The S-25 SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

Locating strategic SAM sites in Google Earth imagery is a time-consuming process. Each panel of high-resolution imagery must be scrutinized and examined in order to locate and identify various site configurations and missile systems. In order to ensure success, the analyst must first know what to look for. This is the first article in a multi-part series which will detail the layout and key features of various identifiable strategic SAM sites found worldwide. Armed with this knowledge, the analyst will be able to positively identify such facilities with greater ease and accuracy.

THE SA-1

The first operational strategic SAM system in the world was the Russian S-25 (SA-1 GUILD). The S-25 was a rail-launched system emplaced at fixed launch sites. The command-guided V-300 missile had a maximum range of 45 kilometers, and a maximum reach of between 4,000 and 14,000 meters in altitude. A 250kg HE warhead was fitted. The E/F band R-113 (GAGE) radar provided target acquisition to a range of 300 kilometers. The E/F band B-200 (YO YO) radar performed target engagement functions, with a maximum range of 150 kilometers and the ability to track between 24 and 30 targets per radar. Each B-200 radar could prosecute one engagement at a time.

SA-1 DEPLOYMENT

The S-25 system was conceived to provide air defense of the skies over Moscow. The system was intended to provide defense against an incoming bomber force of 1,000 aircraft. S-25 sites were located in two rings around Moscow, with radii 45 and 80 kilometers from the center of the city.

The image below depicts the locations of the 34 outer ring sites and the 22 inner ring sites:


Initial CIA projections, shown in the image below taken from the declassified NIE 11-5-57, were not that far from the mark:


A TYPICAL SA-1 SITE

CIA NIE 11-5-57 provides us with the following description of an active S-25 site:


The overhead image below depicts a typical S-25 site as it exists today, with the relevant areas and structures annotated:


This site is a rarity insofar as it has remained mostly intact, allowing the site layout to be studied using present-day imagery. The S-25 sites all followed the same standard layout seen above. The radar position, seen below, was located approximately 1.5 kilometers behind the launch area. Two B-200 radars were positioned in the forward area of the bunker, which housed the command and control section and the crews who controlled the site.


The launch area, seen below, contained the individual launch positions. Each launch area contained three V-300 fixed launch assemblies. Each S-25 site contained a number of launch areas. The interlocking nature of the launch areas gave the S-25 sites their distinctive rectangular herringbone appearance.


Adjacent facilities, as seen in the following image, included housing areas for assigned personnel, and support facilities for maintaining the site itself:


All of the site areas were connected using concrete roads. As these roads still exist carving their tell-tale herringbone path through the forested areas outside Moscow, former S-25 sites are relatively easy to locate and identify.

The expansive nature of the S-25 sites also allows them to be easily identified using low-resolution imagery, as evidenced by the image below:


CURRENT STATUS

As the S-25 has since been replaced by different variants of the S-300P family, there are no active sites located in Russia. The sites themselves do still exist for the most part, and many have been reused for other purposes.

The S-25 site seen below has been reused as a residential area, a relatively simple proposition thanks to the aforementioned interconnecing network of concrete roads found throughout the site:


Alternatively, many S-25 sites have been reused by the Russian defense establishment. Quite a few sites, including the site shown above, feature active S-300P SAM batteries. Other sites have formed the basis of the sites for the exoatmospheric component of Moscow's ABM network over the years. For more information and descriptions of these facilities, reference the relevant article found at this site.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery is provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above
-Jane's Land Based Air Defence provided technical specifications

Russia's Typhoon SSBN Fleet

INTRODUCTION

It is a rarity in Google Earth when every example of a weapon system is visible. One example is the four Kirov-class nuclear powered missile crusiers. Another is the six examples of the Project 941 Akula-class ("Shark", more commonly known as Typhoon to the West) strategic missile submarine (SSBN).

The Typhoon is a relatively easy submarine to identify. It is the largest submarine in the world, with a length of 170 meters and a beam of 23 meters. Locating the Typhoons was a relatively easy proposition once all of the required high-resolution imagery was made available, as they have been mostly inactive for some time due to the prohibitive operating costs associated with the type.

NERPICH'YA GUBA

Operational Typhoon SSBNs were based in Zapadnaya Litsa on the Kola Peninsula, in the port facility of Nerpich'ya Guba. Current imagery depicts three Typhoon SSBNs still in port, although they are no longer believed to be operational. These submarines are TK-12, TK-13, and TK-20.


SEVERODVINSK

The remaining three Typhoons are currently visible at the Russian naval facility at Severodvinsk, near Arkhangelsk. Severodvinsk handles overhaul and refit for the Russian Northern Fleet. SSBNs are produced in the huge Sevmash assembly halls located at Severodvinsk, and some export work is also conducted at the port facility. Interestingly, the refitting of the Admiral Gorshkov for the Indian Navy can be witnessed in current imagery.


Of the three Typhoons visible at Severodvinsk, one is currently being dismantled (TK-202, which began to be dismantled in 2004), and one is seen pierside near the Admiral Gorshkov (likely TK-208 Dmitri Donskoi, the lead vessel of the class).


The third Typhoon at Severodvinsk, likely TK-17, is seen at a weapons loading dock. It cannot be determined if the missiles visible pierside are being loaded or unloaded. The presence of multiple missiles, however, makes the identification of this vessel as TK-17 seem most plausible. TK-208 is still active, conducting flight tests of the new Bulava SLBM. Only one Bulava has ever been fired during a test launch, so the presence of multiple missiles would seem to rule this vessel out as being TK-208. The missile canisters are 19 meters in length and 3.2 meters in diameter, and would easily fit the Typhoon's D-19 (SS-N-20 SEAHAWK) SLBMs. It has been reported that TK-17 was stated for dismantlement and was no longer fitted with SLBMs as of 2005. In this case, it is logical to assume that the missile canisters visible contain D-19 SLBMs that have recently been unloaded.


SOURCES

Imagery provided by Google Earth.
Globalsecurity.org and Pavel Podvig's blog and text Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces were consulted in writing this article.

IMINT & Google Earth

One of the most fascinating applications available on the internet is Google Earth, an open-source satellite imagery browser allowing the user to navigate to any point in the globe and view satellite or overhead imagery of that location. Many kinds of analysis can be performed using Google Earth, but unfortunately the program needs a little work before any significant military analysis can be conducted.

There are three main issues with using Google Earth as an analysis tool for military intelligence information: resolution, timeliness, and coverage.

The first issue is one of resolution. There are varying levels of resolution to be found in Google Earth. Most of the lower resolution areas have a resolution of 15 meters. SPOT imagery has been incorporated in some areas, such as France, bringing the resolution down to the 2.5 meter mark. This is still not sufficient for any sort of analysis. For detailed analysis, resolution of at least 1 meter is necessary in order to accurately identify military equipment. Digital Globe imagery provides 0.7 meter resolution in many areas, and the highest resolution available is 1 inch, although this is only found in select areas. Some facilities such as Russian BMEW radars or SA-5 GAMMON sites can be discerned in the 15 meter imagery, but anything on a smaller scale will go unnoticed. The reason resolution is critical is because smaller objects such as aircraft and SAM systems must be able to be identified. Apart from general layout, one of the easiest ways to do this is to simply measure the object. This is how one can tell the difference between an S-300PM and an S-300PM-1, for example. The S-300PM TELs measure in at approximately 43 feet, where the S-300PM-1 TELs are roughly 4 feet longer. Without decent enough resolution, it is nearly impossible to get an accurate measurement; shadowing, adjacent objects, and other errata cannot be adequately discerned and discounted.

The second issue is timeliness. Effective analysis of a military facility requires a comparitive analysis over a period of time to discern deployment patterns, ORBAT changes, and gather an accurate estimate of equipment on strength. The best illustration of this is an analysis of the naval ORBAT at a given port facility. At the time the image was taken, any number of vessels may be out of port and therefore not depicted. Google does sometimes update the coverage of various areas, but more often they are likely to update areas not previously visible in high-resolution. This presents an analyst with a problem, as he or she will not be able to perform comparitive analysis. Also, if the imagery visible is more than a few months old, wholesale changes in the facility's ORBAT may have occurred. For a while, Langley AFB only depicted F-15C Eagles on the flightline, when it was known that the F-22A Raptor was on-station in substantial numbers. Furthermore, current imagery depicts a barren flightline, the image being taken when the associated units were off-station while runway maintenance was being accomplished. This work was finished months ago, yet the imagery does not depict any operational aircraft on-station. All of this can cause an analyst to misrepresent a facility's ORBAT.

The final issue is coverage itself. Google Earth suffers from a lack of high-resolution data in many areas. In some areas, such as around Moscow, high-resolution coverage is relatively spotty in places, making analysis of known facilities such as Zhukovskiy flight test center impossible. If there is not adequate high-resolution coverage of an area of interest, a complete analysis of that area is impossible. To cite an example, one must only look near Engels AB in Russia. There is an S-300P SAM garrison nearby, but an analysis of the air defense picture is not possible as the lack of sufficient high-resolution data has so far precluded the location of any active or even inactive S-300P SAM sites. They are most definitely in the area, as evidenced by the presence of the garrison, but they are not visible in the available imagery. Simply assuming that they are located within the boundaries of nearby low-resolution areas is not sufficient; a few tens of kilometers of difference in site placement can result in a perceived gap existing in the air defense network where there may be no gap at all.

It should be stated that none of these constraints are meant to be construed as negative aspects of the program itself. They merely illustrate the limited usefulness of the software and the associated geospatial data in military analysis. This is not to say that military analysis cannot or should not be conducted at all, far from it. But it must be understood that the accuracy and scope of any such analysis will be limited by the constraints imposed by the program itself.

Modernizing Pakistani Air Defenses

So I sat down this afternoon and decided to wrap my head around the whole Pakistani air defense issue in light of the FC-1 purchase.

The issue as I see it is that the Pakistani Air Forces (and I am including their SAM network as part of the air forces, I don't think they all report to the PAF but it makes it simpler for the sake of talking about the overall air defense picture) currently lack a robust air defense capability.

Now, we're not talking about pilot skill, PAF vs. IAF inventories, or anything of that nature here. What I mean by that statement is that the current PAF lacks a serious long-range air defense network. Pakistan does possess a number of EW radar systems from various sources, and their EW picture is, for the most part, adequate. There is a concern that the radar picture could be muddled in some areas due to the uneven terrain found throughout the nation, but this can easily be rectified by employing an AEW&C aircraft, such as the Saab platform currently being purchased for the PAF. Personally, I would've preferred a larger platform with the ability to remain on station longer, perhaps one of the new Chinese Y-8 models, but the Saab platform is certainly not going to fall short in the radar performance category, so it should still be perfectly suitable for the needs of the PAF.

The real problem currently lies in the business end of the IADS network, the shooters. Let's examine the air picture first.

The PAF currently has to rely on relatively short-legged, older technology aircraft for the most part (the F-16A does enjoy a bit of a range benefit over the F-7s), and they lack a BVR weapon. That means that any intruder with a BVR weapon will put the PAF interceptor pilot at a disadvantage. This is currently being rectified through the purchase and co-production of the FC-1, which will employ the Chinese SD-10 BVR AAM. An upgrade for the PAF F-16 fleet is also being sought, as well as at least 18 new Block 50/52 jets, complete with AIM-120 BVR AAM capability. So, the airborne intercept portion of the equation is being addressed.

The real problem lies with the ground-based SAM network. Pakistan currently relies on the Chinese HQ-2 for strategic air defense purposes. The problem is that there only appears to be one active HQ-2 site near Islamabad, located at 33°32'40.80"N 73°16'04.44"E. There have been claims of a second HQ-2 unit near Karachi, but there is currently no evidence suggesting that this unit is still active, as the site is not visible in overhead imagery. Given the fact that Karachi is not the capital, the equipment could be being held in storage or active reserve for deployment if needed, but for the sake of argument we will proceed with the assumption that only the northern site is active, as it is the only site that can be verified at this time.

Here is an image of the active HQ-2 site near Islamabad:



The next image depicts the maximum range of the HQ-2, 35 kilometers. 35 kilometers is the range of the farthest-reaching HQ-2 variant, I am operating on the assumption that PAF missiles may have been upgraded or replaced over their service lives.



Take note that the mountanous terrain to the east and southeast will affect radar performance and the system's effectiveness will be hampered to some degree in those areas, particularly at low altitudes.

The rest of the Pakistani SAM inventory consists of short-range tactical SAM systems best suited for a point defense or ground unit support role. Clearly, the SAM side of the Pakistani IADS needs to be addressed. Pakistan has shown interest in acquiring advanced Chinese-made SAM systems, including the FT-2000, which is a rather interesting passive homing weapon. Modern Chinese SAM systems should be just as effective as some of their Russian counterparts, as China has been importing some of the best SAM systems in the world from the Russians for years now and has likely taken the opportunity, as they are so often wont to do, to check things out and figure out just what makes them tick. S-300P technology no doubt aided in the development of the very similar HQ-9 strategic SAM system.

Before one sets about redesigning the Pakistani strategic SAM network, one must first consider the goals of the IADS. The goal of the Pakistani IADS should not be to turn Pakistan into a wholly denied parcel of airspace; that would require far too many SAM systems to effectively pull off. Rather, a strategic SAM network should be positioned to protect key infrastructure elements and the government, as well as key military facilities.

In order to defend these key sites, they must be identified. For the sake of this discussion, here is a preliminary list:

-Islamabad
-Khusab reactor complex
-Hyderabad
-Karachi

This list is by no means all inclusive, and is meant simply to illustrate the next point. Additionally, mobile missile facilities have been discounted as they would likely disperse in the event of a large scale conflict.

Alright, primary facilities have been identified. The next step is to identify a potential SAM system for use. The ideal choice, given the nature of their relationship at the present time, would be for Pakistan to procure the 100 kilometer range HQ-9 system from China. As can be seen by the following image, the placement of four HQ-9 units at the aforementioned locations would represent a substantial increase in the Pakistani strategic air defense capability:



Any further strategic facilities or important locations could be defended by additional HQ-9 batteries, but two batteries at each site organized into two regiments, one north and one south, could provide the basis for a robust strategic SAM network.

That leaves the matter of point defense. While Pakistan may choose to procure a European system as they already have experience operating the short-range Crotale and RBS-70 systems, there is another option I would like to present.

Surface-launched AMRAAMs are being used by a few select nations as short/intermediate-range SAM systems. Pakistan has the opportunity here to develop a similar system in cooperation with the Chinese. The SD-10 could potentially form the basis of a very effective point defense system, as well as a system that could be placed covertly along potential threat aircraft ingress routes, particularly in the mountanous regions of the nation.

The SD-10 is an active radar weapon, ostensibly needing no off-board targeting sensors provided the target can be locked on by the seeker head prior to launch. The way to get around that limitation is to provide a passive detection system based on the FT-2000's EW kit. This would allow for hostile target identification to be performed, and a few sensors positioned at the right locations could provide triangulation so as to enable the system to generate accurate target track data. Target altitudes could be generated by measuring the strength of an identified emission, or perhaps by an accurate EO or IR system. Once a track and an altitude have been identified, the parameters for a launch have been established. An SD-10 could be fired and even updated mid-course using continued examination of the track and altitude data, before going active at point-blank range to allow for the maximum amount of suprise (mid-course signals could, of course, be detected by a sensitive RWR kit, but it'd have to know what it was to classify it as hostile).

The passive/active SD-10 system would be a cheap, effective option for short-range and point defense and would also be able to serve as a gap filler in areas where terrain precludes engagement by longer-range HQ-9s positioned in the area to defend their assigned locations. All Pakistan needs to do is take the initiative and embrace this concept, and with the induction of an HQ-9 class system the overall strategic air defense network will become much more effective.

Again, a network such as this is not intended to turn the entire nation into denied airspace. That's just not possible, or even economically feasible at any rate. But with a few key adjustments and acquisitions, Pakistan could greatly increase it's defensive capabilities insofar as intruding aircraft are concerned. A more robust SAM network would also free up more aircraft from point defense or CAP duties, allowing them to be retasked for other roles.

Russian Strategic Defense - Part 3, The Future

INTRODUCTION

Part 3 of this series focuses on future developments in the field of Russian Strategic Defense. The previous two entries are still available:

Part 1: The S-300P
Part 2: The ABM Network

THE S-400

The next generation SAM system being trialled by the Russian military is the Almaz-Antey S-400 Trieumf (Triumph; SA-X-21). The S-400 represents the latest iteration of the S-300P SAM system. The S-400 may have originally been designated S-300PM-3 due to the relationship with the older system. The 48N6DM used by the S-400 is a derivative of the S-300PM-2's 48N6D missile, and the S-400 will be able to employ the 9M96 series of SAMs as well. The largest changes to the S-400 when compared to the more dated S-300P variants are the inclusion of the new GRAVE STONE target engagement radar, and the inclusion of the new 40N6 400 kilometer range missile. GRAVE STONE is said to give the S-400 an anti-stealth capability. With the 40N6, 48N6DM, and 9M96, the S-400 will represent a very capable SAM system able to engage a variety of targets at various ranges.

The S-400 is due to enter operational service in the summer of 2007, with the first battery being employed near Elektrostal, outside of Moscow as part of the capital city's SAM defense network. Work on the 40N6 missile is still progressing, and this weapon is to be incorporated into the S-400 batteries as early as 2008. Until then, the S-400 will remain little more than yet another incremental upgrade to the S-300P family.

SAMODERZHETS

Later versions of the S-400 system will most likely be of the Samoderzhets family. With the merger of Almaz and Antey a few years ago, a whole wealth of SAM experience was merged, and Samoderzhets will be the first hardware example of that merger. Samoderzhets will be an S-400 system incorporating a towed TEL carrying two 9M82M (SA-X-23 GIANT) ATBMs. This will provide a far more robust ATBM capability for an S-400 battery, and potentially increase the export value of the system as well.

OTHER SAM DEVELOPMENTS

There are two other SAM systems under development for future use, the S-500 and the S-1000. The S-500 has been described as an S-300P follow-on system. The S-500 will likely not enter development for some time, and will represent the next generation of Russian SAM systems, perhaps finally breaking out of the S-300P family's mold. The S-1000 has been described as a follow-on to the S-300V system. The S-1000 may enter development earlier than the S-500, as there is no "S-400 equivalent" being pursued for the Russian S-300V systems. The Antey-2500 and Antey-2500D appear targeted at the export market only, and the upgraded S-300VM and S-300VM-1 appear to be non-starters for domestic use as well, although their technology and 9M82M/M1 missiles may filter down to the Samoderzhets system. In reality, the S-1000 may represent a THAAD-style system, or with the merger of Almaz and Antey the S-500 and S-1000 may be replaced by a single system useable for both roles, along the lines of Samdoerzhets.

ABM DEVELOPMENTS

Much less work appears to be underway on the ABM front. There have been rumors of a new ABM interceptor being developed, desugnated 45T6, but nothing more is known about this system. It would logically be a replacement for the Fakel 51T6 exoatmospheric interceptors, as these have recently been taken out of service.

Most of the ABM work underway is in the radar field. The aforementioned Voronezh-DM radar (see Part 2) is the latest BMEW LPAR design, and is currently under construction at two sites.

Beyond that, very little work appears to be underway regarding future ABM components. Sary Shagan is still an actively-used ABM test range, as evidenced by a recent 53T6 test launch, but there does not appear to be any significant R&D activity ongoing. That could be due to the existance of the test range outside Russian territory; ABM development may be moved to Kapustin Yar, Ashuluk, or another test range in the future to keep it "in house".

THE FUTURE

What is the future of the Russian strategic defense network? With an active, operational ABM system, and a robust SAM network, the future may not be as important as the present. That is to say that money may be better spent upgrading current systems and keeping them viable for the next 10-15 years, before beginning development on the next generation of strategic defense systems.

SOURCE MATERIAL

The following sources were consulted in the preparation of this report:

Globalsecurity's Russian BMD page
Pavel Podvig's blog
Russian language website on ABM systems
ABM and Space Defense
1999 US Senate Hearings on ABMs and Missile Defense

Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (various years)
Jane's Land-based Air Defence (various years)
Fakel's Missiles (Moscow, 2003)

Various posters at Secret Projects, in particular Overscan, Meteorit, and Muxel, provided a good debate about the topic and provided the inspiration for this project. Thanks also to Trident for the Lake Balkhash thing!

All overhead imagery is provided courtesy of Google Earth.

Russian Strategic Defense - Part 2, The ABM Network

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Russian Strategic Defense - Part 1, The S-300P SAM Family

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