Czechoslovakian Strategic Air Defense: A Cold War Case Study

INTRODUCTION

The Czechoslovakian strategic air defense network provided air defense for a critical portion of territory in the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. Various SAM sites provided air defense for the Warsaw Pact's southwestern region, theoretically preventing NATO air strikes from being mounted into Czechoslovakia or onward into East Germany or Poland.

GENERAL LAYOUT

The Czechoslovakian strategic SAM network operated five SAM systems at various points in its history, the SA-75 Dvina and S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 Neva (SA-3 GOA), S-200VE Vega (SA-5 GAMMON), and S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE). Tactical air defense was provided primarily by 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) units. Strategic SAM assets were assigned to five different anti-aircraft brigades, or PLRBs. Engagement ranges of the strategic SAM systems are as follows:

SA-75 Dvina: 34 km
S-75M Volkhov: 43 km
S-125 Neva: 25 km
S-200VE Vega: 240 km
S-300PMU: 90 km

In the imagery contained within this article, SAM systems will be identified as follows: 2K12 sites are marked with green circles, SA-75 and S-75 series sites are marked with triangles and red range rings, S-125 series sites are marked with stars and light blue range rings, and S-200 series sites are marked with hexagons and purple range rings.

71 PLRB

The 71st PLRB provided air defense for the Czechoslovakian capital of Prague. Initial air defense units were equipped with the SA-75 Dvina. In 1965, these units were reequipped with S-75M Volkhov batteries, with the Dvina batteries being relocated to stand up the 77th PLRB. In 1973 the 71st PLRB began to receive the S-125 Neva, and in 1985 the S-200VE Vega arrived. By the end of 1989, eight S-75M and eight S-125 sites were active, alongside the S-200VE site. The S-300PMU arrived in 1990, displacing one of the S-75M batteries near Lisek. Czech air defense units were reorganized in 1994, with the 72st PLRB becoming the 41st PLRB. The 41st PLRB's S-200VE battery disbanded in 1994, and the entire unit was disestablished in 1999.

The following image depicts the coverage of the 71st PLRB in 1989. S-200VE coverage is not depicted.


The following image depicts the coverage of the 41st PLRB in 1994:


76 PLRB

The 76th PLRB provided air defense for the city of Brno and the surrounding areas. Stood up with the SA-75 Dvina at four locations in 1965, the 76th PLRB added four S-125 batteries in the mid 1970's. In 1985 two Dvina batteries reequipped with the S-75M Volkhov, the two remaining Dvina batteries being retired by 1989. 1989 also saw the addition of the second Czechoslovakian S-200VE site. Unlike the 71st PLRB, when the 76th PLRB underwent reorganization the S-200VE was retained. The 76th PLRB became the 42nd PLRB under the reorganization, and was disestablished in 1999.

The following image depicts the coverage of the 76th PLRB in 1985. Note the larger engagement zones of the two S-75M batteries.


The following image depicts the coverage of the 42nd PLRB in 1994:


77 PLRB

The 77th PLRB was established in 1965 to defend the region surrounding Ostrava. As previously mentioned, the initial equipment came from the 71st PLRB in the form of surplus SA-75 Dvina systems which were deployed at five locations. Between 1985 and 1990, the 77th PLRB was reequipped with S-75M Volkhov batteries. The 77th PLRB survived the 1994 reorganization unscathed, retaining all five operational batteries until the unit was disbanded in 1999.

The following image depicts the coverage of the 77th PLRB in 1990. 43rd PLRB coverage was identical.


185 PLRB

The 185th PLRB was established in 1962 to defend the western border of Czechoslovakia and the approaches to Prague. Given that the western border was shared with the southeastern border of West Germany, a layered air defense posture such as this would provide greater defense against a NATO aerial attack. The first S-75M Volkhov batteries stood up in 1964, eventually equipping five locations. The northern two locations were disbanded between 1985 and 1990. The 185th PLRB did not survive the reorganization, having been disestablished sometime between 1990 and 1994.

The following image depicts the coverage of the 185th PLRB at full strength in 1984:


186 PLRB

The 186th PLRB was established in the early 1960's to provide defense of the area surrounding Bratislava. After reception of the S-125 in the mid 1970s, the 186th PLRB consisted of four S-75M sites and four S-125 sites. The 186th PLRB was renamed the 37th PLRB following the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993, becoming part of the new Slovakian air defense network. The 37th PLRB was inactive by 2002.

The following image depicts the coverage of the 186th PLRB in 1989:


2K12 KUB

Tactical air defense for armored units was provided by nine 2K12 Kub units. These units were stood up between 1975 and 1985. Each unit was based at a garrison and was provided with a fixed launch site for field deployment to allow the Kub batteries to perform as part of the overall air defense network. Two Kub units became part of the Slovakian air defense network following the split in 1993. The western unit at Nitra became part of the 36th PLRB, with the eastern unit becoming part of the 35th PLRB.

The following image depicts the locations of the 2K12 batteries. Where known, the placemarks depict the locations of the firing locations.


OVERALL COVERAGE

Taken as a whole the Czechoslovakian Cold War SAM network was arranged geographically, with each brigade being responsible for defending a set piece of territory usually surrounding a major population center. The only exception to this rule would be the 185th PLRB, which was emplaced to provide an additional barrier of defense for Prague.

The following image depicts the locations of the various strategic SAM units based in Czechoslovakia during the Cold War up through 1989. 71st PLRB sites are orange, 76th PLRB sites are red, 77th PLRB sites are yellow, 185th PLRB sites are purple, and 186th PLRB sites are blue.


The following image depicts the overall coverage of the Czechoslovakian air defense network as it existed in 1989:


The following image depicts the coverage of the SAM network following the 1994 reorganization of the Czech Republic's air defense assets:


LIMITATIONS

The main drawback to the Czechoslovakian SAM deployment strategy was that a large swath of territory between Prague and Brno was largely undefended, only falling under the umbrella of the S-200VE batteries of the 71st and 76th PLRBs. As the S-200VE did not perform well at low altitudes or against maneuvering targets at long ranges, the potential for a NATO strike package to ingress through the area was high. It is likely that this are would have been monitored and defended by Soviet and Czechoslovakian interceptors during a time of war, minimizing this potential. In fact, this area may have been set aside for use as an egress corridor for Soviet and Warsaw Pact strike packages, the lack of SAM coverage preventing any friendly fire incidents during the opening stages of a critical air campaign against NATO.

Apart from the deployment strategy, the primary weakness of the Czechoslovakian air defense network, especially during the latter stages of the Cold War, was an overreliance on older SAM systems. NATO members had experience against all of the SAM systems deployed in Czechoslovakia, and the potential for a debilitating electronic warfare campaign was very high. Also, each SAM battery could only engage a single target per engagement radar, with only the S-200VE sites featuring multiple engagement radars. This made the Czechoslovakian strategic SAM network vulnerable to saturation. This was a primary drawback of any nation relying on Soviet-era SAM systems for strategic air defense: until the arrival of the S-300P series SAM systems, a prohibitive number of SAM batteries would be required for any strategic SAM network to be regarded as a truly reliable means of defense.

THE S-300PMU

The S-300PMU was delivered to Czechoslovakia in 1990, becoming part of the 71st PLRB. The S-300PMU was intended to replace most of the extant S-75M Volkhov units inside of Czechoslovakia, but the cessation of the Cold War brought to a halt any future plans for reequipment. In the end only a single S-300PMU battery was activated in Czechoslovakia, replacing an S-75M battery at a site near Prague. The Czechoslovakian S-300PMU battery was positioned at 49°58'07.64"N 14°00'42.37"E. Following the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the S-300PMU battery was transferred to Slovakia, where it became part of the Slovakian 36th PLRB.

The following image depicts the Slovakian S-300PMU battery near Nitra:


The Slovakian S-300PMU site was active as of August 30, 2005, as evidenced by Digital Globe imagery contained in Google Earth. Recently, however, Google has provided coverage of the majority of Slovakia from Geodis Slovakia, imagery which was gathered in 2004. The 2004 imagery does not depict the S-300PMU battery, suggesting that it was not active at Nitra before that date.

The following image from Digital Globe, dated 30 August 2005, clearly shows the Nitra S-300PMU location, circled in red:


CONCLUSION

Czechoslovakian strategic air defense assets would have played a critical role in any Warsaw Pact confrontation with NATO. Aside from providing air defense of critical areas of the nation, the S-200VE batteries combined with those of East Germany and Hungary to provide a significant air defense umbrella for the majority of the Warsaw Pact's western front. Interestingly, there does not appear to have been any significant Soviet contribution to the strategic air defense network in Czechoslovakia. This was likely due to the relatively small number of Soviet military units located in-coutry when compared to other Warsaw Pact states like East Germany or Poland.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

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GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

The range rings used to create this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark file here.

SOURCES

-Imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth and Digital Globe

Czech Air Defense Units
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions

DDR Strategic Air Defense: A Cold War Case Study

INTRODUCTION

By the end of the 1980's a robust air defense network existed in the Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (DDR). DDR and Soviet air defense units combined to provide a layered air defense network capable of defending the Warsaw Pact's northwestern front. As such, the air defense assets located in the DDR provide an interesting and insightful look into Cold War era air defense.

GENERAL LAYOUT

Strategic SAM systems employed by the DDR included the S-75 Dvina and S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125M1A Neva (SA-3 GOA), S-200VE Vega (SA-5 GAMMON), and S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE). Tactical SAMs included the 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF), 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL), and 9K33BM Osa-AK (SA-8 GECKO). Engagement ranges of the strategic assets are as follows:

S-75 Dvina: 34 km
S-75M Volkhov: 43 km
S-125M1A Neva: 25 km
S-200VE Vega: 240 km
S-300PMU: 90 km

In the imagery contained within this article, SAM systems will be identified as follows: tactical SAM garrisons are marked with green circles, S-75 series sites are marked with triangles and red range rings, S-125 series sites are marked with stars and light blue range rings, S-200 series sites are marked with hexagons and purple range rings, the DDR's S-300PMU site is marked with a diamond and a white range ring, and the 64N6 (BIG BIRD) battle management radar site associated with the S-300PMU battery is marked with a square and a blue range ring.

DDR air defenses were organized into two divisions. The 1st Air Defense Division (LVD) consisted of two Air Defense Brigades (FRBr) and one Air Defense Regiment (FRR), while the 3rd LVD consisted of two FRRs and one FRBr. Technical Department 310 controlled two S-75 sites and one S-125 site for training purposes. Also present were 8 tactical SAM regiments.

1ST LVD

The 1st LVD, consisting of the 31st FRR, 41st FRBr, and 51st FRBr, provided coverage of the capital area surrounding Berlin, as well as the DDR's southern flank, as seen in the image below. 31st FRR sites are colored orange, 41st FRBr sites are colored white, and 51st FRBr sites are colored purple.
The 31st FRR consisted of five S-75M sites. The 41st FRBr consisted of six S-75M sites, four S-125M1A sites, and one S-200VE site. The 51st FRBr consisted of five S-75M sites and one S-200VE site. The 41st FRBr and 51st FRBr also controlled four reserve S-75 Dvina sites each. These sites, containing older, shorter-ranged S-75 systems, would be used to increase the capabilities of each regiment during wartime.

The 31st FRR covered the southeastern portion of the DDR, as seen in the image below:
The 41st FRBr covered the capital area surrounding Berlin, as seen in the following image. The four reserve S-75 sites were located along the southwestern portion of the 41st FRBr's area of responsibility.
The 51st FRBr covered the DDR's southwestern flank, as seen in the following image. The four reserve S-75 sites were located in the eastern portion of the 51st FRBr's area of responsibility, along a north-south diagonal stretching from Halle to Chemnitz.
3RD LVD

The 3rd LVD, consisting of the 13th FRR, 23rd FRR, and 43rd FRBR, provided coverage of the DDR's northern flank, as seen in the image below. 13th FRR sites are colored yellow, 23rd FRR sites are colored light blue, and 43rd FRBr sites are colored dark blue.
The 13th FRR consisted of four S-75M sites. The 23rd FRR consisted of five S-75M sites. The 43rd FRBr consisted of six S-75M sites, five S-125M1A sites, one S-200VE site, and one S-300PMU site. The S-300PMU's 64N6 radar facility was also subordinate to the 43rd FRBr.

The 13th FRR covered the northwestern portion of the DDR, as seen in the image below:
The 23rd FRR covered the northeastern portion of the DDR near the Polish border, as seen in the image below:
The 43rd FRBr covered the northern area of the DDR between the 13th FRR and 23rd FRR areas of responsibility, as seen in the image below:
SOVIET CONTRIBUTION

As was the case with many of the Warsaw Pact member states, there was a significant Soviet presence in the DDR. This presence included a number of strategic air defense units. These air defense units defended both DDR airspace, providing coverage not present under the 1st and 3rd LVD, and Soviet military facilities, including airfields home to Soviet combat aircraft. Identified Soviet air defense assets in the DDR included two S-75M sites, 24 S-125M1 sites, and one S-200M site. These Soviet air defense sites were concentrated in the 1st LVD's area of responsibility.

Soviet air defense coverage in the DDR can be seen in the image below:
Various Soviet tactical SAM units were also present in the DDR. These systems included the Krug, Osa, 9K37 Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) and S-300V (SA-12 GLADIATOR/GIANT). As tactical SAM units would have been tasked to provide mobile air defense for Soviet Army units pushing into NATO, they are not covered here.

S-200 COVERAGE

Long-range air defense of the DDR was provided by four S-200 sites. As previously mentioned, one of these sites was a Soviet-controlled battery located east of Madgeburg. These four S-200 batteries not only provided coverage over the entire DDR, but also provided significant cross-border coverage to the north and east, potentially allowing targets to be engaged before crossing into DDR airspace. S-200 effectiveness was reduced at low altitude, but the system still posed a serious threat to medium-high altitude aircraft, in particular nonmaneuverable aircraft such as ISR platforms. After an outbreak of hostilities, the S-200 batteries would be well suited to deny NATO reconnaissance aircraft from operating in close proximity to the DDR border.

The coverage provided by the four S-200 series batteries located in the DDR can be seen in the image below:
OVERALL COVERAGE

The six DDR air defense units within the 1st and 3rd LVDs, when combined with the Soviet air defense units in country, provided an overlapping air defense network to defend DDR airspace. The image below illustrates the locations of all of the DDR and Soviet strategic SAM sites, tactical SAM garrisons, and training sites, the latter of which are brown in color:
The overall coverage provided by the entire air defense network can be seen in the image below:
The deployment strategies employed by the DDR and Soviet units indicate a desire to defend both key border areas as well as major residential and industrial areas. During a postulated Soviet conflict with NATO, Soviet and Warsaw Pact units advancing into Western Europe would likely have contained organic tactical air defense units. The volume of strategic air defense units present in the DDR would suggest that the Soviets placed a great deal of importance on defending the major logistical support areas and lines of communication in the DDR. This meshes well with the Soviet concept of rapid advance of armored units into enemy territory. In order for these advances to be successful, the logistics support train must be well defended.

LIMITATIONS

One of the primary limitations of the DDR was the lack of suitable modern air defense systems during the latter stages of the Cold War. The main drawback of the most numerous strategic SAM systems in service with the DDR was the inability of each battery to prosecute multiple targets. The only system capable of a multiple target engagement capability was the S-200, and this could only be achieved by deploying multiple 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars at each location. The S-200 would typically employ one 5N62 for each 6 launcher cluster present at the site. That being said, this lack of serious multiple target engagement capability, coupled with Western advances in ECM and SEAD/DEAD tactics and weapons, threatened to make the DDR's air defense network virtually obsolete.

The S-200's degraded capability at low altitude also posed a problem for the DDR in the event of a low-level strike. Consider the following example situated in the area of the 3rd LVD. Discounting the S-200, a low-level strike package would face the following threat picture circa 1985:
Eliminating the 14th FRR's northern three S-75 sites and a solitary Soviet S-125 site provides the beginning of an undefended corridor of airspace for striking at targets in the region, as illustrated below:
There is a tactical SAM garrison in the area opened by the postulated strike, but this was an Osa garrison. Operation DESERT STORM proved that the Osa was ineffective at dealing with fast jets backed by EW, SEAD and DEAD assets, recording no successes against Coalition aircraft. Ergo, the strike package would likely not be threatened by the Osa TELARs in the area, being able to proceed deeper into the DDR. A turn to the south reveals another narrow corridor leading to the 1st LVD's area of responsibility being vulnerable were a second Soviet S-125 battery to be destroyed. Clearly, newer air defense systems were necessary to deal with the increased threat posed by NATO strike aircraft and their support assets.

The answer came in 1989 when the first S-300PMU battery entered operational service. Site preparation had begun in 1984 near Retschow in the 43rd FRBr, and system operators were trained in the USSR between August and December of 1988. Superimposing the S-300PMU's range ring over the corridor generated by the postulated strike package, it can be seen that the system was capable of defending the vulnerable area in the northwest.
The exact location of the DDR's S-300PMU site has not been determined with complete certainty, but it is known that the system supplemented, if not replaced outright, the Retschow S-75 battery in the 43rd FRBr. Given this location and the fact that the Retschow S-75 site remains unmodified, the following site stands out as a potential location for the S-300PMU battery:
It is known that Soviet engineers did travel to the DDR to construct S-300P series SAM sites, suggesting that they were responsible for constructing the Retschow site. This would suggest that the above location is a distinct possibility as it has clearly undergone significant deconstruction, potentially erasing evidence of built up revetments and radar platforms. The Soviet engineers may also have constructed Soviet S-300P series sites as well, and the following image presents an example from the 51FRBr where such a site may have been constructed adjacent to a DDR S-75 site:
CONCLUSION

Had the Cold War continued, modernization of DDR air defenses would have necessitated priority status within the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Aging systems, proving to be more and more unreliable against modern combat aircraft, would likely have been supplemented and replaced by further S-300P series SAM systems in both the DDR and Soviet inventories. Only then would the air defense network of the DDR have been able to be relied upon to forestall any significant action by NATO.

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

The range rings, site icons, detail tags, and East German border can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark file here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

DDR Air Defense Units
43rd FRBr S-300PMU
SAMs of the PVO, Mikhail Pervov, 2001
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions

Kaliningrad's Strategic Air Defenses

INTRODUCTION

The Kaliningrad Oblast has historically been a significant strategic location for Russia. Home to the Baltic Sea Fleet and a number of other military units, the Kaliningrad Oblast provides Russia with a foothold in territory surrounded by NATO members. In light of recent worldwide events, the Kaliningrad Oblast may be undergoing a resurgence in terms of strategic importance to Russia. As such, the strategic air defense network of the Kaliningrad Oblast is a critical aspect of the region.

CURRENT STATUS

Currently deployed strategic air defense assets provide the Kaliningrad Oblast with a robust, modern air defense network. System deployment indicates that priority is clearly given to defending the western half of the Oblast, home to the majority of the significant military facilities and the Baltic Sea Fleet.

EW Coverage

Early warning coverage of the Kaliningrad Oblast is provided by six radar facilities. One of these facilities is home to a 300 km range 5N64S (BIG BIRD B) battle management radar controlling the Oblast's S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE) batteries. Four 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radar sites with detection ranges of 165 km are also present providing additional coverage, and a further EW site features legacy radar assets providing additional support to the network.

The following image depicts the locations of the Kaliningrad Oblast's EW sites. 36D6 sites are denoted by triangles, the 5N64S site is denoted by a hexagon, and the legacy EW site is denoted by a square.
The coverage of the 5N64S radar site provides the network with the ability to monitor the airspace over the entire Oblast, with coverage extending into Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. A significant portion of the Baltic Sea is also covered, extending to the shoreline of Sweden. The 36D6 sites, one of which being co-located with an S-300PS battery, are also situated to provide coverage of the entire Oblast as well as portions of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The 36D6 radars are also capable of monitoring an off-shore swath of airspace, albeit to a lesser degree than the longer-ranged 5N64S. The off-shore reach of the Kaliningrad Oblast's EW radars allows them to operate with SAM batteries to provide air defense for Baltic Sea naval vessels operating in the area.

The positioning of the various radar sites provides the network with a significant degree of overlapping EW coverage. The 36D6 radars can also provide targeting support to the S-300PS batteries should the 5N64S radar be rendered inoperable. While this would result in a loss of range with respect to target acquisition, the 36D6 sites are positioned in a manner that ensures that the engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries are not affected. The relatively low, flat terrain in the surrounding areas also ensures that a reliance on the less sophisticated 36D6 radar sets, which can be mounted on 40V6 mast assemblies for increased low-altitude detection capability in areas of rough terrain, would not result in a significant degradation of target acquisition functions.

The following image depicts the coverage of the Kaliningrad Oblast's 5N64S and 36D6 EW sites:
Active Sites

Strategic air defense of the Kaliningrad Oblast is provided by six SAM sites. Five of these sites are occupied by mobile S-300PS SAM systems with maximum engagement ranges of 90 km. The sixth site is the sole remaining S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) SAM site still actively serving with the Russian air defense network. The S-200 has a maximum engagement range of 300 km.

The following image depicts the operational SAM sites in the Kaliningrad Oblast. S-300PS sites are denoted by red diamonds, with the S-200 site being denoted by a purple diamond.
The S-300PS sites are all situated within 11 kilometers of the shoreline in the westernmost portion of the Oblast. Their proximity provides a layered air defense capability over the city of Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea home port. The multiple target engagement capability, 6 targets per battery, and effectiveness of the system against low RCS targets represents a significant threat to any potential airborne aggressor. The deployment of S-300PS batteries in lieu of more modern S-300PM (SA-20 GARGOYLE) batteries appears at first glance to be intended to protect the more advanced variants from being exploited by ELINT collection platforms in the area, potentially enabling vulnerabilities to be discovered that would put areas protected by S-300PM batteries at increased risk during times of war. However, following the delivery of the S-300PMU-1 to NATO member Greece and deployment of S-300PMU-1 batteries along the Chinese coastline, exposing them to EP-3 ELINT aircraft, it is more likely that the S-300PS was retained for air defense of Kaliningrad because deployment of the longer-ranged S-300PM was not deemed necessary to ensure adequate air defense coverage.

The S-200 battery is centrally located within the Oblast, but the system's 300 kilometer maximum range allows it to range targets inside of Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. The system also offers a significant off-shore capability. While the S-200 is no longer a reliable system for engaging maneuverable targets such as fighter aircraft, it remains a significant threat to ISR platforms. The significant reach of the system both offshore and into the surrounding NATO member states would provide Russian air defense commanders with the ability to threaten ISR platforms operating in close proximity to Kaliningrad but remaining outside the engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries.

The following image depicts the engagement zones of the Kaliningrad Oblast's strategic SAM batteries:
Imagery of the S-200 site, seen below, suggests that two of the three batteries remain active, allowing the system to potentially engage two targets simultaneously.
Inactive Sites

There are currently nine inactive strategic SAM sites that have been identified within the Kaliningrad Oblast. These sites are prepared S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-300P sites. One tactical 2K12 (SA-4 GANEF) deployment site has also been located and is included here although tactical SAM coverage is outside the scope of this article. During hostilities, these inactive sites could be exploited to provide dispersal sites for the Oblast's resident S-300PS batteries. While only two of the sites are operationally configured for the S-300P, all of the sites would at least provide a degree of protection for the components thanks to the presence of different revetment configurations. Alternatively, S-300P series batteries could be deployed to the area to take up residence at some or all of the sites to bolster the air defense capability of the Oblast.

It should be noted that the 5N83 battle management complex employed by the S-300PS, which includes the 5N64S battle management radar, is capable of supporting six S-300PS batteries. Were there to be multiple S-300P series batteries introduced into the region, one or more additional 5N83 complexes would be needed to be deployed as well.

The following image depicts the inactive SAM sites located in the Kaliningrad Oblast:
Overall Layout

The following image depicts the entirety of the strategic air defense related network of sites within the Kaliningrad Oblast:
The following image depicts the overall coverage areas of both the SAM and EW assets in the Kaliningrad Oblast. This image highlights the overlapping layout of the entire network, depicting how the EW and SAM sites are positioned to support and defend each other. The multiple target engagement capability of the S-300PS, combined with the expansive EW coverage, allows the Kaliningrad Oblast air defense network to effectively repulse a small-scale strike package, perhaps designed to target and eliminate nuclear missiles in the area. The S-300PS network could engage a total of 30 targets simultaneously, and would be backed up by an Su-27 (FLANKER-B) interceptor unit in the area. Anything less than a full-scale aerial invasion of the Oblast would be an extremely difficult operation to successfully accomplish without risking severe losses and potential failure, inviting a Russian response which could conceivably escalate into an environment where a nuclear exchange is a definite possibility.
MODERNIZATION

Modernization efforts for the Kaliningrad Oblast's air defense network have been discussed in the open press as far back as 2001. Russian officials have stated that the extant S-200 complex will remain operational until it is replaced by the new S-400 (SA-21). S-400 batteries are currently being assigned to the Moscow air defense network, and it could be assumed that it will be some time before a battery is available for assignment to the Kaliningrad Oblast given Moscow's higher strategic priority. However, given the deteriorating relationship between Russia and NATO, replacing the S-200 complex with the S-400 may take on an increased priority in the near term. It is also possible that 150 km range S-300PM batteries displaced by S-400 units around Moscow could be reassigned to the Oblast to replace the older S-300PS batteries.

Were the SAM units to be upgraded, upgrading the EW network would also be necessary, particularly to support the S-400. The 5N64S battle management radar and associated 5N83 battle management complex would need to be replaced by the newer 30K6 complex and 600 km range 91N6 (BIG BIRD E) radar. A one-for-one replacement of S-300PS batteries by S-300PM batteries would necessitate the presence of a single 30K6 complex, capable of handling up to six S-300P and/or S-400 series batteries. Replacement of the 36D6 radar systems with newer 300 km range 96L6 radar systems is also a possibility as these systems were designed to operate with S-300PM and S-400 batteries.

Postulating the replacement of 36D6, 5N64S, S-300PS, and S-200 units with 96L6, 91N6, S-300PM, and S-400 units respectively, the following image depicts the potential coverage of the future Kaliningrad Oblast air defense network. Two range rings are provided for the S-400, one depicting the 240 km engagement range of the 48N6DM missile currently deployed with the system and one depicting the 400 km engagement range of the future 40N6 missile.
As can clearly be seen, such a modernization of the air defense network would significantly enhance the coverage area. The detection range of the EW assets would enable targets to be detected over the entirety of Poland and the Baltic Sea. Increased engagement ranges allow the western-sited S-300PM sites to combine with the S-400 battery to provide overlapping fields of fire over the entirety of the Oblast, bringing the eastern portion of the territory under the protection of a modern SAM system allowing for potential surface-to-surface missile units to be dispersed over a greater expanse and still remain under the protective umbrella of the network. This capability would potentially allow SSM units to deploy without organic tactical air defense support, aiding in their concealment during wartime as there would not be nearby SAM units giving off tell-tale radar emissions. Increasing the difficulty of locating and targeting any such missile units would increase their effectiveness as a potential nuclear deterrent.

CONCLUSION

As relations between Russia and the NATO powers have progressively deteriorated for a number of factors, to include Western political opinion regarding Russian military action in the Caucasus, insinuations have been made that Russia may place nuclear-armed missiles inside the Kaliningrad Oblast as a counter to American missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. Regardless of whether or not this comes to pass, air defense of the Kaliningrad Oblast will continue to be a strategic priority for Russia, helping to ensure the continued security of its foothold inside territory dominated by NATO members.

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

The range rings and site locations used in the imagery in this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark file here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided by Google Earth and Kosmosnimki

S-200 Remains In Service
Russia Severs Military Ties With NATO
Nuclear Kaliningrad?
New Missiles in Kaliningrad?
The S-300P
NPO Almaz
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions

The Chinese SAM Network

REMOVED PENDING PDF CONVERSION

Current Developments

INTRODUCTION

Just a quick note to keep you all informed on the current goings-on related to this site and its content.

IMINT & ANALYSIS FEATURED IN JANE'S

As online subscribers have no doubt discovered, Jane's Missiles & Rockets has two articles in their February print edition featuring the work of this website. In "Iran may have lined up S-300 SAM systems", my work detailing Iran's air defense network is discussed. "China deploys KS-1A SAM" is a report detailing my discovery of the first KS-1A SAM site in China, featured first on this blog a month ago. Hopefully I can contribute more to Jane's and other industry-related publications in the future.

FORTHCOMING PROJECTS

The next three articles for this site are being prepared, and they are going to take a little bit of time, so bear with me. The most extensive is going to be an analysis of China's air defense network, with a good deal of future projection mixed in. Special attention will be given to air defenses along the Taiwan Strait. The other two articles are going to be a feature on Russian space surveillance facilities (inspired by my recent discovery of the Far East Krona site in Google Earth) and an analysis of the impact of the S-300PT in Iranian service.

SAM SITE PROJECTS

The SAM Site .kmz file for Google Earth is still updated on a regular basis whenever I have enough new locations to warrant uploading a new file. I am also looking at developing a document based on that data, something along the lines of a guide to worldwide SAM systems broken down by nation, and featuring location data and information on the numbers and types of individual components at each location.

THE S-300P

I am still preparing what should be the definitive look at the S-300P SAM system, to replace an earlier article on this site, as well as numerous other things. Smaller-scope articles will still be posted as time permits, but my current primary focus is on the Chinese article, so bear with me if the site appears stagnant for a week or so.

CONCLUSION

As always, comments are welcome and encouraged. I'd encourage visitors to post a comment to this thread to suggest ideas for future articles as well.