INTRODUCTIONRussia is a vast nation, encompassing a sizeable portion of two continents. In terms of available open-source imagery coverage, many areas in Russia cannot be viewed in sufficient resolution to identify any SAM assets present. As such, this article is intended to provide an overview of currently identified assets, and is not intended to be truly representative of the entire Russian SAM network. It is known, for example, that modern SAM systems have been deployed to various positions around Moscow that were once home to S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) batteries. Some of these former S-25 positions are not currently visible in high resolution, and may be home to SAM systems which cannot be identified due to the lack of available imagery. The SAM systems which have been identified do, however, provide valuable insight into Russian SAM deployment strategies, allowing the overall SAM network to be analyzed even if all of the deployed assets cannot be located.
EW ASSETSEW and GCIRussia relies on a plethora of radar systems to provide early warning (EW) coverage of its territory. The most common systems are variants of the P-14 (TALL KING) and P-35/37 (BAR LOCK). These radars all have ranges exceeding 300 kilometers and can be found in various locations. They are most commonly deployed at airfields to perform air traffic control or GCI functions, or at dedicated EW facilities to monitor assigned airspace sectors. EW facilities will often be integrated within national and regional command and control networks to provide support for the organic EW and engagement radars deployed with SAM units themselves.
The following radar systems have been identified in the following quantities in available imagery as being employed by the Russian air defense network. It should be noted that identifying individual radar systems can be very problematic and is dependent on the quality of the imagery available for exploitation. Many smaller systems, such as the P-19 (THIN SKIN), may be present in larger quantities than indicated here as the imagery at many sites is of insufficient resolution to positively identify them.
P-12/18 SPOON REST: 18
P-14 TALL KING: 46
P-19 THIN SKIN: 15
P-35/37 BAR LOCK: 148
P-80 BACK NET: 32
22Zh6 TIN TRAP: 36
55Zh6 TALL RACK: 26
1L13 BOX SPRING: 1
Some of these deployed EW sites are situated on former SAM sites which no longer contain active missile batteries. Deploying EW assets in this fashion allows them to take advantage of the hardened revetments already in place, adding a degree of protection for the radar systems. Another method used to protect the often fragile sensor arrays of deployed EW radars is to mount the radar systems inside of protective domes. This is a common feature found in EW sites deployed in coastal regions or in regions where long term exposure to environmental conditions could potentially damage the arrays.
A representative Russian EW site can be seen in the image below:
Dual PurposeThe 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radar system is a capable EW radar and as such can be found at dedicated EW sites throughout Russia. The 36D6 is also capable of interfacing with the S-300P family of strategic SAM systems to provide target track data for the engagement radar. This makes 36D6 locations particularly important. Not only can the 36D6 provide EW data for the overall network, but locations hosting a 36D6 can theoretically directly support or be augmented with S-300P series SAM systems in a time of crisis. Any 36D6 radar site could therefore be considered a potential S-300P deployment site. While Russia has not co-located 36D6 radar assets with deployed S-300P series batteries to a great degree at the present time, nations such as China have done so to maximize the situational awareness of deployed S-300P series batteries, highlighting the potential for the same practice to be exploited by the Russian air defense network should the need arise. Analysts will note that while Russian 36D6 radar systems are not generally co-located with S-300P series batteries, they are often located in the same geographic area as these SAM positions, indicating that they may already be performing a supplementary EW task for the SAM batteries rather than a pure EW function despite not being co-located with the SAM batteries.
A representative Russian 36D6 site can be seen in the image below:
A representative Russian combined 36D6 and EW site can be seen in the image below:
Battle ManagementThe primary battle management radar employed by the Russian air defense network is the 5N64/64N6 (BIG BIRD) series. These are dedicated battle management radars designed to control deployed S-300P series SAM assets. 5N64 or 64N6 radar systems are deployed to control multiple S-300P series strategic SAM systems, providing them with target track data to support engagements. 5N64 and 64N6 radars are not deployed separately as part of the overall EW network, making their identification an indicator that S-300P series SAM assets are present in the area. As it cannot be determined which variant is deployed using the available imagery, the battle management radars will be identified as 64N6 sites throughout this article. The majority of these radars are likely the 64N6 variant, but older 5N64 radars may still be in use to support the older variants of the S-300P series.
A representative 64N6 battle management site can be seen in the following image. This is an excellent image of a deployed 64N6 radar system, with the radar array's shadow clearly showing the characteristic fore and aft feedhorn assemblies used on the 64N6's radar array.
64N6 battle management radars located around Moscow are typically deployed on large towers to provide unobstructed views of the surrounding airspace. A 64N6 deployed in this fashion can be seen in the image below:
New Generation RadarsThe 55Zh6 Nebo-U and 1L13 Nebo-SV represent Russia's new breed of air surveillance radars. These systems operate in the VHF band and as such represent a threat to current LO aircraft optimized to defeat sub-meter band fire control radars. While modernization of the SAM inventory (i.e. operational deployment) has only recently begun in earnest, modernization of the EW network appears to be progressing at a quicker pace. The 55Zh6 has been identified at twenty six locations throughout Russia, providing an improved counter-LO capability over much of the nation. Deployments are primarily concentrated along border regions.
A deployed 55Zh6 radar can be seen in the image below:
In contrast, the 1L13 has only been seen sited with S-300V (SA-12A/B GLADIATOR/GIANT) units. This suggests that the 1L13 may be intended for a direct battery support role to increase the anti-aircraft effectiveness of the S-300V rather than as a dedicated air surveillance radar. It should be noted that the 1L13 has never been located near an S-300P series or S-400 (SA-21) battery in available imagery.
A 1L13 radar deployed at the Orenburg S-300V garrison can be seen in the image below:
AIR DEFENSE ASSETSS-300P SeriesThe primary strategic SAM systems employed by the Russian air defense network are variants of the S-300P family. The S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE), S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE), and S-300PM (SA-20A GARGOYLE) are all widely deployed throughout the nation. The S-300P series SAM systems are all mobile to some degree, able to be redeployed should the need arise. This provides them with greater survivability as constant relocation can complicate targeting. The engagement ranges are as follows: S-300PT, 47 km; S-300PS, 90 km; and S-300PM, 150 km. Detailed information regarding the S-300P series of SAM systems, as well as related components such as the 64N6 battle management radar, can be found
here.
Legacy SystemsVery few legacy Soviet-era strategic SAM systems are still found active inside of Russia. There is one active S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) battery still operational, and what appear to be a small number of S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) batteries deployed on the island of Novaya Zemlya. What appear at first glance to be active S-75 and S-125 (SA-3 GOA) batteries located on the Ashuluk SAM Training Range are likely in place to serve either the training needs of Russian allies still operating these systems, or to serve as launch platforms for specially modified missiles designed to serve as targets for more modern systems such as the S-300PM.
Tactical SAMsTactical SAM systems are not commonly employed as part of the overall Russian air defense network. These tactical systems, such as the S-300V or 9K37 (SA-11 GADFLY), are designed to be deployed in support of Russian army maneuver formations to provide mobile air defense. Some of these systems can, however, be located deployed at prepared sites, such as the S-300V battery deployed near Birobidzhan seen in the image below. As such, given that these systems can provide air defense in their region, they are included here. Identified tactical SAM garrisons are also included as these systems could potentially also be deployed in a quasi-strategic manner to defend key facilities in their vicinity or to fill in coverage gaps in their assigned zones.
GENERAL LAYOUTRussia's strategic air defense network is arranged to defend key military sites, industrial areas, and population centers. Currently deployed assets are consolidated in the vicinity of these locations to provide overlapping surveillance zones and fields of fire, increasing the network's defensive effectiveness.
Strategic SAM assets were initially subordinate to the Troops of Air Defense (PVO). During a reorganization under Yeltsin, the Russian Air Force absorbed the PVO and gained control of the strategic SAM force. Tactical SAM systems remain controlled by the Russian Army. As previously mentioned, many tactical SAM systems are often deployed at fixed sites to provide air defense of certain areas, and as such will be included here even though they are not necessarily administratively integrated with the strategic SAM network.
Russia is presently divided into six miltary zones, which can be seen in the image below. These military zones will be analyzed separately to provide a more detailed look at the currently deployed air defense assets therein.
Within each of these military zones, numerous air defense sites and support facilities can be identified. Identification of active air defense sites is obviously important to provide a general image of the air defense capabilities of the zone in question. Support facilities, however, are also very significant and can often provide valuable information regarding the zone's overall potential as compared to its current status.
Most strategic SAM sites are supported by SAM garrisons housing additional equipment and often providing maintenance facilities for deployed units. These garrisons can often provide valuable information regarding the potential future strength of an air defense zone during a time of conflict. Consider the S-300P garrison near Vsevolodovo, on the outskirts of Moscow, seen in the image below.
This garrison is likely positioned to support many of the S-300PM batteries defending Moscow. A close examination of the equipment visible on the grounds of the facility indicates that there may be up to three S-300P series batteries in-garrison available for deployment. Being able to determine the amount of SAM equipment in-garrison provides a rough concept of the amount of additional batteries which may be available for deployment during a time of increased tensions. This also allows for a differentiation to be made between existing peacetime and potential wartime postures for an air defense network. In the case of Russia, examination of the various SAM garrisons throughout the nation does indicate that there are a substantial number of complete batteries available for deployment should the need arise. Alternatively, this provides an idea of the number of batteries potentially available for resale to foreign clients. As S-400 units replace older S-300P series batteries throughout Russia, for example, these older systems, including those held in garrison, could be available for export at a reduced rate. This would potentially make them attractive options for nations like Syria or Iran who have a significant need to upgrade their aging air defense networks.
Close examination of SAM garrisons and facilities also provides insight into the types of systems which could be available for deployment in a given area. The SAM garrison near Strugi-Krasnye, for example, houses S-300V components. While there are no deployed S-300V batteries identified in the area, the presence of the components at the garrison indicates that the system could be deployed in the region and potentially represents a threat to be considered.
SYMBOLOGYThe following icons will be used to depict air defense related sites within Russia:
Squares: facilities such as garrisons, test and training centers
Diamonds: EW radar sites
Circles: 36D6 and 64N6 radar sites
Triangles: SAM sites
The icons will be color coded as follows:
Dark red: S-75
Bright red: S-300P series, 64N6 battle management radar
Yellow: S-400
Orange: S-300V
Dark blue: general EW radar, 36D6 EW radar
Bright blue: S-125
Faded green: 9K37
Purple: S-200
White: an unoccupied EW radar or SAM location
Brown: a general or multi-type SAM garrison
Engagement zones will match the color of the icon for their respective SAM system, with the exception of the 64N6 battle management radar. The 64N6 will have a blue range ring but a red icon, denoting its EW function (blue) as well as its relation to the S-300P series SAM systems (red).
The specialized capabilities of the 55Zh6 radar will also be annotated using a medium blue range ring. These sites will not, however, be specifically annotated using a unique icon. As 55Zh6 radars can be located at both EW and 36D6 radar sites, the icons for those sites featuring a 55Zh6 radar will also be colored medium blue. A medium blue circle will therefore indicate a 36D6 EW site also containing a 55Zh6 radar.
WESTERN ZONEThe Western Zone is responsible for defense of Russia's western-most region, as well as capital area air defense of Moscow. As such, it is one of the most heavily defended zones found in Russia. Numerous advanced SAM systems are present, making the airspace above Moscow potentially the most heavily defended airspace in the world.
EW SitesFifteen EW sites, one of which is unoccupied in available imagery, provide coverage for the Western Zone. The bulk of these sites are found in the western half of the zone, situated to provide coverage of the border regions. A series of seven EW sites extending northwest from Moscow appears to be oriented to provide airspace monitoring of the air corridor leading to Domodedovo airport.
Identified radar systems can be located in the following quantities in the Western Zone:
P-12/18: 1
P-14: 4
P-35/37: 5
P-80: 2
22Zh6: 6
55Zh6: 4
The locations of the EW sites in the Western Zone can be seen in the image below:
36D6 SitesSixteen 36D6 EW sites provide additional EW coverage for the Western Zone. Half of these facilities are situated to potentially support S-300PS and S-300PM batteries in the region as well. Many of these sites contain multiple radars. The sixteen sites are home to twenty one 36D6 radars. As can be seen in the image below, the 36D6 sites are able to provide coverage of roughly two thirds of the Western Zone, omitting only the far western and far eastern areas:
55Zh6 CoverageOne EW and three 36D6 sites in the Western Zone possess a 55Zh6 radar set. The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below:
64N6 SitesThirteen 64N6 sites provide battle management for the S-300PS and S-300PM batteries deployed in the Western Zone. The majority of these systems are situated around Moscow, to support the large number of SAM batteries present providing defense of the Russian capital. The locations and coverage of the 64N6 sites, one of which is noted as inactive in the most recent imagery, can be seen in the image below:
Active SitesAir defense for the Western Zone is provided by one S-400, twenty S-300PM and one S-300PS batteries. Many of the batteries ringing Moscow are in residence at former S-25 positions. While a solitary S-300PS battery is deployed near Voronezh, the bulk of the attention in the Western Zone has been given to defending Moscow. The Moscow air defense network also features the majority of the most modern S-300PM variants found in Russia. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries are depicted in the image below:
It is known that two S-400 (SA-21) batteries have been deployed around Moscow, with the first battery being emplaced near Elektrostal. Only the first battery has been positively identified using open-source imagery, and as such it is the only S-400 battery included here. It should be mentioned, however, that the S-400 will be replacing S-300P series batteries around Moscow and eventually throughout Russia, providing a significant increase in capability.
Inactive SitesA total of eighty one inactive SAM sites are present in the Western Zone. Thirty nine S-75 and fifteen S-200 sites are present scattered throughout the area. Twenty seven prepared S-300P sites can also be located. These sites, along with the other inactive sites, could be used to redeploy S-300PS and S-300PM batteries during a time of conflict, complicating targeting of these assets. They may also be used to deploy S-300P series batteries held in storage at the SAM garrisons in the area to bolster the defense of the Western Zone should the need arise. The locations of the inactive SAM sites found in the Western Zone can be seen in the image below:
FacilitiesFifteen facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Western Zone. There are eight S-300P series SAM garrisons, three SAM garrisons, one S-300V garrison, one SAM training facility, one S-300P training facility, and one radar test facility. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
MoscowGiven the importance placed on defending Moscow, there are a number of EW sites, SAM sites and support facilities located in close proximity around the Russian capital. In order to better illustrate their position in relation to one another, the image below is provided:
NORTHWESTERN ZONEThe Northwestern Zone encompasses a large swath of terrain. Assets deployed in the Northwestern Zone are situated to defend many strategically significant locations, such as the city of St. Petersburg and the Russian Northern Fleet facilities along the Kola Peninsula. Many of these assets also serve an important function in a strategic environment; they would represent a significant portion of the Russian EW and SAM network defending against incoming American nuclear strike aircraft approaching over the North Pole.
EW SitesTwenty nine EW sites, two of which are unoccupied in available imagery, provide coverage for the Northwestern Zone. Roughly a third of these sites are positioned along the Kola Peninsula to provide EW coverage for the Russian Northern Fleet's facilities and to impart GCI support for interceptor aircraft based there.
Identified radar systems can be located in the following quantities in the Northwestern Zone:
P-12/18: 3
P-14: 4
P-19: 5
P-35/37: 19
P-80: 11
22Zh6: 2
55Zh6: 4
The locations of the EW sites in the Northwestern Zone can be seen in the image below:
36D6 SitesSixteen 36D6 EW sites provide additional EW coverage for the Northwestern Zone. Four of these facilities are situated to potentially support S-300PS and S-300PM batteries surrounding St. Petersburg, with a further site situated to potentially support S-300PT and S-300PM batteries on the Kola Peninsula. The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below:
55Zh6 CoverageTwo EW and two 36D6 sites in the Northwestern Zone possess a 55Zh6 radar set. The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below:
64N6 SitesSeven 64N6 sites provide battle management for the S-300P series batteries deployed in the Northwestern Zone. Six of these systems are situated around St. Petersburg in support of S-300P series batteries in the area. The locations and coverage of the 64N6 sites can be seen in the image below:
Active SitesAir defense for the Northwestern Zone is provided by three S-75 batteries, three S-300PT batteries, nine S-300PS batteries, and six S-300PM batteries. The bulk of the S-300P series batteries are split between St. Petersburg and the Kola Peninsula, with three S-300PT batteries deployed to defend Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk. The actual operational status of the aging S-75 batteries on Novaya Zemlya is in question, but they are included here as they do appear to contain both engagement radars and missile rails. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries are depicted in the image below:
Inactive SitesOne hundred and nineteen inactive SAM sites are present in the Northwestern Zone. There are sixty five S-75 sites, nineteen S-125 sites, seventeen S-200 sites, and eighteen S-300P series sites. Many of these former SAM sites can be found in areas no longer defended by active SAM batteries, providing insight into Cold War era deploment strategies. The locations of these inactive SAM sites can be seen in the image below:
FacilitiesTwelve facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Northwestern Zone. There are eight S-300P series SAM garrisons, three SAM garrisons, and one EW training facility. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
St. Petersburg and the Kola PeninsulaA closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities surrounding St. Petersburg is provided below. Much like Moscow, the SAM batteries and support facilities are arrayed in a largely circular pattern around the city.
The Kola Peninsula is one of the most important strategic locations in the Northwestern Zone, providing the home to Russia's Northern Fleet and a significant portion of the sea-borne nuclear deterrent force. A closer view of the strategic air defense facilities in the area is provided in the image below:
SOUTHWESTERN ZONEThe Southwestern Zone is an important zone in terms of air defense for Russia. The zone provides surveillance and SAM coverage of Russia's southwestern flank bordering the Black Sea. Also, this zone is likely responsible for providing the air defense units which deployed to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in support of Russia's recent military activities in the region.
EW SitesThirty nine EW sites, five of which are unoccupied in available imagery, provide coverage for the Southwestern Zone. These sites are scattered throughout the zone to provide coverage over the bulk of the territory.
Identified radar systems can be located in the following quantities in the Southwestern Zone:
P-12/18: 6
P-14: 10
P-19: 4
P-35/37: 27
P-80: 5
22Zh6: 10
55Zh6: 5
The locations of the EW sites in the Southwestern Zone can be seen in the image below:
36D6 and 64N6 SitesFourteen 36D6 and two 64N6 radar sites provide additional air surveillance of the Southwestern Zone, as well as battle management functions for S-300P series batteries in the area. The majority of the 36D6 radar sites are positioned in the western half of the zone to allow for increased coverage of the border region with the Ukraine and the offshore airspace over the Black Sea. The locations and coverage zones of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
55Zh6 CoverageTwo EW and three 36D6 sites in the Southwestern Zone possess a 55Zh6 radar set. The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below:
Active SitesTwo 9K37 and two S-300PM SAM batteries provide air defense for the Southwestern Zone. One S-300PM battery is positioned to defend the area bordering the Black Sea, providing coverage of the port facility at Novorossiysk as well. The other S-300PM battery is sited to defend Rostov-on-Don. A 9K37 battery is currently deloyed near Sochi, likely emplaced to provide air defense for the Russian Presidential retreat, with another battery sited near Yeysk. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive SitesFifty four inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Southwestern Zone. There are thirty two S-75 sites, nine S-125 sites, eight S-200 sites, and five S-300P series sites. The bulk of these sites are situated around Rostov-on-Don and Volgograd, areas which no longer maintain a significant SAM presence. The locations of these inactive SAM sites can be seen in the image below:
CENTRAL ASIAN ZONEThe Central Asian Zone provides air defense for a significant portion of Russia's interior, concentrating on the western half. As the interior of the nation is less vulnerable to aerial assault, assets contained herein are less capable and more dispersed throughout the territory.
EW SitesTwenty six EW sites, three of which are unoccupied in available imagery, provide surveillance and GCI support capabilities for the Central Asian Zone. These sites are primarily situated near populated areas and airfields.
Identified radar systems can be located in the following quantities in the Central Asian Zone:
P-12/18: 3
P-14: 7
P-19: 1
P-35/37: 21
P-80: 2
22Zh6: 4
55Zh6: 1
The locations of the EW sites in the Central Asian Zone can be seen in the image below:
36D6 and 64N6 SitesNine 36D6 and three 64N6 radar facilities provide expanded EW coverage and battle management support for the Central Asian Zone's air defense systems. The locations and coverage zones of these radar assets can be seen in the image below:
55Zh6 CoverageOne EW site in the Central Asian Zone possess a 55Zh6 radar set. The location and coverage zone of this site can be seen in the image below:
Active SitesSix S-300PS batteries provide the bulk of the active air defense coverage for the Central Asian Zone. These batteries are positioned to defend Saratov, Samara and Ekaterinburg. An S-300V garrison at Orenburg is a potential source of expanded air defense for the region. The locations and engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive SitesSixty two inactive SAM sites can be found scattered throughout the Central Asian Zone. Forty three S-75 sites, sixteen S-200 sites, and three S-300P sites have been identified. Their locations can be seen in the image below:
FacilitiesFive facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Central Asian Zone. These facilities consist of an S-300P garrison, the aforementioned S-300V garrison, one SAM garrison, one SAM training range, and one SAM garrison/training range combined facility. With the exception of the S-300P garrison near Saratov, the rest of the facilities are consolidated around Orenburg. This potentially indicates that Orenburg is a significant training location for tactical SAM units in the area and possibly throughout Russia as well. Longer-range strategic SAM systems likely do not train at these facilities as they employ two dedicated facilities in Russia, but tactical SAM systems could make use of the facilities with greater ease due to their shorter range requiring smaller range impact areas. Examination of the training ranges does indicate that they have been used by tracked vehicles with regularity, providing further evidence that tactical rather than strategic SAM units are the primary users of these facilities. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
SIBERIAN ZONEThe Siberian Zone provides air defense for the eastern portion of Russia's interior. As with the Central Asian Zone, assets contained herein are less capable and more dispersed throughout the territory when compared to other zones throughout Russia. Unlike the Central Asian zone, the northern half of the Siberian Zone is barren of assets save for a single inactive S-200 site near Norilsk. As such, the graphics will not depict the entire zone, but rather the southern half where the relevant assets are consolidated.
EW SitesThirty six EW sites, six of which are unoccupied in available imagery, provide air surveillance for the Siberian Zone. While half of these locations have been scattered throughout the zone, there is a concentration of seventeen facilities in the southeastern quadrant providing air surveillance along the borders with China and Mongolia.
Identified radar systems can be located in the following quantities in the Siberian Zone:
P-12/18: 1
P-14: 10
P-19: 2
P-35/37: 28
P-80: 8
22Zh6: 8
55Zh6: 5
The locations of the EW sites in the Siberian Zone can be seen in the image below:
36D6 and 64N6 SitesFour 36D6 radar and three 64N6 battle management radar sites provide additional EW coverage for the Siberian Zone. The locations and coverage zones of the identified 36D6 and 64N6 radars can be seen in the image below:
55Zh6 CoverageFour EW and one 36D6 site in the Siberian Zone possess a 55Zh6 radar set. The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below:
Active SitesTwo S-300PT batteries and three S-300PS batteries comprise the identified air defense assets deployed in the Siberian Zone. The S-300P series batteries are positioned to provide defense of Achinsk, Irkutsk, and Novosibirsk. The locations and engagement zones of these SAM batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive SitesSixty nine inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Siberian Zone. Forty S-75 sites, one S-125 site, one 2K12 (SA-4 GANEF) site, eighteen S-200 sites, and nine S-300P sites have been located in the region. The locations of these sites can be seen in the image below:
FacilitiesSeven support facilities, comprised of three S-300P garrisons, two 9K37 garrisons, one EW training facility, and the Telemba SAM training facility, have been identified in the Siberian Zone. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
FAR EASTERN ZONEThe Far Eastern Zone provides air defense for Russian forces stationed in the Pacific theater, including the Russian naval bases of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. Petropavlovsk is home to the Pacific Fleet's SSBN force.
EW SitesFifty three EW sites, one of which was inactive when imaged, provide air surveillance for the Far Eastern Zone. These facilities are primarily consolidated in three strategically significant areas: the northeast, near Alaska, the southeast, near Vladivostok, and the far east, on the Kamchatka Peninsula.
Identified radar systems can be located in the following quantities in the Far Eastern Zone:
P-12/18: 2
P-14: 10
P-19: 3
P-35/37: 43
P-80: 2
22Zh6: 5
55Zh6: 5
The locations of the EW sites in the Far Eastern Zone can be seen in the image below:
36D6, 64N6, and 9S18M1 Sites Nine 36D6 sites, five 64N6 sites, and one 9S18M1 site are located in the Far Eastern Zone. The 64N6 and 9S18M1 sites provide support to specific SAM units, with the 64N6 sites providing battle management support for assigned S-300PS batteries and the 9S18M1 site providing EW support to a deployed 9K37 battery in the region. There is likely an unlocated 64N6 located near Vladivostok, denoted by the presence of S-300PS batteries in the area. A further radar position located near Nakhodka likely contains or contained a 64N6 battle management radar housed underneath a protective dome, as evidenced by the S-300PS batteries in the area. The locations and coverage zones of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
55Zh6 and OTH CoverageThree EW and two 36D6 sites in the Far Eastern Zone possess a 55Zh6 radar set. The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below. Additionally, three OTH-SW facilities have also been identified, and may be able to perform air surveillance tasks. These sites are also annotated in the image below.
Active SitesEleven active SAM batteries provide air defense for the Far Eastern Zone. Nine of these batteries are equipped with S-300PS SAM systems and defend naval facilities at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, as well as other key locations in the region. One S-300V and one 9K37 battery have also been identified deployed at prepared sites in the region as well. The locations and engagement zones of the active SAM batteries in the region can be seen in the image below:
Inactive SitesEighty eight inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Far Eastern Zone. These locations consist of fifty four S-75 sites, eight S-125 sites, one 2K12 site, ten S-200 sites, one 9K37 site, and fourteen S-300P sites. The locations of these sites can be seen in the image below. Interestingly, many of these facilities have been identified on the island of Sakhalin, a location which has not seen any active SAM batteries deployed to the region recently. This is evidence of the changing priorities of Russian air defense.
FacilitiesSeven facilities supporting air defense units in the region have been identified in the Far Eastern Zone. There are five S-300P garrisons, one 9K37 garrison, and an S-300V garrison. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
Vladivostok and the Kamchatka PeninsulaA closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities in the region surrounding Vladivostok is provided below:
A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities on the Kola Peninsula near Petropavlovsk, home of the Russian Pacific Fleet's SSBN force, can be seen in the image below:
KALININGRADThe Kaliningrad autonomous region, located to the west of Russia along the Baltic sea, possesses numerous air defense units but is not tecnhically part of the Russian strategic air defense network. Rather, assets in this region are dedicated to the air defense of Kaliningrad and may not be integrated within the overall Russian air defense network due to the fact that Kaliningrad is geographically separated from the rest of Russia.
EW, 36D6, 64N6, and 55Zh6 SitesFour EW sites, four 36D6 radar sites, and one 64N6 battle management radar can be found in Kaliningrad. Additionally, one EW and one 36D6 site possess a 55Zh6 radar.
Identified radar systems can be located in the following quantities in Kaliningrad:
P-12/18: 2
P-14: 1
P-35/37: 4
P-80: 2
22Zh6: 1
55Zh6: 2
Nebo-SV: 1
The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below:
Active SitesAir defense of Kaliningrad is provided by one S-200 battery, the sole remaining S-200 battery operated by Russia, and four S-300PS batteries. Russia has claimed that the S-200 will remain in service in Kaliningrad until it is replaced by an S-400 battery. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites and FacilitiesNine S-75 sites, two S-125 sites, one 2K12 site, and six S-300P sites make up the inactive SAM sites located within Kaliningrad. The locations of these sites can be seen in the image below. Also provided is the location of an S-300P garrison, the sole support facility identified in the region.
For more information regarding the strategic SAM defenses of Kaliningrad, click
here.
SPECIAL FACILITIESThere are eight facilities within Russia which provide test and training services for the Russian strategic SAM network.
Kapustin Yar, located in the Southwestern Zone, is the primary test facility for Russian strategic SAM systems. Ashuluk, also in the Southwestern Zone, and Telemba, in the Siberian Zone, provide training ranges for long-range strategic SAM systems. While most of the actual firing positions at Kapustin Yar and all of Telemba are not visible in sufficient resolution to make any significant analysis of these facilities, Ashuluk can be viewed in great detail. More information on these three facilities can be found
here.
An image of the facilities at Ashuluk is provided below for illustrative purposes:
Two EW training facilities, an S-300P training facility, and three generic SAM training facilities have also been located and are mentioned above in their respective zones. EW training facilities are easily identified thanks to the presence of EW radar systems in a location which precludes their use as active surveillance centers. For illustrative purposes, an image of the EW training center near St. Petersburg is provided below. Close examination will reveal that the radar systems are not mounted on raised berms to facilitate operational use, indicating that they would be hampered by structures and vegetation in the area. As these systems cannot be employed operationally but appear to be deployed in an operational fashion, this is likely a training facility and has therefore been classified as such.
OVERALL TOTALSOver nine hundred air defense related facilities have been identified in Russia and Kaliningrad. Including the sites found in Kaliningrad and among the various test and training ranges, the total numbers are broken down as follows. The first number is the current total, with the second number in parentheses reflecting the change from the December 2008 version of this feature.
EW sites: 202 (+62)
36D6 radar sites: 72 (+34)
64N6 battle management radar sites: 34 (+11)
9S18M1 radar sites: 1 (-)
Active S-75 sites: 3 (-1)
Active S-200 sites: 1 (-)
Active 9K37 sites: 2 (+1)
Active S-300V sites: 1 (-)
Active S-300PT sites: 5 (-1)
Active S-300PS sites: 32 (+5)
Active S-300PM sites: 28 (+7)
Active S-400 sites: 1 (+1)
Support facilities: 57 (+16)
-SAM garrisons: 9
-S-300P garrisons: 27
-S-300V garrisons: 3
-9K37 garrisons: 4
-Test and training facilities: 14
Inactive S-75 sites: 295 (+120)
Inactive S-125 sites: 41 (+14)
Inactive 2K12 sites: 3 (+1)
Inactive S-200 sites: 84 (+6)
Inactive 9K37 sites: 1 (-)
Inactive S-300P sites: 84 (+31)
The rather large disparity between active and inactive sites should not necessarily be seen as a sign of reduced effectiveness. Many legacy SAM batteries have been supplanted in their operating areas by S-300P series batteries, offering increased capability at a reduced number. Each S-300PS battery, for example, can engage six targets simultaneously. Previously, the S-75 could only engage one target per system. A single S-300PS could therefore replace six S-75 batteries, offering an expanded coverage area with no loss in target engagement capability. In this case, deploying the S-300PS battery at a reprofiled S-75 location could result in one active and five inactive locations being present in the area, providing a perception of reduced capability. While it is also true that some locations no longer enjoy strategic SAM protection, the overall impression that the network has been degraded purely because the number of deployed batteries has been greatly reduced is clearly flawed. In truth, many of these locations which are no longer actively defended could easily be protected by in-garrison assets if the need arises.
LIMITATIONSThe primary limitation of the Russian air defense network is one of volume. There is simply too much airspace to ensure contiguous, overlapping SAM coverage of the entire nation. As such, there are significant gaps in SAM coverage which could be exploited by a potential adversary.
Consider the SAM engagement ranges in western Russia from St. Petersburg to Sochi, as depicted in the following image:
With the placement of SAM batteries to defend strategic locations, there are significant areas where enemy aircraft could enter into Russian airspace without being threatened by an identified SAM system. While it is true that a strike package would still face a significant SAM threat when nearing a potential target area, not having to deal with SAM batteries enroute will result in more aircraft being available to prosecute the target.
While the SAM network's coverage is limited, the EW network coverage is robust. As seen in the image below, nearly the entire western border region, as well as most of the potential target areas, are covered by the identified 36D6, 55Zh6 and 64N6 radar systems. This does not take into account other EW assets such as the P-14 or P-35/37 series, which would only add to the available EW coverage. Such a robust and overlapping EW network would likely force a strike package to employ either significant EW support, thereby giving away away its position, or a low level ingress, thereby reducing its range and potentially removing a great deal of potential strategic targets from threat of engagement.
The dark horses of the Russian SAM network are the tactical SAM batteries and potentially unlocated S-300P series batteries, having exploited their significant mobility to relocate along likely ingress routes. These mobile SAM systems could potentially be deployed to maximize their coverage, exploiting both prepared inactive sites and unsurveyed field deployment locations. SAM batteries held in reserve such as those S-300P series batteries identified in garrison also represent a significant threat to be deployed during a time of crisis and would have to be carefully tracked in order to determine their final deployment positions.
At the end of the day, it is unlikely that Russia would be able to effectively deploy enough strategic SAM batteries to mount a contiguous and overlapping defense of both its borders and the strategic targets likely to be struck during a time of conflict. The overwhelming amount of airspace present would make this a prohibitively expensive endeavour.
Furthermore, even if an attempt was made to mount this type of barrier air defense, it is likely that the deployed assets would not have sufficient overlapping coverage to deny an inbound strike package access to Russian airspace should a small number of SAM systems be incapacitated or destroyed. Fortunately for Russia, however, there are two other options present which help to mitigate these limitations.
CIS AIR DEFENSEOne solution available to Russian military forces in a time of conflict is the presence of the CIS air defense network. The CIS air defense network is an integrated cooperative involving the air defense forces of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The combined air defense forces of these nations provide an expanded air defense network along the periphery of Russia. While recent events may cast doubt as to the participation of Georgia or the Ukraine in the CIS air defense network, they have not withdrawn from the organization at this point in time and therefore should be considered active participants.
Continuing with the previous example of a strike package attempting to penetrate into western Russia, consider the presence of multiple 36D6, 55Zh6 and 64N6 radar sites in Belarus and the Ukraine, as well as those deployed by Russia in Kaliningrad. These sites provide contiguous coverage along the western approaches to Russia from St. Petersburg in the north to the Georgian border in the south. Significantly overlapping coverage provides an extremely well monitored air defense zone reaching into Poland and the majority of the Black Sea. This would severely impede the prospects of an inbound strike package successfully evading detection, allowing air defense assets within Russia to be brought to full readiness in anticipation of an aerial attack.
The coverage of 36D6, 55Zh6 and 64N6 radar systems found in the western portion of the CIS air defense network can be seen in the image below:
Belarus and the Ukraine do not only offer air surveillance capabilities to the CIS air defense network. Multiple S-125, S-200, and S-300P series SAM batteries are also present, providing an additional layer of protection for western Russia. The more advanced S-300P series SAM batteries do not provide complete coverage of the western approaches to Russia, as they are primarily deployed in accordance with the air defense requirements of their users, but they do provide yet another complication for an inbound strike package. Furthermore, there remains the chance, as with Russia, that many of the S-300P series SAM batteries could be redeployed to maximize their effectiveness. Most of the S-300P series SAM batteries in Belarus and the Ukraine are consolidated to defend key military and industrial centers and could be relocated to a degree without significantly compromising the defensive posture at those locations. S-200 batteries, however, provide overlapping coverage of the entire region, representing a significant threat to any ISR or support aircraft accompanying a strike package. Both nations also possess 9K37 and S-300V tactical SAM systems which could be situated in the gaps between S-300P series engagement zones, and in some cases these systems are also field deployed to provide point defense.
The SAM coverage found in the western portion of the CIS air defense network, including those Russian systems sited in Kaliningrad, can be seen in the image below:
THE AIR ELEMENTNo discussion of strategic air defense in Russia would be complete without mentioning the MiG-31 (FOXHOUND). As noted above, there are significant gaps in the SAM coverage throughout the nation. The MiG-31 is a strategic interceptor tasked with defending the periphery of Russia, and provides the ability to cover far more territory than a small number of SAM batteries. There are currently six active MiG-31 units inside of Russia. With a combat radius of between 720 kilometers at Mach 2.35 and 1250 kilometers at Mach 0.8, the MiG-31 is well suited for patrolling those areas in Russia lacking sufficient ground-based air defense. Four aircraft can effectively monitor and cooperatively engage targets in a 1600 kilometer wide swath of airspace thanks to the presence of advanced datalinking systems allowing target data to be passed between the interceptors. The MiG-31BM ugrade, currently in progress, will enhance the interceptor's radar and weapon systems and ensure that the aircraft is viable well into the 21st Century.
MiG-31 interceptors can be supported by A-50 (MAINSTAY) AEW&C aircraft based at Ivanovo. These aircraft can operate as airborne GCI platforms to vector MiG-31s and other air combat aircraft towards targets outside the range of the fighters' radar systems. Alternatively the A-50 can be used to vector MiG-31s towards targets while the MiG-31 closes passively with its Zaslon fire control radar shut off to deny an enemy aircraft an RWR indication giving away the MiG-31's presence. The A-50 can also be used as an airborne EW platform, monitoring airspace in regions where EW coverage is limited or non-existant.
Both the A-50 and MiG-31 may have their range extended and their loiter time increased by inflight refueling from Il-78 (MIDAS) tankers. The only limitation with this practice is the fact that Russia's Il-78 fleet is relatively small, and as such is primarily tasked to support strategic aviation units operating nuclear bombers. The long range and endurance capability of both the MiG-31 and A-50, coupled with the presence of multiple airfields and staging locations along the northern Russian coast and the Kola Peninsula allow these assets to be forward deployed in order to take advantage of their range capabilities in regions where their presence is required.
A further air threat to be considered is the Su-27 (FLANKER) series. There are currently nine active Su-27 units inside of Russia, including one operating the carrier-based Su-27K (FLANKER-D) and two operating the Su-27SM. The Far Eastern Zone's Su-27SM units represent an increased threat over the remaining units as the aircraft have received modified weapons and systems, including the capability to fire the R-77 (AA-12 ADDER) BVR ARH AAM. The Su-27's long range and excellent combat persistence make it an ideal candidate for intercept duties to complement the specialized MiG-31.
CONCLUSIONThe Russian strategic air defense network possesses some of the most advanced weapon systems found anywhere in the world. Despite the fact that at first glance there are many significant coverage gaps in the SAM network, the presence of numerous systems held in garrison as well as the incorporation of an air element into the strategic air defense system makes Russian airspace arguably the most heavily defended airspace on the planet. An analyst would do well to remember that numbers and images do not tell the entire story; were every in-garrison system to be deployed, the Russian air defense network would surely represent a significant deterrent to any aerial incursion into sovereign Russian airspace, a view that is not necessarily evident at first glance when only evaluating the identified deployed assets.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONFeel free to discuss this feauture at the IMINT & Analysis forum discussion thread found
here.
SOURCES-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
CIS Air Defense Russian/PLA Low Band Surveillance RadarsThis article has been updated, the original version was published in December of 2008.
The image above depicts an OTH-SW trials facility near Wehai, China. This facility appears to be a reduced-size receiver array similar to that seen at operational OTH-SW sites in China. As a separate transmitter facility has not yet been identified, it is possible that this facility trialled both elements of China's OTH-SW system.
The image above depicts an OTH-SW trials facility near Wehai, China. This facility appears to be a reduced-size receiver array similar to that seen at operational OTH-SW sites in China. As a separate transmitter facility has not yet been identified, it is possible that this facility trialled both elements of China's OTH-SW system.
