INTRODUCTION
Of all the Middle Eastern nations, Syria would appear to have one of the most robust SAM networks. Multiple SAM sites provide redundancy, allowing for overlapping coverage in critical areas and protecting against a loss of capability should one site be eliminated. It should come as no suprise that evidence of a recent illegal incursion into sovereign Syrian airspace by the Israeli air force was found in an area largely undefended by SAM systems.
SAM SYSTEMS
The Syrian air defense network relies primarily on Soviet-era SAM systems. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: SA-2 GUIDELINE, SA-3 GOA, SA-5 GAMMON, and SA-6 GAINFUL.
Currently, there are 97 active SAM sites inside of Syria. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. SA-2 sites are red, SA-3 sites are blue, SA-5 sites are purple, and SA-6 sites are green. Empty sites are denoted by white icons.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Syrian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, SA-2 range rings are red, SA-3 rings are blue, SA-5 rings are purple, and SA-6 rings are green.
SA-2 GUIDELINE
There are currently 30 active SA-2 sites at the following locations:
36 14' 22.60" N 37 18' 23.92" E
36 03' 24.09" N 37 10' 16.04" E
35 57' 13.79" N 37 16' 06.58" E
36 04' 12.06" N 37 20' 29.65" E
35 13' 45.77" N 36 52' 18.48" E
35 40' 24.99" N 35 47' 15.39" E
35 36' 20.83" N 35 51' 56.57" E
35 24' 45.85" N 35 55' 19.86" E
35 10' 04.21" N 36 03' 06.47" E
34 50' 43.56" N 35 54' 54.95" E
34 49' 59.87" N 36 41' 59.26" E
34 40' 20.40" N 36 43' 21.47" E
34 39' 13.58" N 36 44' 35.90" E
34 36' 33.46" N 36 40' 39.68" E
34 27' 00.19" N 37 39' 57.33" E
34 28' 47.08" N 37 37' 50.90" E
33 38' 13.45" N 36 53' 20.08" E
33 32' 50.16" N 36 46' 29.99" E
33 35' 19.54" N 36 37' 06.35" E
33 21' 28.37" N 36 06' 37.49" E
33 29' 53.35" N 36 37' 08.44" E
33 26' 07.02" N 36 30' 53.34" E
33 23' 19.67" N 36 43' 42.86" E
33 17' 01.96" N 36 23' 40.16" E
33 06' 24.58" N 36 36' 45.17" E
33 02' 07.52" N 36 12' 03.35" E
32 49' 52.17" N 36 13' 40.58" E
32 48' 13.79" N 36 19' 30.70" E
32 42' 17.13" N 36 14' 53.99" E
32 35' 52.28" N 36 21' 12.33" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-2 sites:
SA-3 GOA
There are currently 32 active SA-3 sites at the following locations:
36 17' 51.31" N 37 09' 34.63" E
36 13' 16.96" N 37 04' 51.69" E
35 38' 55.23" N 37 06' 48.03" E
36 11' 20.09" N 37 27' 13.60" E
35 58' 49.86" N 37 25' 32.69" E
35 23' 54.14" N 36 54' 02.93" E
35 37' 53.32" N 35 47' 09.01" E
35 33' 48.45" N 35 44' 15.29" E
35 30' 55.46" N 35 48' 58.88" E
35 28' 41.92" N 35 52' 44.63" E
35 19' 52.45" N 35 55' 27.85" E
35 12' 36.57" N 36 15' 24.91" E
35 02' 57.07" N 35 54' 17.33" E
34 55' 08.54" N 35 53' 22.21" E
34 50' 52.71" N 35 59' 23.50" E
34 43' 31.87" N 35 59' 21.25" E
34 40' 57.18" N 36 04' 33.37" E
34 42' 25.16" N 36 47' 17.55" E
34 32' 56.12" N 36 38' 04.93" E
34 32' 42.00" N 36 45' 08.29" E
34 32' 06.07" N 37 35' 05.57" E
34 31' 17.63" N 37 41' 01.54" E
33 33' 34.31" N 36 18' 22.28" E
33 26' 46.27" N 36 18' 52.61" E
33 32' 20.57" N 36 27' 16.79" E
33 28' 25.37" N 36 06' 56.16" E
33 21' 11.45" N 36 32' 53.60" E
32 59' 34.32" N 36 20' 42.87" E
32 56' 09.83" N 36 12' 37.84" E
32 46' 16.58" N 36 10' 42.73" E
32 42' 05.58" N 36 23' 41.63" E
32 36' 24.93" N 36 14' 45.69" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-3 sites:
SA-5 GAMMON
There are currently 5 active SA-5 sites at the following locations:
35 09' 18.84" N 36 15' 29.51" E
34 57' 23.39" N 36 15' 28.67" E
34 37' 32.98" N 36 46' 18.83" E
33 32' 37.99" N 36 41' 10.92" E
33 10' 48.46" N 36 34' 52.32" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-5 sites:
SA-6 GAINFUL
There are currently 30 active SA-6 sites at the following locations:
34 38' 16.77" N 36 50' 41.08" E
34 38' 50.18" N 36 44' 02.47" E
34 35' 30.41" N 36 42' 54.05" E
34 27' 14.54" N 36 57' 42.26" E
33 54' 31.31" N 36 53' 51.70" E
33 43' 51.05" N 36 44' 58.59" E
33 43' 04.01" N 36 29' 40.89" E
33 45' 39.84" N 36 00' 38.81" E
33 39' 20.57" N 35 57' 31.46" E
33 39' 15.92" N 35 59' 44.30" E
33 38' 32.23" N 36 03' 14.28" E
33 36' 26.82" N 36 05' 22.55" E
33 32' 32.30" N 36 42' 28.88" E
33 37' 06.92" N 36 39' 09.71" E
33 35' 25.10" N 36 34' 18.25" E
33 32' 30.71" N 36 35' 46.14" E
33 28' 14.56" N 36 38' 39.46" E
33 34' 39.70" N 36 12' 16.82" E
33 33' 28.02" N 36 09' 26.14" E
33 24' 21.97" N 36 09' 12.80" E
33 25' 31.15" N 36 06' 44.76" E
33 20' 41.33" N 36 08' 17.10" E
33 18' 53.87" N 36 12' 02.74" E
33 16' 20.55" N 36 09' 56.66" E
33 04' 13.62" N 36 13' 31.90" E
33 03' 29.14" N 36 10' 18.70" E
32 51' 09.39" N 36 12' 03.50" E
32 48' 41.35" N 36 08' 10.67" E
32 47' 41.25" N 36 11' 53.29" E
32 46' 02.93" N 36 05' 53.48" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-6 sites:
EMPTY SITES
There are currently 31 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Syria. These sites have been identified as either SA-2, SA-3, or SA-5 sites, based on their configurations.
Syria's empty SAM sites are located at the following coordinates:
SA-2 36 09' 03.04" N 36 59' 05.75" E
SA-2 35 45' 15.89" N 36 57' 28.80" E
SA-2 35 33' 02.94" N 36 54' 09.67" E
SA-2 35 31' 58.81" N 35 49' 08.27" E
SA-2 35 15' 09.81" N 35 56' 14.41" E
SA-2 35 07' 49.90" N 35 57' 43.20" E
SA-2 34 47' 53.82" N 36 00' 49.81" E
SA-2 34 51' 04.53" N 35 59' 33.97" E
SA-2 34 57' 57.64" N 35 55' 35.07" E
SA-2 34 42' 05.06" N 36 12' 16.26" E
SA-2 34 40' 53.75" N 36 27' 57.81" E
SA-2 34 47' 23.26" N 36 36' 56.66" E
SA-2 34 36' 52.02" N 36 35' 48.04" E
SA-2 34 35' 56.57" N 36 40' 55.83" E
SA-2 34 31' 00.74" N 37 41' 08.36" E
SA-2 34 26' 59.27" N 36 57' 28.76" E
SA-2 33 36' 02.26" N 36 48' 39.67" E
SA-2 33 32' 50.59" N 36 41' 04.93" E
SA-2 33 35' 19.36" N 36 37' 00.77" E
SA-2 33 34' 51.11" N 36 38' 25.80" E
SA-2 33 33' 17.64" N 36 09' 36.82" E
SA-2 33 33' 18.14" N 36 10' 14.71" E
SA-2 33 29' 28.24" N 36 24' 59.08" E
SA-2 33 26' 54.63" N 36 24' 55.35" E
SA-2 32 54' 23.49" N 36 23' 01.42" E
SA-3 36 08' 14.98" N 37 06' 07.48" E
SA-3 35 07' 03.27" N 35 53' 52.17" E
SA-3 34 29' 27.20" N 37 37' 36.67" E
SA-3 34 30' 00.61" N 37 43' 01.38" E
SA-3 33 28' 23.73" N 36 07' 23.69" E
SA-5 32 47' 55.18" N 36 17' 42.85" E
These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.
An overview of empty Syrian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK
The Syrian air defense network would appear to be concentrated in six areas. These areas are around the cities of Hims, Halad, and Damascus, Tiyas air base, the Mediterranean coastal area, and the area adjacent to the Golan Heights. These SAM concentrations are emplaced to defend against obvious potential threat ingress routes. The largest perceived threat to Syrian sovereign airspace is Israeli air force activity. Syria enjoyed a relatively equitable relationship with Iraq, and as such did not see a need to deploy air defense assets in the eastern part of the nation. This "empty" airspace could easily be patrolled by MiG-23, MiG-25, or MiG-29 interceptors if the need arose.
There are important issues with the Syrian SAM network that need to be addressed. The main issue is the nature of the SAM systems themselves. All of the SAM systems in the Syrian inventory have a single-target engagement capability. Some of the SA-5 sites have been noted with multiple SQUARE PAIR engagement radars, allowing those sites to engage multiple targets (one per engagement radar), but the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 sites can only engage one target per site. This leaves the Syrian air defense network open to saturation. Another issue is the employment of the SA-6 in a strategic role tied to fixed sites to provide close-in defense. The SA-6 has been exploited thouroughly by both the American and Israeli militaries and as such cannot be counted on to reliably defend against an airborne threat. The same could be said of the SA-2 and SA-3 SAM systems as well, of course, but the SA-6 suffers from the additional drawback of being constrained to a fixed location. The SA-6 is most effective on the move, whereby it can catch opposing aircraft off-guard by appearing in new locations that were previously undocumented. This may be a part of the Syrian strategy, but for now, the SA-6 remains a stationary target insofar as how it is currently deployed. Syrian reliance on aging and well-known Soviet-era SAM systems is a serious defensive liability. This is certainly part of the impetus behind Syria's current drive to purchase more advanced SAM systems from Russia.
Another important issue to address is the fact that there are two noticeable gaps in Syrian SAM coverage, which can be seen in the overview graphic provided above. While these areas are in fact covered by SA-5 sites, they lack any sort of low-altitude coverage or close-in defense. Approximately midway between Damascus and Hims, and midway between Al Lathqiyah and Halab, are large gaps in the SAM coverage, areas where there are not even identified empty sites where fixed systems such as the SA-2 or SA-3 could be emplaced if needbe. These gaps are not necessarily an invitation to invasion, however, as key targets such as the capital are still heavily defended.
The first area to be examined is the area surrounding the capital of Damascus. Damascus is defended by eight SA-2 sites, five SA-3 sites, and nineteen SA-6 sites. Two of Syria's five active SA-5 sites are also located in close vicinity to the capital. Nine empty dispersal sites are also in the area, providing for an increase in defensive capabilities in the area should the need arise. SAM coverage of the capital is relatively robust even without the addition of further SAM sites, and careful placement of SA-3 and SA-6 batteries provides overlapping close-in defense in conjunction with the longer-range SA-2 sites. A number of the SA-6 sites are also positioned to defend the border area to the west.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Damascus:
Apart from the capital, the most important piece of real estate in Syria may be that in the southwest, adjacent to the Golan Heights. This area is defended by six SA-2 sites, five SA-3 sites, and seven SA-6 sites. One of the SA-5 sites located south of Damascus also can provide coverage of this area. While there are only two identified dispersal sites in the area, the large concentration of SAM systems provides a very well put together air defense network over southwestern Syria. The large number of SA-6 sites is clearly meant to counter the threat posed by Israeli air force fighter aircraft, the SA-6 being more maneuverable and better suited to engaging fast jets than the more strategic-oriented SA-2 and SA-3 systems.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage of southwestern Syria:
The Golan-area SAM network is clearly oriented to provide a sort of barrier air defense against airborne threats ingressing from the west. The same sort of barrier air defense network can be found along Syria's Mediterranean coastline to the north. Extending from Al Lathqiyah to Tartus, five SA-2 and eleven SA-3 sites provide air defense along Syria's northwestern border with the sea. There are also two SA-5 sites in the area to provide long-range air defense over open water. Eight dispersal sites in the area are situated to provide an increase in defensive capability in the area. In the end, however, the current status of Syria's northwestern air defense network is such that it provides an easy point of ingress into the nation's inner territory. By eliminating two SA-2 and one SA-3 sites, an enemy can gain access to Syrian airspace at low level, thereby avoiding an engagement by the SA-5 sites in the area. This leaves the task of intercepting these intruders to the inadequate interceptor force of obsolete MiG-23 and MiG-25 interceptors, along with GCI-constrained early model MiG-29s.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage of Syria's northwestern coastline:
The remainder of Syrian SAM sites are concentrated around the cities of Hims, Hama and Halab, and Tiyas air base in the central portion of the nation. Hims is defended by four SA-2, three SA-3, and four SA-6 sites, with a nearby SA-5 site and five dispersal sites providing added firepower if necessary. Hama is defended by a single SA-2 and a single SA-3 site, with one dispersal site present in the area. Halab is defended by four SA-2 and five SA-3 sites, with three dispersal sites present in the area. Tiyas AB is defended by two SA-2 and two SA-3 sites, with three dispersal sites available if necessary. None of these locations enjoy air defenses nearly as robust or organized as that surrounding Damascus, but they do provide a heightened degree of security and are overlapping and redundant to a limited degree. They may not be able to fend off a full-scale air assault, but they should be able to deal with a limited strike.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Hims:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Hama:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Halab:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Tiyas AB:
CONCLUSION
Syria's SAM network is very robust on paper, and would appear to offer a significant degree of protection at first glance, but this is not necessarily the case. Against a limited opponent, the Syrian air defense network should be able to hold its own. But, the reliance on Soviet-era SAM systems provides a serious handicap when facing a modern opponent. There are also two obvious gaps in the coverage which would need to be filled in order to provide a true barrier air defense capability over the entire western part of the nation. Clearly, it is time for Syria to modernize its air defense network, especially given the recent propensity for Israeli activity over its skies.
SOURCES
-SAM ranges taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.
-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.
Of all the Middle Eastern nations, Syria would appear to have one of the most robust SAM networks. Multiple SAM sites provide redundancy, allowing for overlapping coverage in critical areas and protecting against a loss of capability should one site be eliminated. It should come as no suprise that evidence of a recent illegal incursion into sovereign Syrian airspace by the Israeli air force was found in an area largely undefended by SAM systems.
SAM SYSTEMS
The Syrian air defense network relies primarily on Soviet-era SAM systems. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: SA-2 GUIDELINE, SA-3 GOA, SA-5 GAMMON, and SA-6 GAINFUL.
Currently, there are 97 active SAM sites inside of Syria. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. SA-2 sites are red, SA-3 sites are blue, SA-5 sites are purple, and SA-6 sites are green. Empty sites are denoted by white icons.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Syrian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, SA-2 range rings are red, SA-3 rings are blue, SA-5 rings are purple, and SA-6 rings are green.
SA-2 GUIDELINE
There are currently 30 active SA-2 sites at the following locations:
36 14' 22.60" N 37 18' 23.92" E
36 03' 24.09" N 37 10' 16.04" E
35 57' 13.79" N 37 16' 06.58" E
36 04' 12.06" N 37 20' 29.65" E
35 13' 45.77" N 36 52' 18.48" E
35 40' 24.99" N 35 47' 15.39" E
35 36' 20.83" N 35 51' 56.57" E
35 24' 45.85" N 35 55' 19.86" E
35 10' 04.21" N 36 03' 06.47" E
34 50' 43.56" N 35 54' 54.95" E
34 49' 59.87" N 36 41' 59.26" E
34 40' 20.40" N 36 43' 21.47" E
34 39' 13.58" N 36 44' 35.90" E
34 36' 33.46" N 36 40' 39.68" E
34 27' 00.19" N 37 39' 57.33" E
34 28' 47.08" N 37 37' 50.90" E
33 38' 13.45" N 36 53' 20.08" E
33 32' 50.16" N 36 46' 29.99" E
33 35' 19.54" N 36 37' 06.35" E
33 21' 28.37" N 36 06' 37.49" E
33 29' 53.35" N 36 37' 08.44" E
33 26' 07.02" N 36 30' 53.34" E
33 23' 19.67" N 36 43' 42.86" E
33 17' 01.96" N 36 23' 40.16" E
33 06' 24.58" N 36 36' 45.17" E
33 02' 07.52" N 36 12' 03.35" E
32 49' 52.17" N 36 13' 40.58" E
32 48' 13.79" N 36 19' 30.70" E
32 42' 17.13" N 36 14' 53.99" E
32 35' 52.28" N 36 21' 12.33" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-2 sites:
SA-3 GOA
There are currently 32 active SA-3 sites at the following locations:
36 17' 51.31" N 37 09' 34.63" E
36 13' 16.96" N 37 04' 51.69" E
35 38' 55.23" N 37 06' 48.03" E
36 11' 20.09" N 37 27' 13.60" E
35 58' 49.86" N 37 25' 32.69" E
35 23' 54.14" N 36 54' 02.93" E
35 37' 53.32" N 35 47' 09.01" E
35 33' 48.45" N 35 44' 15.29" E
35 30' 55.46" N 35 48' 58.88" E
35 28' 41.92" N 35 52' 44.63" E
35 19' 52.45" N 35 55' 27.85" E
35 12' 36.57" N 36 15' 24.91" E
35 02' 57.07" N 35 54' 17.33" E
34 55' 08.54" N 35 53' 22.21" E
34 50' 52.71" N 35 59' 23.50" E
34 43' 31.87" N 35 59' 21.25" E
34 40' 57.18" N 36 04' 33.37" E
34 42' 25.16" N 36 47' 17.55" E
34 32' 56.12" N 36 38' 04.93" E
34 32' 42.00" N 36 45' 08.29" E
34 32' 06.07" N 37 35' 05.57" E
34 31' 17.63" N 37 41' 01.54" E
33 33' 34.31" N 36 18' 22.28" E
33 26' 46.27" N 36 18' 52.61" E
33 32' 20.57" N 36 27' 16.79" E
33 28' 25.37" N 36 06' 56.16" E
33 21' 11.45" N 36 32' 53.60" E
32 59' 34.32" N 36 20' 42.87" E
32 56' 09.83" N 36 12' 37.84" E
32 46' 16.58" N 36 10' 42.73" E
32 42' 05.58" N 36 23' 41.63" E
32 36' 24.93" N 36 14' 45.69" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-3 sites:
SA-5 GAMMON
There are currently 5 active SA-5 sites at the following locations:
35 09' 18.84" N 36 15' 29.51" E
34 57' 23.39" N 36 15' 28.67" E
34 37' 32.98" N 36 46' 18.83" E
33 32' 37.99" N 36 41' 10.92" E
33 10' 48.46" N 36 34' 52.32" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-5 sites:
SA-6 GAINFUL
There are currently 30 active SA-6 sites at the following locations:
34 38' 16.77" N 36 50' 41.08" E
34 38' 50.18" N 36 44' 02.47" E
34 35' 30.41" N 36 42' 54.05" E
34 27' 14.54" N 36 57' 42.26" E
33 54' 31.31" N 36 53' 51.70" E
33 43' 51.05" N 36 44' 58.59" E
33 43' 04.01" N 36 29' 40.89" E
33 45' 39.84" N 36 00' 38.81" E
33 39' 20.57" N 35 57' 31.46" E
33 39' 15.92" N 35 59' 44.30" E
33 38' 32.23" N 36 03' 14.28" E
33 36' 26.82" N 36 05' 22.55" E
33 32' 32.30" N 36 42' 28.88" E
33 37' 06.92" N 36 39' 09.71" E
33 35' 25.10" N 36 34' 18.25" E
33 32' 30.71" N 36 35' 46.14" E
33 28' 14.56" N 36 38' 39.46" E
33 34' 39.70" N 36 12' 16.82" E
33 33' 28.02" N 36 09' 26.14" E
33 24' 21.97" N 36 09' 12.80" E
33 25' 31.15" N 36 06' 44.76" E
33 20' 41.33" N 36 08' 17.10" E
33 18' 53.87" N 36 12' 02.74" E
33 16' 20.55" N 36 09' 56.66" E
33 04' 13.62" N 36 13' 31.90" E
33 03' 29.14" N 36 10' 18.70" E
32 51' 09.39" N 36 12' 03.50" E
32 48' 41.35" N 36 08' 10.67" E
32 47' 41.25" N 36 11' 53.29" E
32 46' 02.93" N 36 05' 53.48" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-6 sites:
EMPTY SITES
There are currently 31 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Syria. These sites have been identified as either SA-2, SA-3, or SA-5 sites, based on their configurations.
Syria's empty SAM sites are located at the following coordinates:
SA-2 36 09' 03.04" N 36 59' 05.75" E
SA-2 35 45' 15.89" N 36 57' 28.80" E
SA-2 35 33' 02.94" N 36 54' 09.67" E
SA-2 35 31' 58.81" N 35 49' 08.27" E
SA-2 35 15' 09.81" N 35 56' 14.41" E
SA-2 35 07' 49.90" N 35 57' 43.20" E
SA-2 34 47' 53.82" N 36 00' 49.81" E
SA-2 34 51' 04.53" N 35 59' 33.97" E
SA-2 34 57' 57.64" N 35 55' 35.07" E
SA-2 34 42' 05.06" N 36 12' 16.26" E
SA-2 34 40' 53.75" N 36 27' 57.81" E
SA-2 34 47' 23.26" N 36 36' 56.66" E
SA-2 34 36' 52.02" N 36 35' 48.04" E
SA-2 34 35' 56.57" N 36 40' 55.83" E
SA-2 34 31' 00.74" N 37 41' 08.36" E
SA-2 34 26' 59.27" N 36 57' 28.76" E
SA-2 33 36' 02.26" N 36 48' 39.67" E
SA-2 33 32' 50.59" N 36 41' 04.93" E
SA-2 33 35' 19.36" N 36 37' 00.77" E
SA-2 33 34' 51.11" N 36 38' 25.80" E
SA-2 33 33' 17.64" N 36 09' 36.82" E
SA-2 33 33' 18.14" N 36 10' 14.71" E
SA-2 33 29' 28.24" N 36 24' 59.08" E
SA-2 33 26' 54.63" N 36 24' 55.35" E
SA-2 32 54' 23.49" N 36 23' 01.42" E
SA-3 36 08' 14.98" N 37 06' 07.48" E
SA-3 35 07' 03.27" N 35 53' 52.17" E
SA-3 34 29' 27.20" N 37 37' 36.67" E
SA-3 34 30' 00.61" N 37 43' 01.38" E
SA-3 33 28' 23.73" N 36 07' 23.69" E
SA-5 32 47' 55.18" N 36 17' 42.85" E
These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.
An overview of empty Syrian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK
The Syrian air defense network would appear to be concentrated in six areas. These areas are around the cities of Hims, Halad, and Damascus, Tiyas air base, the Mediterranean coastal area, and the area adjacent to the Golan Heights. These SAM concentrations are emplaced to defend against obvious potential threat ingress routes. The largest perceived threat to Syrian sovereign airspace is Israeli air force activity. Syria enjoyed a relatively equitable relationship with Iraq, and as such did not see a need to deploy air defense assets in the eastern part of the nation. This "empty" airspace could easily be patrolled by MiG-23, MiG-25, or MiG-29 interceptors if the need arose.
There are important issues with the Syrian SAM network that need to be addressed. The main issue is the nature of the SAM systems themselves. All of the SAM systems in the Syrian inventory have a single-target engagement capability. Some of the SA-5 sites have been noted with multiple SQUARE PAIR engagement radars, allowing those sites to engage multiple targets (one per engagement radar), but the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 sites can only engage one target per site. This leaves the Syrian air defense network open to saturation. Another issue is the employment of the SA-6 in a strategic role tied to fixed sites to provide close-in defense. The SA-6 has been exploited thouroughly by both the American and Israeli militaries and as such cannot be counted on to reliably defend against an airborne threat. The same could be said of the SA-2 and SA-3 SAM systems as well, of course, but the SA-6 suffers from the additional drawback of being constrained to a fixed location. The SA-6 is most effective on the move, whereby it can catch opposing aircraft off-guard by appearing in new locations that were previously undocumented. This may be a part of the Syrian strategy, but for now, the SA-6 remains a stationary target insofar as how it is currently deployed. Syrian reliance on aging and well-known Soviet-era SAM systems is a serious defensive liability. This is certainly part of the impetus behind Syria's current drive to purchase more advanced SAM systems from Russia.
Another important issue to address is the fact that there are two noticeable gaps in Syrian SAM coverage, which can be seen in the overview graphic provided above. While these areas are in fact covered by SA-5 sites, they lack any sort of low-altitude coverage or close-in defense. Approximately midway between Damascus and Hims, and midway between Al Lathqiyah and Halab, are large gaps in the SAM coverage, areas where there are not even identified empty sites where fixed systems such as the SA-2 or SA-3 could be emplaced if needbe. These gaps are not necessarily an invitation to invasion, however, as key targets such as the capital are still heavily defended.
The first area to be examined is the area surrounding the capital of Damascus. Damascus is defended by eight SA-2 sites, five SA-3 sites, and nineteen SA-6 sites. Two of Syria's five active SA-5 sites are also located in close vicinity to the capital. Nine empty dispersal sites are also in the area, providing for an increase in defensive capabilities in the area should the need arise. SAM coverage of the capital is relatively robust even without the addition of further SAM sites, and careful placement of SA-3 and SA-6 batteries provides overlapping close-in defense in conjunction with the longer-range SA-2 sites. A number of the SA-6 sites are also positioned to defend the border area to the west.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Damascus:
Apart from the capital, the most important piece of real estate in Syria may be that in the southwest, adjacent to the Golan Heights. This area is defended by six SA-2 sites, five SA-3 sites, and seven SA-6 sites. One of the SA-5 sites located south of Damascus also can provide coverage of this area. While there are only two identified dispersal sites in the area, the large concentration of SAM systems provides a very well put together air defense network over southwestern Syria. The large number of SA-6 sites is clearly meant to counter the threat posed by Israeli air force fighter aircraft, the SA-6 being more maneuverable and better suited to engaging fast jets than the more strategic-oriented SA-2 and SA-3 systems.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage of southwestern Syria:
The Golan-area SAM network is clearly oriented to provide a sort of barrier air defense against airborne threats ingressing from the west. The same sort of barrier air defense network can be found along Syria's Mediterranean coastline to the north. Extending from Al Lathqiyah to Tartus, five SA-2 and eleven SA-3 sites provide air defense along Syria's northwestern border with the sea. There are also two SA-5 sites in the area to provide long-range air defense over open water. Eight dispersal sites in the area are situated to provide an increase in defensive capability in the area. In the end, however, the current status of Syria's northwestern air defense network is such that it provides an easy point of ingress into the nation's inner territory. By eliminating two SA-2 and one SA-3 sites, an enemy can gain access to Syrian airspace at low level, thereby avoiding an engagement by the SA-5 sites in the area. This leaves the task of intercepting these intruders to the inadequate interceptor force of obsolete MiG-23 and MiG-25 interceptors, along with GCI-constrained early model MiG-29s.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage of Syria's northwestern coastline:
The remainder of Syrian SAM sites are concentrated around the cities of Hims, Hama and Halab, and Tiyas air base in the central portion of the nation. Hims is defended by four SA-2, three SA-3, and four SA-6 sites, with a nearby SA-5 site and five dispersal sites providing added firepower if necessary. Hama is defended by a single SA-2 and a single SA-3 site, with one dispersal site present in the area. Halab is defended by four SA-2 and five SA-3 sites, with three dispersal sites present in the area. Tiyas AB is defended by two SA-2 and two SA-3 sites, with three dispersal sites available if necessary. None of these locations enjoy air defenses nearly as robust or organized as that surrounding Damascus, but they do provide a heightened degree of security and are overlapping and redundant to a limited degree. They may not be able to fend off a full-scale air assault, but they should be able to deal with a limited strike.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Hims:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Hama:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Halab:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Tiyas AB:
CONCLUSION
Syria's SAM network is very robust on paper, and would appear to offer a significant degree of protection at first glance, but this is not necessarily the case. Against a limited opponent, the Syrian air defense network should be able to hold its own. But, the reliance on Soviet-era SAM systems provides a serious handicap when facing a modern opponent. There are also two obvious gaps in the coverage which would need to be filled in order to provide a true barrier air defense capability over the entire western part of the nation. Clearly, it is time for Syria to modernize its air defense network, especially given the recent propensity for Israeli activity over its skies.
SOURCES
-SAM ranges taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.
-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.
10 comments:
Clearly, it is time for Syria to modernize it's fascist Baath dictatorship.
Ralph
Good reading as usual Sean. A shout out to Kfdrat. Hope he is doing well.
Fascinating.
Sean, any chance of performing work on the new Russian M1 Tor AA defense now deployed in Iran?
Excellent post Sean... just GREAT...
I hope as mark you will have time and will to elaborate Iran air-defence as situation with Iran is becoming more steamy.
Perhaps an update with regards to the recent Israeli airstrike would be in order.
For those of you who demonstrated an interest, Iran's article is now available. The Tor-M1E systems were not included as they are not yet visible in available imagery.
No need to update this one with regards to the Israeli strike as no SAM defenses were struck, apparently.
I didn't mean to imply that any SAM sites were targeted, although that might be the case. I would love to hear your opinion of how the Israelis seemingly penetrated the Syrians defenses with ease. One article I read said they used a massive jamming effort. I can't wait for more information to come out.
Good work! But you're missing a few potentially important sites thus making your conclusion a bit harsh on what syrian artillery and air defence can really do...
US claims photos show Syrian nuclear reactor
[Published: Thursday 25, October 2007 - 09:17]
By Leonard Doyle in Washington
US security experts have published what they believe to be photographs of a secret nuclear facility in Syria, which was bombed by Israeli jets last month.
Their analysis of satellite images in an area near the river Euphrates reveals what they say are buildings similar to a North Korean nuclear reactor capable of producing fuel for a nuclear bomb. The experts, David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector, and Paul Brannan, from the Institute for Science and International Security (Isis), believe they have found the site that could have been the target of a night-time Israeli raid on 6 September. The Israelis imposed a news blackout on the raid, which prompted speculation that the attack may have been a dry run for a strike on Iran.
In a report released yesterday by Isis, the experts say that commercial satellite imagery of the area shows buildings under construction. The buildings have the same footprint as that of North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, which is capable of producing nuclear material for one bomb a year.
Syria admits co-operating with North Korea but says the two countries have no nuclear co-operation. The site is 100 miles from Syria's border with Iraq and close to an airstrip that would allow for easy transportation of personnel. "I'm pretty convinced that Syria was trying to build a nuclear reactor," Mr Albright told The Washington Post yesterday. However the Isis report said the images "raise as many questions as they answer". Isis is an independent research organisation that follows nuclear weapons production around the world.
A week ago ABC News reported that Israel had recruited a spy to take ground photographs of the reactor construction from inside the complex. Because the building was already covered with a roof, they say, a spy may have been necessary to take photographs from inside the reactor building. The Washington Post has reported that the North Korean-style reactor is built gradually on site and the roof would hide what was inside the building.
The Isis experts suspect that Syria was building a small gas-graphite reactor of about 20-25 megawatts, which is large enough to make about one nuclear weapon's worth of plutonium each year.
Israel, which has an estimated 100 nuclear weapons, has remained silent about the bombing raid. Nor has it provided any justification for its raid on a foreign country. Syria flatly denies having a nuclear programme. But secretly building a nuclear reactor would put Syria in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which all signatories must reveal such decisions.
Syria is reported to be to removing what remains of the site, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is also analysing photographs in an attempt to establish what Syria was up to. The director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, is angry at Syria, the Israelis and Western intelligence agencies for failing to pass on information about the alleged secret nuclear programme.
"We have said, 'If any of you has the slightest information showing that there was anything linked to nuclear, we would of course be happy to investigate it,'" Mr ElBaradei told Le Monde. "Frankly, I venture to hope that before people decide to bombard and use force, they will come and see us to convey their concerns." Mr ElBaradei also warned that efforts to contain nuclear proliferation were endangered by military action.
"The use of force can set things back, but it does not deal with the roots of the problem," he said.
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Dan:
I've recently updated my SAM site database (which you can download on the main page on the right hand side) to take into account some new Syrian SAM site locations that have been found as well as altering some locations which have changed type. Eventually I'll get around to updating this article to reflect those new changes.
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