INTRODUCTION
Part 3 of this series focuses on future developments in the field of Russian Strategic Defense. The previous two entries are still available:
Part 1: The S-300P
Part 2: The ABM Network
THE S-400
The next generation SAM system being trialled by the Russian military is the Almaz-Antey S-400 Trieumf (Triumph; SA-X-21). The S-400 represents the latest iteration of the S-300P SAM system. The S-400 may have originally been designated S-300PM-3 due to the relationship with the older system. The 48N6DM used by the S-400 is a derivative of the S-300PM-2's 48N6D missile, and the S-400 will be able to employ the 9M96 series of SAMs as well. The largest changes to the S-400 when compared to the more dated S-300P variants are the inclusion of the new GRAVE STONE target engagement radar, and the inclusion of the new 40N6 400 kilometer range missile. GRAVE STONE is said to give the S-400 an anti-stealth capability. With the 40N6, 48N6DM, and 9M96, the S-400 will represent a very capable SAM system able to engage a variety of targets at various ranges.
The S-400 is due to enter operational service in the summer of 2007, with the first battery being employed near Elektrostal, outside of Moscow as part of the capital city's SAM defense network. Work on the 40N6 missile is still progressing, and this weapon is to be incorporated into the S-400 batteries as early as 2008. Until then, the S-400 will remain little more than yet another incremental upgrade to the S-300P family.
SAMODERZHETS
Later versions of the S-400 system will most likely be of the Samoderzhets family. With the merger of Almaz and Antey a few years ago, a whole wealth of SAM experience was merged, and Samoderzhets will be the first hardware example of that merger. Samoderzhets will be an S-400 system incorporating a towed TEL carrying two 9M82M (SA-X-23 GIANT) ATBMs. This will provide a far more robust ATBM capability for an S-400 battery, and potentially increase the export value of the system as well.
OTHER SAM DEVELOPMENTS
There are two other SAM systems under development for future use, the S-500 and the S-1000. The S-500 has been described as an S-300P follow-on system. The S-500 will likely not enter development for some time, and will represent the next generation of Russian SAM systems, perhaps finally breaking out of the S-300P family's mold. The S-1000 has been described as a follow-on to the S-300V system. The S-1000 may enter development earlier than the S-500, as there is no "S-400 equivalent" being pursued for the Russian S-300V systems. The Antey-2500 and Antey-2500D appear targeted at the export market only, and the upgraded S-300VM and S-300VM-1 appear to be non-starters for domestic use as well, although their technology and 9M82M/M1 missiles may filter down to the Samoderzhets system. In reality, the S-1000 may represent a THAAD-style system, or with the merger of Almaz and Antey the S-500 and S-1000 may be replaced by a single system useable for both roles, along the lines of Samdoerzhets.
ABM DEVELOPMENTS
Much less work appears to be underway on the ABM front. There have been rumors of a new ABM interceptor being developed, desugnated 45T6, but nothing more is known about this system. It would logically be a replacement for the Fakel 51T6 exoatmospheric interceptors, as these have recently been taken out of service.
Most of the ABM work underway is in the radar field. The aforementioned Voronezh-DM radar (see Part 2) is the latest BMEW LPAR design, and is currently under construction at two sites.
Beyond that, very little work appears to be underway regarding future ABM components. Sary Shagan is still an actively-used ABM test range, as evidenced by a recent 53T6 test launch, but there does not appear to be any significant R&D activity ongoing. That could be due to the existance of the test range outside Russian territory; ABM development may be moved to Kapustin Yar, Ashuluk, or another test range in the future to keep it "in house".
THE FUTURE
What is the future of the Russian strategic defense network? With an active, operational ABM system, and a robust SAM network, the future may not be as important as the present. That is to say that money may be better spent upgrading current systems and keeping them viable for the next 10-15 years, before beginning development on the next generation of strategic defense systems.
SOURCE MATERIAL
The following sources were consulted in the preparation of this report:
Globalsecurity's Russian BMD page
Pavel Podvig's blog
Russian language website on ABM systems
ABM and Space Defense
1999 US Senate Hearings on ABMs and Missile Defense
Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (various years)
Jane's Land-based Air Defence (various years)
Fakel's Missiles (Moscow, 2003)
Various posters at Secret Projects, in particular Overscan, Meteorit, and Muxel, provided a good debate about the topic and provided the inspiration for this project. Thanks also to Trident for the Lake Balkhash thing!
All overhead imagery is provided courtesy of Google Earth.
Saturday, June 16, 2007
Sunday, June 10, 2007
Russian Strategic Defense - Part 2, The ABM Network
INTRODUCTION
The 1950's saw the introduction of a new form of nuclear delivery system into the dynamics of the growing Cold War: the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). A new, secret arms race was about to begin. While the development and deployment of ICBMs was well known on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet government was beginning a top secret research and development program designed to counter the growing American ICBM threat. That R&D program aimed to develop the world's first effective anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.
ABM systems were not a new idea. As far back as 1946, the United States had began to research ABM systems capable of intercepting short-range weapons akin to the German V-2 of World War 2. In 1948, the USSR's NII-4 research institute began to study ABM concepts. By 1953, senior ranking officers in the Soviet military were requesting that the Central Committee of the Communist Party to consider developing an ABM system to counter the threat of American ICBMs. The USSR's Council of Ministers authorized the development of an ABM system on the 17th of August, 1956. The seeds for the first operational ABM system in the world were finally planted after nearly a decade of research.
SYSTEM A
The first task for the Soviet defense complex was to develop and test a trial system to validate the concept of an ABM weapon system. The test range was constructed at Sary Shagan on the shores of Lake Balkhash in present-day Kazakhstan. Sary Shagan remains the primary R&D and test center for Russian ABM systems to this day, with the site being leased from the Kazakh government.
The trial ABM system was designated System A, and construction began in 1959. System A consisted of a series of components spread across the Sary Shagan test range, connected via a radio-relay network. The Dunai-2 (HEN ROOST) radar was developed for System A and placed along the shore of Lake Balkhash. Dunai-2 was a 1200 kilometer range early warning radar designed to acquire the inbound targets for the system, and had been developed after the successful trials of the Dunai-1 proof of concept radar. The Dunai-2 radar set was later replaced by the Dunai-3UP (TOP ROOST) radar, a trial version of the 5N11 Dunai-3U (DOG HOUSE) radar later employed by the A-35 (ABM-1) ABM system. The Dunai-2 and Dunai-3 both employed separate transmitter and receiver arrays. The transmitter arrays were located at 45°56'49.67"N 73°37'51.75"E, with the receiver arrays being located at 45°56'09.98"N 73°37'43.45"E. These arrays have been dismantled, but the adjacent control buildings are still present on the range at Sary Shagan (see below).
OKB Fakel's V-1000 was the ABM interceptor used by System A for the test series. The V-1000 was a two-stage weapon, and was launched from fixed rail launchers. Command guidance was used to guide the missile to the target and detonate the warhead. RSV-PR (HEN NEST) and RTN (HEN EGG) acquisition and tracking radars guided the V-1000 to intercept. The V-1000 had a range of 300 kilometers and could reach an altitude of 25,000 meters. Initially, high-explosive warheads were fitted to the V-1000 interceptors. The warheads contained 16,000 carbide-tungsten balls embedded in a TNT filling. The warhead would be command detonated into a disc-shaped fragment field.
The first successful intercept of a ballistic missile was conducted on 24 November, 1960, but a live warhead was not fitted. On the 4th of March in 1961, the first successful intercept of an R-12 (SS-4 SANDAL) IRBM with a V-1000 fitted with a live warhead was performed. Over the course of the test series, there were 11 successful intercepts of inbound targets, including the destruction of an R-5 (SS-3 SHYSTER) SRBM's warhead section 22 days after the first successful intercept. Various iterations of the V-1000 ABM were also trialled, including the IR-guided S2TA variant, and the optically and radar fuzed nuclear armed R2TA and G2TA variants. One of the most interesting test programs involved subjecting the components of System A to high-altitude nuclear detonations. Operation K consisted of five nuclear detonations between 80 and 300 kilometers in altitude, and these events proved to have no effect on the functionality of System A. System A was also used to validate anti-ABM defenses for Soviet ICBMs, including the Kaktus decoy and the Krot jammer.
With the success of System A, the overall concept of an ABM system had been validated.
SYSTEM A-35 (AMB-1A)
In 1960, the Central Committee ordered the development of the operational A-35 ABM system, with the intention of deploying the system around Moscow for defense against ICBM attacks. The original concept called for the deployment of V-1000 interceptors at 32 launch sites aroudn Moscow, along with eight ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radar sites and one Dunai-3U (DOG HOUSE) battle management radar. During the course of development, OKB Fakel determined that the V-1000 was not the ideal missile for operational employment, and the development of a new interceptor was commissioned. Also, by 1964 the number of launch sites was reduced to 16, and the use of a nuclear warhead in the interceptor vehicles was decreed.
The trial version of System A-35 was known as the Aldan system, and it was tested at Sary Shagan beginning in 1967. The test site consisted of a radar site and launch pads for the new Fakel missile. The initiall series of trials of the Aldan system included simulated intercepts of R-12 (SS-4 SANDAL) IRBMs and concluded by 1970. The radar site was located at 45°48'35.24"N 73°34'17.60"E, and the launch sites were located at 45°48'41.83"N 73°33'43.70"E. An image of the Aldan test site can be seen below:
The new missile employed by System A-35 was OKB Fakel's A-350 (GALOSH). The initial variant employed by the system was the A-350Zh, also referred to as the 5V61. The A-350 was a command guided weapon employing a nuclear warhead. Initial plans called for a low-yield warhead to be used, but in the end a one megaton device was employed, enabling the weapon system to function effectively with a lesser degree of accuracy. The A-350 had an intercept range of 350 kilometers and was designed for exoatmospheric intercepts. The A-350 was a two-stage weapon powered by a solid-fuel first stage and a liquid-fuel second stage. The A-350 was hot launched from a container mounted on a launch rail.
System A-35 was deployed at four sites around Moscow. Eight sites were planned, and all of them were in various stages of construction when work ceased, but only four were completed and fitted with launch facilities.
System A-35 launch sites were found at the following locations:
56°20'29.07"N 36°47'40.87"E (inactive)
56°09'01.26"N 36°30'13.38"E (inactive)
55°20'59.03"N 36°28'54.27"E (inactive)
55°04'04.83"N 37°02'33.21"E (not completed)
55°09'09.26"N 38°23'08.43"E (not completed, elements of one TRY ADD complex appear to be present)
55°28'32.07"N 38°50'23.93"E (not completed)
56°14'38.17"N 38°34'37.63"E (inactive)
56°24'06.80"N 38°11'42.98"E (not completed, elements of one TRY ADD complex appear to be present)
Each site was fitted with two launch areas containing eight missile launchers. Two missile tracking radars and one guidance radar were fitted at each launch area (the entire three-radar complex is known as TRY ADD). The Dunai-3U was located at 55°29'12.01"N 36°40'3.10"E. The Dunai-3U was recently dismantled. An ABM support facility was located at 55°17'55.80"N 36°32'42.45"E and is still in use today supporting the current system.
During development it was discovered that the system could effectively intercept single-warhead weapons, but the advent of MIRV'ed ICBMs posed a problem for the A-35. As a result, preliminary operational status was first achieved in 1971, with the intention of updating the system later.
SYSTEM A-35M (ABM-1B)
System A-35M was an upgrade of System A-35. Trials began in 1977, and in 1978 the system replaced System A-35 around Moscow. The upgraded system was intended to intercept ICBMs employing anti-ABM countermeasure systems such as jammers and decoys. An upgraded model of the Dunai-3U, the 5N11A Dunai-3M (CAT HOUSE) was constructed at 55°13'8.71"N 37°17'49.15"E. A modified variant of the A-350, the A-350R/5V61R was employed by System A-35M. This missile differed from System A-35's A-350Zh insofar as it was not situated at the launch sites directly, but rather was stored at a support facility nearby. Missiles would be armed and fueled, and then transported to the launch site as needed, with dummy missiles occupying their space on the 64 launch positions. This suggests that there may have been some operational problems with keeping the original A-350Zh missiles fully fueled and armed in their launch containers at the launch sites. Liquid propellant is very volatile and unstable, and an accident resulting in an explosion had the potential to spread radioactive material from the warhead into the environment, in much the same way as the BOMARC missile accident in the United States in 1960.
The northwestern 5V61 launch sites near Klin were reconfigured with the new 5V61R by the early 1980s. These weapons remained in service with System A-35M until the new System A-135 was completed in the early 1990s, with the two extant A-350Zh sites having been deactivated and reconfigured to house System A-135's new 51T6 silo-launched exoatmospheric interceptors. It would appear that the two remaining 5V61 sites remained active for a time as part of System A-35M, apparently not being refitted with the newer 5V61R interceptor.
The following image depicts the operational components of System A-35 and System A-35M as deployed:
SATURN/5V21
In the late 1950's, the USSR was developing a mobile ABM system known as Saturn. Not much is known about this system, except that it would have relied on modified OKB Fakel missiles. The first of these was the 20DS, a modified V-755 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) SAM. The 20DS would have been primarily employed as a test vehicle, although Western intelligence at one point believed that the 20DS was a tactical ABM system, suggesting that Saturn at least reached the test stage. The operational missile would have been the 5V21S, a modified 5V21 (SA-5 GAMMON).
While the Saturn mobile ABM project was cancelled at an early stage in May of 1961, it should be noted that there is evidence that the 5V21 was intended for use from fixed sites in a limited ABM capacity. In 1973 the 5V21 was tested at Sary Shagan in an ABM capacity, and a nuclear armed variant was accepted for service as a national ABM system in 1975. Intelligence data indicates that the nuclear warheads for the ABM role began to appear at 5V21 sites in 1974. Interestingly, the parameters of the now-defunct ABM Treaty of 1972 do not classify the 5V21 as an ABM system due to its low velocity, but when fitted with a nuclear warhead an intercept is at least technically possible provided adequate early warning and target tracking is obtained.
It should also be noted that the OKB Fakel 5V21 missile system is not related to, but in fact replaced, the Lavochkin 5V11 Dal (GRIFFON) SAM system. Dal was cancelled shortly after work had begun on constructing launch sites around what was then known as Leningrad. Dal was similar in design to the OKB Fakel V-1000 ABM used in System A, and as such Western intelligence agencies often confused the two types, claiming that the new sites being built around Leningrad were part of an ABM system using the Dal missile.
The Dal sites around Leningrad were located at the following coordinates:
60°26'51.88"N 29°43'09.90"E
60°95'10.82"N 30°44'12.39"E
59°43'10.53"N 29°18'29.79"E
The following image depicts the positioning of the Dal sites around Leningrad:
Each Dal site consisted of five launch positions, each launch position containing a central engagement radar emplacement surrounded by six launch rails. One of the launch positions is depicted below:
TARAN
The Taran ABM system was proposed in 1963. This system would have employed a variant of the UR-100 (SS-11 SEGO) ICBM fitted with a ten megaton warhead to intercept incoming missiles at long range. The missile was known as the UR-100PRO. The Taran system would have been controlled by a new radar, the TSSO-S, near Leningrad. Early warning would have been achieved by employing the existing BMEW radar network, particularly EW sites RO-1 and RO-2 (discussed later), before the TSSO-S prosecuted the engagement. The TSSO-S was not built as the entire project was cancelled in 1964.
AURORA (ABM-X-2)
Project Aurora was initiated to develop a national ABM system to complement System A-35 around Moscow. Little is known about Aurora, except that there would have been two missiles employed, the long range A-900 and the short range A-351, the latter possibly being a modified variant of the A-350Zh, perhaps in the form of the second stage only. The weapons would have been equipped with variable yield nuclear warheads so that intercepts at lower altitues would not bring disastrous effects on the ground thanks to EMP. Aurora would have been based in part on components from System A-35, and as such preparations were made to test Aurora components at System A-35's test facility at Sary Shagan. The system was cancelled in 1967, but the 5N24 Argun radar associated with the system remains at Sary Shagan. Initially, the system was believed by the CIA to be a modified version of System A-35. This probably stemmed from the fact that the new radar was placed at the System A-35 test site. According to Jane's, the Argun is currently used as a laser director supporting potential laser ASAT tests.
S-225 (ABM-X-3)
The S-225 was a mobile ABM system intended to defend point targets against a limited strike by one or two ICBMs. Development was initiated in 1962 after the cancellation of the Aurora national ABM system. The S-225 was to have employed a two-tier missile system similar to that envisioned for the Aurora. OKB Fakel's 5Ya27 missile would have handled exoatmospheric intercepts, with the Novator 5Ya26 handling endoatmospheric intercepts. The 5Ya27 was a two-stage missile with a solid fueled first stage and a liquid fueled second stage, similar to the A-350. Both missiles would have been command guided and employed nuclear warheads. Engagements would have been handled by the RSN-225 (FLAT TWIN) phased-array radar, with a separate antenna station (PAWN SHOP) being provided for the transmission of missile guidance commands. Early warning signals would have been provided by BMEW radars at EW sites RO-1 and RO-2.
Development of the multi-missile S-225 system was stopped in 1978, but further work did continue using the Novator PRS-1 missile, which may have been an upgraded version of the 5Ya26, or a new weapon altogether. Work on the S-225 was finally stopped in the early 1980's, some sources indicating that testing continued until as late as 1984. The RSN-225 was active tracking RS-10 (SS-11 SEGO) and RSD-10 (SS-20 SABER) IRBMs during a 1982 exercise, suggesting that work was ongoing on the S-225 at that point.
It is possible that the PRS-1 is related to the Novator 9M82 ATBM weapon which is part of the Antei S-300V2 (SA-12B GIANT) system, or it may have been a trial vehicle for the 53T6 endoatmospheric interceptor used by the current System A-135 ABM network. The 55T6 designator has also been associated with a missile design for the system which was an alternative to the PRS-1, but which was cancelled with the system in 1984. This might also have been a trial vehicle for the 53T6, as the 53T6 is said to have replaced the 55T6 in development. This does raise the possibility of continued research into a mobile ABM system based on the 53T6, but there is no evidence to suggest that such a project was ever proceeded with.
At any rate, the RSN-225 radar set still exists to this day, and has been relocated from the Sary Shagan test range to a position on the Kamchatka peninsula at 56°16'14.40"N 162°44'5.84"E (see the below image).
SYSTEM A-135 (ABM-4)
The current Russian ABM system is System A-135. System A-135 began development in 1968 with the intent of protecting Moscow against a limited nuclear strike. Initial construction of prototype elements began in 1974 at Sary Shagan. Both endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric interceptors were envisioned for the system, with Novator handling the former and OKB Fakel the latter. RTI's 5N20P Don-2P (HORSE LEG) prorotype phased-array radar was installed to provide guidance commands to the two missile systems under test from Sary Shagan. The Don-2NP is still present at Sary Shagan (see the image below), and is located at 46°00'11.18"N 73°38'58.07"E.
Testing of System A-135 at Sary Shagan from 1976 to 1980 confirmed the performance parameters of the system, and it was operational in 1989. Construction of the new launch sites began around Moscow, including the construction of the new 5N20 Don-2N (PILL BOX) phased-array radar and battle management facility, located at 56°10'23.81"N 37°46'11.87"E. The Don-2N is a large phased array system and consists of four phased arrays mounted on a pyramidal structure housing the command and control elements. Its function is to perform target tracking and missile guidance, in the same manner that the Dunai-series radars served System A-35 and System A-35M. Initial target acquisition is handled by the BMEW network, with target track handoffs to the Don-2N being accomplished to perform intercepts. The Don-2N can be seen in the image below:
System A-135 initially employed two missiles, the Novator 53T6 (GAZELLE) endoatmospheric interceptor and the OKB Fakel 51T6 (GORGON) exoatmospheric interceptor. Both missiles were silo launched. The missiles are command guided by the Don-2N and initially used ten kiloton nuclear warheads to destroy their targets. 53T6 missiles are located at four sites around Moscow, and at a fifth site adjacent to the Don-2N radar facility. 51T6 missiles were located at two former A-350R sites. The 51T6 missiles have recently been taken offline, and the 53T6 missiles have had their nuclear warheads removed and presumably replaced by conventional explosives, leaving them as the sole operational interceptor component of System A-135.
System A-135 launch sites were present at the following locations:
56°14'33.01"N 38°34'27.29"E (51T6, 8 silos, non-operational)
55°21'01.16"N 36°28'59.60"E (51T6, 8 silos, non-operational)
55°54'04.11"N 37°18'28.30"E (53T6, 16 silos)
55°37'32.45"N 37°23'22.41"E (53T6, 12 silos)
55°34'39.04"N 37°46'17.67"E (53T6, 16 silos)
55°52'41.09"N 37°53'36.50"E (53T6, 12 silos)
56°10'51.97"N 37°47'16.81"E (53T6, 12 silos)
The following image depicts the southwestern 51T6 site:
The following image depicts the northwestern 53T6 site:
It is interesting to note that with the inconsistent deployment of the 53T6 missiles, System A-135 falls exactly 16 interceptors short of the limitations imposed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is possible that there were plans for two more 8 silo 51T6 interceptor sites, but that they were not proceeded with, or that there were similar unfinished plans for another 16-silo 53T6 site.
The following image depicts the system components of System A-135 as operationally deployed:
RADAR NETWORK
The Russian ABM system relies on a wide range of radar systems. Radars associated with the ABM system perform two main functions: target detection, and target engagement. The overwhelming number of associated radar sites are of the latter variety; the operational interceptors are currently only in place around Moscow, and are all served by the single Don-2N engagement radar descried previously. All of the radar systems are interconnected via the command and control network, allowing the BMEW network to pass target data to the ABM system for engagement. Theoretically, an engagement would work as follows:
1. The BMEW network would identify an inbound target.
2. The BMEW site identifying the target passes track data to the command and control center which forwards target track data to the Don-2N engagement radar.
3. 51T6 interceptors are fired at the target, with the intention of prosecuting an exoatmospheric intercept.
4. 53T6 interceptors are used to endoatmospherically engage any targets which may have slipped past the 51T6 salvo.
DNESTR/DNEPR/DAUGAVA
The original BMEW radar system for the Soviet ABM network was derived from the 5N15 Dnestr (HEN HOUSE) radar system. Dnestr consisted of two radar arrays joined in the center by a control facility, and was used for tracking objects in space such as satellites. The prorotype Dnestr array was trialed at Sary Shagan, and was located near the Don-2NP at 46°00'04.65"N 73°38'52.11"E. The prototype only consisted of a single radar array, and has been dismantled. Early Dnestr radars had a maximum range of 3,520 kilometers. Dnestr space surveillance radars were installed at Sary Shagan and Irkutsk
Alterations to the Dnestr radar set resulted in the 5N15M Dnestr-M NMEW radar system. Dnestr-M radars began to be constructed in 1963. The first Dnestr-M radars were placed at EW sites RO-1 and RO-2, near Murmansk and Riga, respectively. Being oriented towards the United States, these two EW sites figured prominently in early ABM systems, as evidenced by their frequent mention in the above sections. Further improvements led to the introduction of the 5N86 Dnepr and the Daugava radar systems, the Dnepr being trialed at Sary Shagan in the form of the 5N86P Dnepr-P.
Dnestr-series radars had their two arrays projecting from each side of the central control facility in a perpendicular fashion, making the system look like a straight line. Dnestr-M and Dnepr-series BMEW radars featured arrays on either side of the control facility that were positioned at a slight angle from center, making the overhead appearance of the site to appear like a v shape. Two basic configurations were used, with the angle of the v being either sharp or shallow. The difference in layout allowed for radar sites to have different fields of view based on their position and the requirements of the BMEW network. The latest versions of the HEN HOUSE series have a range of 6,000 kilometers. Many of the old Dnestr-M sets were updated to Dnepr standard.
The final HEN HOUSE iteration was the 5U83 Daugava radar set. Daugava introduced a transmitter array designed for the forthcoming Daryal radar system to the Dnepr complex at EW site RO-1. With this configuration, the Daryal array would act as a transmitter, with the Dnepr arrays acting as receivers, to provide increased system performance.
HEN HOUSE radar sites and their current status are indicated below:
68°06'48.75"N 33°54'34.95"E (Daugava, EW site RO-1)
56°42'54.81"N 21°57'46.50"E (Dnepr, EW site RO-2, dismantled)
56°42'29.65"N 21°56'27.48"E (Dnepr, EW site RO-2, dismantled)
48°22'39.64"N 22°42'27.85"E (Dnepr)
44°34'43.66"N 33°23'11.36"E (Dnepr)
46°37'53.15"N 74°30'44.49"E (Dnestr)
46°37'31.31"N 74°31'02.60"E (Dnestr)
46°36'51.92"N 74°31'22.92"E (Dnestr)
46°36'26.61"N 74°31'23.53"E (Dnestr)
46°36'11.29"N 74°31'51.79"E (Dnepr-P)
52°52'58.57"N 103°15'29.19"E (Dnestr)
52°52'53.32"N 103°15'57.70"E (Dnestr)
52°52'31.47"N 103°15'23.64"E (Dnestr)
52°52'29.37"N 103°15'39.21"E (Dnestr)
52°52'39.24"N 103°16'24.73"E (Dnepr)
The Sevastopol Dnepr site is depicted below:
DARYAL
In the 1970s, work began on the next generation of BMEW radar systems. The new 5N79 Daryal phased array BMEW radar was first built and trialed near Pechora in Siberian Russia, and successful trials led to the construction of the first two full-scale sites during the first half of the 1980's. Further refinements led to the development and construction of the improved Daryal-U and Daryal-UM radar systems. The following image depicts the Pechora Daryal site:
The Daryal series consists of two large phased array radars (LPARs), one of which is a transmitter and one of which is a receiver. The system has a range of 5,000 kilometers. One of the radar sites was constructed in Belarus and was given the name Volga, although it appears that this name may be either a codename for the construction operation or for the site itself, as the facility appears to be a standard Daryal-series radar site. There is an inconsistency in the various layouts of the Daryal-series radar sites, as the distance separating the two radar arrays ranges from between 800 meters 2800 meters, and does not appear to be dependent on the variant.
Daryal-series radar locations and their status can be seen below:
68°06'56.20"N 33°55'01.96"E (Daryal, EW site RO-1)
56°43'32.60"N 21°58'51.36"E (Daryal-UM, EW site RO-2, dismantled)
52°50'51.97"N 26°28'15.70"E (Volga)
48°23'14.59"N 22°47'49.07"E (Daryal-UM, dismantled)
40°52'11.08"N 47°48'06.11"E (Daryal, EW site RO-7)
46°35'42.87"N 74°28'57.95"E (Daryal-U)
52°51'34.34"N 103°14'01.34"E (Daryal-U)
57°52'14.05"N 93°06'48.36"E (Daryal-UM, dismantled)
65°12'37.88"N 57°17'07.64"E (Daryal, EW site RO-30)
The reasons behind the dismantling of many of the HEN HOUSE and Daryal radars is both political and financial. The aforememtnioned ABM treaty stipulated that ABM radars could only be deployed along a nation's periphery. This is why the Daryal-UM near Yeniyesk had to be dismantled. When the USSR broke apart, a number of the BMEW sites were located outside of Russian terriroty, and this necessitated the leasing of some of the radar sites, while others were dismantled.
VORONEZH-DM
The latest BMEW radar system is the Voronezh-DM. Two radar sites are planned. The first site in Lekhtusi, located at 60°16'31.47"N 30°32'41.96"E, is currently under construction, while work on the site at Armavir has not yet begun.
The Lekhtusi Voronezh-DM site can be seen below:
SITE LAYOUTS
While a good portion of the BMEW systems were located alone at solitary locations optimised to provide the best coverage of the USSR, many of the BMEW radar sites were co-located with each other at a few consolidated sites. The BMEW facility at Irkutsk was one such location. It currently contains four Dnestr radars, one Daugava radar, and one Daryal-U radar. The site is depicted in the image below:
DUGA
The final BMEW radar type was an over-the-horizon (OTH) radar array system. The Duga-1 proof of concept radar was built near Nikolayev at 47°02'28.33"N 32°11'57.29"E and was tested against rockets launched from Baikonur, demonstrating a 2,500 kilometer range. A larger-scale prototype array designated Duga-2 was later built at the same site and tested against ICBMs launched across the USSR's territory, validating the concept. Two operational Duga-3 (STEEL YARD) systems were put into use. One of these systems was effectively rendered inoperable due to proximity to Chernobyl, and the other was dismantled after being removed from combat alert in 1989. The Duga-3 system employed a transmitter station and a receiver station separated by a
distance of approximately 60 kilometers
The locations of the four Duga-3 facilities are indicated below:
51°18'19.06"N 30°03'57.35"E
51°38'15.98"N 30°42'10.41"E
50°53'34.66"N 136°50'12.38"E
50°23'07.98"N 137°19'41.87"E
Part three of this article will cover the next generation of Russian strategic defense systems, and will provide the reader with a list of source materials.
The 1950's saw the introduction of a new form of nuclear delivery system into the dynamics of the growing Cold War: the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). A new, secret arms race was about to begin. While the development and deployment of ICBMs was well known on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet government was beginning a top secret research and development program designed to counter the growing American ICBM threat. That R&D program aimed to develop the world's first effective anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.
ABM systems were not a new idea. As far back as 1946, the United States had began to research ABM systems capable of intercepting short-range weapons akin to the German V-2 of World War 2. In 1948, the USSR's NII-4 research institute began to study ABM concepts. By 1953, senior ranking officers in the Soviet military were requesting that the Central Committee of the Communist Party to consider developing an ABM system to counter the threat of American ICBMs. The USSR's Council of Ministers authorized the development of an ABM system on the 17th of August, 1956. The seeds for the first operational ABM system in the world were finally planted after nearly a decade of research.
SYSTEM A
The first task for the Soviet defense complex was to develop and test a trial system to validate the concept of an ABM weapon system. The test range was constructed at Sary Shagan on the shores of Lake Balkhash in present-day Kazakhstan. Sary Shagan remains the primary R&D and test center for Russian ABM systems to this day, with the site being leased from the Kazakh government.
The trial ABM system was designated System A, and construction began in 1959. System A consisted of a series of components spread across the Sary Shagan test range, connected via a radio-relay network. The Dunai-2 (HEN ROOST) radar was developed for System A and placed along the shore of Lake Balkhash. Dunai-2 was a 1200 kilometer range early warning radar designed to acquire the inbound targets for the system, and had been developed after the successful trials of the Dunai-1 proof of concept radar. The Dunai-2 radar set was later replaced by the Dunai-3UP (TOP ROOST) radar, a trial version of the 5N11 Dunai-3U (DOG HOUSE) radar later employed by the A-35 (ABM-1) ABM system. The Dunai-2 and Dunai-3 both employed separate transmitter and receiver arrays. The transmitter arrays were located at 45°56'49.67"N 73°37'51.75"E, with the receiver arrays being located at 45°56'09.98"N 73°37'43.45"E. These arrays have been dismantled, but the adjacent control buildings are still present on the range at Sary Shagan (see below).
OKB Fakel's V-1000 was the ABM interceptor used by System A for the test series. The V-1000 was a two-stage weapon, and was launched from fixed rail launchers. Command guidance was used to guide the missile to the target and detonate the warhead. RSV-PR (HEN NEST) and RTN (HEN EGG) acquisition and tracking radars guided the V-1000 to intercept. The V-1000 had a range of 300 kilometers and could reach an altitude of 25,000 meters. Initially, high-explosive warheads were fitted to the V-1000 interceptors. The warheads contained 16,000 carbide-tungsten balls embedded in a TNT filling. The warhead would be command detonated into a disc-shaped fragment field.
The first successful intercept of a ballistic missile was conducted on 24 November, 1960, but a live warhead was not fitted. On the 4th of March in 1961, the first successful intercept of an R-12 (SS-4 SANDAL) IRBM with a V-1000 fitted with a live warhead was performed. Over the course of the test series, there were 11 successful intercepts of inbound targets, including the destruction of an R-5 (SS-3 SHYSTER) SRBM's warhead section 22 days after the first successful intercept. Various iterations of the V-1000 ABM were also trialled, including the IR-guided S2TA variant, and the optically and radar fuzed nuclear armed R2TA and G2TA variants. One of the most interesting test programs involved subjecting the components of System A to high-altitude nuclear detonations. Operation K consisted of five nuclear detonations between 80 and 300 kilometers in altitude, and these events proved to have no effect on the functionality of System A. System A was also used to validate anti-ABM defenses for Soviet ICBMs, including the Kaktus decoy and the Krot jammer.
With the success of System A, the overall concept of an ABM system had been validated.
SYSTEM A-35 (AMB-1A)
In 1960, the Central Committee ordered the development of the operational A-35 ABM system, with the intention of deploying the system around Moscow for defense against ICBM attacks. The original concept called for the deployment of V-1000 interceptors at 32 launch sites aroudn Moscow, along with eight ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radar sites and one Dunai-3U (DOG HOUSE) battle management radar. During the course of development, OKB Fakel determined that the V-1000 was not the ideal missile for operational employment, and the development of a new interceptor was commissioned. Also, by 1964 the number of launch sites was reduced to 16, and the use of a nuclear warhead in the interceptor vehicles was decreed.
The trial version of System A-35 was known as the Aldan system, and it was tested at Sary Shagan beginning in 1967. The test site consisted of a radar site and launch pads for the new Fakel missile. The initiall series of trials of the Aldan system included simulated intercepts of R-12 (SS-4 SANDAL) IRBMs and concluded by 1970. The radar site was located at 45°48'35.24"N 73°34'17.60"E, and the launch sites were located at 45°48'41.83"N 73°33'43.70"E. An image of the Aldan test site can be seen below:
The new missile employed by System A-35 was OKB Fakel's A-350 (GALOSH). The initial variant employed by the system was the A-350Zh, also referred to as the 5V61. The A-350 was a command guided weapon employing a nuclear warhead. Initial plans called for a low-yield warhead to be used, but in the end a one megaton device was employed, enabling the weapon system to function effectively with a lesser degree of accuracy. The A-350 had an intercept range of 350 kilometers and was designed for exoatmospheric intercepts. The A-350 was a two-stage weapon powered by a solid-fuel first stage and a liquid-fuel second stage. The A-350 was hot launched from a container mounted on a launch rail.
System A-35 was deployed at four sites around Moscow. Eight sites were planned, and all of them were in various stages of construction when work ceased, but only four were completed and fitted with launch facilities.
System A-35 launch sites were found at the following locations:
56°20'29.07"N 36°47'40.87"E (inactive)
56°09'01.26"N 36°30'13.38"E (inactive)
55°20'59.03"N 36°28'54.27"E (inactive)
55°04'04.83"N 37°02'33.21"E (not completed)
55°09'09.26"N 38°23'08.43"E (not completed, elements of one TRY ADD complex appear to be present)
55°28'32.07"N 38°50'23.93"E (not completed)
56°14'38.17"N 38°34'37.63"E (inactive)
56°24'06.80"N 38°11'42.98"E (not completed, elements of one TRY ADD complex appear to be present)
Each site was fitted with two launch areas containing eight missile launchers. Two missile tracking radars and one guidance radar were fitted at each launch area (the entire three-radar complex is known as TRY ADD). The Dunai-3U was located at 55°29'12.01"N 36°40'3.10"E. The Dunai-3U was recently dismantled. An ABM support facility was located at 55°17'55.80"N 36°32'42.45"E and is still in use today supporting the current system.
During development it was discovered that the system could effectively intercept single-warhead weapons, but the advent of MIRV'ed ICBMs posed a problem for the A-35. As a result, preliminary operational status was first achieved in 1971, with the intention of updating the system later.
SYSTEM A-35M (ABM-1B)
System A-35M was an upgrade of System A-35. Trials began in 1977, and in 1978 the system replaced System A-35 around Moscow. The upgraded system was intended to intercept ICBMs employing anti-ABM countermeasure systems such as jammers and decoys. An upgraded model of the Dunai-3U, the 5N11A Dunai-3M (CAT HOUSE) was constructed at 55°13'8.71"N 37°17'49.15"E. A modified variant of the A-350, the A-350R/5V61R was employed by System A-35M. This missile differed from System A-35's A-350Zh insofar as it was not situated at the launch sites directly, but rather was stored at a support facility nearby. Missiles would be armed and fueled, and then transported to the launch site as needed, with dummy missiles occupying their space on the 64 launch positions. This suggests that there may have been some operational problems with keeping the original A-350Zh missiles fully fueled and armed in their launch containers at the launch sites. Liquid propellant is very volatile and unstable, and an accident resulting in an explosion had the potential to spread radioactive material from the warhead into the environment, in much the same way as the BOMARC missile accident in the United States in 1960.
The northwestern 5V61 launch sites near Klin were reconfigured with the new 5V61R by the early 1980s. These weapons remained in service with System A-35M until the new System A-135 was completed in the early 1990s, with the two extant A-350Zh sites having been deactivated and reconfigured to house System A-135's new 51T6 silo-launched exoatmospheric interceptors. It would appear that the two remaining 5V61 sites remained active for a time as part of System A-35M, apparently not being refitted with the newer 5V61R interceptor.
The following image depicts the operational components of System A-35 and System A-35M as deployed:
SATURN/5V21
In the late 1950's, the USSR was developing a mobile ABM system known as Saturn. Not much is known about this system, except that it would have relied on modified OKB Fakel missiles. The first of these was the 20DS, a modified V-755 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) SAM. The 20DS would have been primarily employed as a test vehicle, although Western intelligence at one point believed that the 20DS was a tactical ABM system, suggesting that Saturn at least reached the test stage. The operational missile would have been the 5V21S, a modified 5V21 (SA-5 GAMMON).
While the Saturn mobile ABM project was cancelled at an early stage in May of 1961, it should be noted that there is evidence that the 5V21 was intended for use from fixed sites in a limited ABM capacity. In 1973 the 5V21 was tested at Sary Shagan in an ABM capacity, and a nuclear armed variant was accepted for service as a national ABM system in 1975. Intelligence data indicates that the nuclear warheads for the ABM role began to appear at 5V21 sites in 1974. Interestingly, the parameters of the now-defunct ABM Treaty of 1972 do not classify the 5V21 as an ABM system due to its low velocity, but when fitted with a nuclear warhead an intercept is at least technically possible provided adequate early warning and target tracking is obtained.
It should also be noted that the OKB Fakel 5V21 missile system is not related to, but in fact replaced, the Lavochkin 5V11 Dal (GRIFFON) SAM system. Dal was cancelled shortly after work had begun on constructing launch sites around what was then known as Leningrad. Dal was similar in design to the OKB Fakel V-1000 ABM used in System A, and as such Western intelligence agencies often confused the two types, claiming that the new sites being built around Leningrad were part of an ABM system using the Dal missile.
The Dal sites around Leningrad were located at the following coordinates:
60°26'51.88"N 29°43'09.90"E
60°95'10.82"N 30°44'12.39"E
59°43'10.53"N 29°18'29.79"E
The following image depicts the positioning of the Dal sites around Leningrad:
Each Dal site consisted of five launch positions, each launch position containing a central engagement radar emplacement surrounded by six launch rails. One of the launch positions is depicted below:
TARAN
The Taran ABM system was proposed in 1963. This system would have employed a variant of the UR-100 (SS-11 SEGO) ICBM fitted with a ten megaton warhead to intercept incoming missiles at long range. The missile was known as the UR-100PRO. The Taran system would have been controlled by a new radar, the TSSO-S, near Leningrad. Early warning would have been achieved by employing the existing BMEW radar network, particularly EW sites RO-1 and RO-2 (discussed later), before the TSSO-S prosecuted the engagement. The TSSO-S was not built as the entire project was cancelled in 1964.
AURORA (ABM-X-2)
Project Aurora was initiated to develop a national ABM system to complement System A-35 around Moscow. Little is known about Aurora, except that there would have been two missiles employed, the long range A-900 and the short range A-351, the latter possibly being a modified variant of the A-350Zh, perhaps in the form of the second stage only. The weapons would have been equipped with variable yield nuclear warheads so that intercepts at lower altitues would not bring disastrous effects on the ground thanks to EMP. Aurora would have been based in part on components from System A-35, and as such preparations were made to test Aurora components at System A-35's test facility at Sary Shagan. The system was cancelled in 1967, but the 5N24 Argun radar associated with the system remains at Sary Shagan. Initially, the system was believed by the CIA to be a modified version of System A-35. This probably stemmed from the fact that the new radar was placed at the System A-35 test site. According to Jane's, the Argun is currently used as a laser director supporting potential laser ASAT tests.
S-225 (ABM-X-3)
The S-225 was a mobile ABM system intended to defend point targets against a limited strike by one or two ICBMs. Development was initiated in 1962 after the cancellation of the Aurora national ABM system. The S-225 was to have employed a two-tier missile system similar to that envisioned for the Aurora. OKB Fakel's 5Ya27 missile would have handled exoatmospheric intercepts, with the Novator 5Ya26 handling endoatmospheric intercepts. The 5Ya27 was a two-stage missile with a solid fueled first stage and a liquid fueled second stage, similar to the A-350. Both missiles would have been command guided and employed nuclear warheads. Engagements would have been handled by the RSN-225 (FLAT TWIN) phased-array radar, with a separate antenna station (PAWN SHOP) being provided for the transmission of missile guidance commands. Early warning signals would have been provided by BMEW radars at EW sites RO-1 and RO-2.
Development of the multi-missile S-225 system was stopped in 1978, but further work did continue using the Novator PRS-1 missile, which may have been an upgraded version of the 5Ya26, or a new weapon altogether. Work on the S-225 was finally stopped in the early 1980's, some sources indicating that testing continued until as late as 1984. The RSN-225 was active tracking RS-10 (SS-11 SEGO) and RSD-10 (SS-20 SABER) IRBMs during a 1982 exercise, suggesting that work was ongoing on the S-225 at that point.
It is possible that the PRS-1 is related to the Novator 9M82 ATBM weapon which is part of the Antei S-300V2 (SA-12B GIANT) system, or it may have been a trial vehicle for the 53T6 endoatmospheric interceptor used by the current System A-135 ABM network. The 55T6 designator has also been associated with a missile design for the system which was an alternative to the PRS-1, but which was cancelled with the system in 1984. This might also have been a trial vehicle for the 53T6, as the 53T6 is said to have replaced the 55T6 in development. This does raise the possibility of continued research into a mobile ABM system based on the 53T6, but there is no evidence to suggest that such a project was ever proceeded with.
At any rate, the RSN-225 radar set still exists to this day, and has been relocated from the Sary Shagan test range to a position on the Kamchatka peninsula at 56°16'14.40"N 162°44'5.84"E (see the below image).
SYSTEM A-135 (ABM-4)
The current Russian ABM system is System A-135. System A-135 began development in 1968 with the intent of protecting Moscow against a limited nuclear strike. Initial construction of prototype elements began in 1974 at Sary Shagan. Both endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric interceptors were envisioned for the system, with Novator handling the former and OKB Fakel the latter. RTI's 5N20P Don-2P (HORSE LEG) prorotype phased-array radar was installed to provide guidance commands to the two missile systems under test from Sary Shagan. The Don-2NP is still present at Sary Shagan (see the image below), and is located at 46°00'11.18"N 73°38'58.07"E.
Testing of System A-135 at Sary Shagan from 1976 to 1980 confirmed the performance parameters of the system, and it was operational in 1989. Construction of the new launch sites began around Moscow, including the construction of the new 5N20 Don-2N (PILL BOX) phased-array radar and battle management facility, located at 56°10'23.81"N 37°46'11.87"E. The Don-2N is a large phased array system and consists of four phased arrays mounted on a pyramidal structure housing the command and control elements. Its function is to perform target tracking and missile guidance, in the same manner that the Dunai-series radars served System A-35 and System A-35M. Initial target acquisition is handled by the BMEW network, with target track handoffs to the Don-2N being accomplished to perform intercepts. The Don-2N can be seen in the image below:
System A-135 initially employed two missiles, the Novator 53T6 (GAZELLE) endoatmospheric interceptor and the OKB Fakel 51T6 (GORGON) exoatmospheric interceptor. Both missiles were silo launched. The missiles are command guided by the Don-2N and initially used ten kiloton nuclear warheads to destroy their targets. 53T6 missiles are located at four sites around Moscow, and at a fifth site adjacent to the Don-2N radar facility. 51T6 missiles were located at two former A-350R sites. The 51T6 missiles have recently been taken offline, and the 53T6 missiles have had their nuclear warheads removed and presumably replaced by conventional explosives, leaving them as the sole operational interceptor component of System A-135.
System A-135 launch sites were present at the following locations:
56°14'33.01"N 38°34'27.29"E (51T6, 8 silos, non-operational)
55°21'01.16"N 36°28'59.60"E (51T6, 8 silos, non-operational)
55°54'04.11"N 37°18'28.30"E (53T6, 16 silos)
55°37'32.45"N 37°23'22.41"E (53T6, 12 silos)
55°34'39.04"N 37°46'17.67"E (53T6, 16 silos)
55°52'41.09"N 37°53'36.50"E (53T6, 12 silos)
56°10'51.97"N 37°47'16.81"E (53T6, 12 silos)
The following image depicts the southwestern 51T6 site:
The following image depicts the northwestern 53T6 site:
It is interesting to note that with the inconsistent deployment of the 53T6 missiles, System A-135 falls exactly 16 interceptors short of the limitations imposed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is possible that there were plans for two more 8 silo 51T6 interceptor sites, but that they were not proceeded with, or that there were similar unfinished plans for another 16-silo 53T6 site.
The following image depicts the system components of System A-135 as operationally deployed:
RADAR NETWORK
The Russian ABM system relies on a wide range of radar systems. Radars associated with the ABM system perform two main functions: target detection, and target engagement. The overwhelming number of associated radar sites are of the latter variety; the operational interceptors are currently only in place around Moscow, and are all served by the single Don-2N engagement radar descried previously. All of the radar systems are interconnected via the command and control network, allowing the BMEW network to pass target data to the ABM system for engagement. Theoretically, an engagement would work as follows:
1. The BMEW network would identify an inbound target.
2. The BMEW site identifying the target passes track data to the command and control center which forwards target track data to the Don-2N engagement radar.
3. 51T6 interceptors are fired at the target, with the intention of prosecuting an exoatmospheric intercept.
4. 53T6 interceptors are used to endoatmospherically engage any targets which may have slipped past the 51T6 salvo.
DNESTR/DNEPR/DAUGAVA
The original BMEW radar system for the Soviet ABM network was derived from the 5N15 Dnestr (HEN HOUSE) radar system. Dnestr consisted of two radar arrays joined in the center by a control facility, and was used for tracking objects in space such as satellites. The prorotype Dnestr array was trialed at Sary Shagan, and was located near the Don-2NP at 46°00'04.65"N 73°38'52.11"E. The prototype only consisted of a single radar array, and has been dismantled. Early Dnestr radars had a maximum range of 3,520 kilometers. Dnestr space surveillance radars were installed at Sary Shagan and Irkutsk
Alterations to the Dnestr radar set resulted in the 5N15M Dnestr-M NMEW radar system. Dnestr-M radars began to be constructed in 1963. The first Dnestr-M radars were placed at EW sites RO-1 and RO-2, near Murmansk and Riga, respectively. Being oriented towards the United States, these two EW sites figured prominently in early ABM systems, as evidenced by their frequent mention in the above sections. Further improvements led to the introduction of the 5N86 Dnepr and the Daugava radar systems, the Dnepr being trialed at Sary Shagan in the form of the 5N86P Dnepr-P.
Dnestr-series radars had their two arrays projecting from each side of the central control facility in a perpendicular fashion, making the system look like a straight line. Dnestr-M and Dnepr-series BMEW radars featured arrays on either side of the control facility that were positioned at a slight angle from center, making the overhead appearance of the site to appear like a v shape. Two basic configurations were used, with the angle of the v being either sharp or shallow. The difference in layout allowed for radar sites to have different fields of view based on their position and the requirements of the BMEW network. The latest versions of the HEN HOUSE series have a range of 6,000 kilometers. Many of the old Dnestr-M sets were updated to Dnepr standard.
The final HEN HOUSE iteration was the 5U83 Daugava radar set. Daugava introduced a transmitter array designed for the forthcoming Daryal radar system to the Dnepr complex at EW site RO-1. With this configuration, the Daryal array would act as a transmitter, with the Dnepr arrays acting as receivers, to provide increased system performance.
HEN HOUSE radar sites and their current status are indicated below:
68°06'48.75"N 33°54'34.95"E (Daugava, EW site RO-1)
56°42'54.81"N 21°57'46.50"E (Dnepr, EW site RO-2, dismantled)
56°42'29.65"N 21°56'27.48"E (Dnepr, EW site RO-2, dismantled)
48°22'39.64"N 22°42'27.85"E (Dnepr)
44°34'43.66"N 33°23'11.36"E (Dnepr)
46°37'53.15"N 74°30'44.49"E (Dnestr)
46°37'31.31"N 74°31'02.60"E (Dnestr)
46°36'51.92"N 74°31'22.92"E (Dnestr)
46°36'26.61"N 74°31'23.53"E (Dnestr)
46°36'11.29"N 74°31'51.79"E (Dnepr-P)
52°52'58.57"N 103°15'29.19"E (Dnestr)
52°52'53.32"N 103°15'57.70"E (Dnestr)
52°52'31.47"N 103°15'23.64"E (Dnestr)
52°52'29.37"N 103°15'39.21"E (Dnestr)
52°52'39.24"N 103°16'24.73"E (Dnepr)
The Sevastopol Dnepr site is depicted below:
DARYAL
In the 1970s, work began on the next generation of BMEW radar systems. The new 5N79 Daryal phased array BMEW radar was first built and trialed near Pechora in Siberian Russia, and successful trials led to the construction of the first two full-scale sites during the first half of the 1980's. Further refinements led to the development and construction of the improved Daryal-U and Daryal-UM radar systems. The following image depicts the Pechora Daryal site:
The Daryal series consists of two large phased array radars (LPARs), one of which is a transmitter and one of which is a receiver. The system has a range of 5,000 kilometers. One of the radar sites was constructed in Belarus and was given the name Volga, although it appears that this name may be either a codename for the construction operation or for the site itself, as the facility appears to be a standard Daryal-series radar site. There is an inconsistency in the various layouts of the Daryal-series radar sites, as the distance separating the two radar arrays ranges from between 800 meters 2800 meters, and does not appear to be dependent on the variant.
Daryal-series radar locations and their status can be seen below:
68°06'56.20"N 33°55'01.96"E (Daryal, EW site RO-1)
56°43'32.60"N 21°58'51.36"E (Daryal-UM, EW site RO-2, dismantled)
52°50'51.97"N 26°28'15.70"E (Volga)
48°23'14.59"N 22°47'49.07"E (Daryal-UM, dismantled)
40°52'11.08"N 47°48'06.11"E (Daryal, EW site RO-7)
46°35'42.87"N 74°28'57.95"E (Daryal-U)
52°51'34.34"N 103°14'01.34"E (Daryal-U)
57°52'14.05"N 93°06'48.36"E (Daryal-UM, dismantled)
65°12'37.88"N 57°17'07.64"E (Daryal, EW site RO-30)
The reasons behind the dismantling of many of the HEN HOUSE and Daryal radars is both political and financial. The aforememtnioned ABM treaty stipulated that ABM radars could only be deployed along a nation's periphery. This is why the Daryal-UM near Yeniyesk had to be dismantled. When the USSR broke apart, a number of the BMEW sites were located outside of Russian terriroty, and this necessitated the leasing of some of the radar sites, while others were dismantled.
VORONEZH-DM
The latest BMEW radar system is the Voronezh-DM. Two radar sites are planned. The first site in Lekhtusi, located at 60°16'31.47"N 30°32'41.96"E, is currently under construction, while work on the site at Armavir has not yet begun.
The Lekhtusi Voronezh-DM site can be seen below:
SITE LAYOUTS
While a good portion of the BMEW systems were located alone at solitary locations optimised to provide the best coverage of the USSR, many of the BMEW radar sites were co-located with each other at a few consolidated sites. The BMEW facility at Irkutsk was one such location. It currently contains four Dnestr radars, one Daugava radar, and one Daryal-U radar. The site is depicted in the image below:
DUGA
The final BMEW radar type was an over-the-horizon (OTH) radar array system. The Duga-1 proof of concept radar was built near Nikolayev at 47°02'28.33"N 32°11'57.29"E and was tested against rockets launched from Baikonur, demonstrating a 2,500 kilometer range. A larger-scale prototype array designated Duga-2 was later built at the same site and tested against ICBMs launched across the USSR's territory, validating the concept. Two operational Duga-3 (STEEL YARD) systems were put into use. One of these systems was effectively rendered inoperable due to proximity to Chernobyl, and the other was dismantled after being removed from combat alert in 1989. The Duga-3 system employed a transmitter station and a receiver station separated by a
distance of approximately 60 kilometers
The locations of the four Duga-3 facilities are indicated below:
51°18'19.06"N 30°03'57.35"E
51°38'15.98"N 30°42'10.41"E
50°53'34.66"N 136°50'12.38"E
50°23'07.98"N 137°19'41.87"E
Part three of this article will cover the next generation of Russian strategic defense systems, and will provide the reader with a list of source materials.
Tuesday, June 5, 2007
Russian Strategic Defense - Part 1, The S-300P SAM Family
This is the first part in a three part article covering Russian strategic defenses. Part 1 covers the S-300P SAM system, part 2 covers the Russian ABM network, and part 3 covers the future prospects, including the S-400 SAM system.
INTRODUCTION
During the 1960's and 1970's, the Russian air defense network was at a crossroads. The S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) strategic SAM system was the pinnacle of Russian SAM development, providing long-range air defense over wide areas. The definitive 5V28V missile, part of the S-200D Angara system, allowed for intercepts to a range of 300 kilometers. The problem was that the nature of the threat was changing. Russia needed a new strategic SAM system capable of intercepting lower RCS targets. The advent of the ALCM as a strategic offensive weapon meant that bombers would not need to penetrate the S-200 network to hit their targets. The ALCMs themselves presented very small targets, targets which the S-200 was not best suited to deal with. A new system was needed. During the 1970s' the Almaz and Fakel design bureaus began to develop, respectively, the components and missiles of what would become the S-300P SAM system. This was initially a combined tactical and strategic SAM concept, but the tactical version was later split off into a separate version, the S-300V (SA-12A GLADIATOR/SA-12B GIANT), developed by Antey (components) and Novator (missile).
One of the key roles of the new S-300P system would be to replace the aging S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) SAM network in place around Moscow. 56 S-25 sites were positioned in two rings around Moscow to provide defense for the then-Soviet capital. The following image depicts the locations of the now-defunct S-25 SAM sites.
S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE)
The S-300PT was the first iteration of the S-300P, accepted for service in 1979. The S-300PT used a unique and rather unusual TEL configuration. The S-300PT's ChMAP trailers were designed to elevate "backwards". The arm connecting the trailer to the tractor was designed to split in half and open around 45 degrees to either side, allowing the four launch tubes to elevate between them.
The S-300PT introduced the first-generation 5N63 (FLAP LID A) engagement radar, an I/J band system capable of six simultaneous engagements and a range of 200 kilometers. The 5N63 introduced the concept of mounting the radars of the S-300P system on towers to enable them to obtain a better view of the surrounding airspace. This enabled the launchers to be hidden in trees, for example, while the tower-mounted radars maintained their ability to view the surrounding airspace. The 40V6 mast assembly is available for use by all radars of the S-300P system.
The S-300PT's main drawback was the 5V55K missile. The 5V55K was command guided, and had an engagement range of between 5 and 47 kilometers, with a reach of between 25 and 30,000 meters in altitude. A 133 kilogram high-explosive warhead was carried. The problem with the 5V55K was the guidance method, which did not fully take advantage of the 5N63's capabilities, and the short range. The 5V55K had only a two kilometer advantage over the latest missiles used by the S-25 system. All missiles used by the S-300P family employ thrust-vectoring control.
Where Fakel did score was in the containerization of the missiles. The missiles were contained in cold-launch tubes that were sealed when they left the factory. According to Fakel, the missiles of the S-300P series will not need any service over their lifetime due to the fact that they remain in sealed launch canisters. This method was retained over the various iterations of the system.
The following image depicts an operational S-300PT site near Sevastopol, Russia. Notice the unique TEL design, and the tower-mounted 5N63 radar placed in the center of the rows of TELs.
Modifications to the S-300PT system included the S-300PT-1, and S-300PT-1A.
Based on imagery interpretation performed in Google Earth, S-300PT SAM systems are currently operational in Russia (6 sites), Byelorussia (2 sites), and the Ukraine (6 sites).
S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
The S-300PS system was introduced with two goals in mind: to increase the effectiveness of the system, and to enhance its mobility. The components of the S-300PS were mounted on mobile chassis to increase the mobility of the system, enabling the system to be emplaced or remobilized in as little as five minutes. Mobile components had a road speed of between 30 and 60 km/hr depending on terrain, and had a range of 800 kilometers. Fakel's new 5V55R missile introduced a new guidance method called Seeker Aided Ground Guidance (SAGG), enhancing the accuracy of the system.
SAGG works as follows. The missile is launched and guided inertially to a point in space. The TER tracks both the missile and the target, generating guidance commands for the missile. When the missile reaches endgame, it begins semi-active homing. The missile downlinks its target data to the TER, which compares that data to its own and generates guidance commands for the missile. This basically enables the more powerful processing capability of the TER to drive the engagement rather than relying on the missile's seeker alone.
The new guidance method necessitated the incorporation of an enhanced TER, the 30N6 (FLAP LID B). The 30N6 retained the parameters of the original 5N63. The 30N6 was mounted on a MAZ-543 truck chassis, but could still be removed and mounted on a 40V6 mast assembly. The 30N6 could support up to 12 missiles in flight, guided to a maximum of 6 targets simultaneously. The 30N6 could support up to 12 TELs. The 30N6 needed between 9 and 11 seconds to go from target acquisition to missile launch, and was crewed by six personnel. 30N6 had a range accuracy of 5 meters and an azimuth and elevation accuracy of 1 arc minute.
The 5V55R missile had the same performance parameters of the 5V55K, with the exception of the range being increased to 75 kilometers. Missiles could be fired at 3-5 second intervals.
Two different TELs were introduced, the 5P85S and 5P85D, each toting four missile tubes. The 5P85D is a slave unit, controlled by the master 5P85S. The 5P85S contains an added control section behind the crew compartment for controlling the TELs interfacing with it. This helps keep the number of connections to the TER to a minimum.
The S-300PS had an advertised service life of 20 years. Many of these systems were later upgraded to S-300PM standard.
S-300PM (SA-10B GRUMBLE)
The S-300PM was a modification to the S-300PS system. Minor system changes were introduced, but the primary new feature was the incorporation of the 5V55RUD missile. The 5V55RUD had an engagement range of between 5 and 90 kilometers for an aircraft target, and had the ability to engage tactical ballistic missiles to a range of 30 kilometers. The system had a reach of between 10 and 27,000 meters in altitude. The SAGG guidance method was retained, as well as the original 133 kilogram HE warhead introduced with the 5V55K.
The export version of the S-300PM was the S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE). Components also took on the U identifier denoting their export status. For example, the 5P85S TEL would be 5P85SU. The export 30N6 was designated 30N6E.
The following image depicts an S-300PMU near Kiev in the Ukraine. Note the raised berm for the 30N6E vehicle, and the reload canisters in the north-side revetments.
Based on imagery interpretation performed in Google Earth, S-300PM/PMU SAM systems are currently operational in Russia (22 sites), Byelorussia (1 site), Kazakhstan (3 sites), the Ukraine (6 sites), Slovakia (1 site), and China (1 site).
S-300PM-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE)
The next evolution in the S-300P family was the S-300PM-1. The S-300PM-1 introduced new towed TELs, the 30N6-1 (TOMB STONE) radar, and the Fakel 48N6 missile. Export designators include S-300PMU-1 for the system, 48N6E for the missile, and 30N6E1 for the TER.
The S-300PM-1 introduced the 5P85T towed four-round launcher. This time, the missiles elevate to the rear, removing the problems that plagued the S-300PT's ChMAP launchers. The system retained the MAZ-543 for mounting the 30N6-1 radar, and the system's mobility was equal to that of the S-300PS/PM/PMU thanks to the new TEL design.
Fakel's 48N6 missile was a new design, based on the 5V55 series. The 48N6 employed a larger 143 kilogram HE warhead. Guidance methodology and engagement altitude was identical to that of the 5V55RUD, but the range envelope was between 3 and 150 kilometers for airborne targets, and up to 40 kilometers for TBMs.
The 30N6-1 radar shared most of the parameters of the earlier 30N6 and 5N63, but the range was increased to 300 kilometers. A new phased array was also used.
The following image depicts an S-300PM-1 site near Moscow, Russia. Note the tower-mounted 30N6-1 radar located between the TELs and the reload canisters.
Based on imagery interpretation performed in Google Earth, S-300PM-1/PMU-1 SAM systems are currently operational in Russia (11 sites) Greece (2 sites) and China (4 sites).
S-300PM-2 Favorit (SA-20B GARGOYLE)
The ultimate iteration of the S-300P family is the S-300PM-2, known to Russia as the Favorit (Favorite). The export version is the S-300PMU-2, with the export radar being the 30N6E2 and the export missile being the 48N6E1.
The S-300PM-2 introduced improved 5P85SU and 5P85DU TELs, an improved 30N6-2 (TOMB STONE) radar, and the 48N6D missile.
The TELs are analogous to those introduced with the S-300PS, with minor alterations. According to Almaz, the 5P85SU/DU and 5P85T are interchangeable between the S-300PM-1 and S-300PM-2.
System parameters remain unchanged from the S-300PM-1 with the exception of the missile. Fakel's 48N6D SAM incorporates a 180 kilogram directional HE warhead, capable of focusing the blast effects towards the target. Engagement range was increased to 200 kilometers.
Almaz and Fakel also advertise the 9M96 missile as being an option for the S-300PM-2 system. The 9M96 is a highly maneuverable thrust-vectoring active radar weapon available in two variants, the 40 kilometer 9M96 and the 120 kilometer 9M96D. The 9M96 has a minimum altitude of 5 meters, and a maximum of 25,000 meters for the basic version and 30,000 meters for the 9M96D. When employed, a four-pack clip of the smaller missiles displaces one of the 48N6D missile tubes, allowing a maximum of 16 missiles to be carried by a single TEL.
No S-300PM-2 sites are visible in Google Earth, but open press reporting indicates the sale of the S-300PMU-2 system to both China and Vietnam.
EARLY WARNING RADARS
The S-300P family relies on a series of radars for initial early warning and target acquisition. The three radars currently employed by the system are the 5N66/76N6 (CLAM SHELL), the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD), and the 64N6 (BIG BIRD).
The 5N66 (later improved variants were denoted 5N66M or 76N6 and introduced with the S-300PM) is a low-altitude height-finding and detection radar enhancing the system's performance against low-altitude targets. The 5N66 is always employed on a 40V6 mast assembly. The radar has a 120 kilometer range and can track 120 targets.
In the following image of an S-300PMU site deployed near Sevastopol in the Ukraine, the 5N66 radar can clearly be seen positioned to the east of the main site. Typically, the 5N66 is located along the periphery of the site, with the TER being located close to the TELs. This can aid in determining which tower-mounted system is the TER and which one is the 5N66.
The 36D6 was the initial early warning radar employed by the system. It was an E/F band system with a 165 kilometer range. The 36D6 was sometimes offered with initial exports of the system and is still used by China with the S-300PMU-1.
The current early warning radar is the 64N6. The latest version of the system has a range of 300 kilometers. It is a C band system, and can detect 300 targets, track 100, and designate 36 for engagement. The radar has an accuracy of 0.5 degrees in azimuth and elevation and 150 meters in range.
The 64N6 can be tower mounted, as can the 36D6, or it can be operated via the mobile chassis. 64N6 radars are sometimes located adjacent to S-300P sites, but are more commonly found separated from the sites in other locations enabling one 64N6 to serve multiple batteries. The following image depicts a 64N6 deployed near Narva, Russia. The long vehicle with the raised array is the 64N6 vehicle, the shadow of the array can be clearly seen. This site also features two co-located S-300PM-1 batteries, complete with two 30N6-1 and two 5N66M radars.
There are currently a total of 6 36D6 and 17 64N6 radar sites visible, spread between Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and China.
OTHER COMPONENTS
The S-300P is managed by the 83M6 command and control system. Each system can manage up to six separate batteries. The 64N6 radar is typically deployed as part of the 83M6 system, helping to explain why the 64N6 radar sites are typically not co-located with specific firing batteries, although there are exceptions. The Chinese, for example, tend to employ the 64N6 in a command role, with 36D6 radars deployed with S-300P batteries. The 1T12-2M site survey vehicle is typically employed by the 83M6 system to locate optimum sites for the batteries.
Other components employed by the S-300P family include the 22T6 loading vehicle and the 5T58 missile reload transporter. The Baikal-1 and 54K6 command vehicles are also employed by the S-300PT/PS/PM and S-300PM-1/PM-2, respectively. The F-9 shelter unit is provided for TER operators when the radar is mounted on the 40V6 mast assembly.
SYSTEM COVERAGE
The S-300P is a robust system, with excellent range in later variants. To illustrate the range capability of the system, consider the following image. This depicts identified systems in palce around Beijing, China. The large blue rings denote the 64N6 coverage area, with the smaller blue rings denoting the 36D6 coverage areas. Large red rings denote the S-300PMU-1 coverage areas, with the smaller red ring denoting the coverage area of an S-300PMU site.
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