Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Thursday, May 1, 2008
The Cypriot Missile Crisis
INTRODUCTION
Between January of 1997 and December of 1998 a conflict was brewing in the eastern Mediterranean that threatened to launch an armed conflict between two NATO powers, Greece and Turkey. The Cypriot government, much to the apparent dismay of its eastern neighbors in Ankara, made a bold move by purchasing the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) strategic SAM system from Russia. What followed was a chain of events that threatened to result in open warfare.
CYPRIOT AIR DEFENSE ISSUES
The island nation of Cyprus has had a long and sometimes violent history. Currently, the internationally recognized government of Cyprus controls approximately two thirds of the island, with roughly 35,000 Turkish troops occupying the remaining third, a situation that has existed since 1974. The government of Cyprus enjoys support from the Greek government in Athens, with the Turkish government in Ankara supporting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the occupied territory.
In 1995, the government of Cyprus began to examine the possibility of procuring an air defense system. Turkish military aircraft had frequently been seen over the skies of Cyprus with no regard to territorial sovereignty, and the December 1995 announcement of the sale of the ATACMs missile system to the Turkish military represented a new threat system capable of hitting targets in Cyprus from the safety of Turkey.
Cypriot Foreign Minister Alecos Michaelides announced the purchase of the Russian S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system on January 5th, 1997. The terms of the deal were not disclosed, with estimates of between $230 million and $600 million appearing in the open press. The S-300PMU-1 appeared to be an ideal fit for Cyprus with regard to the threats it faced. The 150 kilometer range SAM system would allow Cyprus to monitor the airspace over the entire island, and the associated 64N6E (BIG BIRD D) EW and battle management radar would provide adequate early warning of any inbound Turkish military aircraft. The system was also advertised as having an ATBM capability, allowing it to deal with the forthcoming ATACMs missile system being procured for the Turkish military.
A NEW MISSILE CRISIS
Turkish reaction to the Cypriot SAM purchase was extremely stern. On the 11th of January in 1997 the Washington Times reported that Turkey threatened a pre-emptive strike against Cyprus in order to block the deployment of the missiles. The political back and forth proceeded as the rest of Europe awaited the outcome.
The stern reaction by the Turkish government does not appear to have been logical. Firstly, the S-300PMU-1 is a defensive asset. While the associated radar systems would have been able to peer into a portion of Turkey, no military air bases came under the coverage of either the 150 kilometer engagement range of the missile system of the 300 kilometer detection range of the 64N6E EW radar. Secondly, Turkey formally recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 (being the only nation to do so). By default, that admission recognizes the Turkish occupied portion of Cyprus as a separate independent nation from the rest of Cyprus. With the de facto admission of the sovereignty of Greek-supported Cyprus, Turkey had no basis for threatening a sovereign nation or interfering in its internal affairs. In a similar vein, Turkey was incensed in June of 1997 when Greek F-16s landed at Paphos Air Base in Cyprus, as a part of expanding defense ties between the two nations due in no small part to Turkish aggression over the S-300PMU-1 purchase. Once again, Turkey insisted on governing the internal affairs of an admittedly sovereign nation. The Turkish reaction was to examine the possibility of an airstrike against Paphos, irregardless of the fact that this would certainly lead to a confrontation with Greece.
The Russian reaction to the evolving crisis was certainly interesting. Russia fervently maintained that the sale would proceed. After the Turkish government began to board and search vessels travelling to Cyprus, the Russian reaction became far more ominous. In October of 1997 the Russian Ambassador to Cyprus, Georgy Muratov, went so far as to state that any Turkish interference with the delivery of the missile systems would be treated as an act of war. Later, Russia examined the possibility of escorting the transport vessels with a naval surface action group, containing both the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the guided missile cruiser Peter the Great. This would appear to be an overly aggressive posture to protect a simple export sale of a few SAM batteries, but Russia wanted to ensure that their entry into the arms market in Western Europe was not interfered with.
Despite continued threats from Turkey, the Cypriot government seemed willing to negotiate over the issue of the SAM systems. Various proposals were made to the Turkish government in an attempt to dissolve the crisis, but all were rejected. Perhaps the most interesting was a proposal from Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides to disarm the Cypriot national guard and place the funds from the defense budget in a UN account to improve infrastructure in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. His proposal was rejected by the Turkish government. In the end, President Clerides negotiated an agreement with Greece whereby the S-300PMU-1 components would be delivered to the Greek island of Crete, where they would remain under Cypriot control. Turkey decired this move as well.
CYPRIOT S-300PMU-1 FACILITIES
While no S-300PMU-1 SAM systems were ever deployed to Cyprus, Russian technicians did travel to the island nation and construct three sites, two for the missile systems and one for the 64N6E EW and battle management radar. One missile site, along with the 64N6E site, was constructed atop Mount Olympus. The second missile site was constructed in the western part of the island near Drousha. Imagery obtained of the Mount Olympus sites in September of 2003 depicts unused but complete facilities, suggesting that the S-300PMU-1 batteries would have been able to become operational in short order had they been delivered.
The Cypriot S-300PMU-1 facilities were located at the following coordinates:
34°56'39.26"N 32°51'49.19"E (Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1)
34°57'47.46"N 32°22'34.23"E (Drousha S-300PMU-1)
33°56'18.09"N 32°51'40.93"E (Mount Olympus 64N6E EW site)
The following image depicts the location of the aforementioned facilities on the island of Cyprus:
The following image depicts the coverage provided by the S-300PMU-1 components had they been deployed. S-300PMU-1 range rings are red, while the blue ring denotes the range of the 64N6E EW radar.
As can be seen in the image above, the system did not pose a significant threat to Turkish interests. It did, however, have the ability to monitor a great deal of airspace in Lebanon, perhaps representing the source of alleged Israeli objections to the deployment of the systems.
The S-300PMU-1 sites constructed on Cyprus exhibited a layout not before seen in any other S-300P family SAM deployment. It is possible that the sites were constructed with regard to the potential threat posed by the Turkish ATACMS missile system. Nevertheless, certain features can still be positively identified. Each site features four revetments, each intended to house a single TEL. Two TET pads for emplacing 40V6 mast assemblies, capable of mounting either the 30N6E1 (TOMB STONE) engagement radar or the 76N6E (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar, are present. If mobility is desired, what appears to be a raised berm for mounting the 30N6E1 is also provided. Various support facilities are present as well.
The following image depicts the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site:
Although it is of considerably lower resolution, the following image depicts the Drousha S-300PMU-1 site. The lower resolution does not preclude the identification of various elements of the site.
The following image has been constructed by extracting various system components from other imagery in order to depict what an operational S-300PMU-1 site may have looked like:
The 64N6E site is located adjacent to the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site. In this instance, many of the site elements take on a more traditional appearance and can be found in nearly identical fashion at other 64N6-series sites worldwide. The most prominent features are the typical command bunker, a bunker for support vehicles, and what appears to be a raised berm for housing the 64N6E radar system. Alternatively, there is a radome which may also have been intended to house the 64N6E radar array. Protecting the radar array in such a fashion is not out of the question due to the fixed nature of the site.
The following image depicts the Mount Olympus 64N6E site:
The presence of only two prepared sites configured to support an S-300PMU-1 battery would seem to indicate that only two batteries were ordered.
THE S-300PMU-1 ON CRETE
Following Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides' December 1998 decision not to deploy the Russian strategic SAM system on Cyprus, the Greek government agreed to allow the weapons to be deployed on the Greek island of Crete. Turkey continued to complain, as it was stated that the systems would still be under Cypriot ownership, but the relocation of the systems to Crete would effectively neutralize them as they would no longer have the range necessary to threaten Turkish airspace. Naturally, the issue of a future deployment of the SAMs to Cyprus was not addressed, ostensibly to placate the Turkish government into backing down from threatening military action against the defensive systems. In return for not deploying the S-300PMU-1 in Cyprus, Greece agreed to transfer a number of Tor-M1 TELARs to Cyprus for air defense.
S-300PMU-1 components were delivered to Crete by Russia in April of 1999. Initially, the S-300PMU-1 components were located at Nikos Kazantzakis. Shortly thereafter, at least some of the components were transferred to Tympaki, where the support facilities for the system had been located. By 2004, an S-300PMU-1 battery had been relocated back to Nikos Kazantzakis, along with the associated 64N6E EW radar complex. This battery was deployed to provide air defense for the 2004 Summer Olympics being held in Athens. Analysis of open source imagery indicates that the battery deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis remained there as of June 2007, with the 64N6 radar no longer deployed. Elements of a second battery were still present at Tympaki as of January 2005.
The S-300PMU-1 facilities on the island of Crete are located at the following coordinates:
35°20'33.79"N 25°10'58.77"E (Nikos Kazantzakis)
35°19'52.02"N 25°13'20.74"E (64N6E EW site)
35°04'02.43"N 24°45'10.01"E (Tympaki)
The locations of the aforementioned sites can be seen in the following image:
The Nikos Kazantzakis S-300PMU-1 deployment is organized in two areas on the grounds of Heraklion International Airport. The actual deployment site lies along the northeastern end of the main runway, with a garrison area for system components being found to the southeast of the airport terminal.
The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 components deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis:
The following image depicts the garrison area at Nikos Kazantzakis:
Interestingly, it would appear that there are two 30N6E1 engagement radars at Nikos Kazantzakis, suggesting that more than two batteries may have been delivered. Standard practice is to purchase one engagement radar for each battery. It is also possible that the second radar was deployed from Tympaki to support the continued operation of the system after the Olympics and simply has not been redeployed.
Open source photographs of the 64N6E radar system in operation has allowed the early warning and battle management site to be located. When the image was captured in June of 2007 the 64N6E had been removed, but the location is correct based on analysis of terrain features in the area. The photographs used to determine the location of the 64N6E emplacement will not be posted here in order to respect the copyrights of the respective owners.
The 64N6E location can be seen in the image below:
The Tympaki S-300PMU-1 garrison and support facility is located on the grounds of the former Tympaki Air Base along the southern coast of Crete. While the system was deployed to Nikos Kazantzakis for operational use in 2004, there is nothing precluding an S-300PMU-1 battery from operating at Tympaki. Imagery acquired in January of 2005 depicted a nearly complete battery in residence, supporting the theory that only two batteries were delivered (the second battery likely still residing at Nikos Kazantzakis). A 30N6E1 engagement radar can be seen in operation, as well as three TELs and a stowed 40V6 mast assembly for the 76N6E low altitude detection radar. The only limiting factor to operating an S-300PMU-1 battery out of Tympaki would be terrain. A large mountain range bisects the two S-300PMU-1 facilities on either coast, which would cause problems if the 64N6E EW and battle management radar was emplaced at the previously identified location east of Nikos Kazantzakis to support both batteries.
The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 facility at Tympaki:
In December of 2007, Cypriot ownership of the S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system came to an end. An agreement was signed to formally transfer ownership of the systems to Greece, effectively ending a ten year political incident. Formal Greek inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the Hellenic air defense network would fill a large gap along the southern flank of Greek territory. As the following image demonstrates, activating both S-300PMU-1 batteries would provide air defense for the entire island of Crete and a large portion of the surrounding airspace. The range of the 64N6E radar is illustrated as a blue ring, with red rings denoting the engagement zones of S-300PMU-1 batteries deployed at each identified associated location.
Greece currently relies on three PATRIOT and two HAWK batteries for air defense. The following image illustrates that the inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the overall air defense network would allow for a significant increase in capability along Greece's southern flanks. S-300PMU-1 and PATRIOT ranges are depicted as red rings, HAWK ranges are depicted as orange rings, and the 64N6E radar range is depicted as a blue ring.
REPLACING THE S-300
With the S-300PMU-1 out of the equation, Cyprus still sought a solution to the air defense question. A long-range system was clearly no longer a viable option unless Cyprus desired to continue enhancing the Greek air defense network. Cypriot officials were not overly enamored of the Tor-M1 systems provided by Greece, as they had a short range precluding any significant impact on the nation's air defense posture. Cyprus may have found a solution in another Russian SAM product, the Buk-M1 (SA-11 GADFLY).
In March of 1999 Turkish newspapers were reporting the sale of the Buk-M1 to Cyprus. While not a strategic SAM system in the vein of the S-300PMU-1, the Buk-M1 has a respectable engagement range of 35 kilometers and also enjoys an advertised ATBM capability. Being a tactical system not tied to a fixed, prepared site, the Buk-M1 is also highly mobile, complicating any potential targeting efforts.
Examination of military installations in Cyprus has resulted in the location of two facilities which may be home to Cypriot Buk-M1 components. Imagery captured in October of 2003 depicts what may be a garrison facility as well as a hardened storage site for housing missile reloads or system components themselves.
The garrison site, located at 34°54'27.17"N 33°20'22.88"E, can be seen in the image below. The site appears to be well maintained and displays features in common with the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 facilities, suggesting possible Russian invovlement in its construction.
The hardened storage facility, located at 34°53'51.77"N 33°20'14.42"E, can be seen in the image below. A possible 9A310 TELAR can be seen in the entrance of one of the bunkers. The object compares well with field deployed 9A310 TELARs identified in Russia.
While the S-300PMU-1 purchase was widely reported, it would appear that any Buk-M1 deal has been kept out of the public eye. This was likely done in an effort to avoid yet another diplomatic exercise with Turkey. It is possible that Greece acted as the buyer for Cyprus. A Ria Novosti article in December of 2007 alleged that Greece had procured the Buk-M1-2 system at some point in the past, a 45 kilometer evolution of the Buk-M1 incorporating the 9M317 missile from the Buk-M2 system. Whatever the case may be, the evidence suggests that Cyprus has in fact procured some variant of the Buk family to solve its air defense question.
CONCLUSION
Despite continued posturing by the Turkish government after the plan to deliver the S-300PMU-1 systems to Crete was announced, the conflict rapidly abated. While the issue of Cyprus itself still remains unresolved, on this occasion cooler heads prevailed to ensure that the once-likely military conflict did not transpire. What remains is perhaps a new understanding of the many issues facing the nations resolved to end the political conflict continuing to grasp the island nation.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Turkey opposed to new deployment
S-300PMU-1 deployment cancelled
Athens speaks on Crete deployment
Conflict averted
International lawlessness
Greek MoD on Crete deployment
Disarmament diplomacy
S-300s transferred to Greece
Countdown to conflict?
Cypriot crisis timeline
Effect of missile sale on Cyprus situation
Cyprus knot
A case of brinkmanship
Russian missiles arrive in Greece
Cyprus to receive Tor-M1
Greek Buk-M1-2?
Cypriot Buk-M1 purchase
S-300s to Tympaki
S-300s defend Athens Olympics
Between January of 1997 and December of 1998 a conflict was brewing in the eastern Mediterranean that threatened to launch an armed conflict between two NATO powers, Greece and Turkey. The Cypriot government, much to the apparent dismay of its eastern neighbors in Ankara, made a bold move by purchasing the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) strategic SAM system from Russia. What followed was a chain of events that threatened to result in open warfare.
CYPRIOT AIR DEFENSE ISSUES
The island nation of Cyprus has had a long and sometimes violent history. Currently, the internationally recognized government of Cyprus controls approximately two thirds of the island, with roughly 35,000 Turkish troops occupying the remaining third, a situation that has existed since 1974. The government of Cyprus enjoys support from the Greek government in Athens, with the Turkish government in Ankara supporting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the occupied territory.
In 1995, the government of Cyprus began to examine the possibility of procuring an air defense system. Turkish military aircraft had frequently been seen over the skies of Cyprus with no regard to territorial sovereignty, and the December 1995 announcement of the sale of the ATACMs missile system to the Turkish military represented a new threat system capable of hitting targets in Cyprus from the safety of Turkey.
Cypriot Foreign Minister Alecos Michaelides announced the purchase of the Russian S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system on January 5th, 1997. The terms of the deal were not disclosed, with estimates of between $230 million and $600 million appearing in the open press. The S-300PMU-1 appeared to be an ideal fit for Cyprus with regard to the threats it faced. The 150 kilometer range SAM system would allow Cyprus to monitor the airspace over the entire island, and the associated 64N6E (BIG BIRD D) EW and battle management radar would provide adequate early warning of any inbound Turkish military aircraft. The system was also advertised as having an ATBM capability, allowing it to deal with the forthcoming ATACMs missile system being procured for the Turkish military.
A NEW MISSILE CRISIS
Turkish reaction to the Cypriot SAM purchase was extremely stern. On the 11th of January in 1997 the Washington Times reported that Turkey threatened a pre-emptive strike against Cyprus in order to block the deployment of the missiles. The political back and forth proceeded as the rest of Europe awaited the outcome.
The stern reaction by the Turkish government does not appear to have been logical. Firstly, the S-300PMU-1 is a defensive asset. While the associated radar systems would have been able to peer into a portion of Turkey, no military air bases came under the coverage of either the 150 kilometer engagement range of the missile system of the 300 kilometer detection range of the 64N6E EW radar. Secondly, Turkey formally recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 (being the only nation to do so). By default, that admission recognizes the Turkish occupied portion of Cyprus as a separate independent nation from the rest of Cyprus. With the de facto admission of the sovereignty of Greek-supported Cyprus, Turkey had no basis for threatening a sovereign nation or interfering in its internal affairs. In a similar vein, Turkey was incensed in June of 1997 when Greek F-16s landed at Paphos Air Base in Cyprus, as a part of expanding defense ties between the two nations due in no small part to Turkish aggression over the S-300PMU-1 purchase. Once again, Turkey insisted on governing the internal affairs of an admittedly sovereign nation. The Turkish reaction was to examine the possibility of an airstrike against Paphos, irregardless of the fact that this would certainly lead to a confrontation with Greece.
The Russian reaction to the evolving crisis was certainly interesting. Russia fervently maintained that the sale would proceed. After the Turkish government began to board and search vessels travelling to Cyprus, the Russian reaction became far more ominous. In October of 1997 the Russian Ambassador to Cyprus, Georgy Muratov, went so far as to state that any Turkish interference with the delivery of the missile systems would be treated as an act of war. Later, Russia examined the possibility of escorting the transport vessels with a naval surface action group, containing both the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the guided missile cruiser Peter the Great. This would appear to be an overly aggressive posture to protect a simple export sale of a few SAM batteries, but Russia wanted to ensure that their entry into the arms market in Western Europe was not interfered with.
Despite continued threats from Turkey, the Cypriot government seemed willing to negotiate over the issue of the SAM systems. Various proposals were made to the Turkish government in an attempt to dissolve the crisis, but all were rejected. Perhaps the most interesting was a proposal from Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides to disarm the Cypriot national guard and place the funds from the defense budget in a UN account to improve infrastructure in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. His proposal was rejected by the Turkish government. In the end, President Clerides negotiated an agreement with Greece whereby the S-300PMU-1 components would be delivered to the Greek island of Crete, where they would remain under Cypriot control. Turkey decired this move as well.
CYPRIOT S-300PMU-1 FACILITIES
While no S-300PMU-1 SAM systems were ever deployed to Cyprus, Russian technicians did travel to the island nation and construct three sites, two for the missile systems and one for the 64N6E EW and battle management radar. One missile site, along with the 64N6E site, was constructed atop Mount Olympus. The second missile site was constructed in the western part of the island near Drousha. Imagery obtained of the Mount Olympus sites in September of 2003 depicts unused but complete facilities, suggesting that the S-300PMU-1 batteries would have been able to become operational in short order had they been delivered.
The Cypriot S-300PMU-1 facilities were located at the following coordinates:
34°56'39.26"N 32°51'49.19"E (Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1)
34°57'47.46"N 32°22'34.23"E (Drousha S-300PMU-1)
33°56'18.09"N 32°51'40.93"E (Mount Olympus 64N6E EW site)
The following image depicts the location of the aforementioned facilities on the island of Cyprus:
The following image depicts the coverage provided by the S-300PMU-1 components had they been deployed. S-300PMU-1 range rings are red, while the blue ring denotes the range of the 64N6E EW radar.
As can be seen in the image above, the system did not pose a significant threat to Turkish interests. It did, however, have the ability to monitor a great deal of airspace in Lebanon, perhaps representing the source of alleged Israeli objections to the deployment of the systems.
The S-300PMU-1 sites constructed on Cyprus exhibited a layout not before seen in any other S-300P family SAM deployment. It is possible that the sites were constructed with regard to the potential threat posed by the Turkish ATACMS missile system. Nevertheless, certain features can still be positively identified. Each site features four revetments, each intended to house a single TEL. Two TET pads for emplacing 40V6 mast assemblies, capable of mounting either the 30N6E1 (TOMB STONE) engagement radar or the 76N6E (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar, are present. If mobility is desired, what appears to be a raised berm for mounting the 30N6E1 is also provided. Various support facilities are present as well.
The following image depicts the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site:
Although it is of considerably lower resolution, the following image depicts the Drousha S-300PMU-1 site. The lower resolution does not preclude the identification of various elements of the site.
The following image has been constructed by extracting various system components from other imagery in order to depict what an operational S-300PMU-1 site may have looked like:
The 64N6E site is located adjacent to the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site. In this instance, many of the site elements take on a more traditional appearance and can be found in nearly identical fashion at other 64N6-series sites worldwide. The most prominent features are the typical command bunker, a bunker for support vehicles, and what appears to be a raised berm for housing the 64N6E radar system. Alternatively, there is a radome which may also have been intended to house the 64N6E radar array. Protecting the radar array in such a fashion is not out of the question due to the fixed nature of the site.
The following image depicts the Mount Olympus 64N6E site:
The presence of only two prepared sites configured to support an S-300PMU-1 battery would seem to indicate that only two batteries were ordered.
THE S-300PMU-1 ON CRETE
Following Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides' December 1998 decision not to deploy the Russian strategic SAM system on Cyprus, the Greek government agreed to allow the weapons to be deployed on the Greek island of Crete. Turkey continued to complain, as it was stated that the systems would still be under Cypriot ownership, but the relocation of the systems to Crete would effectively neutralize them as they would no longer have the range necessary to threaten Turkish airspace. Naturally, the issue of a future deployment of the SAMs to Cyprus was not addressed, ostensibly to placate the Turkish government into backing down from threatening military action against the defensive systems. In return for not deploying the S-300PMU-1 in Cyprus, Greece agreed to transfer a number of Tor-M1 TELARs to Cyprus for air defense.
S-300PMU-1 components were delivered to Crete by Russia in April of 1999. Initially, the S-300PMU-1 components were located at Nikos Kazantzakis. Shortly thereafter, at least some of the components were transferred to Tympaki, where the support facilities for the system had been located. By 2004, an S-300PMU-1 battery had been relocated back to Nikos Kazantzakis, along with the associated 64N6E EW radar complex. This battery was deployed to provide air defense for the 2004 Summer Olympics being held in Athens. Analysis of open source imagery indicates that the battery deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis remained there as of June 2007, with the 64N6 radar no longer deployed. Elements of a second battery were still present at Tympaki as of January 2005.
The S-300PMU-1 facilities on the island of Crete are located at the following coordinates:
35°20'33.79"N 25°10'58.77"E (Nikos Kazantzakis)
35°19'52.02"N 25°13'20.74"E (64N6E EW site)
35°04'02.43"N 24°45'10.01"E (Tympaki)
The locations of the aforementioned sites can be seen in the following image:
The Nikos Kazantzakis S-300PMU-1 deployment is organized in two areas on the grounds of Heraklion International Airport. The actual deployment site lies along the northeastern end of the main runway, with a garrison area for system components being found to the southeast of the airport terminal.
The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 components deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis:
The following image depicts the garrison area at Nikos Kazantzakis:
Interestingly, it would appear that there are two 30N6E1 engagement radars at Nikos Kazantzakis, suggesting that more than two batteries may have been delivered. Standard practice is to purchase one engagement radar for each battery. It is also possible that the second radar was deployed from Tympaki to support the continued operation of the system after the Olympics and simply has not been redeployed.
Open source photographs of the 64N6E radar system in operation has allowed the early warning and battle management site to be located. When the image was captured in June of 2007 the 64N6E had been removed, but the location is correct based on analysis of terrain features in the area. The photographs used to determine the location of the 64N6E emplacement will not be posted here in order to respect the copyrights of the respective owners.
The 64N6E location can be seen in the image below:
The Tympaki S-300PMU-1 garrison and support facility is located on the grounds of the former Tympaki Air Base along the southern coast of Crete. While the system was deployed to Nikos Kazantzakis for operational use in 2004, there is nothing precluding an S-300PMU-1 battery from operating at Tympaki. Imagery acquired in January of 2005 depicted a nearly complete battery in residence, supporting the theory that only two batteries were delivered (the second battery likely still residing at Nikos Kazantzakis). A 30N6E1 engagement radar can be seen in operation, as well as three TELs and a stowed 40V6 mast assembly for the 76N6E low altitude detection radar. The only limiting factor to operating an S-300PMU-1 battery out of Tympaki would be terrain. A large mountain range bisects the two S-300PMU-1 facilities on either coast, which would cause problems if the 64N6E EW and battle management radar was emplaced at the previously identified location east of Nikos Kazantzakis to support both batteries.
The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 facility at Tympaki:
In December of 2007, Cypriot ownership of the S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system came to an end. An agreement was signed to formally transfer ownership of the systems to Greece, effectively ending a ten year political incident. Formal Greek inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the Hellenic air defense network would fill a large gap along the southern flank of Greek territory. As the following image demonstrates, activating both S-300PMU-1 batteries would provide air defense for the entire island of Crete and a large portion of the surrounding airspace. The range of the 64N6E radar is illustrated as a blue ring, with red rings denoting the engagement zones of S-300PMU-1 batteries deployed at each identified associated location.
Greece currently relies on three PATRIOT and two HAWK batteries for air defense. The following image illustrates that the inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the overall air defense network would allow for a significant increase in capability along Greece's southern flanks. S-300PMU-1 and PATRIOT ranges are depicted as red rings, HAWK ranges are depicted as orange rings, and the 64N6E radar range is depicted as a blue ring.
REPLACING THE S-300
With the S-300PMU-1 out of the equation, Cyprus still sought a solution to the air defense question. A long-range system was clearly no longer a viable option unless Cyprus desired to continue enhancing the Greek air defense network. Cypriot officials were not overly enamored of the Tor-M1 systems provided by Greece, as they had a short range precluding any significant impact on the nation's air defense posture. Cyprus may have found a solution in another Russian SAM product, the Buk-M1 (SA-11 GADFLY).
In March of 1999 Turkish newspapers were reporting the sale of the Buk-M1 to Cyprus. While not a strategic SAM system in the vein of the S-300PMU-1, the Buk-M1 has a respectable engagement range of 35 kilometers and also enjoys an advertised ATBM capability. Being a tactical system not tied to a fixed, prepared site, the Buk-M1 is also highly mobile, complicating any potential targeting efforts.
Examination of military installations in Cyprus has resulted in the location of two facilities which may be home to Cypriot Buk-M1 components. Imagery captured in October of 2003 depicts what may be a garrison facility as well as a hardened storage site for housing missile reloads or system components themselves.
The garrison site, located at 34°54'27.17"N 33°20'22.88"E, can be seen in the image below. The site appears to be well maintained and displays features in common with the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 facilities, suggesting possible Russian invovlement in its construction.
The hardened storage facility, located at 34°53'51.77"N 33°20'14.42"E, can be seen in the image below. A possible 9A310 TELAR can be seen in the entrance of one of the bunkers. The object compares well with field deployed 9A310 TELARs identified in Russia.
While the S-300PMU-1 purchase was widely reported, it would appear that any Buk-M1 deal has been kept out of the public eye. This was likely done in an effort to avoid yet another diplomatic exercise with Turkey. It is possible that Greece acted as the buyer for Cyprus. A Ria Novosti article in December of 2007 alleged that Greece had procured the Buk-M1-2 system at some point in the past, a 45 kilometer evolution of the Buk-M1 incorporating the 9M317 missile from the Buk-M2 system. Whatever the case may be, the evidence suggests that Cyprus has in fact procured some variant of the Buk family to solve its air defense question.
CONCLUSION
Despite continued posturing by the Turkish government after the plan to deliver the S-300PMU-1 systems to Crete was announced, the conflict rapidly abated. While the issue of Cyprus itself still remains unresolved, on this occasion cooler heads prevailed to ensure that the once-likely military conflict did not transpire. What remains is perhaps a new understanding of the many issues facing the nations resolved to end the political conflict continuing to grasp the island nation.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Turkey opposed to new deployment
S-300PMU-1 deployment cancelled
Athens speaks on Crete deployment
Conflict averted
International lawlessness
Greek MoD on Crete deployment
Disarmament diplomacy
S-300s transferred to Greece
Countdown to conflict?
Cypriot crisis timeline
Effect of missile sale on Cyprus situation
Cyprus knot
A case of brinkmanship
Russian missiles arrive in Greece
Cyprus to receive Tor-M1
Greek Buk-M1-2?
Cypriot Buk-M1 purchase
S-300s to Tympaki
S-300s defend Athens Olympics
Monday, April 28, 2008
Syria and North Korea: Nuclear Partners?
INTRODUCTION
On the 25th of April President Bashar Assad of Syria issued a rebuttal to US claims of a nuclear reactor program in Eastern Syria. The site in question was violently thrust into world view on the 6th of September, 2007 when an illegal Israeli air raid destroyed the facility. Israel has refused to comment on the action, ostensibly in order to refrain from having to admit to such a blatant violation of Syrian territorial sovereignty, and Syria showed great restraint by not justifiably retaliating against the naked aggression of its Jewish neighbor. Fast forward to the 24th of April of this year, and the United States released information describing the facility as a nuclear reactor being constructed with the assistance of North Korea.
POWER OR PLUTONIUM?
Syrian intentions for the reactor complex were unclear, but analysts have theorized that a lack of any major infrastructure in the area indicated that the reactor was not intended for power production. Coupled with the fact that there are no major population centers in the area to make use of any electricity generated by the complex, it would appear that the analysts have come to the correct conclusion. The obvious alternative, given the North Korean assistance in the matter, was to create a reactor able to produce weapons-grade plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon.
THE NORTH KOREAN CONNECTION
The reasoning behind the presence of a nuclear material production facility inside of Syria is not necessarily as clear-cut as it may seem. The obvious inference is that it was intended to produce nuclear material to support a Syrian nuclear weapons program. A Syrian nuclear weapons program would certainly have provided the impetus behind Israel's action of September, 2007. However, the reports of North Korean aid, bolstered by images released depicting a reactor complex startlingly similar to the one in place at Yongbyon, North Korea, may indicate a far more sinister purpose.
The North Korean government is currently negotiating with the United States under the framework of the Six Party Talks to halt nuclear proliferation activity in return for diplomatic and economic concessions from the West. The talks have currently reached an impasse, as the North Koreans are reluctant to reveal details regarding their past proliferation activities, including any aid to Syria in this regard. North Korea has made progress with regard to halting its own nuclear activity, including the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea still views the United States as a significant military threat on the peninsula, and their sudden agreement in February of 2007 to shut down the Yongbyon reactor facility raises serious questions. The reactor facility was inspected by the IAEA, who verified its shutdown in August of 2007. US intelligence officials have claimed that the Syrian complex may have been within weeks of becoming operational when it was destroyed in September of that year. The connection that seems to be eluding the intelligence services as well as the media outlets reporting on the incident is whether or not North Korea would have benefitted from the Syrian reactor's output of nuclear material. It is possible that the purpose of the Syrian reactor complex was to benefit both Syrian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Analysts have noted that there does not appear to have been any enrichment facilities located on-site, facilities which would have been needed in order to transform the reactor's plutonium output into true weapons-grade material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon. By placing the enrichment facilities at a separate location, Syria achieves two things. First, less attention is drawn to the facility. Second, the plutonium by-product must therefore be transported to an enrichment facility. It would not be difficult to mask the transfer of some or all of the plutonium to a ship or aircraft bound for North Korea, allowing the North Koreans to continue their nuclear weapon production while at the same time preserving an air of cooperation in the eyes of the world with the shutdown of their own reactor complex. Alternatively, North Korea may have simply intended to construct a separate weapons production facility inside of Syria with the intent of arming both nations. Given that North Korea has far greater knowledge on the subject of nuclear weapons design and production than Syria, enlisting their aid in that regard would be a logical maneuver.
LACK OF AIR DEFENSES
In his statement, President Assad claimed that the facility in question was an unused military complex, but he would not specify its purpose. Assad claimed that the site was obviously not a nuclear related facility, as it was not protected by any air defense systems. Unfortunately, Assad's claims, regardless of the true nature of the facility, are completely illogical. Eastern Syria would be a logical site for a covert nuclear facility. The location of the site is directly adjacent to a river, providing the necessary water source for cooling the reactor. Also, the site is not near any major military facilities, meaning that it was an unlikely target for surveillance. The lack of any air defense systems also aids the covert nature of the location. Any major SAM system, for example, would emit tell-tale signals from its radar systems, signals which would be tracked and identified by intelligence services. The appearance of air defense systems where none were present previously would only serve to attract unwanted attention to the area. Syria made the right strategic move by not defending the site with any significant military presence. Unfortunately, it would seem that their denial and deception efforts ultimately failed due to a human intelligence source on-site which is the likely source of the videotaped evidence shown by the US government to illustrate the nuclear nature of the facility.
CONCLUSION
This incident highlights the need for more significant diplomatic pressure to be palced on nuclear weapons states with regard to proliferation. Syria has a significant terrorist connection with Hizbullah and a significant diplomatic connection with Iran, two entities which could have benefitted from a Syrian nuclear weapons program, with potentially catastrophic results. While the unilateral decision of Israel to attack and destroy the facility cannot and should not be condoned, neither should the effort by Syria to construct a nuclear reactor under the nose of the IAEA in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, of which Syria is a signatory. Neither should bringing such an issue to the attention of the international community be screened on the basis of Israeli interests, as suggested by Senator Susan Collins of Maine.
SOURCES
Syria denies nuke allegations
IAEA reaction to US evidence
North Korean nuclear program timeline
6 Party Talks
On the 25th of April President Bashar Assad of Syria issued a rebuttal to US claims of a nuclear reactor program in Eastern Syria. The site in question was violently thrust into world view on the 6th of September, 2007 when an illegal Israeli air raid destroyed the facility. Israel has refused to comment on the action, ostensibly in order to refrain from having to admit to such a blatant violation of Syrian territorial sovereignty, and Syria showed great restraint by not justifiably retaliating against the naked aggression of its Jewish neighbor. Fast forward to the 24th of April of this year, and the United States released information describing the facility as a nuclear reactor being constructed with the assistance of North Korea.
POWER OR PLUTONIUM?
Syrian intentions for the reactor complex were unclear, but analysts have theorized that a lack of any major infrastructure in the area indicated that the reactor was not intended for power production. Coupled with the fact that there are no major population centers in the area to make use of any electricity generated by the complex, it would appear that the analysts have come to the correct conclusion. The obvious alternative, given the North Korean assistance in the matter, was to create a reactor able to produce weapons-grade plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon.
THE NORTH KOREAN CONNECTION
The reasoning behind the presence of a nuclear material production facility inside of Syria is not necessarily as clear-cut as it may seem. The obvious inference is that it was intended to produce nuclear material to support a Syrian nuclear weapons program. A Syrian nuclear weapons program would certainly have provided the impetus behind Israel's action of September, 2007. However, the reports of North Korean aid, bolstered by images released depicting a reactor complex startlingly similar to the one in place at Yongbyon, North Korea, may indicate a far more sinister purpose.
The North Korean government is currently negotiating with the United States under the framework of the Six Party Talks to halt nuclear proliferation activity in return for diplomatic and economic concessions from the West. The talks have currently reached an impasse, as the North Koreans are reluctant to reveal details regarding their past proliferation activities, including any aid to Syria in this regard. North Korea has made progress with regard to halting its own nuclear activity, including the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea still views the United States as a significant military threat on the peninsula, and their sudden agreement in February of 2007 to shut down the Yongbyon reactor facility raises serious questions. The reactor facility was inspected by the IAEA, who verified its shutdown in August of 2007. US intelligence officials have claimed that the Syrian complex may have been within weeks of becoming operational when it was destroyed in September of that year. The connection that seems to be eluding the intelligence services as well as the media outlets reporting on the incident is whether or not North Korea would have benefitted from the Syrian reactor's output of nuclear material. It is possible that the purpose of the Syrian reactor complex was to benefit both Syrian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Analysts have noted that there does not appear to have been any enrichment facilities located on-site, facilities which would have been needed in order to transform the reactor's plutonium output into true weapons-grade material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon. By placing the enrichment facilities at a separate location, Syria achieves two things. First, less attention is drawn to the facility. Second, the plutonium by-product must therefore be transported to an enrichment facility. It would not be difficult to mask the transfer of some or all of the plutonium to a ship or aircraft bound for North Korea, allowing the North Koreans to continue their nuclear weapon production while at the same time preserving an air of cooperation in the eyes of the world with the shutdown of their own reactor complex. Alternatively, North Korea may have simply intended to construct a separate weapons production facility inside of Syria with the intent of arming both nations. Given that North Korea has far greater knowledge on the subject of nuclear weapons design and production than Syria, enlisting their aid in that regard would be a logical maneuver.
LACK OF AIR DEFENSES
In his statement, President Assad claimed that the facility in question was an unused military complex, but he would not specify its purpose. Assad claimed that the site was obviously not a nuclear related facility, as it was not protected by any air defense systems. Unfortunately, Assad's claims, regardless of the true nature of the facility, are completely illogical. Eastern Syria would be a logical site for a covert nuclear facility. The location of the site is directly adjacent to a river, providing the necessary water source for cooling the reactor. Also, the site is not near any major military facilities, meaning that it was an unlikely target for surveillance. The lack of any air defense systems also aids the covert nature of the location. Any major SAM system, for example, would emit tell-tale signals from its radar systems, signals which would be tracked and identified by intelligence services. The appearance of air defense systems where none were present previously would only serve to attract unwanted attention to the area. Syria made the right strategic move by not defending the site with any significant military presence. Unfortunately, it would seem that their denial and deception efforts ultimately failed due to a human intelligence source on-site which is the likely source of the videotaped evidence shown by the US government to illustrate the nuclear nature of the facility.
CONCLUSION
This incident highlights the need for more significant diplomatic pressure to be palced on nuclear weapons states with regard to proliferation. Syria has a significant terrorist connection with Hizbullah and a significant diplomatic connection with Iran, two entities which could have benefitted from a Syrian nuclear weapons program, with potentially catastrophic results. While the unilateral decision of Israel to attack and destroy the facility cannot and should not be condoned, neither should the effort by Syria to construct a nuclear reactor under the nose of the IAEA in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, of which Syria is a signatory. Neither should bringing such an issue to the attention of the international community be screened on the basis of Israeli interests, as suggested by Senator Susan Collins of Maine.
SOURCES
Syria denies nuke allegations
IAEA reaction to US evidence
North Korean nuclear program timeline
6 Party Talks
Monday, March 31, 2008
Saturday, March 29, 2008
The Strategic Warfare Reading List
INTRODUCTION
Any serious student or researcher focusing on the concept of strategic warfare can often be hard-pressed to find suitable in-depth source material. The purpose of this article is to provide students, researchers, and historians with a reading list consisting of some of the most interesting and valuable sources that I have collected in the field of strategic warfare.
THE READING LIST
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat - NASIC
NASIC's report detailing the current major strategic missile systems in service or development is a useful starting point when researching strategic delivery systems. Most major programs are mentioned, and basic details such as range and throw weight are provided, as well as a few choice illustrations. The only serious drawback is that the document is only 30 pages in length, meaning that there is not a great deal of detailed information about any of the systems mentioned therein. However, it is a valuable reference tool, containing data on most major missile non-US missile systems in development or service. This unclassified publication can be found online here.
US Strategic and Defensive Missile Systems 1950-2004 - Mark A Berhow
Number 36 in Osprey Publishing's Fortress Series, this volume is a short yet suprisingly detailed account of the development and deployment of American land-based defensive and strategic missile systems. While naval strategic weapons are not covered, all major US ICBM programs are given mention, as are the HAWK, NIKE and SAFEGUARD defensive missile programs. A final mention is given to the current NMD system being deployed. It should be noted that PATRIOT and THAAD, among others, are not covered, as they have not been deployed as operational defensive systems in the United States.
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces - Pavel Podvig
This is the single, definitive reference source dealing with the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. All major delivery systems are covered, from strategic bombers to submarine launched ballistic missiles. The technical data is absolutely first rate, and a history of each program is provided. Topics such as nuclear production facilities, nuclear testing, and strategic defense are also covered in exhaustive detail. There are also extensive endnotes for each chapter, with some of them providing further details and insight into little-known weapon systems alluded to or mentioned briefly in the text. The only drawback is that Mr. Podvig's work was published in 2001, and as such does not deal with the most current systems such as the RS-24 ICBM. He does maintain a website here, which provides up-to-date information supplementing his excellent text. This is the one reference work that any serious Cold War researcher simply must obtain.
The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword - Steven J. Zaloga
This is a shorter, less technical alternative to Podvig's work. It shares the same main drawback of being slightly aged, having been published in 2002. The main advantage to Zaloga's work is that the political side of the equation is given more attention, as are many of the developmental systems which did not enter production. The work is organized chronologically, which can be an inconvenience for a researcher focusing on one type of delivery system. The chronological layout does allow for a more historical analysis to be made, allowing the reader to examine the types of delivery systems that were in development concurrently. Zaloga's work does have merit as a secondary source, or as a primary source if Podvig's work cannot be located. Space surveillance, defensive systems, and nuclear testing and production are either not covered in Zaloga's work, or are only briefly mentioned. All in all, an excellent overview of Russian strategic nuclear forces and a better source than Podvig's where the political side is concerned.
The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb - Richard Rhodes
Both of these extensive reference works offer a great deal of historical and political insight into the American nuclear weapons programs during the early days of the Cold War. Be warned; while both books tend to focus more on the political and historical implications of the programs, they do delve into the weapons development aspect and as such can get very technical.
The ABM Treaty Charade - William T. Lee
This is one of the most interesting reference works on the Cold War, and consequently it is also one of the hardest to find. It is a higly technical look at the Soviet nationwide ABM network, the existance of which was denied by Western intelligence during the run-up to the signing of the ABM Treaty. There is a healthy dose of political discourse dealing with the rationale behind the West's ignorance of the USSR's progress, as well as a concise overview of Soviet ABM programs. The bulk of the work details the evidence supporting the idea that a nationwide ABM network existed in the Soviet Union. If a copy can be obtained, this is one of the most significant and revealing works on the Cold War yet published, and the only English-language publication dealing solely with Soviet ABM programs.
Space Weapons, Earth Wars - Bob Preston et al
Anti-missile and anti-satellite systems are becoming the new rage in the field of strategic warfare. While it primarily focuses on space warfare systems from an American standpoint, delving into the rationale behind acquiring such systems and how best to employ them, this reference work is invaluable to anyone interested in the topic as there is a great deal of technical data presented that cannot be found anywhere else. Various types of systems are described, as well as the technical requirements that they must meet in order to be successful. As a RAND publication, it can be found online here.
CONCLUSION
Strategic warfare is one of the most interesting topics in the field of military studies. By using the sources listed above, any researcher will be well on his or her way to gaining a more complete understanding of the weapon systems and the political motives behind their development. As I locate more source material, I will update this article with the relevant details.
Any serious student or researcher focusing on the concept of strategic warfare can often be hard-pressed to find suitable in-depth source material. The purpose of this article is to provide students, researchers, and historians with a reading list consisting of some of the most interesting and valuable sources that I have collected in the field of strategic warfare.
THE READING LIST
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat - NASIC
NASIC's report detailing the current major strategic missile systems in service or development is a useful starting point when researching strategic delivery systems. Most major programs are mentioned, and basic details such as range and throw weight are provided, as well as a few choice illustrations. The only serious drawback is that the document is only 30 pages in length, meaning that there is not a great deal of detailed information about any of the systems mentioned therein. However, it is a valuable reference tool, containing data on most major missile non-US missile systems in development or service. This unclassified publication can be found online here.
US Strategic and Defensive Missile Systems 1950-2004 - Mark A Berhow
Number 36 in Osprey Publishing's Fortress Series, this volume is a short yet suprisingly detailed account of the development and deployment of American land-based defensive and strategic missile systems. While naval strategic weapons are not covered, all major US ICBM programs are given mention, as are the HAWK, NIKE and SAFEGUARD defensive missile programs. A final mention is given to the current NMD system being deployed. It should be noted that PATRIOT and THAAD, among others, are not covered, as they have not been deployed as operational defensive systems in the United States.
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces - Pavel Podvig
This is the single, definitive reference source dealing with the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. All major delivery systems are covered, from strategic bombers to submarine launched ballistic missiles. The technical data is absolutely first rate, and a history of each program is provided. Topics such as nuclear production facilities, nuclear testing, and strategic defense are also covered in exhaustive detail. There are also extensive endnotes for each chapter, with some of them providing further details and insight into little-known weapon systems alluded to or mentioned briefly in the text. The only drawback is that Mr. Podvig's work was published in 2001, and as such does not deal with the most current systems such as the RS-24 ICBM. He does maintain a website here, which provides up-to-date information supplementing his excellent text. This is the one reference work that any serious Cold War researcher simply must obtain.
The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword - Steven J. Zaloga
This is a shorter, less technical alternative to Podvig's work. It shares the same main drawback of being slightly aged, having been published in 2002. The main advantage to Zaloga's work is that the political side of the equation is given more attention, as are many of the developmental systems which did not enter production. The work is organized chronologically, which can be an inconvenience for a researcher focusing on one type of delivery system. The chronological layout does allow for a more historical analysis to be made, allowing the reader to examine the types of delivery systems that were in development concurrently. Zaloga's work does have merit as a secondary source, or as a primary source if Podvig's work cannot be located. Space surveillance, defensive systems, and nuclear testing and production are either not covered in Zaloga's work, or are only briefly mentioned. All in all, an excellent overview of Russian strategic nuclear forces and a better source than Podvig's where the political side is concerned.
The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb - Richard Rhodes
Both of these extensive reference works offer a great deal of historical and political insight into the American nuclear weapons programs during the early days of the Cold War. Be warned; while both books tend to focus more on the political and historical implications of the programs, they do delve into the weapons development aspect and as such can get very technical.
The ABM Treaty Charade - William T. Lee
This is one of the most interesting reference works on the Cold War, and consequently it is also one of the hardest to find. It is a higly technical look at the Soviet nationwide ABM network, the existance of which was denied by Western intelligence during the run-up to the signing of the ABM Treaty. There is a healthy dose of political discourse dealing with the rationale behind the West's ignorance of the USSR's progress, as well as a concise overview of Soviet ABM programs. The bulk of the work details the evidence supporting the idea that a nationwide ABM network existed in the Soviet Union. If a copy can be obtained, this is one of the most significant and revealing works on the Cold War yet published, and the only English-language publication dealing solely with Soviet ABM programs.
Space Weapons, Earth Wars - Bob Preston et al
Anti-missile and anti-satellite systems are becoming the new rage in the field of strategic warfare. While it primarily focuses on space warfare systems from an American standpoint, delving into the rationale behind acquiring such systems and how best to employ them, this reference work is invaluable to anyone interested in the topic as there is a great deal of technical data presented that cannot be found anywhere else. Various types of systems are described, as well as the technical requirements that they must meet in order to be successful. As a RAND publication, it can be found online here.
CONCLUSION
Strategic warfare is one of the most interesting topics in the field of military studies. By using the sources listed above, any researcher will be well on his or her way to gaining a more complete understanding of the weapon systems and the political motives behind their development. As I locate more source material, I will update this article with the relevant details.
Monday, March 17, 2008
Iran and the S-300PT
INTRODUCTION
Open-source reporting indicates that Iran has purchased the S-300PT SAM system from Belarus. The S-300PT will represent the most modern, advanced SAM system in Iran when it is operationally deployed.
IRANIAN S-300PT SYSTEMS
According to Jane's International Defence Review, Iran is now the owner of four S-300PT battalions. Two of these units were sourced from Belarus, and had been deployed as capital-area air defence units around Minsk. The other two units were sourced from an undisclosed nation and were recently refurbished by Belarussian technicians working at an IRGC facility in Iran, where the units were stored.
A typical Belarussian S-300PT battery consisted of twelve TELs, one 5N63 (FLAP LID) engagement radar, and one 5N66 (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar. It is therefore logical to assume that the two "battalions" obtained from Belarus were in fact two complete firing batteries worth of equipment. Combined with the other two units refurbished in Iran, this gives Iran a total deployable force of approximately four S-300PT batteries.
Jane's goes on to state that both the 5V55K and 5V55R missiles were included in the deal with Belarus, implying that the systems were of the improved S-300PT-1 or S-300PT-1A variant. Baseline S-300PT systems lacked the ability to employ the SAGG-guided 5V55R weapon, and were limited to using the command-guided 5V55K only. It is possible that the extended-range 5V55RUD was also included.
The S-300PT provides Iran with a modern, complex, and very effective SAM system. Iran's current strategic SAM systems, the HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE) and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), are limited by their single-target engagement capability. The S-300PT's 5N63 radar system can prosecute six targets simultaneously, while guiding a maximum of two missiles to each target.
The S-300PT is also a far more mobile system than its Iranian stablemates. It is not, however, a true mobile SAM system. The 5N63 radar system is not vehicle-borne, and is mounted on a towed trailer for transport. 40V6 mast assemblies are required to erect the 5N63 and 5N66 radar systems, although the 5N63 could remain on its trailer for operation if required. These factors lend the S-300PT to a fixed site layout rather than a mobile environment.
POSTULATED DEPLOYMENT
Four S-300PT batteries will result in a significant increase in overall capability, but are not enough to upgrade the entire Iranian air defense network. In order to maximize their effectiveness, Iran will likely adopt one of two deployment strategies. The systems will likely be deployed to protect either significant military facilities, or significant nuclear weapons research and production facilities, or a combination of the two.
Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend militarily significant sites, the following would be the likely locations:
-Tehran, home to Iran's military command
-Tabriz, home to Iran's silo-based missile deterrent
-Bushehr, home to an IrIAF fighter unit and S-200 battery covering much of the Persian Gulf region
-Bandar Abbas, Iran's primary naval facility in the Persian Gulf region and home to the Kilo submarine fleet
The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.
Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend significant nuclear weapons research and development sites, the four likely locations are as follows:
-Tehran, home to the nuclear research center
-Bushehr, home to the contentious nuclear reactor program
-Natanz, home to a fuel enrichment facility
-Esfahan, home to a uranium conversion facility
The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.
To illustrate the limited effect that the S-300PT's presence will have in the context of the overall Iranian air defense picture, consider the following image. In this image, the S-300PTs have been deployed at the nuclear facilities. HQ-2, S-200, and HAWK engagement zones are also displayed, the HQ-2 being denoted by dark red rings, the S-200 by light purple, and the HAWK by orange.
As can be seen, the short-range of even the 5V55RUD-equipped S-300PT does not result in a significant increase in capability. The S-300PT does have a multiple target engagement capability advantage, and this is why the system is likely to be deployed as a point defense asset to protect various facilities. To create a more potent air defense network overall, either a longer-range system would be required, or an increased number of S-300PT batteries.
HARDENED DEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS
On occasion, Iran has turned to North Korea for military assistance. It is possible that North Korea could be called upon to aid in increasing the survivability of Iran's most modern strategic SAM system through the use of hardened launch sites. North Korea has been shown to employ significant hardening techniques at S-125 (SA-3 GOA) and S-200 sites, to include the use of silos used to house the engagement radars, which are ostensibly fitted to elevating platforms. Similar techniques, if employed by the Iranians, could help to make the S-300PT systems far more survivable. Iran has shown a degree of competence in the field of hardened facilities recently with the silo-based missile complex at Tabriz, and could certainly undertake a hardened deployment of the S- 300PT on its own, but North Korean assistance in this regard may still be worthwhile given their experience with hardened siting of SAM systems.
Given the nature of the system, the S-300PT could be deployed in two separate types of hardened facility. The first would feature underground garages for the complete TELs. The second would feature much simpler hardened silos for the individual, sealed launch canisters.
The first example of a hardened site concept for the S-300PT system involves a below-ground, concrete hardened garage. Inside this garage, the 5P85 TEL is mounted. When elevated for launch, a retractable skirt would join the missile tubes with the silo opening. The silo would be covered with quick-opening launch doors, likely covered with debris or dirt when closed to assist in keeping the location hidden. A control bunker would be provided for launch crews, and an entry door would allow the removal of the TEL for maintenance or reloading. Finally, an exhaust extraction fan would prevent the buildup of toxic gasses inside the garage bay.
An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:
The alternative to basing the entire TEL inside of a hardened facility is to simply mount the individual launch canisters inside of hardened silos. These silos would be far cheaper to develop and maintain, and would require far less time to construct given their smaller scale. These remote launch facilities would consist of a number of silos, each containing four 5V55-series launch tubes. As the 5V55 missile tubes are sealed until launch, they could remain inside the silo until they are launched. The only above-ground component required would be a communications antenna, allowing launch commands to be transmitted from the fire control facility. If the radar is located in close proximity, the launch silos could be connected via more secure cables. However, using radio commands would permit the launch sites to be dispersed over greater distances, potentially making them much harder to locate. Basing the missile canisters inside of silo complexes also allows the TELs themselves to be held in reserve in the event that the silo complexes are destroyed, allowing Iran to retain the ability to redeploy the system should the need arise.
An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:
LACK OF EW SUPPORT
The main problem with such a small number of deployable batteries is that they cannot be employed to maximum effect. Doing so would involve the use of EW assets such as the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW radars to provide target acquisition data. the 5N63 engagement radar employed by the S-300PT can perform independent target acquisition functions, but the system is more effective with off-board cueing, providing quicker reaction times. A long-range radar system such as the 64N6 can also acquire targets at roughly twice the range of the 5N63, providing a greater degree of early warning and enhanced situational awareness.
As there is no evidence to suggest that Iran obtained either the 36D6 or the 64N6, it is likely that the batteries will, for the time being, be left to operate as independent units. In this regard, it is entirely possible that Iran may choose to keep its S-300PT batteries garrisoned, deploying them to predetermined locations when the need arises. The only issue with this strategy is that the S-300PT does require a semi-prepared site to operate from, and such sites, unless they are of the hardened, sub-surface variety described earlier, are easily located in overhead imagery.
CONCLUSION
The S-300PT represents the most advanced SAM system in the Iranian inventory. When the Belarussian systems are delivered, the four S-300PT batteries will represent a serious roadblock towards a limited incursion by an aggressor such as Israel seeking to destabilize the region by striking Iranian nuclear weapons production facilities. The S-300PT will not, however, close Iranian airspace to a large-scale aerial offensive. To achieve that goal, Iran must continue to pursue acquisition of more modern S-300PM-1/2 or S-400 SAM systems from Russia, and the EW systems to integrate them on a national level.
SOURCES
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-SAM range data taken from Jane's Land-Based Air Defence
-"Iran set to acquire S-300PTs from Belarus" - Jane's International Defence Review, February 1, 2008
Open-source reporting indicates that Iran has purchased the S-300PT SAM system from Belarus. The S-300PT will represent the most modern, advanced SAM system in Iran when it is operationally deployed.
IRANIAN S-300PT SYSTEMS
According to Jane's International Defence Review, Iran is now the owner of four S-300PT battalions. Two of these units were sourced from Belarus, and had been deployed as capital-area air defence units around Minsk. The other two units were sourced from an undisclosed nation and were recently refurbished by Belarussian technicians working at an IRGC facility in Iran, where the units were stored.
A typical Belarussian S-300PT battery consisted of twelve TELs, one 5N63 (FLAP LID) engagement radar, and one 5N66 (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar. It is therefore logical to assume that the two "battalions" obtained from Belarus were in fact two complete firing batteries worth of equipment. Combined with the other two units refurbished in Iran, this gives Iran a total deployable force of approximately four S-300PT batteries.
Jane's goes on to state that both the 5V55K and 5V55R missiles were included in the deal with Belarus, implying that the systems were of the improved S-300PT-1 or S-300PT-1A variant. Baseline S-300PT systems lacked the ability to employ the SAGG-guided 5V55R weapon, and were limited to using the command-guided 5V55K only. It is possible that the extended-range 5V55RUD was also included.
The S-300PT provides Iran with a modern, complex, and very effective SAM system. Iran's current strategic SAM systems, the HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE) and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), are limited by their single-target engagement capability. The S-300PT's 5N63 radar system can prosecute six targets simultaneously, while guiding a maximum of two missiles to each target.
The S-300PT is also a far more mobile system than its Iranian stablemates. It is not, however, a true mobile SAM system. The 5N63 radar system is not vehicle-borne, and is mounted on a towed trailer for transport. 40V6 mast assemblies are required to erect the 5N63 and 5N66 radar systems, although the 5N63 could remain on its trailer for operation if required. These factors lend the S-300PT to a fixed site layout rather than a mobile environment.
POSTULATED DEPLOYMENT
Four S-300PT batteries will result in a significant increase in overall capability, but are not enough to upgrade the entire Iranian air defense network. In order to maximize their effectiveness, Iran will likely adopt one of two deployment strategies. The systems will likely be deployed to protect either significant military facilities, or significant nuclear weapons research and production facilities, or a combination of the two.
Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend militarily significant sites, the following would be the likely locations:
-Tehran, home to Iran's military command
-Tabriz, home to Iran's silo-based missile deterrent
-Bushehr, home to an IrIAF fighter unit and S-200 battery covering much of the Persian Gulf region
-Bandar Abbas, Iran's primary naval facility in the Persian Gulf region and home to the Kilo submarine fleet
The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.
Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend significant nuclear weapons research and development sites, the four likely locations are as follows:
-Tehran, home to the nuclear research center
-Bushehr, home to the contentious nuclear reactor program
-Natanz, home to a fuel enrichment facility
-Esfahan, home to a uranium conversion facility
The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.
To illustrate the limited effect that the S-300PT's presence will have in the context of the overall Iranian air defense picture, consider the following image. In this image, the S-300PTs have been deployed at the nuclear facilities. HQ-2, S-200, and HAWK engagement zones are also displayed, the HQ-2 being denoted by dark red rings, the S-200 by light purple, and the HAWK by orange.
As can be seen, the short-range of even the 5V55RUD-equipped S-300PT does not result in a significant increase in capability. The S-300PT does have a multiple target engagement capability advantage, and this is why the system is likely to be deployed as a point defense asset to protect various facilities. To create a more potent air defense network overall, either a longer-range system would be required, or an increased number of S-300PT batteries.
HARDENED DEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS
On occasion, Iran has turned to North Korea for military assistance. It is possible that North Korea could be called upon to aid in increasing the survivability of Iran's most modern strategic SAM system through the use of hardened launch sites. North Korea has been shown to employ significant hardening techniques at S-125 (SA-3 GOA) and S-200 sites, to include the use of silos used to house the engagement radars, which are ostensibly fitted to elevating platforms. Similar techniques, if employed by the Iranians, could help to make the S-300PT systems far more survivable. Iran has shown a degree of competence in the field of hardened facilities recently with the silo-based missile complex at Tabriz, and could certainly undertake a hardened deployment of the S- 300PT on its own, but North Korean assistance in this regard may still be worthwhile given their experience with hardened siting of SAM systems.
Given the nature of the system, the S-300PT could be deployed in two separate types of hardened facility. The first would feature underground garages for the complete TELs. The second would feature much simpler hardened silos for the individual, sealed launch canisters.
The first example of a hardened site concept for the S-300PT system involves a below-ground, concrete hardened garage. Inside this garage, the 5P85 TEL is mounted. When elevated for launch, a retractable skirt would join the missile tubes with the silo opening. The silo would be covered with quick-opening launch doors, likely covered with debris or dirt when closed to assist in keeping the location hidden. A control bunker would be provided for launch crews, and an entry door would allow the removal of the TEL for maintenance or reloading. Finally, an exhaust extraction fan would prevent the buildup of toxic gasses inside the garage bay.
An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:
The alternative to basing the entire TEL inside of a hardened facility is to simply mount the individual launch canisters inside of hardened silos. These silos would be far cheaper to develop and maintain, and would require far less time to construct given their smaller scale. These remote launch facilities would consist of a number of silos, each containing four 5V55-series launch tubes. As the 5V55 missile tubes are sealed until launch, they could remain inside the silo until they are launched. The only above-ground component required would be a communications antenna, allowing launch commands to be transmitted from the fire control facility. If the radar is located in close proximity, the launch silos could be connected via more secure cables. However, using radio commands would permit the launch sites to be dispersed over greater distances, potentially making them much harder to locate. Basing the missile canisters inside of silo complexes also allows the TELs themselves to be held in reserve in the event that the silo complexes are destroyed, allowing Iran to retain the ability to redeploy the system should the need arise.
An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:
LACK OF EW SUPPORT
The main problem with such a small number of deployable batteries is that they cannot be employed to maximum effect. Doing so would involve the use of EW assets such as the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW radars to provide target acquisition data. the 5N63 engagement radar employed by the S-300PT can perform independent target acquisition functions, but the system is more effective with off-board cueing, providing quicker reaction times. A long-range radar system such as the 64N6 can also acquire targets at roughly twice the range of the 5N63, providing a greater degree of early warning and enhanced situational awareness.
As there is no evidence to suggest that Iran obtained either the 36D6 or the 64N6, it is likely that the batteries will, for the time being, be left to operate as independent units. In this regard, it is entirely possible that Iran may choose to keep its S-300PT batteries garrisoned, deploying them to predetermined locations when the need arises. The only issue with this strategy is that the S-300PT does require a semi-prepared site to operate from, and such sites, unless they are of the hardened, sub-surface variety described earlier, are easily located in overhead imagery.
CONCLUSION
The S-300PT represents the most advanced SAM system in the Iranian inventory. When the Belarussian systems are delivered, the four S-300PT batteries will represent a serious roadblock towards a limited incursion by an aggressor such as Israel seeking to destabilize the region by striking Iranian nuclear weapons production facilities. The S-300PT will not, however, close Iranian airspace to a large-scale aerial offensive. To achieve that goal, Iran must continue to pursue acquisition of more modern S-300PM-1/2 or S-400 SAM systems from Russia, and the EW systems to integrate them on a national level.
SOURCES
-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-SAM range data taken from Jane's Land-Based Air Defence
-"Iran set to acquire S-300PTs from Belarus" - Jane's International Defence Review, February 1, 2008
Wednesday, January 30, 2008
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