Chinese Military Modernization

INTRODUCTION

China has always been a nation of interesting people, outstanding Szechuan cuisine, and fascinating culture. China has a history of military prowess, from the brilliant strategist Sun Tzu to the modern million-man army. That being said, it was not until the very late stages of the 20th Century, however, that the Chinese military machine began to wander out from the dark and truly enter the modern world.

China's problem, since the end of the Second World War, has been one of technological inferiority. For most of the post-war period, Chinese military doctrine seemed to stress quantity over quality; our weapons are inferior, but the 10,000 soldiers we have holding them will be able to overrun your 2,500 modern fighting men, for example. Interestingly, there appeared to be something of a disconnect in this doctrine. Some modern weapons, like the nuclear bomb or the anti-ballistic missile, were developed and/or fielded. Others, like the modern fighter aircraft, were apparently ignored. Beginning with the end of the 20th Century, however, the Chinese military machine began a widespread modernization program designed to make the People's Liberation Army (PLA) a modern, effective fighting force. That effort continues to this day, and the effects can be witnessed through the examination of overhead imagery detailing certain key facilities and installations scattered throughout China.

The following overhead map of China depicts the locations of the items discussed in this article:


AIRPOWER

Airpower is one of the most important components of modern warfare. For the longest time, the Chinese PLAAF and PLANAF had to rely on imported and copied Soviet aircraft. One of the more common examples was the MiG-21 (FISHBED), remanufactured and redesigned over the years as the Chengdu J-7. During the 1980's the PLAAF and PLANAF could boast thousands of J-7s and other aircraft types on strength, but these aircraft all had some key flaws: they were short ranged, and they lacked any modern fire control systems coupled with BVR weapon systems.

China's first solution was to enter into an agreement with the United States under the PEACE PEARL program to modernize a number of Shenyang J-8II heavy interceptors with APG-66 radars and associated weapons. Another facet of this international collaboration would have been the production of the Super-7, a modernized J-7 design featuring a reprofiled nose, side-mounted intakes, and modern systems. Unfortunately, the activities of the Chinese government surrounding the Tianamen Square incident effectively ended any Sino-American collaboration efforts. The Super-7 has recently re-emerged as the FC-1, a cheap, lightweight replacement for the J-7, primarily useful for third-world countries where more modern fighter aircraft are cost-prohibitive or not required.

The next solution to the modern airpower issue was to import Russian-made Sukhoi Su-27 (FLANKER) fighter jets. The Su-27 was arguably the penultimate example of Russian fighter design, coupling a capable weapon system with a sophisticated, maneuverable aircraft design capable of physically outperforming the latest Western designs in terms of sheer maneuverability. Eventually China would import large numbers of Su-27SKs as well as Su-30MKK and Su-30MK2 multi-role, two-seat variants. Unfortunately, the import of Russian-made fighter aircraft was not going to magically jump-start the Chinese aviation industry. While it is true that many of the Su-27s were license-built by Shenyang, who has subsequently modified the design as the J-11B, incorporating Chinese engines, avionics, and weapons, China still needed an indigenous solution.

The answer to China's modern fighter needs would be provided by the J-7's manufacturer, in the form of the Chengdu J-10. The J-10 is a modern fighter aircraft capable of employing the PL-12, a Chinese AMRAAM equivalent, and performing a variety of tasks thanks to a multi-role avionics suite. The J-10 features a modern glass cockpit and a canard-delta layout, currently favored by European fighter manufacturers. The J-10 is currently being inducted into operational service in increasing numbers, and will likely form the backbone of the PLAAF for years to come.

The following image depicts a number of J-10s on the ramp at the Chengdu flight test facility. These aircraft are likely either prototypes or preproduction aircraft serving in a flight test capacity.


Gucheng airbase was one of the first locations to receive operational J-10s, three of which can be seen in the image below:


An important part of any combat aircraft's test regimen is weapons integration. Weapons systems must be trialled to ensure that they function effectively, and individual armament types must be verified to ensure proper operation and integration with the carrier aircraft. In China, airborne weapons testing is done at Dingxin airbase, situated on the massive military testing range at Shuangchengzi.

The following image provides an overview of the Shuangchengzi test complex:


The following image provides an overview of Dingxin airbase:


One issue with current free imagery services like Google Earth is that imagery can be updated over time, and some rather interesting sights can be removed from view. The next three images are examples of some of the fascinating sights at Dingxin airbase which have disappeared due to a recent Google Earth imagery update and are no longer visible to the public. Let this be a lesson to the imagery analyst or casual observer: if you see something interesting, save a copy of the image, you don't know if it will be there the next time you look!

The following image depicts two J-10s on the ramp at Dingxin AB:


Visible here at Dingxin are examples of two of the PLAAF's current AEW&C projects, the KJ-2000 (based on the Il-76 airframe), and a Y-8 derivative referred to as the "Balance Beam" due to the shape and mounting of the radar array:


The following image would seem to depict some sort of official presentation underway at Dingxin AB. Various aircraft types, including the KJ-2000 and J-10, are visible.


NAVAL

While the modernization efforts in Chinese military aviation are substantial, the efforts underway in updating the PLAN's surface and submarine fleet are equally impressive. Until recently, Chinese naval vessels have lagged far behind those of the West in terms of weapons capability. The most serious deficiency was in the realm of air defense.

China's naval re-equipment and modernization began with the purchase of Sovremennyy-class DDGs from Russia. Fitted with 3M80 anti-ship missiles, the Sovremennyys also boasted the Shtil (SA-N-7 GADFLY) and Shtil-1 (SA-N-12 GRIZZLY) naval SAM systems, providing China's surface fleet with its first modern, ocean-going air defense capability, a capability critical for any nation wishing to possess a blue-water ocean-going naval force. More recent efforts have focused on producing indigenous classes of modern destroyers and frigates, complete with modern weapon systems to replace the outdated legacy systems found on older classes of Chinese-produced warships. One such example is the 052B DDG, which has been fitted with the Shtil-1 SAM system.

The most significant new ship classes, by far, are the 051C and 052C DDGs. The 052C was the first of the two classes to enter service and is fitted with an Aegis-type phased array radar system to control the HHQ-9 SAM system, a derivative of the land-based HQ-9. The 051C lacks the phased-array radar system of the 052C, but is fitted with a far more capable SAM system in the form of the imported Russian-made S-300FM (SA-N-20 GARGOYLE), controlled by a 30N6E1 (TOMB STONE) radar mounted on the rear of the vessel. Even when compared to the Shtil-armed Sovremennyys and 052B DDGs, the 051C and 052C represent a quantum leap in Chinese naval air defense.

The following image depicts a Type 051C DDG in Dalian shipyard:


The ultimate form of naval power is the aircraft carrier. While Chinese production of an indigenous aircraft carrier is only speculation at ths time, there is some evidence to suggest that at least one aircraft carrier may soon enter service with the PLAN. The ex-Soviet carrier Varyag was purchased from the Ukraine in 1998, ostensibly to be used as a floating casino. The vessel was purchased in a 70% completed state from the Nikolayev shipyard where the Varyag was under construction before work halted with the fall of Communism in the USSR. Interestingly, the vessel took up residence in the PLAN shipyard in Dalian once it was finally delivered to China in 2002, suggesting that a floating casino was not what the Varyag was destined to become.

The following image depicts the Varyag at some point after delivery to Dalian:


The evidence that Varyag will soon be inducted into service with the PLAN is circumstantial at best, but it is certainly interesting. In 2005, the Varyag was painted in "PLAN grey", and in 2006 the scaffolding surrounding the superstructure was removed, suggesting that work on restoring the vessel to operational capability was nearing completion. It should be noted that as of yet, no systems have been seen being fitted to the Varyag, such as air search radars or CIWS, and no carrier-based aircraft currently exist in the PLAN. However, China has recently contracted for around 50 Sukhoi Su-27K carrier-based aircraft, designed to operate off of the Varyag and his Russian classmate, the Admiral Kuznetsov (the term "his" is used in deference to the Varyag's Russian designers, as Russian naval vessels are referred to by their sailors in the masculine).

The following image depicts the Varyag after being repainted in overall "PLAN grey":


The Varyag is not the first former-Soviet aircraft carrier to take up residence in Chinese waters. Two former Kiev-class carriers (or more appropriately, aircraft-carrying cruisers, to refer to them in native Russian naval terminology) have been acquired to serve as displays in northern and southern China.

The following image depicts the Kiev as it is currently displayed at a military park in Tianjin:


The following image depicts the Minsk as it currently appears at the Minsk World public theme park near Shenzhen:


The above two examples do offer some evidence that the Varyag may not in fact enter service with the PLAN. Notice that they are displayed painted in standard Russian military colors. Were the Chinese to display Varyag in the colors of a warship, repainting the vessel in the available "PLAN grey" paint scheme would be plausible as the Varyag's original Russian paint job was in no condition to be put on public display when it was delivered in 2002. It could then be argued that the vessel was placed at the PLAN dockyard in Dalian for study and analysis while it was repaired and fitted out for commercial use. This does not, however, explain the Su-27K purchase, apart perhaps from the possibility that an Su-27K fleet would take time to be delivered, and if PLANAF Su-27Ks were destined for an indigenous vessel they could still be employed on the Russian-Ukrainian naval training facility at Saki in the Crimean for initial pilot carrier qualification.

It is obvious that only time holds the answers to the mystery of the Varyag.

There is one further example of an aircraft carrier to be found in China. Situated on the grounds of the Shanghai Military Academy 50 kilometers from the open sea, a 70-percent scale replica of what appears to be a US Nimitz-class CVN is located in a small lake. The purpose of the vessel is unclear, save perhaps to serve as a training aid of some sort. It may even perhaps represent a conceptual Chinese carrier design, given the fact that the flight decks are festooned with Chinese combat aircraft, albeit older, legacy types not likely to ever see carrier-based service with China or any other air arm.

The following image depicts the aircraft carrier replica in Shanghai:


While much attention has been given to the modernization of China's surface fleet due in no small part to the speculation over the Varyag's true purpose, China has also been modernizing her submarine force as well. The newest and most modern SSN is the Type 093 Shang-class. Current Chinese nuclear submarine classes are constructed in the assembly halls of the Huludao shipyard northeast of Beijing.

The following image depicts a Type 093 SSN at Huludao:


STRATEGIC FORCES

China's strategic nuclear deterrent relies on the use of land-based and submarine-launched nuclear missiles. A number of Harbin H-6 (BADGER) bombers, copies of the Russian Tu-16, are also in service, but their age and expansive RCS precludes them from any serious nuclear warfighting apart from use as standoff cruise missile platforms. The primary Chinese ICBM currently in service is the DF-5 (CSS-4). The DF-5 is deployed in well-concealed silos around China. The DF-5 was initially trialled at the Shuangchengzi missile test facility, being pad-launched.

The following image depicts the SLV and ICBM launch pads at Shuangchengzi:


Modern road-mobile ICBMs like the DF-31 and DF-31A are trialled at the Wuzhai test center. Wuzhai also contains an ICBM silo used for test launches of the DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBM in a manner more akin to operational employment than a Shuangchengzi pad launch. The first silo launch of a DF-5 took place at Wuzhai on the 7th of January in 1979.

The following image is an overview of the Wuzhai test facility:


The following image depicts the northern launch facilities at Wuzhai, containing the DF-5 silo and a possible mobile ICBM launch pad:



The following image depicts the southern launch pad, a probable mobile ICBM launch facility:


The Wuzhai facility is also capable of launching pad-launched ICBMs and SLVs.

The following image depicts the Wuzhai fixed launch pad:


The naval component of the Chinese nuclear deterrent consists of two classes of SSBN. The first vessel, the Type 092 Xia, was China's first SSBN. It has been plagued by problems, however, and its JL-1 SLBM lacks the range to target the United States from Chinese-protected waters, making the Xia little more than a theater nuclear strike option. Perhaps due to these issues, only one Type 092 SSBN was ever completed.

The following image depicts the Xia in a drydock at the Jianggezhuang submarine base near Qingdao:


Experience with the Xia provided China with a valuable knowledge base in designing the replacement, the Type 094 Jin class. With the Jin class, the PLAN finally has a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent option. The new JL-2 SLBM allows the Type 094 SSBNs to range the United States while remaining safely in the protected waters of the Bo Hai Gulf.

The following image depicts a Jin-class SSBN at the Xiaopingdao submarine base near Dalian:


AIR DEFENSE

The final area of the Chinese military to see massive modernization in recent years is the strategic SAM network. Chinese strategic air defense had until recently relied upon the HQ-2 SAM system, an indigenous version of the Russian S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE). The HQ-2 suffers from relatively short range, lack of mobility, and relatively dated electronics, although some systems have been modified to cure the latter issue to a degree. The answer to China's modernization efforts is the HQ-9. The HQ-9 is a modern SAM system employing system components which appear to be based on those of the S-300PMU employed by the Chinese military.

The HQ-9 is currently undergoing trials at the Shuangchengzi SAM test facility, seen below:


The image below depicts the HQ-9 test pad at Shuangchengzi:


With all due respect to the Chinese SAM developers, imitation in the form of the HQ-9 may be the sincerest form of flattery, but Russian air defense systems are still the best in the world. As such, S-300P variants have been imported continuously over the last two decades, and components can be found around Beijing, Yutian, and Shanghai.

The following image depicts a key component to the S-300P SAM family, the 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW radar:


For more information on the 64N6 and the S-300P, reference the following two articles: LINK LINK The second link also features a section detailing current Chinese S-300P deployment strategies.

ODDITIES

The Chinese military is clearly well along the path to modernization into a world-class fighting force. There are a few choice oddities that can be found by browsing through imagery of China which may or may not have anything to do with the modernization efforts. They are, however, unusual, and certainly interesting, and as such will be detailed here.

The first oddities to be found in China are evidence of serious research into the WIG concept. The WIG concept was made famous by the Soviet military, who trialed various military WIGs on the Caspian Sea during the Cold War.

The following image depicts the 751G Swan WIG craft, located on the shores of the Dianshan Hu reservoir near Shanghai:


The following image depicts the XTW-4 WIG located on the grounds of the Qingdao seaplane facility, a military facility home to Harbin SH-5 amphibians, perhaps implying a military role for the XTW-4:


A further oddity can be found 45 kilometers northwest of the Chengdu flight test center. Here, a solitary Y-8 apparently resides in an open lot behind a small cluster of buildings. The aircraft is apparently mounted on some sort of catapult system, with a ramp at the end to aid in takeoff. The aircraft seems to be positioned for rapid escape, a one-way proposition as there is no way of landing the aircraft back at the facility. It is possible that the facility where the aircraft is located houses an entrance to an underground military facility. To necessitate a rapid escape system, there are only two logical purposes for such an underground facility. First, the theoretical facility may be associated with the storage or production of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. In the event of an incident, a rapid escape system for the staff and scientists would be a valuable asset. Secondly, the facility may be some sort of national military command and control post. In the event of attack, leadership from Beijing could use the facility as an alternate command post. An escape system would be valuable in the event of a potential counterstrike against the alternate facility.

The image below depicts the unusual Y-8 found near Chengdu:


SOURCES

Chinese Defence Today

-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Sary Shagan: Birthplace of the ABM

REMOVED PENDING PDF CONVERSION

The S-300P SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The S-300P SAM family is one of the most advanced and capable operational SAM systems in the world today. The S-300P SAM system was conceived to replace the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) and the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) as the primary long-range air defense system in the USSR. With the advent of lower-RCS targets like cruise missiles, legacy systems did not provide adequate capability to defend against attacks by such weapons. The S-300P began life as a overarching SAM system intended for use by both the Army and the air defense network. At an early stage, the project was split into two systems, the Army's S-300V (SA-12) and the S-300P.

THE S-300P

The S-300P is a long-range, mobile strategic SAM system. The system has been produced in numerous variants, and an in-depth look at the various system components and missiles employed by the system can be found here: LINK

Western designators for the S-300P variants will be provided here for clarity:

S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE)
S-300PS/PM (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
S-300PM-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE)
S-300PM-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE)

It should be noted that the S-300PM-1 was at one point designated the SA-10C GRUMBLE, before being redesignated due to the fact that a new engagement radar, the 30N6-1 (TOMB STONE) and a new missile, the 48N6, was employed. It should also be noted that the difference between the S-300PS and the S-300PM, apart from minor hardware differences and the introduction of a new missile for the S-300PM, was that the S-300PM introduced digital datalinks for connecting the TELs, radars, and command post in an effort to reduce system setup time. The S-300PT and S-300PS relied on physical cable connections between system components. The S-300PM and subsequent variants can still rely on cable connections, most often at prepared sites, to ensure a higher level of communications security.

Export variants are as follows:

S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE)
S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE)

A TYPICAL S-300P SITE

There are two common battery configurations employed by the S-300P SAM system. The first relies on a typically prepared site with a tower-mounted engagement radar. The second relies on either a prepared or unprepared site with a mobile engagement radar vehicle. The number of TELs present varies from user to user, location to location, and variant to variant, and these differences will be discussed in the Deployment Strategies sections of this article.

The following annotated image of an S-300PT site near Severodvinsk depicts a battery employing tower-mounted engagement and 76N6 radars:


The following annotated image of an S-300PMU site near Sevastopol depicts a standard site layout employing a mobile engagement radar and a tower-mounted 76N6:


Some sites employing a mobile engagement radar still retain the tower assembly for mounting the radar should the need arise. The following site south of Voronezh depicts a mobile engagement radar being employed, with the 40V6 mast assembly positioned nearby in a lowered position:


EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS

There are many different iterations of S-300P site configurations. Most of them differ in the number, shape, and positioning of prepared revetments used to protect the components. However, it should be stressed that the S-300P is a mobile SAM system, and as such can be deployed almost anywhere. That being said, there are a few common site layouts that have been identified, and these layouts will be detailed here.

One of the more common S-300P site configurations is a central tower-mounted engagement radar surrounded on two sides by parralel "slanted-E" shaped divided revetments for TELs or missile reload canisters. A tower-mounted 76N6 is positioned nearby. This site layout is often featured around Moscow on the grounds of former S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) SAM sites, but is also featured elsewhere as well, such as in Belarus.

The following annotated image depicts an S-300PM-1 site near Bortnevo, north of Moscow, employing the "slanted-E" revetment style:


Another common site configuration features four launch positions arranged around a central raised berm for a mobile engagement radar. The size and shape of the launch positions, as well as the presence of protective revetments for the TELs, varies from site to site and nation to nation, but the overall layout remains relatively uniform. The site near Sevastopol depicted above is an example of such a configuration. All identifiable Chinese S-300P sites employ a variation on this layout.

Given that the S-300P SAM system is a mobile system, it is also quite common to find batteries deployed on former legacy SAM sites. As seen previously, many S-25 sites around Moscow are now home to S-300P batteries. Slovakia's S-300PMU battery resides on the grounds of a former S-125 site, and there is a Ukrainian S-300PMU battery and garrison positioned on a former S-200 complex near Sevastopol, to cite a few examples.

The following image depicts an S-300PM battery deployed on the grounds of a former S-75 site near Roschino, north of St. Petersburg. The Roschino site is slightly unusual insofar as there are S-300P-style revetments to the southwest that are apparently unused.


Despite the presence of common site configurations, there are numerous random layouts. The numerous site configurations probably stem from the fact that the S-300P is a mobile system able to be located nearly anywhere. Some sites feature numerous revetments designed for two TELs apiece, some feature larger revetments for four or more TELs, and some feature no revetments at all.

The lack of consistency on a large scale in the configuration of S-300P sites belies the importance of being able to identify the system based on the visible components. The S-300PT is relatively easy to identify given the unique appearance of the 5P85-1 launchers. Differentiating between an S-300PM and an S-300PM-1 seems more difficult from the outset, but is in fact not all that hard. The 5P85S/D TELs measure around 43 feet in length, while the 5P85T TELs measure around 47 feet in length, based on visible imagery. As the S-300PS had a service life of 20 years and was introduced in 1982, and many of them were modified to S-300PM standard, any sites with 43 meter TELs can be identified relatively accurately as S-300PM sites. Of course, export systems would be the S-300PMU, and export sites featuring the 47-foot semi trailer TELs would be S-300PMU-1s.

RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES

Russian S-300P sites display a number of identifiable deployment strategies. S-300P SAM systems are employed in defense of key industrial and military areas, as well as large population centers.

S-300PM and S-300PM-1 sites around Moscow typically employ the "slanted-E" site configuration, and most of them are based on the grounds of former S-25 SAM sites. Moscow defense sites all employ tower mounted engagement radars in conjunction with tower-mounted 76N6 radars. This provides a robust low-altitude target detection envelope around the capital city. Eight to twelve TELs are typically present at each site, with at least six TELs at each site being loaded with missiles and positioned in a launch revetment.

S-300P sites located along the periphery of Russia's Far East Military District, particularly near Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, tend to feature mobile engagement radars and tower-mounted 76N6 radars. This is likely due to the fact that sites located along the periphery are typically positioned very near the water and therefore do not have substantial terrain for the engagement radar to contend with along potential threat ingress routes. A raised berm for the engagement radar is often more than sufficient to ensure the radar has a sufficient field of view with respect to any vegetation in the area. The single exception is the S-300PM site positioned to defend the Rybachiy SSBN base, featuring a tower-mounted engagement radar, likely due to the terrain constraints potentially interfering with the engagement radar being able to see out over the open ocean from where it is positioned. The Yelizovo and Petropavlovsk sites are positioned at a higher elevation than the Rybachiy site, providing them with a better field of view than the Rybachiy site.

S-300P sites on the Kola peninsula and around St. Petersburg feature tower-mounted engagement radars, likely due to the varied terrain in the areas where the SAM sites are positioned. Kola sites feature eight active TELs, with St. Petersburg sites featuring four active TELs, likely due to the greater strategic importance of the Kola peninsula and associated military facilities.

Interestingly, the Kaliningrad S-300P sites feature tower-mounted engagement radars at four sites and a mobile engagement radar at the fifth site. There are no major terrain constraints requiring use of the towers for the engagement radars. However, the Kaliningrad region is geographically separated from the rest of Russia, and is is possible that tower-mounted engagement radars are employed to provide an increased probability of low-altitude detection. Kaliningrad is also home to a Russian naval contingent, so perhaps the engagement radars are tower mounted at four of the sites to remove the potential of low-altitude clutter generated by the incoming and outgoing naval vessels. This doesn't seem to make complete sense, however, as the Baltiysk site nearest the harbor entrance features the mobile engagement radar.

The lack of S-300PM-1 batteries in areas identified as being of strategic importance, such as Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok and Kaliningrad, is likely due to the fact that the more sensitive systems are kept in areas where the presence of foreign ELINT assets is far less likely. There is, however, an S-300PM-1 battery deployed near Novorossiysk, The presence of an S-300PM-1 site in this area is likely due to the fact that it represents the sole identifiable active strategic SAM site in the area. It should also be noted that the S-300PM-1 systems are at most nearly a decade newer than the S-300PM systems. Ergo, it is likely that the areas considered to be the most strategically important were the first to receive the S-300PM-1. This would explain the high concentration around Moscow, and the presence on the Kola Peninsula. S-300PM-1s not being present on the Kamchatka Peninsula can be explained away by the fact that the Northern Fleet is the main combat arm of the Russian Navy. Petropavlovsk and Rybachiy also enjoy protection by a MiG-31 regiment, so the area is not necessarily at a loss.

CHINESE DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES

There are five visible active S-300P sites inside of China at this moment. China apaprently has chosen to employ the S-300P systems to defend key population centers, relying on older HQ-2 SAM systems to defend smaller population centers and military facilities. Four of China's S-300P locations are S-300PMU-1 sites, with the fifth being home to an S-300PMU battery. China employs a relatively standard deployment strategy throughout its S-300P batteries. Four TELs are deployed around a central, mobile engagement radar vehicle positioned on a raised berm. There are four separate pads for the TELs, with two TELs positioned on each of two launch pads. Tower-mounted engagement radars are not employed, allowing the core system components to be rapidly repositioned. A 36D6 or 64N6 EW radar is colocated with each SAM battery, with at least one 64N6 being present in each deployment area either in a colocated or nearby position to provide long-range target detection.

The one major inconsistency in Chinese S-300P deployments is the presence of a tower-mounted 76N6 radar. The 76N6 is present at the Yutian S-300PMU site, along with both Shanghai S-300PMU-1 sites. The reasoning behind this strategy likely relates to potential threat ingress routes. The Shanghai S-300PMU-1 sites are positioned near the coastline and as such would be able to monitor the airspace offshore, potentially detecting inbound strike aircraft and missiles from Kadena AB, Okinawa, and southern Japan. Given the low-altitude detection function of the 76N6, it is plausible that the Shanghai sites are positioned to detect inbound, low-altitude missiles launched from naval vessels or submarines.

Why, then, would there be a disparity in the 76N6 deployment to the north? Beijing is much farther inland, and is also protected by the defenses of the Bo Hai gulf. Any potential threat ingressing from the east or south would have to penetrate a dense air defense network which also included interceptor aircraft and other SAM systems. Beijing is also borered to the north and west by mountainous terrain, making low-altitude detection less important as any inbound target from those directions would pop up into the coverage of the 64N6 EW radar sites positioned in the area.

The inconsistency, therefore, is the presence of the 76N6 at the Yutian S-300PMU site. The 120 kilometer range of the 76N6 does not give it enough range to reach offshore from the Yutian site. It is possible that the 76N6 was only purchased for use with the S-300PMU and therefore would not be found at any of the S-300PMU-1 sites, whose 30N6E1 radar does offer improved performance over the 30N6E employed by the S-300PMU. The answer may also lie in the condition of the Yutian 76N6. It is visible in a lowered position, potentially being prepared for transport.

However, the Yutian 76N6 may simply be lowered for maintenance, or may be a new arrival. In the latter case, it may be indicative of future 76N6 deployments at the northern S-300P sites to augment the already robust radar coverage of the systems. The Yutian site may also be a training unit, allowing crews to train on all of the system components. Lastly, the Yutian 76N6 may be positioned to aid in the detection of cruise missiles fired towards Beijing-area targets from submerged submarines that manage to penetrate the Bo Hai gulf's waters.

DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES OF OTHER NATIONS

S-300P sites in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are primarily deployed to defend population centers, capitals, and in the case of the Ukraine military facilities. Most S-300PT facilities feature a standard twelve TEL complement, although there are some minor variations, as there are with the S-300PMU deployments.

Slovakia was not analyzed due to the presence of only a single identifiable S-300P battery. Likewise, Greece was not analyzed as S-300PMU-1 components are visible at two locations on Crete but they are not deployed.

S-300P SYSTEM COVERAGE

The S-300P is a very capable strategic SAM system, and as such can provide very robust air defense over a large region of airspace. By employing a number of batteries positioned to provide overlapping areas of coverage, a nation can effectively create what amounts to an area of denied airspace. While the S-300P does feature multiple-target engagement capability, it is also wise to overlap coverage areas in order to reduce the effect of saturation by actual or false targets.

The following image depicts S-300P coverage provided by identified, active sites positioned around Moscow. The blue rings represent the associated 64N6 EW radars. Large red rings represent S-300PM-1 batteries, with small red rings representing S-300PM batteries. The S-300PM-1 has a 150 kilometer range, the S-300PM a 90 kilometer range, and the 64N6 a 300 kilometer range. The overlapping coverage areas and the number of batteries in place have effectively transformed the skies over Moscow into the most heavily defended airspace in the world.


CURRENT USERS

Information regarding user nations and the types and numbers of identified sites can be found here: LINK

SOURCES

-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, a definitive text edited by Pavel Podvig
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Identifying Tactical SAM Systems

INTRODUCTION

Identifying tactical SAM systems in overhead imagery can be a very tedious, error-filled process. The problem stems from two key issues: resolution and component size. The resolution of the imagery being examined can often preclude accurate visual identification of a tactical SAM ssytem. Oftentimes these systems are deployed in the field, and as they do not use common site configurations which are easily identifiable, their components must be identified in order to accurately determine the system type. The size of the individual system components also presents a problem for the analyst. Tactical SAM system components are, for the most part, much smaller than their strategic counterparts. Also, when missiles are not uploaded, TELs and TELARs can resemble tanks or other common vehicles, making their identification very problematic unless the imagery is of sufficient quality to discern launch rails and other features of the system components.

This article will focus on four common Russian-made tactical SAM systems. Relevant system components will be detailed, with a focus on system recognition.

THE SA-4

The Antey 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF) tactical SAM system is one of the easier systems to positively identify. This is thanks in no small part to the very large missiles employed by the system. There are two key system components, the 2P24 TEL and the 1S32 (PAT HAND) engagement radar.

The following image depicts an active, field deployed 2K11 battery in Azerbaijan. Three 2P24 TELs can be identified. Take note of the readily identifiable 3M8 missiles, two of which are fitted to each TEL, identifying this as a 2K11 battery. The presence of the three TELs enables the central vehicle to be identified as a 1S32 radar. The 2P24 TELs do not contain on-board engagement radars, necesitating a 1S32 to be located nearby in order for the battery to prosecute an engagement. In this case, the 1S32 does not need to be identified using any major distinguishing features. This is a common theme in tactical SAM system analysis: identification by proximity.


The following image depicts another 2K11 facility in Azerbaijan. In this instance, a garrison area is visible. SAM garrisons are common locations to find tactical SAM equipment which is not field deployed. This site is unusual, however, insofar as there are three TELs deployed around the facility. In a further deviation from the norm, each 2P24 is located adjacent to a separate 1S32. Normal operations dictate the use of one 1S32 to control a handful of TELs; in this case, Azerbaijan has given the erstwhile SAM site the capability to engage a total of three simultaneous targets, as each 1S32 can only prosecute a single target at a time.


THE SA-6

The Tikhomirov Instrument Research Institute's 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) is one of the most widely used tactical SAM systems in the world. Identification of the 2K12 can be difficult due to the smaller, less easily identifiable 3M9 missiles. Important system components are the 2P25 TEL armed with three 3M9s, and the 1S91 (STRAIGHT FLUSH) radar.

The following image depicts an active, field deployed 2K12 battery in Syria. The 2K12 is a mobile, tactical SAM system, but many nations employ the system at prepared site locations as seen here. The 2P25 TELs are identifiable thanks to the visible loadout of 3M9 missiles. If the northernmost TEL is zoomed in on using Google Earth, separate missiles can even be discerned thanks to the resolution of the imagery. The 1S91 is identifiable thanks to a standard feature of the system: cable connections between the individual TELs and the engagement radar. In this case, a well-camoflaged 1S91 is clearly located atop the berm in the center of the site. The radar antenna can even be partially discerned through examination of the visible shadows.


The SA-11

Tikhomirov's follow on to the 2K12 is the 9K37 Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) SAM system employing the 9M38 missile. Key system components are the four-rail 9A310 TELAR fitted with the system's 9S35 (FIRE DOME) engagement radar, the 9A39 loader/launcher vehicle fitted with rails for eight missiles, and the 9S18M1 (SNOW DRIFT) EW radar.

THe following image depicts 9K37 components located in a garrison in Belarus. Take note of the three 9A310 TELARs. Note the visible fitting for the 9S35 radar at the front of the TELAR. This allows the 9A310 to be identified even if missiles are not fitted. Concurrently, it allows for differentiation between the 9A310 and the 9A39, as the 9A39 lacks the 9S35 installation.


The components depicted above are located at a large garrison in Baranovichi, Belarus. Other SAM system components are visible nearby, such as S-300P TELs. The following image depicts a dedicated 9K37 garrison located in Russia:


Many of the previous garrison's 9K37 components are field deployed nearby, possibly as part of a routine air defense exercise, and are visible in the image depicted below:


THE SA-12

Antey's S-300V (SA-12A/B GLADIATOR/GIANT)is the most advanced tactical SAM system in the world, conceived to provide Soviet and Russian army units and facilities with umbrella air defense against airborne and missile threats. Many of the system components are easily identifiable thanks to their unique configurations. Key system components are the 9A83 TELAR with four launch tubes for 9M83 anti-aircraft missiles, the 9A82 TELAR with two launch tubes for 9M82 ATBMs, the 9S32 (GRILL PAN) engagement radar, the 9S19 (HIGH SCREEN) sector scanning radar used for ATBM functions, and the 9S15 (BILL BOARD) EW radar.

The following image depicts an S-300V garrison in Birobidzhan, Russia. First, take note of the 9A83 TELAR in the probable system checkout area. Note the large mast antenna fitted to the front of the TELAR. This mast antenna, when elevated, allows the TELAR to be positively identified as a 9A83 and not a 9A82, regardless of whether missile canisters are fitted or not. The 9A82 by comparison features an antenna fairing that extends forward of the operator's cabin but does not elevate. 9S19 and 9S32 radars are also visible in their stowed for storage or transportation configuration. The radar arrays themselves are visible as white fixtures, with the 9S19 having a much larger, rectangular array compared to the 9S32's smaller, more circular array.


Another S-300V garrison is visible at Orenberg, Russia. Many system components can be seen field deployed to the north of the main garrison facility.


S-300V components are also visible at a possible 9K37 garrison in Smolensk, Russia:


Adjacent to the Birobidzhan S-300V garrison is what would appear to be a dedicated ATBM site. Note the dual missile canisters on the three visible TELARs, identifying them as 9A82 ATBM TELARs. The 9S32 engagement radar is located in close proximity to the TELARs, and is shown in deployed mode with the radar array raised for operation. An antenna mast is visible at the rear of the vehicle, identifying it as a 9S32 and not a 9S19. 9S15 and 9S19 radars round out the battery.


SOURCES

All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

The S-200 SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) SAM system is a long-range air defense system designed to defend large areas against all manner of airborne targets, including high-speed and high-altitude aircraft. The S-200 was originally conceived in part to defend against the expected overflights by Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft, although no such overflights ever took place due to a political restriction of manned overflights of the USSR in the wake of the Francis Gary Powers shootdown. The S-200 entered operational service in 1967 and has remained on combat duty in various nations worldwide ever since.

In a little known role, the S-200 was also employed as a national-level ABM system for a time. More information on this concept can be found here: LINK The same article also contains information regarding a prior use of the Western SA-5 designator.

THE SA-5

The S-200 SAM system is a long-range strategic SAM system. The SARH-guided two-stage 5V21 and 5V28 missiles have a 220 kg HE fragmentation warhead. The 5V21 ad 5V28 differ from previous Fakel-designed air defense missiles insofar as their first stage is not a jetissonable booster stage, but rather four strap-on rocket motors. The missiles themselves are very large, with lengths of 10.5 meters for the 5V21 and 10.8 meters for the 5V28. Ranges vary from variant to variant, with a maximum of between 150 and 300 kilometers. Minimum ranges are between 7 and 17 kilometers, depending on the variant. Minimum altitude for all variants is 300 meters, with a maximum altitude of between 20,000 and 40,000 meters, depending on the variant. Target engagement functions are handled by the 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) radar set, an H band system with a range of 270 kilometers, and a cpaability to engage a single target at a time.

A TYPICAL SA-5 SITE

CIA Intelligence Memorandum 69-15, The Soviet SA-5 Deployment Program, provides us with the following descriptions of active S-200 site configurations:


A typical S-200 site will contain between two and five launch areas, each containing launch pads for six 5P72 launch rails. The radar area will contain a single 5N62 radar for each launch area present in the site. This permits each site to engage multiple targets, reducing the negative impact of the 5N62's single target engagement capability. The image below depicts a typical active S-200 site located in Libya. Relevant areas are annotated.


The following image depicts the Libyan site's radar area. Note the placement of the two 5N62 radars, and the location of the control bunker housing the site's command and control section.


The launch area is detailed below. Launch areas vary in arrangement from nation to nation, but for the most part display a spade shape as seen here. It is common for S-200 sites to feature revetments for the launch rails, and individual environmental shelters to store the 5P72 launch rails during periods of maintenance or inactivity. Each launch area is controlled by crews in a centrally located bunker. Note the cable connections visible between the control bunker and the launch rails.


As witnessed in the imagery provided above, S-200 sites are rather large and expansive. Due to the large footprint of an S-200 site and the plethora of associated structures, inactive S-200 sites are relatively easy to identify.

The following image depicts an inactive S-200 site in Belarus:


EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS

The following images depict the most common S-200 site layouts. Most S-200 sites feature either two or three launch areas.

The following image depicts an active S-200 site in Kazakhstan displaying the two launch site configuration. While there are only two missiles visible on launch rails in the eastern launch position, there are two 5N62 radars visible, implying that the entire site is still active.


The following image depicts an active S-200 site in the Ukraine displaying the three launch site configuration. Only the southernmost launch area appears to be active, as the launch rails appear to have been removed from the other two sites.


Due to the expansive nature of an S-200 complex, S-200 sites can be identified in low-resolution imagery. While this does not provide any indication as to the site's operational status, it does provide the analyst with a location to file away for future observation should coverages be updated.

The following image depicts a Russian S-200 site captured in low-resolution imagery. This is one of two identified S-200 sites containing five launch areas.


NON-STANDARD SA-5 SITES

North Korea and Iran have adopted unusual deployment strategies for their S-200 batteries for various reasons.

North Korean S-200 batteries are deployed in a fashion designed to increase their survivability. As seen previously in examining a North Korean S-125 site, the DPRK chooses to use a series of bunkers to protect the system components. There are individual hardened shelters visible for each 5P72 launch rail, as well as subsurface housings to protect the 5N62 radars when not in use. Two other subsurface bunkers are also visible, implying that the site may contain a total of four 5N62 radars.

The following annotated image depicts North Korea's western S-200 site:


Iranian S-200 batteries, in comparison to other users, are very unusual in their deployment. Iran deploys a single 5N62 radar with two 5P72 launch rails at each location. This is highly irregular, perhaps implying that Iran did not purchase a full complement of missiles or launch rails. It is also possible that, given the capability of the S-200 system, Iran views them as probable targets in any sort of military conflict and as such does not see the need to deploy a significant number of components at each site, choosing instead to hold them in reserve. As the 5N62 can only engage a single target at a time anyway, this would seem to be a sensible strategy.

The following annotated image depicts an Iranian S-200 site located on the grounds of Hamadan AB:


SYSTEM COVERAGE

The S-200 SAM system possesses a very long range, which will only be surpassed once the 400-kilometer S-400 enters full operational service. To that end, the S-200 is capable of providing air defense over large amounts of territory. It should be noted that the long-range S-200 is commonly featured as part of an integrated network which incorporates shorter-range systems such as the S-75, which also helps to cover close-in targets who close within the rather long minimum range of the system. As the S-200 is not intended to counter close-in targets, this should not be considered a design flaw of the system.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-200 sites in Iran:


CIA IM 69-15 provides the following conceptual look at theorized S-200 deployment in the former USSR, based on identified active and in-construction S-200 sites as of 15 June 1969:


CURRENT USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-200 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.

Iran (6/0), Kazakhstan (2/2), Libya (4/2), North Korea (1/0), Syria (2/1), Turkmenistan (1/0), Ukraine (1/2)

FORMER USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-200 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.

Belarus (1), Czech Republic (2), Estonia (1), Germany (4), Hungary (1), Latvia (1), Lithuania (1), Russia (19)

POSSIBLE USERS

The nations listed below possess identified S-200 site locations in low-resolution imagery. As the resolution precludes identification of the sites as active or inactive, they are listed here as possible users. Some of the nations are already mentioned above, indicating that they possess active or inactive S-200 sites in various resolutions. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of low-resolution sites currently visible in Google Earth.

Azerbaijan (2), Belarus (3), Bulgaria (1), Estonia (3), Latvia (4), Libya (2), Lithuania (1), Moldova (1), North Korea (1), Poland (1), Russia (48), Syria (3), Ukraine (10)

SOURCES

-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above

The S-125 SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The S-125 (SA-3 GOA) SAM system was developed to provide additional low-altitude coverage in areas already defended by S-25 and S-75 SAM systems. S-125 SAM systems were also deployed in areas identified by the Soviet Military as potential enemy low-altitude ingress routes en route to high-priority targets. Interestingly, the S-125 began life as the M-1 (SA-N-1 GOA) naval SAM system, and was chosen for land-based use early in development. Many S-125 SAM systems remain in operation to this day, and there are numerous odifications available. The most current modification is the Pechora-2M mobile variant.

THE SA-3

The S-125 SAM system is a two-stage strategic SAM system. Two missiles are employed, the 5V24 and the 5V27. Both weapons are command guided. The 5V24 missiles possess a 60 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have a range envelope of between 4 and 15 kilometers, with a reach of between 100 and 10,000 meters in altitude. The 5V27 missiles possess an 70 kilogram HE fragmentation warhead, and have ranges between 4 and 25 kilometers with a reach of between 20 and 18,000 meters, depending on the specific variant. The 5V27 can be identified by the addition of two braking fins on the booster section. Upgraded missiles used in Pechora-2 and Pechora-2M systems have a maximum range of 38 kilometers. The I-band RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) radar handles target engagement functions, with a range of 110 kilometers. The RSN-125 has the capability to track 6 targets simultaneously, with the ability to engage a single target at a time.

A TYPICAL SA-3 SITE

A typical S-125 SAM site consists of three or four launch positions arranged in various patterns around a central radar area. Two rail 5P71 or four rail 5P73 launchers are employed. 5V24 missiles are 5.89 meters in length, and 5V27 missiles are 6.09 meters in length, although the difference may not be discernable in overhead imagery. Missile length is sometimes not an effective indicator to use when identifying an S-125 SAM site as the missile rails are often elevated. The launch rails measure approximately 8 meters in length. There is a visible counterbalance and hinge assembly that extends approximately 3.7 meters behind the missiles when they are fitted to the launch rails. This is a convenient feature for identifying an actual launch position as opposed to a missile reload vehicle, which mounts two missiles. The following image depicts a typical three-launcher S-125 site in Syria. Major components and features are labeled.


CIA NIE 11-3-62 provides us with the following description of a typical S-125 site:


EXAMPLES OF COMMON SITE CONFIGURATIONS

The following images depict the four most common S-125 site layouts. The first S-125 site configuration to be examined consists of three launch positions arrayed in a triangular fashion around the RSN-125 radar. The following site in Syria is an example of such a configuration, as is the annotated example shown above:


Some S-125 sites feature three launchers but four prepared launch positions. The following S-125 site in Libya is an example:


Some S-125 sites feature four launch positions arranged in a parallelogram-shaped configuration around the RSN-125 radar. The S-125 site detailed in the CIA document shown above is an example of such a configuration, as is the following site in the Ukraine:


The final common S-125 site configuration features four launch rails positioned in a square pattern around the central RSN-125 radar. The following site in the Ukraine is an example of such a configuration:


NON-STANDARD SA-3 SITES

Some users have placed S-125 systems in sites formerly constructed for and occupied by S-75 SAM systems. This illustrates the need to not only identify a site's configuration, but also the components present as well. The following S-125 battery is located in a former S-75 SAM site in Egypt:


Some S-125-occupied S-75 sites found in Serbia and India are distinctive insofar as they lack revetments for the radar and launch rails. The following S-75 battery is located on a former S-75 site in Serbia:


Some Belarussian S-125 sites are located on prepared sites intended to house S-300P SAM systems. It is likely that these sites were constructed on the locations of former S-125 sites, and that the S-125 systems were retained pending availability of the S-300P systems. The following site is an example of such a Belarussian S-125 deployment:


Many North Korean SAM sites use unorthodox layouts to increase their survivability. The S-125 is no exception. The site depicted below illustrates North Korean survivability efforts, including placing the launchers and the RSN-125 radar inside of bunkers to protect them when they are not in use.


Finally, some S-125 users deploy their systems in seemingly random manner dictated by either terrain constraints or potential threat ingress routes. There are numerous other iterations of the S-125 site; the important factor in identifying the site is to identify the system components. Fortunately, the launch rails themselves, either loaded or unloaded, are readily identifiable in high-resolution imagery.

The following S-125 site in Algeria is an example of a "random" site configuration, in this case dictated by the limited space available for the site as it is located in an urban area:


SYSTEM COVERAGE

Given the relatively short range of the S-125 SAM system, most nations commonly employ them as short-range systems complementing longer-range systems such as the S-75 that the system was originally designed to complement.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by identified active S-125 sites (blue) and S-75 sites (red) around the metropolitan areas of northeastern Egypt:


Other nations, such as Eritrea, Peru, and Zambia, employ the S-125 as their primary air defense system, positioning their launchers around key areas. In these cases it is likely that interceptor aircraft would serve as the primary means of air defense, as the SAM network is too short-ranged and widespread to provide accurate coverage.

The following image depicts S-125 coverage in Eritrea:



CURRENT USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as being current users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of occupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, followed by the number of currently unoccupied sites in that nation.

Algeria (4/0), Angola (7/0), Armenia (2/1), Azerbaijan (4/0), Belarus (4/0), Bulgaria (4/0), Cuba (4/0), Egypt (43/11), Eritrea (3/1), Ethiopia (4/1), Georgia (1/1), India (23/9), Kazakhstan (1/0), Kyrgyzstan (2/0), Libya (10/2), Mozambique (3/0), North Korea (1/0), Peru (7/8), Poland (4/6), Serbia and Montenegro (3/2), Syria (26/4), Tajikistan (2/0), Turkmenistan (3/0), Ukraine (2/2), Uzbekistan (3/0), Vietnam (7/3), Yemen (1/0), Zambia (2/0)

FORMER USERS

The nations listed below have been identified through analysis of Google Earth imagery as having been former users of the S-125 SAM system. The number in parentheses following the nation's name is the number of unoccupied sites currently visible in Google Earth, not including those currently occupied by other SAM systems.

Czech Republic (8), Hungary (8), Iraq (14), Romania (1), Slovakia (4)

SOURCES

-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-Fakel's Missiles, by Vladimir Korovin
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The CIA FOIA website at http://foia.cia.gov provided the documents shown and referenced above

-Site measurements were acquired using Google Earth and as such may not be 100% accurate