6 locations have an identifiable 40V6 series mast available for use.
Other EW assets include the A-50I AWACS based at Agra AB, and potentially an aerostat system found near the border with Pakistan. The aerostat system's purpose is unknown at this time, but could potentially be used to mount an air surveillance system. The facility can be seen in the image below.
THE S-125

India's primary strategic SAM system is the S-125M. These systems were delivered between 1973 and 1989 from the USSR, and thirty four batteries are currently active. These batteries provide point defense for key military installations, typically airbases, in the northern and western portions of India.

The locations of India's active S-125M batteries and their engagement zones can be seen in the image below:
The S-125M has two specific drawbacks: range and single-target engagement capability. The ability of the system to engage one target per battery is partially mitigated by placing multiple batteries at many locations, but the 25 km maximum range of the system effectively reduces its role to one of point defense only, lacking the range to provide long-range overlapping fields of fire necessary for a more robust air defense network.

IAF S-125M batteries are frequently relocated in their operating areas. This can be done to complicate targeting by enemy assets and to allow systems to be cycled through maintenance periods. The following image depicts the S-125M deployment area at Vadodara AB in western India. While only one location currently has an active battery, there are four other locations which have been active at some point in the past.
Numbering the S-125M locations 1 through 5 from west to east, the following information can be derived from available imagery:

Site 1
-Active from December 2005 to March 2010

Site 2
-Active from October 2000 to October 2002
-Active from June 2003 to November 2003
-Active from December 2003 to March 2010

Site 3
-Active from October 2000 to October 2002

Site 4
-Active from November 2003 to December 2005
-Currently active as of March 2010

Site 5
-Active from June 2003 to March 2010

All told, there are twenty one inactive or former S-125M positions identified throughout India that can be used as relocation sites should the need arise.

TACTICAL SYSTEMS

Tactical SAM systems are also operated as point defense assets in the IAF. The primary system is the Osa-AKM (SA-8 GECKO), a mobile system mounted on a wheeled TELAR. The 10 km range of the system allows it to serve as a layered short-range counterpart to co-located S-125M batteries.

An IAF Osa-AKM TELAR can be seen in-garrison near Ambala AB in the image below.
The Indian Army operates the 2K12 Kvadrat (SA-6 GAINFUL), which could be employed in a similar capacity to IAF Osa-AKM units if required. The Army also operates additional Osa-AKM units.

LIMITATIONS

Given that India has chosen to rely on a point-defense oriented air defense network, the lack of long-range SAM coverage is not a true limitation. Furthermore, the presence of significant numbers of fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MKI cpaable of acting in concert with the EW network to perform interception tasks can alleviate the lack of long-range SAM coverage. However, there are still some limitations to be addressed within the network as it is currently organized.

The primary limitation is one of terrain. Northern and eastern India contains very varied terrain, which can introduce significant blind spots in radar or SAM coverage, reducing the network's effectiveness. The issue of EW coverage has been addressed to a degree by the procurement of the A-50I AWACS platform.

The other significant limitation faced by the strategic SAM network is one of age. While many of the systems have been refurbished or modified to retain their effectiveness, the age of the systems is such that a potential aggressor has enjoyed a significant amount of time to discern weaknesses and develop ECM systems and countertactics to defeat the deployed systems. In truth, it is the age of many of these systems that has pushed India towards developing and procuring new SAM systems to replace the elderly systems currently in widespread use.

ABM DEVELOPMENTS

One significant aspect of Indian air defense that will become operational in the near future is an ABM capability. India began researching an ABM system in 1999, with the goal of fielding a two-tier system. The two-tier system would consist of the exoatmospheric PAD, a Prithvi SRBM derivative, and the endoatmospheric AAD. Where PAD employs a directional warhead, AAD employs a hit-to-kill kinetic warhead. It is now believed that a new weapon referred to as PDV will replace the PAD in the two-tier structure. This system is capable of engaging 1500 km range ballistic missiles, making it an ATBM rather than a true ABM system, but a separate system with a design goal of engaging 5000 km range weapons is underway to field a true ABM.

The radar syste employed by the PAD/AAD weapons is referred to as Swordfish and is in actuality a modified Israeli EL/M-2080 Green Pine radar system. Two of these radars were delivered to India in 2002. One is currently sited northeast of Bangalore, with the second being located near Konark on India's northeast coast. The radars are sited in protective domes. The inland facility can be seen in the image below:
FUTURE PROSPECTS

India is actively developing and acquiring new SAM systems to revitalize its air defense force for the 21st Century. There are three significant programs which should begin to bear fruit in the near term. The first is the Akash, being procured by the IAF to potentially replace S-125M systems. This is an indigenous mobile SAM system derived in part from the 2K12. Maitri is a short-range SAM being co-developed with France, employing technology used in the French Mica BVR AAM. The third program is a long-range SAM system. This system may build upon the aforementioned AAD weapon under the codename of Ashvin. Deployment of these weapon systems will eventually allow the IAF to retire the S-125M and Osa-AKM, replacing them with weapons more capable of performing effectively in the current environment.

CONCLUSION

While India's SAM network does not appear to be particularly robust or capable on paper, it is not intended to serve as the primary protector of the nation's airspace. However, even with its more limited role, modernization programs must continue if the network is to remain viable in the forseeable future.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

IAF Orbat
SIPRI
PAD Test

Does All of Our Intelligence Data Pass The "So What" Test?

2010-09-06T14:18:00.003-04:00

Data relevance is critical to achieving success in the Intelligence Community (IC). Simply put, everything that we do must pass the “so what?” test, and we need to move away from creating intelligence data for intelligence’ sake. This means that every intelligence product and briefing should have a clear goal and tangible outcomes.

The unfortunate reality is that many of the IC’s efforts do not come close to passing this test. All too often, our intelligence lacks relevance or does not tangibly support a mission. The main issue is a lack of insight into goals based on achieving measurable outcomes.

The following is an example of viable intelligence that would clearly pass the “so what?” test based on tangible outcomes. Imagine that we have identified and then targeted a Taliban kidnapping ringleader, and our intel products/briefings make the argument that we have this terrorist's pattern of life and furthermore, by removing him, we will halt kidnappings in this region for a three-month period. This provides our Commander with a clear “so what?” This intelligence matters. Our Commander and staff, primarily his Operations Officer, are able to analyze the means available to them and formulate an appropriate plan to intervene. By collecting and providing the data needed to remove this leader, the key outcome is the fact that kidnappings decrease in this region. The goal of this mission was to decrease kidnappings and make this region safer, so the outcome was achieved.

From a terrain perspective, many analysts provide data about the slope, vegetation, hydrography, cover and concealment, and location of roads that could play a major role in determining the ideal location of the enemy’s SCUD launchers and associated support vehicles. The “so what?” factor is that by correctly analyzing, interpreting, combining with other intelligence disciplines, and then disseminating this data, we can predict likely SCUD locations. Similar analysis can offer Primary, Alternate, and Supplementary positions for our own Field Artillery units or ideal Drop Zones and Helicopter Landing Zones.

These examples of providing actionable intelligence seem very intuitive, and one would expect these types of efforts to be commonplace. Unfortunately, they are not all that common. One of the driving issues behind this challenge is the myriad of available data.

In 2009, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) alone generated 24 years worth of video if watched continuously. In 2010, UAVs are expected to generate 30 times that amount of data—and military commanders are acknowledging the issue. According to Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, “We are going to find ourselves in the not-too-distant future swimming in sensors and drowning in data.” (1)

The other challenge is focusing only on relevant data. For example, many believe that the IC is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy in Afghanistan because the majority of our collection efforts and analytical prowess are focused on insurgent groups. As such, our vast intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to persuade. (2)

The “so what?” factor in Afghanistan is determining who the local powerbrokers are that need to be influenced, as well as how we can best engage with locals—whether they are villagers, aid workers, or Afghan soldiers—to gain the credible insights we need to help advance the mission. (2)

Now that he has been appointed the new Director of National Intelligence, one of the key challenges that retired Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper Jr. hopes to tackle is to unite the traditionally separate missions of intelligence collection and analysis and to shrink and flatten the intelligence bureaucracy. (3) Clapper has also created the position of Deputy Director for Intelligence Integration to unify the collection and analysis tasks, which is a significant step toward addressing this issue. (4)

It certainly seems that IC leaders are taking this issue very seriously, and a top-down effort could bring about true change. However, all levels of the IC must continually ask themselves “so what?” If they are unable to answer this question, their efforts may be wasting the time and resources of our troops and policymakers—and these are resources that we cannot afford to waste.

-Lt. Col. (Ret.) Marv Gordner, 2010

REFERENCES

(1) “Too Much Information: Taming the UAV Data Explosion,” Defense Industry Daily, May 16, 2010
(2) Greg Dunlap, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 9, 2009
(3) Ellen Nakashima, “New Intelligence Chief Clapper Brings Sense of Humor to Serious Job,” The Washington Post, August 21, 2010
(4) Pam Benson, “Director of National Intelligence Names Deputy to Boost Collaboration,” CNN, August 20, 2010

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The preceeding article was written for this site by Lt. Col. (Ret.) Marv Gordner, a former intelligence officer in the US Army. Mr. Gordner has twenty-one years of extensive leadership and management experience in the Department of Defense and intelligence collection field. His assignments included the 101st Airborne Division and Special Operations Forces including, 5th Special Forces, 3d Special Forces, and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). He now serves as the Program Manager, Intelligence Solutions Division, for MorganFranklin.

Some news items

2010-09-04T17:09:00.002-04:00

Before I get to updating the SAM Site Overview file, here's a few news bits that I either forgot to mention previously, or that are new.

-I have invaded Facebook. Not sure if this is relevant at all, but you can add me if you want. I use the same image as my profile picture here, the MiG-29 Guards badge. Don't know yet if anything amusing or relevant will come out of it, but you can always watch me harass my former coworkers if you want!

-Over the past few months I've been contributing features to Air Power Australia. These are either relevant reworks of features found here, or specialized things like the PLA BM summary that may or may not have worked for this site. So, go to APA and see what you can find if you're interested.

-Monday will see the publication of the first guest-written article here. The author, Lt. Col. (Ret.) Marv Gordner, is a former Army intel officer with an extensive SOF background. I'll post a fuller bio with his article, which covers whether or not intelligence collection has both a goal and serves a requirement. Given the quality of Lt. Col. Gordner's piece, this is something that I will certainly be open to more of in the future. So if any of you have amusing ideas and are looking for someplace to get some exposure, send me an e-mail.

September Schedule

2010-09-01T23:11:00.002-04:00

Here's the projected lineup for September:

Week 1: SAM Site Overview
Week 2: India's SAM Network
Week 3: Iranian BM Facilities
Week 4: China's SAM Network update

Yeah, the China thing keeps getting pushed back. Turns out it needed a very deep update and reformatting, and with starting class and resuming teaching for the fall semester free time has not been very easy to come by recently. But it's still working, and if I get it done early I'll post it and update something else for Week 4.

New PLAN Airfield Identified

2010-08-22T18:04:00.004-04:00

PROBABLE NAVAL AVIATION BASE IDENTIFIED
The image above depicts a new airfield located 28 kilometers southwest of Huludao in northeastern China. This airfield was constructed between April 2009 and June of 2010. The June 2010 imagery shown indicates that many of the structures and airstrips are still being completed, but the overall layout of the airfield is in place.

This airfield is likely a PLAN facility, and may represent the first facility destined to house the PLAN's J-15 carrier-based fighter. The J-15 is a Chinese-produced Su-27K (FLANKER-D) derivative. Photographs of the first prototype currently undergoing flight tests indicate that the aircraft is a derivative of the Chinese-produced J-11B, a modified Su-27SK featuring Chinese avionics, weapons and engines. The J-15 features the canard foreplanes and short tail sting of the Russian Su-27K, but possesses the modified radome and modified wingtip missile rails only found on the J-11B. At this time the J-15 prototype apepars to retain Russian Al-31F engines, but may be fitted with the indigenous WS10 in the future. Alternatively, as the Al-31F is a proven naval aviation powerplant, production J-15s may retain this engine.

Carrier aviation affiliation is denoted by the presence of what appears to be a ski-jump takeoff ramp, similar to that seen at Xian, being constructed adjacent to the main runway. Another potential naval-related feature is a possible mock landing area located near the north end of the main runway. Such a feature allows carrier pilots to practice mock approaches while operating from land. What appear to be foundations for 24 individual aircraft shelters may provide a glimpse into the size of a PLAN J-15 unit, suggesting that an operational airwing may be composed of either 12 or 24 fighters.

Constructing this airfield in the northeast may suggest that Huludao will be fabricating the PLAN's indigenous aircraft carrier. Another option is that the base provides access to the sheltered waters of the Bohai Gulf for overwater training flights, allowing the airwing to be produced and worked-up prior to an eventual training deployment on the refurbished Varyag. Varyag has recently left the dock at Dalian and is possibly in the final stages of outfitting prior to beginning sea trials for the PLAN. Given the amount of work that visibly remaisn to be completed on the Varyag, sea trials are likely no earlier than sometime in late 2011.

The location of the base indicates that the assigned aircraft, should this represent an operational unit, will be assigned to the North Sea Fleet. This would seem to indicate that either the Varyag or a Chinese-produced aircraft carrier will also serve in the North Sea Fleet. The limited amount of aircraft shelters being constructed also indicates that the PLAN is not following the USN model, whereby few large airbases host various carrier aviation units. This suggests that if more than 24 J-15s are to be produced to equip carrier air wings, they will be based at a different location. Identifying the locations where these bases are constructed will provide further insight into China's plans for its carrier force, such as which fleets the vessels will serve with.

A further possibility is that PLAN flight testing is simply being separated from the activity at Xian. In the near future Xian will be testing a new transport aircraft, the XXJ fifth-generation fighter, various UAVs, and other aircraft types. Separating test and training activity for the PLAN to a new facility would serve to alleviate some of the potential crowding at Xian which may occur. Were this to be the case, then the previously mentioned assertions as to the basing, airwing size, etc would no longer be valid.

As China's naval aviation force expands into carrier-based aviation, the identification of facilities such as this will become important in deriving the changing intentions and force strengths of the PLAN. IMINT & Analysis will continue to monitor these locations with a goal of deriving any useful information.

SOURCE

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Google Earth & Law Enforcement

2010-08-20T16:01:00.006-04:00

INTRODUCTION

GIS programs like Google Earth offer a lot of capabilities that can be exploited by various professional agencies. Access to overhead imagery, three dimensional environments, and the ability to edit and distribute information through the program make Google Earth in particular a useful analytical tool. One potential use for the program which seems to be underutilized is in the realm of law enforcement. While Google Earth is not a real-time imagery browser, a number of the capabilities it offers can enhance the performance of law enforcement functions.

This article represents a sanitized and reduced-scope version of a professional training tool developed by the author for a client in the Southwestern United States. It is intended to provide a basic overview of some of the capabilities of Google Earth valuable to law enforcement agencies and brief descriptions of how they can be effectively exploited.

AREA EXPLOITATION

One of the most obvious aspects of Google Earth that can be exploited is the ability to analyze the local environment. This can be of critical importance to any law enforcement agency planning surveillance or an offensive operation in a potentially unfamiliar area. While traditional maps and charts can offer a degree of understanding, Google Earth offers a far more robust set of features for extracting data.

Layout

The overhead nature of Google Earth provides an excellent medium for analyzing the layout of a given area, be it an urban, rural, or uninhabited location. Simply navigating to a point of interest provides the user with a significant amount of information. The status bar along the botom of the screen provides, from left to right, the date the imagery was acquired, the coordinates, the elevation, and the eye altitude.

The imagery capture date is significant as it allows the user to put the image in context. An older image may not show current features such as roads or buildings. Alternatively historical imagery can be browsed to view changes to the area that have been made over time.

The coordinates and elevation data are directly tied to the position of the on-screen cursor. As the cursor is moved around the screen, the coordinates and elevation data will change to account for the current position.

The eye altitude is the apparent position of the viewer above the image. For example, an eye altitude of 5,000 feet indicates that the image is what would be seen by an observer 5,000 feet above ground level.

Once an area of interest has been located, various features can be viewed by selecting different options in the Layers menu found at the bottom left of the screen. Some relevant features include roads, which will bring up the paths and names of various roads in an area, and other locations such as restaurants, bars, hospitals, water features, and terrain.

The following image depicts Nogales, Arizona, with the roads feature activated. Notice how both the pathways and names of the roads are overlaid on the overhead imagery.
Examining Terrain

Google Earth provides many ways to view the environment in three dimensions. The most common involves viewing the terrain in a given area. By selecting the terrain feature in the Layers menu, three dimensional terrain is loaded into the image.

Terrain data can also be manipulated to exaggerate features, making them more apparent to the observer. In the Options menu, accessed through the Tools section of the taskbar at the top of the screen, a number from 0.5 to 3 can be entered for Elevation Exaggeration. The default value is 1, which displays terrain at the natural scale.

Once terrain features are activated, pressing and holding the mouse wheel will bring up a special cursor on the screen. Pulling back on the mouse will tilt the image allowing terrain to be viewed in 3D. Pushing forward will then return the image to its traditional overhead state.

Consider the following two images, both depicting the terrain north of Tuscon, Arizona. Both images show the same approximate areas. The first image depicts the terrain with an elevation exaggeration value of 1, while the second image depicts the terrain with an elevation exaggeration value of 3. Notice how the features in the second image are greatly exaggerated to bring out their details.

Cities in 3D

3D buildings are available for many major metropolitan areas in Google Earth. These buildings are available in two formats, basic greyscale shapes and photorealistic structures. Greyscale shapes approximate the basic shapes of the buildings they represent, while the photorealistic versions have digital photographs applied to their surfaces to provide a more realsitic approximation of the structures.

3D buildings are accessed in the Layers menu, with the option for loading either grayscale, photorealistic, or both types of buildings available. These structures are created by Google and its user community using a program called Google Sketchup. Buildings are submitted to Google for inclusion into the database, which ensures that the most accurate structures are incorporated and are properly aligned with the imagery. Users can also create their own structures and access them locally.

Phoenix, Arizona provides a suitable environment for examining both types of 3D structures available. In this case, as is the case with many locations, downtown Phoenix is primarily populated with photorealistic buildings, with the outlying areas relying primarily on greyscale structures.

The image below illustrates a residential area northwest of downlown Phoenix. This area has been constructed using greyscale buildings.
The image below illustrates downtown Phoenix. The area has been rendered using photorealistic structures for added detail. Note how segments of the overhead imagery for Phoenix has been incorporated into the buildings for additional effect, including the imagery of a tennis court atop the lower level of the Ernst & Young complex.
The following image depicts a location in Phoenix where both types of building can be seen.
Uses

The various layout features of Google Earth lend themselves to a wide variety of law enforcemnt applications. Traditional activities such as foot or vehicle patrol routes can be planned to maximize the coverage available, ensuring that high interest areas are given the required amount of attention. Routes to and from locations of interest can be evaluated. By using the roads feature, any route can be properly planned, including those through areas or to locations which are not well known.

Apart from the basic features, having a three dimensional environment to exploit is a very useful tool. The most obvious advantage conferred by a three dimensional environment is the ability to evaluate fields of view from various positions. When planning an approach to a given location, for example, a three dimensional environment allows law enforcement officials to evaluate the most unobtrusive approach to a given location, taking the greatest advantage of surrounding structures or terrain. Likewise, in a situation where sniper support or some other form of overwatch is required, a three dimensional environment can be used to evaluate the most advantageous deployment locations for these assets, maximizing their fields of view of the area of interest with regard to other obstructions in the area.

Consider the following example. In this instance, assume that the point of interest is a location to which police must be dispatched to deal with a developing situation. In an encounter such as this, success is often related to the ability to arrive with enough stealth to apprehend most or all of the individuals involved. Having a three dimensional view of the environment can be a significant asset in planning the proper route of approach.

In the first image, it can clearly be seen that a direct approach from the north is undesirable. The parking lot of the building across the street provides a clear field of view from the POI to identify any approaching units.
Likewise, an approach from the west may not be desirable. The following image illustrates that even with the building across the street to the west from the POI, the main street leading to the intersection can be monitored to a degree.
Approaching from the east and taking a less direct route can afford the greatest element of suprise. The building directly adjacent to the POI, combined with the large structures across the street to the northeast, can be used to mask the majority of any approach, as seen in the image below.
In this case, the route of approach can be seen in an overhead view in the image below.
Other routes can certainly prove as or more effective, particularly from the south, but this example illustrates how a three dimensional environment can be significantly useful in developing effective strategies.

The eye altitude information can be exploited to enhance helicopter support for organizations possessing these assets. Recall that the eye altitude represents the position of the observer above the image. This data can be used to set altitudes for helicopter assets to ensure that they are able to effectively monitor a given area. Attention should be given to the calibration of the altimeters in the helicopters. Most altimeters are calibrated to sea level. In this case, the correct altitude would be a combination of the eye altitude and the elevation. If the desired eye altitude is 5,000 feet and the local elevation is 1,000 feet, then the distance above sea level of the patrol should be reported as an altitude of 6,000 feet.

DATA INCORPORATION

Having a tool such as Google Earth to evaluate the layout of a given location can certainly enhance law enforcement activities, but where Google Earth becomes truly valuable is when user-generated data is incorporated into the program. This allows for a host of data analysis techniques to be applied. Data is entered into Google Earth using various annotations which can appear on-screen. These include placemarks, paths, polygon shapes, and external images.

Placemarks

The most effective way to incorporate data into Google Earth is by developing a set of placemarks. Placemarks appear on-screen and can be configured to display relevant details when clicked, providing a useful distribution medium for this information. It is important to develop an effective method of cataloging and detailing placemark files to ensure that they provide clear, concise information.

The following image depicts a portion of Phoenix displaying various placemarks denoting law enforcement activity. In this example, three different placemarks have been used. The blue vehicle denotes action by a patrol car, the orange silhouette denotes action by an office on foot, and the red triangle denotes hostile activity.
When clicked, each placemark will bring up a window such as the one seen in the image below.
In this case, the placemark has been filled with data according to the following template:

Activity
Arresting Officer (AO)
Date
Time
Location
Details
Report

This allows any user to access the relevant data about the incident in question noted by the palcemark. There is also a location to incorporate a weblink to any relevant paperwork or reporting on the incident, allowing it to be quickly accessed.

The formatting and content of the information on display can be managed locally but should always employ the same basic template for ease of use. In this example, clicking on any of the placemarks in the image above would result in the same window being displayed, the only difference being in the information contained therein.

To add information to a placemark, one simply edits the Edit Placemark box which is displayed when a placemark is first added to Google Earth. To edit the placemark after it is entered, simply right click on it and select Properties to bring up the same Edit Placemark box.

The previous examples were generated by simply copying and pasting the basic template into the dialog box and filling in the relevant details. To unclutter the screen, the placemark labels have their opacity set to zero in the Edit Placemark dialog box. This hides any text and only displays the icons. It does not affect the displaying of the relevant data when the placemarks are clicked in Google Earth. Leaving the label opacity set to the default of 100% will result in the placemark name being displayed adjacent to the placemark. When a large number of placemarks are displayed on-screen, this can make for a very cluttered environment.

It should be noted that the dialog box is HTML compatible, allowing the text to be highlighted or otherwise edited. However, due to this fact it is necessary to incorporate "br" following each line of text to denote a break or to simulate hitting the return key. The quotation marks should be replaced with < or > on either side of the "br", but this cannot be effectively shown here due to formatting restrictions.

If desired, there are resources available which can be used to develop a unique set of placemarks if those found in Google Earth do not represent the best method of display.

Placemarks can be organized using the My Places section of the Places menu at the left of the screen. By right clicking on My Places, Add Folder can be selected, allowing the user to add a named folder to store placemarks. Likewise, subfolders can be added for further organization. In this case, the placemarks have been stored in a folder titled Precinct 117, in a subfolder for Arrests. This subfolder is then divided into July and August 2010 subfolders. By selecting or deselecting various fodlers and subfolders, the user can manipulate the data he or she wishes to display and evaluate.

Placemarks can be further enhanced by incorporating images. In this case, an image is added by incorporating a web or network link to the relevant image. This feature can be used to provide images of activity, evidence, or other information of relevance. Images can be added to any placemark using the following HTML text: img src="XXX" /img The XXX inside of the quote marks is replaced with the network or web link to the image. Both img src="XXX" and /img are contained within the < and > brackets, which again cannot be fully shown here. In the following image, the dialog box displayed has a picture added.
Images should be stored locally on a shared fileserver if possible. This allows users to use the same basic file path to locate images, removing some of the difficulty involved.

Paths and Polygons

Paths and polygons can also be effective tools. They are added using the path or polygon tools at the top of the screen. In a polygon, clicking on the screen will place a corner, and in a path, clicking on the screen will drop a point along the route. Polygons can be filled or outlined, and both features can have their colors, width, and other features edited. Also, both features have dialog boxes which can be edited using the same method as that found in the placemarks. Clicking on any point along the path or polygon will result in the dialog box being displayed.

The image below denotes a use for the path feature. In this example two paths are denoted. The green path denotes a patrol route for a patrol car, with the blue path denoting a patrol route for an officer on foot.
The image below denotes a use for the polygon feature. In this example different colored polygons are being used to denote different gang turfs.
A placemark database can be saved by selecting the most upper-level folder, which in this case would be Precinct 117, right clicking, and selecting Save As. This will save placemarks as well as any other features such as paths or polygons that are present. Alternatively, Google Earth saves the same files in the My Places directory upon exit. When exiting Google Earth, the Server Log Out option under the File menu in the menu bar should be selected first. This ensures that the placemark data is saved without loss of data. At times Google Earth can fail to save recently entered data if the program is simply exited.

Network Links

One way of effectively sharing placemark data, and ensuring that it is entered consistently using a prescribed format, is to manage the files on one computer. The placemark files would then be shared to other users using a network link. In this case, it is necessary to manage the placemark files as a separate dataset, loading the files into Google Earth when editing or data entry is required.

In this method, the user would load a placemark dataset into Google Earth by clicking Control-O and selecting the dataset from a shared network drive or internet source. Any editing is then done, before the dataset is re-saved to the previous location. To access the information, a network link is generated. This is done by selecting Add Network Link from the Add menu in the menu bar at the top of the screen. In the dialog box that appears, the pathway to the file is included in the Link box. This network link can then be saved independently and shared to various users via email or by posting it to an intranet or shared server. When the users open the network link, they will immediately have access to the dataset.

ANALYTICAL USES

While it can take a considerable amount of time to initially generate a dataset, once it has been generated and proper procedures have been developed for incorporating new data it can prove to be a very useful analytical tool.

Many of the previously mentioned law enforcement functions can be significantly enhanced by employing a robust dataset in Google Earth. For example, simply marking and tracking the locations of arrests or crimes can be used to adjust patrol routes to ensure that they pass through areas with a significant amount of activity. In this instance, proper use of Google Earth and a developed dataset can eventually serve as a deterrent to criminal activity.

Likewise, a developed dataset can allow a law enforcement organization to properly allocate resources in a region, ensuring that high-crime areas have the necessary resources to adequately serve the public. This is a prime example of the financial benefit of geospatial information technology.

Counterdrug Operations

One aspect of law enforcement where GIS technologies such as Google Earth can be effective is in counterdrug operations. Using the aforementioned techniques, locations of drug-related arrests or locations of drug-related points of entry or facilities can be tracked.

Consider the following image. Assuming that the marked locations are distribution points of drugs entering the United States from Mexico, a host of analytical options can be described.
Once locations are known and marked, various options are available for analysis. The most obvious involves discerning potential routes of travel for distribution. Simple analysis can be performed, asking questions such as "do they travel at night" or "are they using heavy or light vehicles". Knowing when and how drugs are being transported can serve to more accurately identify potential routes of travel. Light vehicles may be more likely to make use of minor or even unpaved roadways in a given region, which are often patrolled far less frequently. Being able to exploit a gods-eye view of the area can often help to make such analytical decisions easier to understand.

Furthermore, being able to visually observe drug-related activity in a program such as Google Earth can aid in the identification of distribution facilities or production centers. When a number of drug-related arrests, particularly those involving the sale of controlled substances, are marked in a given area, analysis can be performed on the dataset to identify likely distribution centers. One such method can be to determine the facilities relatively equidistant from each arrest, and marking them for further investigation. Other intelligence sources can also be used in combination with the available data to effectively analyze the overall picture in a given area or region.

Gang Activity

Gang activity can also be evaluated using Google Earth. A previous image depicted two notional gang territories in Phoenix. Simply marking such regions can be a useful endeavor. Areas where two or more territories abut against one another can be potentially volatile regions. A logical use for this data would be to manage patrols in the area to forestall any violent action to a degree.

Territories themselves can be evaluated and marked using analysis of gang symbology in a region. A previous example depicted an image of gang symbology inserted into the dialog box associated with a placemark. Marking these occurrences in Google Earth can serve as a way of identifying the breadth of a particular gang's territory. Furthermore, an officer or agent assigned to a particular area can exploit such a placemark as a reference source on the potential symbology associated with a region. Then, if a different set of symbology is discovered, gang territories can be updated accordingly. This can aid in the understanding of the fluidity of territories in some areas.

Border Security

One of the most critical problems facing law enforcement agencies in some areas is border security. A three dimensional viewer such as Google Earth can be an effective tool in evaluating and combating border incursions.

Having three dimensional terrain to evlauate can often provide insight into potential routes of ingress by illegal aliens. Being able to visualize the terrain in a region can aid law enforcement agencies in discerning how illegals manage to cross the border unobserved. Often, terrain can be exploited by these criminal groups to mask their presence from population centers in a given region. The analyst need simply ask the question "where can they be hidden from view" to discover potential ingress routes which may not have been apparent simply by examining a two dimensional map of the area.

Such analysis can also aid in other areas, such as discovering border crossing zones where illegal substances are brought into the nation. While these techniques alone will not necessarily identify these areas conclusively, they can certainly aid in developing a starting point for any investigation.

CONCLUSION

Google Earth by itself is not going to put an end to crime in America. Nor should it be used as the sole source or method for performing analysis and evaluating potential courses of action by any law enforcement agency. However, it can clearly be seen that effective analysis coupled with a robust set of data to evaluate can most definitely have benefits to any law enforcement agency. Law enforcement agencies would certainly benefit from proper exploitation of this freely available resource.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Schedule Changes

2010-08-17T15:22:00.004-04:00

A few minor scheduling details. First off, the Image of the Week will now be posted on Wednesdays. This will work better with my upcoming fall schedule. Also, this week's feature has been changed. Instead of doing a comparison of FalconView with Google Earth, something that is going to take a lot more time and is probably better suited as an uploaded PDF document, I'll be posting a feature about using Google Earth as a law enforcement tool. This is something I've been asked to produce and assist with, and is turning out to be an interesting exercise.

The Japanese SAM Network

2010-08-15T19:17:00.004-04:00

INTRODUCTION

Japan is a heavily populated nation spread out over a series of islands in the Western Pacific. American and Japanese SAM systems have protected Japanese airspace since the early days of the Cold War. Aging systems and recent developments in the region have led Japan to begin fielding a modern air defense and anti-missile network.

OVERVIEW

Japanese SAM systems are subordinate to both the JGSDF and the JASDF. The JGSDF operates the HAWK and Chu-SAM systems, with Japanese Patriot batteries being operated by the JASDF. However, JASDF control networks provide targeting and EW support for all SAM systems in Japan, as the JASDF operates the Aircraft Control and Warning Wings manning Japan's EW sites. 5 JGSDF units and six JASDF units are equipped with HAWK or Patriot SAMs.

EW

24 active and one inactive EW site form the basis of Japan's early warning network. These sites are located around the periphery of Japan and provide support for both JASDF and JGSDF SAM units. The bulk of these locations operate the indigenous FPS-3 EW radar.

The locations of Japan's EW sites can be seen in the image below:
PATRIOT

In 1984 Japan chose the Patriot missile system to replace its aging Nike-Hercules batteries. The initial PAC-1 batteries were upgraded to PAC-2 standard. Six missile groups operate the Patriot in the JASDF, oriented throughout the nation. These batteries are primarily located on the grounds of former Nike-Hercules units, taking advantage of the hardened revetments already present to protect the TELs.

A representative Patriot battery can be seen in the image below. This site is located near Tokyo, and is a former Nike missile position. The main upgrade performed to Nike sites allowing Patriot operation is the inclusion of a raised berm for the AN/MPQ-53 engagement radar, which can clearly be seen. Amusingly, two of the site's former occupants remain as gate guards.
The locations and coverage zones of Japan's Patriot batteries can be seen in the image below. A portion of the Patriot batteries located on Okinawa are in fact operated by the US Army, but cannot sufficiently be differentiated based on the imagery available. As such, they are all included here.
HAWK AND CHU-SAM

The JGSDF has operated the HAWK missile system since 1965. Eleven batteries appear to remain active in available imagery, with other batteries held in-garrison at various locations.

The locations and coverage zones of Japan's active HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
Chu-SAM, the Mitsubishi Type 03, is Japan's indigenous replacement for the HAWK in JSGDF service. Chu-SAM was inducted in 2005, with the first training firings taking place at Fort Bliss, Texas in late 2006. The extent of Chu-SAM deployment is not currently known. Chu-SAM will offer a significant capability increase in terms of performance and mobility when compared to the HAWK.

Chu-SAM components can be seen in-garrison near Tokyo in the image below:
MISSILE DEFENSE

The increasing threat of DPRK ballistic missiles has led Japan to pursue a relatively robust BMD network. There are three primary components to the system: sensors, land-based PAC-3 missiles, and sea-based SM-3 missiles. The system began to be studied in 1995, with the first component, the PAC-3, becoming operational in 2007. PAC-3 systems were deployed to northern Japan in 2009 in anticipation of DPRK missile tests.

The BMD sensor network will consist of three radar types. Seven FPS-3 radars in the existing EW network have been modified to improve missile detection capabilities. In addition, four new FPS-5 phased-array radars (previously developed as the FPS-XX) will be built by 2012. In the interim, a US FBX-T radar system deployed to Japan in June of 2006 to provide BMEW capability. This system was deployed at Shariki in northern Japan. The US also began operating PAC-3 missiles at Kadena in late 2006.

Japan's projected land-based BMEW network can be seen in the image below. Modified FPS-3 sites are marked with light blue circles, FPS-5 radar site locations are marked with dark blue circles, and the FBX-T radar location is marked as a yellow circle.
The FBX-T radar system can be seen in the image below. This radar has been used to monitor DPRK missile tests. This is a temporary location, with a more permanent site being constructed approximately 1 kilometer to the south.
For the sea-based portion of the network, four Kongo-class AEGIS destroyers will be upgraded and equipped to fire the SM-3. Work on these four vessels, the Kongo, Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishima, will be complete by the end of 2010. Kongo completed modifications in 2007 and conducted Japan's first AEGIS missile intercept in December of that year.

Modification of Japan's command and control networks to incorporate the new BMD capabilities and mission will be completed by 2012

CONCLUSION

The changing threat environment, coupled with the age of legacy systems such as the HAWK, have led Japan to develop one of the most modern air defense networks found in the world. When the BMD network is fully operational after 2012, Japan will have provided its citizens with a robust defensive capability to repel both air and missile attacks on its soil.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

PAC-3 deployed
PAC-3 flight test
Chu-SAM
Chu-SAM testing

Japan's Missile Defense, March 2007
Overview of Japan's Defense Policy, Japanese MoD
Defense White Paper, Japanese MoD, 2009

SAM Site Overview info

2010-08-02T19:43:00.004-04:00

I'll get around to uploading all of the new files a bit later, but here are some changes to the SAM Site Overview that you might notice:

-S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) ranges: ranges for non-FSU users have been reduced to 250 km to correspond with the S-200VE export variant. FSU users remain at 300 km, as they could in theory have the S-200D lying around.

-55Zh6 (TALL RACK) EW radars: these now have light blue range rings. Also, site icons are also light blue. The actual icons are the same as before, either diamonds (EW sites) or circles (36D6 EW sites). Now if you see one that's light blue instead of "normal" blue, you know a 55Zh6 radar is present.

-Bunch of new historical BOMARC, Nike and HAWK sites have been added to the USA. I was working out of a book titled Rings of Supersonic Steel (really great read if you can find it), and only marked the launch positions.

Other than that, the rest of the updates are normal stuff and will be listed in the corresponding post when I've uploaded the new files.

Now, since I know you all followed instructions and went to see Predators, you may henceforth commence waiting for the return of the Vault Dweller in October. Preferably while listening to City of Fire.

August Schedule

2010-08-02T19:35:00.002-04:00

Here's what's coming in August:

Week 1: SAM Site Overview
Week 2: Japan's SAM Network
Week 3: FalconView vs. Google Earth
Week 4: update to China's SAM Network (for real this time)

I didn't get around to doing something for the fifth week in July, we'll see if I get something extra up this month or not.

And yeah, the image of the week was a day late. Hey, at least I haven't abandoned the new schedule thing yet, right?

Russian Strategic Air Defense

2010-07-19T02:45:00.001-04:00

REMOVED PENDING PDF CONVERSION

Underground Airfields: The DPRK

2010-07-12T02:41:00.005-04:00

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact nations erected numerous hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) to protect their multi-million dollar combat aircraft during wartime. Over time, this practice spread throughout the world's conflict zones, with similar structures being found in many Middle Eastern and Asian nations. Some nations, however, took this practice one step further: they began building full underground facilities (UGFs) to store aircraft.

UGFs are commonly used in many nations to store and protect military hardware, but only a few nations have used them to protect their combat aircraft. These nations include the DPRK, China, and Taiwan in Asia, and Albania, the FRY, Sweden, and Switzerland in Europe. In this feature, the facilities used by the DPRK will be examined.

THE DPRK

Twenty major airfields in the DPRK feature significant UGFs for storing combat aircraft. In addition, two locations feature unique runway layouts incorporating UGFs, and seven airfields feature no UGF storage facilities. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below. The airbases incorporating UGFs are marked in red, those lacking UGFs are marked in blue/white, and those incorporating hardened airfields are marked in yellow.
UGF DESIGN

There are two basic UGF layouts employed by the DPRK to protect and house combat aircraft. These facilities are either positioned close to the main runway, facilitating ease of movement between the UGF and the operations area, or further afield, suggesting their use primarily for long-term storage. In addition, they are connected to their assigned facilities using two different taxiway styles. Some UGFs are connected by simple taxiways which wind their way through bulidings and terrain to reach the runways, while others appear to have a more interesting purpose, that of a backup launching strip for concealed assets. This information, combined with an analysis of the types stationed at each location, can give an indication as to the employment strategy or readiness level of aircraft contained within. Three airbases will be examined in detail to provide an overview of the DPRK's UGF design, layout, and potential use.

Sunchon AB

Sunchon AB is arguably the DPRK AF's most important installation. Situated approximately 40 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang, it is home to the most advanced combat aircraft in the DPRK. Sunchon AB is home to the DPRK's MiG-29 (FULCRUM) and Su-25 (FROGFOOT) fleets. The MiG-29 represents the DPRK's only true modern, 4th generation fighter aircraft. The Su-25 is likewise the only true survivable, modern ground attack aircraft in the DPRK. Sunchon's MiG-29 unit also makes up roughly half of the BVR-capable combat aircraft in the DPRK, with Pukchang's MiG-23 (FLOGGER) unit being the only other BVR shooters in the AF's inventory. Despite widely published claims to the contrary (including a thoroughly ludicrous Wikipedia article), whereby the MiG-29 fleet is believed to be based at a host of other locations, Sunchon is the only facility where the MiG-29 has been imaged inside of the DPRK.

An overview of Sunchon AB is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:
Sunchon's UGF is situated in close proximity to the airfield itself. There are three main entrances, with two entrances likely leading to the storage area for operational aircraft. The third entrance may be for long-term storage of derelict or obsolete aircraft, or for entrance into a dedicated maintenance or GSE storage area. Sunchon's UGF is connected by a series of taxiways to the main apron area.

An overview of the UGF at Sunchon AB can be seen in the image below:
Sunchon AB has ramp space for roughly 34 combat aircraft, with HASs for four more aircraft. There is also an alert or arming/dearming pad at the north end of the runway which can easily park two aircraft. Open ramp space is therefore provided for at least 38 aircraft. 66 modern aircraft, discounting possible attrition since delivery, are based at Sunchon AB, indicating that at least half of them are stored in the UGF at any point in time. 36 Su-25s and 24 MiG-29s were delivered from the USSR, including 4 UB/UBK training versions of each type, as well as 6 MiG-29S (FULCRUM-C) SKD kits assembled in the DPRK. It was the MiG-29S that was used to intercept a USAF RC-135 in 2003.

Analysis of imagery of Sunchon AB provides insight into a number of factors. First, while between 19 and 29 Su-25s are visible depending on the date, only 5 to 9 MiG-29s are visible. This may indicate a much lower readiness level in the far more technologically complicated MiG-29 fleet. Second, it would appear that aircraft are moved from the UGF to the parking ramps for operations, before being re-stored. The image below depicts an open UGF, and an Su-25 being towed from the apron back to its underground hangar:
Furthermore, analyzing the layout of Sunchon AB in relation to the UGF illustrates an interesting feature. A 1350 meter taxiway extends from the UGF to a point beyond the main parking aprons. This taxiway may in fact be an auxiliary runway, allowing aircraft to be prepared for flight while concealed within the UGF and then launched with little or no warning for a strike against the ROK. While the MiG-29 would likely be employed to defend the skies above Pyongyang, the Su-25 is certainly a credible platform for use in this capacity given its relative survivability (compared to other available air to ground platforms in the inventory) and its high payload. Alternatively, this may facilitate the storage of armed, combat-ready MiG-29s in an alert status, protecting them from the elements while other airframes are removed for training flights as needed.

Sunan AB

Sunan AB, situated just north of Pyongyang, is the primary home to the DPRK AF's air transport assets. Assigned aircraft include the DPRK's Il-76 (CANDID) fleet. It also serves as the major international air terminal for the DPRK.

An overview of Sunan AB is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:
There are no identified combat aircraft at Sunan AB, but the UGF can be used to illustrate a different layout than that of Sunchon AB. In the case of Sunan AB, the UGF is situated a much greater distance from the main operating area, likely indicating that aircraft stored therein are not operational or are being held in storage. Also, the UGF is not connected by a taxiway suitable for use as an auxiliary runway, reducing the chance that assets contained in the UGF are suitable for rapid deployment.

An overview of the UGF at Sunan AB can be seen in the image below:
Hwangju AB

Hwangju AB, approximately 40 kilometers south of Pyongyang, is home to a DPRK AF MiG-21 (FISHBED) unit.

An overview of Hwangju AB is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:
Hwangju's overall layout is similar in many respects to that of Sunchon AB. Hwangju features three ramp areas and four HASs for housing its assigned aircraft. It also features a UGF complex for storing MiG-21s, which is connected to the main facility by an auxiliary runway similar to that found at Sunchon AB. The primary difference in the two facilities is the distance. Sunchon AB features a UGF in relatively close proximity to the main airfield, suggesting that combat aircraft may be stored there on a regular basis. Analysis of the available imagery would seem to validate this theory. In contrast, the UGF complex at Hwangju AB is much further removed from the main airbase. Imagery indicates that a consistent number of MiG-21s, around 20, is parked on the main ramp space of the airfield. This suggests that the UGF is not used for primary storage of aircraft, as it appears to be for Sunchon AB's MiG-29 fleet. This illustrates the relationship between UGF location and storage activity in the DPRK AF.

An overview of the UGF at Hwangju AB can be seen in the image below:
HAS Use

As operational fighter bases, both Sunchon AB and Hwangju AB possess four HASs in close proximity to the main runway. These facilities are likely employed for alert aircraft, enabling them to be protected to a degree from a preemptive strike. While aircraft parked on open ramp areas are soft targets, those contained in HASs would potentially be available for airbase defense or counterstrike sorties in cooperation with aircraft retained within the UGFs.

HARDENED RUNWAYS

Onchon airbase in the west and Kang Da Ri airfield in the east feature unique hardened facilities. These airbases incorporate large UGFs for storage, maintenance, and operations work, with runway surfaces exiting the UGFs in multiple directions. No information is available as to the purpose for, use of, or units assigned to these facilities. The most probable use for these unique airbases is as dispersal sites for combat aircraft. They represent very survivable hardened structures, and could potentially house a significant number of aircraft. The only drawback is that deploying a significant number of aircraft to each facility would be a potential identifiable indicator of forthcoming hostile action. To mask such activity, the DPRK would likely establish routine training deployments to each location.

An alternative use for the hardened airbases has nothing to do with aircraft and at this time represents pure speculation. Given that air activity at either location has never been publicly disclosed or identified in imagery, an interesting concept would be to employ the facilities as hardened SSM bases. The facilities resemble airfields in their layout, but a concrete SSM launch pad is little different from a runway surface. Ergo, the DPRK could stockpile SSMs in these facilities, using the "runways" as mass launching areas. In this scenario, transporting SSMs to the facilities would be far easier to mask than the deployment of combat aircraft. The facilities could represent logical storage and mating points for nuclear or chemical warheads, allowing them to remain protected prior to use. Furthermore, what better way to hide an SSM base than by designing it as an airfield? The only serious additional expense would be the additional concrete used to create a "runway" rather than a number of SSM launch pads. In this vein, given the security and survivability of these facilities, they could also represent launch points for UAVs or drone conversions of obsolete aircraft armed with nuclear warheads. At this point in time, however, the facilities are assumed to be exactly what they appear to be: hardened airfields.

Onchon AB

Onchon AB is unique in the DPRK as it possesses both a traditionally designed airfield and a separate hardened airbase facility. The airfield itself is home to a number of old, outdated combat aircraft including the MiG-19/J-6 (FARMER).

An overview of Onchon AB depicting its location relative to the hardened airbase can be seen in the image below:
The hardened airbase at Onchon consists of a single massive UGF with multiple entrances, and three runway surfaces. The facility was noted as being complete in January of 2004. The two primary runway surfaces lead directly into the massive UGF. A third surface useable as an auxiliary runway is connected to the main facility through a taxiway leading to one of the primary runways and to two secondary, secured UGF entrances. These secured entrances may lack the clearance for combat aircraft to use them to gain access to the UGF, but may provide entrance and exit points for GSE or other necessary equipment. A small exterior parking ramp is also provided, possibly for alert aircraft.

Details of the Onchon AB hardened airfield can be seen in the image below:
Kang Da Ri AB

As of 2007, Kang Da Ri AB was still under construction. It is a hardened airbase similar in concept to that found at Onchon. Kang Da Ri AB consists of a large UGF with two separate entrances leading directly to runway surfaces. There is a separate external runway surface, but unlike Onchon it does not lead directly to a UGF portal. Instead, it leads to one of the main runway surfaces via a taxiway still under construction in the latest imagery.

Details of the Kang Da Ri hardened airfield can be seen in the image below:
STRIKE OPTIONS

Employing UGFs to store aircraft does not necessarily mean they will remain viable combat assets. There are numerous options available for negating the impact of these facilities. While penetrating weapons may not be able to access the UGFs themselves from above, PGMs could be used in an attempt to destroy the access doors to the facilities, collapsing the entrances and sealing the aircraft inside for a period of time. Taxiways and auxiliary runways could also be cratered and seeded with bomblets from cluster munitions. The value of the UGFs therefore depends on the ability of DPRK personnel to clear and repair runway and taxiway surfaces and gain access to the facilities to allow the assets held within to be deployed.

CONCLUSION

The DPRK employs a number of UGFs throughout the nation to house various types of military equipment. The DPRK's Air Force is no exception, and the employment of UGFs will ensure that a portion of the air element remains viable after a first series of strikes by the ROK or USA.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Slight Schedule Change

2010-07-10T21:07:00.002-04:00

This month I'll post an updated Russian SAM Network overview. I was going to do China, but as China is about two and a half years old, it's taking a lot longer to basically completely rewrite the entire thing. Russia is almost two years old, but the layout of the original article made it way easier to update. China will therefore be moved to August, and will be a ridiculous improvement over what is available now.

Now stop reading this and go see Predators.

If It Bleeds, We Can Map It

2010-07-09T20:42:00.003-04:00

THE PREDATOR SET

Overhead imagery can be useful for all sorts of analysis work, but it can also be used for purely amusing pursuits. Earlier today I went and saw Predators, the new movie featuring everyone's favorite chameleonic aliens. The movie, which was awesome, got me thinking: I know Predator (the 1987 original) was shot in Mexico, I wonder if I can find the sets in Google Earth?

Guerilla Base

The easiest site to locate is the guerilla base that Schwarzenegger and his commandos obliterate. It turns out that the old set has been largely retained and is now a museum and restaurant dedicated to the movie. As far as I'm concerned, this means that everyone on the planet now has a reason to go visit Mexico! The site is located south of Puerto Vallarta on Mexico's western coastline, a few miles into the jungle near Mismaloya, and can be seen in the image below:
Waterfalls

Two different waterfalls were used in the movie. One of them, Misol-Ha, depicted where Schwarzenegger (ok, his stunt double, who actually messed up his leg doing the scene) fell off of the cliff into the water trying to get away from the Predator. The other one, Agua Azul, was where the Governator fell over a few small falls and crawled out of the water covered in mud. Both sites are located near Palenque in eastern Mexico. They aren't visible in high resolution in Google Earth, so a general overview is provided in the image below:
Wait, where?

The last location isn't a set, but it is related to the movie. This is one of the fun things that Blu-Ray lets you figure out when you have way too much time on your hands. In the opening scene of the movie, Schwarzenegger, Carl Weathers, and R.G. Armstrong are discussing where the helicopter was shot down carrying the guys Schwarzenegger's commandos are being sent in to rescue. Armstrong points to a map of the location, and if you pause the movie on Blu-Ray you can make out what the map says. It turns out that it's actually a real navigation chart...but it's pointing to a location in Brazil, one that's not even close to any border the helo was supposed to have crossed! Check out the image below to see what's actually at the coordinates indicated on the map, and notice the total lack of jungle foliage in the area:
This amusing exercise just goes to show how much fun you can have when you stop being serious with Google Earth. SAM sites? Bah. Finding the set locations of the greatest movie of all time is way more entertaining! Check out the location of the Predator set near Puerto Vallarta in Google Earth and bring up the Panoramio Photos of the area to see some of the fun leftovers from the film. There are a ton of good Panoramio Photos showing the waterfalls as well.

-Overhead imagery courtesy of Google Earth

The South Korean SAM Network

2010-07-09T19:42:00.007-04:00

INTRODUCTION

With cross-border tensions between the two Koreas seeming to increase daily, the Republic of Korea's (ROK) SAM network is a significant element in protecting its citizens and infrastructure from hostile forces. Currently undergoing a deep modernization, the ROK's SAM network represents a significant facet of the nation's defense against air and missile attack.

ORGANIZATION

The ROK's SAM force is operated by the Air Defense Artillery Command. The Air Defense Artillery Command became part of the ROK Air Force in 1991, previously being subordinate to the ROK Army. The ROK Air Force also controls the EW radar facilities throughout the nation. EW radars report information to the ROK Air Force's Master Control Reporting Center, which is responsible for managing the airspace above and around the peninsula.Additional SAM assets available to defend ROK airspace are operated by the US Army.

EW NETWORK

Early warning coverage of the ROK is provided by seventeen identified EW sites. Five of these sites are positioned along the DMZ, with a further three positioned on the islands of Baegryeong-do to the west, Ullung-do to the east, and Cheju-do to the south. EW coverage will be bolstered in the near future with the introduction of four Boeing 737 PEACE EYE AEW&C platforms, the first of which was handed over to KAI at Sacheon in February 2010 for radar integration.

The locations of the ROK's EW sites can be seen in the image below:
HAWK

The most numerous SAM system employed in the ROK is the MIM-23 HAWK. The 40 kilometer range missile system is deployed at twenty three locations spread throughout the peninsula. While the HAWK is technically a mobile, tactical SAM system, it is employed in a strategic capacity by the ROK, being emplaced at fixed, hardened locations containing both the missile launchers and the guidance radars.

The locations and coverage zones of the ROK's HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
NIKE-HERCULES

The primary long-range strategic SAM system employed by the ROK is the Nike-Hercules. Six sites remain operational in available imagery, primarily situated in the northern third of the nation. Nike-Hercules batteries are each split between two locations, one hosting the guidance radars and another hosting the actual missile battery.

An example of the Nike-Hercules split site layout can be seen in the image below, which depicts a Nike-Hercules location near Yeoju, southeast of Seoul:
The locations and coverage zones of the ROK's Nike-Hercules batteries can be seen in the image below:
While the Nike-Hercules boasts a range of 155 kilometers, an impressive number, its effectiveness is in doubt. Recent incidents have suggested that the missile may no longer be a viable weapon system, causing the ROK to pursue other options. In fact, due to the varied dates of imagery available to analyze the individual battery locations, some (or all) of them may already have been withdrawn from use. However, as no reporting has been located to suggest that the Nike-Hercules has been fully withdrawn by the ROK, those sites which remain active in available imagery are noted here.

Nike-Hercules may remain a significant weapon in the ROK's arsenal following retirement from the air defense role. Two SSM variants have been developed, with ranges of 150 and 180-250 kilometers. These systems are referred to as Hyunmoo I and Hyunmoo II, and may be sited at existing Nike-Hercules facilities as they can employ the same launch systems. Interestingly, the northwestern Nike-Hercules site west of Inchon is 180 kilometers from P'yongyang, and does not appear to have a guidance radar facility nearby necessary for surface-to-air operations. This facility may represent an operational Hyunmoo SSM base, and was apparently constructed between 2004 and 2008. It is unlikely that the ROK would construct such a significant facility merely to support a SAM that was already overdue for replacement.

The Inchon Nike-Hercules site can be seen in the image below:
PATRIOT

To bolster the air defense of the ROK, the US Army began deploying Patriot strategic SAM batteries to the peninsula in the 1990's. US Army Patriot batteries began to be upgraded in 2003 with the addition of the PAC-3 missile, optimized for the ATBM role. The PAC-2 missile has a range of 160 kilometers, with the PAC-3 having a range of approximately 30 kilometers due to its significantly smaller airframe.

There are currently eight Patriot batteries assigned to the ROK, with active batteries located at Osan (two), Suwon (two), and Kunsan (one) airbases. A sixth active battery was briefly located at Gwangju airbase in October of 2004, but was relocated by December of 2006. Despite the protests from anti-American elements when the battery was sited at the Korean airbase, the US Army had never intended the relocation to be permanent. It relocated to Camp Carroll near Daegu, where it remains garrisoned with the other two batteries assigned to the ROK for future deployment when required. Each Patriot battery is typically deployed with eight TELs and a guidance radar.

A representative Patriot deployment at Osan AB can be seen in the iamge below:
The locations and coverage zones of US Army Patriot batteries deployed in the ROK can be seen in the image below. The Camp Carroll garrison facility is also annotated.
The ROK began to investigate purchasing its own Patriot missile systems in the 1990s. The SAM-X program was initiated in 1990 to find a successor to the Nike-Hercules. Due to financial and political reasons, the program did not bear fruit until 2007, when a decision was made to purchase second-hand German PAC-2 batteries. The first ex-German Patriots were delivered in 2008. They will serve in a trials capacity before being operationally deployed in 2012.

A SAM training facility southeast of Daegu was expanded between 2003 and 2007. The timing is significant as this was when the ROK government was still investigating its options for SAM-X, and by this stage had decided to focus on a variant of the Patriot system. This facility, which likely trains ROK SAM operators as evidenced by the presence of Nike-Hercules equipment, was hosting Patriot equipment in January of 2009. This likely represents the first sighting of ROK-operated Patriot equipment in imagery.

The ROK SAM training facility can be seen in the image below:
Unconfirmed reporting suggests that the ex-German Patriot systems have been deployed near Seosan, Suwon, Incheon, and Gangneung. This report first appeared in September of 2008, coinciding with the first deliveries of Patriots to the ROK. Sighting ROK Patriot equipment at the training facility near Daegu suggests that it was not deployed directly after delivery as the report suggests. With the exception of Suwon, these locations all feature Nike-Hercules batteries. While Patriot deployment has not been confirmed at these locations, they do represent logical deployment sites in the future once crews have been trained and the sites have been reconfigured to support Patriot batteries.

CAPABILITIES

On paper the ROK's SAM network appears to be relatively robust. Sites are organized in a logical fashion, often enjoying overlapping fields of fire. Terrain concerns, particularly in the areas closest to the DMZ, are largely alleviated by placing many of the sites at high altitude atop mountain ranges. The bulk of the ROK-operated sites are consolidated in the heavily populated northwestern sector.

The coverage zones of ROK-controlled SAM batteries can be seen in the image below:
US-operated Patriot batteries provide additional defense against both aircraft and ballistic missiles over a large portion of the nation. This added coverage can be seen in the image below, which adds range rings for PAC-2 missiles to those of the ROK's HAWK and Nike-Hercules batteries:
The main problem facing the ROK's SAM network is one of quality. Nike-Hercules and HAWK systems are both legacy systems better suited for museum display than battlefield use at this juncture. HAWK missile batteries likely retain a degree of effectiveness thanks to numerous upgrades being available during their service lives, but they lack the range to effectively protect the peninsula. Cognizant of the deficiencies of the HAWK system in the 21st Century, original plans called for the replacement of ROK HAWK batteries by 2010, a deadline which will not be reached. By 2012, Nike-Hercules batteries should be withdrawn in place of Patriot batteries, providing a significant upgrade to the ROK SAM network in terms of overall capability.

FUTURE PLANS

In the future, the ROK's SAM network will see significant changes. First and foremost, the ROK will no longer rely on the ineffective Nike-Hercules for long-range air defense, with Patriot batteries replacing these systems in 2012. Whether the withdrawl of Nike-Hercules SAM batteries will affect the Hyunmoo programs is not known at this time.

A replacement for the HAWK is being co-developed with the Russian Almaz design bureau, and is slated to complete development in 2011. This system, codenamed KM-SAM or Cheolmae-II, will employ a modified Fakel 9M96 active radar homing SAM along with a modern phased array radar. KM-SAM batteries will consist of a radar vehicle, a command post vehicle, and up to eight TELs, all mounted on wheeled vehicles for high mobility. Each TEL will carry eight cold-launch missile canisters. The modified 9M96 dispenses with the original Russian design's canard foreplanes, but retains the nose-mounted reaction control thrusters. It will also employ a directional warhead, and has an advertised range capability of over 40 kilometers.

The ROK also plans to create a missile defense network called KAMD, incorporating the Elta EL/M-2080 Green Pine BMEW radar, Patriot systems, and KDX-III AEGIS destroyers. Mention has also been made of an improved Cheolmae-II called K-THAAD forming part of this network. Creation of such a system is ironic given that protests over potential PAC-3 purchases were due in part to a feeling that the ROK would be drawn into a US-led anti-missile network.

CONCLUSION

The ROK currently fields a SAM network that would have been state of the art in the 1960s, and effective into the early 1980s. The modernization programs underway will correct many of its deficiencies and shortcomings, allowing the network to achieve technological parity with other nations in the region and provide capable and effective defense well into the 21st Century. Hopefully the ROK's citizens will find their government's desire to defend them acceptable.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Patriot moves to Camp Carroll
PEACE EYE Delivered
SAM-X
PAC-3 Deployed to Korea
German Patriots Delivered
Seoul Begins Deploying Patriot Missile Interceptors
Air Defense Artillery Command
Hyunmoo Ballistic Missiles
Korean Missile Defense

Scheduling info and more SAMs

2010-06-28T18:56:00.002-04:00

After I posted the SAM Site Overview update, it occurred to me to look at a calendar. I then, of course, realized that I have something of a problem. My schedule is based on a four-week cycle. Since July starts this week and I'd already processed through all of June's stuff, I counted this as week 1 for the July schedule. Hence the SAM Site Overview update. Anyway, July still has a full four weeks to go. So what I'll be doing in these instances is posting something random during the fifth week whenever something like this occurs. Could be a Site Analysis, could be a SAM Network Overview of a smaller nation, could be something else entirely, who knows. I'll pick something when I get to that point this month, and then every subsequent month will have it listed in the posted schedule if necessary.

Also, the next SAM Site Overview update will incorporate all of the old Nike, BOMARC, and HAWK sites in the US that I can find. I know this is already technically in Google Earth, but I've got a few good books on continental US air defense during the Cold War and figured trying to find them all myself would be a good exercise in imagery analysis. Never hurts to keep the chops fresh. Besides, they should be in the database anyway in the Historical Sites section.

July Schedule

2010-06-27T16:16:00.002-04:00

Here's what's coming in July:

Week 1: SAM Site Overview
Week 2: South Korea's SAM Network
Week 3: Underground Airfields, Part 1
Week 4: update to China's SAM Network

The Underground Airfields bit will be a three part piece. Part 1 covers the DPRK, part 2 covers Taiwan and various nations in Europe, and part 3 covers China. These probably won't appear in consecutive months, as some of them (particularly China) will involve a ton of work.

Dragon's Fire: The PLA's 2nd Artillery Corps

2010-06-26T15:03:00.002-04:00

Undergoing conversion to PDF format.

Executive Protection Webinar

2010-06-23T20:41:00.001-04:00

A little short notice because I am behind in my e-mails, but this one will be hosted tomorrow.

On Thursday, June 24, Henley-Putnam Professor of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies Branch Walton will lead the university’s next free career webinar, “Insider’s Guide to Careers in Executive Protection.”

During the webinar, Professor Walton will discuss:
- Career opportunities in the Protection Management field
- Typical hiring requirements and how to better prepare for the job
- Work environment and what to expect
- Performance suggestions/professional standards
- The future of Protection Management

“Insider’s Guide to Careers Executive Protection” will take place Thursday, June 24, from 1:00 - 2:00 PM PDT.

If you're interested, go here to sign up: click me.

Site Analysis: The Ulan-Ude SAM Garrison

2010-06-19T13:48:00.004-04:00

INTRODUCTION

The SAM garrison at Ulan-Ude is a significant military facility located in Russia's Siberian Military Zone. It represents one of the largest SAM garrisons inside of Russia, containing enough equipment to thoroughly modernize any lesser nation's air defense network.

OVERVIEW

The Ulan-Ude SAM garrison, sited roughly 28 kilometers ENE of Ulan-Ude, is an expansive facility composed of three main areas. Apart from the actual garrison and storage facility, there is an administrative and support area and a weapons storage area (WSA).

The general layout of the facility can be seen in the image below:
INFRASTRUCTURE

Various items of infrastructure can be identified at the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison. Power to the facility comes from external sources fed into the facility's substation by overland power lines. From the substation, power to the garrison itself is provided by a partially buried conduit. A POL storage facility is located south of the administrative and support complex, providing fuel for the garrison's vehicles as well as maintenance, security, and transportation vehicles serving the entire facility. While a network of minor paved and unpaved roads connect the complex with the outside world, the primary means of access is by rail. A rail transfer point for onloading and offloading equipment located adjacent to the garrison complex. A maneuver area is also located adjacent to the garrison complex, where wheeled and tracked vehicles can be put through their paces before dispersal to active units to pre-emptively identify any maintenance concerns.

The local infrastructure of the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison can be seen in the image below:
Regionally, there are numerous facilities which may serve to support the complex. 5 kilometers to the northwest, a power substation has been identified near the town of Onokhoy. This substation serves as the regional substation serving the SAM garrison. The garrison's power substation uses overland lines which lead directly to the Onokhoy substation. 6.5 kilometers to the west is a major rail transfer point. Equipment and cargo moved to and from the garrison complex travels down a dedicated rail spur which merges with the main line 2 kilometers east of the rail transfer point. Equipment being dispersed would travel down the rail spur, reach the rail transfer point, and likely either 1) continue along the main line, 2) be held for transfer to a different line, or 3) be offloaded and moved by road to an airfield in Ulan-Ude for airlift. Further to the southwest, at a distance of 9.5 kilometers from the main garrison complex, is a large POL storage facility. This facility could serve as the main holding area for POL in the region, with fuel being transferred by rail to the garrison when required to refill the complex's relatively minor capacity.

The regional infrastructure servicing the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison can be seen in the image below:
GARRISON DETAIL

The Ulan-Ude SAM garrison itself is a 530,000 square meter complex with numerous facilities designed to service, maintain, and disperse SAM equipment to operational units. The primary systems held at the facility are members of the S-300P series.

Apart from the holding areas and sheds, major identified locations include an equipment checkout pad, for verifying the operational status of equipment held at the facility before dispersal or during periodic maintenance, and a probable radar storage facility. The radar storage facility is the likely holding point for 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW radar systems, as these systems have not been identified in open storage. The high-bay garage has an entrance at the northwest end of the building which has enough exterior clearance for a large vehicle such as the 64N6 transporter to maneuver out of the building and into the complex. No other buildings appear to have the necessary exterior clearance, suggesting that 64N6 components must be held in this facility.

Enough equipment for roughly fifteen S-300P series batteries can be seen in open storage at the facility. There are 68 5P85-1 TELs and 2 5N63 (FLAP LID A) radars associated with the S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE), and 56 5P85S/D TELs and 9 5N63S (FLAP LID B) radars associated with the S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE). Additionally, one 64N6 radar set and 9 40V6 mast assemblies can also be identified. SAM equipment is typically organized by battery, with the components for a complete battery being held in the same area. Apart from the S-300P series components, components for at least 4 S-125 (SA-3 GOA) batteries are also held at the facility, as well as numerous tactical SAM components.

The quantity of components held at the garrison is indicative of Russia's peacetime air defense posture. There are numerous inactive SAM sites in the nation, leading many casual observers to note that the network appears to be a shell of its former Cold War era self. This is not entirely accurate; the Russians have simply garrisoned a significant number of units, holding them in reserve until required. The equipment held at the Ulan-Ude garrison alone would be enough to significantly increase the effectiveness of any regional network. By holding these units in garrison, operating expenses can be saved while retaining the capability for future exploitation when required.

Identified areas and SAM components at the garrison complex can be seen in the image below. For the SAM components, which are identified by colored dots, the following color scheme has been used: S-300PT TELs are purple, S-300PS TELs are red, 5N63 radars are orange, 5N63S radars are yellow, 64N6 radars are blue, and 40V6 masts are green.
The garrison complex has numerous identifiable security measures to protect its holdings. The facility is entered using a primary entry control point which leads directly to the rail transfer point servicing the complex. A secondary entry control point likely serves as the entry for personnel and service vehicles. The complex is surrounded by a double fenceline, with an 18 meter dirt strip having been cleared between the fencelines. The exterior fenceline has lightposts placed every 32 to 35 meters, and four guard towers are situated at the corners of the fenceline in the dirt strip.

Security measures at the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison complex can be seen in the image below:
Located south of the main garrison is the weapons storage area for the complex. This facility serves as the primary holding area for the actual missiles to be employed by SAM systems held at the complex. Holding the weapons in a separate secure facility negates the possibility of a catastrophic explosion or fire damaging the SAM components. The WSA is accessed by a single road leading to an entry control point. Security is similar to that of the actual garrison complex, with a double fenceline separated by a defoliated dirt strip, various guard towers and lighposts surrounding the compound. The interior of the compound possesses numerous revetted holding areas, some of which contain storage buildings, others serving as open air holding pens.

Details of the Ulan-Ude WSA can be seen in the image below:
The following image depicts the likely steps for equipment to be dispersed from the garrison. First, equipment would be removed from holding areas and sent to the checkout pad. There, the equipment is spun up to determine its operational status. At this point minor maintenance would likely be conducted if required, and if enough discrepancies are noted it is likely that a different set of components would be removed from storage. Lastly, the components would be sent to the rail transfer point for transport.
CRITICAL NODES

The critical nodes for the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison are the main garrison complex and the rail transfer point. Eliminating the garrison complex itself removes the potential threat psoed by the garrisoned components, while eliminating the rail transfer point would make dispersal a far more time-consuming and tedious process. The WSA is not necessarily a critical node as there are sufficient holdings of missile rounds throughout the region and the nation to make up for any loss. Similarly, the power substation is not a critical node as its destruction would not cause any appreciable loss of ability to disperse equipment. The portable generators possessed by each individual battery could be used to power components for checkout.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS

The following intelligence gaps exist in the analysis of the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison complex:

1. The power station servicing the complex through the Onokhoy substation has not been identified.

2. Communications systems and facilities serving the complex have not been identified.

3. The source of potable water for the facility has not been identified.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Site Analysis: New Stuff Coming Soon

2010-06-16T00:15:00.005-04:00

Some of you might have noticed that this week's feature is scheduled to be on the Ulan-ude SAM garrison. Now, I know what you might be thinking: "Sean, what the hell, that's called an Image of the Week." Not so! This is going to be the first of a new type of feature I intend to do on a relatively regular basis called a Site Analysis. It'll be similar to the SAM Site Analysis pieces, or the look at the Iranian missile silos in Tabriz. Basically I'll be analyzing a military facility, describing the layout, the major features, any identifiable equipment, etc. Why did I pick Ulan-ude to start with? OK, you got me there: I'm cheating, it's a big SAM garrison with a lot of stuff that's easy for me to ID. It makes a relatively benign way to begin a new "series" of articles, letting me tinker around with the layout and the overall format without having to expend too much brainpower on the actual analysis. What this also means is that Site Analysis topics are now fair game for you to suggest as future topics for inclusion into the monthly schedule. So, that's what that is all about. Look for the first Site Analysis on the Ulan-ude SAM garrison later this week!

Saudi to Israel: Clear for takeoff?

2010-06-13T22:55:00.003-04:00

One of the big stories that seems to have gone relatively quietly into the abyss this week is the fact that Saudi Arabia has apparently given Israel overflight clearance to strike Iranian targets believed to be involved in the development of nuclear weapons. Reports state that Saudi Arabia has even exercised the standing down of air defense units along its northern border to ensure that Israeli aircraft are able to pass through the region unmolested. Of course, Saudi Arabia has been quick to deny the reports, but their denials weren't all that convincing.

OK, since Israel seems hell-bent on blowing up whatever facilities they think are involved, even though the Western world has never actually proven that Iran is developing nuclear weapons (after all, such weapons are clearly meant to only be possessed by non-Muslim people in the Middle East, or at least that's the way they're being treated), I thought it might be interesting to analyze some of the potential factors related to such a strike.

Point 1: Iran will have to rely heavily on its fighter force to defend itself. Apart from the Tor-M1E (SA-15 GAUNTLET) TELARs sighted near Natanz, Iran lacks any credible SAM defenses capable of deterring a modern fighting force. That puts the onus on the Iranian Air Force to prove that it can defeat what Israel throws at it. Saudi Arabia may have already given Iran an unintentional (or intentional? That'd be amusing to consider...) signal as to when to expect such a strike: all they have to do is monitor the status of Saudi Arabia's air defense network. Bottom line: if you know its coming and you still can't stop it, you may need to reconsider a few things. Like, I don't know, buying Su-30s or J-10s instead of acting like the world's aeronautical laughingstock sticking twin tails on an F-5.

Point 2: One of the purported targets for Israeli fighters is the Bushehr reactor complex. Now, I'm not entirely sure of what they'd hit it with, or how much material is inside, but it seems to me like bombing a nuclear reactor sitting right on the Persian Gulf is a relatively stupid idea. There is a risk for contamination if it isn't done exactly right. That could make gas prices shoot into the stratosphere quicker than a SPRINT ABM (which is pretty damn fast for those of you wondering what the hell that thing is).

Point 3: Speaking of gas prices, if I'm Iran, I've got teams ready to mine the Strait of Hormuz the minute the first bomb hits. The point here is that anyone who thinks Iran is going to sit idly buy and get bombed is delusional. Yes, their air defense network doesn't really scare anyone, but you can bet they'll lash out in all kinds of interesting ways, most of which will probably have a negative impact on the price of gas. Israel gets away with a lot of stuff on the international stage, like pretending to be a US ally while shipping arms to China, but if they are perceived as the reason why people are getting hammered at the pump they might find themselves with fewer friends for a while. There's also the missile force to consider: a possible Iranian response would be to salvo a ton of ballistic missiles at Israel.

Point 4: This has the potential to backfire in epic fashion. I can think of two obvious ways in which this could explode in Israel's face. First off, let's say they aren't completely successful. Jets are shot down. Pilots are captured. Talk about a propaganda boon aircraft fragments bearing the Star of David paraded through Tehran would be for the extremist elements in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. Secondly, some of the potential targets might be hardened, but they aren't necessarily isolated hundreds of miles from civilization. When Iran and Israel bombed Iraq's reactor complex in 1980-81 (pretty ironic, huh), the site wasn't active. Iran's facilities are all believed to be active. This could possibly result in the spread of radioactive material after an attack. So, say Israel blows up all of the sites it wants to blow up, but then a lot of material gets spread around as a result. Does Israel really want to have to deal with the political fallout from that scenario?

Point 5: This could also explode in Iran's face in just as epic a fashion. Ahmadinejad talks a big game, but what happens to the way Iran, particularly its military capability, is perceived if Israel just flys in there and blows stuff up? "We will defeat any aggressors...we are ready to defend..."...yeah, but what if the Israelis prove that you can't, and you weren't? Then what?

Nobody really knows what's going on in Iran. Nobody really knows if Saudi Arabia will actually let the Israelis fly over to blow stuff up, although it certainly seems that way regardless of any political "denials". What we can state is that any military action is going to have some significant effects on that part of the world. Iran may have no choice militarily but to pretty much sit there and take it, but they won't sit there sulking after the bombs stop dropping.

Now, somebody who knows more about such things than I do chime in and tell me if blowing up all of these nuclear-related sites could actually spread nasty things around in Iran and into the Persian Gulf. Because at the end of the day, it would seem to me that mining the Persian Gulf or playing terrorist could turn out to be the least of the region's problems after this type of airstrike.

And why the hell doesn't Iran just leave the NPT and the UN and give everyone the finger anyway? Then they legally can do whatever they want with nuclear weapons, and it makes military action a lot tougher to justify.

Strat SAM Network Menu

2010-06-12T23:00:00.003-04:00

I've modified the Strategic SAM Network menu on the right of the page. You'll now see both the country name and the current as of date. For example, I just posted the North Korea feature, so you'll see North Korea (June 2010) in the menu. That will tell you if the feature has been published or updated recently. If you're looking for a more accurate picture and the feature hasn't been updated in a while, as is the case with China, Russia, and Taiwan, you should rely on what's in the SAM Site Overview .kml file. That will always remain relatively current as it is updated the first week of every month.

The North Korean SAM Network

2010-06-12T22:41:00.005-04:00

INTRODUCTION

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea fields one of the most capable third-world strategic SAM networks on paper. However, despite the high concentration of strategic SAM batteries and EW sites, there are significant issues in the network which need to be addressed in the near future. If these issues are ignored, the DPRK will be placing itself at risk.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

The DPRK's strategic SAM assets are subordinate to the Air Force. The Air Force operates a variety of Soviet-era equipment. The following strategic SAM systems are currently in service: S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON).

EW Coverage

Thirty three active and one inactive EW sites provide the DPRK with early warning radar coverage, used for SAM system target acquisition and track handoff, and GCI control of fighter units. These EW sites are primarily consolidated in the southern half of the nation, providing substantial coverage of the capital and the DMZ. Identified EW radars operating in the DPRK are predominately Soviet-era systems, although the presence of a JY-8 (WALL RUST) radar indicates that Chinese hardware is also in use. How well the Chinese system integrates with the rest of the FSU-era equipment is not known, but it is potentially not a problem given that China operates a number of Soviet and Russian systems. The following systems have been identified in available imagery:

P-12/18 (SPOON REST)
P-14 (TALL KING)
P-35/37 (BAR LOCK)
P-80 (BACK NET)
36D6 (TIN SHIELD)
JY-8 (WALL RUST)

The US DoD reports that the following radars are also in service, but they have not been identified in available imagery at this time:

5N69 (BIG BACK)
P-8/10 (KNIFE REST)
P-15 (FLAT FACE)
P-15M (SQUAT EYE)
PRV-11 (SIDE NET)
PRV-13 (ODD PAIR)

The following image depicts the locations of identified EW radar sites in the DPRK:
The following image depicts a notional DPRK EW site. Most EW sites appear to be host to a single example of one radar type, in this case a P-14. Other radars, especially smaller units such as those of the P-12/18 series, may be present but not visible in available imagery. Alternatively, they may be held in reserve to expand the network when required, or may simply not be discovered yet. AAA sites, such as the battery seen here, are common at both EW and SAM sites to provide additional defense.
Interestingly, the only strategic SAM system which appears to possess an organic EW system is the S-200, with each battery containing a P-14 radar. The S-75 and S-125 batteries do not appear to field any organic EW elements, in which case they must rely on either the external network or the limited functionality of their engagement radars to provide target acquisition and track generation. It is possible that these SAM batteries do contain EW elements, but that they have not been located or are not visible in available imagery.

A further EW system available to the DPRK is the Ramona passive detection system. The advantage to the Ramona is that it does not radiate, allowing it to be relocated to complicate targeting with considerably more ease than a strategic SAM battery. The Ramona system has not been located in available imagery, but is believed to be a leftover Soviet system, emplaced and operated by the USSR.

SAM Coverage

There are currently fifty eight active strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. S-75 sites are red, S-125 sites are light blue, and S-200 sites are purple. As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of the deployed strategic SAM assets are located along the DMZ and the coasts.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by the identified DPRK strategic SAM sites. Using the same color scheme applied previously, SA-2 zones are red, S-125 zones are light blue, and S-200 zones are purple.
The S-75

There are currently forty six active S-75 sites inside of the DPRK, constituting the bulk of the strategic SAM force. According to SIPRI, a total of 45 S-75 Dvina systems were delivered to the DPRK from the USSR. 15 batteries were supplied between 1962 and 1964, with the remaining 30 batteries being supplied between 1966 and 1971. A total of 1950 missiles were reportedly supplied to arm the batteries. S-75 batteries are deployed to provide barrier air defense of the DPRK's coastlines and the DMZ, as well as coverage of the bulk of the DPRK's interior.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-75 batteries:
The S-125

There are currently ten active S-125 sites inside of the DPRK. Seven batteries are positioned to defend the capital of Pyongyang, with the other three situated to defend the nuclear research center at Yongbyon. The DPRK operates the S-125M Neva-M variant, with SIPRI reporting that eight batteries were supplied between 1985 and 1986.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-125 batteries:
Seven of the deployed S-125 batteries, six around Pyongyang and one near Yongbyon, are situated at sophisticated hardened facilities. These hardened sites contain three launch revetments for 5P73 4-rail launchers and a radar position for the RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) engagement radar. The launchers can be retracted into bunkers when not in use. Similarly, the engagement radar can be lowered into a bunker and protected by a retractable cover, which splits in half and slides open when the radar is exposed.

A hardened S-125 site near Pyongyang can be seen in the image below:
The S-200

There are currently two active S-200 sites inside of the DPRK. These sites are placed near the east and west coasts in the southern portion of the nation, allowing them to range far offshore and deep into the ROK. The S-200 represents the longest-range strategic SAM system in the DPRK's arsenal. Four S-200 batteries were supplied to the DPRK between 1987 and 1988, and two batteries are likely co-located at each location.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-200 batteries:
As with the S-125, the DPRK employs hardened facilities for the S-200. Elevators are provided for the two 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars at each location allowing them to be stowed undergroudn when not in use, and hardened bunkers are provided for the 5P72 launch rails.

Inactive Sites

There are currently twenty nine identified inactive strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK. There are twenty seven S-75 sites and two S-125 sites. The bulk of these sites are located in the vicinity of Pyongyang. As such, they may represent facilities available for bolstering capital area air defenses during a time of conflict. They may also be employed as relocation facilities, complicating targeting of active batteries. Some inactive locations, notably those near the northwest border with China and near Kuum-ni on the northeastern coast, are situated in coverage gaps in the SAM network, suggesting that they may have been labeled as inactive when last imaged due to their assets being relocated for training or maintenance purposes.

The following image depicts the locations of inactive strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK:
Support Facilities

Interestingly, there are no identified support facilities related to the strategic SAM force in the DPRK. Given that the DPRK employs a great deal of hardened and underground facilities, this is not necessarily suprising. Many of these facilities are identified in other nations due to the identifiable presence of SAM components in imagery. If these facilities are kept hidden in the DPRK, then their identification would be extremely difficult. However, it should be assumed that such facilities do exist, even if they have not yet been located or conclusively identified. These facilities would provide maintenance functions, store missile reloads, and garrison surplus equipment for future deployment.

STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

The DPRK appears to possess an intelligently designed, layered air defense network at first glance. S-75 sites are positioned to provide barrier air defense of the coastal and southern border regions, with the remaining S-75 and S-125 batteries bolstering inland defenses and protecting critical locations.

S-200 Coverage

Long-range air defense is provided by the DPRK's S-200 batteries. The S-200 is a significant threat to ISR and support aircraft operating in the theater, such as the USAF's U-2R based out of Osan AB in the ROK. The location and range of the S-200 would hold any such cooperative target at risk shortly following takeoff from most of the airfields in the ROK. Ergo, while the S-200 is not a serious threat to any non-cooperative, maneuverable targets such as fighter aircraft, it represents a significant problem for any potential aggressor.

Border Coverage

Many of the DPRK's S-75 batteries are positioned along the coastline and along the DMZ. These systems are placed to provide barrier air defense to deter any foreign intrusion into the DPRK's airspace. The majority of these systems are positioned to provide overlapping fields of fire to strengthen air defenses in these areas. The northern border with China and the northeastern border with Russia are left undefended, likely due to the DPRK not anticipating that either nation would be a party to hostilities against it.

Inland Coverage

The wide-ranging deployment of military facilities in the central part of the nation has precipitated the siting of S-75 and S-125 batteries to protect much of the DPRK's interior. S-125 batteries are specifically sited to protect two areas, Pyongyang and Yongbyon.

Air defense facilities and coverage zones near the capital of Pyongyang can be seen in the image below:
Air defense facilities and coverage zones near the Yongbyon nuclear research complex can be seen in the image below:
Interestingly, one location left udnefended is the underground nuclear test facility in the northeast. This may be due to the fact that if air defenses are present, analysts will assume that there is something there worth protecting. Similarly, the DPRK's rocket test sites at Musudan-ri and Changya-dong are also currently unprotected.

Denial and Deception Efforts

It is possible that many of the sites identified as active are not in fact legitimate SAM sites. With a number of camoflaged and underground facilities, the DPRK is clearly aware of the concept of denial and deception. Such practices may be in place in the strategic SAM network.

Consider the figures. It is reported that forty five S-75 batteries have been delivered, but forty six sites have been identified as operational. Many of these sites do not use traditional FSU site layouts, and are partially obscured by trees and other vegetation. The same numerical discrepancy exists in the S-125 force, with ten sites appearing active but only eight batteries reportedly being delivered. In addition, seven of the S-125 batteries have been provided with hardened facilities, begging the question of why the others have not. It is possible that the active S-125 batteries found at non-hardened facilities are in fact decoy sites. However, there is not sufficient evidence to conclusively prove this one way or the other.

The simplest method available to prove if a site is active or a decoy outside of having a personal ELINT system is to examine the imagery for the associated cable connections and other typical equipment found at active batteries. However, due to the aforementioned vegetation, many of these sites cannot be examined in this fashion. As such, if they contain what appears to be active equipment, they are assumed to be active batteries.

One mock S-125 site has been identified conclusively. This site, seen in the image below, contains a radar mockup and three launcher mockups. Note the southernmost launcher mockup. This launcher is clearly a mockup, having only two widely separated launch rails which are not parallel. Were this an actual 5P73 launcher, there would be four perfectly parallel rails. The imagery is of sufficient quality to discern that there are in fact only two rails. The spacing of the rails also indicates that this is not a 5P71 two-rail launcher. Further evidence of this site's true nature is found in the lack of any support equipment. None of the command and control vans are present, which would render this site unuseable even if it were fitted with operational equipment.
Air Defense Issues

The primary issue facing the DPRK's air defense network is one of age. While the equipment may still be serviceable, none of it is a major threat to a modern air arm. The DPRK desperately needs an infusion of modern air defense systems if it is to remain viable in the 21st Century.

The S-75 and S-125 have been faced multiple times by modern air arms since 1990 and have consistently been defeated by current tactics and electronic warfare techniques and systems. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia all possessed these systems and they were all defeated. The main victory claimed by these systems was the downing of an F-117A by a Yugoslavian S-125 battery in 1999, but this was due more to excellent intelligence support (they knew the F-117's route and whatever idiot planner was responsible used the same flight path over and over), outstanding site discipline (the site did not often radiate to give its position away), and the addition of an optical tracking system than the actual effectiveness of the system. In a conceivable conflict the DPRK would be facing American and ROK aircraft, and the USAF has exploited the S-75 and S-125 for decades. The S-200 may be marginally more credible as a threat, but as mentioned before it is only a significant threat to a cooperative (i.e. nonmaneuverable and slow) target. It has also been physically exploited based on the presence of equipment at the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range, but it is not known when this was acquired, meaning that the DPRK may have a more recent iteration of the system with a few tricks up its sleeve that remain undocumented. Given American reliance on ISR and IFR platforms during wartime air operations, it is likely that the S-200 batteries would be struck during the opening salvo of any conflict.

The other major obstacle to the DPRK's strategic SAM force is terrain. Much of the terrain in the DPRK is very varied, including that near the DMZ. Even a height difference of a few hundred feet can produce an exploitable blind zone in a SAM battery's coverage. More critically, many of the S-75 batteries along the DMZ are placed in positions of lower altitude than the surrounding terrain, restricting the fields of view of the SAM batteries. This is a significant error in the placement of these systems, as it denys them the ability to function to their maximum degree of effectiveness. The hardened S-125 and S-200 batteries were placed more logically at higher elevations than surrounding terrain, allowing them greater freedom of operation.

One further issue to address is the overreliance on AAA and MANPADS' in the DPRK. The DPRK possesses some of the highest AAA concentrations in the world. The general cocnept is that combat aircraft will fly at lower altitudes to more easily evade SAM batteries, making them susceptible to AAA or MANPADS'. What the DPRK has overlooked is the fact that its SAM defenses are inadequate in light of current ECM and SEAD systems, allowing combat aircraft to fly at higher altitudes to avoid the bulk of the AAA and the entirety of the MANPADS threat. AAA is comparatively cheap and can be very effective in the right environment, but the DPRK seems to have seriously erred in its judgement.

CONCLUSION

The DPRK is the new Iraq. During the lead-up to Operation DESERT STORM, the Iraqi air defense network was often described as being one of the world's most capable. This turned out to be an erroneous description, based in part due to Iraq's overreliance on dated technology and weapon systems. The same problems which plagued Iraq's air defense network in 1991 are evident in North Korea's current network, and must be rectified if the DPRK intends to field any sort of credible air defense in the 21st Century.

SOURCES

-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of North Korea and may therefore not represent the entire air defense network.

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

SIPRI
Ramona in the DPRK

North Korea Country Handbook, US DoD, 1997

June Schedule

2010-05-31T02:54:00.003-04:00

Here's what's on the plate for June:

Week 1: SAM Site Overview
Week 2: North Korea's SAM Network (changed from Kazakhstan)
Week 3: the Ulan Ude SAM Garrison: A Site Overview
Week 4: update to the PLA's 2nd Artillery article

There'll probably be an additional random piece or two in there based on things I've been tinkering with as well, such as a new Reading List, but those are the three primary topics for this month.

I've also compiled a much larger list of nations to produce SAM Network pieces on, and have started a pretty good list of potential Week 3 topics for the coming months.

At the very lest, it looks like I've successfully managed to develop and stick with a schedule!

The Ukrainian SAM Network

2010-05-28T09:40:00.002-04:00

INTRODUCTION

Many individuals may be suprised to know the identity of the largest and most capable SAM network in Europe outside of Russia. The distinction goes to the Ukraine, the inheritor of numerous legacy Soviet SAM systems and facilities after the fall of the USSR. More importantly, many of these systems were top of the line during the 1980s, providing a very solid technology base on which the Ukraine would be able to rely going towards and into the 21st century.

AIR DEFENSE ASSETS

The Ukrainian Air Defense Force is responsible for operating the radar and SAM systems tasked with defending Ukrainian airspace. The force is subordinate to the Ukrainian Air Force, and operates S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE), S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE), S-300V1 (SA-12A GLADIATOR), and Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) SAM systems. The Ukrainian Army operates separate, subordinate SAM assets for providing battlefield air defense.

Over two hundred air defense related facilities have been identified in the Ukraine. There are a total of 35 active and 133 inactive SAM sites, as well as 106 supporting facilities. These locations are broken down as follows:

EW sites: 54
36D6 radar sites: 30
64N6 battle management radar sites: 9
SAM Garrisons: 1
S-300P Garrisons: 4
S-300V Garrisons: 3
9K37 Garrisons: 2
SAM Training Ranges: 3

Active S-125 sites: 2
Active S-200 sites: 4
Active S-300PT sites: 16
Active S-300PS sites: 11
Active S-300V sites: 2

Inactive S-75 sites: 77
Inactive S-125 sites: 19
Inactive 2K12 sites: 1
Inactive S-200 sites: 12
Inactive 9K37 sites: 1
Inactive S-300P sites: 23

SYMBOLOGY

The following icons will be used to depict air defense related sites within the Ukraine:

Squares: support facilities such as garrisons
Diamonds: EW radar sites
Circles: 36D6, 64N6 radar sites
Triangles: SAM sites

The icons will be color coded as follows:

Dark blue: general EW radar, 36D6 EW radar
Bright blue: S-125
Purple: S-200
Bright red: S-300PT, S-300PS, 64N6 battle management radar
Orange: S-300V
Faded green: 9K37
White: an unoccupied EW radar or SAM location
Brown: a SAM garrison (type-specific SAM garrisons are color coded as above based on their respective equipment)

Engagement zones will match the color of the icon for their respective system.

EW ASSETS

Early warning over the Ukraine is provided by various radar sites located throughout the nation. These sites typically host one or more types of EW radar, as well as height finding and IFF interrogation systems. There are forty-one active EW sites, with thirteen additional inactive sites available for network expansion or asset redeployment should the need arise. Note that this does not include organic EW radars deployed at SAM sites, which provide further coverage overlap.

Primary EW assets are a mixture of legacy FSU systems. These assets are commonly deployed at mixed-type EW sites, ostensibly to capitalize on the different capabilities of different radar systems. The most commonly identified system is the P-35/37 (BAR LOCK), with P-12/18 (SPOON REST), P-14 (TALL KING), P-19 (THIN SKIN), and P-80 (BACK NET) also scattered throughout the nation. The 1L13 BOX SPRING is deployed to support S-300V1 batteries to provide additional EW capability.

Thirty 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) and seven 64N6 (BIG BIRD) sites provide target identification and battle management functions for the Ukrainian SAM network. One 36D6 sites is co-located with an S-300PS unit, possibly providing direct support to the assigned batteries. The 36D6 and 64N6 radars are positioned to provide overlapping coverage. These systems are capable of monitoring virtually all of the Ukraine's airspace, as well as significant portions of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and as such the 36D6 radars may have a basic EW or GCI function as well.

The locations of the Ukrainian EW assets, including the 36D6 and 64N6 sites, can be seen in the image below:
The coverage zones of the 36D6 radar sites can be seen in the image below:
The coverage zones of the identified 64N6 battle management radar sites can be seen in the image below. A further 64N6 is likely positioned near L'viv, as there is an S-300PT battery deployed at a prepared site in the area. Likewise, 64N6 sites near Odessa and Sevastopol are not likely to remain inactive for an extended period as numerous S-300PS batteries are deployed in each area as well.
THE S-200V....D?

The S-200 is the longest-range SAM asset available to the Ukrainian Air Defense Force. Four active S-200 batteries provide air defense over all but the far eastern region of the nation between Kharkov and Lugansk. A further twelve inactive S-200 sites remain, although these are likely to be reused as homes for mobile assets such as the S-300PS if at all, due to the time required to redeploy an S-200 battery.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that the 250 kilometer range S-200V is in service, but the October 2001 shootdown of a Russian airliner over the Black Sea by an errant S-200 would seem to indicate that the 300 kilometer range S-200D is the variant operated by the Ukraine. The Russian airliner was reportedly no closer than 250 kilometers to the launch site and flying towards the Russian coastline. Hitting a crossing target at 250 kilometers would be nearly impossible with an S-200V, but would be within the capability of the S-200D.

The locations of the Ukraine's S-200 batteries, inactive S-200 sites, and relevant coverage zones for the active sites can be seen in the image below:
S-300P PROMINENCE

The S-200 is the longest-ranged Ukrainian-operated SAM system, but the S-300P variants represent the most capable and widely deployed systems. Twenty-seven S-300P series SAM batteries are in active service; sixteen batteries are equipped with the S-300PT, while eleven are equipped with the more capable S-300PS. Examining these sites in conjunction with the twenty-three inactive S-300P sites provides a great deal of insight into the deployment strategy of air defense assets within the Ukraine.

The S-300PT and S-300PS batteries are deployed to protect the most critical political, urban, military, and industrial areas in the nation. Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa were each defended by no fewer than six batteries at one point, while Nikolayev and Sevastopol were defended by no less than five apiece.

The following image depicts the locations of the Ukraine's S-300P series batteries, inactive S-300P series sites, and relevant coverage zones for the active sites:
Standard deployment practice deduced through imagery analysis indicates that a full-strength S-300PT battery has twelve TELs, while a full-strength S-300PS battery has eight TELs. Each battery is equipped with a 5N63 or 5N63S (FLAP LID) engagement radar, as well as a 5N66 or 5N66M (CLAM SHELL) low-altitude detection radar. 40V6 series mast assemblies are commonly employed for both radar systems.

The capital of Kiev is the most heavily defended location, with five S-300P series batteries. Of the five active sites, four operate the S-300PT and one operates the S-300PS. The sixth site was occupied by an S-300PS battery, but as of April 2009 the site was unoccupied. This could be due to scheduled maintenance, deployment to a training facility, or site relocation, suggesting that a full complement of six batteries may still be assigned to defend the capital.

Dnepropetrovsk (S-300PT), Kharkov (S-300PT), Nikolayev (S-300PT), Odessa (S-300PS), and Sevastopol (S-300PS) are currently defended by three active batteries apiece.

The following image depicts the layout of the S-300PT and S-300PS batteries around Kiev, along with other air defense associated sites in the area:
The following image depicts the coverage of the air defense assets deployed around Kiev. Note the significant degree of overlap present in the S-300PT and S-300PS batteries.
36D6 EW radars can be co-located with S-300PT and S-300PS batteries to take advantage of added target acquisition support should the need arise. An S-300PS battery near Pervomaysk, seen in the image below, currently possess an on-site 36D6 EW radar, indicating that this type of interoperability may be practiced within the Ukraine even if it is not widely utilized in peacetime. However, due to the presence of other EW assets, it is also possible that a dedicated EW unit is simply co-located at the site, which would indicate that interoperability between the 36D6 and S-300P series is not necessarily utilized.
Recent activity near Odessa suggests that the older S-300PT may be being phased out, or at the very least redeployed to less important regions. A site south of Odessa was imaged in 2004, and was seen to be home to both an S-300PT and an S-300PS battery. As can be seen in the image below, the S-300PT battery occupied the site proper, with the S-300PS battery being deployed along the southeastern periphery.
In 2007, the same site was reimaged, with the S-300PS battery seen to have taken over occupation of the site proper, with the S-300PT battery having been removed.
Evidence of this sort of realignment or redeployment can be seen at other locations in the Ukraine as well. S-300PT batteries are deployed predominantly at older-style S-300P sites, containing six revetments for two TELs apiece, or four revetments for three TELs apiece and a position for a mast-mounted 5N63 in the center. S-300PS batteries are deployed predominantly at newer-style sites, featuring four TEL revetments and a significant raised berm in the center for the mobile 5N63S engagement radar. It is likely that the S-300PT sites were built over old S-75 locations, perhaps explaining the similar launcher revetment placement. At any rate, an S-300PS battery northwest of Kiev is deployed at what would typically be a six-revetment S-300PT site. This likely indicates that the S-300PS replaced an S-300PT battery at this location at some point prior to 2003, when the earliest available imagery was captured. Furthermore, the native language website for the MoD no longer claims that the S-300PT is operated, only listing the S-300PS. It is therefore possible that the S-300PT is in fact being phased out. The latter case is interesting given that there are still numerous S-300PT batteries operational in imagery captured as late as September of 2009. This could indicate that the S-300PT is perhaps no longer serviced, and will be allowed to retire on a battery-by-battery basis as service lives are exhausted.

S-125....STILL SERVING ON?

One strategic-level SAM asset which may still be operated by the Ukrainian Air Defense Force is the S-125. The S-125 was imaged at two active locations in 2002 and 2003, but has not been mentioned in the Ukrainian MoD's annual White Book as far back as 2005. The latter fact indicates that the system is not currently being trained on or funded for service life extensions, occurrences which would be necessary for the system to remain viable into the future. Given that these events have not taken place, it is likely that the Ukrainian S-125 batteries were removed from service between 2003 and 2005. While further analysis is necessary to make a definitive statement to that extent, the evidence does suggest it to be the case.

"TACTICAL" SAMS

There are two tactical SAM systems which serve in the Ukrainian air defense network. The Ukraine operates both 9K37 Buk and S-300V1 systems, with a portion of these systems being subordinate to the Air Defense Force. The Ukrainian MoD claims that the Army operates the Buk-M variant, with the Air Defense Force operating the Buk-M1. The MoD also claims that the Army and Air Defense Force operates the S-300V1 (SA-12A GLADIATOR), indicating that the Ukraine may not be in possession of the S-300V2 (SA-12B GIANT) ATBM system.

The Buk issue is somewhat complicated, as there is no known specific "Buk-M" variant. The term has been used by Russia to refer to both Buk-M1 and Buk-M1-2 systems collectively. Alternatively, this may indicate a local modification of the original Buk system. The original Buk system was present in the Ukraine as late as 2005, as evidenced by the sighting of a 9S18 Kupol (TUBE ARM) target acquisition radar at a Buk-affiliated SAM garrison. This can be seen in the image below:
Two Buk garrisons and three S-300V1 garrisons have been identified, with S-300V1 components seen field deployed near two garrisons. The garrison affiliations cannot be effectively determined, as the Ukrainian Army and Air Defense Force each operate both systems, although the Zolotonosha garrison displaying the Kupol radar may be affiliated with the Ukrainian Army if the original Kupol radar was in fact retained in the Ukraine's "Buk-M" system.

SUPPORT FACILITIES

Identified support facilities for the Ukrainian Air Defense Force consist of numerous SAM garrisons and three SAM training facilities. Ukrainian SAM units have also been known to travel to Telemba in Russia to conduct missile firings. Identified SAM garrisons, including those potentially supporting Army assets, and SAM training ranges can be seen in the image below:
OVERALL COVERAGE

The Ukrainian SAM network was inherited from the USSR following the collapse of the latter nation. Air defense assets are organized to defend key population centers and geographic regions. The capital of Kiev, key industrial and urban centers Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Nikolayev, and Odessa, and the Crimean peninsula are home to the majority of the assets. Other assets are scattered throughout the nation and along the western border.

The following image depicts the locations of all air defense oriented sites, both active and inactive, throughout the nation:
The following image depicts the total coverage of identified EW and SAM assets deployed throughout the nation:
As can be seen in the images above, the Ukraine enjoys near-total nationwide EW coverage and boasts a layered SAM defense network around multiple key locations. While the network no longer faces the threat of a war against NATO, and has downsized significantly since the fall of the USSR as a result, the Ukraine remains very well equipped to defend itself from aerial attack.

The possible recent retirement of the S-300PT by the Air Defense Force will not necessarily impart a significant loss of capability in terms of overall coverage to the network. While the S-200 is not well suited for engaging maneuverable, non-cooperative, or low-RCS targets, it can deter any ISR platforms or other large combat aircraft from approaching Ukrainian airspace. Given that the S-300PS has a maximum engagement range of nearly double that of the S-300PT, 90 kilometers to 47, it would be possible to redeploy S-300PS batteries around key locations in a fashion which would allow S-300PT batteries to be retired. Having fewer batteries would certainly mean that fewer targets could be engaged at a given time, but the longer engagement range would alleviate some of this loss by allowing targets to be engaged further down range, with more targets engaged following intercept of the first wave. This would be a sensible redistribution of assets, allowing the capability to be virtually retained by only operating roughly half of the assets. This would result in an appropriate reduction in yearly operating and training costs as well. This course of action could necessitate removing and redeploying the solitary S-300PS batteries near Khakovka, Kherson, and Pervomaysk, and the resulting gaps in coverage would need to be assessed to ensure that they represent acceptable degradations of the overall network. Alternatively, S-300PS assets currently identified as being held in-garrison could be field deployed to counter the retirement of S-300PT batteries.

The potential gaps in the air defense network which would be caused by a redeployment of S-300PS assets could be filled by the Buk or S-300V1 batteries tasked with an Air Defense Force mission. These mobile units are capable of serving as effective "gap fillers" and complements to the longer-range strategic SAM systems. Buk or S-300V1 batteries could also be deployed to provide close-in defense of key facilities, taking some of the workload from S-300P series batteries. Alternatively, they could be deployed along the nation's periphery underneath known or potential ingress routes in an attempt to ambush inbound aircraft during wartime.

Mobile assets such as the S-300PS, Buk, and S-300V1 are capable of operating wherever they are required, virtually anywhere in the nation. 64N6 coverage and 36D6 deployment can provide these systems with battle management and target acquisition support wherever they may deploy, thanks to the robust EW network. As S-300PS SAMs are typically deployed at prepared sites, the large network of inactive SAM facilities in the nation represent potential deployment sites, or locations for field training exercises. There are over 100 inactive SAM sites of various configuration in the Ukraine, the locations of which can be seen in the image below:
It is interesting to analyze the former SAM locations in a historical sense. The Soviet military had placed two ICBM units in the Ukraine under the command of the 43rd Missile Army. These were the 19th Missile Division near Khmelnitskiy and the 46th Missile Division near Pervomaisk. It is interesting to note that, while numerous active and inactive SAM sites are located near Pervomaisk, no evidence of strategic SAM deployment near Khmelnitskiy has been found. This would seem to indicate that the defense of ICBM batteries was not a significant priority, or that this mission was primarily handled by aerial assets.

The locations of the Pervomaisk ICBM silos and nearby SAM sites can be seen in the image below:
FUTURE EFFORTS

Despite the modern, robust nature of the Ukrainian air defense network, it will require modernization in the future. The S-200 and S-300PS systems will likely require replacement in the 2015-2020 timeframe. Even without taking service life into account, both systems are likely nearing (S-300PS) or past (S-200) their prime, thanks to constant development of ECM and SEAD/DEAD systems and tactics throughout the world.

The simplest option would be to procure S-300PMU-2 Favorit (SA-20B GARGOYLE) or S-400 (SA-21) systems from Russia, as they would be able to operate within the existing EW and battle management networks. This could also be packaged together with Buk-M2E (SA-17 GRIZZLY) systems as Buk-M1 replacements. Current tensions with Russia regarding Ukrainian desires to join NATO and the nation's support of Georgia have been well-publicized, but may not be enough to impede an arms deal of this expense. The Ukraine is a member of the CIS Air Defense Network and has shared information in that capacity with Russia, continuing to do so through 2009, and participates in various multinational exercises related to the network as well. Russia and the Ukraine also do well over $10 billion USD in trade annually, demonstrating that while the governments do have issues they are still able to coexist and cooperate in other areas.

After the breakup of the USSR, the Ukraine began to research many indigenous missile systems, including the Grom/Sapsan SRBM and Korshun GLCM. An IR-guided AAM, the Izdelie 611 "Gran" is also under development, and could represent a stepping stone towards a new SAM design. No evidence of any BVR AAM development has surfaced in the Ukraine, but a viable WVR AAM could lead designers down that path in the future. A BVR system, particularly an active or passive radar missile, would certainly be a candidate for surface-launch as a SAM system. Such a weapon could potentially replace the Buk systems, as well as S-300PS systems in a boosted form for extended range. This option remains less attractive than pursuing Russian-made SAM systems, however, as indigenous radars may be required and development could consume a decade or more given that the Ukraine is basically starting from scratch. An alternative but more complicated solution would be to merely develop a SAM to replace the 5V55-series missiles employed by the S-300PS. This would enable the system to retain the guidance systems and components of the S-300PS, while rejuvenating its service life through the addition of a new missile with a new solid rocket motor.

The last option would be to purchase a foreign-made, non-Russian SAM system. NATO entry could theoretically open the doors necessary for a Patriot or MEADS purchase. While these systems would certainly be viable, they would potentially require a new EW network for support, further increasing the overall cost of modernization. This EW requirement stems from the issues many nations have had, particularly Greece with the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) and Patriot, at getting Russian-made and Western-made SAM systems to operate cooperatively. In that light, a Russian-made SAM system purchase would be far more logical.

CONCLUSION

The Ukrainian Air Defense Force remains a very capable, modern SAM network. With a renewed focus on training and professionalism in the Ukrainian armed forces as a whole since 2005, the Air Defense Force stands ready to take on any regional aggressor and defend the citizenry underneath its umbrella. It will be very interesting to watch as the network evolves in the coming decade.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Ukraine's Air Defense Force
Failed Firings in 2008
Ukraine and the S-200D
The Ukrainian Air Defense Force (in Ukrainian)

This article has been updated, the original version was published in July of 2009.

China's OTH Network

2010-05-22T04:07:00.005-04:00

REMOVED PENDING PDF CONVERSION

The Libyan SAM Network

2010-05-11T23:57:00.006-04:00

INTRODUCTION

Libya possesses one of the most robust air defense networks on the African continent, falling second only to Egypt in terms of coverage and operational systems. Libyan strategic SAM assets are primarily arrayed along the coastline, ostensibly defending the bulk of the Libyan population and preventing foreign incursion into Libyan airspace.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

Libyan strategic SAM assets are subordinate to the Air Defense Forces, which in turn are subordinate to the Libyan Air Force. Currently believed to be divided into five separate regional commands, the Air Defense Force operates a variety of Soviet-era equipment. The following strategic SAM systems are currently serving within the Libyan Air Defense Force: S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON).

EW Coverage

Seventeen active and four inactive EW sites provide Libya's military with early warning radar coverage, used for SAM system target acquisition and track handoff, and GCI control of fighter units. These EW sites are located primarily along the western and eastern coastal regions, monitoring the airspace around Tripoli and Benghazi. Identified EW radars operating in Libya are predominately Soviet-era systems. The following systems have been identified in available imagery:

P-12/18 (SPOON REST)
P-14 (TALL KING)
P-35/37 (BAR LOCK)
P-80 (BACK NET)

In addition, Libya is reported to have received five Italian LPD-20 air search radars in 1983 and three Soviet 5N69 (BIG BACK) EW radars between 1984 and 1985. None of these systems have been identified in available imagery, but that does not preclude their existance.

The following image depicts the locations of identified EW radar sites in Libya:
The following image depicts a notional Libyan EW site, located near Sabha in the western portion of the nation's interior. This is representative of roughly one third of Libya's EW sites. Five sites are only fitted with P-12/18 series radars, with five being fitted with multiple radar systems. The P-12/18 sites likely serve to bolster or extend coverage, with the five sites containing multiple EW radars possibly serving as the command centers for the aforementioned regional commands.
Some strategic SAM sites contain their own organic EW elements. This allows them to perform independent target acquisition, or to accept long-range track handoff from regional EW centers. Seven SAM sites, four S-75 and three S-200, have identified EW assets. S-75 sites feature P-12/18 radars, with S-200 sites featuring P-14 radars. No S-125 sites, and the remaining S-75 and S-200 sites, contain identified EW assets, but this is likely due to the quality of available imagery rather than a lack of assets.

The following image depicts a deployed P-12/18 EW radar at an S-75 site near Tripoli:
SAM Coverage

There are currently thirty one active strategic SAM sites located in Libya. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. S-75 sites are red, S-125 sites are light blue, and S-200 sites are purple. As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of the deployed strategic SAM assets are located along the same coastal regions featuring the bulk of the EW assets.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by the identified Libyan strategic SAM sites. Using the same color scheme applied previously, SA-2 zones are red, S-125 zones are light blue, and S-200 zones are purple.
S-75

There are currently eleven active S-75 sites inside of Libya, constituting roughly one third of the strategic SAM force. Russian sources claim that thirty nine S-75M Volkhov batteries were supplied to Libya between 1974 and 1985. Other sources suggest that the initial order of eighteen batteries supplied between 1974 and 1975 consisted of S-75 Dvina systems. S-75 batteries are deployed to protect key population centers and military facilities, predominately along the coastal region.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-75 batteries:
S-125

There are currently sixteen active S-125 sites inside of Libya. Eight batteries are situated on former S-75 sites. The S-125 represents half of the deployed strategic SAM assets in the nation. Libya operates the S-125M Neva-M variant, with thirty three batteries being supplied between 1974 and 1976. As with the S-75, S-125 batteries are deployed to protect key population and military facilities, predominately along the coastal region.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-125 batteries:
S-200

There are currently four active S-200 sites inside of Libya, each site being equipped with two batteries. The S-200 represents the longest-range strategic SAM system in the Libyan arsenal. The proximity of these four locations to the coastline allows them to range far out into the Mediterranean, theoretically providing a significant standoff engagement capability. Six S-200 batteries were initially supplied to Libya between 1985 and 1986, with a further five being delivered in 1988. There is some confusion as to which variant Libya operates. Russian sources refer to the system delivered as the S-200VE, but the SIPRI arms trade register refers to the system as the Angara, implying that the longer-range S-200DE was delivered.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Libya's active S-200 batteries. A range of 300 kilometers is used, corresponding to the Angara variant.
Tactical SAM Systems

The Libyan Army operates various tactical SAM ssytems which could be called upon to provide point defense of serve as gap fillers in the overall air defense network. These systems include the 2K12 Kvadrat (SA-6 GAINFUL), 9K33 Osa (SA-8 GECKO), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 GASKIN), 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 GOPHER), and Crotale. While the 9K33 is the most numerous system, the 2K12 represents the msot capable tactical SAM system.

Inactive Sites

There are currently thirty identified inactive strategic SAM sites located in Libya. There are fifteen S-75 sites, eleven S-125 sites, and four S-200 sites. These sites are all located within areas featuring active SAM batteries. As such, they may represent facilities available for bolstering the defenses of a given region during hostilities, drawing on equipment held in garrison, or they may represent dispersal locations for the realignment of SAM deployments over time.

To support the latter concept, it should be noted that five inactive sites, two S-75, one S-125, and two S-200, have hosted operational batteries at some point in the past. Also, three S-125 and one S-200 site currently operational were noted as being inactive at some point in the past. This suggests that there is a policy of redeployment and reorganization that occurs. Militarily this is a sound strategy, as it complicates the targeting of these facilities by a potential aggressor. While it is true that new site locations can be deduced by imagery or ELNT analysis, it adds to the workload of pre-strike planners.

The following image depicts the locations of inactive strategic SAM sites located in Libya:
Support Facilities

Eleven facilities provide logistical support for the overall strategic SAM network. Ten of these facilities are SAM garrisons housing undeployed equipment and missile reloads, with the remaining facility being a dedicated SAM training complex. Seven of the SAM garrisons are generic facilities supporting multiple systems. Based on the identification of system components in available imagery, two of the remaining SAM garrisons appear to solely support the S-75, with the remaining garrison supporting the S-125. All garrisons are located in the vicinity of prepared launch sites.

The following image depicts a combined S-75/125 garrison complex near Tripoli:
The following image depicts the Libyan SAM training complex near Misratah:
STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

Libyan strategic SAM assets are arranged to provide a layered air defense zone with overlapping fields of fire. S-75 and S-125 batteries are located in close proximity to provide both redundancy and support, with the S-125 being more capable at lower altitudes than the S-75. The large number of inactive sites suggests that the force has been drawn down over time. This could be due to service life issues, equipment failure, financial reasons, or the expenditure of missile stocks.

National S-200 Coverage

The first line of defense in Libya's strategic SAM network is the S-200. Positioned along the coastline, the four active S-200 batteries provide a credible deterrent to high-RCS cooperative targets such as ISR platforms. S-200 batteries are located near Tripoli, Misratah, Surt, and Benghazi.

Coastal Coverage

Libya's S-75 and S-125 sites are concentrated primarily along the western and eastern coastlines. While the S-200 batteries are situated to provide barrier air defense of the nation's coastline, the S-75 and S-125 sites are positioned to provide point defense of assigned areas. From west to east, these sites are arrayed around Ibn Nafa airbase, Tripoli, Misratah, Benghazi, Bombah, and Adam. While contiguous coverage of the coastal region is not provided by these sites, each location is defended by no fewer than three batteries. Ibn Nafa and Bombah are defended by one S-75 and two S-125 batteries, Misratah is defended by one S-75 and three S-125 batteries, and Benghazi and Adam are defended by two S-75 and two S-125 batteries.

The following image depicts the coastal coverage of Libya's S-75 and S-125 batteries, with the locations of the S-200 batteries also marked:
Interestingly, while Surt features an active S-200 battery, all S-75 and S-125 sites in the area are currently inactive. This leaves the coastline along the Gulf of Sidra relatively undefended.

The most heavily defended city is the capitol of Tripoli. Tripoli is defended by three S-75 and four S-125 batteries, with an S-200 battery positioned south of the city. Three SAM garrisons and three EW facilities are also present in the area, as are four inactive SAM sites.

The following image depicts SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near Tripoli:
The following images depict SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near the remaining coastal areas.

Ibn Nafa Airbase
Misratah
Benghazi
Bombah
Adam
Inland Coverage

Sabha is the only inland city within Libya to have any strategic SAM defenses. Much of the Libyan interior is sparsely populated, as are the regions it borders. What then makes Sabha stand out as a location requiring SAM defenses? First, Sabha is believed to have been associated with the defunct Libyan nuclear weapons program. Second, Sabha was home to Libyan rocket development in the early 1980s, when the OTRAG rocket was tested from the Seba Oasis launch facility. There remains a significant military presence in the area, which is likely the ultimate reason for the presence of strategic SAM assets and related support facilities.

The following image depicts SAM-related facilities and coverage zones near Sebha:
Air Defense Issues

Libya's strategic SAM network is logically arrayed to defend key facilities following a point defense strategy, with long-range S-200 systems providing standoff barrier air defense along the coastal region. However, Libya's strategic SAM network has many flaws.

The main drawback of the Libyan strategic SAM network is an overreliance on aging Soviet technology. Russian manufacturers presently produce what are arguably the most advanced and capable land-based strategic SAM systems in the world. Much of their success lies in the fact that they have produced a diverse array of SAM systems with numerous variants. However, this history also presents a problem for nations relying on older technology: the rest of the world has simply passed them by. Advances in electronic warfare and ECM have made many of the older Soviet-era SAM systems obsolete in a modern air combat environment. Libya's S-75, S-125, and S-200 systems are no exception. Furthermore, despite some claims to the contrary, the Libyan strategic SAM force was generally ineffective during hostilities with the United States in the mid 1980s.

In one case, Soviet military officials deduced that the S-200 succeeded in downing three US Navy aircraft in March of 1986, based only on the perception of fragments on the radar readouts and the presence of helicopter activity in the area, the latter being attributed to CSAR efforts. The USN has never disclosed any aircraft losses during the incident, which in and of itself does not indicate that no aircraft were lost, but the other two pieces of "evidence" can easily be explained. The apparent appearance of aircraft fragments on the radar operators' screens could have been attributed to chaff dispersal or radar interference, especially if the aircraft descended below the radar's field of view. Also, helicopter activity is not limited to CSAR operations in the USN; helicopters active at the time could have been performing anti-submarine patrols, searching out and identifying surface contacts, or simply flying proiciency sorties. Whatever the case may be, the evidence does not conclusively indicate that any USN aircraft were downed by S-200s, and if the Russians or Libyans have any evidence to the contrary they have certainly never seen fit to bring it into the open.

Later in 1986, the Libyan strategic SAM network was abused during Operation ELDORADO CANYON, the US military response to Libyan support of terrorism. Lieutenant General Vladimir Yaroshenko, a former officer in the Soviet PVO SAM Troops, was assigned to analyze the poor performance of the Soviet supplied SAM systems in that operation. LTG Yaroshenko has reported his discovery that poor command and control, poor radar coverage, and a lack of appreciation for American anti-radar weapons and tactics precluded effective target engagement. One interesting fact which he mentions is that the S-75 batteries had a minimum engagement altitude of 100 meters, corresponding to the S-75M Volkhov system as mentioned previously. He also confirms that only one US aircraft, an F-111 shot down by AAA fire, was lost, despite Venikian levels of propaganda claiming otherwise at the time.

Part of the current problem stems from international sanctions placed on Libya during the 1980s which effectively stifled any serious chances of upgrading or replacing obsolete systems. The rest of the problem lies in the systems themselves. All three strategic SAM types operated by Libya have been thoroughly exploited by Western intelligence agencies, and many Western nations have faced these same systems in combat at various times, allowing for continued refinement of ECM systems designed to defeat these weapons electronically. Also, no strategic SAM system operated by Libya possesses a multi-target engagement capability. The only SAM sites representing a threat to multiple aircraft are the S-200 locations, as they possess multiple 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars. As such, even though Libyan strategic SAM sites are arrayed to provide overlapping fields of fire while defending a given area, the relatively small number of sites represents a threat to only a small number of targets. As a result, the overall network is easily susceptible to oversaturation.

The second drawback to Libya's strategic SAM network is one of layout. If it is accepted that older Soviet-era systems may still be reliable against regional aggressors lacking modern, sophisticated EW or ECM suites, the system still has a significant number of gaps that could be exploited. The S-200 represents the only significant over water threat, but is constrained by having a minimum engagement altitude of 300 meters. Any terrain-hugging aircraft or cruise missiles would easily be able to exploit this weakness to approach the Libyan coastline. Once the coastline has been reached, the most obvious point of ingress would be the area adjacent to the Gulf of Sidra, which is devoid of deployed strategic SAM assets. Furthermore, as evidenced in the image seen previously, there are gaps between areas covered by S-75 and S-125 batteries which could also be exploited. This does not of course take into account the presence or performance of interceptors, AAA, or tactical SAM units, as these systems are outside the scope of this analysis.

CONCLUSION

At the end of the day, the Libyan strategic SAM network requires a massive infusion of new technology to remain viable in the twenty first century. It was not capable of repelling an attack over twenty years ago, and there is no reason to suspect that it will be capable of such action today. Libya is reportedly negotiating for the purchase of advanced S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE) SAM systems from Russia, which would go a long way towards modernizing the network and restoring its effectiveness. Colonel al-Gaddafi has made great strides in bringing Libya back into the community of nations, and deserves a large amount of praise for doing so, but that should not lessen the Libyan government's desire or responsibility to provide adequate defense for its citizens.

SOURCES

-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of Libya and may therefore not represent the entire air defense network.

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

SIPRI
The North African Military Balance: Force Developments in the Maghreb (PDF File)
The OTRAG rocket
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
SAMs of the PVO, Mikhail Pervov, 2001
Fakel's Missiles, Vladimir Korovin, 2003

Falcon Missile Info Wanted

2010-05-10T02:24:00.003-04:00

One of my ongoing research projects is a history of the Falcon missile. For those of you who don't know, the Falcon was the USAF's first guided AAM. It evolved into a whole mess of variants, culminating in the monster AIM-47, the projected armament for the F-12B Mach 3 interceptor. I've collected a ton of information, schematics, photos, etc, over the past few years, but I still have some holes left to fill in the story. Here's what I'm looking for:

-What variants of the AIM-4/26 did Greece, Iran, Taiwan, and Turkey receive? Were they ever used in combat? What were the results?
-What were the details of the Swedish modification program, which is supposed to have brought the license-built AIM-4C to AIM-4D standard?
-Were there any differences between the Swedish license built missiles and those exported to Switzerland?

If anyone can point me in the right direction, it'd be appreciated. I'm particularly interested to hear what foreign pilots, particularly those from the Greek, Japanese, Swedish, Swiss, and Turkish AFs, thought of the missile. If you know of anybody that can help, have them drop me a line! Same goes if you know of anybody who may have worked on the missile at some point, particularly the GAR-9/AIM-47.

Upcoming Schedule

2010-05-10T01:49:00.003-04:00

I think I'll start posting the upcoming schedule at the beginning of the month. That'll give you guys an idea of what's coming. I've started formulating a list of topics for the next few months, this way I can work on them bit by bit and have everything done on time, keeping to my new schedule.

Here's what's coming in May and June (May is set, June is tentative and will be re-posted at the beginning of June concurrently with the first Image of the Week):

May 2010
Week 1: SAM Site Overview (done already)
Week 2: Libyan SAM Network
Week 3: China's OTH Radar Network
Week 4: update to Ukraine's SAM Network

June 2010
Week 1: SAM Site Overview
Week 2: Kazakhstan's SAM Network
Week 3: the Ulan Ude SAM Garrison
Week 4: update to the PLA's 2nd Artillery

Here's some of the analysis pieces that I'll be working on over the summer:
Iran's Ballistic Missile Facilities
Underground Airfields (this'll be a multi-part feature over the course of a few months)
Falcon View

And, here's a list of nations that will see SAM Network pieces done at some point:
Armenia
Azerbaijan
India
Japan
North Korea
South Korea
Vietnam

Feel free to comment and let me know what other nations you'd like to see SAM Network pieces published on, what older articles you'd like to see updated, or if you have any fun ideas for an analysis piece.

Computer Foul-up (Again)

2010-05-03T23:45:00.003-04:00

I've had to order a new keyboard for my laptop. Some of the keys have quit working; this isn't a suprise, as there was an incident a while ago involving my dork of a cat, my laptop, and a glass of Spezi. Most of it works fine, but the numbers 5 and 6 and the - symbol don't, as well as a few others. This makes it relatively impossible to type SA-5! Plus, some of the keys, the d and f most obviously, tend to stick and insert random letters. Fortunately, I already compiled the SAM Site Overview update for this week (to be posted tomorrow after I save and upload the new files), and the new hardware should be here before the week is over. But, as I will keep posting until the new keyboard arrives (the Microsoft On-Screen Keyboard thing is an irritating yet sufficient temporary fix), I'd ask all of you to let me know if you find any obvious typos or other weirdness that slips through the cracks. Keyboard stupidity will not deter me from my new schedule!

New Release Schedule, Other Notes

2010-04-29T00:23:00.005-04:00

Schedule Madness

Been a bit busy around here with the end of the semester. Exams and papers to grade, all that fun stuff. Every time I think I've gotten it sorted out, my schedule seems to perform an auto-destruct! I've got a pile of things in progress for this site that have not seemed to be effectively nearing completion with anything resembling timeliness. So, as I sat here yesterday pondering how I managed to make a total mess of things, I realized that there was a simple answer: I need a schedule!

Scheduling Applied...in theory

Here's how this will work until I think of something better, or until I totally screw this up backwards and have to rethink yet again. During a normal month, things will fall like this:

-Every week will still see an Image of the Week, that will not go away. Beginning with this weekend, Images of the Week will be posted on Sunday. This keeps them away from any potential foul-ups that affect my life during the week, yay.

-The first week of the month will see the SAM Site Overview file updated.

-The second week of the month will see a new SAM Network Overview piece published (the new part is important, keep reading). There are still a lot of amusing nations to cover, like Libya, India, Vietnam, and many of the Asian former Soviet republics.

-The third week of the month will see some sort of analysis piece published. This can be something like I did with the Chinese Laser ASAT sites, or the piece on RCS ranges. These articles might also be covering topics thoroughly unrelated to imagery analysis, such as an assessment of the JSF program, or my take on the USAF's search for the next long-range bomber.

-The fourth week of the month will be left for updates to older articles, like when I updated the Iranian and Syrian SAM Network articles recently. This also gives me a cushion to work on some of the aforementioned bits for the upcoming month if I know I'll be busy.

-Anything else might appear totally at random. These can include things like the Reading Lists, or other amusing things that I feel the need to write on. The piece I did on the updated imagery coverage of KYMTR would fit into this category.

-The first day of the month or thereabouts (probably a Monday, but no later than the date which the SAM Site Overview is posted), I'll post a message listing my planned topics for the month. This will give you all a chance to chime in and let me know if there's something you want to see. I may cover your idea instead of mine, or I might use your ideas for a future month. Either way I do keep track of people's suggestions and I do try and get around to them eventually. By doing things in an organized fashion like this, I should be able to reduce the length of time corresponging to "eventually". In theory. As a result of this, I have also obliterated the "Forthcoming Articles" menu.

And now, on to some other notes.

Comments

Comments are still welcome and encouraged. Yes, they are still moderated, but that serves a purpose. About the time I hit 350,000 hits, I started getting blasted with comments which were advertisements for certain male-oriented pharmaceutical products. Moderating comments allows me to purge those before they ever get posted. I am not here to act as your personal censor. If you post a comment that relates to the site, I will approve it. I don't care if you agree with me, disagree with me, or whatever. Have your say, and I'll see it gets posted. Now, there are still some caveats to that which I'll bring up again:

-Comments may not appear immediately. For one, I have to log in and approve them. Duh. Also, some of them may be held for a day or two until I have a chance to formulate a reply if I think one is warranted, or if someone was asking a direct question. Keeping them in the que helps me to keep track of them. But they will appear, be patient.

-If you comment in some non-English language, it may or may not get posted. There are two reasons for this. One, if I cannot verify that it is relevant to the site (I can read some of them, and others I do translate), it won't get through. Two, if you post in something like Chinese, all I see are a bunch of squares where the characters should appear. So those get tossed as well, as I have no idea what you're trying to say.

All in all, I think the comments have worked well recently. Remember, just because they are moderated does not in any way shape or form mean I am trying to censor them. Yes, this is my site, but I want you to feel free to disagree and express your opinions as well.

The Forum

The forum still works. There hare been reports of it setting off people's anti-virus software recently. I have no clue what that is about. I've looked, and there is no reason why that should be happening. I've got no indications of anything nefarious on my end, nor have I ever gotten such a notification from my software. The issue probably has to do with the ads placed on the forum (which is what makes the forum free). My guess is that some anti-virus software just doesn't like some of the ads. If anybody has any other insight regarding this issue, definitely let me know. But as of right now, the forum is perfectly safe to the best of my knowledge. It certainly hasn't tried to assault my computer.

Another Webinar

I post these because they're free (and therefore awesome, like the forum), and because I was asked to as they might interest a lot of the readers here. Another one is coming up, and here are the details:

This month, Henley-Putnam University continues its exclusive, free webinar series with “Insider’s Guide to Intelligence & Interrogation,” led by former CIA polygraph examiner and deception detection expert Barry McManus. During the webinar, Mr. McManus will cover topics essential to anyone interested in a career in intelligence or deception detection.

“Insider’s Guide to Intelligence & Interrogation” will take place Friday, April 30, from 2:00 - 3:00 PM EDT. Those interested should register here.

If anybody has something else like this that they'd like me to post, send me an e-mail.

Helping you out

I've gotten quite a few requests from people for help in various projects, or for permission to use my material in presentations or journals. I'm always open to such things, just fire me an e-mail with the details. Usually all I care about are two things: credit if necessary, and a copy of whatever you stick my work into, if an actual non-electronic copy exists. Basically, I work for free, because I find it amusing.

That's about it for now. There will be some other tidbits filtering out over the next week, and the new schedule will apply starting in May. As always, send me any feedback you might have via email or a comment here.

Free Counterintelligence Webinar

2010-03-25T12:58:00.002-04:00

Former USAF OSI Special Agent Colonel (Ret.) Michael Angley will be conducting a free webinar, Insider’s Guide to the Counterintelligence Community, on March 31 from 11:00 AM - 12:00 PM PST. Col. Angley, conducting the webinar on behalf of Henley-Putnam University, has over 25 years of experience conducting counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations around the world. Colonel Angley will provide a broad overview of the field of counterintelligence (CI), an often misunderstood and mysterious subset of both the intelligence and law enforcement communities. He will discuss the formal definition of CI as it appears in current Executive Orders, as well as break it down into more simplistic and practical terms. He will also discuss the differences between defensive and offensive approaches to CI, the major agencies that have a CI mission, and the limitations the U.S. government places on the conduct of CI activities.

Anyone interested in attending can register online here.

Menu Fail

2010-03-20T05:19:00.003-04:00

Google has changed Google Earth's Layers menu. They've basically consolidated a lot of things into one "button", Places of Interest. Activating this will open what used to be city and town names, shops, restaurants, parks, schools, banks, train stations, airports, etc. In an effort to consolidate and make things more streamlined, they've basically made it far less useful and a lot more confusing.

First off, you'll notice that there are a good deal fewer placemarks now. For example, a lot of schools seem to have disappeared. These placemarks are all altitude restricted as well, meaning that certain things disappear once you zoom out far enough. This makes it a lot more complicated to do things like find schools or restaurants near your home, unless you're only concerned with what is practically right across the street. The only positive to this change is that certain places, like airports or restaurants, have kept their unique placemarks.

Secondly, the place names don't appear unless you click on the icon to display the ddescriptive balloon. This doesn't really matter for shops and the like, but is very irritating when it comes to displaying the names of population centers using this new feature. If you want to see the old-style city names and markers, you now have to activate the Labels "button" in the Borders and Labels folder. OK, doing this will activate ALL of the labels, including those for islands, water bodies, and the like, which isn't all that bad for the most part. The problem is that it also activates all of the alternate or foreign place names as well, giving you two names for a lot of locations. This can make images very cluttered. It also isn't consistant. Mountains, for example, are included in Places of Interest, while islands are in Labels. Shouldn't all the geographic features be in the same place?

Personally, I find the second problem far more irritating than the first. I wouldn't mind if they went with either the Western or native names for the cities and whatnot, but having to have both of them displayed if you want or need them on-screen makes life a little more difficult. The only solution at this point is to develop my own series of placemarks for these locations when I need them, adding more time and effort to any project. If the point of doing this is to make things more streamlined and simpler to use, Google has, in my opinion, failed. Something that is intended to be simpler should not require the expenditure of more time and effort to get it to do what you need.

There's also the issue that a lot of their placemarks draw data directly from Wikipedia, but we won't touch that one today.

Yeah, I know I'm what would probably be considered a "niche" user of Google Earth, exploiting it for very specific and specialized purposes, but the first point I discussed above makes life more complicated for everyone. Hopefully, this will turn out to be part of a rolling update to remake the entire Layers menu. But if not, Google just made life more difficult for a lot of users, and if you ask me, it was a completely unnecessary change. Unless, of course, they just had to clear out the disk space to throw up more new imagery, but the probability of that being the reason is ridiculously remote given the fact that Google could buy new servers with the same frequency that I buy obnoxious death metal CDs.

What are your thoughts? Post them in the comments!

SAM Site Overview Alteration

2010-03-17T17:33:00.004-04:00

I've been exploiting Terra Server, Bing Maps, and a few other amusing online imagery sources to examine some areas of Google Earth that are either 1) not covered in high resolution, or 2) have not been updated with newer imagery for quite some time. I've discovered a number of things that will be included in the SAM Site Overview, beginning with the next update. This might be a little confusing at first glance. For example, I've found imagery from 2009 showing that the 64N6E site in China near Dalian is now active. I will be changing the placemarks in the file to reflect this, as Google Earth's imagery of that region is still a bit dated. So, you'll see an empty 64N6E location, but have a placemark telling you that it is active. No, I haven't lost my mind, I'm just beginning to incorporate other sources into the database on a larger scale. Anything potentially weird like that example will always be explained in the Notes section of the placemark. Just thought I'd give everyone a heads-up before I start doing something potentially confusing.

IMINT & Analysis Photo Archive

2010-03-16T23:55:00.002-04:00

Digital Photography

I've been an amateur photographer for a few years now, and have built up a pretty large battery of images. I'm going to be using more of them in some upcoming projects for this site, but I figured I'd post a list of the military-themed objects I've photographed and make them available to readers here who are researching some of these items. What you'll find below is a list containing the location I took the photos and the year I was there, followed by the items photographed at that location. Most of these are static images, but some of them, particularly those taken at military open houses, are of aircraft in the air. I was as detailed as I could be from memory looking at the images, so if you see something like "F-4" instead of "F-4G", ask me and I can tell you what the specific model or variant is that I have images of from a given location. The majority of the subjects were shot from numerous angles, and most of them have a number of close-up detail shots as well (equipment bays, antennae, hardpoints, intakes, etc). Anything 2007 and later was taken with a Canon EOS30D DSLR, those images are of a bit better quality on average, particularly of aircraft in the sky. Also, some of them do feature dust spots, as it did take me a while to learn how to clean the sensor on the camera!

Obtaining Images

To obtain digital copies of any of these images for research or personal use, send me an e-mail with a listing of what it is you'd like and what you are requesting the images for, and I'll do my best to accomodate you as soon as possible.

If you wish to obtain images for publication in any fashion (web, periodical, book, etc), I don't charge a fee but I do request the following:
-Credit as the photographer; and
-A copy of the periodical or other hardcopy publication you use them in, or
-A link to this specific page of the website if the images are to be used online

Hampton Roads Air Power Park - 2005
AIM-4D
F-86D
F-89
F-101B
F-105
NIKE-AJAX
NIKE-ZEUS
RF-4E
XV-6A Kestrel

Langley AFB Open House - 2007
A-10
B-1B
B-2A
C-130
F-15C
F/A-18F
F-22A
F-35A mockup
F-86
F-117A
US Air Force Heritage Flight: A-10, F-15C, F-22A, F-86
US Air Force Thunderbirds
US Navy Heritage Flight: F/A-18F, F4F

Langley AFB Open House - 2008
A-10
B-1B
B-17
C-17
C-130
E-2C
F-4E
F-15C
F-15E
F-16
F/A-18F
F-22A
F-35 mockup
KC-10A
P-51
Spitfire
T-45A
Royal Air Force Red Arrows
US Air Force Heritage Flight: F-4E, F-15E, F-22A

Langley AFB Open House - 2009
A-4
B-52
C-17
C-130
F-4E
F-15C
F-16
F-21A Kfir
F-22A
F/A-18C
KC-135R
P-51
Sea Harrier FRS.2
T-33
US Air Force Heritage Flight: F-4E, F-15C, F-22A, P-51
US Air Force Thunderbirds
US Navy Heritage Flight: F/A-18C, F4F

McConnell AFB - 2003
C-130
KC-135R
Saab Gripen

McConnell AFB Open House - 2003
A-10
B-1B
B-17
B-25
B-52D
C-17
CF-188
CP-140
E-6A
F-16
F/A-18C
F-117A
M-109 Paladin
MiG-15UTI
MLRS
Tornado IDS Luftwaffe
T-38A

McConnell AFB Open House - 2004
A6M Zero
AT-6
B-1B
B-2
B-17
B-25
Canadian Air Force Snowbirds
DC-3
F-15
F-16
KC-135R
Learjet 23
P-51
Pearl Harbor Display Flight: A6M, P-51
US Air Force Heritage Flight: F-16, P-51

McConnell AFB Open House - 2006
US Air Force Thunderbirds

McGuire AFB BOMARC Site - 2007
Various shots from outside the now-contaminated site's fenceline

McGuire AFB Open House - 2007
A-10
F-4E
US Army Golden Knights
US Air Force Heritage Flight: A-10, F-4E, P-51
US Air Force Thunderbirds

National Air And Space Museum Udvar Hazy Annex - 2006
707
AGM-76A
AGM-86A
AGM-86B
AIM-120
ASM-135 ASAT
B-29 Enola Gay
Concorde
Corona capsule
Do-335A
F-4
Ho-111h
Homing Overlay Experiment
MiG-21
Reinochter R-1
RIM-8J Talos
Ruhrstahl
SA-2
Silkworm
Space Shuttle Enterprise
SR-71A
X-35B
XAAM-N-3 Sparrow II
XV-15

USAF Museum - scans of old photos taken before I went digital
AIM-4A
AIM-4C
AIM-4D
AIM-4F
AIM-4G
AIM-7
AIM-9
AIM-26B
AIM-120
AIR-2
B-1A
CIM-10
MiG-23MLD

USAF Museum - 2003
A-10
A-37
AC-130
ADM-20
AGM-28
AGM-86B
AGM-129
AGM-131
AIM-4A
AIM-4D
AIM-4F
AIM-4G
AIM-9M
AIM-26B
AIR-2
AN/TPS-1B
Apollo capsule
B-1B
B-2 Iron Bird
B-29 Bock's Car
B-58
Bird Of Prey
BLU-82
C-45H
C-54C
C-118
C-121
CIM-10
D-21B
EF-111A
F-4G
F-15
F-16 AFTI
F-16 Thunderbird
F-100D Thunderbird
F-101B
F-102A
F-105
F-106
F-107A
F-111A
F-111F
F-117A
Fritz-X
GBU-15
Gemini capsule
J-3C-65-8
LANTIRN
MiG-21
MiG-23MLD
Mercury capsule
Model 24 C8F
NT-33A
PA-48
P-51D
P-59B
P-80R
R-13 Atoll
RF-4C
RQ-1
RQ-3
RQ-4
SA-2
SR-71A
T-39A
TACIT BLUE
TACT RAINBOW
Tornado GR.1 RAF
U-4B
UH-13J
V-1
V-2
VC-6A
VC-137A
VC-140B
X-1B
X-3
X-4 Ruhrstahl
X-4
X-5
X-10
X-15
X-24A
X-24B
X-25A
X-29
X-36
X-45
XB-70 Valkyrie
XC-142A
XF-84H
XF-85
XF-91
XF-92
XGAM-63
XH-20
XV-6A
YF-12A
YF-22A
YFH-84H
ZPU-2
ZPU-4

USAF Museum - 2004
AIM-4A
AIM-4D
AIM-4F
AIM-4G
AIM-120
B-2 Iron Bird
B-47
B-57
B-58
BGM-109
D-21B
EF-111A
F-16 Thunderbird
F-101B
F-117A
GBU-24
Mark 41
MiG-23MLD
RF-4C
SR-71A
TACIT BLUE
TACIT RAINBOW
Tornado GR.1 RAF
X-45

USAF Museum - 2005
A-7
ADM-20
AGM-28
AGM-129
B-26K
B-66
CF-100
CGM-13
D-21B
EC-121
EC-135E
Fat Man device
F-4G
F-84
F-100
F-111F
EF-111A
F-117A
MiG-17
MiG-19
Minuteman RV test shape
NKC-135
Peacekeeper railcar
RF-4C
SA-2
SICBM TEL
SR-71A
U-2

USAF Museum - 2007
AGM-129
AGM-131
B-2 Iron Bird
Bird Of Prey
CBU-58
D-21B
DH.89 Dominie
F-16 AFTI
F-102A
F-107A
GBU-12
LoFLYTE
MiG-19
SR-71A Blackbird
TACIT BLUE
X-10
X-13
X-29
XB-70 Valkyrie
XF-91 Thunderceptor
XH-20
XV-6A Kestrel
YF-12A Blackbird
YF-22A
YQM-94A

USAF Museum - 2009
AC-130A
AGM-129
AGM-131
Avrocar
Bird Of Prey
C-119J
C-141C
D-21
EC-135E
F-4G
F-22A
F-106A
F-107A
F-117A
Ju-52
MiG-29
NC-131H
NKC-135A
Peacekeepeer railcar
SA-2
SICBM TEL
SR-71A
TACIT BLUE
TACIT RAINBOW
Tornado GR.1 RAF
X-40A
X-45
XB-70A
XV-3
YC-125B
YF-12A
YF-23A

USS Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space Museum - 2005
A-4
A-6F
A-12 Blackbird
AGM-84
AV-8A
BGM-109
Concorde
Dassault Etendard IVP
F7U
F-4
F-8
F-14B
Gemini capsule
IAI Kfir F-21A
Mb-339
Mercury capsule
RGM-6
Standard SM-1
T-72

Virginia Aviation Museum - 2005
SR-71A

The Blackbird Reading List

2010-03-15T22:55:00.001-04:00

INTRODUCTION

Blackbird. Habu. Cygnus. OXCART. SENIOR CROWN. Anyone with even a passing interest in Cold War military history or aviation history knows what those names represent. This reading list will provide historians, researchers, and aviation fans with some of the best reading materials and reference sources available on these most fascinating of aircraft. All of these titles have been taken straight from the author's personal library (in other words, this is not meant to represent every single published work, just the ones that I've bought and read) and will be reviewed in brief. Titles will be divided by decade, demonstrating to an extent how they seemed to land on the market in bunches, ostensibly due to the discovery or release of new information previously unavailable.

THE 1980S

Blackbird-related titles began to arrive on the shelves in earnest in the 1980s. The aircraft had been operating for a sufficient length of time for authors to start devoting attention to Lockheed's Mach 3 legends. The addition to the USAF Museum of the surviving YF-12A in 1979 also precipitated speeches by key personnel divulging further information. The main sticking point about the 1980s was that not much was known about the CIA's Blackbirds, and details of their operational exploits were still highly clasified for the most part. The first photographs and basic details of CIA-operated Blackbirds were released in 1982, nearly 15 years after Agency operations concluded.

SR-71 Blackbird in action, Lou Drendel, 1982 My first Blackbird book! Not much more than a photo chronicle, it does provide some details on flying the Sled thanks to interviews with crewmembers, and provides the first bit of speculation on what exactly the A-12s sitting in the California sun at Palmdale were for. A very brief section also theorizes on the purpose and operation of the D-21, accompanied by the sole photo of the M-21/D-21 combination released for publication at the time.

Lockheed SR-71, Jay Miller, 1985 This Aerofax title seems to be one of the more sought-after titles on the Blackbird. Apparently tailored more towards the modeling community rather than the enthusiast community, a number of detail photographs highlight this book, showcasing such airframe bits as the nacelles, landing gear, and canopies. The text is naturally a bit sparse being that this is primarily a photographic work, but some interesting bits of data, such as a complete production list of all Blackbirds, were included.

Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird, Paul F. Crickmore, 1986 Crickmore's first Blackbird work (as far as I know) and arguably the best book written on the subject for many years to come. I first ran across this one in the library at 2 ATAF HQ at RAF Rheindahlen in the mid 80's and was determined to find a copy. Coming in at 200 pages, it contained the most detailed look at the entire program published during the '80s. A brief paragraph even mentioned CIA operational sorties out of Kadena with the A-12.

Lockheed Blackbirds, Anthony M. Thornborough and Peter E. Davies, 1988 Not much is included in this work, which covers both the Blackbird and the U-2/TR-1 families, that isn't found in far greater detail in Crickmore's work. However, some large three-view drawings are provided which are pretty impressive, with different three views provided for the YF-12A, "M-12" (the M-21 designator hadn't been discovered yet), and SR-71, with scrap side views of the A-12, "A-12 two seater" (again, TA-12, undiscovered), and SR-71B provided as well.

By the end of the 1980s, when the Blackbird program was nearing its first official end, the reference works available provided a great deal of insight into the YF-12A and SR-71 development and operational histories. It was also becoming known that the CIA had something to do with flying single-seat Blackbirds around in the Far East, and that they were trying to do strange things with what basically amounted to the World's Fastest Biplane (thank you, I'll be here all night) as well.

THE 1990S

Three significant books on the Blackbird appeared in the 1990s, basically due to an increase in interest coinciding with the brief return to operational service of the SR-71A. By this time far more information on the A-12 program had been declassified, allowing a much clearer picture of the CIA's operation of the Blackbird to be presented for the first time.

SR-71 Blackbird, James Goodall, 1995 Aside from Crickmore's 1986 work, this became a standard reference for the Blackbird until the 21st Century. A great deal of information on the CIA's Blackbird operations was included, as well as a host of new photographs. This also marked the first time that the SR-71A Big Tail modification was detailed in a Blackbird book.

SR-71 Revealed: The Inside Story, Richard H. Graham, 1996 Who else but a former Sled driver, who became a Blackbird squadron commander and later the commander of the 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, would be a better choice to pen a book on the SR-71? After reading Col. Graham's book, the answer is nobody. Col. Graham tells the Blackbird's story the way only an insider can, from his recruitment into the program, all the way to the politics behind the Blackbird's retirement while he was the 9th SRW's CC. This book is not a purely technical overview, with the Blackbird's family history relegated to a mere four pages, but rather a detailed accounting of the program from a pilot's perspective. Col. Graham's personal tales and anecdotes are what make this a must-read for any Cold War aviation enthusiast.

Lockheed SR-71/YF-12 Blackbirds, Dennis R. Jenkins, 1997 At first glance there doesn't appear to be much in the way of new textual information that Jim Goodall didn't cover in 1995 in this book. However, the real strength of this book was the inclusion of a great deal of technical schematics and reference drawings taken from flight manuals and other official sources. Many of these dealt with the YF-12, including schematics detailing the loading procedures for inserting AIM-47 missiles into the weapon bays.

2000-2010

With the turn of the century, the Blackbird again found itself out of operational service, and no longer in use by NASA. Despite the fact that no Blackbird would ever take to the air again (unless somebody wants to convice Bill Gates or Richard Branson that it'd just be really fun to restore one to flying status for the airshow circuit...anybody?), newly declassified information began to flow out of the CIA and SENIOR CROWN coffers with more regularity. This was in part due to the fact that the aircraft family was completely out to pasture, and likely in no small part due to the fact that researchers were continuing to bombard the relevant FOIA offices with requests for information!

A-12 Blackbird Declassified, Jeanette Remak and Joseph Ventolo Jr., 2001 The first Blackbird-themed book to emerge in the 21st Century was certainly one of the finest. It was also the first book to deal primarily with the A-12 program. Making through use of newly declassified information, a nearly complete operational history of the aircraft with the CIA was reconstructed, as well as numerous flight test details. Token mention of the USAF's KEDLOCK and SENIOR CROWN programs is made, as well as a brief overview of the TAGBOARD/SENIOR BOWL experimentation with the D-21 drone.

Combat Legend: SR-71 Blackbird, Paul F. Crickmore, 2002 This work was part of a series called Combat Legends published by Airlife. It reads like an abridged and updated version of Crickmore's 1986 work, and is bolstered by numerous color profiles.

Lockheed's SR-71 Blackbird Family, James Goodall and Jay Miller, 2002 This is a thoroughly updated and greatly expanded edition of Jay Miller's first Aerofax title from the 1980s, and is not to be missed. This work probably made the best use of the declassified material available at the time, covering the design process of the A-12 in far greater detail than any previous work. This is one of the few Blackbird books that still stands up even today, due to the wealth of historical and technical data included. This was also the first publication to depict some of the declassified schematics for armed SR-71 iterations.

Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird, Bill Holder, 2002 This book is nothing special, featuring minimalist text and too many poor-quality images. This one is only recommended for the serious collector, and can be overlooked by the researcher or historian. One interesting inclusion, however, is a series of photos depicting most of the Blackbirds at their display locations at the time of publication. This, of course, precipitated my own campaign to eventually photograph every surviving Blackbird myself.

SR-71 Blackbird Walk Around, James Goodall, 2003 This title is exactly what it sounds like, a photographic history of the Blackbird family. While there are a number of detail photographs like the title suggests, there are also a number of in-flight and static images as well. If there is a detail feature of the Blackbird, it is likely covered here, including the different cockpit configurations of nearly every variant. This should be regarded as the primary source for any modeler interested in creating the Blackbird.

Lockheed Blackbird: Beyond the Secret Missions, Paul F. Crickmore, 2004 A revised edition of a Crickmore book I managed to somehow miss, this is a serious volume and should be on the shelf of every Blackbird enthusiast. At 400 pages this is easily the largest book on the Blackbird family yet published. Nearly every operational detail is covered, and the development and test histories of the aircraft programs are certainly not glossed over. The real strength of this book is in the descriptions of various operational sorties flown by Blackbird crews around the globe, as well as intercepts flown by Soviet and Russian interceptor pilots. The interview with a former MiG-31 pilot is very nearly worth the cover price alone.

Lockheed Blackbirds, Tony R. Landis and Dennis R. Jenkins, 2004 This is an expanded and far better illustrated version of Jenkins' 1997 book. Many new photographs are included from Tony Landis's collection of Blackbird images, and there are a host of new technical diagrams as well.

Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird, Steve Pace, 2004 This was a welcome addition to the Blackbird library. Pace's work is a well written, relatively concise history of the Blackbird family, backed up by numerous data tables describing test occurrences (such as AIM-47 firings), and significant historical references (such as Kelly Johnsons's A-12 flight log, albeit in an abridged form). The most interesting section details numerous unbuilt Blackbird iterations, many of which were meant to be armed. A hypothetical F-12B intercept scenario is also included. While there isn't much "new" information when compared to earlier works, the presentation and the interesting bits mentioned above still make this an interesting and worthwhile read.

Lockheed SR-71 Operations in the Far East, Paul F. Crickmore, 2008 Crickmore returns to the Blackbird with Volume 76 of Osprey's Combat Aircraft series. This is an up-to-date reference detailing the operational service of the A-12 and SR-71 flying reconnaissance sorties over targets in the Far East. This is basically an abridged update of his last work, making use of the most up-to-date declassified information available. In this case, the history of the aircraft is only briefly detailed, as the focus is on the operational side of things.

Flying the SR-71 Blackbird: In the Cockpit on a Secret Operational Mission, Richard H. Graham, 2008 Colonel Graham, in his second Blackbird book, provides the reader with a step-by-step look at flying an operational sortie in the SR-71A. Each chapter is broken down based on the pilot's checklist steps for that particular segment of the sortie. This is a unique and insightful look at actually flying the Blackbird and includes numerous historical bits and amusing stories from Colonel Graham's Blackbird career.

From Archangel to Senior Crown: Design and Development of the Blackbird, Peter W. Merlin, 2008 For the first time, an author has decided to focus entirely on the technical and technological aspects of the Blackbird family. Merlin's work is outstanding, the only complaint being that this could have easily surpassed 500 pages! While the text is outstanding and well researched, the real treat is the included CD containing numerous flight manuals, documents, images, and videos. The information here is substantial and valuable enough to almost make the book an afterthought, but that would be to ignore the well written insight into the technology of the Blackbird family that Merlin has authored.

The Archangel and the OXCART, Jeanette Remak and Joseph Ventolo, 2008 Remak and Ventolo have provided us with a complete rehash of their 2001 work, incorporating a host of newly declassified material. The most interesting new bits and pieces deal with the ECM systems on the A-12. There are a lot of issues with the editing, but Jeanette Remak has been kind enough to explain them here. Any Blackbird enthusiast would be well advised to see past these issues and pick this up, as it represents the most detailed look at the A-12 published to date.

Archangel: CIA's Supersonic A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft, David Robarge, 2008 This is the printed version of the official CIA history of the A-12 published online in 2007 here. It is a concise look at the Agency's involvement in Mach 3 reconnaissance.

Lockheed SR-71 Operations in Europe and the Middle East, Paul F. Crickmore, 2009 Crickmore's most recent work is a companion piece to his 2008 volume on operations in the Far East. Primarily focused on operations out of RAF Mildenhall, sorties staged from the United States over the Middle East are also detailed. This book reads like a second volume of his 2008 book, jumping right into operations without any mention of the program's history, and that's just fine. The only potential omission is a reference to OXCART preparations for missions over Cuba, but that's more of a nitpick than a true drawback, as those missions were, after all, never flown.

From RAINBOW to GUSTO: Stealth and the Design of the Lockheed Blackbird, Paul A. Suhler, 2009 This represents the single most fascinating book yet published on the Blackbird family. Suhler takes the reader through the various designs which led to the final A-12, including competing designs from Convair and proposed successors. Most of the usual technical aspects of the programs are glossed over or simply ignored, and with very good reason. For the first time, a book has been written focusing primarily on the program's efforts to defeat Soviet radar systems. This is definitely a must-read for any Blackbird enthusiast, or anyone interested in low RCS aircraft design.

Lockheed Blackbird Family: Photo Scrapbook, Tony Landis, 2010 This is exactly what it sounds like, a 126 page picture book featuring the Blackbird family. Don't expect a rehashing of the Blackbird's development, that's not the point here, and the actual text is very sparse. There are a number of amusing anecdotes in some of the captions, but the main focus is simply the images of the Blackbirds. There are a ton of images that have not been published before, and most of the book is presented in glorious full color. The highlights are images of two A-12s in formation flight, and a D-21 RCS model depicting a very early shape far removed from what was actually built. Most of the images depict the actual aircraft, with very few detail shots, although there are numerous new drawings of sensor systems and other items included as well. This book serves as an ideal, updated complement to Jim Goodall's SR-71 Blackbird Walk Around from 2003.

OTHER REFERENCES

There are, of course, other excellent Blackbird references to consider apart from books. Wings/Airpower magazine did a four-part piece, each focusing on a different Blackbird variant, a few years ago that was a great source of photographs and interesting bits of information. The Red Star volume on Soviet and Russian UAVs features a section on the Soviet D-21 clone, the Tupolev Voron, which makes for very interesting reading. And there is always the CIA's FOIA internet page, to see what the latest round of declassified documents brings to the OXCART historical knowledge base.

MAIN ERRORS

Two errors seem to propagate themselves among Blackbird books with relative regularity. These are not merely examples of honest educated guesswork refuted by the declassification of information, but rather more blatant errors that have apparently stuck around thanks to their persistence over time often despite the declassification of accurate information. Firstly, the AIM-47 missile carried by the F-12 was not armed with a nuclear warhead. A 0.25 kiloton warhead was investigated early on, but dropped when more accurate homing systems made the need for a nuclear warhead unnecessary. The history of the AIM-47 can be found in brief here (hey, who wrote that?). Secondly, the probes extending forward from the leading edges of the D-21's wings were not associated with the D-21B modification. While captive carry articles seen on M-21 60-6940 did not feature these probes, at least one D-21 launched from the back of M-21 60-6941 did feature them. This can be seen in a video depicting M-21 launch operations, including the fatal accident which destroyed 60-6941. The video is available online here. Look at screenshot M21_009 and the leading edge probes are clearly visible.

FUN ITEMS

Books are great, but a serious Blackbird fan can branch out into all sorts of fun territory. Many people like to collect patches, squadron and aircraft memorabilia, and the like. This is all well and good, and certainly enjoyable, but there are two items which are seriously recommended.

The first is a Century Wings diecast display model of the SR-71A, depicting the famous Ichi Ban Blackbird. Details and photos of this very large and very well detailed model can be seen here. It is over a foot in length, and looks very serious sitting on display among a diecast aircraft collection. Good luck, though, as they have sold out from the manufacturer and can only be obtained through a retailer who has them in stock!

The second item is another diecast aircraft. This one isn't as massive or detailed as the Century Wings Blackbird, but I personally find it to be far more amusing. Plus, and you all should appreciate this after my last example, you can usually find one for just a few dollars. Back in the early 80's you could find the Dyna Flites diecast airplane toys in stores. Pretty simple, usually around four inches long, little metal wheels for undercarriage. Well, check out the image below:
Cut-back chines, short tail...that's a YF-12A! If you can find one of these (I've got three...two from decades ago and a third from EBay), they are pretty unique and well worth it.

Of course, if you're seriously hardcore, you can always buy a piece of certified Blackbird titanium!

CONCLUSION

The source material available on the Blackbird family is increasing with each passing year, and it is fascinating to note how each new publication seems to shed new light on a previously unknown aspect of the aircraft's development or operational use. Until the OXCART, KEDLOCK, TAGBOARD, and SENIOR CROWN files are totally declassified, we likely will not know the complete history of an aviation icon. But it sure is fun to wade through the knowledge that the aforementioned authors have already pieced together for our benefit.

If you want to know where these aircraft are currently located so you can view one for yourself, check out the article here.

Free Intel Career Webinar

2010-01-22T09:10:00.003-05:00

On Thursday, 28 January, at 1100 PST, Professor Edward M. Roche, Ph.D., J.D. will lead a free "Insider's Guide" webinar on the impact of social networking and virtual worlds on intelligence collection. During the webinar Professor Roche will discuss topics including methods of intelligence gathering and surveillance through social networks, actions being taken by law enforcement and intelligence agencies to monitor and combat terrorism through social networks, and the legal implications of using the Internet as a medium on intelligence gathering.

Anyone interested in attending can register online here.

A press release containing more information can be downloaded here.

An Op-Ed piece by Professor Roche, titled “Virtual Worlds and the Intelligence Community”, a look at how virtual technology is being used to combat terrorism, can be downloaded here.