Syria and North Korea: Nuclear Partners?

INTRODUCTION

On the 25th of April President Bashar Assad of Syria issued a rebuttal to US claims of a nuclear reactor program in Eastern Syria. The site in question was violently thrust into world view on the 6th of September, 2007 when an illegal Israeli air raid destroyed the facility. Israel has refused to comment on the action, ostensibly in order to refrain from having to admit to such a blatant violation of Syrian territorial sovereignty, and Syria showed great restraint by not justifiably retaliating against the naked aggression of its Jewish neighbor. Fast forward to the 24th of April of this year, and the United States released information describing the facility as a nuclear reactor being constructed with the assistance of North Korea.

POWER OR PLUTONIUM?

Syrian intentions for the reactor complex were unclear, but analysts have theorized that a lack of any major infrastructure in the area indicated that the reactor was not intended for power production. Coupled with the fact that there are no major population centers in the area to make use of any electricity generated by the complex, it would appear that the analysts have come to the correct conclusion. The obvious alternative, given the North Korean assistance in the matter, was to create a reactor able to produce weapons-grade plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon.

THE NORTH KOREAN CONNECTION

The reasoning behind the presence of a nuclear material production facility inside of Syria is not necessarily as clear-cut as it may seem. The obvious inference is that it was intended to produce nuclear material to support a Syrian nuclear weapons program. A Syrian nuclear weapons program would certainly have provided the impetus behind Israel's action of September, 2007. However, the reports of North Korean aid, bolstered by images released depicting a reactor complex startlingly similar to the one in place at Yongbyon, North Korea, may indicate a far more sinister purpose.

The North Korean government is currently negotiating with the United States under the framework of the Six Party Talks to halt nuclear proliferation activity in return for diplomatic and economic concessions from the West. The talks have currently reached an impasse, as the North Koreans are reluctant to reveal details regarding their past proliferation activities, including any aid to Syria in this regard. North Korea has made progress with regard to halting its own nuclear activity, including the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea still views the United States as a significant military threat on the peninsula, and their sudden agreement in February of 2007 to shut down the Yongbyon reactor facility raises serious questions. The reactor facility was inspected by the IAEA, who verified its shutdown in August of 2007. US intelligence officials have claimed that the Syrian complex may have been within weeks of becoming operational when it was destroyed in September of that year. The connection that seems to be eluding the intelligence services as well as the media outlets reporting on the incident is whether or not North Korea would have benefitted from the Syrian reactor's output of nuclear material. It is possible that the purpose of the Syrian reactor complex was to benefit both Syrian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Analysts have noted that there does not appear to have been any enrichment facilities located on-site, facilities which would have been needed in order to transform the reactor's plutonium output into true weapons-grade material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon. By placing the enrichment facilities at a separate location, Syria achieves two things. First, less attention is drawn to the facility. Second, the plutonium by-product must therefore be transported to an enrichment facility. It would not be difficult to mask the transfer of some or all of the plutonium to a ship or aircraft bound for North Korea, allowing the North Koreans to continue their nuclear weapon production while at the same time preserving an air of cooperation in the eyes of the world with the shutdown of their own reactor complex. Alternatively, North Korea may have simply intended to construct a separate weapons production facility inside of Syria with the intent of arming both nations. Given that North Korea has far greater knowledge on the subject of nuclear weapons design and production than Syria, enlisting their aid in that regard would be a logical maneuver.

LACK OF AIR DEFENSES

In his statement, President Assad claimed that the facility in question was an unused military complex, but he would not specify its purpose. Assad claimed that the site was obviously not a nuclear related facility, as it was not protected by any air defense systems. Unfortunately, Assad's claims, regardless of the true nature of the facility, are completely illogical. Eastern Syria would be a logical site for a covert nuclear facility. The location of the site is directly adjacent to a river, providing the necessary water source for cooling the reactor. Also, the site is not near any major military facilities, meaning that it was an unlikely target for surveillance. The lack of any air defense systems also aids the covert nature of the location. Any major SAM system, for example, would emit tell-tale signals from its radar systems, signals which would be tracked and identified by intelligence services. The appearance of air defense systems where none were present previously would only serve to attract unwanted attention to the area. Syria made the right strategic move by not defending the site with any significant military presence. Unfortunately, it would seem that their denial and deception efforts ultimately failed due to a human intelligence source on-site which is the likely source of the videotaped evidence shown by the US government to illustrate the nuclear nature of the facility.

CONCLUSION

This incident highlights the need for more significant diplomatic pressure to be palced on nuclear weapons states with regard to proliferation. Syria has a significant terrorist connection with Hizbullah and a significant diplomatic connection with Iran, two entities which could have benefitted from a Syrian nuclear weapons program, with potentially catastrophic results. While the unilateral decision of Israel to attack and destroy the facility cannot and should not be condoned, neither should the effort by Syria to construct a nuclear reactor under the nose of the IAEA in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, of which Syria is a signatory. Neither should bringing such an issue to the attention of the international community be screened on the basis of Israeli interests, as suggested by Senator Susan Collins of Maine.

SOURCES

Syria denies nuke allegations
IAEA reaction to US evidence
North Korean nuclear program timeline
6 Party Talks

China's DF-31 Launch Sites

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The Strategic Warfare Reading List

INTRODUCTION

Any serious student or researcher focusing on the concept of strategic warfare can often be hard-pressed to find suitable in-depth source material. The purpose of this article is to provide students, researchers, and historians with a reading list consisting of some of the most interesting and valuable sources that I have collected in the field of strategic warfare.

THE READING LIST

Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat - NASIC
NASIC's report detailing the current major strategic missile systems in service or development is a useful starting point when researching strategic delivery systems. Most major programs are mentioned, and basic details such as range and throw weight are provided, as well as a few choice illustrations. The only serious drawback is that the document is only 30 pages in length, meaning that there is not a great deal of detailed information about any of the systems mentioned therein. However, it is a valuable reference tool, containing data on most major missile non-US missile systems in development or service. This unclassified publication can be found online here.

US Strategic and Defensive Missile Systems 1950-2004 - Mark A Berhow
Number 36 in Osprey Publishing's Fortress Series, this volume is a short yet suprisingly detailed account of the development and deployment of American land-based defensive and strategic missile systems. While naval strategic weapons are not covered, all major US ICBM programs are given mention, as are the HAWK, NIKE and SAFEGUARD defensive missile programs. A final mention is given to the current NMD system being deployed. It should be noted that PATRIOT and THAAD, among others, are not covered, as they have not been deployed as operational defensive systems in the United States.

Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces - Pavel Podvig
This is the single, definitive reference source dealing with the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. All major delivery systems are covered, from strategic bombers to submarine launched ballistic missiles. The technical data is absolutely first rate, and a history of each program is provided. Topics such as nuclear production facilities, nuclear testing, and strategic defense are also covered in exhaustive detail. There are also extensive endnotes for each chapter, with some of them providing further details and insight into little-known weapon systems alluded to or mentioned briefly in the text. The only drawback is that Mr. Podvig's work was published in 2001, and as such does not deal with the most current systems such as the RS-24 ICBM. He does maintain a website here, which provides up-to-date information supplementing his excellent text. This is the one reference work that any serious Cold War researcher simply must obtain.

The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword - Steven J. Zaloga
This is a shorter, less technical alternative to Podvig's work. It shares the same main drawback of being slightly aged, having been published in 2002. The main advantage to Zaloga's work is that the political side of the equation is given more attention, as are many of the developmental systems which did not enter production. The work is organized chronologically, which can be an inconvenience for a researcher focusing on one type of delivery system. The chronological layout does allow for a more historical analysis to be made, allowing the reader to examine the types of delivery systems that were in development concurrently. Zaloga's work does have merit as a secondary source, or as a primary source if Podvig's work cannot be located. Space surveillance, defensive systems, and nuclear testing and production are either not covered in Zaloga's work, or are only briefly mentioned. All in all, an excellent overview of Russian strategic nuclear forces and a better source than Podvig's where the political side is concerned.

The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb - Richard Rhodes
Both of these extensive reference works offer a great deal of historical and political insight into the American nuclear weapons programs during the early days of the Cold War. Be warned; while both books tend to focus more on the political and historical implications of the programs, they do delve into the weapons development aspect and as such can get very technical.

The ABM Treaty Charade - William T. Lee
This is one of the most interesting reference works on the Cold War, and consequently it is also one of the hardest to find. It is a higly technical look at the Soviet nationwide ABM network, the existance of which was denied by Western intelligence during the run-up to the signing of the ABM Treaty. There is a healthy dose of political discourse dealing with the rationale behind the West's ignorance of the USSR's progress, as well as a concise overview of Soviet ABM programs. The bulk of the work details the evidence supporting the idea that a nationwide ABM network existed in the Soviet Union. If a copy can be obtained, this is one of the most significant and revealing works on the Cold War yet published, and the only English-language publication dealing solely with Soviet ABM programs.

Space Weapons, Earth Wars - Bob Preston et al
Anti-missile and anti-satellite systems are becoming the new rage in the field of strategic warfare. While it primarily focuses on space warfare systems from an American standpoint, delving into the rationale behind acquiring such systems and how best to employ them, this reference work is invaluable to anyone interested in the topic as there is a great deal of technical data presented that cannot be found anywhere else. Various types of systems are described, as well as the technical requirements that they must meet in order to be successful. As a RAND publication, it can be found online here.

CONCLUSION

Strategic warfare is one of the most interesting topics in the field of military studies. By using the sources listed above, any researcher will be well on his or her way to gaining a more complete understanding of the weapon systems and the political motives behind their development. As I locate more source material, I will update this article with the relevant details.

Iran and the S-300PT

INTRODUCTION

Open-source reporting indicates that Iran has purchased the S-300PT SAM system from Belarus. The S-300PT will represent the most modern, advanced SAM system in Iran when it is operationally deployed.

IRANIAN S-300PT SYSTEMS

According to Jane's International Defence Review, Iran is now the owner of four S-300PT battalions. Two of these units were sourced from Belarus, and had been deployed as capital-area air defence units around Minsk. The other two units were sourced from an undisclosed nation and were recently refurbished by Belarussian technicians working at an IRGC facility in Iran, where the units were stored.

A typical Belarussian S-300PT battery consisted of twelve TELs, one 5N63 (FLAP LID) engagement radar, and one 5N66 (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar. It is therefore logical to assume that the two "battalions" obtained from Belarus were in fact two complete firing batteries worth of equipment. Combined with the other two units refurbished in Iran, this gives Iran a total deployable force of approximately four S-300PT batteries.

Jane's goes on to state that both the 5V55K and 5V55R missiles were included in the deal with Belarus, implying that the systems were of the improved S-300PT-1 or S-300PT-1A variant. Baseline S-300PT systems lacked the ability to employ the SAGG-guided 5V55R weapon, and were limited to using the command-guided 5V55K only. It is possible that the extended-range 5V55RUD was also included.

The S-300PT provides Iran with a modern, complex, and very effective SAM system. Iran's current strategic SAM systems, the HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE) and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), are limited by their single-target engagement capability. The S-300PT's 5N63 radar system can prosecute six targets simultaneously, while guiding a maximum of two missiles to each target.

The S-300PT is also a far more mobile system than its Iranian stablemates. It is not, however, a true mobile SAM system. The 5N63 radar system is not vehicle-borne, and is mounted on a towed trailer for transport. 40V6 mast assemblies are required to erect the 5N63 and 5N66 radar systems, although the 5N63 could remain on its trailer for operation if required. These factors lend the S-300PT to a fixed site layout rather than a mobile environment.

POSTULATED DEPLOYMENT

Four S-300PT batteries will result in a significant increase in overall capability, but are not enough to upgrade the entire Iranian air defense network. In order to maximize their effectiveness, Iran will likely adopt one of two deployment strategies. The systems will likely be deployed to protect either significant military facilities, or significant nuclear weapons research and production facilities, or a combination of the two.

Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend militarily significant sites, the following would be the likely locations:

-Tehran, home to Iran's military command
-Tabriz, home to Iran's silo-based missile deterrent
-Bushehr, home to an IrIAF fighter unit and S-200 battery covering much of the Persian Gulf region
-Bandar Abbas, Iran's primary naval facility in the Persian Gulf region and home to the Kilo submarine fleet

The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.


Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend significant nuclear weapons research and development sites, the four likely locations are as follows:

-Tehran, home to the nuclear research center
-Bushehr, home to the contentious nuclear reactor program
-Natanz, home to a fuel enrichment facility
-Esfahan, home to a uranium conversion facility

The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.


To illustrate the limited effect that the S-300PT's presence will have in the context of the overall Iranian air defense picture, consider the following image. In this image, the S-300PTs have been deployed at the nuclear facilities. HQ-2, S-200, and HAWK engagement zones are also displayed, the HQ-2 being denoted by dark red rings, the S-200 by light purple, and the HAWK by orange.


As can be seen, the short-range of even the 5V55RUD-equipped S-300PT does not result in a significant increase in capability. The S-300PT does have a multiple target engagement capability advantage, and this is why the system is likely to be deployed as a point defense asset to protect various facilities. To create a more potent air defense network overall, either a longer-range system would be required, or an increased number of S-300PT batteries.

HARDENED DEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS

On occasion, Iran has turned to North Korea for military assistance. It is possible that North Korea could be called upon to aid in increasing the survivability of Iran's most modern strategic SAM system through the use of hardened launch sites. North Korea has been shown to employ significant hardening techniques at S-125 (SA-3 GOA) and S-200 sites, to include the use of silos used to house the engagement radars, which are ostensibly fitted to elevating platforms. Similar techniques, if employed by the Iranians, could help to make the S-300PT systems far more survivable. Iran has shown a degree of competence in the field of hardened facilities recently with the silo-based missile complex at Tabriz, and could certainly undertake a hardened deployment of the S- 300PT on its own, but North Korean assistance in this regard may still be worthwhile given their experience with hardened siting of SAM systems.

Given the nature of the system, the S-300PT could be deployed in two separate types of hardened facility. The first would feature underground garages for the complete TELs. The second would feature much simpler hardened silos for the individual, sealed launch canisters.

The first example of a hardened site concept for the S-300PT system involves a below-ground, concrete hardened garage. Inside this garage, the 5P85 TEL is mounted. When elevated for launch, a retractable skirt would join the missile tubes with the silo opening. The silo would be covered with quick-opening launch doors, likely covered with debris or dirt when closed to assist in keeping the location hidden. A control bunker would be provided for launch crews, and an entry door would allow the removal of the TEL for maintenance or reloading. Finally, an exhaust extraction fan would prevent the buildup of toxic gasses inside the garage bay.

An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:


The alternative to basing the entire TEL inside of a hardened facility is to simply mount the individual launch canisters inside of hardened silos. These silos would be far cheaper to develop and maintain, and would require far less time to construct given their smaller scale. These remote launch facilities would consist of a number of silos, each containing four 5V55-series launch tubes. As the 5V55 missile tubes are sealed until launch, they could remain inside the silo until they are launched. The only above-ground component required would be a communications antenna, allowing launch commands to be transmitted from the fire control facility. If the radar is located in close proximity, the launch silos could be connected via more secure cables. However, using radio commands would permit the launch sites to be dispersed over greater distances, potentially making them much harder to locate. Basing the missile canisters inside of silo complexes also allows the TELs themselves to be held in reserve in the event that the silo complexes are destroyed, allowing Iran to retain the ability to redeploy the system should the need arise.

An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:


LACK OF EW SUPPORT

The main problem with such a small number of deployable batteries is that they cannot be employed to maximum effect. Doing so would involve the use of EW assets such as the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW radars to provide target acquisition data. the 5N63 engagement radar employed by the S-300PT can perform independent target acquisition functions, but the system is more effective with off-board cueing, providing quicker reaction times. A long-range radar system such as the 64N6 can also acquire targets at roughly twice the range of the 5N63, providing a greater degree of early warning and enhanced situational awareness.

As there is no evidence to suggest that Iran obtained either the 36D6 or the 64N6, it is likely that the batteries will, for the time being, be left to operate as independent units. In this regard, it is entirely possible that Iran may choose to keep its S-300PT batteries garrisoned, deploying them to predetermined locations when the need arises. The only issue with this strategy is that the S-300PT does require a semi-prepared site to operate from, and such sites, unless they are of the hardened, sub-surface variety described earlier, are easily located in overhead imagery.

CONCLUSION

The S-300PT represents the most advanced SAM system in the Iranian inventory. When the Belarussian systems are delivered, the four S-300PT batteries will represent a serious roadblock towards a limited incursion by an aggressor such as Israel seeking to destabilize the region by striking Iranian nuclear weapons production facilities. The S-300PT will not, however, close Iranian airspace to a large-scale aerial offensive. To achieve that goal, Iran must continue to pursue acquisition of more modern S-300PM-1/2 or S-400 SAM systems from Russia, and the EW systems to integrate them on a national level.

SOURCES

-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-SAM range data taken from Jane's Land-Based Air Defence
-"Iran set to acquire S-300PTs from Belarus" - Jane's International Defence Review, February 1, 2008

The Chinese SAM Network

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Current Developments

INTRODUCTION

Just a quick note to keep you all informed on the current goings-on related to this site and its content.

IMINT & ANALYSIS FEATURED IN JANE'S

As online subscribers have no doubt discovered, Jane's Missiles & Rockets has two articles in their February print edition featuring the work of this website. In "Iran may have lined up S-300 SAM systems", my work detailing Iran's air defense network is discussed. "China deploys KS-1A SAM" is a report detailing my discovery of the first KS-1A SAM site in China, featured first on this blog a month ago. Hopefully I can contribute more to Jane's and other industry-related publications in the future.

FORTHCOMING PROJECTS

The next three articles for this site are being prepared, and they are going to take a little bit of time, so bear with me. The most extensive is going to be an analysis of China's air defense network, with a good deal of future projection mixed in. Special attention will be given to air defenses along the Taiwan Strait. The other two articles are going to be a feature on Russian space surveillance facilities (inspired by my recent discovery of the Far East Krona site in Google Earth) and an analysis of the impact of the S-300PT in Iranian service.

SAM SITE PROJECTS

The SAM Site .kmz file for Google Earth is still updated on a regular basis whenever I have enough new locations to warrant uploading a new file. I am also looking at developing a document based on that data, something along the lines of a guide to worldwide SAM systems broken down by nation, and featuring location data and information on the numbers and types of individual components at each location.

THE S-300P

I am still preparing what should be the definitive look at the S-300P SAM system, to replace an earlier article on this site, as well as numerous other things. Smaller-scope articles will still be posted as time permits, but my current primary focus is on the Chinese article, so bear with me if the site appears stagnant for a week or so.

CONCLUSION

As always, comments are welcome and encouraged. I'd encourage visitors to post a comment to this thread to suggest ideas for future articles as well.

China's J-10: An Imagery Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The most important modernisation program underway within China's PLAAF is the introduction of the Chengdu J-10 into widespread service. The J-10 is a modern, 4th generation fighter aircraft combining a canard-delta layout with modern avionics and a BVR air-to-air weapon system. Careful analysis of current and past open-source overhead imagery has provided a detailed look at the current status of the J-10 program insofar as operational deployment is concerned. This highlights the value of overhead imagery as an analysis tool, as the J-10 program was not even officially acknowledged by the Chinese military until late 2006. Such secrecy is common in China, and goes a long way towards discrediting the various designs purported to represent the next-generation XXJ, which were revealed as far back as 2002. The fact that China refused to acknowledge an aircraft already visible in hundreds of photographs but at the same time was releasing images of the designs competing for a new stealthy fighter program would seem to be an obvious contradiction in policy, but that is another issue entirely.

TEST FACILITIES

Chengdu

Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) is the manufacturer of the J-10 fighter aircraft. Many of the early flight tests took place from Chengdu's facility located northwest of Chengdu in central China. Many of the prototypes are still located at the CAC facility and continue to serve various purposes in the continued development of the J-10.

The following image depicts the J-10 area at CAC's flight test facility:


Xian-Yanliang
Xian-Yanliang is home to the Chinese Flight Test Establishment, or CFTE. The CFTE handles the bulk of the flight test programs for the PLAAF, and as such evaluated the J-10 extensively. Xian-Yanliang is located to the northeast of Xian in central China.

The following image depicts a J-10 on the ramp at the CFTE facility:


Dingxin AB
Dingxin airbase, located in north central China near the Shuangchengzi missile test range, is home to a great deal of PLAAF flight test efforts. Pockmarked terrain and targets marked in the desert indicate that among other things, Dingxin is home to weapons integration testing. As such, J-10s have deployed to Dingxin on various occasions beginning in 2002 to conduct trials of the weapon system, including integration of the PL-12 ARH MRAAM.

The following image depicts a lineup of six J-10s on the ramp at Dingxin:


Imagery available in October of 2006 depicted three J-10s on the ramp at Dingxin, with one of the aircraft participating in an apparent display lineup for government or military officials, as seen in the images below:



Cangzhou AB and Jiugucheng AB

J-10s are visible in residence at two airbases known to be subordinate to the Chinese Flight Test & Training Center (FTTC). The FTTC is based at Cangzhou AB south of Beijing. It has been reported that between six and ten J-10s were delivered to Cangzhou in March of 2003 to form the 13th Operational Trials Regiment. Recent imagery taken from 2006 and 2007, however, suggests that six aircraft were delivered to Jiugucheng AB further south, a location also associated with the FTTC in some sources. This does not indicate that no J-10s were operated or are currently operated from Cangzhou AB, but as no J-10s are visible in available imagery of Cangzhou AB one can only speculate as to the status of any J-10 unit at that location.

At least three J-10s are still visible on the ramp at Jiugucheng AB, with six shelters having been constructed for housing the new fighters. The following two images illustrate the alteration of the ramp area. The first image depicts three J-10s sitting behind three of the four hangars, while the second image illustrates the fact that at least two more hangars have been constructed for the J-10s in residence, with a further eight hangars having been constructed for additional aircraft:



If the J-10 Operational Trials Regiment was in fact based at Cangzhou AB, it is possible that the unit based at Jiugucheng is the operational conversion unit tasked with pilot training for J-10 crews. Conversely, the opposite may be true; the OTR may have been based at Jiugucheng AB, with the larger 10 aircraft OCU being located at Cangzhou AB. Whatever the case may be, it is obvious that the J-10 has operated at some point in the past from Jiugucheng AB in some capacity, and the construction of the new hangar spaces does seem to indicate a more permanent presence than an Operational Trials Regiment, whose aircraft may have been reapportioned to operational units following the certicifation of the J-10 for operational service in 2004.

OPERATIONAL UNITS

Liuliang AB

The first operational J-10 unit was the 131st Air Regiment of the 44th Fighter Division. This unit formed between July and August of 2004.

The following image depicts the 28 shelters for the J-10s based at Liuliang AB, as seen in photographs of the PLAAF induction ceremony:


Changxing AB

The second operational J-10 unit formed in early 2006 at Changxing AB near Shanghai.

The following image depicts the 28 shelters for the J-10s based at Changxing AB, as well as a solitary J-10 parked on the open ramp:


Siuxi AB

The most recent J-10 unit known to have been formed became operational in 2007 at Siuxi AB, located in southern China north of Hainan Island. Currently available imagery is outdated and does not yet indicate any evidence of J-10 operations from this location.

CURRENT INVENTORY

The following image illustrates the current airbases where J-10s are known to operate or have operated in the past, as described above:


Analysis of the hangar spaces at Liuliang and Changxing air bases indicates that an operational J-10 regiment would consist of no fewer than 28 aircraft. Discounting test aircraft and accounting for the fact that the 4th Air Regiment is known to be operating out of Siuxi AB despite the fact that currently available imagery does not depict any newly constructed hangars for the J-10 unit, there should be no less than 84 J-10s between the three operational units, provided that they are all at full strength. There are also up to 16 other trials aircraft spread between Jiugucheng and Cangzhou airbases, indicating that over 100 J-10s may have been produced to date when the various flight test articles held by Chengdu are accounted for.

The next J-10 unit to enter operational service will most likely be found in either the Nanjing or Guangzhou Military Region. Found across the strait from Formosa, the presence of a J-10 unit in this geographical region would fill a current gap between Changxing and Siuxi airbases.

CONCLUSION

Replacing the large numbers of J-7s with the new J-10 is a top priority for the PLAAF. The J-10 is by far the most advanced aircraft yet to be produced by the Chinese military aviation complex, and as such will enable the PLAAF to be far more effective in a modern air combat environment. With hundreds of FLANKER-family aircraft already in service, and up to 300 J-10s projected to be produced, the PLAAF is rapidly becoming one of the more modern and well equipped air arms in the world, a welcome change from as recently as ten years ago when FLANKERs were scarce, and aged designs like the J-7 and J-8 were relied upon to provide the bulk of the Chinese air combat force.

SOURCES

-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

Scramble
Sinodefence
Chinese Military Aviation