Decoding Codenames

INTRODUCTION

Western intelligence organizations began applying codenames to Soviet military equipment shortly after the Second World War. Codenames were a convenient way to describe military equipment when the native designators were often unknown. Eventually, two naming systems became the standard for Western military use. The US DoD assigned a series of alphanumeric designators to missile systems, and the five-nation Air Standards Coordinating Committee (ASCC, ASIC as of 2005) assigned a codename to various military systems and weapons.

THE DOD SYSTEM

The DoD system assigns identifiers to missiles using an alphanumeric format. The two-letter prefix denotes the missile type, and the numeral following denotes the specific system in that prefix series. For example, AA-8 is the 8th air-to-air missile assigned a designator. Missiles are categorized using the following prefixes:

AA-air to air missile
AS-air to surface missile
AT-anti tank missile
SA-surface to air missile system
SL-space launch vehicle
SS-surface to surface missile
SSC-surface to surface missile for coastal defense (an anti-ship weapon)

Other identifiers have been employed, but those listed above are the most common.

Using the information above, a lot of information can be inferred by examining an identifier. It can be inferred, for example, that the SA-20 is likely a newer system than the SA-10.

Two additional letters can be used before the numerical identifier to describe a system. These are N, denoting a naval system, and X, denoting an experimental system. In the case of the former, these are assigned separate categories. SA-N- and SS-N- prefixes denote naval SAMs and SSMs, respectively. These series are separate from the SA- and SS- series. In other words, the SA-N-4 does not represent a naval variant of the SA-4. In fact, until recently naval SAMs were assigned different numerical designators than land-based counterparts. The naval SA-10 was the SA-N-6. This is because designators are believed ot be assigned chronologically. The first naval SAM system, therefore, was the SA-N-1, even though it was a navalized SA-3. The X designator can be used with naval systems, and in this case it is employed as follows: SA-NX-20. This denotes an experimental naval SAM system, being the 20th naval SAM system identified.

Missiles which are for test purposes are not assigned designators. Only weapon systems believed to be undergoing trials for service are given designators, and they typically possess the X prefix denoting their experimental status. When the weapon enters service, the X is no longer used with that system.

Suffixes applied after the numeric designator are used to denote different variants of that system. For example, there are six in-service variants of the AA-10, and these are referred to as AA-10A through AA-10F.

THE ASCC/ASIC SYSTEM

The ASCC system assignes codenames to various pieces of military hardware. They are usually categorized by the first letter of their codename. Various suffixes are employed to denote different modifications or versions of the system. Systems are categorized into groupings using the following first letters:

A-air to air missile
B-bomber
C-cargo aircraft or airliner
F-fighter aircraft
G-surface to air missile/ABM
H-helicopter
K-air to surface missile
M-miscellaneous aircraft (trainers, AEW&C, tankers, etc)
S-surface to surface missile

It is important to note that in the case of missiles, the codename refers to the missile itself, not the entire system. This becomes important when combining DoD and ASCC/ASIC designators to describe a system.

When dealing with aircraft, single syllable words denote propeller driven aircraft, while jet powered aircraft have two syllable codenames. For example, the Tu-95 has the codename BEAR, while the Tu-160 has the codename BLACKJACK.

Suffixes do not appear to follow a specific rule, but rather a set of loose rules. Firstly, the letters I and O are not used, to avoid confusion with the numbers 1 and 0. Modified variants can be denoted using the suffix Mod., followed by a numeral indicating which modification is being identified. This is commonly used for SAMs and SSMs. For example, GRUMBLE mod 1 refers to the 5V55R missile, while GRUMBLE mod 0 is the earlier 5V55K. Aircraft typically employ an alphabetical suffix to denote which variant of the airfract is being referred to. The Su-27 series is an excellent example. FLANKER-A refers to the original T-10 prototype series, while FLANKER-B refers to the T-10S series production model. Further examples include FLANKER-G for the Su-30MKK series, or FLANKER-H for the Su-30MKI series. Different variations of a subvariant are denoted by adding Variant to the codename, followed by a sequential numerical designator to note the variation. The FLANKER provides another example here, in the form of the Su-27M and Su-37. The former was designated FLANKER-E Variant 1, while the latter was designated FLANKER-E Variant 2.

The ASCC/ASIC system is different from the DoD system insofar as it often assigns codenames to anything identified regardless of whether or not it is predicted to be used operationally. For example, both the MiG-AT and Yak-130 received codenames, even though it was widely assumed that only one would be purchased for the Russian Air Force.

The ASCC/ASIC system also assignes two-word codenames to radar systems (airborne, ground-based, and naval), such as TOMB STONE, although these do not appear to follow any sort of naming convention. In some cases, such as SPOON REST or CLAM SHELL, the codenames are an amusing play on the visual appearance of the radar array.

COMBINING DESIGNATORS

As mentioned previously, US DoD and ASCC/ASIC designators can be combined to describe a given system. Consider the example of the S-300P series. Being a SAM system, it has a DoD designator prefixed with SA and an ASCC/ASIC codename starting with G: SA-10 GRUMBLE. Employing the proper suffixes can provide a detailed description of the system. A SAM battery described as employing SA-10B GRUMBLE Mod 0 systems can therefore be known to possess mobile components (SA-10B refers to the S-300PS or S-300PMU) equipped with the 5V55K missile. Ergo, the system is not operating to the limit of its capability, as the 5V55K is shorter-ranged and uses a simpler guidance method than the 5V55R or 5V55RD.

COMMON ERRORS

There are numerous errors in the way that these designators are referred and employed by analysts, journalists, and authors. First and foremost, ASCC and DoD codemanes are often used by NATO forces, and have erroneously been referred to as "NATO names". This is not the case; NATO did not devise these designators, the US DoD and/or the ASCC/ASIC did. Secondly, codenames are often not properly formatted. Codenames should be written in all capitals. Returning to the Su-27, the commonly seen printed name is Flanker rather than the correct FLANKER. Thirdly, correct codenames are often misused. Many sources refer to the 64N6 as TOMB STONE, when this is in fact BIG BIRD, for example. Other sources confuse the same issue altogether, referring to the guidance radar as "64N6 Tomb Stone". Correct codename, wrong radar system, and improperly formatted.

CONCLUSION

This is not intended as an all-inclusive lesson on Western codenames, but rather an introduction to how they are devised and employed. Understanding the systems in place aids an analyst who is not fully versed on Soviet/Russian system names (many Chinese or Warsaw Pact systems such as the JH-7 and L-29 have also been named using these systems as well), and also will aid in properly employing them.

FURTHER READING

For a comprehensive listing of known codenames and further explanation of other DoD and ASCC/ASIC sequences, Andreas Parsch has done a very good job here.

Updates Coming

Over the next few days I'm going to be updating some of the older articles. Older features such as the Syrian SAM Network piece are out of date given new data that has been acquired, and need to be altered accordingly. As mentioned a while ago, when an article is updated it'll jump to the top of the list as it'll be "re-posted" on the date it is fixed up. In the "Latest Updates" menu on the right, an article which has been changed will be relisted. Instead of saying "published", it'll say "updated", to denote that this is a change to a previous piece.

Here's a tentative list of the articles I'll be reworking:

The Syrian SAM Network
The Iranian SAM Network
IMINT & Analysis Photo Archive
China's J-10: An Imagery Analysis
US Restricted and Classified Test Sites

Note that when an article is updated and reposted, the link to the article does not change. So, if you have linked to any of these pieces on another site, you won't have to change anything. You'll automatically be linked to the updated version.

More Accurate SAM Analysis

SAM WEDGES

The normal method used to illustrate SAM engagement ranges graphically is to display a ring around the site corresponding to the engagement range of the system. As the theory goes, any aircraft inside of that ring could potentially be engaged by the system. With certain types of strategic SAM systems, however, this method is not entirely accurate. Engagement radars are often sited and aligned along a certain bearing. If the radar is not capable of continuous 360 degree rotation, the radar's field of view in azimuth dictates the engagement zone of that deployed SAM battery at a given time.

Consider the following examples. Taiwan's Tien Kung SAM systems are deployed from fixed, silo-launched positions, supported by fixed, hardened Chang Bei LPARs. Given that these radars are occupying fixed positions, the engagement zone of the SAM system is dictated by the 120 degree FOV of the radar, 60 degrees to the left and right of center.

The Russian S-300P series of SAM systems and the American Patriot missile system operate in a similar manner. These two mobile SAM systems operate by deploying their engagement radars in a given position. The Patriot's AN/MPQ-65 radar has the same 120 degree FOV as the aforementioned Chang Bei, providing it with a similar engagement zone. The difference between the AN/MPQ-65 and the engagement radars employed by the S-300P series is that the Patriot's radar also performs acquisition functions. The S-300P's radars are cued by 36D6 or 64N6 series radars. Mounted on towers or on mobile vehicles or trailers the S-300P's radars can easily be rotated to face an inbound threat. Ergo, the S-300P series SAM systems are not as "tied in" to a particular zone as the Patriot is. While the S-300P's engagement radars offer azimuth sector coverage of between 90 and 105 degrees depending on the variant, and operationally they will typically be tied to a certain sector for deconfliction purposes, the system is credited with full 360 degree capability due to mounting the engagement radars on rotating platforms. The AN/MPQ-65, on the other hand, is emplaced statically to facilitate target acquisition, and is therefore not a "true" 360 degree coverage system, despite its mobility.

How, then, to better illustrate these concepts graphically? The answer is to use a wedge shape denoting the field of view of the engagement radar array in systems for which a circular range ring would not be appropriate. Google Earth serves as a good platform for developing and displaying these shapes. The process for doing so will be described below. Readers are advised to read the instructions completely before trying this for themselves.

FUKUOKA PATRIOT

First, a suitable weapon system must be located. For this example a Patriot battery near Fukuoka in Japan will be used, seen in the image below. For this to be accurate, the AN/MPQ-65 position must be identified positively.
A ring corresponging to the Patriot's 160 kilometer range must also be placed on the map, as seen below:
CREATING WEDGES

Step 1

The first step in calculating an approximate engagement zone for the system is to determine the azimuth which the radar is oriented towards. Start by placing a line parallel to the edge of the radar array, as seen below. Using the Ruler tool in Google Earth is best, as it will give you the azimuth of your line.
A heading parallel to the face of the radar array would seem to be approximately 81 degrees, travelling from right to left.

Step 2

Next, we must determine the azimuth heading of the radar array's center. Knowing that a parallel heading is 81 degrees, we can subtract 90 degrees to get a perpendicular bearing, pointing straight down range from the radar array. This equates to 351 degrees. Mark a line on screen extending away from the radar position on a bearing of 351 degrees. This will appear as shown in the following image:
Step 3

Now, zoom out using the mouse wheel without closing the ruler tool. This allows you to zoom out and then extend the line that has been drawn. Extend the line out past the range ring, as seen below:
Step 4

In order to generate the wedge, three placemarks are needed. The first should be placed at the point where the Ruler tool's line crosses the range ring. Zoom in on this point to ensure accuracy, and deposit a placemark as seen in the image below. I have set the placemarks to have zero opacity for their labels, meaning that no text will be displayed.
Step 5

The following process should now be repeated to set placemarks along the boundary of the radar's FOV. 60 degrees left and right or 351 degrees equates to headings of 291 degrees and 51 degrees. Repeat the above processes, dragging lines from the radar out past the range ring on these headings and inserting placemarks where they cross.

The end result should be as follows, once the ruler tool has been cleared and closed:
Step 6

Now, the wedge can be constructed. Using the Area tool, click on screen in four places: the radar, and the three placemarks. Begin with the radar and work counterclockwise. The end result should look like this:
Step 7

To make the next phase easier, right click on the area placemark in the left-side menu and select Properties. Under the Style, Color tab, enter the following settings:

Lines: Color-red, width-2.0, opacity-100%
Area: select Outlined from the pulldown menu

The end result should resemble this:
Step 8

Now, zoom in on the three intersect points. After zooming in, it should look like this:
The goal is to correct the Area's primary points so that they match up with the placemarks on the range ring. Right click on the Area placemark again, select Properties, and drag the points until they are in the correct locations.

A correct example is seen below:
Step 9

The placemarks for intersect points are no longer required. Deselect them, so that the screen looks like this:
Step 10

The next step is to shape the two sides of the wedge so that they match the range ring. Each side should be divided by adding a number of new points, which will be placed along the range ring to give the wedge a curved shape. I've found that adding six points between the end points of a given side works well. To better illustrate the idea here, reference the following image:
The important thing to remember here is to work counterclockwise. You must click on the first point of each side to "activate" that side. Then, when a new point is added, it will align the trailing segment accordingly. If this is done right, after completing a side it should look like this:
If the proper order is not followed, weird things can happen, and they'll probably look like this:
Step 11

Repeat the above process for the next side. Remember to click on the center of the three points first, the point that lies along a 351 degree azimuth from the radar. Once complete, turn off the range ring, and this should be displayed:
Step 12

Now, it is necessary to clean up the wedge segments that were just created. Turn on the range ring and the three placemarks denoting the azimuth limits of the radar, which should look as follows:
Placing the points to create segments is not an exact procedure, and if you zoom in on the range ring at any of these points, it may look like the image below:
Select each point along the curved side of the wedge, including the center and end points, and drag them so that they sit on the range ring. When finished, deactivate the placemarks and range ring. The following wedge should now be present:
Step 13

All that remains is to fill in the area. Again, right click on the area placemark in the left-side menu and select Properties. Under the Style, Color tab, enter the following settings:

Area: Color-red, select Filled from the menu, and set opacity to 55%

The following image should now be displayed:
Zooming out and displaying the range ring, as seen below, we can see that using a wedge instead of a ring is far more accurate.
EXTRA FEATURES

But wait, there's more! Google Earth can be rotated and manipulated to allow 3 dimensional viewing of areas, so why should missile zones be any different? Right click on the area placemark in the left-side menu and select Properties. This time, go to the Altitude tab, enter the following settings:

Under the pull down menu, select Absolute. This must be done first. Under Altitude, enter 30,000 meters, which is roughly equivalent to something close to the Patriot's reach. Click on the box that says Extend sides to ground.

The end result, after you mess about with the viewing angle and altitude, is something like this:
SAM engagement zones have now become far more amusing. But that's not the end of it. When are SAM systems deployed in any environment without support? Envision a small SAM system with a range of 20 miles and a reach of 15,000 meters in altitude deployed on Orono-shima island, about 40 miles northwest of the Patriot battery. Without matching the wedge to a nonexistant range ring (this is for illustrative purposes, after all), a little tweaking and you can get this:
Notice the new engagement zone (yes, you need to use a different color for a different system) inside the Patriot zone.

Now that we know that zones can interact with each other, that can also be exploited. The PAC-3's ERINT ATBM has a 20 kilometer range. Let's suppose that our Patriot battery received the necessary upgrades. Now we have one battery with two different missiles, and two separate engagement zones. By overlaying a 20 kilometer range ring over the existing wedge (this must be done BEFORE you set the wedge for 3D viewing), we can show both zones. Of course, it does help to remember to make the ERINT zone a separate color. If you've done that, it should look like this:
One final point to consider. Remember, the Patriot is typically tied to a specific engagement zone, but the radar can still be moved. This is a far more complicated procedure than simply slewing the S-300P's engagement radar to a new bearing and recoordinating with the battlefield management station, but it can be accomplished nonetheless. The main point here is that the basic range ring does show the capability of the system, but the wedge shows the capability of the system at a given point in time. By combining these two methods and employing a little bit of tweaking here and there, we can get a full, 3D representation of a PAC-3 ERINT battery, as seen below. This highlights the need to have a very in-depth understanding of a given SAM system before attempting any sort of analysis, imagery based or otherwise.
ONE GLITCH

There is one glitch in Google Earth that should be addressed as a final point to alleviate any cases where readers believe they have done something erroneous. Examine the following image:
These are the TK-II engagement zones from the Taiwan SAM Network feature displayed in 3D. They are all set to the same altitude of 30,000 meters. Notice how overlap in the wedges can be seen as the boundaries are always visible due to the opacity of the red fill, but along the upper surface there are various patches that do not match with any sort of overlap. Why this occurs, I have no idea. Perhaps this has to do with data inconsistencies in the Earth's surface in that part of the world. At any rate, displaying the wedges in "flat" mode and not 3D gets rid of any such occurrences.

CONCLUSION

You are now authorized to be impressed, and are directed to go forth and employ these techniques to produce your own analysis pieces. Any questions can be directed to the author in the IMINT & Analysis Forum, by blog comment, or by e-mail. Go forth and analyze.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

SAM Ranges taken from Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions

The AN/MPQ-65

Taiwan's SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

The island of Taiwan sits less than 200 kilometers from the coast of the People's Republic of China. Faced with a potential threat consisting of over a thousand ballistic missiles and swarms of strike fighters, Taiwan's strategic SAM network is a significant element of the island's defense.

2/71 AND NIKE

Strategic air defense of Taiwan began in the 1950's during a highly classified US military deployment to the island. Soldiers and equipment from Fort Bliss deployed to Taiwan as the 2nd Battalion, 71st Artillery, forming a four battery MIM-14 Nike-Hercules SAM network along the northwestern edge of the island. The deployment of US Army personnel only lasted for a year, but the seeds were sown for Taiwan's strategic air defense network. Not only did Taiwan retain the four Nike-Hercules batteries previously operated by the US Army, but a further four batteries had been procured at some point before the mid 1970s. These systems represented the first significant strategic air defense network to appear in the cross-strait conflict zone, and were retired in 1996.

GENERAL LAYOUT

Taiwan's present-day strategic air defenses are oriented logically with respect to the perceived primary threat to the nation's security: the People's Republic of China. The bulk of the air defense assets are located on the northern and western sides of the island, with their sensors illuminating the cross-strait environment to monitor for any unauthorized inbound traffic. Air surveillance is provided by eleven EW facilities, and engagements are prosecuted by twenty two fixed missile batteries, occupied by HAWK, Patriot, and Tien Kung SAM systems. These systems have engagement ranges of 40 kilometers, 160 kilometers, and 200 kilometers, respectively. A further twenty two Skyguard facilities are located to provide close-in defense of key population centers and military facilities, some of which are equipped with 18 kilometer range RIM-7M Sparrow missiles.

The following image depicts the general layout of Taiwan's strategic air defense network. EW sites are marked with blue diamonds, the CSIST Missile Test Facility is marked with a brown square, and SAM sites are marked as follows:

HAWK: Orange triangle
Patriot: Yellow triangle
Tien Kung: Red triangle
Sparrow: Green triangle
Inactive: White triangle
HAWK

Taiwan acquired the MIM-23 HAWK SAM system in the 1960s. Thirteen prepared HAWK sites are currently occupied by active batteries. One battery is located offshore in the Penghu island group. The remaining sites wrap around the western coast of Taiwan at intervals of roughly 65 kilometers. Taipei and Kaohsiung, Taiwan's largest population centers, are defended by three sites and two sites respectively, with closer spacing to provide a greater degree of overlap in their fields of fire. Three sites are present on the eastern shore of the island, situated to defend the three main population centers in that region.

The locations and coverage of Taiwan's HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
TIEN KUNG

CSIST began to develop the Tien Kung SAM system in the early 1980s, envisioning a replacement for Taiwan's aging HAWK batteries. The system has been produced and deployed in two variants, the Tien Kung I (TK-I) and the improved Tien Kung II (TK-II). An ATBM Tien Kung III is in development. The TK-I was originally fielded in both static and mobile variants, with the TK-II only being deployed in a static variant. In 2006 it was announced that the TK-I was being retired and replaced by the TK-II. It was not specified if the TK-Is were only being replaced in the static launchers, or if the mobile TK-Is would be withdrawn as well.

The TK-I was deployed on a trial basis in 1989 and declared fully operational in 1993. The TK-II was deployed in 1996. The TK-I had an engagement range of 100 kilometers, with the TK-II having a range of 200 kilometers and adding an active radar terminal homing seeker. The TK-I, in contrast, relied on SARH for terminal homing. Both systems receive target acquisition and midcourse guidance support from an ADAR-1 Chang Bei LPAR. In the TK-I, a CS/MPG-25 continuous wave illuminator provides the necessary target illumination during terminal homing for the SARH guidance method.

The static SAM systems are deployed in silo launchers at six fixed sites, two sites being located offshore. One is located in the Penghu island group, and the other is located in the Dongyin island group. These silo launch facilities are unique in the field of air defense; no other active land-based SAM system in the world uses a silo-based launch method. Each silo launch complex consists of two separate areas: a silo launch facility and a radar facility.

The silo launch facility consists primarily of five underground launch complexes. These complexes each house four four-round vertical launch cells for TK-I or TK-II missiles, for a total of 80 missiles per complex. Two CS/MPG-25 CW illuminators are present at each complex.

The image below depicts a silo launch facility constructed on the grounds of a former Nike Hercules launch site.
Mobile TK-I systems may be deployed at these fixed launch facilities in some capacity, either to augment the silo-mounted TK-IIs or simply to utilize the garrison facilities before being field deployed as required. It is possible that mobile ADAR-1 LPARs could also be employed at silo launch facilities to increase the target engagement capacity of a single battery. Whatever the case, CS/MPG-25 illuminators were still emplaced at static launch complexes imaged at various points in 2006, implying that TK-Is were possibly still present in some capacity and had at the very least not yet been fully removed from silo launchers.

The radar facility consists of a fixed, hardened ADAR-1 LPAR. One radar facility is attached to each silo launch facility. The two facilities are separated by a distance of between one and four kilometers and are treated as a single complex. Separating the complexes allows for the hardened radars to be built into bunkers which are at a higher elevation than the launch facility. This allows the radars to have a less cluttered field of view without employing far more vulnerable mast-mounted antennas, and to mitigate the effects of the radar horizon on the system's engagement envelope.

The image below depicts an ADAR-1 radar facility:
Both of the above images are interesting in that they are both censored in the default Google Earth imagery set. They can only be accessed through the historical imagery feature. Various Tien Kung associated facilities can only be viewed in this fashion.

While the Tien Kung SAM system has a maximum range of 200 kilometers with the latest TK-II variant, the engagement zones of these fixed launch sites are oriented in specific directions. The fixed ADAR-1 LPAR has a 120 degree field of view in azimuth, able to scan 60 degrees to the left and right of center. This determines the engagement zone available to a missile fired from the associated fixed launch site. Mobile radars could theoretically be employed to increase the coverage zones, but it is not known if the TK-I's mobile ADAR-1 sets are compatible with the silo-launched TK-II missile. It would seem likely that they are, or could be with minimal modification, given that the hardened ADAR-1 radars are still employed by the TK-II system.

The locations and engagement zones of the five southern fixed launch sites can be seen in the image below. The zones are oriented to match the likely fields of view of the hardened ADAR-1 LPARs and correspond to the 200 kilometer TK-II system. A TK-I fired by a fixed launch site would engage a target within the same zone, but only to half the range. The Dongyin island group Tien Kung site is not included as the LPAR field of view cannot be determined due to a lack of high-resolution imagery.
PATRIOT

In 1993 Taiwan purchased three MIM-104 Patriot SAM batteries from the United States, receiving PAC-2 standard weapons. Taiwan's three Patriot batteries became operational in 1998 and were deployed at prepared sites near Taipei for capital area air defense, focusing on an ATBM role. The AN/MPQ-65 radar, when emplaced, has a field of view of 120 degrees in azimuth. The radar is not rotating for full 360 degree coverage, rather it is aligned in the direction of a potential threat axis when deployed. While the radars can be repositioned and realigned when needed, historical imagery indicates that these three batteries have remained aligned in the same general direction since at least 2000.

The locations and coverage zones of Taiwan's Patriot batteries, as currently imaged, can be seen below:
SKYGUARD-SPARROW

The final component of Taiwan's strategic air defense network are the close-in, point defense RIM-7M Sparrow SAM systems integrated with Skyguard batteries. The locations of identified Skyguard installations, along with the coresponding engagement zones for the Sparrow-equipped batteries, can be seen in the image below:
OVERALL COVERAGE

The main issue facing Taiwan is numerical. With an estimated 1300-1500 ballistic missiles and hundreds of strike aircraft targeting the island from the People's Republic of China, it would appear that Taiwan simply cannot afford to procure and deploy enough land-based SAM systems to guarantee clear skies in a time of crisis. That is not entirely true, however, given a complete understanding of a potential conflict. The People's Republic of China wishes to reintegrate Taiwan with the mainland, not acquire a new bombed-out target range for its military forces. Logically speaking, while certain targets are likely to be struck during a military engagement, and likely struck multiple times to increase the chances of oversaturating the air and missile defenses, it is not likely that the PLA will simply bombard the island into submission. Simply speaking, that would completely defeat the point of any military confrontation designed to reintegrate Taiwan. Therefore, when faced with a numerically superior force desiring to eliminate key military facilities rather than to obliterate the entire island, the logical approach would be to employ strategic SAM assets and air interceptors in an integrated air defense system (IADS).

In an integrated warfighting environment, TK-II SAMs could be employed beyond a certain range to thin out inbound formations, while air interceptors remain on station to combat the remaining inbound aircraft. Any cruise missiles or aircraft penetrating the combat air patrol zones could be engaged by HAWK SAMs, as well as SHORAD systems such as Skyguard. Naval SAM systems could also be employed offshore to provide further assistance in thinning out any inbound aggressors. While this strategy would likely still result in a number of successful strikes, it represents a logical, organized use of the assets at hand when faced with a numerically superior threat.

Taken as a whole, the strategic SAM network on Taiwan is well organized. Engagement zones have a significant degree of overlap, allowing targets to be shared by multiple systems, and HAWK batteries are logically deployed as both a closer-in defensive line and a gap filler to eliminate holes in the network created by the azimuth limitations of the hardened ADAR-1 LPAR facilities.

The overall coverage zones of Taiwan's strategic SAM systems can be seen in the image below. As mentioned previously, the Dongyin island group Tien Kung site is not illustrated.
It should be pointed out that the eastern side of the island is relatively undefended in terms of SAM coverage. This should not necessarily be seen as a weakness in the overall network, as the bulk of the military and political targets likely to be struck during a conflict are not in this region.

It has been reported that Taiwan possesses eighteen or twenty HAWK batteries, but there have only been thirteen HAWK sites identified. The remaining batteries are likely held in reserve for attrition replacement and training purposes. They are also potentially available to be field deployed during a crisis to reinforce air defenses in certain sectors. Likewise, existing HAWK batteries could be removed from their fixed locations and deployed to field firing positions, as could Patriot or extant mobile TK-I units.

There is evidence suggesting that plans may exist for redeploying Patriot and/or TK-I batteries during a crisis. The following image represents a Patriot or TK-I mobile SAM site constructed on the grounds of a former MIM-14 battery. The image was captured in late 2004, when Taiwan only possessed three PAC-2 Patriot batteries. These batteries were all intended primarily for ATBM defense of Taipei, as previously mentioned, and were already sited in that region. Ergo, this unoccupied facility was likely not intended to house a permanent Patriot battery, as the only Patriot batteries in Taiwan were already positioned according to their intended role. It is, of course, possible that this facility was home to a mobile TK-I battery which has since been deactivated, but that does not preclude the site from being used as a deployment site in the future.
One oddity that stands out when analyzing the coverage zones of Taiwan's strategic SAM network is the presence of a corridor north of the Penghu island group, heading roughly north towards the Chinese mainland, which is only defended by a single Tien Kung fixed launch site. This is unusual because care has apparently been taken to ensure a degree of overlap in most of the network. This corridor could simply be an aberration of geography meant to be filled by a naval SAM system, it could be a purposely less-defended corridor for civillian traffic meant to be filled by a mobile TK-I battery in the Penghu islands, or it could represent a "safe zone" for outbound strike aircraft. The latter example is noteworthy; as the corridor passes over the Chinese mainland, it is flanked on either side by a Chinese S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) SAM battery. This could have been identified by the People's Republic as a potential ingress route for Taiwanese strike aircraft desiring to enter the Chinese mainland and attack ballistic missile launch positions and garrisons. The PLA's DF-11A garrisons at Xianyou and Yong An, along with the DF-15 garrison at Nanping, would likely be within reach of such a strike package. This is, however, pure speculation, but does draw attention to the types of data which could potentially be revealed by analyzing an air defense network.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

In the future, Taiwan's goal is to greatly increase the effectiveness of its strategic air defense network against ballistic missiles. To that end, CSIST has been developing the TK-III, an ATBM off-shoot of the TK-II. The Taiwanese government has also been in negotiations with the United States to procure PAC-3 series Patriots with their associated ERINT ATBMs.

The ERINT ATBM has a range of 20 kilometers against a ballistic target, and is designed as a hit-to-kill weapon with very high accuracy. An enhanced variant is being developed which would increase the ATBM range to 45 kilometers. In January of 2009 it was reported that Taiwan had received approval for a contract with Raytheon to upgrade the three existing PAC-2 batteries to PAC-3 standard, enabling them to support the ERINT missile. Taiwan is still negotiating the sale of 330 ERINT missiles as well as four AN/MPQ-65 radars and other Patriot components to deploy three or four additional Patriot batteries.

The footprint of the Taipei PAC-2 sites, when upgraded and equipped with PAC-3 ERINT weapons in an ATBM capacity, can be seen in the image below:
Taiwan is also developing a new SHORAD system based on the Tien Chien II (TC-2) BVR AAM, to be integrated with the Antelope SHORAD system as a Skyguard replacement.

STEALTH OFFENSE

No discussion involving the TK-II SAM system would be complete without a brief mention of the Tien Chi surface-to-surface missile derivative. This weapon is a 320 kilometer range system fired from static TK-II launch sites. It is believed that the system is deployed in two locations, and that one of them is the Tien Kung facility in the Dongyin islands. The other is likely the Tien Kung facility in the Penghu islands, as offshore basing does allow for greater inland reach of mainland China.

The following image depicts some of the potential targets for the Tien Chi missiles, assuming that they are based at the two aforementioned locations. The missile locations and their associated ranges are indicated in white. Do note that not only is one of China's OTH-SW systems within range of the Dongyin site, but that it can also reach the two S-300PMU-1 batteries mentioned previously. The main drawback of the system, however, is short range; the image depicts the PLA's 52nd Division ballistic missile units, and only two of them are within range of the Tien Chi system. Given the sheer number of Chinese ballistic missiles available in the theater, it is more likely that the Tien Chi is intended for high-value targets such as the OTH-SW system.
CONCLUSION

Taiwan's strategic SAM network has been arranged logically given the potential threat it has been designed to counter. As more ATBM systems are developed, the network will continue to evolve into a more modern, capable system, in much the same manner that the network of Taiwan's cross-strait rival has evolved. While the SAM network is not capable of deterring a massed, large scale attack, it is modern and credible enough to act as a potential deterrent against small-scale incursions or attacks, and therefore is a stabilizing force in the region.

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

A Google Earth file containing the placemarks used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Special thanks to IMINT & Analysis forum members Planeman and BryanC for acting as sounding boards and discussion partners during the creation of this article

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

-Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions

2nd Missile battalion, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association
Taiwan: Missile Profile
Taiwan to Upgrade to Tien Kung-2 SAM
Taiwan switches from Tien Kung I to Tien Kung II
Tien Chi
The AN/MPQ-65
Raytheon welcomes PAC-3 deal
FMS: Taiwan Seeks 330 Patriot PAC-3 Missiles and Four MPQ-65 Radar Sets

SAM Site Overview Mailing List

I've figured out how to solve the amusing problem of the SAM Site Overview constantly not being available for download. From this point forward, the file will not be available for download. Instead, anyone interested in receiving the updated file when changes are made should send an e-mail to imintandanalysisATgmail.com, with SAM SITE UPDATE in the subject line. I will create a mailing list and send everyone the file when it is altered. I will still post the update information here in the normal fashion, but you'll get the file in your inbox instead of from a download link. All you need to do is make sure you can receive a file that is around 6 megabytes in size. This will solve the problems we've been having, and it'll give me an idea of how many people are using the file as well. Those of you who have been sending me updates or questions and whatnot at my other e-mail address, continue using that address for those purposes. All I want to use the above address for is managing the SAM site file mailing list. When the file is updated next, I'll also include these instructions in the main post as well, but go ahead and send me your information now so I can start building the mailing list. This should take care of our problem, and save the download bandwidth for the (considerably smaller) placemark files which are provided with some of my articles. Those of you interested in receiving the current SAM Site Overview file now should send me an e-mail at the above address with SAM SITE FILE in the subject line. I'll then send you the current file, and I'll still add you to the mailing list for updates.

Download Issues, Etc.

Alright, people have been mentioning that the SAM Site Overview file is often not available for download. Apparently, because it's a nearly 6MB file and everyone wants it, Google disables it at times due to bandwidth restriction limits being exceeded. Or something. If anyone knows of a better way to make the file available, let me know. Post a comment on this here or e-mail me. This was the best option last time I decided to host the file outside of the Google Earth/Keyhole BBS, but apparently I need a new solution. I'd like to avoid something like Rapidshare where I have to generate a whole new download link each time I update the file if possible. Any suggestions are welcome!

Also, if you haven't figured it out with yesterday's update to the aforementioned troublesome SAM site file, I'm back up and running for the time being, although there will be another (announced) "service outage" in a month or two when I get around to actually finishing up the find a job, move the house process. I'll post the usual Image of the Week this Friday, and we'll go from there. I'm back at work on some more substantial pieces as well, so expect more of the good stuff in the very near future.

Site News

As some of you might have noticed, things have been a little slow around here lately. I'm currently in the process of packing up the house and moving, so I haven't had nearly as much time to muck about on here as I'd have liked to. The site will be back up and running at full speed hopefully in about a week or two, once the moving stuff has been dealt with. The forum is of course still open and available, and I'll pop in there from time to time when I have a moment to see what's going on. I just wanted to let everyone know the reason for the lack of activity. I'm still checking e-mail as well, so those of you forwarding me SAM file updates and whatnot (including job opportunities-thanks Frank!) are more than welcome to continue doing so. I might not reply right away, but I'll still get your mail.

Anyway, that's about it for that. Once I've gotten the relocation process sorted out and dealt with, I'll explain just what I've been doing for the past 10 years. Until I'm back up and running at full speed on here, check this out, pulled from Google Earth's newly updated historical imagery files:
What you've got there is a lineup of SS-25 TELs and open single-bay garages, likely for START treaty verification purposes. Fun stuff, mess around with the historical imagery in the area and see if you can find the other Novosibirsk SS-25 garrison showing the same thing!