Sunday, August 17, 2008

Russia, Georgia, & Disinformation

INTRODUCTION

Between 8 and 11 August the Georgian-Russian dispute over the separatist provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia came to a violent head. Regardless of who is more at fault, the separatists, Saakashvili's Georgian government, or the Medvedev/Putin government in Russia, the entire affair has been surrounded by massive amounts of disinformation thanks in no small part to an apparent total disregard for accurate reporting by the media.

ABHORRENT REPORTING

There is an absurd amount of inaccurate information being propagated throughout the media regarding the current conflict between Russia and Georgia. Supposedly professional and well-respected media outlets have been severely lacking with respect to fact checking and corroborating the news they have been reporting.

Oil Pipelines Were Not Struck

The Associated Press, among other sources, has been spreading the story that Russian warplanes were dropping bombs in close proximity to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which is the second longest oil pipeline in the world. Various media sources have claimed that there were attacks which in some cases resulted in bombs impacting within close proximity to the pipeline itself. The alleged pipeline attack was mentioned, for instance, in an 11 August Associated Press report. The date of the report itself tells any intelligent reader all they need to know about the fact-checking abilities of the Associated Press; on 9 August, Agence-France Presse reported that British Petroleum, one of the shareholders of the pipeline, was not aware of any such attack. An 11 August interview with BP officials published in The Telegraph indicated that BP workers had in fact inspected the pipeline and found absolutely no evidence of any bombing raids whatsoever. One would think that if the Russian air force had been attempting to bomb the pipeline, that evidence of impact craters would have been found. There was also an ironic incident where Russian Su-25s (FROGFOOT) bombed a factory near the Tbilisi airport, a factory which had at one time produced Su-25s! This was translated into a Russian attack on the airport itself, a claim which was even denied by the Georgian government.

Advanced Weapons?

In another example of erroneous reporting, New York Post columnist Ralph Peters stated that Russia was employing precision guided munitions (PGMs), in part of a 12 August column seemingly written with the sole intent to disparage the performance of Russian military units. Russian General Staff Deputy Chief General-Colonel Anatoly Nogovitsyn seemed to provide evidence to back up Peters' claim in an August 12 Kommersant report. General-Colonel Nogovitsyn claimed that Russia possessed "weapons allowing to hit only the facilities threatening our troops instead of fighting by carpet bombing", claiming that this is what the Russian military was doing. Here's the issue: Nogovitsyn did not necessarily specify that these were air-delivered weapons. Russia has employed the 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 SCARAB) SRBM against Georgian positions, and while the Tochka is not necessarily a PGM in the truest sense of the word, the 90 meter CEP does provide far more accuracy than other Russian SRBMs and battlefield support systems. Furthermore, there have been various images spread around the internet showing Russian Su-24 (FENCER) tactical bombers uploaded with weapons. Some of these images have depicted the Cyrillic script applied to the weapons by Russian aviators as messages to their intended targets. The weapons in question were all unguided gravity bombs of various sizes. If Russia was air dropping PGMs, what are these Su-24s doing toting standard dumb bombs? Various international media outlets are also carrying stories detailing Georgian claims that cluster bombs were employed by the Russians; cluster bombs are indiscriminate, inaccurate weapons designed to saturate a portion of the battlefield. Again, where are the PGMs?

Peters also claims that Russian pilots are flying their latest combat aircraft. This is patently false. The combat aircraft employed by Russia on bombing sorties over Georgia are Su-24s (FENCER-D) and Su-25s. Anyone with a basic knowledge of the Russian air force will be aware that both the Su-27SM and Su-34 are currently in service to varying degrees, both of which are far more capable air-to-ground platforms in most respects than their legacy Sukhoi counterparts. The Su-34 is in fact currently entering service, with five series-produced examples undergoing trials at Lipetsk. The Su-34 has been trialled in combat before over Chechnya while still in prototype form, so operational use over Georgia would certainly have been a possibility.

Peters' problem is an apparent desire to paint the Russian pilots as ill trained and incapable of performing simple combat tasks. By claiming that the Russian aircraft are employing PGMs he creates an illusion that the bombs being dropped are not being employed properly as they are not striking targets with a high degree of accuracy. By claiming that Russia is employing the most advanced aircraft in its arsenal, he creates an illusion that the Russian pilots are not competent enough to handle modern warplanes. Unfortunately the evidence simply does not support any of his ludicrous and obviously biased claims against the Russian Air Force. Peters has traveled through Georgia, and may therefore have a sympathetic view of their situation, but his (admittedly op-ed) piece does nothing to reinforce his credibility as an objective journalist.

RUSSIAN "PREPARATION"

One of the most propagated theories behind the Georgian conflict is that it was preplanned and prepared for in advance by the Russian military. Logically, this should of course be partly true. Any military worth its salt will always be preparing for likely future conflicts. Two American examples of warplanning are OPLAN 5027, outlining plans for a conflict on the Korean peninsula, and OPLAN 8044, dealing with nuclear warfighting. Given the recent history of the Georgian situation, it would be illogical to assume that Russia had not at least outlined plans for a military action against Georgia. Russian troops based in Georgia pre-conflict were described as peacekeepers; peacekeepers would not be necessary were it not for the potential for open conflict, and where there is potential there will most assuredly be a contingency plan. But does this mean that Russia purposely created an environment where such a contingency plan would be called into action?

The interesting aspect to this theory is that it can only survive in blind ignorance of the events leading up to the conflict. Prior to the outbreak of serious hostilities, South Ossetian separatists and Georgian military forces had begun trading fire as early as 1 August in response to separatist shelling of Georgian villages in South Ossetia. By 3 August Russia was warning Georgia that the conflict would escalate if it continued further. After declaring a cease-fire on August 7, Georgian forces began to assault South Ossetia during the early hours on August 8 in response to further shelling by separatist forces. By August 11, Russian forces were entering Georgia, seemingly to end the conflict on their own terms. The idea that Russia preplanned and provoked the entire operation is clearly absurd. There were multiple meetings within the framework of the UN and multiple talks regarding a ceasefire well before August 11, and in some cases even before August 8. The South Ossetian separatists do appear to have been the primary instigators of the conflict, but this was a full 10 days before any major Russian military involvement in the area.

The main evidence used to support the idea that Russia was behind the conflict as a means of invading Georgia was that the 58th Army or some other force was prepositioned near the Roki tunnel to allow them to advance into Georgia. A US defense official was quoted by AFP on 12 August as stating that there was no evidence to support a buildup of Russian forces prior to the invasion. Rather, American military officials were suprised with the rapidity with which Russian forces mobilized and deployed into the conflict zone. This should not necessarily have been much of a shock, as there were Russian troops in the area prepared to enter South Ossetia. These troops were taking part in the Kavkaz-2008 exercise in the region, and Russian Army spokesperson Igor Konashenkov claimed that they would in fact be reporting to South Ossetia in the near future as replacements for the current peacekeeping force stationed there. As a result, according to Konashenkov, part of the Kavkaz-2008 exercise would focus on that peacekeeping mission.

Kavkaz-2008 ran through the end of July and it is possible that the troops had not left for their garrisons when initial signs of conflict appeared on 1 August. Russia's warning of expanded conflict on August 3 may have led to many of the troops involved with Kavkaz-2008 remaining in the area. Of course, moving troops rapidly and with little warning has been a hallmark of former Soviet doctrine for a European war. Given Russia's knowledge and infrastructure, it is also just as likely that troops were mobilized on 3 August and moved towards the battlefield with lightning speed once Moscow decided to become seriously involved. The Russian 58th Army, for example, has been cited as being involved in the conflict. The 58th Army is based at Vladikavkaz in the North Caucasus Military District, less than 50 kilometers from the Georgian border. If mobilized on or about 3 August, moving elements of the 58th Army into South Ossetia by 11 August would not be a difficult task, particularly if they had been involved with Kavkaz-2008 and were therefore already at an increased state of readiness.

Returning to Ralph Peters' journalistic slaughtering of the facts surrounding the conflict, Peters claims that airstrikes were launched against pre-planned targets, citing this as an example of how Russia had clearly been planning for the conflict. This is both accurate, and absurd. Anyone remotely familiar with the concept of ISR will state that any area of potential conflict is monitored for enemy forces and scanned for potential targets. This is all part of the contingency planning process described earlier. Russia has likely searched the United States to derive aimpoints for its ballistic missile force, does this mean that Russia is also looking for an excuse to engage in a nuclear exchange with the United States? It is absurdity such as this that only serves to propagate the appearance of a decidedly anti-Russian bias throughout the West, a bias that will ultimately hinder continued relations between the US and Russia as it begins to affect the populations of both nations. Further demonstration of Peters' decidedly anti-Russian bias can be found in another New York Post column from 9 August. In this diatribe, Peters claims that the Russian 58th Army was incapable of short-notice combat operations due to readiness issues. Apparently he failed to make a journalistic inquiry to the US defense community, as they have a decidedly different opinion, and decidedly better sources.

Another piece of information used by the media to paint the picture that Russia decided to provoke a conflict was the April 2008 placement of artillery pieces in Abkhazia. This can be partly explained by referencing the UN Arms Register, which details the acquisition of mobile artillery pieces by the Georgian military well prior to this date. Once again, standard military practice rears its head. In a potential conflict zone, it is ludicrous not to be prepared to fight your enemy on at a minimum the same level. In the West, however, this must only mean that the Russians are planning a war.

NO S-200

Russian government officials and media outlets are not, of course, above fabricating their own news regarding the conflict. Russia claimed that a Ukrainian-supplied S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) SAM system was used to down one of their aircraft. However, there is simply no evidence to support such a claim. Georgia did operate the S-200 at one point in time, an S-200 battery having been present under the USSR to defend Tbilisi. As of November 2006, however, the S-200 site sat unused, with all of the military equipment having been removed and many of the structures having been razed or fallen into disrepair. A satellite image of the S-200 site in question can be seen below:


Furthermore, the Georgian newspaper Kviris Palitra ran a story in June of 2008 detailing Georgian air defense assets. The assets mentioned included the S-125 (SA-3 GOA), Osa-AK (SA-8 GECKO), and Buk-M1 (SA-11 GADFLY). The Osa and Buk systems are known to have been sourced from the Ukraine, while the S-125s remained from Soviet times. A May 2008 article in the Kiev Kommentarii detailed numerous arms sales by the Ukraine to Georgia, and made mention of a Buk sale in 2005. A glance through the UN Arms Register shows that the Ukraine delivered Osa systems in 2006 and Buk systems in 2007 as well. No serious mention has ever been made of an S-200 sale by anyone except the Russians, and the Ukraine denies having provided such a system. Given the status of the S-200 facility in Georgia and the evidence provided by Kiev, Tbilisi, and the UN, there is no credible evidence to support the assertion that any S-200 was ever sold to Georgia. The S-200's role in Georgian air defense seems to have ended with the deactivation of the battery near Tbilisi.

MR, NOT M3

One final example of faulty reporting relates to the purported S-200 sale. Russia claimed that a Tu-22 was downed by the Ukrainian-supplied SAM system. This led to various media outlets reporting that a Tu-22M3 (BACKFIRE-C) was lost over Georgia. A Tu-22M-series aircraft was downed, but proper examination of the facts would suggest that it was not a Tu-22M3 but in fact a Tu-22MR (BACKFIRE-D) reconnaissance aircraft. In this case, deliberate misrepresentation or altering of the facts behind the story does not appear to have taken place (excluding the aforementioned S-200 report, of course). This would appear to be representative of the media's lack of knowledge and attention to detail rather than deliberate false reporting.

The crewmembers who were flying the Tupolev were recovered and hospitalized by Georgian forces, and have been interviewed by the media. The pilot claimed that the aircraft was on a reconnaissance mission, flying from Engels air base. Engels is not a Tu-22M operator, so any BACKFIRE operating from there would have been forward deployed. Furthermore, the basic Tu-22M3 is a sub-strategic bomber, capable of carrying a variety of weapons but not possessing any credible capability to conduct reconnaissance sorties. The Tu-22MR, on the other hand, is a dedicated reconnaissance aircraft. If the pilot of the aircraft is to be believed, then he must have been flying a Tu-22MR rather than a Tu-22M3.

CONCLUSION

Neither Georgia nor Russia are entirely without fault in the current conflict. Georgia escalated the conflict by attacking the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali following clashes with separatists. Russia took it to a wholly different level with a massive military campaign designed to deny Georgia the ability to inflict further damage to South Ossetia. However, misreporting and deliberate distortion of the facts by the worldwide media has led to a convoluted picture of the events that have taken place. The fact that so many of the most commonly reported news items can be disassembled piece by piece with a few minutes of research places doubts on the credibility and objectivity of these establishments. When dealing with Russia after the cessation of hostilities, it would be wise to remember that there is no evidence to suggest a preplanned and orchestrated campaign to allow Russia to invade South Ossetia and Georgia. Painting Russia as a resurgent Evil Empire is a sign of unsubstantiated bias and nothing more. After all, Russia did warn Georgia that escalation was possible, and Saakashvili chose to give them the excuse needed to ensure the integrity of South Ossetia, perhaps permanently. Arguing that Russia's methods were overkill is one thing, accusing them of trying to take over the Caucasus is another thing entirely.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Ralph Peters' claims of PGMs and advanced aircraft
Ralph Peters' claims of Russian buildup
Russia created the crisis
Russian pilot was flying a recon mission
OPLAN 5027
OPLAN 8044
Kavkaz-2008
Kavkaz-2008 (second source)
Did Russia use cluster bombs?
Artillery in Abkhazia
BP says pipeline not damaged
BP pipeline attacks disproven
Oil pipelines attacked
Russia hints at precision weapon use
The UN Arms Register
No evidence of Russian troop buildup

Georgia's Air Defense - Kviris Palitra, 14 July 2008
Ukraine acknowledges Buk sale - Kiev Kommentarii, 30 May 2008

Tuesday, July 15, 2008

Test Your Skills

While fumbling around the web I came across a very interesting page on the Australian MoD's website:

Testing Your Skills in Imagery Analysis

Basically, you have fifteen minutes to answer questions about an overhead image. This is not a military facility of any sort, so it will really test your ability to figure out some of the answers. It's not a representative example of the intense amount of training that professional imagery analysts must endure, but it is a pretty good example of the kinds of details you have to be able to pick up on when analyzing overhead imagery. Give it a try and see if you can hack it!

Wednesday, July 9, 2008

DNI Open Source Conference

I have been asked to advertise the fact that the Office of the DNI will be hosting an open source conference on 11 and 12 September this year. This is basically a way for intelligence consumers to discover a lot of the open source intelligence sources that are available, and learn how to effectively employ them. The event is open to the public provided you register in advance, and is obviously of great benefit to intelligence consumers in both academic and professional career fields. Anyone interested in attending must register by 31 July. Registration has to be done online at the link provided below.

Download a fact sheet on the conference here.

Visit the DNI's Open Source Conference 2008 website to register.

For an idea of the kinds of information on offer, you can view the presentations made at the 2007 conference at the following link: 2007 DNI Conference Sessions

Certainly sounds like a very interesting event. Unfortunately I won't be able to attend this year because of professional obligations, but this is something I'll definitely keep my eye out for in the future!

Tuesday, July 8, 2008

Monday, July 7, 2008

One Year Later

It's been one year since I started this blog, and I have to say that I am pleased with the result so far. I've gotten a lot of traffic from interesting places, came into contact with a lot of interesting people, and even gotten my work mentioned various times in Jane's Missiles & Rockets, an industry-leading publication.

My plans for the next year are pretty much more of the same. The Image of the Week feature has gotten some good feedback and will of course continue. Various in-depth features are currently at various stages of completion, expect to see them appearing with greater frequency. The next feature to appear will be the S-300P SAM System Analysis feature, which is nearly complete. After that, I plan on giving some old features much-needed updates, and move into more of the SAM Network Analysis pieces like the ones available on China, Iran, and Syria.

My current goal, once the S-300P feature is finalized, is to produce at least three imagery-based updates a week: a major feature, like the report on US Restricted & Classified Test Sites, a minor feature, such as the piece on Russia's Typhoon SSBN fleet, and of course the Image of the Week.

I also expect to get back to analytical work, such as the piece on Samoderzhets. I have a bunch of topics I've already started on that relate to current defense issues nationwide.

That about sums up the past, present, and future of this place. My work schedule and the resident 2 year old sometimes keeps me from posting updates as often as I'd like, but I have a better handle on a lot of things now so I hope to be a lot more active (which you may have heard before, but you know how it is!).

In closing, I'd like to offer my thanks to the readers of this site. Without people reading and sending me feedback, this place might have died out a long time ago. Thanks for the support, and I look forward to hearing from you in the future!

Sean O'Connor

Friday, June 13, 2008

Soviet & Russian Space Surveillance Facilities

INTRODUCTION

With the advent of military satellites being tasked to perform a variety of roles, the task of satellite detection and tracking played a prominent role in the history of the Cold War. Such complex systems were necessary for the identification of foreign intelligence-gathering satellites to ensure the continued secrecy of sensitive activities, and to provide accurate orbital parametric data for use by ASAT weapon systems. Two of the most advanced satellite detection systems in operation today were products of this Cold War environment: Okno and Krona.

DNESTR

The first Soviet effort to produce a dedicated space surveillance complex capable of tracking artificial objects orbiting the Earth was the 5N15 Dnestr (HEN HOUSE) radar system. Dnestr radars would be placed at two sites, SD-1 near Irkutsk and SD-2 near Sary Shagan; SD stood for Satellite Detection. Each site would feature four Dnestr radar complexes, with each complex consisting of two arrays joined in the center by a central command and control facility. The Dnestr radars were initially intended to form the acquisition and tracking potrion of an ASAT system, employing the 5V91 intercept vehicle launched by SLVs at Baikonur, designed to destroy satellites orbiting at altitudes of up to 1000 km. This ASAT system entered limited operational service in 1973, with command and control facilities located at Noginsk. The first successful intercept test was conducted on 1 November 1968.

Following the testing of a small-scale array at Sary Shagan, construction of the SD-1 and SD-2 facilities began in 1964. The system passed state acceptance trials in May of 1967. Dnestr radars employed by the SD facilities were capable of tracking satellites at altitudes between 250 and 1000 kilometers and generating three simultaneous target tracks for the ASAT role.

The locations of the two SD facilities can be seen in the image below:


Later, Dnestr radars were incorporated into the BMEW network along with numerous modified and developed variants designed specifically to serve in that capacity. The first variant produced to provide a long-range BMEW capability was the 5N15M Dnestr-M. The Dnestr-M had a significant signal-processing flaw during early stages of development. The automated systems designed to track space objects 24 hours a day were not sufficiently capable of calculating trajectory information, leading to numerous false launch warnings being issued. Eventually this deficiency was corrected and the Dnestr-M complexes were integrated into the national BMEW network. Dnestr-M radars also retained the ability to provide target track data to ASAT interceptors, and were capable of tracking six simultaneous targets for intercept.

OKNO

The Okno system is a fully automated optical tracking station used for the identification of satellites. Optical telescopes scan the night sky, while computer systems analyze the results and filter out the stars through analysis and comparison of velocities, luminosities, and trajectories. Satellites are then tracked with orbital parameters being calculated and logged. Okno can detect and track satellites orbiting the Earth at altitudes between 2,000 and 40,000 kilometers. This increased altitude capability over the earlier Dnestr space surveillance radar system was necessitated due to the fielding of American surveillance satellites operating in high geostationary orbits outside Dnestr's field of view.

Development of the Okno system began in the late 1960s. By late 1971, prototypes of the optical systems destined for use in the Okno complex were being trialled at Byurukan Observatory in Armenia. Preliminary design work for the operational system was completed in 1976 and approved in 1977. Construction of the Okno site near Nurek in Tajikistan began in 1980. By the middle of 1992, the facilities, electronic systems, and a portion of the sensor suite was complete. Unfortunately, a civil war in Tajikistan put an end to construction efforts on 6 August 1992, with work resuming in 1994. The system began to undergo operational trials in late 1999 and was placed on combat duty in July of 2002.

Nurek

The Okno system is situated near Nurek, Tajikistan, approximately fifty kilometers southeast of the capital of Dushanbe. The main facility consists of ten telescopes covered by large clamshell domes. The telescopes are divided into two stations, with the detection complex containing six telescopes and the tracking station containing four. Each station features its own control center, with a central command and control center, likely also housing the detection and tracking computer systems, located in the center of the facility. Also present is an eleventh, smaller dome mounted atop a much smaller building. It is not known what function this additional facility performs. It may contain some sort of atmospheric measuring equipment used to assess atmospheric conditions before activation of the system.

The following image depicts the Okno complex near Nurek:


A power substation is located one kilometer south of the main complex, with administrative facilities and barracks being located approximately one kilometer north of the main complex.

The following image depicts the support facilities near the Okno complex:


Okno-S

In 1980 the Okno-S system was commissioned. Original plans called for the construction of four Okno and four Okno-S sites at various locations throughout the USSR and allied nations such as Cuba. Foreign locations were later rejected, and later plans called for the single Okno site at Nurek to be supported by two Okno-S sites in the Ukraine and eastern Russia. In the end, work only began on the eastern Okno-S site, to be located in the Primorye territory.

Okno-S is a high-altitude optical surveillance system based on the Okno complex design. The primary difference is in the area of interest. Okno-S is only designed to monitor an altitude band between 30,000 and 40,000 kilometers, permitting geostationary satellites to be located over a wider area. Work on the Okno-S complex began in the early 1980s. It is not known if this system was completed and brought to operational readiness. The Okno-S complex is located near Spassk-Dalny, adjacent to Lysiy mountain. Currently available satellite imagery of the region precludes accurately locating the facility.

KRONA

The Krona system is a long-range radar and optical tracking system designed to facilitate the identification and tracking of satellites. Rather than simply identifying objects as artificial satellites, the Krona system seeks to categorize satellites by type. The system consists of three main components:

-A large decimetric-band phased-array radar for target identification
-A system of five centimetric-band parabolic radar antennae for target classification
-An optical system combining an optical telescope with a laser system

The Krona system has a range of 3200 kilometers and can detect targets orbiting at a height of up to 40,000 kilometers.

Development of the Krona system began in 1974 when it was determined that current space-tracking systems were unable to accurately identify the type of satellite being tracked. Target discrimination was an important component of any ASAT program. Preliminary design work for the Krona complex, designated 45J6, was completed in 1976. The radar system was designated 20J6, and comprised both the decimetric and centimetric band systems. The optical/laser complex was designated 30J6 with separate housings for the optical telescope and laser system.

The centimetric-band radar system incorporated into the 20J6 system was designed in part to provide telemetry data to direct the 30J6 optical/laser system. The laser system was designed to provide target illumination for the optical system, which would capture images of target satellites at night or in clear weather. Favorable atmospheric qualities were one factor in determining the location of the Krona systems.

Storozhevaya

Construction of the first Krona facility began in 1979 near Storozhevaya in southwestern Russia. The facility was originally intended to be co-located with the Zelenchuk observatory, but concerns over interference with the observatory's systems led to the relocation of the Krona complex.

The following image depicts the locations of the 20J6 and 30J6 facilities at Storozhevaya:


The following image depicts the layout of the 20J6 complex at Storozhevaya:


The following image depicts the layout of the 30J6 complex at Storozhevaya:


Primary work on the facilities at Storozhevaya was completed in 1984, but economic difficulties prevented factory and state testing from being undertaken until 1992. State acceptance testing was completed by January 1994, but once again funding issues intervened and the system was not declared operational until November of 1999. As of 2003 work on the optical/laser system was not completed due to financial constraints, but a 2007 Russian television program featuring the Krona system indicates that the 30J6 system was completed sometime in the intervening period, attaining at least a limited operational capability.

Nakhodka

It was initially planned to construct three Krona complexes. The second Krona complex would have been located near the Okno complex in Tajikistan, with the third complex being located near Nakhodka in the Russian Far East. During the 1980s work was suspended on the second and third Krona complexes for financial reasons, but work on the Nakhodka complex was eventually resumed. The Nakhodka Krona system has sometimes been referred to as Krona-N, with the N likely representing either the location or the fact that the system is a radar only system; there is not a 30J6 complex at the Nakhodka location. Work was never resumed on the Tajikistan Krona site due in part to the civil unrest plaguing the region in the early 1990s.

The following image depicts the layout of the Nakhodka Krona complex:


LASER WEAPON SYSTEMS?

At various points in history, both the Okno and Krona complexes were associated with laser weapon systems by Western intelligence agencies and open source reporting. For example, a declassified CIA National Intelligence Report from December of 1985 titled "Soviet Space Programs" classified the Okno site as a probable laser weapon facility, even going so far as to state that it was possible but less likely that the facility was intended for space surveillance! In truth, only the Krona's 30J6 complex features a laser system, and this system lacks the required characteristics to be used as an offensive weapon. Laser weapon systems were trialled at Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan under various programs, with mixed results, and there is currently no evidence to suggest that they were operationally fielded at any point.

CONCLUSION

With the Okno and Krona complexes operational, Russia maintains a significant space surveillance capability independant of its BMEW assets. These systems have performed various military and civil roles, including an analysis of the surface impact point of the Mir space station and identification of space debris. The performance of the Okno and Krona systems guarantees that the Russian space surveillance network will have a valuable part to play in the areas of national defense and international space exploitation.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

CIA NIE 11-1-85J, Soviet Space Programs Volume 1-Key Judgements and Executive Summary
Okno and Krona Sourcebook
The Creation of Space and Missile Defense Systems, by Mikhail Perov (Moscow: Aviarus, 2003)
Russia's Krona Space Reconnaissance System Profiled, Praised in TV Programme

KMZ FILE

A Google Earth placemark file containing the sites described above can be downloaded here: Soviet and Russian Space Surveillance

Wednesday, June 4, 2008

Change of Plans

Alright, I've given this some more thought and decided to remove the separate page for Google Earth files. Instead, they will be hosted there but posted here to keep everything on one site for ease of use. The only thing that will really change is that when I upload placemark files, the information will be posted here along with the download link. To make them easy to find, I'll tag them all with the label "Google Earth Placemark". To find all the posts containing such files, just select that label from the list in the menu area on the right side of the page. This will be better for everyone because you'll only need to keep track of one website and I'll only have to produce textual updates for one site as well. A basic placeholder page will remain at the old link but you will no longer find anything amusing over there.