The S-200 SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) SAM system is a long-range air defense system designed to defend large areas against all manner of airborne targets, including high-speed and high-altitude aircraft. The S-200 was originally conceived in part to defend against the expected overflights by Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft, although no such overflights ever took place due to a political restriction of manned overflights of the USSR in the wake of the Francis Gary Powers shootdown. The S-200 entered operational service in 1967 and has remained on combat duty in various nations worldwide ever since.

In a little known role, the S-200 was also employed as a national-level ABM system for a time. More information on this concept can be found here: LINK The same article also contains information regarding a prior use of the Western SA-5 designator.

THE SA-5

The S-200 SAM system is a long-range strategic SAM system. The SARH-guided two-stage 5V21 and 5V28 missiles have a 220 kg HE fragmentation warhead. The 5V21 ad 5V28 differ from previous Fakel-designed air defense missiles insofar as their first stage is not a jetissonable booster stage, but rather four strap-on rocket motors. The missiles themselves are very large, with lengths of 10.5 meters for the 5V21 and 10.8 meters for the 5V28. Ranges vary from variant to variant, with a maximum of between 150 and 300 kilometers. Minimum ranges are between 7 and 17 kilometers, depending on the variant. Minimum altitude for all variants is 300 meters, with a maximum altitude of between 20,000 and 40,000 meters, depending on the variant. Target engagement functions are handled by the 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) radar set, an H band system with a range of 270 kilometers, and a cpaability to engage a single target at a time.

A TYPICAL SA-5 SITE

CIA Intelligence Memorandum 69-15, The Soviet SA-5 Deployment Program, provides us with the following descriptions of active S-200 site configurations:


A typical S-200 site will contain between two and five launch areas, each containing launch pads for six 5P72 launch rails. The radar area will contain a single 5N62 radar for each launch area present in the site. This permits each site to engage multiple targets, reducing the negative impact of the 5N62's single target engagement capability. The image below depicts a typical active S-200 site located in Libya. Relevant areas are annotated.


The following image depicts the Libyan site's radar area. Note the placement of the two 5N62 radars, and the location of the control bunker housing the site's command and control section.


The launch area is detailed below. Launch areas vary in arrangement from nation to nation, but for the most part display a spade shape as seen here. It is common for S-200 sites to feature revetments for the launch rails, and individual environmental shelters to store the 5P72 launch rails during periods of maintenance or inactivity. Each launch area is controlled by crews in a centrally located bunker. Note the cable connections visible between the control bunker and the launch rails.


As witnessed in the imagery provided above, S-200 sites are rather large and expansive. Due to the large footprint of an S-200 site and the plethora of associated structures, inactive S-200 sites are relatively easy to identify.

The following image depicts an inactive S-200 site in Belarus:


EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS

The following images depict the most common S-200 site layouts. Most S-200 sites feature either two or three launch areas.

The following image depicts an active S-200 site in Kazakhstan displaying the two launch site configuration. While there are only two missiles visible on launch rails in the eastern launch position, there are two 5N62 radars visible, implying that the entire site is still active.


The following image depicts an active S-200 site in the Ukraine displaying the three launch site configuration. Only the southernmost launch area appears to be active, as the launch rails appear to have been removed from the other two sites.


Due to the expansive nature of an S-200 complex, S-200 sites can be identified in low-resolution imagery. While this does not provide any indication as to the site's operational status, it does provide the analyst with a location to file away for future observation should coverages be updated.

The following image depicts a Russian S-200 site captured in low-resolution imagery. This is one of two identified S-200 sites containing five launch areas.


NON-STANDARD SA-5 SITES

North Korea and Iran have adopted unusual deployment strategies for their S-200 batteries for various reasons.

North Korean S-200 batteries are deployed in a fashion designed to increase their survivability. As seen previously in examining a North Korean S-125 site, the DPRK chooses to use a series of bunkers to protect the system components. There are individual hardened shelters visible for each 5P72 launch rail, as well as subsurface housings to protect the 5N62 radars when not in use. Two other subsurface bunkers are also visible, implying that the site may contain a total of four 5N62 radars.

The following annotated image depicts North Korea's western S-200 site:


Iranian S-200 batteries, in comparison to other users, are very unusual in their deployment. Iran deploys a single 5N62 radar with two 5P72 launch rails at each location. This is highly irregular, perhaps implying that Iran did not purchase a full complement of missiles or launch rails. It is also possible that, given the capability of the S-200 system, Iran views them as probable targets in any sort of military conflict and as such does not see the need to deploy a significant number of components at each site, choosing instead to hold them in reserve. As the 5N62 can only engage a single target at a time anyway, this would seem to be a sensible strategy.

The following annotated image depicts an Iranian S-200 site located on the grounds of Hamadan AB:


SYSTEM COVERAGE

The S-200 SAM system possesses a very long range, which will only be surpassed once the 400-kilometer S-400 enters full operational service. To that end, the S-200 is capable of providing air defense over large amounts of territory. It should be noted that the long-range S-200 is commonly featured as part of an integrated network which incorporates shorter-range systems such as the S-75, which also helps to cover close-in targets who close within the rather long minimum range of the system. As the S-200 is not intended to counter close-in targets, this should not be considered a design flaw of the system.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-200 sites in Iran:


CIA IM 69-15 provides the following conceptual look at theorized S-200 deployment in the former USSR, based on identified active and in-construction S-200 sites as of 15 June 1969:


CURRENT USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-200 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.

Iran (6/0), Kazakhstan (2/2), Libya (4/2), North Korea (1/0), Syria (2/1), Turkmenistan (1/0), Ukraine (1/2)

FORMER USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-200 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.

Belarus (1), Czech Republic (2), Estonia (1), Germany (4), Hungary (1), Latvia (1), Lithuania (1), Russia (19)

POSSIBLE USERS

The nations listed below possess identified S-200 site locations in low-resolution imagery. As the resolution precludes identification of the sites as active or inactive, they are listed here as possible users. Some of the nations are already mentioned above, indicating that they possess active or inactive S-200 sites in various resolutions. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of low-resolution sites currently visible in Google Earth.

Azerbaijan (2), Belarus (3), Bulgaria (1), Estonia (3), Latvia (4), Libya (2), Lithuania (1), Moldova (1), North Korea (1), Poland (1), Russia (48), Syria (3), Ukraine (10)

SOURCES

-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above

The S-125 SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The S-125 (SA-3 GOA) SAM system was developed to provide additional low-altitude coverage in areas already defended by S-25 and S-75 SAM systems. S-125 SAM systems were also deployed in areas identified by the Soviet Military as potential enemy low-altitude ingress routes en route to high-priority targets. Interestingly, the S-125 began life as the M-1 (SA-N-1 GOA) naval SAM system, and was chosen for land-based use early in development. Many S-125 SAM systems remain in operation to this day, and there are numerous odifications available. The most current modification is the Pechora-2M mobile variant.

THE SA-3

The S-125 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. Two missiles are employed, the 5V24 and the 5V27. Both weapons are command guided. The 5V24 missiles possess a 60 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have a range envelope of between 4 and 15 kilometers, with a reach of between 100 and 10,000 meters in altitude. The 5V27 missiles possess an 70 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have ranges between 4 and 25 kilometers with a reach of between 20 and 18,000 meters, depending on the specific variant. The 5V27 can be identified by the addition of two braking fins on the booster section. Upgraded missiles used in Pechora-2 and Pechora-2M systems have a maximum range of 38 kilometers. The I-band RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) radar handles target engagement functions, with a range of 110 kilometers. The RSN-125 has the capability to track 6 targets simultaneously, with the ability to engage a single target at a time.

A TYPICAL SA-3 SITE

A typical S-125 SAM site consists of three or four launch positions arranged in various patterns around a central radar area. Two rail 5P71 or four rail 5P73 launchers are employed. 5V24 missiles are 5.89 meters in length, and 5V27 missiles are 6.09 meters in length, although the difference may not be discernable in overhead imagery. Missile length is sometimes not an effective indicator to use when identifying an S-125 SAM site as the missile rails are often elevated. The launch rails measure approximately 8 meters in length. There is a visible counterbalance and hinge assembly that extends approximately 3.7 meters behind the missiles when they are fitted to the launch rails. This is a convenient feature for identifying an actual launch position as opposed to a missile reload vehicle, which mounts two missiles. The following image depicts a typical three-launcher S-125 site in Syria. Major components and features are labeled.


CIA NIE 11-3-62 provides us with the following description of a typical S-125 site:


EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS

The following images depict the four most common S-125 site layouts. The first S-125 site configuration to be examined consists of three launch positions arrayed in a triangular fashion around the RSN-125 radar. The following site in Syria is an example of such a configuration, as is the annotated example shown above:


Some S-125 sites feature three launchers but four prepared launch positions. The following S-125 site in Libya is an example:


Some S-125 sites feature four launch positions arranged in a parallelogram-shaped configuration around the RSN-125 radar. The S-125 site detailed in the CIA document shown above is an example of such a configuration, as is the following site in the Ukraine:


The final common S-125 site configuration features four launch rails positioned in a square pattern around the central RSN-125 radar. The following site in the Ukraine is an example of such a configuration:


NON-STANDARD SA-3 SITES

Some users have placed S-125 systems in sites formerly constructed for and occupied by S-75 SAM systems. This illustrates the need to not only identify a site's configuration, but also the components present as well. The following S-125 battery is located in a former S-75 SAM site in Egypt:


Some S-125-occupied S-75 sites found in Serbia and India are distinctive insofar as they lack revetments for the radar and launch rails. The following S-75 battery is located on a former S-75 site in Serbia:


Some Belarussian S-125 sites are located on prepared sites intended to house S-300P SAM systems. It is likely that these sites were constructed on the locations of former S-125 sites, and that the S-125 systems were retained pending availability of the S-300P systems. The following site is an example of such a Belarussian S-125 deployment:


Many North Korean SAM sites use unorthodox layouts to increase their survivability. The S-125 is no exception. The site depicted below illustrates North Korean survivability efforts, including placing the launchers and the RSN-125 radar inside of bunkers to protect them when they are not in use.


Finally, some S-125 users deploy their systems in seemingly random manner dictated by either terrain constraints or potential threat ingress routes. There are numerous other iterations of the S-125 site; the important factor in identifying the site is to identify the system components. Fortunately, the launch rails themselves, either loaded or unloaded, are readily identifiable in high-resolution imagery.

The following S-125 site in Algeria is an example of a "random" site configuration, in this case dictated by the limited space available for the site as it is located in an urban area:


SYSTEM COVERAGE

Given the relatively short range of the S-125 SAM system, most nations commonly employ them as short-range systems complementing longer-range systems such as the S-75 that the system was originally designed to complement.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-125 sites (blue) and S-75 sites (red) around the metropolitan areas of northeastern Egypt:


Other nations, such as Eritrea, Peru, and Zambia, employ the S-125 as their primary air defense system, positioning their launchers around key areas. In these cases it is likely that interceptor aircraft would serve as the primary means of air defense, as the SAM network is too short-ranged and widespread to provide accurate coverage.

The following image depicts S-125 coverage in Eritrea:



CURRENT USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.

Algeria (4/0), Angola (7/0), Armenia (2/1), Azerbaijan (4/0), Belarus (4/0), Bulgaria (4/0), Cuba (4/0), Egypt (43/11), Eritrea (3/1), Ethiopia (4/1), Georgia (1/1), India (23/9), Kazakhstan (1/0), Kyrgyzstan (2/0), Libya (10/2), Mozambique (3/0), North Korea (1/0), Peru (7/8), Poland (4/6), Serbia and Montenegro (3/2), Syria (26/4), Tajikistan (2/0), Turkmenistan (3/0), Ukraine (2/2), Uzbekistan (3/0), Vietnam (7/3), Yemen (1/0), Zambia (2/0)

FORMER USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.

Czech Republic (8), Hungary (8), Iraq (14), Romania (1), Slovakia (4)

SOURCES

-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Fakel's Missiles, by Vladimir Korovin
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above

-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate

The S-75 SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The S-75 (SA-2 GUIDLEINE) SAM system was developed in the USSR to provide a semi-mobile, widely deployable SAM system to complement the S-25 system in place around Moscow. Deploying the S-25 nationwide would have proved to be cost-prohibitive, so a smaller, more compact, and therefore cheaper SAM system was needed for air defense across the USSR and the Warsaw Pact member states. The S-75 remains in widespread use to this day, a testament to the robust design and capability of this Cold-War era SAM system. Chinese-produced derivatives share the same deployment layouts, a testament to their S-75 heritage, and are designated HQ-2.

THE SA-2

The S-75 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. The command-guided V-750 missiles have a 195 kg HE fragmentation warhead. Ranges vary from variant to variant, with a maximum of between 30 and 67 kilometers. Minimum ranges are as little as 6 kilometers. Altitudes range from a minimum of as little as 100 meters to a maximum of 30,000 meters, depending on the variant. Target engagement functions are handled by the RSN-75 (FAN SONG) radar set, an E or G band system with a range of up to 145 kilometers, depending on the specific model, and a cpaability to engage a single target at a time.

In an interesting footnote, the initial designator for the RSN-75 radar in the West was FRUIT SET, as evidenced by declassified CIA documentation from 1961 (NIE 11-5-6, available online at the CIA's FOIA website). No reason has yet been discerned for the change to FAN SONG.

A TYPICAL SA-2 SITE

S-75 SAM sites are relatively easy to identify on high-resolution imagery. S-75 components are typically arranged in a circular pattern. The RSN-75 engagement radar is positioned in the center of the site, typically atop a large service and command bunker, and there are six launch rails for the V-750 missiles positioned in a circular pattern facing outward around the radar position. The V-750 missiles are between 10.6 and 11.2 meters in length, depending on the variant. The launch rails measure between 10 and 10.5 meters in length in overhead imagery, depending on the resolution. S-75 sites tend to have a diameter of approximately 0.2 kilometers, although diameters of 0.16 and 0.23 kilometers have also been noted. Deployment in crowded urban areas or in some terrain can necessitate a closer or wider spacing of the site components. The V-750 launch rails are housed in circular revetments between 20 and 25 meters across, with HQ-2 sites having revetments up to 30 meters across.

The following image depicts a typical S-75 site in Yemen. Major components are labeled, including a TET used to transport missile reloads from the storage area to the launch rails.


The common practice of placing the launch rails in sturdy revetments enables inactive S-75 sites to still be identifiable, even though they may have been unused for quite some time.

The following image depicts an inactive, overgrown S-75 site in Germany:


EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS

The following images depict the most common S-75/HQ-2 site layouts.

The S-75 site depicted below is a Bulgarian site displaying the classic circular layout:


Some S-75 sites use a compressed layout, positioning the launch revetments far closer to the RSN-75 radar position than is normal. This is commonly seen in Egyptian S-75 sites, such as the one seen below:


Some S-75 or HQ-2 sites use a semi-circle layout, as depicted by the HQ-2 site near Shanghai seen below:


Not all S-75 or HQ-2 sites feature a radar bunker or even revetments. In this case the site must be identified by the number of launchers, the size of the missiles, and any identifiable support equipment. The site depicted below is such an example, found in Libya. Note that sand berms have been constructed around some of the components, but these are a far cry from the sturdy revetments found at prepared site locations.


NON-STANDARD SA-2 SITES

S-75 and HQ-2 users have developed some unorthodox site layouts for a variety of reasons. Regardless of the layout, two elements will always be present at an S-75 or HQ-2 launch site: the engagement radar, and the missile launch rails themselves. The most common unorthodox site layouts will be discussed here.

Vietnam has created an unorthodox site layout for its S-75 batteries. The revised layout consists of a single RSN-75 engagement radar surrounded by four, rather than six, launch rails, arranged in various patterns. The reasoning behind the revised layout is unclear, but there are a few logical reasons which may be behind the unusual deployment. First, Vietnam may simply be taking launchers and missiles out of service to save maintenance and upkeep costs. Given that the RSN-75 can only prosecute one engagement at a time, reducing the number of launchers at a given site may be strategically acceptable. Secondly, Vietnam may be limiting the number of in-service missiles to reduce the wear and tear on important defensive assets, enabling more missiles to be kept in reserve storage for wartime use. Thirdly, as the revised sites do not maintain the 360-degree layout with respect to the launch rails, reducing the number of rails at certain sites may be indicative of Vietnam's strategic thinking insofar as potential threat ingress routes are concerned. All of Vietnam's S-75 sites feature this layout save one, but even that site is only configured with four launch rails.

The following image depicts a Vietnamese S-75 site near Nha Trang AB using the aforementioned unorthodox equipment configuration:


The Chinese military has been forced to employ an unorthodox HQ-2 site layout due to force modernization issues. A number of HQ-2 sites are apparently being converted to S-300P or HQ-9 sites. In order to mitigate the potential loss of capability while a site is being modernized, the HQ-2 battery is simply relocated off-site to a nearby area.

The following image depicts a Chinese HQ-2 site being modernized to field the S-300P or HQ-9 strategic SAM system. Note the HQ-2 battery which has been repositioned to the northwest of the site being refurbished. In this case, the battery is kept at half-strength.


Once site modernization is complete, some Chinese S-300P or HQ-9 sites appear to retain the HQ-2 battery, which has been relocated back onto the "new" site. This ensures that local air defenses will not be degraded while S-300P or HQ-9 components are procured or produced in sufficient numbers to take up residence at the relevant site or sites.

The following image depicts a recently modernized SAM site configured for the S-300P or HQ-9 system, clearly illustrating the presence of an HQ-2 battery:


SYSTEM COVERAGE

While the S-75 does not possess the sheer range of more modern strategic SAM systems such as the S-200 or the S-300P series, it is still capable of fulfilling a prominent role in the air defense network of a given nation.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-75 sites in Syria:


CURRENT USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.

Albania (2/0), Angola (2/1), Azerbaijan (1/1), Bulgaria (3/0), China (35/7, HQ-2), Cuba (2/0), Egypt (37/100), Ethiopia (6/1), Iran (3/9, HQ-2), Kazakhstan (3/6), Kyrgyzstan (3/0), Libya (8/4), North Korea (15/5), Pakistan (1/0, HQ-2), Syria (24/18), Turkmenistan (2/15), Uzbekistan (1/0), Vietnam (9/1), Yemen (11/1)

FORMER USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-75 or HQ-2 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.

Belarus (1), Czech Republic (1), Estonia (1), Germany (6), Hungary (4), India (2), Iraq (17), Latvia (1), Lithuania (2), Mozambique (1), Poland (9), Romania (3), Russia (9), Slovakia (2), Somalia (2), Ukraine (6)

SOURCES

-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate
-For more information on Pakistan's air defense situation, reference the following article at this site: Modernizing Pakistani Air Defenses

The S-25 SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

Locating strategic SAM sites in Google Earth imagery is a time-consuming process. Each panel of high-resolution imagery must be scrutinized and examined in order to locate and identify various site configurations and missile systems. In order to ensure success, the analyst must first know what to look for. This is the first article in a multi-part series which will detail the layout and key features of various identifiable strategic SAM sites found worldwide. Armed with this knowledge, the analyst will be able to positively identify such facilities with greater ease and accuracy.

THE SA-1

The first operational strategic SAM system in the world was the Russian S-25 (SA-1 GUILD). The S-25 was a rail-launched system emplaced at fixed launch sites. The command-guided V-300 missile had a maximum range of 45 kilometers, and a maximum reach of between 4,000 and 14,000 meters in altitude. A 250kg HE warhead was fitted. The E/F band R-113 (GAGE) radar provided target acquisition to a range of 300 kilometers. The E/F band B-200 (YO YO) radar performed target engagement functions, with a maximum range of 150 kilometers and the ability to track between 24 and 30 targets per radar. Each B-200 radar could prosecute one engagement at a time.

SA-1 DEPLOYMENT

The S-25 system was conceived to provide air defense of the skies over Moscow. The system was intended to provide defense against an incoming bomber force of 1,000 aircraft. S-25 sites were located in two rings around Moscow, with radii 45 and 80 kilometers from the center of the city.

The image below depicts the locations of the 34 outer ring sites and the 22 inner ring sites:


Initial CIA projections, shown in the image below taken from the declassified NIE 11-5-57, were not that far from the mark:


A TYPICAL SA-1 SITE

CIA NIE 11-5-57 provides us with the following description of an active S-25 site:


The overhead image below depicts a typical S-25 site as it exists today, with the relevant areas and structures annotated:


This site is a rarity insofar as it has remained mostly intact, allowing the site layout to be studied using present-day imagery. The S-25 sites all followed the same standard layout seen above. The radar position, seen below, was located approximately 1.5 kilometers behind the launch area. Two B-200 radars were positioned in the forward area of the bunker, which housed the command and control section and the crews who controlled the site.


The launch area, seen below, contained the individual launch positions. Each launch area contained three V-300 fixed launch assemblies. Each S-25 site contained a number of launch areas. The interlocking nature of the launch areas gave the S-25 sites their distinctive rectangular herringbone appearance.


Adjacent facilities, as seen in the following image, included housing areas for assigned personnel, and support facilities for maintaining the site itself:


All of the site areas were connected using concrete roads. As these roads still exist carving their tell-tale herringbone path through the forested areas outside Moscow, former S-25 sites are relatively easy to locate and identify.

The expansive nature of the S-25 sites also allows them to be easily identified using low-resolution imagery, as evidenced by the image below:


CURRENT STATUS

As the S-25 has since been replaced by different variants of the S-300P family, there are no active sites located in Russia. The sites themselves do still exist for the most part, and many have been reused for other purposes.

The S-25 site seen below has been reused as a residential area, a relatively simple proposition thanks to the aforementioned interconnecing network of concrete roads found throughout the site:


Alternatively, many S-25 sites have been reused by the Russian defense establishment. Quite a few sites, including the site shown above, feature active S-300P SAM batteries. Other sites have formed the basis of the sites for the exoatmospheric component of Moscow's ABM network over the years. For more information and descriptions of these facilities, reference the relevant article found at this site.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery is provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above
-Jane's Land Based Air Defence provided technical specifications

Russia's Typhoon SSBN Fleet

INTRODUCTION

It is a rarity in Google Earth when every example of a weapon system is visible. One example is the four Kirov-class nuclear powered missile crusiers. Another is the six examples of the Project 941 Akula-class ("Shark", more commonly known as Typhoon to the West) strategic missile submarine (SSBN).

The Typhoon is a relatively easy submarine to identify. It is the largest submarine in the world, with a length of 170 meters and a beam of 23 meters. Locating the Typhoons was a relatively easy proposition once all of the required high-resolution imagery was made available, as they have been mostly inactive for some time due to the prohibitive operating costs associated with the type.

NERPICH'YA GUBA

Operational Typhoon SSBNs were based in Zapadnaya Litsa on the Kola Peninsula, in the port facility of Nerpich'ya Guba. Current imagery depicts three Typhoon SSBNs still in port, although they are no longer believed to be operational. These submarines are TK-12, TK-13, and TK-20.


SEVERODVINSK

The remaining three Typhoons are currently visible at the Russian naval facility at Severodvinsk, near Arkhangelsk. Severodvinsk handles overhaul and refit for the Russian Northern Fleet. SSBNs are produced in the huge Sevmash assembly halls located at Severodvinsk, and some export work is also conducted at the port facility. Interestingly, the refitting of the Admiral Gorshkov for the Indian Navy can be witnessed in current imagery.


Of the three Typhoons visible at Severodvinsk, one is currently being dismantled (TK-202, which began to be dismantled in 2004), and one is seen pierside near the Admiral Gorshkov (likely TK-208 Dmitri Donskoi, the lead vessel of the class).


The third Typhoon at Severodvinsk, likely TK-17, is seen at a weapons loading dock. It cannot be determined if the missiles visible pierside are being loaded or unloaded. The presence of multiple missiles, however, makes the identification of this vessel as TK-17 seem most plausible. TK-208 is still active, conducting flight tests of the new Bulava SLBM. Only one Bulava has ever been fired during a test launch, so the presence of multiple missiles would seem to rule this vessel out as being TK-208. The missile canisters are 19 meters in length and 3.2 meters in diameter, and would easily fit the Typhoon's D-19 (SS-N-20 SEAHAWK) SLBMs. It has been reported that TK-17 was stated for dismantlement and was no longer fitted with SLBMs as of 2005. In this case, it is logical to assume that the missile canisters visible contain D-19 SLBMs that have recently been unloaded.


SOURCES

Imagery provided by Google Earth.
Globalsecurity.org and Pavel Podvig's blog and text Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces were consulted in writing this article.

IMINT & Google Earth

One of the most fascinating applications available on the internet is Google Earth, an open-source satellite imagery browser allowing the user to navigate to any point in the globe and view satellite or overhead imagery of that location. Many kinds of analysis can be performed using Google Earth, but unfortunately the program needs a little work before any significant military analysis can be conducted.

There are three main issues with using Google Earth as an analysis tool for military intelligence information: resolution, timeliness, and coverage.

The first issue is one of resolution. There are varying levels of resolution to be found in Google Earth. Most of the lower resolution areas have a resolution of 15 meters. SPOT imagery has been incorporated in some areas, such as France, bringing the resolution down to the 2.5 meter mark. This is still not sufficient for any sort of analysis. For detailed analysis, resolution of at least 1 meter is necessary in order to accurately identify military equipment. Digital Globe imagery provides 0.7 meter resolution in many areas, and the highest resolution available is 1 inch, although this is only found in select areas. Some facilities such as Russian BMEW radars or SA-5 GAMMON sites can be discerned in the 15 meter imagery, but anything on a smaller scale will go unnoticed. The reason resolution is critical is because smaller objects such as aircraft and SAM systems must be able to be identified. Apart from general layout, one of the easiest ways to do this is to simply measure the object. This is how one can tell the difference between an S-300PM and an S-300PM-1, for example. The S-300PM TELs measure in at approximately 43 feet, where the S-300PM-1 TELs are roughly 4 feet longer. Without decent enough resolution, it is nearly impossible to get an accurate measurement; shadowing, adjacent objects, and other errata cannot be adequately discerned and discounted.

The second issue is timeliness. Effective analysis of a military facility requires a comparitive analysis over a period of time to discern deployment patterns, ORBAT changes, and gather an accurate estimate of equipment on strength. The best illustration of this is an analysis of the naval ORBAT at a given port facility. At the time the image was taken, any number of vessels may be out of port and therefore not depicted. Google does sometimes update the coverage of various areas, but more often they are likely to update areas not previously visible in high-resolution. This presents an analyst with a problem, as he or she will not be able to perform comparitive analysis. Also, if the imagery visible is more than a few months old, wholesale changes in the facility's ORBAT may have occurred. For a while, Langley AFB only depicted F-15C Eagles on the flightline, when it was known that the F-22A Raptor was on-station in substantial numbers. Furthermore, current imagery depicts a barren flightline, the image being taken when the associated units were off-station while runway maintenance was being accomplished. This work was finished months ago, yet the imagery does not depict any operational aircraft on-station. All of this can cause an analyst to misrepresent a facility's ORBAT.

The final issue is coverage itself. Google Earth suffers from a lack of high-resolution data in many areas. In some areas, such as around Moscow, high-resolution coverage is relatively spotty in places, making analysis of known facilities such as Zhukovskiy flight test center impossible. If there is not adequate high-resolution coverage of an area of interest, a complete analysis of that area is impossible. To cite an example, one must only look near Engels AB in Russia. There is an S-300P SAM garrison nearby, but an analysis of the air defense picture is not possible as the lack of sufficient high-resolution data has so far precluded the location of any active or even inactive S-300P SAM sites. They are most definitely in the area, as evidenced by the presence of the garrison, but they are not visible in the available imagery. Simply assuming that they are located within the boundaries of nearby low-resolution areas is not sufficient; a few tens of kilometers of difference in site placement can result in a perceived gap existing in the air defense network where there may be no gap at all.

It should be stated that none of these constraints are meant to be construed as negative aspects of the program itself. They merely illustrate the limited usefulness of the software and the associated geospatial data in military analysis. This is not to say that military analysis cannot or should not be conducted at all, far from it. But it must be understood that the accuracy and scope of any such analysis will be limited by the constraints imposed by the program itself.

Modernizing Pakistani Air Defenses

So I sat down this afternoon and decided to wrap my head around the whole Pakistani air defense issue in light of the FC-1 purchase.

The issue as I see it is that the Pakistani Air Forces (and I am including their SAM network as part of the air forces, I don't think they all report to the PAF but it makes it simpler for the sake of talking about the overall air defense picture) currently lack a robust air defense capability.

Now, we're not talking about pilot skill, PAF vs. IAF inventories, or anything of that nature here. What I mean by that statement is that the current PAF lacks a serious long-range air defense network. Pakistan does possess a number of EW radar systems from various sources, and their EW picture is, for the most part, adequate. There is a concern that the radar picture could be muddled in some areas due to the uneven terrain found throughout the nation, but this can easily be rectified by employing an AEW&C aircraft, such as the Saab platform currently being purchased for the PAF. Personally, I would've preferred a larger platform with the ability to remain on station longer, perhaps one of the new Chinese Y-8 models, but the Saab platform is certainly not going to fall short in the radar performance category, so it should still be perfectly suitable for the needs of the PAF.

The real problem currently lies in the business end of the IADS network, the shooters. Let's examine the air picture first.

The PAF currently has to rely on relatively short-legged, older technology aircraft for the most part (the F-16A does enjoy a bit of a range benefit over the F-7s), and they lack a BVR weapon. That means that any intruder with a BVR weapon will put the PAF interceptor pilot at a disadvantage. This is currently being rectified through the purchase and co-production of the FC-1, which will employ the Chinese SD-10 BVR AAM. An upgrade for the PAF F-16 fleet is also being sought, as well as at least 18 new Block 50/52 jets, complete with AIM-120 BVR AAM capability. So, the airborne intercept portion of the equation is being addressed.

The real problem lies with the ground-based SAM network. Pakistan currently relies on the Chinese HQ-2 for strategic air defense purposes. The problem is that there only appears to be one active HQ-2 site near Islamabad, located at 33°32'40.80"N 73°16'04.44"E. There have been claims of a second HQ-2 unit near Karachi, but there is currently no evidence suggesting that this unit is still active, as the site is not visible in overhead imagery. Given the fact that Karachi is not the capital, the equipment could be being held in storage or active reserve for deployment if needed, but for the sake of argument we will proceed with the assumption that only the northern site is active, as it is the only site that can be verified at this time.

Here is an image of the active HQ-2 site near Islamabad:



The next image depicts the maximum range of the HQ-2, 35 kilometers. 35 kilometers is the range of the farthest-reaching HQ-2 variant, I am operating on the assumption that PAF missiles may have been upgraded or replaced over their service lives.



Take note that the mountanous terrain to the east and southeast will affect radar performance and the system's effectiveness will be hampered to some degree in those areas, particularly at low altitudes.

The rest of the Pakistani SAM inventory consists of short-range tactical SAM systems best suited for a point defense or ground unit support role. Clearly, the SAM side of the Pakistani IADS needs to be addressed. Pakistan has shown interest in acquiring advanced Chinese-made SAM systems, including the FT-2000, which is a rather interesting passive homing weapon. Modern Chinese SAM systems should be just as effective as some of their Russian counterparts, as China has been importing some of the best SAM systems in the world from the Russians for years now and has likely taken the opportunity, as they are so often wont to do, to check things out and figure out just what makes them tick. S-300P technology no doubt aided in the development of the very similar HQ-9 strategic SAM system.

Before one sets about redesigning the Pakistani strategic SAM network, one must first consider the goals of the IADS. The goal of the Pakistani IADS should not be to turn Pakistan into a wholly denied parcel of airspace; that would require far too many SAM systems to effectively pull off. Rather, a strategic SAM network should be positioned to protect key infrastructure elements and the government, as well as key military facilities.

In order to defend these key sites, they must be identified. For the sake of this discussion, here is a preliminary list:

-Islamabad
-Khusab reactor complex
-Hyderabad
-Karachi

This list is by no means all inclusive, and is meant simply to illustrate the next point. Additionally, mobile missile facilities have been discounted as they would likely disperse in the event of a large scale conflict.

Alright, primary facilities have been identified. The next step is to identify a potential SAM system for use. The ideal choice, given the nature of their relationship at the present time, would be for Pakistan to procure the 100 kilometer range HQ-9 system from China. As can be seen by the following image, the placement of four HQ-9 units at the aforementioned locations would represent a substantial increase in the Pakistani strategic air defense capability:



Any further strategic facilities or important locations could be defended by additional HQ-9 batteries, but two batteries at each site organized into two regiments, one north and one south, could provide the basis for a robust strategic SAM network.

That leaves the matter of point defense. While Pakistan may choose to procure a European system as they already have experience operating the short-range Crotale and RBS-70 systems, there is another option I would like to present.

Surface-launched AMRAAMs are being used by a few select nations as short/intermediate-range SAM systems. Pakistan has the opportunity here to develop a similar system in cooperation with the Chinese. The SD-10 could potentially form the basis of a very effective point defense system, as well as a system that could be placed covertly along potential threat aircraft ingress routes, particularly in the mountanous regions of the nation.

The SD-10 is an active radar weapon, ostensibly needing no off-board targeting sensors provided the target can be locked on by the seeker head prior to launch. The way to get around that limitation is to provide a passive detection system based on the FT-2000's EW kit. This would allow for hostile target identification to be performed, and a few sensors positioned at the right locations could provide triangulation so as to enable the system to generate accurate target track data. Target altitudes could be generated by measuring the strength of an identified emission, or perhaps by an accurate EO or IR system. Once a track and an altitude have been identified, the parameters for a launch have been established. An SD-10 could be fired and even updated mid-course using continued examination of the track and altitude data, before going active at point-blank range to allow for the maximum amount of suprise (mid-course signals could, of course, be detected by a sensitive RWR kit, but it'd have to know what it was to classify it as hostile).

The passive/active SD-10 system would be a cheap, effective option for short-range and point defense and would also be able to serve as a gap filler in areas where terrain precludes engagement by longer-range HQ-9s positioned in the area to defend their assigned locations. All Pakistan needs to do is take the initiative and embrace this concept, and with the induction of an HQ-9 class system the overall strategic air defense network will become much more effective.

Again, a network such as this is not intended to turn the entire nation into denied airspace. That's just not possible, or even economically feasible at any rate. But with a few key adjustments and acquisitions, Pakistan could greatly increase it's defensive capabilities insofar as intruding aircraft are concerned. A more robust SAM network would also free up more aircraft from point defense or CAP duties, allowing them to be retasked for other roles.