The KS-1A SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

Southwest of Kunming, one can find the latest evidence of the ongoing modernization of the Chinese air defense network. With the large amount of effort underway to modernize the Chinese air defense network through the inclusion of long-range strategic SAM systems like the S-300PMU-1 and HQ-9, the appearance of a cheaper, short-range complement designed to replace the HQ-2 and supplement the long-range assets is a logical development. The KS-1A can serve as a close-in point defense system to complement the more advanced systems, as well as performing as a gap filler to preclude the need for additional, expensive strategic SAM systems.

THE KS-1A SAM SYSTEM

The KS-1A represents the current configuration of the KS-1 SAM system. The KS-1 was developed in the 1980's as a replacement for the HQ-2 GUIDELINE strategic SAM system. Due to reasons which have not been publicly disclosed at this time, the KS-1 did not enter Chinese military service when development was completed in 1994. A likely reason was the poor maneuvering capability of the missile. Open source reporting indicates that the weapon could only engage targets with a 5g maneuvering capability, making the KS-1 largely ineffective for defending against modern fighter aircraft. The improved KS-1A variant, which was publicly revealed at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2002, is the current variant of the system which has now been adopted for service.

The KS-1A is a command guided weapon with a range of 50 kilometers, capable of intercepting targets at altitudes of up to 27,000 meters. The command guided weapon is controlled by an SJ-202 phased-array radar, which appears to be generally similar to the HT-233 radar used to guide the HQ-9 SAM system. The TEL vehicle can mount either a single or a dual launcher, and the design of the components (including the towed SJ-202 radar set) would seem to imply that the system is at least semi-mobile and capable of rapid relocation to improve system survivability.

The single identified KS-1A site is found southwest of Kunming in southern China at the following coordinates:

24 54' 51.79" N 102 33' 47.22" E

KS-1A SITE LAYOUT

The KS-1A SAM system is deployed at a prepared site similar in layout to those constructed for the S-300P and HQ-9 SAM systems. A raised berm in the center of the site is present to mount the SJ-202 engagement radar. Surrounding that berm are six square pads, each containing a single TEL. There are various structures present, ostensibly to house support equipment, power generation vehicles, and command and control facilities. The visible components appear to be connected via cables, potentially providing the system with a measure of communications security.

The following image depicts the sole Chinese KS-1A site:


SYSTEM COVERAGE

The KS-1A enjoys a 15 kilometer increase in effective range over the HQ-2, and as such represents an relatively significant improvement in air defense capability.

The following image depicts the engagement zone of the Kunming KS-1A SAM site:


CONCLUSION

The first operational KS-1A battery to be identified in open-source imagery indicates that the system has moved from development to deployment and is prepared to take its place among the other land-based air defense assets protecting the Chinese mainland. Coupled with the HQ-9, the KS-1A provides China with the ability to construct and deploy an entirely indigenous modern SAM network.

SOURCES

-Jane's Land Based Air Defence 2006-07
-The KS-1A SAM system
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Slightly Revised Layout

I've altered the layout over on the right to a small degree. I divided the Recommended Links section into Websites and Blogs. Websites are still those places on the web which I find amusing, and the blogs listed are places which have been found to link to this site in some fashion.

Updates to older articles

With the recent substantial updates to the SAM site file available here for download, I have begun to update some of the older SAM site and SAM network articles. The Syrian article was recently finished, and readers will note that it has jumped back to the top of the pile, as I have changed the post date to reflect the date it was updated. This will continue to be standard practice as I provide some significant updates to older articles published here.

As always, comments and feedback are welcome.

The HQ-9 SAM System: A Site Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese military is currently undergoing a major renovation with the development and introduction of new weapon systems such as the Type 094 SSBN and the J-10 fighter aircraft. Part of this major facelift, aimed at making the Chinese military a more streamlined, modern, and capable force, is directed at the ground-based air defense network. Until advanced Russian-made S-300P family SAM systems were introduced in the 1990s, the primary strategic SAM system was the aging HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE), a copy of the technologically ancient Soviet-era S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE). The introduction of the S-300P has provided China with a modern, robust SAM system capable of dealing with 21st century airborne threat systems, but the desire to produce a native system was still present. That system was the HQ-9.

THE HQ-9

The HQ-9 is a modern mobile strategic SAM system roughly analogous to the Russian-made S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE). The HQ-9 has a range of 100 kilometers, an increase over the S-300PMU's 90 kilometer maximum range but less than that of the S-300PMU-1's 150 kilometers. The containerized missiles are carried in groups of four on the back of wheeled TELs very similar in design to that of the S-300P's 5P85. Target prosecution is handled by the HT-233 phased-array radar system, mounted on a wheeled chassis in a configuration very similar to that employed by the S-300PMU, which mounts the 30N6 (FLAP LID) engagement radar on a MAZ-7910 chassis. The HT-233 radar is likely capable of engaging multiple targets thanks to its phased-array construction.

The similarities between the S-300PMU components and the HQ-9 components may be the result of a limited reverse-engineering effort. China had no prior experience in developing a modern, high-performance strategic SAM system, and it is likely that the S-300P was examined as either a possible starting point or at the very least a general roadmap for component design. Espionage efforts may have aided the development effort as well, as the HT-233's radar array bears some similarities to the MIM-104 PATRIOT's AN/MPQ-53 phased-array radar. Were the HQ-9 to be an amalgamation of S-300PMU and PATRIOT technology, it would have to be regarded as a very formidable weapon system, although there is no reason to doubt the system's effectiveness were this not to be the case.

Trials of the HQ-9 were conducted at the Shuangchengzi SAM test range located in north-central China.

The following image depicts the HQ-9 test facility at Shuangchengzi:


HQ-9 production appears to take place at a facility located southwest of Beijing at 39 47' 22.62" N 116 09' 28.40" E. What would appear to be a complete HQ-9 battery is located on a pad at this facility, probably undergoing system checkout and calibration before the battery is deployed to an operational site.

The following image depicts an HQ-9 battery undergoing probable system checkout:


HT-233 radar development may have also taken place at the Beijing facility. The facility appears to house an RCS range. The presence of an RCS range and HT-233 radar vehicles indicates that this facility may be used for radar development as well as HQ-9 production.

The following image depicts three HT-233 TERs at the Beijing facility:


A TYPICAL HQ-9 SITE

A typical HQ-9 site will consist of a raised central berm for the HT-233 engagement radar, surrounded by four prepared pads upon which the TELs will be deployed. A pad is located next to the HT-233 berm, likely housing generators or command and control facilities. A circular path surrounds the main complex, containing the TEL pads and the engagement radar position. A second raised berm is situated outside this circular path, likely intended to mount an early warning radar of some sort. The one inconsistency in identified active HQ-9 sites is the presence or lack of additional structures housing various pieces of support equipment. This includes a vehicle situated between the TELs, which probably serves as a control vehicle for two TELs in much the same way that the "Master" 5P85S TEL is used to control 5P85D "Slave" TELs in an S-300P battery. System components of an HQ-9 battery are linked via cable connections.

The following image depicts an occupied HQ-9 site outside Beijing:


HQ-9 SITE LAYOUT VS S-300P SITE LAYOUT

Identifying HQ-9 sites in imagery can be a confusing task. The system components share similarities with those of the S-300P family, and the site layout is very similar to that of the S-300P systems based in China and other nations across the globe. In order to avoid misidentification of a given site, it is important to be mindful of the identifiable differences in the layouts of HQ-9 and S-300P sites.

The first obvious difference is the presence of the control vehicle between the HQ-9 TELs. This feature is absent in an S-300P battery. It is not important, however, to go to this level of detail to differentiate between HQ-9 and S-300P facilities.

The second identifiable difference between an S-300P and an HQ-9 site is the shape of the TEL pads. The following two images depict unoccupied HQ-9 and S-300P sites located in China. Note the rectangular shaped pads provided for the HQ-9 TELs, compared to the pie-shaped pads provided for the S-300P TELs.

The following image depicts an unoccupied HQ-9 site:


The following image depicts an unoccupied S-300P site:


Given proper attention to detail and a working knowledge of the characteristics of each SAM site, it can be seen that it is possible to differentiate between HQ-9 and S-300P facilities without having to discern differences between individual system components. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to effectively identify unoccupied facilities with a high degree of precision.

SYSTEM COVERAGE

The HQ-9's 100 kilometer range and multiple target engagement capability means that fewer SAM sites are now required to defend a given portion of airspace.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by an HQ-9 site situated north of Beijing. Note the much smaller coverage areas provided by the four HQ-2 sites in the same region.


CURRENT USERS

The only current user of the HQ-9 strategic SAM system is China. There are currently three HQ-9 sites located at the following coordinates:

34 37' 14.21" N 108 42' 23.62" E (Active)
40 21' 20.79" N 116 41' 01.81" E (Active)
36 32' 14.19" N 104 08' 34.30" E (Unoccupied)

SOURCES

-Jane's Land Based Air Defense 2002-03
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

China's New SSBN Fleet

INTRODUCTION

China's first entry into the seaborne nuclear deterrent realm was the Type 092 Xia-class SSBN, a solitary vessel plagued by problems and a short range SLBM. For the first time, imagery analysis has discovered the presence of multiple hulls of a new class of SSBN, the Type 094 Jin-class. This evidence signifies the new commitment to a seagoing nuclear deterrent force by China, changing the nuclear warfighting dynamic in that region of the world.

TYPE 092

Produced as a solitary example, the Type 092's primary drawback as a strategic deterrent was the lack of an adequate SLBM. The JL-1, China's first SLBM and the weapon employed on the sole operational example of Type 092, the Xia, suffered from a lack of intercontinental range. The JL-1 had a range of 2500 km. If the Xia operated close to the Chinese mainland in waters that could be secured by other PLAN assets, then the deterernt value of the Type 092/JL-1 combination would be severely limited, making it only truly effective in a regional conflict.

The following image depicts the area covered by the Type 092's JL-1 SLBM, postulating a deterrent patrol 50 kilometers offshore from the Xia's homeport near Qingdao:


The short range of the JL-1 meant that the Xia would have to operate much closer to the United States in order to mount an effective deterrent patrol outside the Far East theater of operations. Given the limited number of land-based ICBMs available to the Chinese military at the time, it is possible that in the event of serious hostilities the Xia would be intended to operate in just such a fashion.

The following image depicts the area covered by the Type 092's JL-1 SLBM, postulating a deterrent patrol XX kilometers from the western coastline of the United States, with ICBM fields in the central United States being the primary target:


The above image demonstrates the close proximity that the Xia would have to come to the United States in order to launch any serious strike against military targets. The 500 kT warhead of the JL-1 precludes its ability for being used in a strike against major population centers; this role is better suited to the DF-5 ICBM. The JL-1, therefore, is most likely suited for a counterforce strike, or a preemptive strike against strategic assets, a role which would be enhanced due to the limited reaction time thanks to the close proximity of the launching SSBN. The main problem, however, is the aforementioned proximity. The Xia must penetrate American waters and evade detection and attack by interloping 688-class SSNs. Such a dangerous proposition would likely preclude the use of the solitary Xia against the mainland United States. It is most likely, therefore, that the JL-1/092 combination was intended to provide a deterrent against Japan and South Korea, as well as US military forces in the region, as both nations are well within the range of the JL-1.

Another possibility is the forward deployment of the Xia to strike against the Pacific Fleet headquarters at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, but this again places the Xia at a higher risk as it would operate further from protected Chinese waters.

TYPE 094

The answer to China's seagoing deterrent capability is the new Type 094, or Jin-class SSBN. The Type 094 SSBNs will be armed with the new 8000 km range JL-2 SLBM, which is currently undergoing testing. The advantage of the JL-2 is that the longer range allows for a much wider range of deployment options.

The most interesting concept would be to position the Jin-class SSBN fleet in the Bohai Gulf, in close proximity to the Type 094's homeport of Xiaopingdao. This would keep the SSBN fleet very well protected from attack, and allow for a significant seagoing deterrent capability. A Bohai-based Jin would be able to range as far West as Europe and the Middle East.

The following image depicts the area covered to the west of a postulated protected deployment in the Bohai Gulf:


Where the Xia had to close within 1000 kilometers of the American coastline to strike targets deep inside the United States, the Jin could remain 3500 kilometers offshore and range the entire nation, from West coast to Eastern seaboard. A patrolling SSBN in the north Pacific is much harder to localize and engage than an SSBN which has continuously proceeded towards the American coastline, allowing for far more opportunities for detection and tracking, especially given the passing of Hawaii and associated antisubmarine warfare systems.

While the PLAN was satisfied for a time with the solitary Xia SSBN, probably due to operational problems which have plagued the vessel, a whole fleet of Type 094 SSBNs is planned. For the first time, China will have a sustainable seagoing nuclear deterrent force. While the lead Type 094 SSBN has been seen in photographs for some time now, the first evidence of a large-scale production program has recently been uncovered in satellite imagery.

The following image depicts two Type 094 submarines pierside at Huludao shipyard in northern China, where the Type 094 SSBNs are constructed:


A single hull previously identified is still visible at Xiaopingdao, as seen in the image below, suggesting that for the first time China has at least two new SSBNs, indicating that the program will not end with a one-for-one replacement of the aging Xia:


Further analysis of the available imagery would seem to suggest that there are in fact now three distinct examples of Jin-class SSBNs in existance. The two submarines at Huludao are riding higher in the water than the example at Xiaopingdao, suggesting that they are newer hulls still in the process of being fitted out, while the Xiaopingdao hull is in a near-operational state as evidenced by its greater gross weight denoted by the fact that it is riding lower in the water. The presence of various items pierside of the two Huludao hulls would suggest that this specific pier is designated for the fitting out of newly-produced submarines, an interesting fact to note for further analysis in the future when newer imagery of the area becomes available.

Further analysis of the Huludao shipyard appears to depict a third Type 094 hull in the area. What appears to be the rear end of a submarine hull can be seen jutting out of one of the main assembly halls. This object has a diameter of 11.8 meters, which would match up well with the 11.28 meter measurement taken from the visible hull of one of the two pierside 094s in the shipyard. A submarine out of water would obviously have a greater visible diameter as part of the hull is obscured from view under water when the vessel is seaborne. By employing Google Earth's overlay feature and adjusting the image opacity, it can also be seen that the hull contours of the unfinished hull match up nearly perfectly with the rear of the two 094 hulls pierside at Huludao. This hull would represent the fourth Type 094 SSBN, provided that the earlier analysis of the presence of three distinct hulls is accurate.

The following image depicts the unfinished Type 094 hull at Huludao:


CONCLUSION

The presence of multiple new SSBNs in China will enable the Chinese military to develop new nuclear deterrence postures and tactics, changing the warfighting dynamic in the region. Where the Xia only represented a minimal threat, a fleet of Type 094 SSBNs will enable China to rely more and more on the seaborne nuclear deterrent, a far more dangerous warfighting tool than land-based weapons thanks to their significantly greater elusiveness and therefore survivability.

SOURCES

-SLBM ranges used to construct the range rings were taken from the website Sinodefence.com.

-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

Dead World

INTRODUCTION

Progress does not come without a price. Many of mankind's technological advancements in the name of science or warfare have had devastating effects on the environment and the populace. This article will focus on four of the most dangerous places on the face of the planet.

THE NUCLEAR PACIFIC

In 1945, the first atomic bombs were used in anger, effectively bringing the Second World War to an abrupt, immediate end. After the war, testing of nuclear weapons for various uses was expanded exponentially. The bulk of the wide-ranging test programs were moved out of the Untied States, where the first weapons were tested, and into the South Pacific.

The next step in the development of nuclear weaponry was the Teller-Ulam weapon design, the first of the so-called hydrogen bombs. The first Teller-Ulam h-bomb to be detonated was the IVY MIKE device, detonated on 1 November 1952. This 10.4 megaton detonation completely vaporized the island of Elugelab in Enewetak Atoll. IVY MIKE's bomb design was, however, only a test device. Further refinement would be necessary to develop and field a weapon suitable for operational use.

On 1 March 1954, the largest nuclear detonation ever initiated by the United States took place on an artificial island in Bikini Atoll. The CASTLE BRAVO test resulted in a 15 megaton blast, fully 175% larger than predicted yield due to the presence of lithium-7 in the fuel. Work on weaponizing the "Shrimp" bomb design used in the BRAVO device began less than one month after the test.

The following image depicts the blast crater carved out of Bikini Atoll by the CASTLE BRAVO detonation:


CASTLE BRAVO was clearly a powerful weapon, but the unseen component, radioactive fallout, was just as deadly and even more invasive than the blast itself. Fallout from the BRAVO blast traveled hundreds of miles downrange, and many portions of the test area were blanketed with enough radiation to easily kill a human being.

The following image is a graphic representation of the radiation spread across the test range, measured 96 hours after the blast. It should be noted that a cumulative dose of 700 rads over 96 hours can be fatal to human beings, with an instantaneous dose of 1000-2000 rads in one exposure also being fatal.


CASTLE BRAVO was perhaps the ultimate demonstration of the power and destructive, killing force of a nuclear detonation. Not only did a good percentage of the test area end up being vaporized, but the resultant radiation spread around the test range resulted in an exclusion zone being enacted around the site, effectively marking 1 percent of the Earth's surface as unfit for human occupation until radiation levels drop substantially.

That being said, nuclear weapons do not need to be employed to result in the potential deaths of thousands, perhaps even hundreds of thousands, of people.

CHELYABINSK

The Mayak nuclear weapons research and production facility situated 150 kilometers northwest of Chelyabinsk in Russia is home to one of the most potentially dangerous pieces of real estate in the world. Mayak was established after the Second World War to produce plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.

There have been various incidents related to the radioactive nature of the facility. The most significant occurred in 1957 when a cooling unit for a nuclear waste storage unit failed, resulting in an explosion that spread radiation over hundreds of square miles. At least 200 people died as a result of their exposure, with as many as half a million others being exposed to some degree.

After dumping radioactive waste from the production facilities into the Techa River during the early years of operation, the Mayak complex began to use the nearby Lake Karachay as a dumping site. This appeared to be a better idea on the surface, as the lake was enclosed and did not connect to the Techa River and eventually the waters off of Siberia. Unfortunately, by 1967 the lake had dried up, leaving behind a large amount of radioactive sediment. In 1967 a large amount of this radioactive material was spread throughout the province by a large wind storm, once again affecting nearly 500,000 people. The worst disaster, however, may be yet to occur.

After the 1967 accident, Lake Karachay was covered with concrete in an effort to contain the radioactive material. The concrete-covered lake can be seen in the image below:


Covering the dry lakebed with concrete has prevented an airborne radiological threat from emerging from the dry lake since 1967, but a very serious problem still remains. The radioactive material has been leaking into the groundwater below the lake. While the lake was self-contained, the groundwater source could potentially transport radioactive material from Lake Karachay into the Arctic. Were that to happen, half of the globe could be affected, as the sheer amount of radioactive material still present buried underneath the concrete is staggering. Lake Karachay has been referred to as the most radioactive spot on the planet for a very good reason.

CHERNOBYL

In 1986 the world's worst nuclear accident took place near a town in the Ukraine called Pripyat. A accident in a nuclear reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant resulted in an explosion and the release of large quantities of radiation into the atmosphere.

The following image depicts the Chernobyl power plant and the surrounding area:


The Complex

The Chernobyl nuclear power plant consisted of four 1 Gigawatt nuclear reactors. The first reactor was comissioned in 1977. At the time of the accident in 1986, two other reactors were under construction, as seen in the image above. After the accident, the three remaining operational reactors were gradually taken off-line, with the last reactor powering down in December of 2000.

The following image depicts the main reactor complex at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant:


The Accident

On April 26, 1986, Reactor #4 suffered a catastrophic failure during a test program, resulting in a violent explosion. Without going into exhaustive detail, the explosion blew a hole in the roof of the reactor, leaving the core exposed, and spread radioactive debris throughout the surrounding area. Portions of Europe and the rest of the world were also affected by the radioactive debris cloud, albeit on a much reduced scale. An area of 150,000 square kilometers was irradiated in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, and a 30 kilometer exclusion zone was established around the site.

Pripyat

The nearby town of Pripyat was constructed to house the workers of Chernobyl as well as their families. Pripyat's inhabitants were ordered to evacuate on 27 April, and would never return, leaving behind an eerie ghost town as a reminder of the events that occurred the previous day.

The following image depicts some of the abandoned structures in the heart of Pripyat:


The main problem with Chernobyl today is the state of the sarcophagus containing the radioactive material in Reactor 4. The sarcophagus was intended as a temporary solution, designed to last for no more than 20 years. It was built in 1986, 21 years ago, and is rapidly deteriorating.

The following image depicts the sarcophagus erected atop Reactor 4:


A collapse of the sarcophagus would result in the further dissemination of radioactive material throughout the area. While radiation levels in the surrounding area have dropped considerably in the years following the accident, the material contained inside the core is still extremely dangerous and must be dealt with accordingly.

As we can see, nuclear testing grounds and accident sites can still pose serious health risks years after events have occurred. They may not, however, represent the most serious threat, nor represent the most potentially dangerous piece of real estate on the entire globe.

VOZROZHDENIYE ISLAND

In 1936, the Soviet Union began to test biological weapons on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea. Various types of biological agents were tested on the island, including anthrax and smallpox.

The following image depicts the main research and residential facilities on Vozrozhdeniye Island:


While the research facilities were closed down in 1991, Vozrozhdeniye Island remains a potential source of biological warfare material. In 1992 it was revealed that weaponized anthrax had been buried on the island. Beginning in 1988, various biological warfare agents were buried on the island as they were present in quantities too large to destroy in an autoclave. It was later discovered that the containment and decontamination efforts were not as effective as it had been hoped, as weaponzied anthrax spores had been found surviving in the soil of the island.

The main problem facing Vozrozhdeniye Island today is that it is literally growing in size. In an effort to divert water to agricultural projects in the area, a number of rivers feeding the Aral Sea were dammed over the years, resulting in a gradual decline in the water level of what was once the world's fourth-largest body of inland water.

The following image depicts the island as it currently appears, with a yellow area denoting the size of the island as it existed in 1962:


As the water level in the Aral Sea drops, Vozrozhdeniye Island will eventually join with the surrounding land, removing the main source of security that had led to the islands choice as a biowarfare testing facility in the first place: isolation. The effects of the falling water levels can already be seen; apart from the obvious effect of increasing the landmass associated with Vozrozhdeniye Island, various ships have been seen trapped on land along the northern edge of the new landmass.

The following image depicts the locations of numerous ships which have fallen into disuse after being abandoned on the new shores of Vozrozhdeniye Island:


The following image is a detail view of some of the aforementioned shipwrecks:


The ultimate threat from Vozrozhdeniye Island lies in what is buried under the sands. As the island becomes more accessible, the chances of something sinister being unearthed and released into the population increase exponentially. It is known that weaponized anthrax was buried on the island. One can only speculate in silent horror at what else may have been buried there, and given the weaponzied nature of the testing, what else may still survive and lie in wait to descend on an unsuspecting population. The ultimate doomsday scenario could play out in a simple and innocent fashion: reintroduction of burrowing animals after the island rejoins the mainland could result in the spread of biological warfare organisms with no warning whatsoever.

CONCLUSION

It should be noted that this article is not intended as an indictemnt of nuclear power or nuclear weaponry. Nuclear power, when used in a safe and controlled manner, is a very valuable power source. Nuclear weaponry does have a very significant role in both defensive and offensive military actions, although world leaders refuse to acknowledge the latter. Rather, this was intended to illustrate the effects of a lack of knowledge or attention to detail. Had the Chernobyl reactor been of a more sound design, the explosion would have had far less of an effect on the surrounding area. Had scientists at Bikini been aware of the effects of the materials inside their weapon, the CASTLE BRAVO detonation would have been far more controlled and not resulted in a massive radiation spread. If we are going to possess or experiment with such technologies, we must be aware of the consequences, and be prepared to deal with them in a far more effective manner.

SOURCES

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd Edition, Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan (eds), 1977

US Nuclear Testing
Chelyabinsk
Nuclear Waste in the Ural Mountains
Contamination In Russia
Chernobyl FAQ
Vozrozhdeniye Island
Vozrozhdeniye Island

-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

Samoderzhets Decloaked

INTRODUCTION

The introduction of the S-400 strategic SAM system into the operational inventory of the Russian air defense network has resulted in increased speculation over the nature of the next-generation of Russian SAM systems. One of the most common misconceptions appears to be the belief that a new SAM system referred to as Samoderzhets is being prepared for front-line service.

RUSSIAN MODERN SAM DEVELOPMENT

The development of the next generation of Russian SAM systems can be traced back to 1979 when the first S-300PT batteries were accepted for service. Over the course of the S-300P's lifetime, various modifications have surfaced, each providing an incremental increase in capability over the last variant.

The principal S-300P variants were as follows:

S-300PT: Initial trailer-launched SAM system employing 5N63 (FLAP LID) target engagement radar (TER) and 5V55K missile.

S-300PS: Initial mobile SAM system with components mounted on 8x8 chassis, introduced 5N63S/30N6 (30N6E) TER and 5V55R missile.

S-300PM (export variant: S-300PMU): Introduced digital connectivity between components and 5V55RUD missile.

S-300PM-1 (export variant: S-300PMU-1): Introduced new 30N6-1 (30N6E1, TOMB STONE) TER, and 48N6 (48N6E) missile.

S-300PM-2 (export variant: S-300PMU-2): Introduced 48N6D (48N6E2) missile, as well as 9M96 (9M96E) and 9M96D (9M96E2) missiles, although there is no evidence that the latter two weapons have been fielded with Russian units.

S-300PM-3: developmental variant aimed at increased range with 48N6DM missile and new TER (GRAVE STONE). Evolved into the S-400 (SA-X-21).

As early as 1984, two other advanced SAM systems were stated to be in development, the S-500 and S-1000. The S-500 was a new long-range, mobile ATBM system, analogous to the American THAAD system currently in development. The S-1000 was described as a very long-range SAM designed to target air-breathing targets such as ISR platforms and other support aircraft. Where the S-300P was the successor to the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) in the Moscow air defense network, the S-1000 was possibly intended to be deployed as a partial replacement for the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON); S-300P units have replaced S-200 units in some areas, but only the most recent iterations can claim to have a range anywhere near that of the massive 300 kilometers attained by the S-200. Neither the S-500 nor the S-1000 were anywhere near operational service, as they only existed as concepts throughout the 1980s. Recent analysis would seem to suggest, however, that both systems will eventually be operationally employed, with at least one of them being mentioned by name as recently as August 2007.

It is likely that the S-1000 has actually been absorbed into the S-400. The intended capabilities of the S-1000 seem to match up with the S-400's 40N6 missile, a product of OKB Fakel, who has historically been responsible for the development of long-range strategic SAM missiles such as the 5V21 employed by the S-200 and the 48N6 employed by the S-300PM-1. The likely course of development could have seen the S-300PM-3 and S-1000 combined into a new system, the S-400, utilizing common system components and radars. This would explain the delays in fielding the S-400 as well as the current status of the 40N6 program. Radars would need to be suitably altered to support longer-range engagements, and the S-1000's weapon would need to be refined and complete development allowing it to function as part of the S-400 system.

ALMAZ-ANTEY MERGER

In May of 2002 the producer of the S-300P, the Almaz design bureau, was merged with the Antey design bureau, creator of the S-300V tactical SAM system, to form the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern. This effectively consolidated all of the long-range SAM and ATBM experience into one organization. The new association resulted in a whole new concept of thinking regarding the boundaries between tactical and strategic air defense.

SAMODERZHETS

Despite the merger of Almaz and Antey, projects which had previously been active did continue development. These included the Antey-2500/S-300VM (SA-X-23) and the latest S-300P iteration, the S-300PM-3, which had by then morphed into the S-400. Future projects, however, would need to take full advantage of the consolidated expertise offered by the new corporation. Enter Samoderzhets.

Samoderzhets was a program begun shortly after the merger of Almaz and Antey aimed at identifying the characteristics and capabilities of new SAM systems operating on a national level. The research effort was conducted by the Second Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. Deputy Defense Minister General of the Army Aleksey Moskovskiy, in a December 2004 interview for Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, described Samoderzhets as a project aimed at finding an "optimal solution" for the development of new air defense systems, systems capable of performing tasks for both the Army and PVO air defense, and operating within a national integrated air defense network framework:

"The name you mentioned, Samoderzhets, is not a system. It is a system project to look for an optimal solution."

General Moskovskiy goes on to state that an actual SAM system like the one outlined in the Samoderzhets project would most likely not be procured anytime soon as it would be "superfluous", as the S-400 was nearing service entry, but does state that modifying S-400 components to operate in such a manner (implying a national integrated network) was possible. The reason for integrating such systems would be to better coordinate air defense assets, and to better integrate the anti-missile capabilities of S-300V type systems (which are presently Russian Army assets, being tactical systems) into the national defense network. Ergo, the creation of an actual weapon system was not the goal of Samoderzhets, but rather the description and outlining of a new national framework to better control and integrate present and future systems to maximize their effectiveness, as well as the delineation and outlining of capabilities required by the individual systems serving in such a network. Official news regarding the Samoderzhets project virtually disappeared after 2004. There was a logical explanation for this, however: the research program was completed in 2004.

Samoderzhets was clearly never intended to result in the direct production of a new SAM system bearing the name, but it was a very important research endeavour, especially in the light of the new Almaz-Antey consortium. Future SAM systems will likely be designed around the system requirements and framework researched and outlined in the Samoderzhets project. In fact, early 2007 saw the mention of such a system. Sergey Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister, gave Almaz-Antey the task to develop a new air defense system capable for the first time of providing air defense, missile defense, and space defense. Such a project would seem to be revolutionary in concept, but seems perfectly logical as a next step given the results of the Samoderzhets project, and has been given until 2015 to produce hardware. 2015 may not seem that far off, especially given the delays associated with the S-400 system, but the new all-encompassing system has in fact been mentioned as early as 2005, and may have been in development before then.

It should be noted that the term "air defense system" does not necessarily imply one specific system such as the S-400, but could very well imply a series of systems, in this case the S-400 and S-500, integrated under a united national network, such as the kind outlined under the Samoderzhets project.

It is likely that the new system will build upon the S-400, using S-400 components for air defense. The missile defense component will likely be the aforementioned S-500 system, referred to in some sources as Vlastelin. The S-500 re-entered the public eye in August of 2007. On the 6th of August, Igor Ashurbeyli of Almaz-Antey was interviewed on Channel One TV in Russia regarding the first S-400 battery being activated near Elektrostal. Ashurbeyli stated that the next project for Almaz-Antey was the S-500, a mobile anti-missile system designed to function as part of the "unified system of Russia's air defense", a clear reference to Ivanov's statements in February and the concepts researched under Samoderzhets. Development of the S-500, according to some sources, had ended at one point in the past due to a lack of funding, but could easily have been restarted, saving Almaz-Antey from having to come up with a new anti-missile system from scratch. The S-500 is also believed to be related to the 45T6 anti-ballistic missile, which would certainly enable it to potentially perform exoatmospheric intercepts.

Confusion resulting from the appearance of the Samoderzhets name in press reporting did lead to the assumption that a new system was being developed, but as Samoderzhets was a project only, this is clearly not the case. There are a few reasons why certain assumptions about the potential new system were made, however, and they can be logically explained.

Samoderzhets is often claimed to be a SAM system integrating S-300P/S-400 and S-300V components. This is basically true, but not in a physical sense. Samoderzhets called for the integration of existing systems into a national level network, while designing new systems to operate in such a manner from the outset, regardless of whether or not they were employed by the Army or the Air Defense Troops. These systems would have, according to General Moskovskiy, included the S-300P and S-300V families. They would have been integrated, but not in a physical sense, as many have incorrectly assumed.

Samoderzhets was also described as combining the best aspects of previously developed SAM systems, and serving as the basis for a new standardized SAM system. This is partly correct; Samoderzhets would have integrated S-300V and S-300P/S-400 type systems, enabling their effectiveness to be maximized. Samoderzhets does also form the basis for new SAM development, as it outlined the framework under which new systems will operate, as well as their desired performance characteristics.

The main nail in the coffin of the Samoderzhets argument is the 2007 tasking to develop a new SAM system. Were Samoderzhets already a developed system by 2004, as some suggest, a new air and missile defense system would clearly not have been required. Furthermore, the Samoderzhets project was already three years past its completion date by 2007. As such the project initiated in 2007 would not have required a 2015 demonstration date; were Samoderzhets a true SAM system, completed in 2004, it would be ready for deployment far earlier than 2015. Lastly, the S-500 has been mentioned as the next SAM system to be developed for operational use, not Samoderzhets.

Some sources have claimed that Samoderzhets was proposed as an alternative to the S-400. In that light Samoderzhets may have been intended to result in a hybrid system, but the induction of the S-400 into front-line service would seem to be enough to put that theory to rest.

A final argument against the development of Samoderzhets as an actual SAM system is that it would represent both a waste of effort, given the S-500 development program for the anti-missile role, and a reduction in capability when compared to the S-400. In the anti-aircraft role the S-300VM's 9M83M missile has a range of 200 kilometers, a full 50 or 100 kilometers shy of the two range figures quoted for the 48N6DM employed by the S-400, even without considering the 400 kilometer range attained by the S-400's 40N6. Furthermore, Samoderzhets cannot be the new S-500 system, provided of course that both Ivanov and Ashurbeyli were referring to the same system. If, as many sources would have us believe, Samoderzhets represents a combination of S-300VM and S-400 systems, then the resultant system would fail to achieve the performance specified by Ivanov insofar as intercepting exoatmospheric targets is concerned.

Samoderzhets as a research endeavour is a far more logical explanation in light of the current evidence.

CONCLUSION

Samoderzhets was a very important project, one which will help to outline and govern the framework and interoperability of Russian air defense units for some time. But Samoderzhets was not a SAM system development effort, and no Samoderzhets system will be operating in Russia. The task of defending the skies and space over Russia will fall in the future to the S-400 and S-500 systems.

SOURCES

-New Russian SAM System Said Superior to Patriot, Has Multipurpose Capability (Moscow Vremya Novostey, 13 August 2004 p. 4)
-Russia approves Almaz-Antei merger (David Isby, Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 June 2002)
-Russian Defense Ministry to state performance specifications for new air defense system (Interfax, 4 October 2004)
-Russia to Develop New Air, Missile, Space Defense "Superweapon" (Vremya Novostey, 28 February 2007)
-Russian Channel One TV broadcast (6 August 2007)
-Russia looks to bolster air defence (James O'Halloran, Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March 2007)
-Advantages of Upgraded Versus New Technology (Vestnik Vozhdushnogo Flota, 31 December 2004)
-Second Central Scientific Research Institute of MoD Receives Pennant (Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 November 2005)
-Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems