It's been one year since I started this blog, and I have to say that I am pleased with the result so far. I've gotten a lot of traffic from interesting places, came into contact with a lot of interesting people, and even gotten my work mentioned various times in Jane's Missiles & Rockets, an industry-leading publication.
My plans for the next year are pretty much more of the same. The Image of the Week feature has gotten some good feedback and will of course continue. Various in-depth features are currently at various stages of completion, expect to see them appearing with greater frequency. The next feature to appear will be the S-300P SAM System Analysis feature, which is nearly complete. After that, I plan on giving some old features much-needed updates, and move into more of the SAM Network Analysis pieces like the ones available on China, Iran, and Syria.
My current goal, once the S-300P feature is finalized, is to produce at least three imagery-based updates a week: a major feature, like the report on US Restricted & Classified Test Sites, a minor feature, such as the piece on Russia's Typhoon SSBN fleet, and of course the Image of the Week.
I also expect to get back to analytical work, such as the piece on Samoderzhets. I have a bunch of topics I've already started on that relate to current defense issues nationwide.
That about sums up the past, present, and future of this place. My work schedule and the resident 2 year old sometimes keeps me from posting updates as often as I'd like, but I have a better handle on a lot of things now so I hope to be a lot more active (which you may have heard before, but you know how it is!).
In closing, I'd like to offer my thanks to the readers of this site. Without people reading and sending me feedback, this place might have died out a long time ago. Thanks for the support, and I look forward to hearing from you in the future!
Sean O'Connor
Monday, July 7, 2008
Friday, June 13, 2008
Soviet & Russian Space Surveillance Facilities
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of military satellites being tasked to perform a variety of roles, the task of satellite detection and tracking played a prominent role in the history of the Cold War. Such complex systems were necessary for the identification of foreign intelligence-gathering satellites to ensure the continued secrecy of sensitive activities, and to provide accurate orbital parametric data for use by ASAT weapon systems. Two of the most advanced satellite detection systems in operation today were products of this Cold War environment: Okno and Krona.
DNESTR
The first Soviet effort to produce a dedicated space surveillance complex capable of tracking artificial objects orbiting the Earth was the 5N15 Dnestr (HEN HOUSE) radar system. Dnestr radars would be placed at two sites, SD-1 near Irkutsk and SD-2 near Sary Shagan; SD stood for Satellite Detection. Each site would feature four Dnestr radar complexes, with each complex consisting of two arrays joined in the center by a central command and control facility. The Dnestr radars were initially intended to form the acquisition and tracking potrion of an ASAT system, employing the 5V91 intercept vehicle launched by SLVs at Baikonur, designed to destroy satellites orbiting at altitudes of up to 1000 km. This ASAT system entered limited operational service in 1973, with command and control facilities located at Noginsk. The first successful intercept test was conducted on 1 November 1968.
Following the testing of a small-scale array at Sary Shagan, construction of the SD-1 and SD-2 facilities began in 1964. The system passed state acceptance trials in May of 1967. Dnestr radars employed by the SD facilities were capable of tracking satellites at altitudes between 250 and 1000 kilometers and generating three simultaneous target tracks for the ASAT role.
The locations of the two SD facilities can be seen in the image below:
Later, Dnestr radars were incorporated into the BMEW network along with numerous modified and developed variants designed specifically to serve in that capacity. The first variant produced to provide a long-range BMEW capability was the 5N15M Dnestr-M. The Dnestr-M had a significant signal-processing flaw during early stages of development. The automated systems designed to track space objects 24 hours a day were not sufficiently capable of calculating trajectory information, leading to numerous false launch warnings being issued. Eventually this deficiency was corrected and the Dnestr-M complexes were integrated into the national BMEW network. Dnestr-M radars also retained the ability to provide target track data to ASAT interceptors, and were capable of tracking six simultaneous targets for intercept.
OKNO
The Okno system is a fully automated optical tracking station used for the identification of satellites. Optical telescopes scan the night sky, while computer systems analyze the results and filter out the stars through analysis and comparison of velocities, luminosities, and trajectories. Satellites are then tracked with orbital parameters being calculated and logged. Okno can detect and track satellites orbiting the Earth at altitudes between 2,000 and 40,000 kilometers. This increased altitude capability over the earlier Dnestr space surveillance radar system was necessitated due to the fielding of American surveillance satellites operating in high geostationary orbits outside Dnestr's field of view.
Development of the Okno system began in the late 1960s. By late 1971, prototypes of the optical systems destined for use in the Okno complex were being trialled at Byurukan Observatory in Armenia. Preliminary design work for the operational system was completed in 1976 and approved in 1977. Construction of the Okno site near Nurek in Tajikistan began in 1980. By the middle of 1992, the facilities, electronic systems, and a portion of the sensor suite was complete. Unfortunately, a civil war in Tajikistan put an end to construction efforts on 6 August 1992, with work resuming in 1994. The system began to undergo operational trials in late 1999 and was placed on combat duty in July of 2002.
Nurek
The Okno system is situated near Nurek, Tajikistan, approximately fifty kilometers southeast of the capital of Dushanbe. The main facility consists of ten telescopes covered by large clamshell domes. The telescopes are divided into two stations, with the detection complex containing six telescopes and the tracking station containing four. Each station features its own control center, with a central command and control center, likely also housing the detection and tracking computer systems, located in the center of the facility. Also present is an eleventh, smaller dome mounted atop a much smaller building. It is not known what function this additional facility performs. It may contain some sort of atmospheric measuring equipment used to assess atmospheric conditions before activation of the system.
The following image depicts the Okno complex near Nurek:
A power substation is located one kilometer south of the main complex, with administrative facilities and barracks being located approximately one kilometer north of the main complex.
The following image depicts the support facilities near the Okno complex:
Okno-S
In 1980 the Okno-S system was commissioned. Original plans called for the construction of four Okno and four Okno-S sites at various locations throughout the USSR and allied nations such as Cuba. Foreign locations were later rejected, and later plans called for the single Okno site at Nurek to be supported by two Okno-S sites in the Ukraine and eastern Russia. In the end, work only began on the eastern Okno-S site, to be located in the Primorye territory.
Okno-S is a high-altitude optical surveillance system based on the Okno complex design. The primary difference is in the area of interest. Okno-S is only designed to monitor an altitude band between 30,000 and 40,000 kilometers, permitting geostationary satellites to be located over a wider area. Work on the Okno-S complex began in the early 1980s. It is not known if this system was completed and brought to operational readiness. The Okno-S complex is located near Spassk-Dalny, adjacent to Lysiy mountain. Currently available satellite imagery of the region precludes accurately locating the facility.
KRONA
The Krona system is a long-range radar and optical tracking system designed to facilitate the identification and tracking of satellites. Rather than simply identifying objects as artificial satellites, the Krona system seeks to categorize satellites by type. The system consists of three main components:
-A large decimetric-band phased-array radar for target identification
-A system of five centimetric-band parabolic radar antennae for target classification
-An optical system combining an optical telescope with a laser system
The Krona system has a range of 3200 kilometers and can detect targets orbiting at a height of up to 40,000 kilometers.
Development of the Krona system began in 1974 when it was determined that current space-tracking systems were unable to accurately identify the type of satellite being tracked. Target discrimination was an important component of any ASAT program. Preliminary design work for the Krona complex, designated 45J6, was completed in 1976. The radar system was designated 20J6, and comprised both the decimetric and centimetric band systems. The optical/laser complex was designated 30J6 with separate housings for the optical telescope and laser system.
The centimetric-band radar system incorporated into the 20J6 system was designed in part to provide telemetry data to direct the 30J6 optical/laser system. The laser system was designed to provide target illumination for the optical system, which would capture images of target satellites at night or in clear weather. Favorable atmospheric qualities were one factor in determining the location of the Krona systems.
Storozhevaya
Construction of the first Krona facility began in 1979 near Storozhevaya in southwestern Russia. The facility was originally intended to be co-located with the Zelenchuk observatory, but concerns over interference with the observatory's systems led to the relocation of the Krona complex.
The following image depicts the locations of the 20J6 and 30J6 facilities at Storozhevaya:
The following image depicts the layout of the 20J6 complex at Storozhevaya:
The following image depicts the layout of the 30J6 complex at Storozhevaya:
Primary work on the facilities at Storozhevaya was completed in 1984, but economic difficulties prevented factory and state testing from being undertaken until 1992. State acceptance testing was completed by January 1994, but once again funding issues intervened and the system was not declared operational until November of 1999. As of 2003 work on the optical/laser system was not completed due to financial constraints, but a 2007 Russian television program featuring the Krona system indicates that the 30J6 system was completed sometime in the intervening period, attaining at least a limited operational capability.
Nakhodka
It was initially planned to construct three Krona complexes. The second Krona complex would have been located near the Okno complex in Tajikistan, with the third complex being located near Nakhodka in the Russian Far East. During the 1980s work was suspended on the second and third Krona complexes for financial reasons, but work on the Nakhodka complex was eventually resumed. The Nakhodka Krona system has sometimes been referred to as Krona-N, with the N likely representing either the location or the fact that the system is a radar only system; there is not a 30J6 complex at the Nakhodka location. Work was never resumed on the Tajikistan Krona site due in part to the civil unrest plaguing the region in the early 1990s.
The following image depicts the layout of the Nakhodka Krona complex:
LASER WEAPON SYSTEMS?
At various points in history, both the Okno and Krona complexes were associated with laser weapon systems by Western intelligence agencies and open source reporting. For example, a declassified CIA National Intelligence Report from December of 1985 titled "Soviet Space Programs" classified the Okno site as a probable laser weapon facility, even going so far as to state that it was possible but less likely that the facility was intended for space surveillance! In truth, only the Krona's 30J6 complex features a laser system, and this system lacks the required characteristics to be used as an offensive weapon. Laser weapon systems were trialled at Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan under various programs, with mixed results, and there is currently no evidence to suggest that they were operationally fielded at any point.
CONCLUSION
With the Okno and Krona complexes operational, Russia maintains a significant space surveillance capability independant of its BMEW assets. These systems have performed various military and civil roles, including an analysis of the surface impact point of the Mir space station and identification of space debris. The performance of the Okno and Krona systems guarantees that the Russian space surveillance network will have a valuable part to play in the areas of national defense and international space exploitation.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
CIA NIE 11-1-85J, Soviet Space Programs Volume 1-Key Judgements and Executive Summary
Okno and Krona Sourcebook
The Creation of Space and Missile Defense Systems, by Mikhail Perov (Moscow: Aviarus, 2003)
Russia's Krona Space Reconnaissance System Profiled, Praised in TV Programme
KMZ FILE
A Google Earth placemark file containing the sites described above can be downloaded here: Soviet and Russian Space Surveillance
With the advent of military satellites being tasked to perform a variety of roles, the task of satellite detection and tracking played a prominent role in the history of the Cold War. Such complex systems were necessary for the identification of foreign intelligence-gathering satellites to ensure the continued secrecy of sensitive activities, and to provide accurate orbital parametric data for use by ASAT weapon systems. Two of the most advanced satellite detection systems in operation today were products of this Cold War environment: Okno and Krona.
DNESTR
The first Soviet effort to produce a dedicated space surveillance complex capable of tracking artificial objects orbiting the Earth was the 5N15 Dnestr (HEN HOUSE) radar system. Dnestr radars would be placed at two sites, SD-1 near Irkutsk and SD-2 near Sary Shagan; SD stood for Satellite Detection. Each site would feature four Dnestr radar complexes, with each complex consisting of two arrays joined in the center by a central command and control facility. The Dnestr radars were initially intended to form the acquisition and tracking potrion of an ASAT system, employing the 5V91 intercept vehicle launched by SLVs at Baikonur, designed to destroy satellites orbiting at altitudes of up to 1000 km. This ASAT system entered limited operational service in 1973, with command and control facilities located at Noginsk. The first successful intercept test was conducted on 1 November 1968.
Following the testing of a small-scale array at Sary Shagan, construction of the SD-1 and SD-2 facilities began in 1964. The system passed state acceptance trials in May of 1967. Dnestr radars employed by the SD facilities were capable of tracking satellites at altitudes between 250 and 1000 kilometers and generating three simultaneous target tracks for the ASAT role.
The locations of the two SD facilities can be seen in the image below:
Later, Dnestr radars were incorporated into the BMEW network along with numerous modified and developed variants designed specifically to serve in that capacity. The first variant produced to provide a long-range BMEW capability was the 5N15M Dnestr-M. The Dnestr-M had a significant signal-processing flaw during early stages of development. The automated systems designed to track space objects 24 hours a day were not sufficiently capable of calculating trajectory information, leading to numerous false launch warnings being issued. Eventually this deficiency was corrected and the Dnestr-M complexes were integrated into the national BMEW network. Dnestr-M radars also retained the ability to provide target track data to ASAT interceptors, and were capable of tracking six simultaneous targets for intercept.
OKNO
The Okno system is a fully automated optical tracking station used for the identification of satellites. Optical telescopes scan the night sky, while computer systems analyze the results and filter out the stars through analysis and comparison of velocities, luminosities, and trajectories. Satellites are then tracked with orbital parameters being calculated and logged. Okno can detect and track satellites orbiting the Earth at altitudes between 2,000 and 40,000 kilometers. This increased altitude capability over the earlier Dnestr space surveillance radar system was necessitated due to the fielding of American surveillance satellites operating in high geostationary orbits outside Dnestr's field of view.
Development of the Okno system began in the late 1960s. By late 1971, prototypes of the optical systems destined for use in the Okno complex were being trialled at Byurukan Observatory in Armenia. Preliminary design work for the operational system was completed in 1976 and approved in 1977. Construction of the Okno site near Nurek in Tajikistan began in 1980. By the middle of 1992, the facilities, electronic systems, and a portion of the sensor suite was complete. Unfortunately, a civil war in Tajikistan put an end to construction efforts on 6 August 1992, with work resuming in 1994. The system began to undergo operational trials in late 1999 and was placed on combat duty in July of 2002.
Nurek
The Okno system is situated near Nurek, Tajikistan, approximately fifty kilometers southeast of the capital of Dushanbe. The main facility consists of ten telescopes covered by large clamshell domes. The telescopes are divided into two stations, with the detection complex containing six telescopes and the tracking station containing four. Each station features its own control center, with a central command and control center, likely also housing the detection and tracking computer systems, located in the center of the facility. Also present is an eleventh, smaller dome mounted atop a much smaller building. It is not known what function this additional facility performs. It may contain some sort of atmospheric measuring equipment used to assess atmospheric conditions before activation of the system.
The following image depicts the Okno complex near Nurek:
A power substation is located one kilometer south of the main complex, with administrative facilities and barracks being located approximately one kilometer north of the main complex.
The following image depicts the support facilities near the Okno complex:
Okno-S
In 1980 the Okno-S system was commissioned. Original plans called for the construction of four Okno and four Okno-S sites at various locations throughout the USSR and allied nations such as Cuba. Foreign locations were later rejected, and later plans called for the single Okno site at Nurek to be supported by two Okno-S sites in the Ukraine and eastern Russia. In the end, work only began on the eastern Okno-S site, to be located in the Primorye territory.
Okno-S is a high-altitude optical surveillance system based on the Okno complex design. The primary difference is in the area of interest. Okno-S is only designed to monitor an altitude band between 30,000 and 40,000 kilometers, permitting geostationary satellites to be located over a wider area. Work on the Okno-S complex began in the early 1980s. It is not known if this system was completed and brought to operational readiness. The Okno-S complex is located near Spassk-Dalny, adjacent to Lysiy mountain. Currently available satellite imagery of the region precludes accurately locating the facility.
KRONA
The Krona system is a long-range radar and optical tracking system designed to facilitate the identification and tracking of satellites. Rather than simply identifying objects as artificial satellites, the Krona system seeks to categorize satellites by type. The system consists of three main components:
-A large decimetric-band phased-array radar for target identification
-A system of five centimetric-band parabolic radar antennae for target classification
-An optical system combining an optical telescope with a laser system
The Krona system has a range of 3200 kilometers and can detect targets orbiting at a height of up to 40,000 kilometers.
Development of the Krona system began in 1974 when it was determined that current space-tracking systems were unable to accurately identify the type of satellite being tracked. Target discrimination was an important component of any ASAT program. Preliminary design work for the Krona complex, designated 45J6, was completed in 1976. The radar system was designated 20J6, and comprised both the decimetric and centimetric band systems. The optical/laser complex was designated 30J6 with separate housings for the optical telescope and laser system.
The centimetric-band radar system incorporated into the 20J6 system was designed in part to provide telemetry data to direct the 30J6 optical/laser system. The laser system was designed to provide target illumination for the optical system, which would capture images of target satellites at night or in clear weather. Favorable atmospheric qualities were one factor in determining the location of the Krona systems.
Storozhevaya
Construction of the first Krona facility began in 1979 near Storozhevaya in southwestern Russia. The facility was originally intended to be co-located with the Zelenchuk observatory, but concerns over interference with the observatory's systems led to the relocation of the Krona complex.
The following image depicts the locations of the 20J6 and 30J6 facilities at Storozhevaya:
The following image depicts the layout of the 20J6 complex at Storozhevaya:
The following image depicts the layout of the 30J6 complex at Storozhevaya:
Primary work on the facilities at Storozhevaya was completed in 1984, but economic difficulties prevented factory and state testing from being undertaken until 1992. State acceptance testing was completed by January 1994, but once again funding issues intervened and the system was not declared operational until November of 1999. As of 2003 work on the optical/laser system was not completed due to financial constraints, but a 2007 Russian television program featuring the Krona system indicates that the 30J6 system was completed sometime in the intervening period, attaining at least a limited operational capability.
Nakhodka
It was initially planned to construct three Krona complexes. The second Krona complex would have been located near the Okno complex in Tajikistan, with the third complex being located near Nakhodka in the Russian Far East. During the 1980s work was suspended on the second and third Krona complexes for financial reasons, but work on the Nakhodka complex was eventually resumed. The Nakhodka Krona system has sometimes been referred to as Krona-N, with the N likely representing either the location or the fact that the system is a radar only system; there is not a 30J6 complex at the Nakhodka location. Work was never resumed on the Tajikistan Krona site due in part to the civil unrest plaguing the region in the early 1990s.
The following image depicts the layout of the Nakhodka Krona complex:
LASER WEAPON SYSTEMS?
At various points in history, both the Okno and Krona complexes were associated with laser weapon systems by Western intelligence agencies and open source reporting. For example, a declassified CIA National Intelligence Report from December of 1985 titled "Soviet Space Programs" classified the Okno site as a probable laser weapon facility, even going so far as to state that it was possible but less likely that the facility was intended for space surveillance! In truth, only the Krona's 30J6 complex features a laser system, and this system lacks the required characteristics to be used as an offensive weapon. Laser weapon systems were trialled at Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan under various programs, with mixed results, and there is currently no evidence to suggest that they were operationally fielded at any point.
CONCLUSION
With the Okno and Krona complexes operational, Russia maintains a significant space surveillance capability independant of its BMEW assets. These systems have performed various military and civil roles, including an analysis of the surface impact point of the Mir space station and identification of space debris. The performance of the Okno and Krona systems guarantees that the Russian space surveillance network will have a valuable part to play in the areas of national defense and international space exploitation.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
CIA NIE 11-1-85J, Soviet Space Programs Volume 1-Key Judgements and Executive Summary
Okno and Krona Sourcebook
The Creation of Space and Missile Defense Systems, by Mikhail Perov (Moscow: Aviarus, 2003)
Russia's Krona Space Reconnaissance System Profiled, Praised in TV Programme
KMZ FILE
A Google Earth placemark file containing the sites described above can be downloaded here: Soviet and Russian Space Surveillance
Wednesday, June 4, 2008
Change of Plans
Alright, I've given this some more thought and decided to remove the separate page for Google Earth files. Instead, they will be hosted there but posted here to keep everything on one site for ease of use. The only thing that will really change is that when I upload placemark files, the information will be posted here along with the download link. To make them easy to find, I'll tag them all with the label "Google Earth Placemark". To find all the posts containing such files, just select that label from the list in the menu area on the right side of the page. This will be better for everyone because you'll only need to keep track of one website and I'll only have to produce textual updates for one site as well. A basic placeholder page will remain at the old link but you will no longer find anything amusing over there.
Google Earth Placemarks
A new site is now available for IMINT & Analysis Google Earth placemark files. It can be accessed by clicking on the link on the right side of the page labeled "IMINT & Analysis Placemarks", or by clicking here. This site will serve as a location to store placemark files which will accompany articles in the future, as well as to host other interesting placemark files I generate. When any new files are uploaded that do not relate to articles here, I'll post an update on this site. You'll then be able to go to the other site and read a description of what is contained inside of the file and download it if you choose. If a file is hosted that pertains to an article written here, then the file's download link will be found at the end of the article, along with a brief description of what is contained inside. Hopefully this will be of use to the readers of this blog.
The first file is already available at the new site, it's my worldwide SAM site collection. Yes, that means you'll have to check there for updates from now on, as it'll no longer be hosted at the Google Earth Community.
Later on this week I will post some more placemark files dealing with older articles on this site so that they are available to everyone. Once I get a few files hosted, I'll probably give each one of them their own page so that you don't have to scroll through tons of file descriptions to find what you're interested in.
All for now!
The first file is already available at the new site, it's my worldwide SAM site collection. Yes, that means you'll have to check there for updates from now on, as it'll no longer be hosted at the Google Earth Community.
Later on this week I will post some more placemark files dealing with older articles on this site so that they are available to everyone. Once I get a few files hosted, I'll probably give each one of them their own page so that you don't have to scroll through tons of file descriptions to find what you're interested in.
All for now!
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Update
Thought I'd feed everyone an update on a few things.
First off, IMINT & Analysis has made it into Jane's Missiles and Rockets once again, this time in the May issue for the discovery of potential DF-31 launch sites around Nanyang.
Secondly, the guys at Ogle Earth have often found my articles interesting but have decried the lack of downloadable content. I thought about that for a bit, and have decided that they may be on to something. So, from now on, there will be a link to download a Google Earth placemark file at the end of each article, where appropriate. Image of the Week features will not contain downloads as they are just a single place (i.e., extrapolate the coordinates from the image and mark it yourself if you're interested), and text-based articles such as the forthcoming S-300P feature won't either. I may or may not go back and provide downloadable content for older articles. If there is one that you want to see, leave a comment to this post and let me know. I save all of that stuff so it won't be an issue.
Thirdly, in light of my second point, here is the download link to the file containing the Google Earth placemarks from the Russian nuclear complexes article: Right click, save as I'll have to be a bit creative as to where I upload these, so if anybody has a good idea, let me know. Blogger.com won't let you upload files! The Google Earth community forum was hosting the file for about thirty seconds before moderator TheLedge complained that it was a duplicate of an existing placemark, obviously ignorant of the fact that most of the sites were not actually marked, especially the storage sites. I can leave the SAM site placemark there for now as I started the file long enough ago to have ownership of the process, but clearly I need someplace else to get these files hosted.
That's it for now. I'll be busy for the next two weeks so there may not be any major articles posted apart from the Image of the Week, but I will try to get some things finalized. Once these two weeks are up I'll have a lot more time available so major articles will be posted with greater frequency.
As always, comments are welcome and encouraged. And if there's a certain location or topic you'd like to see covered, let me know!
First off, IMINT & Analysis has made it into Jane's Missiles and Rockets once again, this time in the May issue for the discovery of potential DF-31 launch sites around Nanyang.
Secondly, the guys at Ogle Earth have often found my articles interesting but have decried the lack of downloadable content. I thought about that for a bit, and have decided that they may be on to something. So, from now on, there will be a link to download a Google Earth placemark file at the end of each article, where appropriate. Image of the Week features will not contain downloads as they are just a single place (i.e., extrapolate the coordinates from the image and mark it yourself if you're interested), and text-based articles such as the forthcoming S-300P feature won't either. I may or may not go back and provide downloadable content for older articles. If there is one that you want to see, leave a comment to this post and let me know. I save all of that stuff so it won't be an issue.
Thirdly, in light of my second point, here is the download link to the file containing the Google Earth placemarks from the Russian nuclear complexes article: Right click, save as I'll have to be a bit creative as to where I upload these, so if anybody has a good idea, let me know. Blogger.com won't let you upload files! The Google Earth community forum was hosting the file for about thirty seconds before moderator TheLedge complained that it was a duplicate of an existing placemark, obviously ignorant of the fact that most of the sites were not actually marked, especially the storage sites. I can leave the SAM site placemark there for now as I started the file long enough ago to have ownership of the process, but clearly I need someplace else to get these files hosted.
That's it for now. I'll be busy for the next two weeks so there may not be any major articles posted apart from the Image of the Week, but I will try to get some things finalized. Once these two weeks are up I'll have a lot more time available so major articles will be posted with greater frequency.
As always, comments are welcome and encouraged. And if there's a certain location or topic you'd like to see covered, let me know!
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Thursday, May 1, 2008
The Cypriot Missile Crisis
INTRODUCTION
Between January of 1997 and December of 1998 a conflict was brewing in the eastern Mediterranean that threatened to launch an armed conflict between two NATO powers, Greece and Turkey. The Cypriot government, much to the apparent dismay of its eastern neighbors in Ankara, made a bold move by purchasing the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) strategic SAM system from Russia. What followed was a chain of events that threatened to result in open warfare.
CYPRIOT AIR DEFENSE ISSUES
The island nation of Cyprus has had a long and sometimes violent history. Currently, the internationally recognized government of Cyprus controls approximately two thirds of the island, with roughly 35,000 Turkish troops occupying the remaining third, a situation that has existed since 1974. The government of Cyprus enjoys support from the Greek government in Athens, with the Turkish government in Ankara supporting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the occupied territory.
In 1995, the government of Cyprus began to examine the possibility of procuring an air defense system. Turkish military aircraft had frequently been seen over the skies of Cyprus with no regard to territorial sovereignty, and the December 1995 announcement of the sale of the ATACMs missile system to the Turkish military represented a new threat system capable of hitting targets in Cyprus from the safety of Turkey.
Cypriot Foreign Minister Alecos Michaelides announced the purchase of the Russian S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system on January 5th, 1997. The terms of the deal were not disclosed, with estimates of between $230 million and $600 million appearing in the open press. The S-300PMU-1 appeared to be an ideal fit for Cyprus with regard to the threats it faced. The 150 kilometer range SAM system would allow Cyprus to monitor the airspace over the entire island, and the associated 64N6E (BIG BIRD D) EW and battle management radar would provide adequate early warning of any inbound Turkish military aircraft. The system was also advertised as having an ATBM capability, allowing it to deal with the forthcoming ATACMs missile system being procured for the Turkish military.
A NEW MISSILE CRISIS
Turkish reaction to the Cypriot SAM purchase was extremely stern. On the 11th of January in 1997 the Washington Times reported that Turkey threatened a pre-emptive strike against Cyprus in order to block the deployment of the missiles. The political back and forth proceeded as the rest of Europe awaited the outcome.
The stern reaction by the Turkish government does not appear to have been logical. Firstly, the S-300PMU-1 is a defensive asset. While the associated radar systems would have been able to peer into a portion of Turkey, no military air bases came under the coverage of either the 150 kilometer engagement range of the missile system of the 300 kilometer detection range of the 64N6E EW radar. Secondly, Turkey formally recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 (being the only nation to do so). By default, that admission recognizes the Turkish occupied portion of Cyprus as a separate independent nation from the rest of Cyprus. With the de facto admission of the sovereignty of Greek-supported Cyprus, Turkey had no basis for threatening a sovereign nation or interfering in its internal affairs. In a similar vein, Turkey was incensed in June of 1997 when Greek F-16s landed at Paphos Air Base in Cyprus, as a part of expanding defense ties between the two nations due in no small part to Turkish aggression over the S-300PMU-1 purchase. Once again, Turkey insisted on governing the internal affairs of an admittedly sovereign nation. The Turkish reaction was to examine the possibility of an airstrike against Paphos, irregardless of the fact that this would certainly lead to a confrontation with Greece.
The Russian reaction to the evolving crisis was certainly interesting. Russia fervently maintained that the sale would proceed. After the Turkish government began to board and search vessels travelling to Cyprus, the Russian reaction became far more ominous. In October of 1997 the Russian Ambassador to Cyprus, Georgy Muratov, went so far as to state that any Turkish interference with the delivery of the missile systems would be treated as an act of war. Later, Russia examined the possibility of escorting the transport vessels with a naval surface action group, containing both the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the guided missile cruiser Peter the Great. This would appear to be an overly aggressive posture to protect a simple export sale of a few SAM batteries, but Russia wanted to ensure that their entry into the arms market in Western Europe was not interfered with.
Despite continued threats from Turkey, the Cypriot government seemed willing to negotiate over the issue of the SAM systems. Various proposals were made to the Turkish government in an attempt to dissolve the crisis, but all were rejected. Perhaps the most interesting was a proposal from Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides to disarm the Cypriot national guard and place the funds from the defense budget in a UN account to improve infrastructure in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. His proposal was rejected by the Turkish government. In the end, President Clerides negotiated an agreement with Greece whereby the S-300PMU-1 components would be delivered to the Greek island of Crete, where they would remain under Cypriot control. Turkey decired this move as well.
CYPRIOT S-300PMU-1 FACILITIES
While no S-300PMU-1 SAM systems were ever deployed to Cyprus, Russian technicians did travel to the island nation and construct three sites, two for the missile systems and one for the 64N6E EW and battle management radar. One missile site, along with the 64N6E site, was constructed atop Mount Olympus. The second missile site was constructed in the western part of the island near Drousha. Imagery obtained of the Mount Olympus sites in September of 2003 depicts unused but complete facilities, suggesting that the S-300PMU-1 batteries would have been able to become operational in short order had they been delivered.
The Cypriot S-300PMU-1 facilities were located at the following coordinates:
34°56'39.26"N 32°51'49.19"E (Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1)
34°57'47.46"N 32°22'34.23"E (Drousha S-300PMU-1)
33°56'18.09"N 32°51'40.93"E (Mount Olympus 64N6E EW site)
The following image depicts the location of the aforementioned facilities on the island of Cyprus:
The following image depicts the coverage provided by the S-300PMU-1 components had they been deployed. S-300PMU-1 range rings are red, while the blue ring denotes the range of the 64N6E EW radar.
As can be seen in the image above, the system did not pose a significant threat to Turkish interests. It did, however, have the ability to monitor a great deal of airspace in Lebanon, perhaps representing the source of alleged Israeli objections to the deployment of the systems.
The S-300PMU-1 sites constructed on Cyprus exhibited a layout not before seen in any other S-300P family SAM deployment. It is possible that the sites were constructed with regard to the potential threat posed by the Turkish ATACMS missile system. Nevertheless, certain features can still be positively identified. Each site features four revetments, each intended to house a single TEL. Two TET pads for emplacing 40V6 mast assemblies, capable of mounting either the 30N6E1 (TOMB STONE) engagement radar or the 76N6E (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar, are present. If mobility is desired, what appears to be a raised berm for mounting the 30N6E1 is also provided. Various support facilities are present as well.
The following image depicts the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site:
Although it is of considerably lower resolution, the following image depicts the Drousha S-300PMU-1 site. The lower resolution does not preclude the identification of various elements of the site.
The following image has been constructed by extracting various system components from other imagery in order to depict what an operational S-300PMU-1 site may have looked like:
The 64N6E site is located adjacent to the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site. In this instance, many of the site elements take on a more traditional appearance and can be found in nearly identical fashion at other 64N6-series sites worldwide. The most prominent features are the typical command bunker, a bunker for support vehicles, and what appears to be a raised berm for housing the 64N6E radar system. Alternatively, there is a radome which may also have been intended to house the 64N6E radar array. Protecting the radar array in such a fashion is not out of the question due to the fixed nature of the site.
The following image depicts the Mount Olympus 64N6E site:
The presence of only two prepared sites configured to support an S-300PMU-1 battery would seem to indicate that only two batteries were ordered.
THE S-300PMU-1 ON CRETE
Following Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides' December 1998 decision not to deploy the Russian strategic SAM system on Cyprus, the Greek government agreed to allow the weapons to be deployed on the Greek island of Crete. Turkey continued to complain, as it was stated that the systems would still be under Cypriot ownership, but the relocation of the systems to Crete would effectively neutralize them as they would no longer have the range necessary to threaten Turkish airspace. Naturally, the issue of a future deployment of the SAMs to Cyprus was not addressed, ostensibly to placate the Turkish government into backing down from threatening military action against the defensive systems. In return for not deploying the S-300PMU-1 in Cyprus, Greece agreed to transfer a number of Tor-M1 TELARs to Cyprus for air defense.
S-300PMU-1 components were delivered to Crete by Russia in April of 1999. Initially, the S-300PMU-1 components were located at Nikos Kazantzakis. Shortly thereafter, at least some of the components were transferred to Tympaki, where the support facilities for the system had been located. By 2004, an S-300PMU-1 battery had been relocated back to Nikos Kazantzakis, along with the associated 64N6E EW radar complex. This battery was deployed to provide air defense for the 2004 Summer Olympics being held in Athens. Analysis of open source imagery indicates that the battery deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis remained there as of June 2007, with the 64N6 radar no longer deployed. Elements of a second battery were still present at Tympaki as of January 2005.
The S-300PMU-1 facilities on the island of Crete are located at the following coordinates:
35°20'33.79"N 25°10'58.77"E (Nikos Kazantzakis)
35°19'52.02"N 25°13'20.74"E (64N6E EW site)
35°04'02.43"N 24°45'10.01"E (Tympaki)
The locations of the aforementioned sites can be seen in the following image:
The Nikos Kazantzakis S-300PMU-1 deployment is organized in two areas on the grounds of Heraklion International Airport. The actual deployment site lies along the northeastern end of the main runway, with a garrison area for system components being found to the southeast of the airport terminal.
The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 components deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis:
The following image depicts the garrison area at Nikos Kazantzakis:
Interestingly, it would appear that there are two 30N6E1 engagement radars at Nikos Kazantzakis, suggesting that more than two batteries may have been delivered. Standard practice is to purchase one engagement radar for each battery. It is also possible that the second radar was deployed from Tympaki to support the continued operation of the system after the Olympics and simply has not been redeployed.
Open source photographs of the 64N6E radar system in operation has allowed the early warning and battle management site to be located. When the image was captured in June of 2007 the 64N6E had been removed, but the location is correct based on analysis of terrain features in the area. The photographs used to determine the location of the 64N6E emplacement will not be posted here in order to respect the copyrights of the respective owners.
The 64N6E location can be seen in the image below:
The Tympaki S-300PMU-1 garrison and support facility is located on the grounds of the former Tympaki Air Base along the southern coast of Crete. While the system was deployed to Nikos Kazantzakis for operational use in 2004, there is nothing precluding an S-300PMU-1 battery from operating at Tympaki. Imagery acquired in January of 2005 depicted a nearly complete battery in residence, supporting the theory that only two batteries were delivered (the second battery likely still residing at Nikos Kazantzakis). A 30N6E1 engagement radar can be seen in operation, as well as three TELs and a stowed 40V6 mast assembly for the 76N6E low altitude detection radar. The only limiting factor to operating an S-300PMU-1 battery out of Tympaki would be terrain. A large mountain range bisects the two S-300PMU-1 facilities on either coast, which would cause problems if the 64N6E EW and battle management radar was emplaced at the previously identified location east of Nikos Kazantzakis to support both batteries.
The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 facility at Tympaki:
In December of 2007, Cypriot ownership of the S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system came to an end. An agreement was signed to formally transfer ownership of the systems to Greece, effectively ending a ten year political incident. Formal Greek inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the Hellenic air defense network would fill a large gap along the southern flank of Greek territory. As the following image demonstrates, activating both S-300PMU-1 batteries would provide air defense for the entire island of Crete and a large portion of the surrounding airspace. The range of the 64N6E radar is illustrated as a blue ring, with red rings denoting the engagement zones of S-300PMU-1 batteries deployed at each identified associated location.
Greece currently relies on three PATRIOT and two HAWK batteries for air defense. The following image illustrates that the inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the overall air defense network would allow for a significant increase in capability along Greece's southern flanks. S-300PMU-1 and PATRIOT ranges are depicted as red rings, HAWK ranges are depicted as orange rings, and the 64N6E radar range is depicted as a blue ring.
REPLACING THE S-300
With the S-300PMU-1 out of the equation, Cyprus still sought a solution to the air defense question. A long-range system was clearly no longer a viable option unless Cyprus desired to continue enhancing the Greek air defense network. Cypriot officials were not overly enamored of the Tor-M1 systems provided by Greece, as they had a short range precluding any significant impact on the nation's air defense posture. Cyprus may have found a solution in another Russian SAM product, the Buk-M1 (SA-11 GADFLY).
In March of 1999 Turkish newspapers were reporting the sale of the Buk-M1 to Cyprus. While not a strategic SAM system in the vein of the S-300PMU-1, the Buk-M1 has a respectable engagement range of 35 kilometers and also enjoys an advertised ATBM capability. Being a tactical system not tied to a fixed, prepared site, the Buk-M1 is also highly mobile, complicating any potential targeting efforts.
Examination of military installations in Cyprus has resulted in the location of two facilities which may be home to Cypriot Buk-M1 components. Imagery captured in October of 2003 depicts what may be a garrison facility as well as a hardened storage site for housing missile reloads or system components themselves.
The garrison site, located at 34°54'27.17"N 33°20'22.88"E, can be seen in the image below. The site appears to be well maintained and displays features in common with the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 facilities, suggesting possible Russian invovlement in its construction.
The hardened storage facility, located at 34°53'51.77"N 33°20'14.42"E, can be seen in the image below. A possible 9A310 TELAR can be seen in the entrance of one of the bunkers. The object compares well with field deployed 9A310 TELARs identified in Russia.
While the S-300PMU-1 purchase was widely reported, it would appear that any Buk-M1 deal has been kept out of the public eye. This was likely done in an effort to avoid yet another diplomatic exercise with Turkey. It is possible that Greece acted as the buyer for Cyprus. A Ria Novosti article in December of 2007 alleged that Greece had procured the Buk-M1-2 system at some point in the past, a 45 kilometer evolution of the Buk-M1 incorporating the 9M317 missile from the Buk-M2 system. Whatever the case may be, the evidence suggests that Cyprus has in fact procured some variant of the Buk family to solve its air defense question.
CONCLUSION
Despite continued posturing by the Turkish government after the plan to deliver the S-300PMU-1 systems to Crete was announced, the conflict rapidly abated. While the issue of Cyprus itself still remains unresolved, on this occasion cooler heads prevailed to ensure that the once-likely military conflict did not transpire. What remains is perhaps a new understanding of the many issues facing the nations resolved to end the political conflict continuing to grasp the island nation.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Turkey opposed to new deployment
S-300PMU-1 deployment cancelled
Athens speaks on Crete deployment
Conflict averted
International lawlessness
Greek MoD on Crete deployment
Disarmament diplomacy
S-300s transferred to Greece
Countdown to conflict?
Cypriot crisis timeline
Effect of missile sale on Cyprus situation
Cyprus knot
A case of brinkmanship
Russian missiles arrive in Greece
Cyprus to receive Tor-M1
Greek Buk-M1-2?
Cypriot Buk-M1 purchase
S-300s to Tympaki
S-300s defend Athens Olympics
Between January of 1997 and December of 1998 a conflict was brewing in the eastern Mediterranean that threatened to launch an armed conflict between two NATO powers, Greece and Turkey. The Cypriot government, much to the apparent dismay of its eastern neighbors in Ankara, made a bold move by purchasing the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) strategic SAM system from Russia. What followed was a chain of events that threatened to result in open warfare.
CYPRIOT AIR DEFENSE ISSUES
The island nation of Cyprus has had a long and sometimes violent history. Currently, the internationally recognized government of Cyprus controls approximately two thirds of the island, with roughly 35,000 Turkish troops occupying the remaining third, a situation that has existed since 1974. The government of Cyprus enjoys support from the Greek government in Athens, with the Turkish government in Ankara supporting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the occupied territory.
In 1995, the government of Cyprus began to examine the possibility of procuring an air defense system. Turkish military aircraft had frequently been seen over the skies of Cyprus with no regard to territorial sovereignty, and the December 1995 announcement of the sale of the ATACMs missile system to the Turkish military represented a new threat system capable of hitting targets in Cyprus from the safety of Turkey.
Cypriot Foreign Minister Alecos Michaelides announced the purchase of the Russian S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system on January 5th, 1997. The terms of the deal were not disclosed, with estimates of between $230 million and $600 million appearing in the open press. The S-300PMU-1 appeared to be an ideal fit for Cyprus with regard to the threats it faced. The 150 kilometer range SAM system would allow Cyprus to monitor the airspace over the entire island, and the associated 64N6E (BIG BIRD D) EW and battle management radar would provide adequate early warning of any inbound Turkish military aircraft. The system was also advertised as having an ATBM capability, allowing it to deal with the forthcoming ATACMs missile system being procured for the Turkish military.
A NEW MISSILE CRISIS
Turkish reaction to the Cypriot SAM purchase was extremely stern. On the 11th of January in 1997 the Washington Times reported that Turkey threatened a pre-emptive strike against Cyprus in order to block the deployment of the missiles. The political back and forth proceeded as the rest of Europe awaited the outcome.
The stern reaction by the Turkish government does not appear to have been logical. Firstly, the S-300PMU-1 is a defensive asset. While the associated radar systems would have been able to peer into a portion of Turkey, no military air bases came under the coverage of either the 150 kilometer engagement range of the missile system of the 300 kilometer detection range of the 64N6E EW radar. Secondly, Turkey formally recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 (being the only nation to do so). By default, that admission recognizes the Turkish occupied portion of Cyprus as a separate independent nation from the rest of Cyprus. With the de facto admission of the sovereignty of Greek-supported Cyprus, Turkey had no basis for threatening a sovereign nation or interfering in its internal affairs. In a similar vein, Turkey was incensed in June of 1997 when Greek F-16s landed at Paphos Air Base in Cyprus, as a part of expanding defense ties between the two nations due in no small part to Turkish aggression over the S-300PMU-1 purchase. Once again, Turkey insisted on governing the internal affairs of an admittedly sovereign nation. The Turkish reaction was to examine the possibility of an airstrike against Paphos, irregardless of the fact that this would certainly lead to a confrontation with Greece.
The Russian reaction to the evolving crisis was certainly interesting. Russia fervently maintained that the sale would proceed. After the Turkish government began to board and search vessels travelling to Cyprus, the Russian reaction became far more ominous. In October of 1997 the Russian Ambassador to Cyprus, Georgy Muratov, went so far as to state that any Turkish interference with the delivery of the missile systems would be treated as an act of war. Later, Russia examined the possibility of escorting the transport vessels with a naval surface action group, containing both the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the guided missile cruiser Peter the Great. This would appear to be an overly aggressive posture to protect a simple export sale of a few SAM batteries, but Russia wanted to ensure that their entry into the arms market in Western Europe was not interfered with.
Despite continued threats from Turkey, the Cypriot government seemed willing to negotiate over the issue of the SAM systems. Various proposals were made to the Turkish government in an attempt to dissolve the crisis, but all were rejected. Perhaps the most interesting was a proposal from Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides to disarm the Cypriot national guard and place the funds from the defense budget in a UN account to improve infrastructure in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. His proposal was rejected by the Turkish government. In the end, President Clerides negotiated an agreement with Greece whereby the S-300PMU-1 components would be delivered to the Greek island of Crete, where they would remain under Cypriot control. Turkey decired this move as well.
CYPRIOT S-300PMU-1 FACILITIES
While no S-300PMU-1 SAM systems were ever deployed to Cyprus, Russian technicians did travel to the island nation and construct three sites, two for the missile systems and one for the 64N6E EW and battle management radar. One missile site, along with the 64N6E site, was constructed atop Mount Olympus. The second missile site was constructed in the western part of the island near Drousha. Imagery obtained of the Mount Olympus sites in September of 2003 depicts unused but complete facilities, suggesting that the S-300PMU-1 batteries would have been able to become operational in short order had they been delivered.
The Cypriot S-300PMU-1 facilities were located at the following coordinates:
34°56'39.26"N 32°51'49.19"E (Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1)
34°57'47.46"N 32°22'34.23"E (Drousha S-300PMU-1)
33°56'18.09"N 32°51'40.93"E (Mount Olympus 64N6E EW site)
The following image depicts the location of the aforementioned facilities on the island of Cyprus:
The following image depicts the coverage provided by the S-300PMU-1 components had they been deployed. S-300PMU-1 range rings are red, while the blue ring denotes the range of the 64N6E EW radar.
As can be seen in the image above, the system did not pose a significant threat to Turkish interests. It did, however, have the ability to monitor a great deal of airspace in Lebanon, perhaps representing the source of alleged Israeli objections to the deployment of the systems.
The S-300PMU-1 sites constructed on Cyprus exhibited a layout not before seen in any other S-300P family SAM deployment. It is possible that the sites were constructed with regard to the potential threat posed by the Turkish ATACMS missile system. Nevertheless, certain features can still be positively identified. Each site features four revetments, each intended to house a single TEL. Two TET pads for emplacing 40V6 mast assemblies, capable of mounting either the 30N6E1 (TOMB STONE) engagement radar or the 76N6E (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar, are present. If mobility is desired, what appears to be a raised berm for mounting the 30N6E1 is also provided. Various support facilities are present as well.
The following image depicts the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site:
Although it is of considerably lower resolution, the following image depicts the Drousha S-300PMU-1 site. The lower resolution does not preclude the identification of various elements of the site.
The following image has been constructed by extracting various system components from other imagery in order to depict what an operational S-300PMU-1 site may have looked like:
The 64N6E site is located adjacent to the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site. In this instance, many of the site elements take on a more traditional appearance and can be found in nearly identical fashion at other 64N6-series sites worldwide. The most prominent features are the typical command bunker, a bunker for support vehicles, and what appears to be a raised berm for housing the 64N6E radar system. Alternatively, there is a radome which may also have been intended to house the 64N6E radar array. Protecting the radar array in such a fashion is not out of the question due to the fixed nature of the site.
The following image depicts the Mount Olympus 64N6E site:
The presence of only two prepared sites configured to support an S-300PMU-1 battery would seem to indicate that only two batteries were ordered.
THE S-300PMU-1 ON CRETE
Following Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides' December 1998 decision not to deploy the Russian strategic SAM system on Cyprus, the Greek government agreed to allow the weapons to be deployed on the Greek island of Crete. Turkey continued to complain, as it was stated that the systems would still be under Cypriot ownership, but the relocation of the systems to Crete would effectively neutralize them as they would no longer have the range necessary to threaten Turkish airspace. Naturally, the issue of a future deployment of the SAMs to Cyprus was not addressed, ostensibly to placate the Turkish government into backing down from threatening military action against the defensive systems. In return for not deploying the S-300PMU-1 in Cyprus, Greece agreed to transfer a number of Tor-M1 TELARs to Cyprus for air defense.
S-300PMU-1 components were delivered to Crete by Russia in April of 1999. Initially, the S-300PMU-1 components were located at Nikos Kazantzakis. Shortly thereafter, at least some of the components were transferred to Tympaki, where the support facilities for the system had been located. By 2004, an S-300PMU-1 battery had been relocated back to Nikos Kazantzakis, along with the associated 64N6E EW radar complex. This battery was deployed to provide air defense for the 2004 Summer Olympics being held in Athens. Analysis of open source imagery indicates that the battery deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis remained there as of June 2007, with the 64N6 radar no longer deployed. Elements of a second battery were still present at Tympaki as of January 2005.
The S-300PMU-1 facilities on the island of Crete are located at the following coordinates:
35°20'33.79"N 25°10'58.77"E (Nikos Kazantzakis)
35°19'52.02"N 25°13'20.74"E (64N6E EW site)
35°04'02.43"N 24°45'10.01"E (Tympaki)
The locations of the aforementioned sites can be seen in the following image:
The Nikos Kazantzakis S-300PMU-1 deployment is organized in two areas on the grounds of Heraklion International Airport. The actual deployment site lies along the northeastern end of the main runway, with a garrison area for system components being found to the southeast of the airport terminal.
The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 components deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis:
The following image depicts the garrison area at Nikos Kazantzakis:
Interestingly, it would appear that there are two 30N6E1 engagement radars at Nikos Kazantzakis, suggesting that more than two batteries may have been delivered. Standard practice is to purchase one engagement radar for each battery. It is also possible that the second radar was deployed from Tympaki to support the continued operation of the system after the Olympics and simply has not been redeployed.
Open source photographs of the 64N6E radar system in operation has allowed the early warning and battle management site to be located. When the image was captured in June of 2007 the 64N6E had been removed, but the location is correct based on analysis of terrain features in the area. The photographs used to determine the location of the 64N6E emplacement will not be posted here in order to respect the copyrights of the respective owners.
The 64N6E location can be seen in the image below:
The Tympaki S-300PMU-1 garrison and support facility is located on the grounds of the former Tympaki Air Base along the southern coast of Crete. While the system was deployed to Nikos Kazantzakis for operational use in 2004, there is nothing precluding an S-300PMU-1 battery from operating at Tympaki. Imagery acquired in January of 2005 depicted a nearly complete battery in residence, supporting the theory that only two batteries were delivered (the second battery likely still residing at Nikos Kazantzakis). A 30N6E1 engagement radar can be seen in operation, as well as three TELs and a stowed 40V6 mast assembly for the 76N6E low altitude detection radar. The only limiting factor to operating an S-300PMU-1 battery out of Tympaki would be terrain. A large mountain range bisects the two S-300PMU-1 facilities on either coast, which would cause problems if the 64N6E EW and battle management radar was emplaced at the previously identified location east of Nikos Kazantzakis to support both batteries.
The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 facility at Tympaki:
In December of 2007, Cypriot ownership of the S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system came to an end. An agreement was signed to formally transfer ownership of the systems to Greece, effectively ending a ten year political incident. Formal Greek inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the Hellenic air defense network would fill a large gap along the southern flank of Greek territory. As the following image demonstrates, activating both S-300PMU-1 batteries would provide air defense for the entire island of Crete and a large portion of the surrounding airspace. The range of the 64N6E radar is illustrated as a blue ring, with red rings denoting the engagement zones of S-300PMU-1 batteries deployed at each identified associated location.
Greece currently relies on three PATRIOT and two HAWK batteries for air defense. The following image illustrates that the inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the overall air defense network would allow for a significant increase in capability along Greece's southern flanks. S-300PMU-1 and PATRIOT ranges are depicted as red rings, HAWK ranges are depicted as orange rings, and the 64N6E radar range is depicted as a blue ring.
REPLACING THE S-300
With the S-300PMU-1 out of the equation, Cyprus still sought a solution to the air defense question. A long-range system was clearly no longer a viable option unless Cyprus desired to continue enhancing the Greek air defense network. Cypriot officials were not overly enamored of the Tor-M1 systems provided by Greece, as they had a short range precluding any significant impact on the nation's air defense posture. Cyprus may have found a solution in another Russian SAM product, the Buk-M1 (SA-11 GADFLY).
In March of 1999 Turkish newspapers were reporting the sale of the Buk-M1 to Cyprus. While not a strategic SAM system in the vein of the S-300PMU-1, the Buk-M1 has a respectable engagement range of 35 kilometers and also enjoys an advertised ATBM capability. Being a tactical system not tied to a fixed, prepared site, the Buk-M1 is also highly mobile, complicating any potential targeting efforts.
Examination of military installations in Cyprus has resulted in the location of two facilities which may be home to Cypriot Buk-M1 components. Imagery captured in October of 2003 depicts what may be a garrison facility as well as a hardened storage site for housing missile reloads or system components themselves.
The garrison site, located at 34°54'27.17"N 33°20'22.88"E, can be seen in the image below. The site appears to be well maintained and displays features in common with the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 facilities, suggesting possible Russian invovlement in its construction.
The hardened storage facility, located at 34°53'51.77"N 33°20'14.42"E, can be seen in the image below. A possible 9A310 TELAR can be seen in the entrance of one of the bunkers. The object compares well with field deployed 9A310 TELARs identified in Russia.
While the S-300PMU-1 purchase was widely reported, it would appear that any Buk-M1 deal has been kept out of the public eye. This was likely done in an effort to avoid yet another diplomatic exercise with Turkey. It is possible that Greece acted as the buyer for Cyprus. A Ria Novosti article in December of 2007 alleged that Greece had procured the Buk-M1-2 system at some point in the past, a 45 kilometer evolution of the Buk-M1 incorporating the 9M317 missile from the Buk-M2 system. Whatever the case may be, the evidence suggests that Cyprus has in fact procured some variant of the Buk family to solve its air defense question.
CONCLUSION
Despite continued posturing by the Turkish government after the plan to deliver the S-300PMU-1 systems to Crete was announced, the conflict rapidly abated. While the issue of Cyprus itself still remains unresolved, on this occasion cooler heads prevailed to ensure that the once-likely military conflict did not transpire. What remains is perhaps a new understanding of the many issues facing the nations resolved to end the political conflict continuing to grasp the island nation.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Turkey opposed to new deployment
S-300PMU-1 deployment cancelled
Athens speaks on Crete deployment
Conflict averted
International lawlessness
Greek MoD on Crete deployment
Disarmament diplomacy
S-300s transferred to Greece
Countdown to conflict?
Cypriot crisis timeline
Effect of missile sale on Cyprus situation
Cyprus knot
A case of brinkmanship
Russian missiles arrive in Greece
Cyprus to receive Tor-M1
Greek Buk-M1-2?
Cypriot Buk-M1 purchase
S-300s to Tympaki
S-300s defend Athens Olympics
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