INTRODUCTION
With the current attention being given to potential Iranian nuclear weapons development, it is prudent to examine the defense posture of the Persian state in light of potential military action. This article will focus on Iran's fixed SAM network. Three different SAM types provide a sporadic, yet still potentially effective, SAM network throughout the nation. Unusual deployment strategies hint at what may be part of a serious deception campaign, possibly providing insight into the apparent lack of serious, integrated ground-based air defense coverage throughout most of the nation.
SAM SYSTEMS
The Iranian air defense network relies on a mixture of Soviet and Western SAM systems. This relatively unusual mix stems from both pre- and post-1979 acquisitions from the West and the Soviet Union, respectively. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: HQ-2 GUIDELINE (a Chinese-produced SA-2 derivative, employing the TIGER SONG engagement radar), HAWK, and SA-5 GAMMON.
Currently, there are 19 active SAM sites inside of Iran. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, and SA-5 sites are purple. Empty sites are denoted by white icons.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Iranian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, and SA-5 sites are purple.
HQ-2 GUIDELINE
There are currently 3 active HQ-2 sites at the following locations:
35 42' 21.53" N 51 04' 42.97" E
33 53' 10.86" N 51 35' 15.42" E
27 10' 17.75" N 56 10' 23.09" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HQ-2 sites:
HAWK
There are currently 10 active HAWK sites at the following locations:
36 13' 19.77" N 59 39' 46.71" E
35 41' 22.10" N 51 16' 08.29" E
35 35' 56.19" N 51 14' 12.97" E
35 30' 54.72" N 51 22' 29.90" E
33 47' 13.71" N 51 42' 02.42" E
32 45' 52.38" N 51 49' 14.90" E
32 25' 15.76" N 48 28' 13.56" E
29 15' 12.54" N 50 18' 19.51" E
28 56' 29.45" N 50 48' 42.66" E
28 54' 10.12" N 50 49' 56.48" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HAWK sites:
SA-5 GAMMON
There are currently 6 active SA-5 sites at the following locations:
35 12' 03.67" N 48 39' 16.69" E
35 18' 20.10" N 51 08' 28.91" E
35 23' 06.05" N 53 44' 22.29" E
32 47' 13.06" N 51 49' 23.00" E
28 57' 03.27" N 50 49' 13.63" E
27 15' 03.44" N 56 23' 27.27" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's SA-5 sites:
EMPTY SITES
There are currently 19 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Iran. These sites have been identified as either HQ-2 or HAWK sites, based on their configurations.
Iran's empty SAM sites are located at the following coordinates:
HQ-2 37 58' 04.83" N 46 10' 40.42" E
HQ-2 37 56' 36.66" N 46 11' 47.59" E
HQ-2 35 30' 24.55" N 51 05' 47.20" E
HQ-2 35 26' 34.93" N 51 23' 00.52" E
HQ-2 31 21' 56.98" N 48 35' 24.41" E
HQ-2 29 35' 11.25" N 52 18' 47.83" E
HQ-2 29 33' 03.87" N 52 25' 07.64" E
HQ-2 28 52' 12.20" N 50 51' 37.87" E
HQ-2 28 52' 04.26" N 50 51' 25.16" E
HAWK 38 02' 45.30" N 46 12' 31.55" E
HAWK 35 34' 07.59" N 51 32' 41.90" E
HAWK 34 58' 12.30" N 50 48' 03.10" E
HAWK 32 44' 34.85" N 51 36' 51.47" E
HAWK 31 17' 07.87" N 47 56' 09.14" E
HAWK 28 50' 05.88" N 50 55' 41.81" E
HAWK 26 48' 20.11" N 53 16' 37.84" E
HAWK 25 52' 21.47" N 55 02' 33.59" E
HAWK 27 13' 36.39" N 56 19' 53.54" E
HAWK 25 27' 15.68" N 60 27' 28.66" E
These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.
An overview of empty Iranian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK
National SA-5 Coverage
The primary means of air defense in Iran, insofar as SAM systems are concerned, is the deployment of six SA-5 GAMMON firing batteries throughout the nation. The three northernmost sites are positioned to defend the northern border and the region surrounding the capital of Tehran. A fourth site is situated to defend facilities in and around Esfahan in central Iran, including the Natanz nuclear facility. The last two sites are situated at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr and provide coverage over the Straits of Hormuz and the northern half of the Persian Gulf, respectively.
The northern three SA-5 sites, as well as the southern two sites, are well positioned to provide air defense outside Iran's borders to deter any inbound aggressor from approaching the ADIZ. The central site near Esfahan is a curiosity, however. The southern and western portions of the coverage area are limited due to the presence of a good deal of mountainous terrain, in some cases 10,000 feet or more higher than the terrain where Esfahan is located. This also affects the remaining five sites, but they are affected to a lesser degree due to the fact that they are positioned to defend outwards towards the border and beyond, not likely intended to defend against targets operating deep within Iranian airspace. The Esfahan site, in direct contrast, is apparently situated to defend a central portion of the nation, and as such is limited in its effectiveness by the aforementioned terrain considerations. The curiosity lies in positioning a long-range SAM system in such a fashion to apparently purposely limit its effectiveness. This can be overlooked to a small degree as the SA-5 is not necessarily a choice system when it comes to engaging low-altitude targets, but the terrain in the area would seem to greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Esfahan site. The radar horizon is the key issue here, as each piece of terrain situated higher than the engagement radar will carve a significant portion out of the system's field of view and limit its ability to provide widespread coverage.
Iranian SA-5 sites are also purposely limited in their composition. Each site consists, unusually, of one 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radar and two launch rails. For more information on this unusual practice, reference the following article on this site analyzing S-200 site layouts worldwide: LINK
Point Defense
The remainder of Iran's SAM sites are positioned in a point defense strategy to provide coverage of key areas in the nation. There are four key areas defended by shorter-range systems: Tehran, Esfahan, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. All of these areas are also covered by SA-5 sites, which are co-located in some instances, providing a degree of overlapping coverage in these locations.
The capital city of Tehran is defended by three HAWK sites and a solitary HQ-2 battery. There are three empty sites in the area. The outer two sites are prepared HQ-2 sites, while the inner site to the east is a prepared HAWK site. Were the empty sites to be occupied, they would form an inner HAWK barrier and an outer HQ-2 barrier oriented to defend against threats from the west and south. This layout may be a legacy leftover from the Iran-Iraq War. An SA-5 site is also in the vicinity, and the other two SA-5 sites to the east and west also provide limited coverage of the capital.
The following image depicts SAM coverage of Tehran:
There are two HAWK sites and one HQ-2 site in the vicinity of Esfahan. One of the HAWK sites, as well as the SA-5 site in the area, are located on the grounds of Esfahan AB, with the HAWK site likely situated to provide point defense of the airbase. The HQ-2 site and the remaining HAWK site are located near Kashan approximately 120 kilometers to the north. These sites provide point defense for the nuclear facility at Natanz. An empty HAWK site is also located in Esfahan proper, likely representing a dispersal site for the battery at Esfahan AB.
The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Esfahan:
The Bushehr region, which contains a key nuclear facility, is defended by three HAWK sites. Two HAWK sites are located on the grounds of the Bushehr military comples, with a third site being located offshore on Khark Island. Bushehr AB is also home to an SA-5 battery. There are two unoccupied HQ-2 sites and a single unoccupied HAWK site in the area as well. The unoccupied sites are situated around the nuclear complex, perhaps suggesting that any weapons-related work has been moved from the facility to one of the various inland nuclear research and development locations such as Natanz. This would appear to be a sensible course of action given the serious vulnerability of the coastal Bushehr nuclear facility to enemy activity approaching from the Persian Gulf region.
The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Bushehr:
Bandar Abbas, home to the bulk of the Iranian Navy including the deadly Kilo SSK fleet, is defended by one HQ-2 battery and one HAWK battery. There is an empty HAWK site in the area, as well as an SA-5 site.
The following image depicts SAM coverage of Bandar Abbas:
Defending the Straits
The SA-5 sites located in the vicinity of both Bushehr and Bandar Abbas provide Iran with a significant air defense capability over not only a good portion of the Persian Gulf, but also over the critical Straits of Hormuz. This SAM coverage, which can be further expanded thanks to the presence of unoccupied, prepared HAWK sites on the islands of Abu Musa and Lavan, allows Iran to provide increased air defense in conjunction with fighter aircraft to protect any naval operations in the region, including the potentially catastrophic mining of the Straits of Hormuz.
Air Defense Issues
The problem with Iran's SAM network is the apparent over-reliance on the SA-5 system to provide air defense over most of the nation. The SA-5 is certainly a threat to ISR aircraft such as the U-2R or E-3, but the primary threat which Iran must consider is that of standoff cruise missiles and strike aircraft featuring comprehensive EW suites. Against these types of low-RCS or maneuverable targets, the SA-5 cannot be counted upon to be effective. Libyan SA-5 systems proved completely ineffective against USN and USAFE strike aircraft in 1986, and the Iranian SA-5s would certainly fare no better in a much more modern air combat environment.
As mentioned previously, the remainder of the air defense network is primarily situated to provide point defense and as such does not represent a serious threat to a dedicated and sophisticated enemy. Even lesser-equipped nations would be able to explot the various gaps and vulnerabilities in the network provided the SA-5s could be neutralized in some fashion, be it through ECM, technical capability, or direct attack.
This raises the question of the importance of SAM systems to Iran's air defense network. Given the current deployment strategy, the small number of sites, and the capability of the systems themselves, it is likely that Iran places more importance on the fighter force as an air defense element. This would explain the continued efforts to retain an operational fleet of F-14A interceptors. The short range of the HQ-2 and HAWK systems, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the SA-5 to deal with low-RCS targets, also explains the reports regarding Iranian attempts to purchase advanced SAM systems from Russia.
It is possible that Iran simply does not feel that a more robust SAM network is necessary. Given the aforementioned terrain constraints in some areas of the nation, as well as the lack of a large number of what may be regarded by the Iranian government as potential critical targets inside of Iran, the Persian nation may have simply taken a minimalist posture, relying on the SA-5 for long-range defense and the other systems as point defense weapons to defend Iran's critical military and political infrastructure.
Another reason for the lack of deployed SAM systems could be that the shorter-ranged HQ-2 and HAWK systems are no longer viewed as being effective enough to warrant widespread use. HQ-2 sites are currently 25% occupied, with HAWK sites being 50% occupied, perhaps signifying more faith in the HAWK system but still demonstrating a potential overall trend of perceived non-reliability. Iran does have reason to suspect the reliability of the HAWK SAM system against a Western opponent, as the missile was an American product and has been in widespread use throughout the West for decades. The HQ-2, however, should be regarded as potentially more reliable, as it is not a standard (and widely exploited) SA-2 but rather a Chinese-produced weapon with which the West should have a lesser degree of familiarity insofar as electronic performance, if not physical performance, is concerned.
A high ratio of unoccupied sites could be due to financial reasons (lack of operating funds may have resulted in a number of batteries placed in storage) or simple attrition (they may have been expended or destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War), of course, but those facets of the equation cannot be examined through imagery analysis alone. It should be mentioned that one possible source of attrition for the HQ-2 system is the conversion of many missiles to Mushak SSMs to complement CSS-8 SSMs (HQ-2 derivatives) obtained from China. Many batteries may also be out of service for modification to Sayyad-1 standard, which represents a modification of the HQ-2 design with some indigenous components.
CONCLUSION
On the surface, Iran's ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the six SA-5 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals a network which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian SAM network is obviously in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran's SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form or defense against a modern agressor. Given the current political climate, it would be in the best interest of the Iranian military to proceed with a widespread upgrade, with the most effective option being the purchase of S-300PMU-2 or S-400 SAM systems for Russia, or perhaps the more cost-effective and similarly capable HQ-9 SAM system from China. Incorporating either purchase into a package deal with modern fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MK or J-10 would result in a much more robust air defense network overall.
SOURCES
-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of Iran and may not represent the entire air defense network. Tor-M1E units, for example, are known to be present, but are not yet visible in available imagery.
-Iranian Military Guide
-SAM ranges used to construct the range rings were taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.
-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.
With the current attention being given to potential Iranian nuclear weapons development, it is prudent to examine the defense posture of the Persian state in light of potential military action. This article will focus on Iran's fixed SAM network. Three different SAM types provide a sporadic, yet still potentially effective, SAM network throughout the nation. Unusual deployment strategies hint at what may be part of a serious deception campaign, possibly providing insight into the apparent lack of serious, integrated ground-based air defense coverage throughout most of the nation.
SAM SYSTEMS
The Iranian air defense network relies on a mixture of Soviet and Western SAM systems. This relatively unusual mix stems from both pre- and post-1979 acquisitions from the West and the Soviet Union, respectively. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: HQ-2 GUIDELINE (a Chinese-produced SA-2 derivative, employing the TIGER SONG engagement radar), HAWK, and SA-5 GAMMON.
Currently, there are 19 active SAM sites inside of Iran. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, and SA-5 sites are purple. Empty sites are denoted by white icons.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Iranian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, and SA-5 sites are purple.
HQ-2 GUIDELINE
There are currently 3 active HQ-2 sites at the following locations:
35 42' 21.53" N 51 04' 42.97" E
33 53' 10.86" N 51 35' 15.42" E
27 10' 17.75" N 56 10' 23.09" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HQ-2 sites:
HAWK
There are currently 10 active HAWK sites at the following locations:
36 13' 19.77" N 59 39' 46.71" E
35 41' 22.10" N 51 16' 08.29" E
35 35' 56.19" N 51 14' 12.97" E
35 30' 54.72" N 51 22' 29.90" E
33 47' 13.71" N 51 42' 02.42" E
32 45' 52.38" N 51 49' 14.90" E
32 25' 15.76" N 48 28' 13.56" E
29 15' 12.54" N 50 18' 19.51" E
28 56' 29.45" N 50 48' 42.66" E
28 54' 10.12" N 50 49' 56.48" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HAWK sites:
SA-5 GAMMON
There are currently 6 active SA-5 sites at the following locations:
35 12' 03.67" N 48 39' 16.69" E
35 18' 20.10" N 51 08' 28.91" E
35 23' 06.05" N 53 44' 22.29" E
32 47' 13.06" N 51 49' 23.00" E
28 57' 03.27" N 50 49' 13.63" E
27 15' 03.44" N 56 23' 27.27" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's SA-5 sites:
EMPTY SITES
There are currently 19 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Iran. These sites have been identified as either HQ-2 or HAWK sites, based on their configurations.
Iran's empty SAM sites are located at the following coordinates:
HQ-2 37 58' 04.83" N 46 10' 40.42" E
HQ-2 37 56' 36.66" N 46 11' 47.59" E
HQ-2 35 30' 24.55" N 51 05' 47.20" E
HQ-2 35 26' 34.93" N 51 23' 00.52" E
HQ-2 31 21' 56.98" N 48 35' 24.41" E
HQ-2 29 35' 11.25" N 52 18' 47.83" E
HQ-2 29 33' 03.87" N 52 25' 07.64" E
HQ-2 28 52' 12.20" N 50 51' 37.87" E
HQ-2 28 52' 04.26" N 50 51' 25.16" E
HAWK 38 02' 45.30" N 46 12' 31.55" E
HAWK 35 34' 07.59" N 51 32' 41.90" E
HAWK 34 58' 12.30" N 50 48' 03.10" E
HAWK 32 44' 34.85" N 51 36' 51.47" E
HAWK 31 17' 07.87" N 47 56' 09.14" E
HAWK 28 50' 05.88" N 50 55' 41.81" E
HAWK 26 48' 20.11" N 53 16' 37.84" E
HAWK 25 52' 21.47" N 55 02' 33.59" E
HAWK 27 13' 36.39" N 56 19' 53.54" E
HAWK 25 27' 15.68" N 60 27' 28.66" E
These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.
An overview of empty Iranian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK
National SA-5 Coverage
The primary means of air defense in Iran, insofar as SAM systems are concerned, is the deployment of six SA-5 GAMMON firing batteries throughout the nation. The three northernmost sites are positioned to defend the northern border and the region surrounding the capital of Tehran. A fourth site is situated to defend facilities in and around Esfahan in central Iran, including the Natanz nuclear facility. The last two sites are situated at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr and provide coverage over the Straits of Hormuz and the northern half of the Persian Gulf, respectively.
The northern three SA-5 sites, as well as the southern two sites, are well positioned to provide air defense outside Iran's borders to deter any inbound aggressor from approaching the ADIZ. The central site near Esfahan is a curiosity, however. The southern and western portions of the coverage area are limited due to the presence of a good deal of mountainous terrain, in some cases 10,000 feet or more higher than the terrain where Esfahan is located. This also affects the remaining five sites, but they are affected to a lesser degree due to the fact that they are positioned to defend outwards towards the border and beyond, not likely intended to defend against targets operating deep within Iranian airspace. The Esfahan site, in direct contrast, is apparently situated to defend a central portion of the nation, and as such is limited in its effectiveness by the aforementioned terrain considerations. The curiosity lies in positioning a long-range SAM system in such a fashion to apparently purposely limit its effectiveness. This can be overlooked to a small degree as the SA-5 is not necessarily a choice system when it comes to engaging low-altitude targets, but the terrain in the area would seem to greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Esfahan site. The radar horizon is the key issue here, as each piece of terrain situated higher than the engagement radar will carve a significant portion out of the system's field of view and limit its ability to provide widespread coverage.
Iranian SA-5 sites are also purposely limited in their composition. Each site consists, unusually, of one 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radar and two launch rails. For more information on this unusual practice, reference the following article on this site analyzing S-200 site layouts worldwide: LINK
Point Defense
The remainder of Iran's SAM sites are positioned in a point defense strategy to provide coverage of key areas in the nation. There are four key areas defended by shorter-range systems: Tehran, Esfahan, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. All of these areas are also covered by SA-5 sites, which are co-located in some instances, providing a degree of overlapping coverage in these locations.
The capital city of Tehran is defended by three HAWK sites and a solitary HQ-2 battery. There are three empty sites in the area. The outer two sites are prepared HQ-2 sites, while the inner site to the east is a prepared HAWK site. Were the empty sites to be occupied, they would form an inner HAWK barrier and an outer HQ-2 barrier oriented to defend against threats from the west and south. This layout may be a legacy leftover from the Iran-Iraq War. An SA-5 site is also in the vicinity, and the other two SA-5 sites to the east and west also provide limited coverage of the capital.
The following image depicts SAM coverage of Tehran:
There are two HAWK sites and one HQ-2 site in the vicinity of Esfahan. One of the HAWK sites, as well as the SA-5 site in the area, are located on the grounds of Esfahan AB, with the HAWK site likely situated to provide point defense of the airbase. The HQ-2 site and the remaining HAWK site are located near Kashan approximately 120 kilometers to the north. These sites provide point defense for the nuclear facility at Natanz. An empty HAWK site is also located in Esfahan proper, likely representing a dispersal site for the battery at Esfahan AB.
The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Esfahan:
The Bushehr region, which contains a key nuclear facility, is defended by three HAWK sites. Two HAWK sites are located on the grounds of the Bushehr military comples, with a third site being located offshore on Khark Island. Bushehr AB is also home to an SA-5 battery. There are two unoccupied HQ-2 sites and a single unoccupied HAWK site in the area as well. The unoccupied sites are situated around the nuclear complex, perhaps suggesting that any weapons-related work has been moved from the facility to one of the various inland nuclear research and development locations such as Natanz. This would appear to be a sensible course of action given the serious vulnerability of the coastal Bushehr nuclear facility to enemy activity approaching from the Persian Gulf region.
The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Bushehr:
Bandar Abbas, home to the bulk of the Iranian Navy including the deadly Kilo SSK fleet, is defended by one HQ-2 battery and one HAWK battery. There is an empty HAWK site in the area, as well as an SA-5 site.
The following image depicts SAM coverage of Bandar Abbas:
Defending the Straits
The SA-5 sites located in the vicinity of both Bushehr and Bandar Abbas provide Iran with a significant air defense capability over not only a good portion of the Persian Gulf, but also over the critical Straits of Hormuz. This SAM coverage, which can be further expanded thanks to the presence of unoccupied, prepared HAWK sites on the islands of Abu Musa and Lavan, allows Iran to provide increased air defense in conjunction with fighter aircraft to protect any naval operations in the region, including the potentially catastrophic mining of the Straits of Hormuz.
Air Defense Issues
The problem with Iran's SAM network is the apparent over-reliance on the SA-5 system to provide air defense over most of the nation. The SA-5 is certainly a threat to ISR aircraft such as the U-2R or E-3, but the primary threat which Iran must consider is that of standoff cruise missiles and strike aircraft featuring comprehensive EW suites. Against these types of low-RCS or maneuverable targets, the SA-5 cannot be counted upon to be effective. Libyan SA-5 systems proved completely ineffective against USN and USAFE strike aircraft in 1986, and the Iranian SA-5s would certainly fare no better in a much more modern air combat environment.
As mentioned previously, the remainder of the air defense network is primarily situated to provide point defense and as such does not represent a serious threat to a dedicated and sophisticated enemy. Even lesser-equipped nations would be able to explot the various gaps and vulnerabilities in the network provided the SA-5s could be neutralized in some fashion, be it through ECM, technical capability, or direct attack.
This raises the question of the importance of SAM systems to Iran's air defense network. Given the current deployment strategy, the small number of sites, and the capability of the systems themselves, it is likely that Iran places more importance on the fighter force as an air defense element. This would explain the continued efforts to retain an operational fleet of F-14A interceptors. The short range of the HQ-2 and HAWK systems, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the SA-5 to deal with low-RCS targets, also explains the reports regarding Iranian attempts to purchase advanced SAM systems from Russia.
It is possible that Iran simply does not feel that a more robust SAM network is necessary. Given the aforementioned terrain constraints in some areas of the nation, as well as the lack of a large number of what may be regarded by the Iranian government as potential critical targets inside of Iran, the Persian nation may have simply taken a minimalist posture, relying on the SA-5 for long-range defense and the other systems as point defense weapons to defend Iran's critical military and political infrastructure.
Another reason for the lack of deployed SAM systems could be that the shorter-ranged HQ-2 and HAWK systems are no longer viewed as being effective enough to warrant widespread use. HQ-2 sites are currently 25% occupied, with HAWK sites being 50% occupied, perhaps signifying more faith in the HAWK system but still demonstrating a potential overall trend of perceived non-reliability. Iran does have reason to suspect the reliability of the HAWK SAM system against a Western opponent, as the missile was an American product and has been in widespread use throughout the West for decades. The HQ-2, however, should be regarded as potentially more reliable, as it is not a standard (and widely exploited) SA-2 but rather a Chinese-produced weapon with which the West should have a lesser degree of familiarity insofar as electronic performance, if not physical performance, is concerned.
A high ratio of unoccupied sites could be due to financial reasons (lack of operating funds may have resulted in a number of batteries placed in storage) or simple attrition (they may have been expended or destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War), of course, but those facets of the equation cannot be examined through imagery analysis alone. It should be mentioned that one possible source of attrition for the HQ-2 system is the conversion of many missiles to Mushak SSMs to complement CSS-8 SSMs (HQ-2 derivatives) obtained from China. Many batteries may also be out of service for modification to Sayyad-1 standard, which represents a modification of the HQ-2 design with some indigenous components.
CONCLUSION
On the surface, Iran's ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the six SA-5 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals a network which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian SAM network is obviously in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran's SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form or defense against a modern agressor. Given the current political climate, it would be in the best interest of the Iranian military to proceed with a widespread upgrade, with the most effective option being the purchase of S-300PMU-2 or S-400 SAM systems for Russia, or perhaps the more cost-effective and similarly capable HQ-9 SAM system from China. Incorporating either purchase into a package deal with modern fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MK or J-10 would result in a much more robust air defense network overall.
SOURCES
-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of Iran and may not represent the entire air defense network. Tor-M1E units, for example, are known to be present, but are not yet visible in available imagery.
-Iranian Military Guide
-SAM ranges used to construct the range rings were taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.
-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.
8 comments:
Excellent as usual Sean!
Im rather astonished by the lack of interest in air-defence systems by Iranian govrement concerning threat they are facing. Thay have small quantities of stone age air-defence systems with holes in it like Swich cheese and same can be said for theirs airforce.
I guess several bateries of even older S-300PMU1/FT-2000 systems linked with dozen MIG-31( R-37M missile ) would make things a bit complicated with extensive use of SARH missile guidance.
Syrian airdefence is mutch mutch more dense althrow with same or slightly newer systems.
I guess in exchange for a oil field or two they could buy enought moder weapons to make rise some eyebrow in Pentagon because like this it seems that braking Iran is childs game.
I tought to see some rings of S-300PMU system belived to be delivered by Russia to Iran in 90-ies...you dont think Iran has it?
Sean that's very impressive work!
But this is getting a bit ridiculous, what is the point of having an air defence if you can spot it so easily? Do Iranian generals know this? Aren't these systems mobile..also how would you know if these are real or fake targets/decoys?
The Iranians have probably drawn conclusions from the two American wars in Iraq, the Iran-Iraq war, the US air war against Serbia and the Israeli-Syrian wars.
The air defense virtues of Iran's F-14A fighters seem to have provided the best results against enemy aerial intrusion during the Iran-Iraq war. Hence their efforts at refurbishment, and apparent disdain for Russian built alternatives.
Also, the relatively poor performance from Russian (and Chinese) SAM's described in this survey suggest the reason for Iran's reluctance to further invest in said systems. They really haven't been terribly effective against US and Israeli efforts at direct targeting. I agree with Sean's comments concerning the aging HAWK system.
Regarding the Esfahan site, it is possible that while the terrain carves out a significant portion from the system's field of view, it may be thought that the same applies to an aggressor, somewhat improving the odds of survival and scoring a successful hit. (This is only a guess.)
The Tor-M1E is an interesting choice as an upgrade for Iran's SAM capability. Should a war be imposed upon Iran from the US and/or Israel, I believe it would mark the combat debut of this air defense system. Also, it would be illuminating to examine this new systems' exact whereabouts of deployment in Iran.
One last note. Iran's overall defense strategy does not include taking on the US in an even, head to head manner. This is impossible. Iran's overall strategy of defense is deterrence, in the form of making any war imposed upon it too destructive in the region, in terms of strikes against US and Gulf targets, both military and economic. These strikes include the potential use of ballistic and cruise missile systems.
Thanks for the fine work, Sean. Any chance of locating and reviewing select Iranian naval and air force assets? These are sure to be targeted in any breakout of hostilities between the US and Iran.
Actually the Iranians used the Tomcats as ad-hoc AWACS against the Iraqi air force and they tried to avoid WVR engagement whit more agile fighters that downed some Tomcats (i.e. MiG-21). Obviously this will not work against an American attack. The Iranians probably assumed that, sooner or later, they will loose its AA network so they concentrated just in point defense with Tor-M1 as “Tomahawk hunters” and rely on retaliatory strikes as a deterrence tool. So the will provably launch some MRBM to sensitive oil facilities in Arabia and try to sink as many tankers as possible hoping to cause an “oil hypoxia” on western economies. Nightmare scenario for some oil-dependant countries that will be confronted with a US$ 150/barril possibility.
Actually, IRIAF F-14's successfully shot down a number of MiG-21 fighters. The greatest threat to the Tomcat came from the Mirage F 1EQ, equipped with Super 530D missiles. You're correct, the AWG-9 was effective as an "ad-hoc" AWACS, for Tomcats flying Combat Air Patrol. It must also be conceded that, in general, IrAF pilots were no match for their IRIAF counterparts during the Iran-Iraq War.
Obviously, Iran has no chance of defeating outright a concerted US air strike campaign. However, it's possible that their point defense could prove more effective in scoring hits and kills upon intruding aggressors, than previous attempts by Iraqi, Serbian and Syrian air defenses.
Iranian ballistic and cruise missile technology should not be automatically dismissed, if a repeat of the Israeli Navy's failure during the 2nd Lebanon War is to be avoided.
Ken:
"what is the point of having an air defence if you can spot it so easily? Do Iranian generals know this?"
They can be spotted easily using ELINT systems as well when they are active, and most of these systems need large, prepared sites, so they're hard to hide anwyay.
"Aren't these systems mobile..also how would you know if these are real or fake targets/decoys?"
Identification of real vs. decoy sites would likely be done using ELINT systems. If site A has a SQUARE PAIR radar that is radiating and site B does not, then site B is likely a decoy site. That doesn't help for looking at imagery though, so I have to go with what I have!
The fact is that no matter how advanced a system Iran buys firstly it cannot be a match for the US air force (even if we shoot down 100 of their planes they still have a few 1000s left and can replace them quickly too!) and secondly no defence system can cover all Iran because of the mountainous nature of the country. There is also no need to spend lots of money to defend the desert and small farming towns and villages! I don’t think that America comes all the way to Iran to bomb our desert or farms or villages! And even if we spend all our money on a fool proof defence system there is no guarantee that such system will be a deterrent for the USA.
The best defence strategy is exactly what the Iranian government has adapted; namely making the outcome of a war too unpredictable and expensive for the USA by expanding the war to US interests in the region (including Israel and maybe even beyond). The fact is that we cannot win a conventional war with the USA but we will have a good chance with militia wars because as we know traditional armies are hopeless against militias (and that is why Iran’s main emphasis is on the Bassij and Revolutionary Guards (and USA’s main concerns also are these two groups)).
So in conclusion, in my humble opinion instead of spending lots of money on a defence system that may not even do its job, we should spend a fraction of the cost of such defence system on our militias (better training and equipments) and our friends and allies in the region (and beyond).
You know whats funny?..
I feel the need to say this.. Its funny that even after the jews prove to the world how much they have contributed to the advancement of mankind, people still believe to eagerly type something negative about the jews on the media.. Why? No no REALLY why?? Im not saying that they are perfect and error-less. everybody has their own defects but seriously, if you really look at the big picture, the world and everything in it, you would most definitely see that it is quite foolish to speak in such ways about the jews.. If anybody needs some more info about if the jews werent here, then I can tell them exactly what kind of world this would have been without them.. Oh by the way, did you know that the little camera on your cell phone was invented in Israel by the jews.. Funny isnt it :)
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