Showing posts with label Overhead Imagery. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Overhead Imagery. Show all posts
Friday, August 3, 2007
Wednesday, August 1, 2007
The S-300P SAM System: A Site Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The S-300P SAM family is one of the most advanced and capable operational SAM systems in the world today. The S-300P SAM system was conceived to replace the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) and the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) as the primary long-range air defense system in the USSR. With the advent of lower-RCS targets like cruise missiles, legacy systems did not provide adequate capability to defend against attacks by such weapons. The S-300P began life as a overarching SAM system intended for use by both the Army and the air defense network. At an early stage, the project was split into two systems, the Army's S-300V (SA-12) and the S-300P.
THE S-300P
The S-300P is a long-range, mobile strategic SAM system. The system has been produced in numerous variants, and an in-depth look at the various system components and missiles employed by the system can be found here: LINK
Western designators for the S-300P variants will be provided here for clarity:
S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE)
S-300PS/PM (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
S-300PM-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE)
S-300PM-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE)
It should be noted that the S-300PM-1 was at one point designated the SA-10C GRUMBLE, before being redesignated due to the fact that a new engagement radar, the 30N6-1 (TOMB STONE) and a new missile, the 48N6, was employed. It should also be noted that the difference between the S-300PS and the S-300PM, apart from minor hardware differences and the introduction of a new missile for the S-300PM, was that the S-300PM introduced digital datalinks for connecting the TELs, radars, and command post in an effort to reduce system setup time. The S-300PT and S-300PS relied on physical cable connections between system components. The S-300PM and subsequent variants can still rely on cable connections, most often at prepared sites, to ensure a higher level of communications security.
Export variants are as follows:
S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE)
S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE)
A TYPICAL S-300P SITE
There are two common battery configurations employed by the S-300P SAM system. The first relies on a typically prepared site with a tower-mounted engagement radar. The second relies on either a prepared or unprepared site with a mobile engagement radar vehicle. The number of TELs present varies from user to user, location to location, and variant to variant, and these differences will be discussed in the Deployment Strategies sections of this article.
The following annotated image of an S-300PT site near Severodvinsk depicts a battery employing tower-mounted engagement and 76N6 radars:
The following annotated image of an S-300PMU site near Sevastopol depicts a standard site layout employing a mobile engagement radar and a tower-mounted 76N6:
Some sites employing a mobile engagement radar still retain the tower assembly for mounting the radar should the need arise. The following site south of Voronezh depicts a mobile engagement radar being employed, with the 40V6 mast assembly positioned nearby in a lowered position:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
There are many different iterations of S-300P site configurations. Most of them differ in the number, shape, and positioning of prepared revetments used to protect the components. However, it should be stressed that the S-300P is a mobile SAM system, and as such can be deployed almost anywhere. That being said, there are a few common site layouts that have been identified, and these layouts will be detailed here.
One of the more common S-300P site configurations is a central tower-mounted engagement radar surrounded on two sides by parralel "slanted-E" shaped divided revetments for TELs or missile reload canisters. A tower-mounted 76N6 is positioned nearby. This site layout is often featured around Moscow on the grounds of former S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) SAM sites, but is also featured elsewhere as well, such as in Belarus.
The following annotated image depicts an S-300PM-1 site near Bortnevo, north of Moscow, employing the "slanted-E" revetment style:
Another common site configuration features four launch positions arranged around a central raised berm for a mobile engagement radar. The size and shape of the launch positions, as well as the presence of protective revetments for the TELs, varies from site to site and nation to nation, but the overall layout remains relatively uniform. The site near Sevastopol depicted above is an example of such a configuration. All identifiable Chinese S-300P sites employ a variation on this layout.
Given that the S-300P SAM system is a mobile system, it is also quite common to find batteries deployed on former legacy SAM sites. As seen previously, many S-25 sites around Moscow are now home to S-300P batteries. Slovakia's S-300PMU battery resides on the grounds of a former S-125 site, and there is a Ukrainian S-300PMU battery and garrison positioned on a former S-200 complex near Sevastopol, to cite a few examples.
The following image depicts an S-300PM battery deployed on the grounds of a former S-75 site near Roschino, north of St. Petersburg. The Roschino site is slightly unusual insofar as there are S-300P-style revetments to the southwest that are apparently unused.
Despite the presence of common site configurations, there are numerous random layouts. The numerous site configurations probably stem from the fact that the S-300P is a mobile system able to be located nearly anywhere. Some sites feature numerous revetments designed for two TELs apiece, some feature larger revetments for four or more TELs, and some feature no revetments at all.
The lack of consistency on a large scale in the configuration of S-300P sites belies the importance of being able to identify the system based on the visible components. The S-300PT is relatively easy to identify given the unique appearance of the 5P85-1 launchers. Differentiating between an S-300PM and an S-300PM-1 seems more difficult from the outset, but is in fact not all that hard. The 5P85S/D TELs measure around 43 feet in length, while the 5P85T TELs measure around 47 feet in length, based on visible imagery. As the S-300PS had a service life of 20 years and was introduced in 1982, and many of them were modified to S-300PM standard, any sites with 43 meter TELs can be identified relatively accurately as S-300PM sites. Of course, export systems would be the S-300PMU, and export sites featuring the 47-foot semi trailer TELs would be S-300PMU-1s.
RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES
Russian S-300P sites display a number of identifiable deployment strategies. S-300P SAM systems are employed in defense of key industrial and military areas, as well as large population centers.
S-300PM and S-300PM-1 sites around Moscow typically employ the "slanted-E" site configuration, and most of them are based on the grounds of former S-25 SAM sites. Moscow defense sites all employ tower mounted engagement radars in conjunction with tower-mounted 76N6 radars. This provides a robust low-altitude target detection envelope around the capital city. Eight to twelve TELs are typically present at each site, with at least six TELs at each site being loaded with missiles and positioned in a launch revetment.
S-300P sites located along the periphery of Russia's Far East Military District, particularly near Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, tend to feature mobile engagement radars and tower-mounted 76N6 radars. This is likely due to the fact that sites located along the periphery are typically positioned very near the water and therefore do not have substantial terrain for the engagement radar to contend with along potential threat ingress routes. A raised berm for the engagement radar is often more than sufficient to ensure the radar has a sufficient field of view with respect to any vegetation in the area. The single exception is the S-300PM site positioned to defend the Rybachiy SSBN base, featuring a tower-mounted engagement radar, likely due to the terrain constraints potentially interfering with the engagement radar being able to see out over the open ocean from where it is positioned. The Yelizovo and Petropavlovsk sites are positioned at a higher elevation than the Rybachiy site, providing them with a better field of view than the Rybachiy site.
S-300P sites on the Kola peninsula and around St. Petersburg feature tower-mounted engagement radars, likely due to the varied terrain in the areas where the SAM sites are positioned. Kola sites feature eight active TELs, with St. Petersburg sites featuring four active TELs, likely due to the greater strategic importance of the Kola peninsula and associated military facilities.
Interestingly, the Kaliningrad S-300P sites feature tower-mounted engagement radars at four sites and a mobile engagement radar at the fifth site. There are no major terrain constraints requiring use of the towers for the engagement radars. However, the Kaliningrad region is geographically separated from the rest of Russia, and is is possible that tower-mounted engagement radars are employed to provide an increased probability of low-altitude detection. Kaliningrad is also home to a Russian naval contingent, so perhaps the engagement radars are tower mounted at four of the sites to remove the potential of low-altitude clutter generated by the incoming and outgoing naval vessels. This doesn't seem to make complete sense, however, as the Baltiysk site nearest the harbor entrance features the mobile engagement radar.
The lack of S-300PM-1 batteries in areas identified as being of strategic importance, such as Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok and Kaliningrad, is likely due to the fact that the more sensitive systems are kept in areas where the presence of foreign ELINT assets is far less likely. There is, however, an S-300PM-1 battery deployed near Novorossiysk, The presence of an S-300PM-1 site in this area is likely due to the fact that it represents the sole identifiable active strategic SAM site in the area. It should also be noted that the S-300PM-1 systems are at most nearly a decade newer than the S-300PM systems. Ergo, it is likely that the areas considered to be the most strategically important were the first to receive the S-300PM-1. This would explain the high concentration around Moscow, and the presence on the Kola Peninsula. S-300PM-1s not being present on the Kamchatka Peninsula can be explained away by the fact that the Northern Fleet is the main combat arm of the Russian Navy. Petropavlovsk and Rybachiy also enjoy protection by a MiG-31 regiment, so the area is not necessarily at a loss.
CHINESE DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES
There are five visible active S-300P sites inside of China at this moment. China apaprently has chosen to employ the S-300P systems to defend key population centers, relying on older HQ-2 SAM systems to defend smaller population centers and military facilities. Four of China's S-300P locations are S-300PMU-1 sites, with the fifth being home to an S-300PMU battery. China employs a relatively standard deployment strategy throughout its S-300P batteries. Four TELs are deployed around a central, mobile engagement radar vehicle positioned on a raised berm. There are four separate pads for the TELs, with two TELs positioned on each of two launch pads. Tower-mounted engagement radars are not employed, allowing the core system components to be rapidly repositioned. A 36D6 or 64N6 EW radar is colocated with each SAM battery, with at least one 64N6 being present in each deployment area either in a colocated or nearby position to provide long-range target detection.
The one major inconsistency in Chinese S-300P deployments is the presence of a tower-mounted 76N6 radar. The 76N6 is present at the Yutian S-300PMU site, along with both Shanghai S-300PMU-1 sites. The reasoning behind this strategy likely relates to potential threat ingress routes. The Shanghai S-300PMU-1 sites are positioned near the coastline and as such would be able to monitor the airspace offshore, potentially detecting inbound strike aircraft and missiles from Kadena AB, Okinawa, and southern Japan. Given the low-altitude detection function of the 76N6, it is plausible that the Shanghai sites are positioned to detect inbound, low-altitude missiles launched from naval vessels or submarines.
Why, then, would there be a disparity in the 76N6 deployment to the north? Beijing is much farther inland, and is also protected by the defenses of the Bo Hai gulf. Any potential threat ingressing from the east or south would have to penetrate a dense air defense network which also included interceptor aircraft and other SAM systems. Beijing is also borered to the north and west by mountainous terrain, making low-altitude detection less important as any inbound target from those directions would pop up into the coverage of the 64N6 EW radar sites positioned in the area.
The inconsistency, therefore, is the presence of the 76N6 at the Yutian S-300PMU site. The 120 kilometer range of the 76N6 does not give it enough range to reach offshore from the Yutian site. It is possible that the 76N6 was only purchased for use with the S-300PMU and therefore would not be found at any of the S-300PMU-1 sites, whose 30N6E1 radar does offer improved performance over the 30N6E employed by the S-300PMU. The answer may also lie in the condition of the Yutian 76N6. It is visible in a lowered position, potentially being prepared for transport.
However, the Yutian 76N6 may simply be lowered for maintenance, or may be a new arrival. In the latter case, it may be indicative of future 76N6 deployments at the northern S-300P sites to augment the already robust radar coverage of the systems. The Yutian site may also be a training unit, allowing crews to train on all of the system components. Lastly, the Yutian 76N6 may be positioned to aid in the detection of cruise missiles fired towards Beijing-area targets from submerged submarines that manage to penetrate the Bo Hai gulf's waters.
DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES OF OTHER NATIONS
S-300P sites in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are primarily deployed to defend population centers, capitals, and in the case of the Ukraine military facilities. Most S-300PT facilities feature a standard twelve TEL complement, although there are some minor variations, as there are with the S-300PMU deployments.
Slovakia was not analyzed due to the presence of only a single identifiable S-300P battery. Likewise, Greece was not analyzed as S-300PMU-1 components are visible at two locations on Crete but they are not deployed.
S-300P SYSTEM COVERAGE
The S-300P is a very capable strategic SAM system, and as such can provide very robust air defense over a large region of airspace. By employing a number of batteries positioned to provide overlapping areas of coverage, a nation can effectively create what amounts to an area of denied airspace. While the S-300P does feature multiple-target engagement capability, it is also wise to overlap coverage areas in order to reduce the effect of saturation by actual or false targets.
The following image depicts S-300P coverage provided by identified, active sites positioned around Moscow. The blue rings represent the associated 64N6 EW radars. Large red rings represent S-300PM-1 batteries, with small red rings representing S-300PM batteries. The S-300PM-1 has a 150 kilometer range, the S-300PM a 90 kilometer range, and the 64N6 a 300 kilometer range. The overlapping coverage areas and the number of batteries in place have effectively transformed the skies over Moscow into the most heavily defended airspace in the world.
CURRENT USERS
Information regarding user nations and the types and numbers of identified sites can be found here: LINK
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, a definitive text edited by Pavel Podvig
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
The S-300P SAM family is one of the most advanced and capable operational SAM systems in the world today. The S-300P SAM system was conceived to replace the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) and the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) as the primary long-range air defense system in the USSR. With the advent of lower-RCS targets like cruise missiles, legacy systems did not provide adequate capability to defend against attacks by such weapons. The S-300P began life as a overarching SAM system intended for use by both the Army and the air defense network. At an early stage, the project was split into two systems, the Army's S-300V (SA-12) and the S-300P.
THE S-300P
The S-300P is a long-range, mobile strategic SAM system. The system has been produced in numerous variants, and an in-depth look at the various system components and missiles employed by the system can be found here: LINK
Western designators for the S-300P variants will be provided here for clarity:
S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE)
S-300PS/PM (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
S-300PM-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE)
S-300PM-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE)
It should be noted that the S-300PM-1 was at one point designated the SA-10C GRUMBLE, before being redesignated due to the fact that a new engagement radar, the 30N6-1 (TOMB STONE) and a new missile, the 48N6, was employed. It should also be noted that the difference between the S-300PS and the S-300PM, apart from minor hardware differences and the introduction of a new missile for the S-300PM, was that the S-300PM introduced digital datalinks for connecting the TELs, radars, and command post in an effort to reduce system setup time. The S-300PT and S-300PS relied on physical cable connections between system components. The S-300PM and subsequent variants can still rely on cable connections, most often at prepared sites, to ensure a higher level of communications security.
Export variants are as follows:
S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE)
S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE)
A TYPICAL S-300P SITE
There are two common battery configurations employed by the S-300P SAM system. The first relies on a typically prepared site with a tower-mounted engagement radar. The second relies on either a prepared or unprepared site with a mobile engagement radar vehicle. The number of TELs present varies from user to user, location to location, and variant to variant, and these differences will be discussed in the Deployment Strategies sections of this article.
The following annotated image of an S-300PT site near Severodvinsk depicts a battery employing tower-mounted engagement and 76N6 radars:
The following annotated image of an S-300PMU site near Sevastopol depicts a standard site layout employing a mobile engagement radar and a tower-mounted 76N6:
Some sites employing a mobile engagement radar still retain the tower assembly for mounting the radar should the need arise. The following site south of Voronezh depicts a mobile engagement radar being employed, with the 40V6 mast assembly positioned nearby in a lowered position:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
There are many different iterations of S-300P site configurations. Most of them differ in the number, shape, and positioning of prepared revetments used to protect the components. However, it should be stressed that the S-300P is a mobile SAM system, and as such can be deployed almost anywhere. That being said, there are a few common site layouts that have been identified, and these layouts will be detailed here.
One of the more common S-300P site configurations is a central tower-mounted engagement radar surrounded on two sides by parralel "slanted-E" shaped divided revetments for TELs or missile reload canisters. A tower-mounted 76N6 is positioned nearby. This site layout is often featured around Moscow on the grounds of former S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) SAM sites, but is also featured elsewhere as well, such as in Belarus.
The following annotated image depicts an S-300PM-1 site near Bortnevo, north of Moscow, employing the "slanted-E" revetment style:
Another common site configuration features four launch positions arranged around a central raised berm for a mobile engagement radar. The size and shape of the launch positions, as well as the presence of protective revetments for the TELs, varies from site to site and nation to nation, but the overall layout remains relatively uniform. The site near Sevastopol depicted above is an example of such a configuration. All identifiable Chinese S-300P sites employ a variation on this layout.
Given that the S-300P SAM system is a mobile system, it is also quite common to find batteries deployed on former legacy SAM sites. As seen previously, many S-25 sites around Moscow are now home to S-300P batteries. Slovakia's S-300PMU battery resides on the grounds of a former S-125 site, and there is a Ukrainian S-300PMU battery and garrison positioned on a former S-200 complex near Sevastopol, to cite a few examples.
The following image depicts an S-300PM battery deployed on the grounds of a former S-75 site near Roschino, north of St. Petersburg. The Roschino site is slightly unusual insofar as there are S-300P-style revetments to the southwest that are apparently unused.
Despite the presence of common site configurations, there are numerous random layouts. The numerous site configurations probably stem from the fact that the S-300P is a mobile system able to be located nearly anywhere. Some sites feature numerous revetments designed for two TELs apiece, some feature larger revetments for four or more TELs, and some feature no revetments at all.
The lack of consistency on a large scale in the configuration of S-300P sites belies the importance of being able to identify the system based on the visible components. The S-300PT is relatively easy to identify given the unique appearance of the 5P85-1 launchers. Differentiating between an S-300PM and an S-300PM-1 seems more difficult from the outset, but is in fact not all that hard. The 5P85S/D TELs measure around 43 feet in length, while the 5P85T TELs measure around 47 feet in length, based on visible imagery. As the S-300PS had a service life of 20 years and was introduced in 1982, and many of them were modified to S-300PM standard, any sites with 43 meter TELs can be identified relatively accurately as S-300PM sites. Of course, export systems would be the S-300PMU, and export sites featuring the 47-foot semi trailer TELs would be S-300PMU-1s.
RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES
Russian S-300P sites display a number of identifiable deployment strategies. S-300P SAM systems are employed in defense of key industrial and military areas, as well as large population centers.
S-300PM and S-300PM-1 sites around Moscow typically employ the "slanted-E" site configuration, and most of them are based on the grounds of former S-25 SAM sites. Moscow defense sites all employ tower mounted engagement radars in conjunction with tower-mounted 76N6 radars. This provides a robust low-altitude target detection envelope around the capital city. Eight to twelve TELs are typically present at each site, with at least six TELs at each site being loaded with missiles and positioned in a launch revetment.
S-300P sites located along the periphery of Russia's Far East Military District, particularly near Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, tend to feature mobile engagement radars and tower-mounted 76N6 radars. This is likely due to the fact that sites located along the periphery are typically positioned very near the water and therefore do not have substantial terrain for the engagement radar to contend with along potential threat ingress routes. A raised berm for the engagement radar is often more than sufficient to ensure the radar has a sufficient field of view with respect to any vegetation in the area. The single exception is the S-300PM site positioned to defend the Rybachiy SSBN base, featuring a tower-mounted engagement radar, likely due to the terrain constraints potentially interfering with the engagement radar being able to see out over the open ocean from where it is positioned. The Yelizovo and Petropavlovsk sites are positioned at a higher elevation than the Rybachiy site, providing them with a better field of view than the Rybachiy site.
S-300P sites on the Kola peninsula and around St. Petersburg feature tower-mounted engagement radars, likely due to the varied terrain in the areas where the SAM sites are positioned. Kola sites feature eight active TELs, with St. Petersburg sites featuring four active TELs, likely due to the greater strategic importance of the Kola peninsula and associated military facilities.
Interestingly, the Kaliningrad S-300P sites feature tower-mounted engagement radars at four sites and a mobile engagement radar at the fifth site. There are no major terrain constraints requiring use of the towers for the engagement radars. However, the Kaliningrad region is geographically separated from the rest of Russia, and is is possible that tower-mounted engagement radars are employed to provide an increased probability of low-altitude detection. Kaliningrad is also home to a Russian naval contingent, so perhaps the engagement radars are tower mounted at four of the sites to remove the potential of low-altitude clutter generated by the incoming and outgoing naval vessels. This doesn't seem to make complete sense, however, as the Baltiysk site nearest the harbor entrance features the mobile engagement radar.
The lack of S-300PM-1 batteries in areas identified as being of strategic importance, such as Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok and Kaliningrad, is likely due to the fact that the more sensitive systems are kept in areas where the presence of foreign ELINT assets is far less likely. There is, however, an S-300PM-1 battery deployed near Novorossiysk, The presence of an S-300PM-1 site in this area is likely due to the fact that it represents the sole identifiable active strategic SAM site in the area. It should also be noted that the S-300PM-1 systems are at most nearly a decade newer than the S-300PM systems. Ergo, it is likely that the areas considered to be the most strategically important were the first to receive the S-300PM-1. This would explain the high concentration around Moscow, and the presence on the Kola Peninsula. S-300PM-1s not being present on the Kamchatka Peninsula can be explained away by the fact that the Northern Fleet is the main combat arm of the Russian Navy. Petropavlovsk and Rybachiy also enjoy protection by a MiG-31 regiment, so the area is not necessarily at a loss.
CHINESE DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES
There are five visible active S-300P sites inside of China at this moment. China apaprently has chosen to employ the S-300P systems to defend key population centers, relying on older HQ-2 SAM systems to defend smaller population centers and military facilities. Four of China's S-300P locations are S-300PMU-1 sites, with the fifth being home to an S-300PMU battery. China employs a relatively standard deployment strategy throughout its S-300P batteries. Four TELs are deployed around a central, mobile engagement radar vehicle positioned on a raised berm. There are four separate pads for the TELs, with two TELs positioned on each of two launch pads. Tower-mounted engagement radars are not employed, allowing the core system components to be rapidly repositioned. A 36D6 or 64N6 EW radar is colocated with each SAM battery, with at least one 64N6 being present in each deployment area either in a colocated or nearby position to provide long-range target detection.
The one major inconsistency in Chinese S-300P deployments is the presence of a tower-mounted 76N6 radar. The 76N6 is present at the Yutian S-300PMU site, along with both Shanghai S-300PMU-1 sites. The reasoning behind this strategy likely relates to potential threat ingress routes. The Shanghai S-300PMU-1 sites are positioned near the coastline and as such would be able to monitor the airspace offshore, potentially detecting inbound strike aircraft and missiles from Kadena AB, Okinawa, and southern Japan. Given the low-altitude detection function of the 76N6, it is plausible that the Shanghai sites are positioned to detect inbound, low-altitude missiles launched from naval vessels or submarines.
Why, then, would there be a disparity in the 76N6 deployment to the north? Beijing is much farther inland, and is also protected by the defenses of the Bo Hai gulf. Any potential threat ingressing from the east or south would have to penetrate a dense air defense network which also included interceptor aircraft and other SAM systems. Beijing is also borered to the north and west by mountainous terrain, making low-altitude detection less important as any inbound target from those directions would pop up into the coverage of the 64N6 EW radar sites positioned in the area.
The inconsistency, therefore, is the presence of the 76N6 at the Yutian S-300PMU site. The 120 kilometer range of the 76N6 does not give it enough range to reach offshore from the Yutian site. It is possible that the 76N6 was only purchased for use with the S-300PMU and therefore would not be found at any of the S-300PMU-1 sites, whose 30N6E1 radar does offer improved performance over the 30N6E employed by the S-300PMU. The answer may also lie in the condition of the Yutian 76N6. It is visible in a lowered position, potentially being prepared for transport.
However, the Yutian 76N6 may simply be lowered for maintenance, or may be a new arrival. In the latter case, it may be indicative of future 76N6 deployments at the northern S-300P sites to augment the already robust radar coverage of the systems. The Yutian site may also be a training unit, allowing crews to train on all of the system components. Lastly, the Yutian 76N6 may be positioned to aid in the detection of cruise missiles fired towards Beijing-area targets from submerged submarines that manage to penetrate the Bo Hai gulf's waters.
DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES OF OTHER NATIONS
S-300P sites in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are primarily deployed to defend population centers, capitals, and in the case of the Ukraine military facilities. Most S-300PT facilities feature a standard twelve TEL complement, although there are some minor variations, as there are with the S-300PMU deployments.
Slovakia was not analyzed due to the presence of only a single identifiable S-300P battery. Likewise, Greece was not analyzed as S-300PMU-1 components are visible at two locations on Crete but they are not deployed.
S-300P SYSTEM COVERAGE
The S-300P is a very capable strategic SAM system, and as such can provide very robust air defense over a large region of airspace. By employing a number of batteries positioned to provide overlapping areas of coverage, a nation can effectively create what amounts to an area of denied airspace. While the S-300P does feature multiple-target engagement capability, it is also wise to overlap coverage areas in order to reduce the effect of saturation by actual or false targets.
The following image depicts S-300P coverage provided by identified, active sites positioned around Moscow. The blue rings represent the associated 64N6 EW radars. Large red rings represent S-300PM-1 batteries, with small red rings representing S-300PM batteries. The S-300PM-1 has a 150 kilometer range, the S-300PM a 90 kilometer range, and the 64N6 a 300 kilometer range. The overlapping coverage areas and the number of batteries in place have effectively transformed the skies over Moscow into the most heavily defended airspace in the world.
CURRENT USERS
Information regarding user nations and the types and numbers of identified sites can be found here: LINK
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, a definitive text edited by Pavel Podvig
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Thursday, July 26, 2007
Identifying Tactical SAM Systems
INTRODUCTION
Identifying tactical SAM systems in overhead imagery can be a very tedious, error-filled process. The problem stems from two key issues: resolution and component size. The resolution of the imagery being examined can often preclude accurate visual identification of a tactical SAM ssytem. Oftentimes these systems are deployed in the field, and as they do not use common site configurations which are easily identifiable, their components must be identified in order to accurately determine the system type. The size of the individual system components also presents a problem for the analyst. Tactical SAM system components are, for the most part, much smaller than their strategic counterparts. Also, when missiles are not uploaded, TELs and TELARs can resemble tanks or other common vehicles, making their identification very problematic unless the imagery is of sufficient quality to discern launch rails and other features of the system components.
This article will focus on four common Russian-made tactical SAM systems. Relevant system components will be detailed, with a focus on system recognition.
THE SA-4
The Antey 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF) tactical SAM system is one of the easier systems to positively identify. This is thanks in no small part to the very large missiles employed by the system. There are two key system components, the 2P24 TEL and the 1S32 (PAT HAND) engagement radar.
The following image depicts an active, field deployed 2K11 battery in Azerbaijan. Three 2P24 TELs can be identified. Take note of the readily identifiable 3M8 missiles, two of which are fitted to each TEL, identifying this as a 2K11 battery. The presence of the three TELs enables the central vehicle to be identified as a 1S32 radar. The 2P24 TELs do not contain on-board engagement radars, necesitating a 1S32 to be located nearby in order for the battery to prosecute an engagement. In this case, the 1S32 does not need to be identified using any major distinguishing features. This is a common theme in tactical SAM system analysis: identification by proximity.
The following image depicts another 2K11 facility in Azerbaijan. In this instance, a garrison area is visible. SAM garrisons are common locations to find tactical SAM equipment which is not field deployed. This site is unusual, however, insofar as there are three TELs deployed around the facility. In a further deviation from the norm, each 2P24 is located adjacent to a separate 1S32. Normal operations dictate the use of one 1S32 to control a handful of TELs; in this case, Azerbaijan has given the erstwhile SAM site the capability to engage a total of three simultaneous targets, as each 1S32 can only prosecute a single target at a time.
THE SA-6
The Tikhomirov Instrument Research Institute's 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) is one of the most widely used tactical SAM systems in the world. Identification of the 2K12 can be difficult due to the smaller, less easily identifiable 3M9 missiles. Important system components are the 2P25 TEL armed with three 3M9s, and the 1S91 (STRAIGHT FLUSH) radar.
The following image depicts an active, field deployed 2K12 battery in Syria. The 2K12 is a mobile, tactical SAM system, but many nations employ the system at prepared site locations as seen here. The 2P25 TELs are identifiable thanks to the visible loadout of 3M9 missiles. If the northernmost TEL is zoomed in on using Google Earth, separate missiles can even be discerned thanks to the resolution of the imagery. The 1S91 is identifiable thanks to a standard feature of the system: cable connections between the individual TELs and the engagement radar. In this case, a well-camoflaged 1S91 is clearly located atop the berm in the center of the site. The radar antenna can even be partially discerned through examination of the visible shadows.
The SA-11
Tikhomirov's follow on to the 2K12 is the 9K37 Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) SAM system employing the 9M38 missile. Key system components are the four-rail 9A310 TELAR fitted with the system's 9S35 (FIRE DOME) engagement radar, the 9A39 loader/launcher vehicle fitted with rails for eight missiles, and the 9S18M1 (SNOW DRIFT) EW radar.
THe following image depicts 9K37 components located in a garrison in Belarus. Take note of the three 9A310 TELARs. Note the visible fitting for the 9S35 radar at the front of the TELAR. This allows the 9A310 to be identified even if missiles are not fitted. Concurrently, it allows for differentiation between the 9A310 and the 9A39, as the 9A39 lacks the 9S35 installation.
The components depicted above are located at a large garrison in Baranovichi, Belarus. Other SAM system components are visible nearby, such as S-300P TELs. The following image depicts a dedicated 9K37 garrison located in Russia:
Many of the previous garrison's 9K37 components are field deployed nearby, possibly as part of a routine air defense exercise, and are visible in the image depicted below:
THE SA-12
Antey's S-300V (SA-12A/B GLADIATOR/GIANT)is the most advanced tactical SAM system in the world, conceived to provide Soviet and Russian army units and facilities with umbrella air defense against airborne and missile threats. Many of the system components are easily identifiable thanks to their unique configurations. Key system components are the 9A83 TELAR with four launch tubes for 9M83 anti-aircraft missiles, the 9A82 TELAR with two launch tubes for 9M82 ATBMs, the 9S32 (GRILL PAN) engagement radar, the 9S19 (HIGH SCREEN) sector scanning radar used for ATBM functions, and the 9S15 (BILL BOARD) EW radar.
The following image depicts an S-300V garrison in Birobidzhan, Russia. First, take note of the 9A83 TELAR in the probable system checkout area. Note the large mast antenna fitted to the front of the TELAR. This mast antenna, when elevated, allows the TELAR to be positively identified as a 9A83 and not a 9A82, regardless of whether missile canisters are fitted or not. The 9A82 by comparison features an antenna fairing that extends forward of the operator's cabin but does not elevate. 9S19 and 9S32 radars are also visible in their stowed for storage or transportation configuration. The radar arrays themselves are visible as white fixtures, with the 9S19 having a much larger, rectangular array compared to the 9S32's smaller, more circular array.
Another S-300V garrison is visible at Orenberg, Russia. Many system components can be seen field deployed to the north of the main garrison facility.
S-300V components are also visible at a possible 9K37 garrison in Smolensk, Russia:
Adjacent to the Birobidzhan S-300V garrison is what would appear to be a dedicated ATBM site. Note the dual missile canisters on the three visible TELARs, identifying them as 9A82 ATBM TELARs. The 9S32 engagement radar is located in close proximity to the TELARs, and is shown in deployed mode with the radar array raised for operation. An antenna mast is visible at the rear of the vehicle, identifying it as a 9S32 and not a 9S19. 9S15 and 9S19 radars round out the battery.
SOURCES
All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.
Identifying tactical SAM systems in overhead imagery can be a very tedious, error-filled process. The problem stems from two key issues: resolution and component size. The resolution of the imagery being examined can often preclude accurate visual identification of a tactical SAM ssytem. Oftentimes these systems are deployed in the field, and as they do not use common site configurations which are easily identifiable, their components must be identified in order to accurately determine the system type. The size of the individual system components also presents a problem for the analyst. Tactical SAM system components are, for the most part, much smaller than their strategic counterparts. Also, when missiles are not uploaded, TELs and TELARs can resemble tanks or other common vehicles, making their identification very problematic unless the imagery is of sufficient quality to discern launch rails and other features of the system components.
This article will focus on four common Russian-made tactical SAM systems. Relevant system components will be detailed, with a focus on system recognition.
THE SA-4
The Antey 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF) tactical SAM system is one of the easier systems to positively identify. This is thanks in no small part to the very large missiles employed by the system. There are two key system components, the 2P24 TEL and the 1S32 (PAT HAND) engagement radar.
The following image depicts an active, field deployed 2K11 battery in Azerbaijan. Three 2P24 TELs can be identified. Take note of the readily identifiable 3M8 missiles, two of which are fitted to each TEL, identifying this as a 2K11 battery. The presence of the three TELs enables the central vehicle to be identified as a 1S32 radar. The 2P24 TELs do not contain on-board engagement radars, necesitating a 1S32 to be located nearby in order for the battery to prosecute an engagement. In this case, the 1S32 does not need to be identified using any major distinguishing features. This is a common theme in tactical SAM system analysis: identification by proximity.
The following image depicts another 2K11 facility in Azerbaijan. In this instance, a garrison area is visible. SAM garrisons are common locations to find tactical SAM equipment which is not field deployed. This site is unusual, however, insofar as there are three TELs deployed around the facility. In a further deviation from the norm, each 2P24 is located adjacent to a separate 1S32. Normal operations dictate the use of one 1S32 to control a handful of TELs; in this case, Azerbaijan has given the erstwhile SAM site the capability to engage a total of three simultaneous targets, as each 1S32 can only prosecute a single target at a time.
THE SA-6
The Tikhomirov Instrument Research Institute's 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) is one of the most widely used tactical SAM systems in the world. Identification of the 2K12 can be difficult due to the smaller, less easily identifiable 3M9 missiles. Important system components are the 2P25 TEL armed with three 3M9s, and the 1S91 (STRAIGHT FLUSH) radar.
The following image depicts an active, field deployed 2K12 battery in Syria. The 2K12 is a mobile, tactical SAM system, but many nations employ the system at prepared site locations as seen here. The 2P25 TELs are identifiable thanks to the visible loadout of 3M9 missiles. If the northernmost TEL is zoomed in on using Google Earth, separate missiles can even be discerned thanks to the resolution of the imagery. The 1S91 is identifiable thanks to a standard feature of the system: cable connections between the individual TELs and the engagement radar. In this case, a well-camoflaged 1S91 is clearly located atop the berm in the center of the site. The radar antenna can even be partially discerned through examination of the visible shadows.
The SA-11
Tikhomirov's follow on to the 2K12 is the 9K37 Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) SAM system employing the 9M38 missile. Key system components are the four-rail 9A310 TELAR fitted with the system's 9S35 (FIRE DOME) engagement radar, the 9A39 loader/launcher vehicle fitted with rails for eight missiles, and the 9S18M1 (SNOW DRIFT) EW radar.
THe following image depicts 9K37 components located in a garrison in Belarus. Take note of the three 9A310 TELARs. Note the visible fitting for the 9S35 radar at the front of the TELAR. This allows the 9A310 to be identified even if missiles are not fitted. Concurrently, it allows for differentiation between the 9A310 and the 9A39, as the 9A39 lacks the 9S35 installation.
The components depicted above are located at a large garrison in Baranovichi, Belarus. Other SAM system components are visible nearby, such as S-300P TELs. The following image depicts a dedicated 9K37 garrison located in Russia:
Many of the previous garrison's 9K37 components are field deployed nearby, possibly as part of a routine air defense exercise, and are visible in the image depicted below:
THE SA-12
Antey's S-300V (SA-12A/B GLADIATOR/GIANT)is the most advanced tactical SAM system in the world, conceived to provide Soviet and Russian army units and facilities with umbrella air defense against airborne and missile threats. Many of the system components are easily identifiable thanks to their unique configurations. Key system components are the 9A83 TELAR with four launch tubes for 9M83 anti-aircraft missiles, the 9A82 TELAR with two launch tubes for 9M82 ATBMs, the 9S32 (GRILL PAN) engagement radar, the 9S19 (HIGH SCREEN) sector scanning radar used for ATBM functions, and the 9S15 (BILL BOARD) EW radar.
The following image depicts an S-300V garrison in Birobidzhan, Russia. First, take note of the 9A83 TELAR in the probable system checkout area. Note the large mast antenna fitted to the front of the TELAR. This mast antenna, when elevated, allows the TELAR to be positively identified as a 9A83 and not a 9A82, regardless of whether missile canisters are fitted or not. The 9A82 by comparison features an antenna fairing that extends forward of the operator's cabin but does not elevate. 9S19 and 9S32 radars are also visible in their stowed for storage or transportation configuration. The radar arrays themselves are visible as white fixtures, with the 9S19 having a much larger, rectangular array compared to the 9S32's smaller, more circular array.
Another S-300V garrison is visible at Orenberg, Russia. Many system components can be seen field deployed to the north of the main garrison facility.
S-300V components are also visible at a possible 9K37 garrison in Smolensk, Russia:
Adjacent to the Birobidzhan S-300V garrison is what would appear to be a dedicated ATBM site. Note the dual missile canisters on the three visible TELARs, identifying them as 9A82 ATBM TELARs. The 9S32 engagement radar is located in close proximity to the TELARs, and is shown in deployed mode with the radar array raised for operation. An antenna mast is visible at the rear of the vehicle, identifying it as a 9S32 and not a 9S19. 9S15 and 9S19 radars round out the battery.
SOURCES
All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.
Sunday, July 22, 2007
The S-200 SAM System: A Site Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) SAM system is a long-range air defense system designed to defend large areas against all manner of airborne targets, including high-speed and high-altitude aircraft. The S-200 was originally conceived in part to defend against the expected overflights by Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft, although no such overflights ever took place due to a political restriction of manned overflights of the USSR in the wake of the Francis Gary Powers shootdown. The S-200 entered operational service in 1967 and has remained on combat duty in various nations worldwide ever since.
In a little known role, the S-200 was also employed as a national-level ABM system for a time. More information on this concept can be found here: LINK The same article also contains information regarding a prior use of the Western SA-5 designator.
THE SA-5
The S-200 SAM system is a long-range strategic SAM system. The SARH-guided two-stage 5V21 and 5V28 missiles have a 220 kg HE fragmentation warhead. The 5V21 ad 5V28 differ from previous Fakel-designed air defense missiles insofar as their first stage is not a jetissonable booster stage, but rather four strap-on rocket motors. The missiles themselves are very large, with lengths of 10.5 meters for the 5V21 and 10.8 meters for the 5V28. Ranges vary from variant to variant, with a maximum of between 150 and 300 kilometers. Minimum ranges are between 7 and 17 kilometers, depending on the variant. Minimum altitude for all variants is 300 meters, with a maximum altitude of between 20,000 and 40,000 meters, depending on the variant. Target engagement functions are handled by the 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) radar set, an H band system with a range of 270 kilometers, and a cpaability to engage a single target at a time.
A TYPICAL SA-5 SITE
CIA Intelligence Memorandum 69-15, The Soviet SA-5 Deployment Program, provides us with the following descriptions of active S-200 site configurations:
A typical S-200 site will contain between two and five launch areas, each containing launch pads for six 5P72 launch rails. The radar area will contain a single 5N62 radar for each launch area present in the site. This permits each site to engage multiple targets, reducing the negative impact of the 5N62's single target engagement capability. The image below depicts a typical active S-200 site located in Libya. Relevant areas are annotated.
The following image depicts the Libyan site's radar area. Note the placement of the two 5N62 radars, and the location of the control bunker housing the site's command and control section.
The launch area is detailed below. Launch areas vary in arrangement from nation to nation, but for the most part display a spade shape as seen here. It is common for S-200 sites to feature revetments for the launch rails, and individual environmental shelters to store the 5P72 launch rails during periods of maintenance or inactivity. Each launch area is controlled by crews in a centrally located bunker. Note the cable connections visible between the control bunker and the launch rails.
As witnessed in the imagery provided above, S-200 sites are rather large and expansive. Due to the large footprint of an S-200 site and the plethora of associated structures, inactive S-200 sites are relatively easy to identify.
The following image depicts an inactive S-200 site in Belarus:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the most common S-200 site layouts. Most S-200 sites feature either two or three launch areas.
The following image depicts an active S-200 site in Kazakhstan displaying the two launch site configuration. While there are only two missiles visible on launch rails in the eastern launch position, there are two 5N62 radars visible, implying that the entire site is still active.
The following image depicts an active S-200 site in the Ukraine displaying the three launch site configuration. Only the southernmost launch area appears to be active, as the launch rails appear to have been removed from the other two sites.
Due to the expansive nature of an S-200 complex, S-200 sites can be identified in low-resolution imagery. While this does not provide any indication as to the site's operational status, it does provide the analyst with a location to file away for future observation should coverages be updated.
The following image depicts a Russian S-200 site captured in low-resolution imagery. This is one of two identified S-200 sites containing five launch areas.
NON-STANDARD SA-5 SITES
North Korea and Iran have adopted unusual deployment strategies for their S-200 batteries for various reasons.
North Korean S-200 batteries are deployed in a fashion designed to increase their survivability. As seen previously in examining a North Korean S-125 site, the DPRK chooses to use a series of bunkers to protect the system components. There are individual hardened shelters visible for each 5P72 launch rail, as well as subsurface housings to protect the 5N62 radars when not in use. Two other subsurface bunkers are also visible, implying that the site may contain a total of four 5N62 radars.
The following annotated image depicts North Korea's western S-200 site:
Iranian S-200 batteries, in comparison to other users, are very unusual in their deployment. Iran deploys a single 5N62 radar with two 5P72 launch rails at each location. This is highly irregular, perhaps implying that Iran did not purchase a full complement of missiles or launch rails. It is also possible that, given the capability of the S-200 system, Iran views them as probable targets in any sort of military conflict and as such does not see the need to deploy a significant number of components at each site, choosing instead to hold them in reserve. As the 5N62 can only engage a single target at a time anyway, this would seem to be a sensible strategy.
The following annotated image depicts an Iranian S-200 site located on the grounds of Hamadan AB:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
The S-200 SAM system possesses a very long range, which will only be surpassed once the 400-kilometer S-400 enters full operational service. To that end, the S-200 is capable of providing air defense over large amounts of territory. It should be noted that the long-range S-200 is commonly featured as part of an integrated network which incorporates shorter-range systems such as the S-75, which also helps to cover close-in targets who close within the rather long minimum range of the system. As the S-200 is not intended to counter close-in targets, this should not be considered a design flaw of the system.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-200 sites in Iran:
CIA IM 69-15 provides the following conceptual look at theorized S-200 deployment in the former USSR, based on identified active and in-construction S-200 sites as of 15 June 1969:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-200 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Iran (6/0), Kazakhstan (2/2), Libya (4/2), North Korea (1/0), Syria (2/1), Turkmenistan (1/0), Ukraine (1/2)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-200 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Belarus (1), Czech Republic (2), Estonia (1), Germany (4), Hungary (1), Latvia (1), Lithuania (1), Russia (19)
POSSIBLE USERS
The nations listed below possess identified S-200 site locations in low-resolution imagery. As the resolution precludes identification of the sites as active or inactive, they are listed here as possible users. Some of the nations are already mentioned above, indicating that they possess active or inactive S-200 sites in various resolutions. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of low-resolution sites currently visible in Google Earth.
Azerbaijan (2), Belarus (3), Bulgaria (1), Estonia (3), Latvia (4), Libya (2), Lithuania (1), Moldova (1), North Korea (1), Poland (1), Russia (48), Syria (3), Ukraine (10)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above
The S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) SAM system is a long-range air defense system designed to defend large areas against all manner of airborne targets, including high-speed and high-altitude aircraft. The S-200 was originally conceived in part to defend against the expected overflights by Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft, although no such overflights ever took place due to a political restriction of manned overflights of the USSR in the wake of the Francis Gary Powers shootdown. The S-200 entered operational service in 1967 and has remained on combat duty in various nations worldwide ever since.
In a little known role, the S-200 was also employed as a national-level ABM system for a time. More information on this concept can be found here: LINK The same article also contains information regarding a prior use of the Western SA-5 designator.
THE SA-5
The S-200 SAM system is a long-range strategic SAM system. The SARH-guided two-stage 5V21 and 5V28 missiles have a 220 kg HE fragmentation warhead. The 5V21 ad 5V28 differ from previous Fakel-designed air defense missiles insofar as their first stage is not a jetissonable booster stage, but rather four strap-on rocket motors. The missiles themselves are very large, with lengths of 10.5 meters for the 5V21 and 10.8 meters for the 5V28. Ranges vary from variant to variant, with a maximum of between 150 and 300 kilometers. Minimum ranges are between 7 and 17 kilometers, depending on the variant. Minimum altitude for all variants is 300 meters, with a maximum altitude of between 20,000 and 40,000 meters, depending on the variant. Target engagement functions are handled by the 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) radar set, an H band system with a range of 270 kilometers, and a cpaability to engage a single target at a time.
A TYPICAL SA-5 SITE
CIA Intelligence Memorandum 69-15, The Soviet SA-5 Deployment Program, provides us with the following descriptions of active S-200 site configurations:
A typical S-200 site will contain between two and five launch areas, each containing launch pads for six 5P72 launch rails. The radar area will contain a single 5N62 radar for each launch area present in the site. This permits each site to engage multiple targets, reducing the negative impact of the 5N62's single target engagement capability. The image below depicts a typical active S-200 site located in Libya. Relevant areas are annotated.
The following image depicts the Libyan site's radar area. Note the placement of the two 5N62 radars, and the location of the control bunker housing the site's command and control section.
The launch area is detailed below. Launch areas vary in arrangement from nation to nation, but for the most part display a spade shape as seen here. It is common for S-200 sites to feature revetments for the launch rails, and individual environmental shelters to store the 5P72 launch rails during periods of maintenance or inactivity. Each launch area is controlled by crews in a centrally located bunker. Note the cable connections visible between the control bunker and the launch rails.
As witnessed in the imagery provided above, S-200 sites are rather large and expansive. Due to the large footprint of an S-200 site and the plethora of associated structures, inactive S-200 sites are relatively easy to identify.
The following image depicts an inactive S-200 site in Belarus:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the most common S-200 site layouts. Most S-200 sites feature either two or three launch areas.
The following image depicts an active S-200 site in Kazakhstan displaying the two launch site configuration. While there are only two missiles visible on launch rails in the eastern launch position, there are two 5N62 radars visible, implying that the entire site is still active.
The following image depicts an active S-200 site in the Ukraine displaying the three launch site configuration. Only the southernmost launch area appears to be active, as the launch rails appear to have been removed from the other two sites.
Due to the expansive nature of an S-200 complex, S-200 sites can be identified in low-resolution imagery. While this does not provide any indication as to the site's operational status, it does provide the analyst with a location to file away for future observation should coverages be updated.
The following image depicts a Russian S-200 site captured in low-resolution imagery. This is one of two identified S-200 sites containing five launch areas.
NON-STANDARD SA-5 SITES
North Korea and Iran have adopted unusual deployment strategies for their S-200 batteries for various reasons.
North Korean S-200 batteries are deployed in a fashion designed to increase their survivability. As seen previously in examining a North Korean S-125 site, the DPRK chooses to use a series of bunkers to protect the system components. There are individual hardened shelters visible for each 5P72 launch rail, as well as subsurface housings to protect the 5N62 radars when not in use. Two other subsurface bunkers are also visible, implying that the site may contain a total of four 5N62 radars.
The following annotated image depicts North Korea's western S-200 site:
Iranian S-200 batteries, in comparison to other users, are very unusual in their deployment. Iran deploys a single 5N62 radar with two 5P72 launch rails at each location. This is highly irregular, perhaps implying that Iran did not purchase a full complement of missiles or launch rails. It is also possible that, given the capability of the S-200 system, Iran views them as probable targets in any sort of military conflict and as such does not see the need to deploy a significant number of components at each site, choosing instead to hold them in reserve. As the 5N62 can only engage a single target at a time anyway, this would seem to be a sensible strategy.
The following annotated image depicts an Iranian S-200 site located on the grounds of Hamadan AB:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
The S-200 SAM system possesses a very long range, which will only be surpassed once the 400-kilometer S-400 enters full operational service. To that end, the S-200 is capable of providing air defense over large amounts of territory. It should be noted that the long-range S-200 is commonly featured as part of an integrated network which incorporates shorter-range systems such as the S-75, which also helps to cover close-in targets who close within the rather long minimum range of the system. As the S-200 is not intended to counter close-in targets, this should not be considered a design flaw of the system.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-200 sites in Iran:
CIA IM 69-15 provides the following conceptual look at theorized S-200 deployment in the former USSR, based on identified active and in-construction S-200 sites as of 15 June 1969:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-200 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Iran (6/0), Kazakhstan (2/2), Libya (4/2), North Korea (1/0), Syria (2/1), Turkmenistan (1/0), Ukraine (1/2)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-200 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Belarus (1), Czech Republic (2), Estonia (1), Germany (4), Hungary (1), Latvia (1), Lithuania (1), Russia (19)
POSSIBLE USERS
The nations listed below possess identified S-200 site locations in low-resolution imagery. As the resolution precludes identification of the sites as active or inactive, they are listed here as possible users. Some of the nations are already mentioned above, indicating that they possess active or inactive S-200 sites in various resolutions. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of low-resolution sites currently visible in Google Earth.
Azerbaijan (2), Belarus (3), Bulgaria (1), Estonia (3), Latvia (4), Libya (2), Lithuania (1), Moldova (1), North Korea (1), Poland (1), Russia (48), Syria (3), Ukraine (10)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above
Saturday, July 21, 2007
The S-125 SAM System: A Site Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The S-125 (SA-3 GOA) SAM system was developed to provide additional low-altitude coverage in areas already defended by S-25 and S-75 SAM systems. S-125 SAM systems were also deployed in areas identified by the Soviet Military as potential enemy low-altitude ingress routes en route to high-priority targets. Interestingly, the S-125 began life as the M-1 (SA-N-1 GOA) naval SAM system, and was chosen for land-based use early in development. Many S-125 SAM systems remain in operation to this day, and there are numerous odifications available. The most current modification is the Pechora-2M mobile variant.
THE SA-3
The S-125 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. Two missiles are employed, the 5V24 and the 5V27. Both weapons are command guided. The 5V24 missiles possess a 60 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have a range envelope of between 4 and 15 kilometers, with a reach of between 100 and 10,000 meters in altitude. The 5V27 missiles possess an 70 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have ranges between 4 and 25 kilometers with a reach of between 20 and 18,000 meters, depending on the specific variant. The 5V27 can be identified by the addition of two braking fins on the booster section. Upgraded missiles used in Pechora-2 and Pechora-2M systems have a maximum range of 38 kilometers. The I-band RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) radar handles target engagement functions, with a range of 110 kilometers. The RSN-125 has the capability to track 6 targets simultaneously, with the ability to engage a single target at a time.
A TYPICAL SA-3 SITE
A typical S-125 SAM site consists of three or four launch positions arranged in various patterns around a central radar area. Two rail 5P71 or four rail 5P73 launchers are employed. 5V24 missiles are 5.89 meters in length, and 5V27 missiles are 6.09 meters in length, although the difference may not be discernable in overhead imagery. Missile length is sometimes not an effective indicator to use when identifying an S-125 SAM site as the missile rails are often elevated. The launch rails measure approximately 8 meters in length. There is a visible counterbalance and hinge assembly that extends approximately 3.7 meters behind the missiles when they are fitted to the launch rails. This is a convenient feature for identifying an actual launch position as opposed to a missile reload vehicle, which mounts two missiles. The following image depicts a typical three-launcher S-125 site in Syria. Major components and features are labeled.
CIA NIE 11-3-62 provides us with the following description of a typical S-125 site:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the four most common S-125 site layouts. The first S-125 site configuration to be examined consists of three launch positions arrayed in a triangular fashion around the RSN-125 radar. The following site in Syria is an example of such a configuration, as is the annotated example shown above:
Some S-125 sites feature three launchers but four prepared launch positions. The following S-125 site in Libya is an example:
Some S-125 sites feature four launch positions arranged in a parallelogram-shaped configuration around the RSN-125 radar. The S-125 site detailed in the CIA document shown above is an example of such a configuration, as is the following site in the Ukraine:
The final common S-125 site configuration features four launch rails positioned in a square pattern around the central RSN-125 radar. The following site in the Ukraine is an example of such a configuration:
NON-STANDARD SA-3 SITES
Some users have placed S-125 systems in sites formerly constructed for and occupied by S-75 SAM systems. This illustrates the need to not only identify a site's configuration, but also the components present as well. The following S-125 battery is located in a former S-75 SAM site in Egypt:
Some S-125-occupied S-75 sites found in Serbia and India are distinctive insofar as they lack revetments for the radar and launch rails. The following S-75 battery is located on a former S-75 site in Serbia:
Some Belarussian S-125 sites are located on prepared sites intended to house S-300P SAM systems. It is likely that these sites were constructed on the locations of former S-125 sites, and that the S-125 systems were retained pending availability of the S-300P systems. The following site is an example of such a Belarussian S-125 deployment:
Many North Korean SAM sites use unorthodox layouts to increase their survivability. The S-125 is no exception. The site depicted below illustrates North Korean survivability efforts, including placing the launchers and the RSN-125 radar inside of bunkers to protect them when they are not in use.
Finally, some S-125 users deploy their systems in seemingly random manner dictated by either terrain constraints or potential threat ingress routes. There are numerous other iterations of the S-125 site; the important factor in identifying the site is to identify the system components. Fortunately, the launch rails themselves, either loaded or unloaded, are readily identifiable in high-resolution imagery.
The following S-125 site in Algeria is an example of a "random" site configuration, in this case dictated by the limited space available for the site as it is located in an urban area:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
Given the relatively short range of the S-125 SAM system, most nations commonly employ them as short-range systems complementing longer-range systems such as the S-75 that the system was originally designed to complement.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-125 sites (blue) and S-75 sites (red) around the metropolitan areas of northeastern Egypt:
Other nations, such as Eritrea, Peru, and Zambia, employ the S-125 as their primary air defense system, positioning their launchers around key areas. In these cases it is likely that interceptor aircraft would serve as the primary means of air defense, as the SAM network is too short-ranged and widespread to provide accurate coverage.
The following image depicts S-125 coverage in Eritrea:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Algeria (4/0), Angola (7/0), Armenia (2/1), Azerbaijan (4/0), Belarus (4/0), Bulgaria (4/0), Cuba (4/0), Egypt (43/11), Eritrea (3/1), Ethiopia (4/1), Georgia (1/1), India (23/9), Kazakhstan (1/0), Kyrgyzstan (2/0), Libya (10/2), Mozambique (3/0), North Korea (1/0), Peru (7/8), Poland (4/6), Serbia and Montenegro (3/2), Syria (26/4), Tajikistan (2/0), Turkmenistan (3/0), Ukraine (2/2), Uzbekistan (3/0), Vietnam (7/3), Yemen (1/0), Zambia (2/0)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Czech Republic (8), Hungary (8), Iraq (14), Romania (1), Slovakia (4)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Fakel's Missiles, by Vladimir Korovin
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above
-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate
The S-125 (SA-3 GOA) SAM system was developed to provide additional low-altitude coverage in areas already defended by S-25 and S-75 SAM systems. S-125 SAM systems were also deployed in areas identified by the Soviet Military as potential enemy low-altitude ingress routes en route to high-priority targets. Interestingly, the S-125 began life as the M-1 (SA-N-1 GOA) naval SAM system, and was chosen for land-based use early in development. Many S-125 SAM systems remain in operation to this day, and there are numerous odifications available. The most current modification is the Pechora-2M mobile variant.
THE SA-3
The S-125 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. Two missiles are employed, the 5V24 and the 5V27. Both weapons are command guided. The 5V24 missiles possess a 60 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have a range envelope of between 4 and 15 kilometers, with a reach of between 100 and 10,000 meters in altitude. The 5V27 missiles possess an 70 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have ranges between 4 and 25 kilometers with a reach of between 20 and 18,000 meters, depending on the specific variant. The 5V27 can be identified by the addition of two braking fins on the booster section. Upgraded missiles used in Pechora-2 and Pechora-2M systems have a maximum range of 38 kilometers. The I-band RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) radar handles target engagement functions, with a range of 110 kilometers. The RSN-125 has the capability to track 6 targets simultaneously, with the ability to engage a single target at a time.
A TYPICAL SA-3 SITE
A typical S-125 SAM site consists of three or four launch positions arranged in various patterns around a central radar area. Two rail 5P71 or four rail 5P73 launchers are employed. 5V24 missiles are 5.89 meters in length, and 5V27 missiles are 6.09 meters in length, although the difference may not be discernable in overhead imagery. Missile length is sometimes not an effective indicator to use when identifying an S-125 SAM site as the missile rails are often elevated. The launch rails measure approximately 8 meters in length. There is a visible counterbalance and hinge assembly that extends approximately 3.7 meters behind the missiles when they are fitted to the launch rails. This is a convenient feature for identifying an actual launch position as opposed to a missile reload vehicle, which mounts two missiles. The following image depicts a typical three-launcher S-125 site in Syria. Major components and features are labeled.
CIA NIE 11-3-62 provides us with the following description of a typical S-125 site:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the four most common S-125 site layouts. The first S-125 site configuration to be examined consists of three launch positions arrayed in a triangular fashion around the RSN-125 radar. The following site in Syria is an example of such a configuration, as is the annotated example shown above:
Some S-125 sites feature three launchers but four prepared launch positions. The following S-125 site in Libya is an example:
Some S-125 sites feature four launch positions arranged in a parallelogram-shaped configuration around the RSN-125 radar. The S-125 site detailed in the CIA document shown above is an example of such a configuration, as is the following site in the Ukraine:
The final common S-125 site configuration features four launch rails positioned in a square pattern around the central RSN-125 radar. The following site in the Ukraine is an example of such a configuration:
NON-STANDARD SA-3 SITES
Some users have placed S-125 systems in sites formerly constructed for and occupied by S-75 SAM systems. This illustrates the need to not only identify a site's configuration, but also the components present as well. The following S-125 battery is located in a former S-75 SAM site in Egypt:
Some S-125-occupied S-75 sites found in Serbia and India are distinctive insofar as they lack revetments for the radar and launch rails. The following S-75 battery is located on a former S-75 site in Serbia:
Some Belarussian S-125 sites are located on prepared sites intended to house S-300P SAM systems. It is likely that these sites were constructed on the locations of former S-125 sites, and that the S-125 systems were retained pending availability of the S-300P systems. The following site is an example of such a Belarussian S-125 deployment:
Many North Korean SAM sites use unorthodox layouts to increase their survivability. The S-125 is no exception. The site depicted below illustrates North Korean survivability efforts, including placing the launchers and the RSN-125 radar inside of bunkers to protect them when they are not in use.
Finally, some S-125 users deploy their systems in seemingly random manner dictated by either terrain constraints or potential threat ingress routes. There are numerous other iterations of the S-125 site; the important factor in identifying the site is to identify the system components. Fortunately, the launch rails themselves, either loaded or unloaded, are readily identifiable in high-resolution imagery.
The following S-125 site in Algeria is an example of a "random" site configuration, in this case dictated by the limited space available for the site as it is located in an urban area:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
Given the relatively short range of the S-125 SAM system, most nations commonly employ them as short-range systems complementing longer-range systems such as the S-75 that the system was originally designed to complement.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-125 sites (blue) and S-75 sites (red) around the metropolitan areas of northeastern Egypt:
Other nations, such as Eritrea, Peru, and Zambia, employ the S-125 as their primary air defense system, positioning their launchers around key areas. In these cases it is likely that interceptor aircraft would serve as the primary means of air defense, as the SAM network is too short-ranged and widespread to provide accurate coverage.
The following image depicts S-125 coverage in Eritrea:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Algeria (4/0), Angola (7/0), Armenia (2/1), Azerbaijan (4/0), Belarus (4/0), Bulgaria (4/0), Cuba (4/0), Egypt (43/11), Eritrea (3/1), Ethiopia (4/1), Georgia (1/1), India (23/9), Kazakhstan (1/0), Kyrgyzstan (2/0), Libya (10/2), Mozambique (3/0), North Korea (1/0), Peru (7/8), Poland (4/6), Serbia and Montenegro (3/2), Syria (26/4), Tajikistan (2/0), Turkmenistan (3/0), Ukraine (2/2), Uzbekistan (3/0), Vietnam (7/3), Yemen (1/0), Zambia (2/0)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Czech Republic (8), Hungary (8), Iraq (14), Romania (1), Slovakia (4)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Fakel's Missiles, by Vladimir Korovin
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above
-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
The S-75 SAM System: A Site Analysis
INTRODUCTION
The S-75 (SA-2 GUIDLEINE) SAM system was developed in the USSR to provide a semi-mobile, widely deployable SAM system to complement the S-25 system in place around Moscow. Deploying the S-25 nationwide would have proved to be cost-prohibitive, so a smaller, more compact, and therefore cheaper SAM system was needed for air defense across the USSR and the Warsaw Pact member states. The S-75 remains in widespread use to this day, a testament to the robust design and capability of this Cold-War era SAM system. Chinese-produced derivatives share the same deployment layouts, a testament to their S-75 heritage, and are designated HQ-2.
THE SA-2
The S-75 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. The command-guided V-750 missiles have a 195 kg HE fragmentation warhead. Ranges vary from variant to variant, with a maximum of between 30 and 67 kilometers. Minimum ranges are as little as 6 kilometers. Altitudes range from a minimum of as little as 100 meters to a maximum of 30,000 meters, depending on the variant. Target engagement functions are handled by the RSN-75 (FAN SONG) radar set, an E or G band system with a range of up to 145 kilometers, depending on the specific model, and a cpaability to engage a single target at a time.
In an interesting footnote, the initial designator for the RSN-75 radar in the West was FRUIT SET, as evidenced by declassified CIA documentation from 1961 (NIE 11-5-6, available online at the CIA's FOIA website). No reason has yet been discerned for the change to FAN SONG.
A TYPICAL SA-2 SITE
S-75 SAM sites are relatively easy to identify on high-resolution imagery. S-75 components are typically arranged in a circular pattern. The RSN-75 engagement radar is positioned in the center of the site, typically atop a large service and command bunker, and there are six launch rails for the V-750 missiles positioned in a circular pattern facing outward around the radar position. The V-750 missiles are between 10.6 and 11.2 meters in length, depending on the variant. The launch rails measure between 10 and 10.5 meters in length in overhead imagery, depending on the resolution. S-75 sites tend to have a diameter of approximately 0.2 kilometers, although diameters of 0.16 and 0.23 kilometers have also been noted. Deployment in crowded urban areas or in some terrain can necessitate a closer or wider spacing of the site components. The V-750 launch rails are housed in circular revetments between 20 and 25 meters across, with HQ-2 sites having revetments up to 30 meters across.
The following image depicts a typical S-75 site in Yemen. Major components are labeled, including a TET used to transport missile reloads from the storage area to the launch rails.
The common practice of placing the launch rails in sturdy revetments enables inactive S-75 sites to still be identifiable, even though they may have been unused for quite some time.
The following image depicts an inactive, overgrown S-75 site in Germany:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the most common S-75/HQ-2 site layouts.
The S-75 site depicted below is a Bulgarian site displaying the classic circular layout:
Some S-75 sites use a compressed layout, positioning the launch revetments far closer to the RSN-75 radar position than is normal. This is commonly seen in Egyptian S-75 sites, such as the one seen below:
Some S-75 or HQ-2 sites use a semi-circle layout, as depicted by the HQ-2 site near Shanghai seen below:
Not all S-75 or HQ-2 sites feature a radar bunker or even revetments. In this case the site must be identified by the number of launchers, the size of the missiles, and any identifiable support equipment. The site depicted below is such an example, found in Libya. Note that sand berms have been constructed around some of the components, but these are a far cry from the sturdy revetments found at prepared site locations.
NON-STANDARD SA-2 SITES
S-75 and HQ-2 users have developed some unorthodox site layouts for a variety of reasons. Regardless of the layout, two elements will always be present at an S-75 or HQ-2 launch site: the engagement radar, and the missile launch rails themselves. The most common unorthodox site layouts will be discussed here.
Vietnam has created an unorthodox site layout for its S-75 batteries. The revised layout consists of a single RSN-75 engagement radar surrounded by four, rather than six, launch rails, arranged in various patterns. The reasoning behind the revised layout is unclear, but there are a few logical reasons which may be behind the unusual deployment. First, Vietnam may simply be taking launchers and missiles out of service to save maintenance and upkeep costs. Given that the RSN-75 can only prosecute one engagement at a time, reducing the number of launchers at a given site may be strategically acceptable. Secondly, Vietnam may be limiting the number of in-service missiles to reduce the wear and tear on important defensive assets, enabling more missiles to be kept in reserve storage for wartime use. Thirdly, as the revised sites do not maintain the 360-degree layout with respect to the launch rails, reducing the number of rails at certain sites may be indicative of Vietnam's strategic thinking insofar as potential threat ingress routes are concerned. All of Vietnam's S-75 sites feature this layout save one, but even that site is only configured with four launch rails.
The following image depicts a Vietnamese S-75 site near Nha Trang AB using the aforementioned unorthodox equipment configuration:
The Chinese military has been forced to employ an unorthodox HQ-2 site layout due to force modernization issues. A number of HQ-2 sites are apparently being converted to S-300P or HQ-9 sites. In order to mitigate the potential loss of capability while a site is being modernized, the HQ-2 battery is simply relocated off-site to a nearby area.
The following image depicts a Chinese HQ-2 site being modernized to field the S-300P or HQ-9 strategic SAM system. Note the HQ-2 battery which has been repositioned to the northwest of the site being refurbished. In this case, the battery is kept at half-strength.
Once site modernization is complete, some Chinese S-300P or HQ-9 sites appear to retain the HQ-2 battery, which has been relocated back onto the "new" site. This ensures that local air defenses will not be degraded while S-300P or HQ-9 components are procured or produced in sufficient numbers to take up residence at the relevant site or sites.
The following image depicts a recently modernized SAM site configured for the S-300P or HQ-9 system, clearly illustrating the presence of an HQ-2 battery:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
While the S-75 does not possess the sheer range of more modern strategic SAM systems such as the S-200 or the S-300P series, it is still capable of fulfilling a prominent role in the air defense network of a given nation.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-75 sites in Syria:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Albania (2/0), Angola (2/1), Azerbaijan (1/1), Bulgaria (3/0), China (35/7, HQ-2), Cuba (2/0), Egypt (37/100), Ethiopia (6/1), Iran (3/9, HQ-2), Kazakhstan (3/6), Kyrgyzstan (3/0), Libya (8/4), North Korea (15/5), Pakistan (1/0, HQ-2), Syria (24/18), Turkmenistan (2/15), Uzbekistan (1/0), Vietnam (9/1), Yemen (11/1)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Belarus (1), Czech Republic (1), Estonia (1), Germany (6), Hungary (4), India (2), Iraq (17), Latvia (1), Lithuania (2), Mozambique (1), Poland (9), Romania (3), Russia (9), Slovakia (2), Somalia (2), Ukraine (6)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate
-For more information on Pakistan's air defense situation, reference the following article at this site: Modernizing Pakistani Air Defenses
The S-75 (SA-2 GUIDLEINE) SAM system was developed in the USSR to provide a semi-mobile, widely deployable SAM system to complement the S-25 system in place around Moscow. Deploying the S-25 nationwide would have proved to be cost-prohibitive, so a smaller, more compact, and therefore cheaper SAM system was needed for air defense across the USSR and the Warsaw Pact member states. The S-75 remains in widespread use to this day, a testament to the robust design and capability of this Cold-War era SAM system. Chinese-produced derivatives share the same deployment layouts, a testament to their S-75 heritage, and are designated HQ-2.
THE SA-2
The S-75 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. The command-guided V-750 missiles have a 195 kg HE fragmentation warhead. Ranges vary from variant to variant, with a maximum of between 30 and 67 kilometers. Minimum ranges are as little as 6 kilometers. Altitudes range from a minimum of as little as 100 meters to a maximum of 30,000 meters, depending on the variant. Target engagement functions are handled by the RSN-75 (FAN SONG) radar set, an E or G band system with a range of up to 145 kilometers, depending on the specific model, and a cpaability to engage a single target at a time.
In an interesting footnote, the initial designator for the RSN-75 radar in the West was FRUIT SET, as evidenced by declassified CIA documentation from 1961 (NIE 11-5-6, available online at the CIA's FOIA website). No reason has yet been discerned for the change to FAN SONG.
A TYPICAL SA-2 SITE
S-75 SAM sites are relatively easy to identify on high-resolution imagery. S-75 components are typically arranged in a circular pattern. The RSN-75 engagement radar is positioned in the center of the site, typically atop a large service and command bunker, and there are six launch rails for the V-750 missiles positioned in a circular pattern facing outward around the radar position. The V-750 missiles are between 10.6 and 11.2 meters in length, depending on the variant. The launch rails measure between 10 and 10.5 meters in length in overhead imagery, depending on the resolution. S-75 sites tend to have a diameter of approximately 0.2 kilometers, although diameters of 0.16 and 0.23 kilometers have also been noted. Deployment in crowded urban areas or in some terrain can necessitate a closer or wider spacing of the site components. The V-750 launch rails are housed in circular revetments between 20 and 25 meters across, with HQ-2 sites having revetments up to 30 meters across.
The following image depicts a typical S-75 site in Yemen. Major components are labeled, including a TET used to transport missile reloads from the storage area to the launch rails.
The common practice of placing the launch rails in sturdy revetments enables inactive S-75 sites to still be identifiable, even though they may have been unused for quite some time.
The following image depicts an inactive, overgrown S-75 site in Germany:
EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS
The following images depict the most common S-75/HQ-2 site layouts.
The S-75 site depicted below is a Bulgarian site displaying the classic circular layout:
Some S-75 sites use a compressed layout, positioning the launch revetments far closer to the RSN-75 radar position than is normal. This is commonly seen in Egyptian S-75 sites, such as the one seen below:
Some S-75 or HQ-2 sites use a semi-circle layout, as depicted by the HQ-2 site near Shanghai seen below:
Not all S-75 or HQ-2 sites feature a radar bunker or even revetments. In this case the site must be identified by the number of launchers, the size of the missiles, and any identifiable support equipment. The site depicted below is such an example, found in Libya. Note that sand berms have been constructed around some of the components, but these are a far cry from the sturdy revetments found at prepared site locations.
NON-STANDARD SA-2 SITES
S-75 and HQ-2 users have developed some unorthodox site layouts for a variety of reasons. Regardless of the layout, two elements will always be present at an S-75 or HQ-2 launch site: the engagement radar, and the missile launch rails themselves. The most common unorthodox site layouts will be discussed here.
Vietnam has created an unorthodox site layout for its S-75 batteries. The revised layout consists of a single RSN-75 engagement radar surrounded by four, rather than six, launch rails, arranged in various patterns. The reasoning behind the revised layout is unclear, but there are a few logical reasons which may be behind the unusual deployment. First, Vietnam may simply be taking launchers and missiles out of service to save maintenance and upkeep costs. Given that the RSN-75 can only prosecute one engagement at a time, reducing the number of launchers at a given site may be strategically acceptable. Secondly, Vietnam may be limiting the number of in-service missiles to reduce the wear and tear on important defensive assets, enabling more missiles to be kept in reserve storage for wartime use. Thirdly, as the revised sites do not maintain the 360-degree layout with respect to the launch rails, reducing the number of rails at certain sites may be indicative of Vietnam's strategic thinking insofar as potential threat ingress routes are concerned. All of Vietnam's S-75 sites feature this layout save one, but even that site is only configured with four launch rails.
The following image depicts a Vietnamese S-75 site near Nha Trang AB using the aforementioned unorthodox equipment configuration:
The Chinese military has been forced to employ an unorthodox HQ-2 site layout due to force modernization issues. A number of HQ-2 sites are apparently being converted to S-300P or HQ-9 sites. In order to mitigate the potential loss of capability while a site is being modernized, the HQ-2 battery is simply relocated off-site to a nearby area.
The following image depicts a Chinese HQ-2 site being modernized to field the S-300P or HQ-9 strategic SAM system. Note the HQ-2 battery which has been repositioned to the northwest of the site being refurbished. In this case, the battery is kept at half-strength.
Once site modernization is complete, some Chinese S-300P or HQ-9 sites appear to retain the HQ-2 battery, which has been relocated back onto the "new" site. This ensures that local air defenses will not be degraded while S-300P or HQ-9 components are procured or produced in sufficient numbers to take up residence at the relevant site or sites.
The following image depicts a recently modernized SAM site configured for the S-300P or HQ-9 system, clearly illustrating the presence of an HQ-2 battery:
SYSTEM COVERAGE
While the S-75 does not possess the sheer range of more modern strategic SAM systems such as the S-200 or the S-300P series, it is still capable of fulfilling a prominent role in the air defense network of a given nation.
The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-75 sites in Syria:
CURRENT USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.
Albania (2/0), Angola (2/1), Azerbaijan (1/1), Bulgaria (3/0), China (35/7, HQ-2), Cuba (2/0), Egypt (37/100), Ethiopia (6/1), Iran (3/9, HQ-2), Kazakhstan (3/6), Kyrgyzstan (3/0), Libya (8/4), North Korea (15/5), Pakistan (1/0, HQ-2), Syria (24/18), Turkmenistan (2/15), Uzbekistan (1/0), Vietnam (9/1), Yemen (11/1)
FORMER USERS
The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.
Belarus (1), Czech Republic (1), Estonia (1), Germany (6), Hungary (4), India (2), Iraq (17), Latvia (1), Lithuania (2), Mozambique (1), Poland (9), Romania (3), Russia (9), Slovakia (2), Somalia (2), Ukraine (6)
SOURCES
-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate
-For more information on Pakistan's air defense situation, reference the following article at this site: Modernizing Pakistani Air Defenses
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