Zhukovskiy in Imagery

INTRODUCTION

One of the most important historical sites in the field of aviation history can be found southeast of the Russian capital of Moscow. Situated along the eastern bank of the Moskva river, the Gromov Flight Research Institute (LII) has been home to some of the most important aircraft and personalities in the history of aviation.

NOT RAMENSKOYE, BUT...

During the Cold War, LII was referred to in the West as Ramenskoye, owing to the belief that the airfield had taken the name of a nearby town. Apparently unbeknownst to the Western analysts, the facility was more closely associated with Zhukovskiy, and not Ramenskoye. Zhukovskiy, for example, is where the scientific counterpart to LII is housed, the Central Aerohydrondynamic Institute (TsAGI). TsAGI is responsible for research and design work, while LII is the flight test center.

The following image depicts the Gromov Flight Research Center facility located near Zhukovskiy, Russia:


Due to the misidentification of the airfield, somewhat inaccurate codenames were applied to new aircraft spotted at LII facilities. For example, the Tu-144 prototype SST, first sighted at the Tupolev facility located on the grounds of the airfield in 1969, was assigned the codename RAM-H. RAM-H denoted the aircraft as the eighth new type sighted at the (improperly named) Ramenskoye facility. Once aircraft were identified by type, appropriate ASCC codenames were then assigned. The codename for the Tu-144 was CHARGER, denoting a jet-powered transport aircraft (two syllable names were given to jet-powered aircraft, and names beginning with C denoted transport aircraft, to include commercial airliners).

GROMOV FLIGHT RESEARCH INSTITUTE

The Gromov Flight Research Institute is home to a number of individual facilities owned and operated by various aircraft design bureaus. The closest Western comparison would, at first glance, seem to be Edwards AFB in California, the United States Air Force's major flight test facility found in the California desert. While it is true that nearly all of Russia's combat aircraft have been trialled at LII, this comparison is not entirely suitable. Being home to the various design bureau flight test operations, LII has also been home to the flight test programs for numerous civillian aircraft, such as the aforementioned Tu-144. In the Western world, for example, a new Boeing bomber may have been trialled at Edwards AFB, but a new Boeing airliner would likely be trialled at the civillian facility in Seattle. This emphasizes the massive impact that the LII facility has had on Soviet and Russian aviation, being the home to both civil and military flight test programs.

The following annotated image depicts the locations of various design bureau's facilities located on the grounds of the LII facility, as well as other important areas:


TUPOLEV

Perhaps the most significant design bureau to operate out of Zhukovskiy is named for one of the true pioneers of modern aviation, Andrei Tupolev. OKB Tupolev has produced some of the most recognizable military aircraft in the world, from the Tu-95 BEAR, the stalwart Cold Warrior, to the sleek and powerful Tu-160 BLACKJACK, the world's most powerful combat aircraft. OKB Tupolev has also produced some of history's most important civillian designs, including the world's first supersonic transport, the Tu-144 CHARGER.

The following image depicts the Tupolev ramp area at LII. Quite a few significant aircraft can be seen, such as Tu-160 strategic bombers, and the Tu-144LL testbed, a refurbished Tu-144D used in a joint US-Russian supersonic flight research program.


MIG AND SUKHOI

Aside from Tupolev, the most famous and well-known aircraft to begin their careers at LII are the fighter aircraft developed by MIG-MAPO and OKB Sukhoi. Many of these aircraft have gone on to have distinguished careers in both Russian and foreign service, including the MiG-23 FLOGGER tactical fighter and the Su-24 FENCER strike aircraft. Russia's fifth-generation fighter prototypes, the MiG 1.44 and Su-47, both conducted their flight test programs over the skies of Zhukovskiy. Current efforts include continued refining and updating of two of the most advanced fighter aircraft ever produced by the Russian aerospace industry, MIG-MAPO's MiG-29 FULCRUM and OKB Sukhoi's Su-27 FLANKER series.

The following image depicts the ramp area shared by the two fighter design bureaus at LII. Interesting aircraft of note include a solitary MiG-31M FOXHOUND-B advanced interceptor prototype, as well as a Sukhoi S-80 transport prototype.


YAKOVLEV

OKB Yakovlev also conducts flight test operations on the grounds of the LII facility, and while it is not as active as Tupolev or MiG/Sukhoi, it does consistently venture into both the military and civillian aspects of aviation.

The following image depicts OKB Yakovlev's operations area at the LII facility. Various civillian types are in residence, as are a single Yak-130 trainer prototype and a single Yak-141 V/STOL fighter demonstrator. An Su-34 FULLBACK can also be seen on the taxiway.


MYASISCHEV

OKB Myasischev has seen its contribution to Russian aviation gradually reduced over the past few decades. Once home to a massive strategic aviation design effort, that area of work was mostly taken over by OKB Tupolev after the failure of the M-50 BOUNDER supersonic bomber project. OKB Myasischev's last significant contribution to Russian strategic aviation may be little known outside Russian circles, however, as it was responsible for the M-18 design passed to OKB Tupolev for development into what became the Tu-160 strategic bomber.

The following image depicts the area surrounding OKB Myasischev's ramp space at the LII facility. OKB Myasischev still operates the VM-T Atlant transporter, a converted M-4 BISON strategic bomber outfitted for the carriage of oversized external loads relating to Russia's space program. An M-55 MYSTIC-B high-altitude surveillance aircraft can also be seen on the ramp. Nearby are two Beriev 976 range-control aircraft, converted Ilyushin Il-76 CANDID transports to a configuration similar to that of the Beriev A-50 MAINSTAY AEW&C aircraft. A solitary Su-30MKI prototype can also be seen in the area.


THE MOSCOW AIRSHOW

One of the most important functions of the LII facility is to host the recurring Moscow Aerosalon, one of the most famous airshows in the world.

The following image depicts a number of aircraft being prepared for display at the 2007 Moscow airshow. Various combat aircraft can be seen, as well as an example of the NPO Mash 3M25 Meteorit supersonic cruise missile.


CONCLUSION

The Gromov Flight Research Institute in Zhukovskiy is one of the most interesting aviation-related facilities in the world. Home to numerous historic flight test programs and one of the longest runways in Europe, it is truly a fascinating facility to observe in imagery. One can only hope that the next century is as interesting as the last. With the ingenuity constantly shown by Russian aeronautical engineers, not much hope may be needed after all.

SOURCES

-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Dead World

INTRODUCTION

Progress does not come without a price. Many of mankind's technological advancements in the name of science or warfare have had devastating effects on the environment and the populace. This article will focus on four of the most dangerous places on the face of the planet.

THE NUCLEAR PACIFIC

In 1945, the first atomic bombs were used in anger, effectively bringing the Second World War to an abrupt, immediate end. After the war, testing of nuclear weapons for various uses was expanded exponentially. The bulk of the wide-ranging test programs were moved out of the Untied States, where the first weapons were tested, and into the South Pacific.

The next step in the development of nuclear weaponry was the Teller-Ulam weapon design, the first of the so-called hydrogen bombs. The first Teller-Ulam h-bomb to be detonated was the IVY MIKE device, detonated on 1 November 1952. This 10.4 megaton detonation completely vaporized the island of Elugelab in Enewetak Atoll. IVY MIKE's bomb design was, however, only a test device. Further refinement would be necessary to develop and field a weapon suitable for operational use.

On 1 March 1954, the largest nuclear detonation ever initiated by the United States took place on an artificial island in Bikini Atoll. The CASTLE BRAVO test resulted in a 15 megaton blast, fully 175% larger than predicted yield due to the presence of lithium-7 in the fuel. Work on weaponizing the "Shrimp" bomb design used in the BRAVO device began less than one month after the test.

The following image depicts the blast crater carved out of Bikini Atoll by the CASTLE BRAVO detonation:


CASTLE BRAVO was clearly a powerful weapon, but the unseen component, radioactive fallout, was just as deadly and even more invasive than the blast itself. Fallout from the BRAVO blast traveled hundreds of miles downrange, and many portions of the test area were blanketed with enough radiation to easily kill a human being.

The following image is a graphic representation of the radiation spread across the test range, measured 96 hours after the blast. It should be noted that a cumulative dose of 700 rads over 96 hours can be fatal to human beings, with an instantaneous dose of 1000-2000 rads in one exposure also being fatal.


CASTLE BRAVO was perhaps the ultimate demonstration of the power and destructive, killing force of a nuclear detonation. Not only did a good percentage of the test area end up being vaporized, but the resultant radiation spread around the test range resulted in an exclusion zone being enacted around the site, effectively marking 1 percent of the Earth's surface as unfit for human occupation until radiation levels drop substantially.

That being said, nuclear weapons do not need to be employed to result in the potential deaths of thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands, of people.

CHELYABINSK

The Mayak nuclear weapons research and production facility situated 150 kilometers northwest of Chelyabinsk in Russia is home to one of the most potentially dangerous pieces of real estate in the world. Mayak was established after the Second World War to produce plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.

There have been various incidents related to the radioactive nature of the facility. The most significant occurred in 1957 when a cooling unit for a nuclear waste storage unit failed, resulting in an explosion that spread radiation over hundreds of square miles. At least 200 people died as a result of their exposure, with as many as half a million others being exposed to some degree.

After dumping radioactive waste from the production facilities into the Techa River during the early years of operation, the Mayak complex began to use the nearby Lake Karachay as a dumping site. This appeared to be a better idea on the surface, as the lake was enclosed and did not connect to the Techa River and eventually the waters off of Siberia. Unfortunately, by 1967 the lake had dried up, leaving behind a large amount of radioactive sediment. In 1967 a large amount of this radioactive material was spread throughout the province by a large wind storm, once again affecting nearly 500,000 people. The worst disaster, however, may be yet to occur.

After the 1967 accident, Lake Karachay was covered with concrete in an effort to contain the radioactive material. The concrete-covered lake can be seen in the image below:


Covering the dry lakebed with concrete has prevented an airborne radiological threat from emerging from the dry lake since 1967, but a very serious problem still remains. The radioactive material has been leaking into the groundwater below the lake. While the lake was self-contained, the groundwater source could potentially transport radioactive material from Lake Karachay into the Arctic. Were that to happen, half of the globe could be affected, as the sheer amount of radioactive material still present buried underneath the concrete is staggering. Lake Karachay has been referred to as the most radioactive spot on the planet for a very good reason.

CHERNOBYL

In 1986 the world's worst nuclear accident took place near a town in the Ukraine called Pripyat. A accident in a nuclear reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant resulted in an explosion and the release of large quantities of radiation into the atmosphere.

The following image depicts the Chernobyl power plant and the surrounding area:


The Complex

The Chernobyl nuclear power plant consisted of four 1 Gigawatt nuclear reactors. The first reactor was comissioned in 1977. At the time of the accident in 1986, two other reactors were under construction, as seen in the image above. After the accident, the three remaining operational reactors were gradually taken off-line, with the last reactor powering down in December of 2000.

The following image depicts the main reactor complex at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant:


The Accident

On April 26, 1986, Reactor #4 suffered a catastrophic failure during a test program, resulting in a violent explosion. Without going into exhaustive detail, the explosion blew a hole in the roof of the reactor, leaving the core exposed, and spread radioactive debris throughout the surrounding area. Portions of Europe and the rest of the world were also affected by the radioactive debris cloud, albeit on a much reduced scale. An area of 150,000 square kilometers was irradiated in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, and a 30 kilometer exclusion zone was established around the site.

Pripyat

The nearby town of Pripyat was constructed to house the workers of Chernobyl as well as their families. Pripyat's inhabitants were ordered to evacuate on 27 April, and would never return, leaving behind an eerie ghost town as a reminder of the events that occurred the previous day.

The following image depicts some of the abandoned structures in the heart of Pripyat:


The main problem with Chernobyl today is the state of the sarcophagus containing the radioactive material in Reactor 4. The sarcophagus was intended as a temporary solution, designed to last for no more than 20 years. It was built in 1986, 21 years ago, and is rapidly deteriorating.

The following image depicts the sarcophagus erected atop Reactor 4:


A collapse of the sarcophagus would result in the further dissemination of radioactive material throughout the area. While radiation levels in the surrounding area have dropped considerably in the years following the accident, the material contained inside the core is still extremely dangerous and must be dealt with accordingly.

As we can see, nuclear testing grounds and accident sites can still pose serious health risks years after events have occurred. They may not, however, represent the most serious threat, nor represent the most potentially dangerous piece of real estate on the entire globe.

VOZROZHDENIYE ISLAND

In 1936, the Soviet Union began to test biological weapons on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea. Various types of biological agents were tested on the island, including anthrax and smallpox.

The following image depicts the main research and residential facilities on Vozrozhdeniye Island:


While the research facilities were closed down in 1991, Vozrozhdeniye Island remains a potential source of biological warfare material. In 1992 it was revealed that weaponized anthrax had been buried on the island. Beginning in 1988, various biological warfare agents were buried on the island as they were present in quantities too large to destroy in an autoclave. It was later discovered that the containment and decontamination efforts were not as effective as it had been hoped, as weaponzied anthrax spores had been found surviving in the soil of the island.

The main problem facing Vozrozhdeniye Island today is that it is literally growing in size. In an effort to divert water to agricultural projects in the area, a number of rivers feeding the Aral Sea were dammed over the years, resulting in a gradual decline in the water level of what was once the world's fourth-largest body of inland water.

The following image depicts the island as it currently appears, with a yellow area denoting the size of the island as it existed in 1962:


As the water level in the Aral Sea drops, Vozrozhdeniye Island will eventually join with the surrounding land, removing the main source of security that had led to the islands choice as a biowarfare testing facility in the first place: isolation. The effects of the falling water levels can already be seen; apart from the obvious effect of increasing the landmass associated with Vozrozhdeniye Island, various ships have been seen trapped on land along the northern edge of the new landmass.

The following image depicts the locations of numerous ships which have fallen into disuse after being abandoned on the new shores of Vozrozhdeniye Island:


The following image is a detail view of some of the aforementioned shipwrecks:


The ultimate threat from Vozrozhdeniye Island lies in what is buried under the sands. As the island becomes more accessible, the chances of something sinister being unearthed and released into the population increase exponentially. It is known that weaponized anthrax was buried on the island. One can only speculate in silent horror at what else may have been buried there, and given the weaponzied nature of the testing, what else may still survive and lie in wait to descend on an unsuspecting population. The ultimate doomsday scenario could play out in a simple and innocent fashion: reintroduction of burrowing animals after the island rejoins the mainland could result in the spread of biological warfare organisms with no warning whatsoever.

CONCLUSION

It should be noted that this article is not intended as an indictemnt of nuclear power or nuclear weaponry. Nuclear power, when used in a safe and controlled manner, is a very valuable power source. Nuclear weaponry does have a very significant role in both defensive and offensive military actions, although world leaders refuse to acknowledge the latter. Rather, this was intended to illustrate the effects of a lack of knowledge or attention to detail. Had the Chernobyl reactor been of a more sound design, the explosion would have had far less of an effect on the surrounding area. Had scientists at Bikini been aware of the effects of the materials inside their weapon, the CASTLE BRAVO detonation would have been far more controlled and not resulted in a massive radiation spread. If we are going to possess or experiment with such technologies, we must be aware of the consequences, and be prepared to deal with them in a far more effective manner.

SOURCES

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd Edition, Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan (eds), 1977

US Nuclear Testing
Chelyabinsk
Nuclear Waste in the Ural Mountains
Contamination In Russia
Chernobyl FAQ
Vozrozhdeniye Island
Vozrozhdeniye Island

-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

Samoderzhets Decloaked

INTRODUCTION

The introduction of the S-400 strategic SAM system into the operational inventory of the Russian air defense network has resulted in increased speculation over the nature of the next-generation of Russian SAM systems. One of the most common misconceptions appears to be the belief that a new SAM system referred to as Samoderzhets is being prepared for front-line service.

RUSSIAN MODERN SAM DEVELOPMENT

The development of the next generation of Russian SAM systems can be traced back to 1979 when the first S-300PT batteries were accepted for service. Over the course of the S-300P's lifetime, various modifications have surfaced, each providing an incremental increase in capability over the last variant.

The principal S-300P variants were as follows:

S-300PT: Initial trailer-launched SAM system employing 5N63 (FLAP LID) target engagement radar (TER) and 5V55K missile.

S-300PS: Initial mobile SAM system with components mounted on 8x8 chassis, introduced 5N63S/30N6 (30N6E) TER and 5V55R missile.

S-300PM (export variant: S-300PMU): Introduced digital connectivity between components and 5V55RUD missile.

S-300PM-1 (export variant: S-300PMU-1): Introduced new 30N6-1 (30N6E1, TOMB STONE) TER, and 48N6 (48N6E) missile.

S-300PM-2 (export variant: S-300PMU-2): Introduced 48N6D (48N6E2) missile, as well as 9M96 (9M96E) and 9M96D (9M96E2) missiles, although there is no evidence that the latter two weapons have been fielded with Russian units.

S-300PM-3: developmental variant aimed at increased range with 48N6DM missile and new TER (GRAVE STONE). Evolved into the S-400 (SA-X-21).

As early as 1984, two other advanced SAM systems were stated to be in development, the S-500 and S-1000. The S-500 was a new long-range, mobile ATBM system, analogous to the American THAAD system currently in development. The S-1000 was described as a very long-range SAM designed to target air-breathing targets such as ISR platforms and other support aircraft. Where the S-300P was the successor to the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) in the Moscow air defense network, the S-1000 was possibly intended to be deployed as a partial replacement for the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON); S-300P units have replaced S-200 units in some areas, but only the most recent iterations can claim to have a range anywhere near that of the massive 300 kilometers attained by the S-200. Neither the S-500 nor the S-1000 were anywhere near operational service, as they only existed as concepts throughout the 1980s. Recent analysis would seem to suggest, however, that both systems will eventually be operationally employed, with at least one of them being mentioned by name as recently as August 2007.

It is likely that the S-1000 has actually been absorbed into the S-400. The intended capabilities of the S-1000 seem to match up with the S-400's 40N6 missile, a product of OKB Fakel, who has historically been responsible for the development of long-range strategic SAM missiles such as the 5V21 employed by the S-200 and the 48N6 employed by the S-300PM-1. The likely course of development could have seen the S-300PM-3 and S-1000 combined into a new system, the S-400, utilizing common system components and radars. This would explain the delays in fielding the S-400 as well as the current status of the 40N6 program. Radars would need to be suitably altered to support longer-range engagements, and the S-1000's weapon would need to be refined and complete development allowing it to function as part of the S-400 system.

ALMAZ-ANTEY MERGER

In May of 2002 the producer of the S-300P, the Almaz design bureau, was merged with the Antey design bureau, creator of the S-300V tactical SAM system, to form the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern. This effectively consolidated all of the long-range SAM and ATBM experience into one organization. The new association resulted in a whole new concept of thinking regarding the boundaries between tactical and strategic air defense.

SAMODERZHETS

Despite the merger of Almaz and Antey, projects which had previously been active did continue development. These included the Antey-2500/S-300VM (SA-X-23) and the latest S-300P iteration, the S-300PM-3, which had by then morphed into the S-400. Future projects, however, would need to take full advantage of the consolidated expertise offered by the new corporation. Enter Samoderzhets.

Samoderzhets was a program begun shortly after the merger of Almaz and Antey aimed at identifying the characteristics and capabilities of new SAM systems operating on a national level. The research effort was conducted by the Second Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. Deputy Defense Minister General of the Army Aleksey Moskovskiy, in a December 2004 interview for Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, described Samoderzhets as a project aimed at finding an "optimal solution" for the development of new air defense systems, systems capable of performing tasks for both the Army and PVO air defense, and operating within a national integrated air defense network framework:

"The name you mentioned, Samoderzhets, is not a system. It is a system project to look for an optimal solution."

General Moskovskiy goes on to state that an actual SAM system like the one outlined in the Samoderzhets project would most likely not be procured anytime soon as it would be "superfluous", as the S-400 was nearing service entry, but does state that modifying S-400 components to operate in such a manner (implying a national integrated network) was possible. The reason for integrating such systems would be to better coordinate air defense assets, and to better integrate the anti-missile capabilities of S-300V type systems (which are presently Russian Army assets, being tactical systems) into the national defense network. Ergo, the creation of an actual weapon system was not the goal of Samoderzhets, but rather the description and outlining of a new national framework to better control and integrate present and future systems to maximize their effectiveness, as well as the delineation and outlining of capabilities required by the individual systems serving in such a network. Official news regarding the Samoderzhets project virtually disappeared after 2004. There was a logical explanation for this, however: the research program was completed in 2004.

Samoderzhets was clearly never intended to result in the direct production of a new SAM system bearing the name, but it was a very important research endeavour, especially in the light of the new Almaz-Antey consortium. Future SAM systems will likely be designed around the system requirements and framework researched and outlined in the Samoderzhets project. In fact, early 2007 saw the mention of such a system. Sergey Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister, gave Almaz-Antey the task to develop a new air defense system capable for the first time of providing air defense, missile defense, and space defense. Such a project would seem to be revolutionary in concept, but seems perfectly logical as a next step given the results of the Samoderzhets project, and has been given until 2015 to produce hardware. 2015 may not seem that far off, especially given the delays associated with the S-400 system, but the new all-encompassing system has in fact been mentioned as early as 2005, and may have been in development before then.

It should be noted that the term "air defense system" does not necessarily imply one specific system such as the S-400, but could very well imply a series of systems, in this case the S-400 and S-500, integrated under a united national network, such as the kind outlined under the Samoderzhets project.

It is likely that the new system will build upon the S-400, using S-400 components for air defense. The missile defense component will likely be the aforementioned S-500 system, referred to in some sources as Vlastelin. The S-500 re-entered the public eye in August of 2007. On the 6th of August, Igor Ashurbeyli of Almaz-Antey was interviewed on Channel One TV in Russia regarding the first S-400 battery being activated near Elektrostal. Ashurbeyli stated that the next project for Almaz-Antey was the S-500, a mobile anti-missile system designed to function as part of the "unified system of Russia's air defense", a clear reference to Ivanov's statements in February and the concepts researched under Samoderzhets. Development of the S-500, according to some sources, had ended at one point in the past due to a lack of funding, but could easily have been restarted, saving Almaz-Antey from having to come up with a new anti-missile system from scratch. The S-500 is also believed to be related to the 45T6 anti-ballistic missile, which would certainly enable it to potentially perform exoatmospheric intercepts.

Confusion resulting from the appearance of the Samoderzhets name in press reporting did lead to the assumption that a new system was being developed, but as Samoderzhets was a project only, this is clearly not the case. There are a few reasons why certain assumptions about the potential new system were made, however, and they can be logically explained.

Samoderzhets is often claimed to be a SAM system integrating S-300P/S-400 and S-300V components. This is basically true, but not in a physical sense. Samoderzhets called for the integration of existing systems into a national level network, while designing new systems to operate in such a manner from the outset, regardless of whether or not they were employed by the Army or the Air Defense Troops. These systems would have, according to General Moskovskiy, included the S-300P and S-300V families. They would have been integrated, but not in a physical sense, as many have incorrectly assumed.

Samoderzhets was also described as combining the best aspects of previously developed SAM systems, and serving as the basis for a new standardized SAM system. This is partly correct; Samoderzhets would have integrated S-300V and S-300P/S-400 type systems, enabling their effectiveness to be maximized. Samoderzhets does also form the basis for new SAM development, as it outlined the framework under which new systems will operate, as well as their desired performance characteristics.

The main nail in the coffin of the Samoderzhets argument is the 2007 tasking to develop a new SAM system. Were Samoderzhets already a developed system by 2004, as some suggest, a new air and missile defense system would clearly not have been required. Furthermore, the Samoderzhets project was already three years past its completion date by 2007. As such the project initiated in 2007 would not have required a 2015 demonstration date; were Samoderzhets a true SAM system, completed in 2004, it would be ready for deployment far earlier than 2015. Lastly, the S-500 has been mentioned as the next SAM system to be developed for operational use, not Samoderzhets.

Some sources have claimed that Samoderzhets was proposed as an alternative to the S-400. In that light Samoderzhets may have been intended to result in a hybrid system, but the induction of the S-400 into front-line service would seem to be enough to put that theory to rest.

A final argument against the development of Samoderzhets as an actual SAM system is that it would represent both a waste of effort, given the S-500 development program for the anti-missile role, and a reduction in capability when compared to the S-400. In the anti-aircraft role the S-300VM's 9M83M missile has a range of 200 kilometers, a full 50 or 100 kilometers shy of the two range figures quoted for the 48N6DM employed by the S-400, even without considering the 400 kilometer range attained by the S-400's 40N6. Furthermore, Samoderzhets cannot be the new S-500 system, provided of course that both Ivanov and Ashurbeyli were referring to the same system. If, as many sources would have us believe, Samoderzhets represents a combination of S-300VM and S-400 systems, then the resultant system would fail to achieve the performance specified by Ivanov insofar as intercepting exoatmospheric targets is concerned.

Samoderzhets as a research endeavour is a far more logical explanation in light of the current evidence.

CONCLUSION

Samoderzhets was a very important project, one which will help to outline and govern the framework and interoperability of Russian air defense units for some time. But Samoderzhets was not a SAM system development effort, and no Samoderzhets system will be operating in Russia. The task of defending the skies and space over Russia will fall in the future to the S-400 and S-500 systems.

SOURCES

-New Russian SAM System Said Superior to Patriot, Has Multipurpose Capability (Moscow Vremya Novostey, 13 August 2004 p. 4)
-Russia approves Almaz-Antei merger (David Isby, Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 June 2002)
-Russian Defense Ministry to state performance specifications for new air defense system (Interfax, 4 October 2004)
-Russia to Develop New Air, Missile, Space Defense "Superweapon" (Vremya Novostey, 28 February 2007)
-Russian Channel One TV broadcast (6 August 2007)
-Russia looks to bolster air defence (James O'Halloran, Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March 2007)
-Advantages of Upgraded Versus New Technology (Vestnik Vozhdushnogo Flota, 31 December 2004)
-Second Central Scientific Research Institute of MoD Receives Pennant (Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 November 2005)
-Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems

FLANKERs In Imagery

INTRODUCTION

The Su-27 (FLANKER) is one of the most famous aircraft to come out of Russia. The result of a Cold-War requirement for an aircraft capable of besting the latest fighter aircraft the West had to offer, Sukhoi's T-10S design represented the pinnacle of Russian aerodynamic achievement in the 20th Century. The Su-27 design eventually spawned numerous variants, including the carrier capable Su-27K (FLANKER-D) and the Su-34 (FULLBACK) strike aircraft.

FLANKERS WORLDWIDE

Su-27s and their offspring are employed by various nations worldwide. This article will provide an overview of all FLANKER users with airframes visible in overhead imagery provided by Google Earth. This is in no way a representation of every Su-27 user, or an accurate representation of true inventories, but rather an analysis of available imagery. As such, known Su-27 operators such as Indonesia and Angola are not covered; this does not suggest that there has been an oversight on the part of the author, but rather that there are no visible Su-27 airframes in these nations.

There are currently 498 FLANKER-family airframes visible in the available imagery. They operate from 29 airbases in 10 nations. Each nation will be detailed in the following format:

NATION (total number of airframes visible)

Airbase
-Location: (coordinates)
-Inventory: (number and type; this field will be repeated for different types visible at a given airfield)

(Imagery highlights; not a visible representation of every FLANKER, but rather interesting or unusual aircraft)

(Image of identified FLANKER bases where more than one location has been identified)

Su-27 family types will be identified using the following designators:

Su-27: denotes Su-27 or Su-27UB, or export versions thereof
Su-30K: denotes Indian Su-30K
Su-30KI: denotes Russian single-seat prototype
Su-30MKI: denotes Indian advanced fighter aircraft
Su-30MKK: denotes Chinese twin-seat strike fighter
Su-33: denotes Russian carrier-based Su-27 derivative
Su-34: denotes Russian strike derivative
Su-35: denotes Russian advanced fighter derivative
J-11: denotes Chinese kit-assembled Su-27SK or UBK
FLANKER: generic designator used to denote an Su-27 or derivative where imagery cannot determine the type; for example, KnAAPO-located Su-27s are denoted as FLANKER as they cannot be identified as Su-27 or Su-27SM aircraft when both types are known to operate at the location

TYPE IDENTIFICATION

Identifying individual types is a detailed process that involves both a knowledge of standard recognition features, and the inventory of the nation being examined. Most FLANKER variants cannot be specifically identified due to the resolution of the imagery available. There are, however, features that are visible that can aid in identifying certain specific types. These features are the configuration of the tail structure which extends aft between the engine nozzles, and the presence or lack of canard foreplanes.

The basic Su-27

A lineup of basic Su-27s can be seen below. Note the lack of canards, and the standard-length tail structure:


The Su-30 and Su-30MKI

Tandem twin-seat FLANKERs such as the Su-27UB and Su-30 are not able to be distinguished using the available imagery. In the case of India, however, all FLANKER-family aircraft are of the tandem twin-seat variety, being either Su-30K or Su-30MKI variants. The two types are distinguishable as the Su-30MKI features visible canard foreplanes.

The following image depicts four Su-30K and one Su-30MKI aircraft visible at Pune AB in India. The arcraft on the north end of the lineup is the Su-30MKI. Note how the starboard canard is visible, as well as its associated shadow on the runway, differentiating this aircraft from the others in the lineup. The white rectangular shapes which appear to cover the port sides of the aircraft are actually markings on the runway.


The Su-33

The Su-33 is identifiable thanks to its shorter tail structure and the presence of canards, as evidenced in the image below. The aircraft on the right is an Su-33, and is also displaying another characteristic of the aircraft which is sometimes visible in overhead imagery: folding wings to permit storage at sea. In contrast, the FLANKER on the left possesses the standard tail structure. Canards make the aircraft either an Su-30MKI or an Su-35, both of which have been trialled at Akhtubinsk where the image was taken.


The Su-34

The Su-34 is easily identifiable. While the altered forward fuselage and side-by-side cockpit layout is not discernable, the tail structure of greatly increased length is readily distinguishable, as can be seen in the following image of three Su-34s parked at Akhtubinsk:


RUSSIA (376)

Akhtubinsk Flight Test Center
-Location: 48°18'24.62"N 46°12'08.80"E
-Inventory: 18 FLANKER, 1 Su-33, 3 Su-34

The following image depicts the primary Sukhoi ramp at Akhtubinsk:


Besovets-Petrozavodsk-15
-Location: 61°53'11.51"N 34°09'21.87"E
-Inventory: 28 Su-27

Chkalovsk
-Location: 54°46'00.03"N 20°23'45.05"E
-Inventory: 24 Su-27

Kilp-Yavr
-Location: 69°05'41.83"N 32°24'04.19"E
-Inventory: 38 Su-27

Komsomolsk-na-Amur
-Location: 50°36'20.98"N 137°04'52.80"E
-Inventory: 64 FLANKER, 1 Su-30KI

The following image depicts the Su-30KI demonstrator at the KnAAPO facility:


Krasnodar
-Location: 45°05'02.94"N 38°56'47.78"E
-Inventory: 18 Su-27

Krymsk
-Location: 44°57'52.14"N 38°00'05.46"E
-Inventory: 47 Su-27

Kubinka
-Location: 55°36'45.74"N 36°39'00.97"E
-Inventory: 15 Su-27, 5 Su-35

The following image depicts 6 Su-27 and 5 Su-35 aircraft in service with the "Russian Knights" aerial demonstration team, based at Kubinka AB:


The following image depicts a "Russian Knights" Su-27 in a probable maintenance area at Kubinka AB:


Kushchevskaya
-Location: 46°32'20.71"N 39°33'04.87"E
-Inventory: 9 Su-27

Lodeynoye Pole
-Location: 60°42'33.90"N 33°34'03.08"E
-Inventory: 28 Su-27

Pushkin
-Location: 59°41'05.32"N 30°20'15.14"E
-Inventory: 24 Su-27

Severomorsk-3
-Location: 68°52'04.55"N 33°43'06.85"E
-Inventory: 10 Su-33

The following image depicts the Su-33 parking apron at Severomorsk-3 AB:


Tsentralnaya Uglovaya
-Location: 43°20'56.01"N 132°03'33.89"E
-Inventory: 30 Su-27

Ussuriysk-Vozdvizhenka
-Location: 43°54'32.00"N 131°55'32.52"E
-Inventory: 10 Su-27

The following image depicts identified FLANKER bases in Western Russia:


The following image depicts identified FLANKER bases in Eastern Russia:


Su-27 airframes are also visible at the following locations inside Russia:

Central Armed Forces Museum
-Location: 55°47'05.76"N 37°37'06.94"E
-Inventory: 1 Su-27

Irkutsk Southeast
-Location: 52°16'16.68"N 104°20'52.98"E
-Inventory: 1 FLANKER

Khodynka Air Museum
-Location: 55°47'16.67"N 37°32'04.73"E
-Inventory: the T10-20 development aircraft

BELARUS (9)

Baranovichi
-Location: 53°05'44.11"N 26°02'51.49"E
-Inventory: 9 Su-27

CHINA (20)

Cangzhou
-Location: 38°24'10.37"N 116°55'51.65"E
-Inventory: 1 Su-30MKK

Dingxin Flight Test Center
-Location: 40°23'58.08"N 99°47'34.81"E
-Inventory: 4 FLANKER

Siuxi
-Location: 21°23'46.28"N 110°11'56.66"E
-Inventory: 1 FLANKER

Wuhu
-Location: 31°23'26.43"N 118°24'35.19"E
-Inventory: 8 Su-30MKK

Zhangjiakao
-Location: 40°44'20.77"N 114°55'52.56"E
-Inventory: 5 J-11

The following image depicts identified FLANKER bases in China:


An Su-27 airframe is also visible at the following location inside China:

Shenyang Aircraft Corporation
-Location: 41°52'11.65"N 123°26'21.81"E
-Inventory: 1 J-11

ERITREA (2)

Asmara International Airport
-Location: 15°17'16.41"N 38°54'28.41"E
-Inventory: 2 Su-27

ETHIOPIA (10)

Debre Zeyt
-Location: 08°42'59.43"N 39°00'21.02"E
-Inventory: 10 Su-27

INDIA (19)

Bareilly
-Location: 28°25'22.37"N 79°26'56.73"E
-Inventory: 10 Su-30K

Pune
-Location: 18°34'55.66"N 73°55'22.05"E
-Inventory: 6 Su-30K, 3 Su-30MKI

KAZAKHSTAN (22)

Taldy-Kurgan
-Location: 45°07'21.15"N 78°26'33.87"E
-Inventory: 22 Su-27

UKRAINE (14)

Zhitomir
-Location: 50°09'30.22"N 28°44'24.34"E
-Inventory: 14 Su-27

UZBEKISTAN (25)

Karshi-Khanabad
-Location: 38°50'01.00"N 65°55'18.57"E
-Inventory: 25 Su-27

VIETNAM (1)

Bien Hoa
-Location: 10°58'31.85"N 106°49'08.29"E
-Inventory: 1 Su-27

SOURCES

-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Sary Shagan: Birthplace of the ABM

REMOVED PENDING PDF CONVERSION

The S-300P SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The S-300P SAM family is one of the most advanced and capable operational SAM systems in the world today. The S-300P SAM system was conceived to replace the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) and the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) as the primary long-range air defense system in the USSR. With the advent of lower-RCS targets like cruise missiles, legacy systems did not provide adequate capability to defend against attacks by such weapons. The S-300P began life as a overarching SAM system intended for use by both the Army and the air defense network. At an early stage, the project was split into two systems, the Army's S-300V (SA-12) and the S-300P.

THE S-300P

The S-300P is a long-range, mobile strategic SAM system. The system has been produced in numerous variants, and an in-depth look at the various system components and missiles employed by the system can be found here: LINK

Western designators for the S-300P variants will be provided here for clarity:

S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE)
S-300PS/PM (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
S-300PM-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE)
S-300PM-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE)

It should be noted that the S-300PM-1 was at one point designated the SA-10C GRUMBLE, before being redesignated due to the fact that a new engagement radar, the 30N6-1 (TOMB STONE) and a new missile, the 48N6, was employed. It should also be noted that the difference between the S-300PS and the S-300PM, apart from minor hardware differences and the introduction of a new missile for the S-300PM, was that the S-300PM introduced digital datalinks for connecting the TELs, radars, and command post in an effort to reduce system setup time. The S-300PT and S-300PS relied on physical cable connections between system components. The S-300PM and subsequent variants can still rely on cable connections, most often at prepared sites, to ensure a higher level of communications security.

Export variants are as follows:

S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE)
S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE)

A TYPICAL S-300P SITE

There are two common battery configurations employed by the S-300P SAM system. The first relies on a typically prepared site with a tower-mounted engagement radar. The second relies on either a prepared or unprepared site with a mobile engagement radar vehicle. The number of TELs present varies from user to user, location to location, and variant to variant, and these differences will be discussed in the Deployment Strategies sections of this article.

The following annotated image of an S-300PT site near Severodvinsk depicts a battery employing tower-mounted engagement and 76N6 radars:


The following annotated image of an S-300PMU site near Sevastopol depicts a standard site layout employing a mobile engagement radar and a tower-mounted 76N6:


Some sites employing a mobile engagement radar still retain the tower assembly for mounting the radar should the need arise. The following site south of Voronezh depicts a mobile engagement radar being employed, with the 40V6 mast assembly positioned nearby in a lowered position:


EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS

There are many different iterations of S-300P site configurations. Most of them differ in the number, shape, and positioning of prepared revetments used to protect the components. However, it should be stressed that the S-300P is a mobile SAM system, and as such can be deployed almost anywhere. That being said, there are a few common site layouts that have been identified, and these layouts will be detailed here.

One of the more common S-300P site configurations is a central tower-mounted engagement radar surrounded on two sides by parralel "slanted-E" shaped divided revetments for TELs or missile reload canisters. A tower-mounted 76N6 is positioned nearby. This site layout is often featured around Moscow on the grounds of former S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) SAM sites, but is also featured elsewhere as well, such as in Belarus.

The following annotated image depicts an S-300PM-1 site near Bortnevo, north of Moscow, employing the "slanted-E" revetment style:


Another common site configuration features four launch positions arranged around a central raised berm for a mobile engagement radar. The size and shape of the launch positions, as well as the presence of protective revetments for the TELs, varies from site to site and nation to nation, but the overall layout remains relatively uniform. The site near Sevastopol depicted above is an example of such a configuration. All identifiable Chinese S-300P sites employ a variation on this layout.

Given that the S-300P SAM system is a mobile system, it is also quite common to find batteries deployed on former legacy SAM sites. As seen previously, many S-25 sites around Moscow are now home to S-300P batteries. Slovakia's S-300PMU battery resides on the grounds of a former S-125 site, and there is a Ukrainian S-300PMU battery and garrison positioned on a former S-200 complex near Sevastopol, to cite a few examples.

The following image depicts an S-300PM battery deployed on the grounds of a former S-75 site near Roschino, north of St. Petersburg. The Roschino site is slightly unusual insofar as there are S-300P-style revetments to the southwest that are apparently unused.


Despite the presence of common site configurations, there are numerous random layouts. The numerous site configurations probably stem from the fact that the S-300P is a mobile system able to be located nearly anywhere. Some sites feature numerous revetments designed for two TELs apiece, some feature larger revetments for four or more TELs, and some feature no revetments at all.

The lack of consistency on a large scale in the configuration of S-300P sites belies the importance of being able to identify the system based on the visible components. The S-300PT is relatively easy to identify given the unique appearance of the 5P85-1 launchers. Differentiating between an S-300PM and an S-300PM-1 seems more difficult from the outset, but is in fact not all that hard. The 5P85S/D TELs measure around 43 feet in length, while the 5P85T TELs measure around 47 feet in length, based on visible imagery. As the S-300PS had a service life of 20 years and was introduced in 1982, and many of them were modified to S-300PM standard, any sites with 43 meter TELs can be identified relatively accurately as S-300PM sites. Of course, export systems would be the S-300PMU, and export sites featuring the 47-foot semi trailer TELs would be S-300PMU-1s.

RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES

Russian S-300P sites display a number of identifiable deployment strategies. S-300P SAM systems are employed in defense of key industrial and military areas, as well as large population centers.

S-300PM and S-300PM-1 sites around Moscow typically employ the "slanted-E" site configuration, and most of them are based on the grounds of former S-25 SAM sites. Moscow defense sites all employ tower mounted engagement radars in conjunction with tower-mounted 76N6 radars. This provides a robust low-altitude target detection envelope around the capital city. Eight to twelve TELs are typically present at each site, with at least six TELs at each site being loaded with missiles and positioned in a launch revetment.

S-300P sites located along the periphery of Russia's Far East Military District, particularly near Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, tend to feature mobile engagement radars and tower-mounted 76N6 radars. This is likely due to the fact that sites located along the periphery are typically positioned very near the water and therefore do not have substantial terrain for the engagement radar to contend with along potential threat ingress routes. A raised berm for the engagement radar is often more than sufficient to ensure the radar has a sufficient field of view with respect to any vegetation in the area. The single exception is the S-300PM site positioned to defend the Rybachiy SSBN base, featuring a tower-mounted engagement radar, likely due to the terrain constraints potentially interfering with the engagement radar being able to see out over the open ocean from where it is positioned. The Yelizovo and Petropavlovsk sites are positioned at a higher elevation than the Rybachiy site, providing them with a better field of view than the Rybachiy site.

S-300P sites on the Kola peninsula and around St. Petersburg feature tower-mounted engagement radars, likely due to the varied terrain in the areas where the SAM sites are positioned. Kola sites feature eight active TELs, with St. Petersburg sites featuring four active TELs, likely due to the greater strategic importance of the Kola peninsula and associated military facilities.

Interestingly, the Kaliningrad S-300P sites feature tower-mounted engagement radars at four sites and a mobile engagement radar at the fifth site. There are no major terrain constraints requiring use of the towers for the engagement radars. However, the Kaliningrad region is geographically separated from the rest of Russia, and is is possible that tower-mounted engagement radars are employed to provide an increased probability of low-altitude detection. Kaliningrad is also home to a Russian naval contingent, so perhaps the engagement radars are tower mounted at four of the sites to remove the potential of low-altitude clutter generated by the incoming and outgoing naval vessels. This doesn't seem to make complete sense, however, as the Baltiysk site nearest the harbor entrance features the mobile engagement radar.

The lack of S-300PM-1 batteries in areas identified as being of strategic importance, such as Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok and Kaliningrad, is likely due to the fact that the more sensitive systems are kept in areas where the presence of foreign ELINT assets is far less likely. There is, however, an S-300PM-1 battery deployed near Novorossiysk, The presence of an S-300PM-1 site in this area is likely due to the fact that it represents the sole identifiable active strategic SAM site in the area. It should also be noted that the S-300PM-1 systems are at most nearly a decade newer than the S-300PM systems. Ergo, it is likely that the areas considered to be the most strategically important were the first to receive the S-300PM-1. This would explain the high concentration around Moscow, and the presence on the Kola Peninsula. S-300PM-1s not being present on the Kamchatka Peninsula can be explained away by the fact that the Northern Fleet is the main combat arm of the Russian Navy. Petropavlovsk and Rybachiy also enjoy protection by a MiG-31 regiment, so the area is not necessarily at a loss.

CHINESE DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES

There are five visible active S-300P sites inside of China at this moment. China apaprently has chosen to employ the S-300P systems to defend key population centers, relying on older HQ-2 SAM systems to defend smaller population centers and military facilities. Four of China's S-300P locations are S-300PMU-1 sites, with the fifth being home to an S-300PMU battery. China employs a relatively standard deployment strategy throughout its S-300P batteries. Four TELs are deployed around a central, mobile engagement radar vehicle positioned on a raised berm. There are four separate pads for the TELs, with two TELs positioned on each of two launch pads. Tower-mounted engagement radars are not employed, allowing the core system components to be rapidly repositioned. A 36D6 or 64N6 EW radar is colocated with each SAM battery, with at least one 64N6 being present in each deployment area either in a colocated or nearby position to provide long-range target detection.

The one major inconsistency in Chinese S-300P deployments is the presence of a tower-mounted 76N6 radar. The 76N6 is present at the Yutian S-300PMU site, along with both Shanghai S-300PMU-1 sites. The reasoning behind this strategy likely relates to potential threat ingress routes. The Shanghai S-300PMU-1 sites are positioned near the coastline and as such would be able to monitor the airspace offshore, potentially detecting inbound strike aircraft and missiles from Kadena AB, Okinawa, and southern Japan. Given the low-altitude detection function of the 76N6, it is plausible that the Shanghai sites are positioned to detect inbound, low-altitude missiles launched from naval vessels or submarines.

Why, then, would there be a disparity in the 76N6 deployment to the north? Beijing is much farther inland, and is also protected by the defenses of the Bo Hai gulf. Any potential threat ingressing from the east or south would have to penetrate a dense air defense network which also included interceptor aircraft and other SAM systems. Beijing is also borered to the north and west by mountainous terrain, making low-altitude detection less important as any inbound target from those directions would pop up into the coverage of the 64N6 EW radar sites positioned in the area.

The inconsistency, therefore, is the presence of the 76N6 at the Yutian S-300PMU site. The 120 kilometer range of the 76N6 does not give it enough range to reach offshore from the Yutian site. It is possible that the 76N6 was only purchased for use with the S-300PMU and therefore would not be found at any of the S-300PMU-1 sites, whose 30N6E1 radar does offer improved performance over the 30N6E employed by the S-300PMU. The answer may also lie in the condition of the Yutian 76N6. It is visible in a lowered position, potentially being prepared for transport.

However, the Yutian 76N6 may simply be lowered for maintenance, or may be a new arrival. In the latter case, it may be indicative of future 76N6 deployments at the northern S-300P sites to augment the already robust radar coverage of the systems. The Yutian site may also be a training unit, allowing crews to train on all of the system components. Lastly, the Yutian 76N6 may be positioned to aid in the detection of cruise missiles fired towards Beijing-area targets from submerged submarines that manage to penetrate the Bo Hai gulf's waters.

DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES OF OTHER NATIONS

S-300P sites in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are primarily deployed to defend population centers, capitals, and in the case of the Ukraine military facilities. Most S-300PT facilities feature a standard twelve TEL complement, although there are some minor variations, as there are with the S-300PMU deployments.

Slovakia was not analyzed due to the presence of only a single identifiable S-300P battery. Likewise, Greece was not analyzed as S-300PMU-1 components are visible at two locations on Crete but they are not deployed.

S-300P SYSTEM COVERAGE

The S-300P is a very capable strategic SAM system, and as such can provide very robust air defense over a large region of airspace. By employing a number of batteries positioned to provide overlapping areas of coverage, a nation can effectively create what amounts to an area of denied airspace. While the S-300P does feature multiple-target engagement capability, it is also wise to overlap coverage areas in order to reduce the effect of saturation by actual or false targets.

The following image depicts S-300P coverage provided by identified, active sites positioned around Moscow. The blue rings represent the associated 64N6 EW radars. Large red rings represent S-300PM-1 batteries, with small red rings representing S-300PM batteries. The S-300PM-1 has a 150 kilometer range, the S-300PM a 90 kilometer range, and the 64N6 a 300 kilometer range. The overlapping coverage areas and the number of batteries in place have effectively transformed the skies over Moscow into the most heavily defended airspace in the world.


CURRENT USERS

Information regarding user nations and the types and numbers of identified sites can be found here: LINK

SOURCES

-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, a definitive text edited by Pavel Podvig
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

The S-25 SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

Locating strategic SAM sites in Google Earth imagery is a time-consuming process. Each panel of high-resolution imagery must be scrutinized and examined in order to locate and identify various site configurations and missile systems. In order to ensure success, the analyst must first know what to look for. This is the first article in a multi-part series which will detail the layout and key features of various identifiable strategic SAM sites found worldwide. Armed with this knowledge, the analyst will be able to positively identify such facilities with greater ease and accuracy.

THE SA-1

The first operational strategic SAM system in the world was the Russian S-25 (SA-1 GUILD). The S-25 was a rail-launched system emplaced at fixed launch sites. The command-guided V-300 missile had a maximum range of 45 kilometers, and a maximum reach of between 4,000 and 14,000 meters in altitude. A 250kg HE warhead was fitted. The E/F band R-113 (GAGE) radar provided target acquisition to a range of 300 kilometers. The E/F band B-200 (YO YO) radar performed target engagement functions, with a maximum range of 150 kilometers and the ability to track between 24 and 30 targets per radar. Each B-200 radar could prosecute one engagement at a time.

SA-1 DEPLOYMENT

The S-25 system was conceived to provide air defense of the skies over Moscow. The system was intended to provide defense against an incoming bomber force of 1,000 aircraft. S-25 sites were located in two rings around Moscow, with radii 45 and 80 kilometers from the center of the city.

The image below depicts the locations of the 34 outer ring sites and the 22 inner ring sites:


Initial CIA projections, shown in the image below taken from the declassified NIE 11-5-57, were not that far from the mark:


A TYPICAL SA-1 SITE

CIA NIE 11-5-57 provides us with the following description of an active S-25 site:


The overhead image below depicts a typical S-25 site as it exists today, with the relevant areas and structures annotated:


This site is a rarity insofar as it has remained mostly intact, allowing the site layout to be studied using present-day imagery. The S-25 sites all followed the same standard layout seen above. The radar position, seen below, was located approximately 1.5 kilometers behind the launch area. Two B-200 radars were positioned in the forward area of the bunker, which housed the command and control section and the crews who controlled the site.


The launch area, seen below, contained the individual launch positions. Each launch area contained three V-300 fixed launch assemblies. Each S-25 site contained a number of launch areas. The interlocking nature of the launch areas gave the S-25 sites their distinctive rectangular herringbone appearance.


Adjacent facilities, as seen in the following image, included housing areas for assigned personnel, and support facilities for maintaining the site itself:


All of the site areas were connected using concrete roads. As these roads still exist carving their tell-tale herringbone path through the forested areas outside Moscow, former S-25 sites are relatively easy to locate and identify.

The expansive nature of the S-25 sites also allows them to be easily identified using low-resolution imagery, as evidenced by the image below:


CURRENT STATUS

As the S-25 has since been replaced by different variants of the S-300P family, there are no active sites located in Russia. The sites themselves do still exist for the most part, and many have been reused for other purposes.

The S-25 site seen below has been reused as a residential area, a relatively simple proposition thanks to the aforementioned interconnecing network of concrete roads found throughout the site:


Alternatively, many S-25 sites have been reused by the Russian defense establishment. Quite a few sites, including the site shown above, feature active S-300P SAM batteries. Other sites have formed the basis of the sites for the exoatmospheric component of Moscow's ABM network over the years. For more information and descriptions of these facilities, reference the relevant article found at this site.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery is provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above
-Jane's Land Based Air Defence provided technical specifications

Russia's Typhoon SSBN Fleet

INTRODUCTION

It is a rarity in Google Earth when every example of a weapon system is visible. One example is the four Kirov-class nuclear powered missile crusiers. Another is the six examples of the Project 941 Akula-class ("Shark", more commonly known as Typhoon to the West) strategic missile submarine (SSBN).

The Typhoon is a relatively easy submarine to identify. It is the largest submarine in the world, with a length of 170 meters and a beam of 23 meters. Locating the Typhoons was a relatively easy proposition once all of the required high-resolution imagery was made available, as they have been mostly inactive for some time due to the prohibitive operating costs associated with the type.

NERPICH'YA GUBA

Operational Typhoon SSBNs were based in Zapadnaya Litsa on the Kola Peninsula, in the port facility of Nerpich'ya Guba. Current imagery depicts three Typhoon SSBNs still in port, although they are no longer believed to be operational. These submarines are TK-12, TK-13, and TK-20.


SEVERODVINSK

The remaining three Typhoons are currently visible at the Russian naval facility at Severodvinsk, near Arkhangelsk. Severodvinsk handles overhaul and refit for the Russian Northern Fleet. SSBNs are produced in the huge Sevmash assembly halls located at Severodvinsk, and some export work is also conducted at the port facility. Interestingly, the refitting of the Admiral Gorshkov for the Indian Navy can be witnessed in current imagery.


Of the three Typhoons visible at Severodvinsk, one is currently being dismantled (TK-202, which began to be dismantled in 2004), and one is seen pierside near the Admiral Gorshkov (likely TK-208 Dmitri Donskoi, the lead vessel of the class).


The third Typhoon at Severodvinsk, likely TK-17, is seen at a weapons loading dock. It cannot be determined if the missiles visible pierside are being loaded or unloaded. The presence of multiple missiles, however, makes the identification of this vessel as TK-17 seem most plausible. TK-208 is still active, conducting flight tests of the new Bulava SLBM. Only one Bulava has ever been fired during a test launch, so the presence of multiple missiles would seem to rule this vessel out as being TK-208. The missile canisters are 19 meters in length and 3.2 meters in diameter, and would easily fit the Typhoon's D-19 (SS-N-20 SEAHAWK) SLBMs. It has been reported that TK-17 was stated for dismantlement and was no longer fitted with SLBMs as of 2005. In this case, it is logical to assume that the missile canisters visible contain D-19 SLBMs that have recently been unloaded.


SOURCES

Imagery provided by Google Earth.
Globalsecurity.org and Pavel Podvig's blog and text Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces were consulted in writing this article.

IMINT & Google Earth

One of the most fascinating applications available on the internet is Google Earth, an open-source satellite imagery browser allowing the user to navigate to any point in the globe and view satellite or overhead imagery of that location. Many kinds of analysis can be performed using Google Earth, but unfortunately the program needs a little work before any significant military analysis can be conducted.

There are three main issues with using Google Earth as an analysis tool for military intelligence information: resolution, timeliness, and coverage.

The first issue is one of resolution. There are varying levels of resolution to be found in Google Earth. Most of the lower resolution areas have a resolution of 15 meters. SPOT imagery has been incorporated in some areas, such as France, bringing the resolution down to the 2.5 meter mark. This is still not sufficient for any sort of analysis. For detailed analysis, resolution of at least 1 meter is necessary in order to accurately identify military equipment. Digital Globe imagery provides 0.7 meter resolution in many areas, and the highest resolution available is 1 inch, although this is only found in select areas. Some facilities such as Russian BMEW radars or SA-5 GAMMON sites can be discerned in the 15 meter imagery, but anything on a smaller scale will go unnoticed. The reason resolution is critical is because smaller objects such as aircraft and SAM systems must be able to be identified. Apart from general layout, one of the easiest ways to do this is to simply measure the object. This is how one can tell the difference between an S-300PM and an S-300PM-1, for example. The S-300PM TELs measure in at approximately 43 feet, where the S-300PM-1 TELs are roughly 4 feet longer. Without decent enough resolution, it is nearly impossible to get an accurate measurement; shadowing, adjacent objects, and other errata cannot be adequately discerned and discounted.

The second issue is timeliness. Effective analysis of a military facility requires a comparitive analysis over a period of time to discern deployment patterns, ORBAT changes, and gather an accurate estimate of equipment on strength. The best illustration of this is an analysis of the naval ORBAT at a given port facility. At the time the image was taken, any number of vessels may be out of port and therefore not depicted. Google does sometimes update the coverage of various areas, but more often they are likely to update areas not previously visible in high-resolution. This presents an analyst with a problem, as he or she will not be able to perform comparitive analysis. Also, if the imagery visible is more than a few months old, wholesale changes in the facility's ORBAT may have occurred. For a while, Langley AFB only depicted F-15C Eagles on the flightline, when it was known that the F-22A Raptor was on-station in substantial numbers. Furthermore, current imagery depicts a barren flightline, the image being taken when the associated units were off-station while runway maintenance was being accomplished. This work was finished months ago, yet the imagery does not depict any operational aircraft on-station. All of this can cause an analyst to misrepresent a facility's ORBAT.

The final issue is coverage itself. Google Earth suffers from a lack of high-resolution data in many areas. In some areas, such as around Moscow, high-resolution coverage is relatively spotty in places, making analysis of known facilities such as Zhukovskiy flight test center impossible. If there is not adequate high-resolution coverage of an area of interest, a complete analysis of that area is impossible. To cite an example, one must only look near Engels AB in Russia. There is an S-300P SAM garrison nearby, but an analysis of the air defense picture is not possible as the lack of sufficient high-resolution data has so far precluded the location of any active or even inactive S-300P SAM sites. They are most definitely in the area, as evidenced by the presence of the garrison, but they are not visible in the available imagery. Simply assuming that they are located within the boundaries of nearby low-resolution areas is not sufficient; a few tens of kilometers of difference in site placement can result in a perceived gap existing in the air defense network where there may be no gap at all.

It should be stated that none of these constraints are meant to be construed as negative aspects of the program itself. They merely illustrate the limited usefulness of the software and the associated geospatial data in military analysis. This is not to say that military analysis cannot or should not be conducted at all, far from it. But it must be understood that the accuracy and scope of any such analysis will be limited by the constraints imposed by the program itself.

Russian Strategic Defense - Part 3, The Future

INTRODUCTION

Part 3 of this series focuses on future developments in the field of Russian Strategic Defense. The previous two entries are still available:

Part 1: The S-300P
Part 2: The ABM Network

THE S-400

The next generation SAM system being trialled by the Russian military is the Almaz-Antey S-400 Trieumf (Triumph; SA-X-21). The S-400 represents the latest iteration of the S-300P SAM system. The S-400 may have originally been designated S-300PM-3 due to the relationship with the older system. The 48N6DM used by the S-400 is a derivative of the S-300PM-2's 48N6D missile, and the S-400 will be able to employ the 9M96 series of SAMs as well. The largest changes to the S-400 when compared to the more dated S-300P variants are the inclusion of the new GRAVE STONE target engagement radar, and the inclusion of the new 40N6 400 kilometer range missile. GRAVE STONE is said to give the S-400 an anti-stealth capability. With the 40N6, 48N6DM, and 9M96, the S-400 will represent a very capable SAM system able to engage a variety of targets at various ranges.

The S-400 is due to enter operational service in the summer of 2007, with the first battery being employed near Elektrostal, outside of Moscow as part of the capital city's SAM defense network. Work on the 40N6 missile is still progressing, and this weapon is to be incorporated into the S-400 batteries as early as 2008. Until then, the S-400 will remain little more than yet another incremental upgrade to the S-300P family.

SAMODERZHETS

Later versions of the S-400 system will most likely be of the Samoderzhets family. With the merger of Almaz and Antey a few years ago, a whole wealth of SAM experience was merged, and Samoderzhets will be the first hardware example of that merger. Samoderzhets will be an S-400 system incorporating a towed TEL carrying two 9M82M (SA-X-23 GIANT) ATBMs. This will provide a far more robust ATBM capability for an S-400 battery, and potentially increase the export value of the system as well.

OTHER SAM DEVELOPMENTS

There are two other SAM systems under development for future use, the S-500 and the S-1000. The S-500 has been described as an S-300P follow-on system. The S-500 will likely not enter development for some time, and will represent the next generation of Russian SAM systems, perhaps finally breaking out of the S-300P family's mold. The S-1000 has been described as a follow-on to the S-300V system. The S-1000 may enter development earlier than the S-500, as there is no "S-400 equivalent" being pursued for the Russian S-300V systems. The Antey-2500 and Antey-2500D appear targeted at the export market only, and the upgraded S-300VM and S-300VM-1 appear to be non-starters for domestic use as well, although their technology and 9M82M/M1 missiles may filter down to the Samoderzhets system. In reality, the S-1000 may represent a THAAD-style system, or with the merger of Almaz and Antey the S-500 and S-1000 may be replaced by a single system useable for both roles, along the lines of Samdoerzhets.

ABM DEVELOPMENTS

Much less work appears to be underway on the ABM front. There have been rumors of a new ABM interceptor being developed, desugnated 45T6, but nothing more is known about this system. It would logically be a replacement for the Fakel 51T6 exoatmospheric interceptors, as these have recently been taken out of service.

Most of the ABM work underway is in the radar field. The aforementioned Voronezh-DM radar (see Part 2) is the latest BMEW LPAR design, and is currently under construction at two sites.

Beyond that, very little work appears to be underway regarding future ABM components. Sary Shagan is still an actively-used ABM test range, as evidenced by a recent 53T6 test launch, but there does not appear to be any significant R&D activity ongoing. That could be due to the existance of the test range outside Russian territory; ABM development may be moved to Kapustin Yar, Ashuluk, or another test range in the future to keep it "in house".

THE FUTURE

What is the future of the Russian strategic defense network? With an active, operational ABM system, and a robust SAM network, the future may not be as important as the present. That is to say that money may be better spent upgrading current systems and keeping them viable for the next 10-15 years, before beginning development on the next generation of strategic defense systems.

SOURCE MATERIAL

The following sources were consulted in the preparation of this report:

Globalsecurity's Russian BMD page
Pavel Podvig's blog
Russian language website on ABM systems
ABM and Space Defense
1999 US Senate Hearings on ABMs and Missile Defense

Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (various years)
Jane's Land-based Air Defence (various years)
Fakel's Missiles (Moscow, 2003)

Various posters at Secret Projects, in particular Overscan, Meteorit, and Muxel, provided a good debate about the topic and provided the inspiration for this project. Thanks also to Trident for the Lake Balkhash thing!

All overhead imagery is provided courtesy of Google Earth.

Russian Strategic Defense - Part 2, The ABM Network

REMOVED PENDING PDF CONVERSION

Russian Strategic Defense - Part 1, The S-300P SAM Family

REMOVED PENDING PDF CONVERSION

Beyond BVR: Russia's R-37 and KS-172 LRAAMs

With the current developments in super agility, and the ruthless performance of today’s WVR air-to-air missiles such as the Israeli Python 4, it is no surprise that most fighters have adopted BVR weapons as their primary air-to-air armament. The last true Western Big Stick in the air-to-air arena was the US Navy’s AIM-54 Phoenix, with its 100+ NM range and active radar seeker. The LRAAM project of the Mid-1980’s, charged with producing a successor to the AIM-54, would have given the US Navy an even greater capability well into the 21st Century. However, the project was terminated, leaving the medium-range missile as the primary air-to-air weapon in the BVR arena in the West, until the European Meteor and the American AIM-120D are introduced.

The primary purpose of the AIM-54 was to defend carrier battle groups at long range from attack by Soviet bombers and their cruise missiles. This reason, coupled with the fact that the AIM-7 (and later the AIM-120) was regarded as more than capable of countering the Soviet fighter threat, explains why the USAF never took it upon itself to develop its own long-range weapon or adopt the AIM-54 for its own use (although the F-14/AIM-54 combination was briefly considered, as well as an AIM-54 armed F-15). Russia’s premier long-range AAM, the R-33, was designed with a similar purpose in mind. The MiG-31/R-33 combination was designed to counter the threat of Western air-launched cruise missiles, specifically the AGM-86B, and their launchers. Now, however, Russian weapon designers are exploring new tasks and capabilities for the next generation of LRAAMs.

LRAAMs are limited in their usefulness. A large weapon such as the AIM-54 or R-33 would have a difficult time against a modern, agile fighter such as the Su-27 or F-16. To understand this, one needs only to examine the flight profile of the AIM-54. The Phoenix achieves its extremely long range by using a substantial boost motor, propelling it to heights in excess of 100,000 feet and speeds greater than Mach 6. The missile then nosedives towards its target, activates its seeker when within range, and makes the intercept. But what happens when one of these weapons is employed against a maneuvering target? A long-range missile expends most of its kinetic energy during the boost phase of its flight, leaving it very little with which to maneuver against an agile target. This is part of the reason behind the failure of the AIM-54 to score an air-to-air kill in DESERT STORM: the AIM-54 was never designed to be employed in such a manner. One solution would be to fire the weapon at a shorter range, but then you are better off using a dedicated MRAAM such as the AIM-120; large, heavy weapons in the AIM-54 class are typically not as maneuverable as smaller, lighter MRAAMs. LRAAMs are more adept at engaging non-maneuverable targets, such as lumbering bombers, and cruise missiles, which for the most part fly straight courses, making course corrections as dictated by their guidance systems. Granted, ramjet propulsion and gel-fueled rocket engines can now give MRAAMs ranges touching 60 or even 100 nautical miles, pushing them into the LRAAM class. This is where the capabilities of Russia’s new LRAAMs become even more impressive.

The first new LRAAM to emerge from behind the former Iron Curtain is the Vympel design bureau R-37. This successor to the R-33 features a dual mode 9B-1388 active/semi-active seeker head and can reach ranges touching 160 NM, demonstrated in an October 1993 test launch from a MiG-31M, the weapons intended launcher aircraft. This was such an accomplishment, especially in the former Soviet Union, that in April of 1994 Boris Yeltsin sent telegrams to the OKBs (design bureaus) involved congratulating them on this achievement. The weapon is matched to the improved Zaslon-M radar of the MiG-31M, which can accommodate six of these advanced weapons under its fuselage, replacing the baseline MiG-31’s four R-33s. The R-37 retains the basic aerodynamic arrangement of the older R-33, with a few notable differences. The control surfaces have been reshaped, to provide the weapon with better agility, and the rear control fins have been moved further aft, leaving a noticeable gap between these fins and the missile’s wings. The R-37’s nose has also been reshaped, no doubt due to the new seeker head. Semi-conformal carriage is still achieved by folding the rear fins, as in the R-33. Still touted as primarily an anti-cruise missile weapon, the R-37 is slated to be incorporated into the upgraded MiG-31BM at a future date, possibly in the form of the further improved K-37M variant (Note: In-service Russian AAM designations begin with R, test weapons or weapons still in the prototype stage have designations beginning with K.). Baseline R-37s may also arm improved MiG-29SMTs in the Russian Air Force, although this is unlikely as even an upgraded FULCRUM lacks the radar needed to fully take advantage of the R-37’s impressive intercept range.

On the surface the R-37 appears to offer only technical improvements over the R-33. The advantages it will bestow upon the MiG-31, however, are more than just longer reach. A longer ranged AAM will give the MiG-31 the capability to engage targets at greater ranges, giving it more time to reacquire and reengage targets which have gotten past the first wave of weapons. In theory this will increase the effectiveness of the MiG-31, meaning fewer aircraft will be needed to fulfill the same role. Given the current financial state of the Russian military, this will obviously be very beneficial.

The second LRAAM to emerge from Russian armament designers is the little known Novator KS-172, also referred to as the AAM-L. This weapon has been seen in armament displays accompanying Su-35 aircraft and has recently been displayed as the improved KS-172S-1 under the wing of an improved Su-35BM FLANKER variant. The AAM-L has an entirely different purpose than the R-37. Novator has designed a very long-range weapon intended to specifically attack AWACS aircraft equipping hostile nations. Where the R-37 retains a complex arrangement of control surfaces, the AAM-L is almost barren. The weapon resembles a typical surface-to-air missile, such as the 48N6 (S-300PMU-1/2), possessing only small control fins at the rear of a long, pointed body. The active radar homing missile is reported to have a range touching 216 nautical miles, which can be extended with the addition of a booster stage. Long range is a must for a weapon intended to target aircraft such as the E-3; this keeps the launching aircraft out of range of the weapons employed by escorting fighter aircraft.

It is no hidden fact that much of the success of Western militaries comes from the battlefield information superiority bestowed upon them by modern airborne sensor platforms. AWACS aircraft such as the IAI Phalcon and E-3 Sentry give commanders an unrivalled picture of the airborne arena and provide pilots with unparalleled situational awareness. The J-STARS platform provides commanders with a comprehensive view of the battlefield, allowing them to redirect and reposition forces to counter and defeat an opposing army. Winning a war against a Western military force armed with this knowledge proves a daunting task, as demonstrated by the rout of the Iraqi military in 1991. To put it another way, the 21st Century war is a digital encounter, and successfully engaging an enemy armed with these information resources would prove difficult to even the most well-equipped military. The AAM-L is intended to deny an enemy access to this wealth of knowledge, hopefully giving the Russian military the edge needed to prevail in a conflict.

Military weapon development progresses as follows: a threat is identified, a counter is developed, and the counter is deployed. In the case of Russia’s LRAAMs, the threat was identified as cruise missiles and AWACS aircraft. The counters developed were the R-37 and AAM-L LRAAMs. Although they have yet to be fielded by the Russian Air Force, the existence of weapons in this class is enough to cause Western designers to consider new approaches to aircraft and missile design, most notably in the form of stealth technology. Quite a few of the designs for US Navy and Royal Navy future carrier based AWACS platforms have already been seen to incorporate stealth technology. Of course, one can assume that this will only cause the Russians to develop further advanced weapons and countertactics; and the circle continues. One thing is for certain: the technology exists to deny an enemy the ability to use advanced sensor platforms and rely on cruise missile attacks. Perhaps in a future conflict the ability to overcome these losses will be how military capabilities are analyzed.