Wednesday, November 14, 2007
Slightly Revised Layout
I've altered the layout over on the right to a small degree. I divided the Recommended Links section into Websites and Blogs. Websites are still those places on the web which I find amusing, and the blogs listed are places which have been found to link to this site in some fashion.
IMINT & Analysis Photo Archive
Digital Photography
I've been an amateur photographer for a few years now, and have built up a pretty large battery of images. I'm going to be using more of them in some upcoming projects for this site, but I figured I'd post a list of the military-themed objects I've photographed and make them available to readers here who are researching some of these items. What you'll find below is a list containing the location I took the photos and the year I was there, followed by the items photographed at that location. Most of these are static images, but some of them, particularly those taken at military open houses, are of aircraft in the air. I was as detailed as I could be from memory looking at the images, so if you see something like "F-4" instead of "F-4G", ask me and I can tell you what the specific model or variant is that I have images of from a given location. The majority of the subjects were shot from numerous angles, and most of them have a number of close-up detail shots as well (equipment bays, antennae, hardpoints, intakes, etc).
Obtaining Images
To obtain digital copies of any of these images for research or personal use, send me an e-mail with a listing of what it is you'd like and what you are requesting the images for, and I'll do my best to accomodate you as soon as possible.
If you wish to obtain images for publication in any fashion (web, periodical, book, etc), I don't charge a fee but I do request the following:
-Credit as the photographer
-A copy of the periodical or other hardcopy publication
-A link to this website if the images are to be used online
Hampton Roads Air Power Park - 2005
AIM-4D
F-86D
F-89
F-101B
F-105
NIKE-AJAX
NIKE-ZEUS
RF-4E
XV-6A Kestrel
Langley AFB Open House - 2007
A-10
B-1B
B-2A
C-130
F-15C
F/A-18F
F-22A
F-35A mockup
F-86
F-117A
US Air Force Heritage Flight: A-10, F-15C, F-22A, F-86
US Air Force Thunderbirds
US Navy Heritage Flight: F/A-18F, F4F
McConnell AFB - 2003
C-130
KC-135R
Saab Gripen
McConnell AFB Open House - 2003
A-10
B-1B
B-17
B-25
B-52D
C-17
CF-188
CP-140
E-6A
F-16
F/A-18C
F-117A
M-109 Paladin
MiG-15UTI
MLRS
Tornado IDS Luftwaffe
T-38A
McConnell AFB Open House - 2004
A6M Zero
AT-6
B-1B
B-2
B-17
B-25
Canadian Air Force Snowbirds
DC-3
F-15
F-16
KC-135R
Learjet 23
P-51
Pearl Harbor Display Flight: A6M, P-51
US Air Force Heritage Flight: F-16, P-51
McConnell AFB Open House - 2006
US Air Force Thunderbirds
McGuire AFB BOMARC Site - 2007
Various shots from outside the now-contaminated site's fenceline
McGuire AFB Open House - 2007
A-10
F-4E
US Army Golden Knights
US Air Force Heritage Flight: A-10, F-4E, P-51
US Air Force Thunderbirds
National Air And Space Museum Udvar Hazy Annex - 2006
707
AGM-76A
AGM-86A
AGM-86B
AIM-120
ASM-135 ASAT
B-29 Enola Gay
Concorde
Corona capsule
Do-335A
F-4
Ho-111h
Homing Overlay Experiment
MiG-21
Reinochter R-1
RIM-8J Talos
Ruhrstahl
SA-2
Silkworm
Space Shuttle Enterprise
SR-71A
X-35B
XAAM-N-3 Sparrow II
XV-15
USAF Museum - scans of old photos taken before I went digital
AIM-4A
AIM-4C
AIM-4D
AIM-4F
AIM-4G
AIM-7
AIM-9
AIM-26B
AIM-120
AIR-2
B-1A
CIM-10
MiG-23MLD
USAF Museum - 2003
A-10
A-37
AC-130
ADM-20
AGM-28
AGM-86B
AGM-129
AGM-131
AIM-4A
AIM-4D
AIM-4F
AIM-4G
AIM-9M
AIM-26B
AIR-2
AN/TPS-1B
Apollo capsule
B-1B
B-2 Iron Bird
B-29 Bock's Car
B-58
Bird Of Prey
BLU-82
C-45H
C-54C
C-118
C-121
CIM-10
D-21B
EF-111A
F-4G
F-15
F-16 AFTI
F-16 Thunderbird
F-100D Thunderbird
F-101B
F-102A
F-105
F-106
F-107A
F-111A
F-111F
F-117A
Fritz-X
GBU-15
Gemini capsule
J-3C-65-8
LANTIRN
MiG-21
MiG-23MLD
Mercury capsule
Model 24 C8F
NT-33A
PA-48
P-51D
P-59B
P-80R
R-13 Atoll
RF-4C
RQ-1
RQ-3
RQ-4
SA-2
SR-71A
T-39A
TACIT BLUE
TACT RAINBOW
Tornado GR.1 RAF
U-4B
UH-13J
V-1
V-2
VC-6A
VC-137A
VC-140B
X-1B
X-3
X-4 Ruhrstahl
X-4
X-5
X-10
X-15
X-24A
X-24B
X-25A
X-29
X-36
X-45
XB-70 Valkyrie
XC-142A
XF-84H
XF-85
XF-91
XF-92
XGAM-63
XH-20
XV-6A
YF-12A
YF-22A
YFH-84H
ZPU-2
ZPU-4
USAF Museum - 2004
AIM-4A
AIM-4D
AIM-4F
AIM-4G
AIM-120
B-2 Iron Bird
B-47
B-57
B-58
BGM-109
D-21B
EF-111A
F-16 Thunderbird
F-101B
F-117A
GBU-24
Mark 41
MiG-23MLD
RF-4C
SR-71A
TACIT BLUE
TACIT RAINBOW
Tornado GR.1 RAF
X-45
USAF Museum - 2005
A-7
ADM-20
AGM-28
AGM-129
B-26K
B-66
CF-100
CGM-13
D-21B
EC-121
EC-135E
Fat Man device
F-4G
F-84
F-100
F-111F
EF-111A
F-117A
MiG-17
MiG-19
Minuteman RV test shape
NKC-135
Peacekeeper railcar
RF-4C
SA-2
SICBM TEL
SR-71A
U-2
USAF Museum - 2007
AGM-129
AGM-131
B-2 Iron Bird
Bird Of Prey
CBU-58
D-21B
DH.89 Dominie
F-16 AFTI
F-102A
F-107A
GBU-12
LoFLYTE
MiG-19
SR-71A Blackbird
TACIT BLUE
X-10
X-13
X-29
XB-70 Valkyrie
XF-91 Thunderceptor
XH-20
XV-6A Kestrel
YF-12A Blackbird
YF-22A
YQM-94A
USS Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space Museum - 2005
A-4
A-6F
A-12 Blackbird
AGM-84
AV-8A
BGM-109
Concorde
Dassault Etendard IVP
F7U
F-4
F-8
F-14B
Gemini capsule
IAI Kfir F-21A
Mb-339
Mercury capsule
RGM-6
Standard SM-1
T-72
Virginia Aviation Museum - 2005
SR-71A
I've been an amateur photographer for a few years now, and have built up a pretty large battery of images. I'm going to be using more of them in some upcoming projects for this site, but I figured I'd post a list of the military-themed objects I've photographed and make them available to readers here who are researching some of these items. What you'll find below is a list containing the location I took the photos and the year I was there, followed by the items photographed at that location. Most of these are static images, but some of them, particularly those taken at military open houses, are of aircraft in the air. I was as detailed as I could be from memory looking at the images, so if you see something like "F-4" instead of "F-4G", ask me and I can tell you what the specific model or variant is that I have images of from a given location. The majority of the subjects were shot from numerous angles, and most of them have a number of close-up detail shots as well (equipment bays, antennae, hardpoints, intakes, etc).
Obtaining Images
To obtain digital copies of any of these images for research or personal use, send me an e-mail with a listing of what it is you'd like and what you are requesting the images for, and I'll do my best to accomodate you as soon as possible.
If you wish to obtain images for publication in any fashion (web, periodical, book, etc), I don't charge a fee but I do request the following:
-Credit as the photographer
-A copy of the periodical or other hardcopy publication
-A link to this website if the images are to be used online
Hampton Roads Air Power Park - 2005
AIM-4D
F-86D
F-89
F-101B
F-105
NIKE-AJAX
NIKE-ZEUS
RF-4E
XV-6A Kestrel
Langley AFB Open House - 2007
A-10
B-1B
B-2A
C-130
F-15C
F/A-18F
F-22A
F-35A mockup
F-86
F-117A
US Air Force Heritage Flight: A-10, F-15C, F-22A, F-86
US Air Force Thunderbirds
US Navy Heritage Flight: F/A-18F, F4F
McConnell AFB - 2003
C-130
KC-135R
Saab Gripen
McConnell AFB Open House - 2003
A-10
B-1B
B-17
B-25
B-52D
C-17
CF-188
CP-140
E-6A
F-16
F/A-18C
F-117A
M-109 Paladin
MiG-15UTI
MLRS
Tornado IDS Luftwaffe
T-38A
McConnell AFB Open House - 2004
A6M Zero
AT-6
B-1B
B-2
B-17
B-25
Canadian Air Force Snowbirds
DC-3
F-15
F-16
KC-135R
Learjet 23
P-51
Pearl Harbor Display Flight: A6M, P-51
US Air Force Heritage Flight: F-16, P-51
McConnell AFB Open House - 2006
US Air Force Thunderbirds
McGuire AFB BOMARC Site - 2007
Various shots from outside the now-contaminated site's fenceline
McGuire AFB Open House - 2007
A-10
F-4E
US Army Golden Knights
US Air Force Heritage Flight: A-10, F-4E, P-51
US Air Force Thunderbirds
National Air And Space Museum Udvar Hazy Annex - 2006
707
AGM-76A
AGM-86A
AGM-86B
AIM-120
ASM-135 ASAT
B-29 Enola Gay
Concorde
Corona capsule
Do-335A
F-4
Ho-111h
Homing Overlay Experiment
MiG-21
Reinochter R-1
RIM-8J Talos
Ruhrstahl
SA-2
Silkworm
Space Shuttle Enterprise
SR-71A
X-35B
XAAM-N-3 Sparrow II
XV-15
USAF Museum - scans of old photos taken before I went digital
AIM-4A
AIM-4C
AIM-4D
AIM-4F
AIM-4G
AIM-7
AIM-9
AIM-26B
AIM-120
AIR-2
B-1A
CIM-10
MiG-23MLD
USAF Museum - 2003
A-10
A-37
AC-130
ADM-20
AGM-28
AGM-86B
AGM-129
AGM-131
AIM-4A
AIM-4D
AIM-4F
AIM-4G
AIM-9M
AIM-26B
AIR-2
AN/TPS-1B
Apollo capsule
B-1B
B-2 Iron Bird
B-29 Bock's Car
B-58
Bird Of Prey
BLU-82
C-45H
C-54C
C-118
C-121
CIM-10
D-21B
EF-111A
F-4G
F-15
F-16 AFTI
F-16 Thunderbird
F-100D Thunderbird
F-101B
F-102A
F-105
F-106
F-107A
F-111A
F-111F
F-117A
Fritz-X
GBU-15
Gemini capsule
J-3C-65-8
LANTIRN
MiG-21
MiG-23MLD
Mercury capsule
Model 24 C8F
NT-33A
PA-48
P-51D
P-59B
P-80R
R-13 Atoll
RF-4C
RQ-1
RQ-3
RQ-4
SA-2
SR-71A
T-39A
TACIT BLUE
TACT RAINBOW
Tornado GR.1 RAF
U-4B
UH-13J
V-1
V-2
VC-6A
VC-137A
VC-140B
X-1B
X-3
X-4 Ruhrstahl
X-4
X-5
X-10
X-15
X-24A
X-24B
X-25A
X-29
X-36
X-45
XB-70 Valkyrie
XC-142A
XF-84H
XF-85
XF-91
XF-92
XGAM-63
XH-20
XV-6A
YF-12A
YF-22A
YFH-84H
ZPU-2
ZPU-4
USAF Museum - 2004
AIM-4A
AIM-4D
AIM-4F
AIM-4G
AIM-120
B-2 Iron Bird
B-47
B-57
B-58
BGM-109
D-21B
EF-111A
F-16 Thunderbird
F-101B
F-117A
GBU-24
Mark 41
MiG-23MLD
RF-4C
SR-71A
TACIT BLUE
TACIT RAINBOW
Tornado GR.1 RAF
X-45
USAF Museum - 2005
A-7
ADM-20
AGM-28
AGM-129
B-26K
B-66
CF-100
CGM-13
D-21B
EC-121
EC-135E
Fat Man device
F-4G
F-84
F-100
F-111F
EF-111A
F-117A
MiG-17
MiG-19
Minuteman RV test shape
NKC-135
Peacekeeper railcar
RF-4C
SA-2
SICBM TEL
SR-71A
U-2
USAF Museum - 2007
AGM-129
AGM-131
B-2 Iron Bird
Bird Of Prey
CBU-58
D-21B
DH.89 Dominie
F-16 AFTI
F-102A
F-107A
GBU-12
LoFLYTE
MiG-19
SR-71A Blackbird
TACIT BLUE
X-10
X-13
X-29
XB-70 Valkyrie
XF-91 Thunderceptor
XH-20
XV-6A Kestrel
YF-12A Blackbird
YF-22A
YQM-94A
USS Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space Museum - 2005
A-4
A-6F
A-12 Blackbird
AGM-84
AV-8A
BGM-109
Concorde
Dassault Etendard IVP
F7U
F-4
F-8
F-14B
Gemini capsule
IAI Kfir F-21A
Mb-339
Mercury capsule
RGM-6
Standard SM-1
T-72
Virginia Aviation Museum - 2005
SR-71A
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
Updates to older articles
With the recent substantial updates to the SAM site file available here for download, I have begun to update some of the older SAM site and SAM network articles. The Syrian article was recently finished, and readers will note that it has jumped back to the top of the pile, as I have changed the post date to reflect the date it was updated. This will continue to be standard practice as I provide some significant updates to older articles published here.
As always, comments and feedback are welcome.
As always, comments and feedback are welcome.
The Syrian SAM Network
INTRODUCTION
Of all the Middle Eastern nations, Syria would appear to have one of the most robust SAM networks. Multiple SAM sites provide redundancy, allowing for overlapping coverage in critical areas and protecting against a loss of capability should one site be eliminated. It should come as no suprise that evidence of a recent illegal incursion into sovereign Syrian airspace by the Israeli air force was found in an area largely undefended by SAM systems.
SAM SYSTEMS
The Syrian air defense network relies primarily on Soviet-era SAM systems. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: SA-2 GUIDELINE, SA-3 GOA, SA-5 GAMMON, and SA-6 GAINFUL.
Currently, there are 97 active SAM sites inside of Syria. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. SA-2 sites are red, SA-3 sites are blue, SA-5 sites are purple, and SA-6 sites are green. Empty sites are denoted by white icons.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Syrian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, SA-2 range rings are red, SA-3 rings are blue, SA-5 rings are purple, and SA-6 rings are green.
SA-2 GUIDELINE
There are currently 30 active SA-2 sites at the following locations:
36 14' 22.60" N 37 18' 23.92" E
36 03' 24.09" N 37 10' 16.04" E
35 57' 13.79" N 37 16' 06.58" E
36 04' 12.06" N 37 20' 29.65" E
35 13' 45.77" N 36 52' 18.48" E
35 40' 24.99" N 35 47' 15.39" E
35 36' 20.83" N 35 51' 56.57" E
35 24' 45.85" N 35 55' 19.86" E
35 10' 04.21" N 36 03' 06.47" E
34 50' 43.56" N 35 54' 54.95" E
34 49' 59.87" N 36 41' 59.26" E
34 40' 20.40" N 36 43' 21.47" E
34 39' 13.58" N 36 44' 35.90" E
34 36' 33.46" N 36 40' 39.68" E
34 27' 00.19" N 37 39' 57.33" E
34 28' 47.08" N 37 37' 50.90" E
33 38' 13.45" N 36 53' 20.08" E
33 32' 50.16" N 36 46' 29.99" E
33 35' 19.54" N 36 37' 06.35" E
33 21' 28.37" N 36 06' 37.49" E
33 29' 53.35" N 36 37' 08.44" E
33 26' 07.02" N 36 30' 53.34" E
33 23' 19.67" N 36 43' 42.86" E
33 17' 01.96" N 36 23' 40.16" E
33 06' 24.58" N 36 36' 45.17" E
33 02' 07.52" N 36 12' 03.35" E
32 49' 52.17" N 36 13' 40.58" E
32 48' 13.79" N 36 19' 30.70" E
32 42' 17.13" N 36 14' 53.99" E
32 35' 52.28" N 36 21' 12.33" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-2 sites:
SA-3 GOA
There are currently 32 active SA-3 sites at the following locations:
36 17' 51.31" N 37 09' 34.63" E
36 13' 16.96" N 37 04' 51.69" E
35 38' 55.23" N 37 06' 48.03" E
36 11' 20.09" N 37 27' 13.60" E
35 58' 49.86" N 37 25' 32.69" E
35 23' 54.14" N 36 54' 02.93" E
35 37' 53.32" N 35 47' 09.01" E
35 33' 48.45" N 35 44' 15.29" E
35 30' 55.46" N 35 48' 58.88" E
35 28' 41.92" N 35 52' 44.63" E
35 19' 52.45" N 35 55' 27.85" E
35 12' 36.57" N 36 15' 24.91" E
35 02' 57.07" N 35 54' 17.33" E
34 55' 08.54" N 35 53' 22.21" E
34 50' 52.71" N 35 59' 23.50" E
34 43' 31.87" N 35 59' 21.25" E
34 40' 57.18" N 36 04' 33.37" E
34 42' 25.16" N 36 47' 17.55" E
34 32' 56.12" N 36 38' 04.93" E
34 32' 42.00" N 36 45' 08.29" E
34 32' 06.07" N 37 35' 05.57" E
34 31' 17.63" N 37 41' 01.54" E
33 33' 34.31" N 36 18' 22.28" E
33 26' 46.27" N 36 18' 52.61" E
33 32' 20.57" N 36 27' 16.79" E
33 28' 25.37" N 36 06' 56.16" E
33 21' 11.45" N 36 32' 53.60" E
32 59' 34.32" N 36 20' 42.87" E
32 56' 09.83" N 36 12' 37.84" E
32 46' 16.58" N 36 10' 42.73" E
32 42' 05.58" N 36 23' 41.63" E
32 36' 24.93" N 36 14' 45.69" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-3 sites:
SA-5 GAMMON
There are currently 5 active SA-5 sites at the following locations:
35 09' 18.84" N 36 15' 29.51" E
34 57' 23.39" N 36 15' 28.67" E
34 37' 32.98" N 36 46' 18.83" E
33 32' 37.99" N 36 41' 10.92" E
33 10' 48.46" N 36 34' 52.32" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-5 sites:
SA-6 GAINFUL
There are currently 30 active SA-6 sites at the following locations:
34 38' 16.77" N 36 50' 41.08" E
34 38' 50.18" N 36 44' 02.47" E
34 35' 30.41" N 36 42' 54.05" E
34 27' 14.54" N 36 57' 42.26" E
33 54' 31.31" N 36 53' 51.70" E
33 43' 51.05" N 36 44' 58.59" E
33 43' 04.01" N 36 29' 40.89" E
33 45' 39.84" N 36 00' 38.81" E
33 39' 20.57" N 35 57' 31.46" E
33 39' 15.92" N 35 59' 44.30" E
33 38' 32.23" N 36 03' 14.28" E
33 36' 26.82" N 36 05' 22.55" E
33 32' 32.30" N 36 42' 28.88" E
33 37' 06.92" N 36 39' 09.71" E
33 35' 25.10" N 36 34' 18.25" E
33 32' 30.71" N 36 35' 46.14" E
33 28' 14.56" N 36 38' 39.46" E
33 34' 39.70" N 36 12' 16.82" E
33 33' 28.02" N 36 09' 26.14" E
33 24' 21.97" N 36 09' 12.80" E
33 25' 31.15" N 36 06' 44.76" E
33 20' 41.33" N 36 08' 17.10" E
33 18' 53.87" N 36 12' 02.74" E
33 16' 20.55" N 36 09' 56.66" E
33 04' 13.62" N 36 13' 31.90" E
33 03' 29.14" N 36 10' 18.70" E
32 51' 09.39" N 36 12' 03.50" E
32 48' 41.35" N 36 08' 10.67" E
32 47' 41.25" N 36 11' 53.29" E
32 46' 02.93" N 36 05' 53.48" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-6 sites:
EMPTY SITES
There are currently 31 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Syria. These sites have been identified as either SA-2, SA-3, or SA-5 sites, based on their configurations.
Syria's empty SAM sites are located at the following coordinates:
SA-2 36 09' 03.04" N 36 59' 05.75" E
SA-2 35 45' 15.89" N 36 57' 28.80" E
SA-2 35 33' 02.94" N 36 54' 09.67" E
SA-2 35 31' 58.81" N 35 49' 08.27" E
SA-2 35 15' 09.81" N 35 56' 14.41" E
SA-2 35 07' 49.90" N 35 57' 43.20" E
SA-2 34 47' 53.82" N 36 00' 49.81" E
SA-2 34 51' 04.53" N 35 59' 33.97" E
SA-2 34 57' 57.64" N 35 55' 35.07" E
SA-2 34 42' 05.06" N 36 12' 16.26" E
SA-2 34 40' 53.75" N 36 27' 57.81" E
SA-2 34 47' 23.26" N 36 36' 56.66" E
SA-2 34 36' 52.02" N 36 35' 48.04" E
SA-2 34 35' 56.57" N 36 40' 55.83" E
SA-2 34 31' 00.74" N 37 41' 08.36" E
SA-2 34 26' 59.27" N 36 57' 28.76" E
SA-2 33 36' 02.26" N 36 48' 39.67" E
SA-2 33 32' 50.59" N 36 41' 04.93" E
SA-2 33 35' 19.36" N 36 37' 00.77" E
SA-2 33 34' 51.11" N 36 38' 25.80" E
SA-2 33 33' 17.64" N 36 09' 36.82" E
SA-2 33 33' 18.14" N 36 10' 14.71" E
SA-2 33 29' 28.24" N 36 24' 59.08" E
SA-2 33 26' 54.63" N 36 24' 55.35" E
SA-2 32 54' 23.49" N 36 23' 01.42" E
SA-3 36 08' 14.98" N 37 06' 07.48" E
SA-3 35 07' 03.27" N 35 53' 52.17" E
SA-3 34 29' 27.20" N 37 37' 36.67" E
SA-3 34 30' 00.61" N 37 43' 01.38" E
SA-3 33 28' 23.73" N 36 07' 23.69" E
SA-5 32 47' 55.18" N 36 17' 42.85" E
These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.
An overview of empty Syrian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK
The Syrian air defense network would appear to be concentrated in six areas. These areas are around the cities of Hims, Halad, and Damascus, Tiyas air base, the Mediterranean coastal area, and the area adjacent to the Golan Heights. These SAM concentrations are emplaced to defend against obvious potential threat ingress routes. The largest perceived threat to Syrian sovereign airspace is Israeli air force activity. Syria enjoyed a relatively equitable relationship with Iraq, and as such did not see a need to deploy air defense assets in the eastern part of the nation. This "empty" airspace could easily be patrolled by MiG-23, MiG-25, or MiG-29 interceptors if the need arose.
There are important issues with the Syrian SAM network that need to be addressed. The main issue is the nature of the SAM systems themselves. All of the SAM systems in the Syrian inventory have a single-target engagement capability. Some of the SA-5 sites have been noted with multiple SQUARE PAIR engagement radars, allowing those sites to engage multiple targets (one per engagement radar), but the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 sites can only engage one target per site. This leaves the Syrian air defense network open to saturation. Another issue is the employment of the SA-6 in a strategic role tied to fixed sites to provide close-in defense. The SA-6 has been exploited thouroughly by both the American and Israeli militaries and as such cannot be counted on to reliably defend against an airborne threat. The same could be said of the SA-2 and SA-3 SAM systems as well, of course, but the SA-6 suffers from the additional drawback of being constrained to a fixed location. The SA-6 is most effective on the move, whereby it can catch opposing aircraft off-guard by appearing in new locations that were previously undocumented. This may be a part of the Syrian strategy, but for now, the SA-6 remains a stationary target insofar as how it is currently deployed. Syrian reliance on aging and well-known Soviet-era SAM systems is a serious defensive liability. This is certainly part of the impetus behind Syria's current drive to purchase more advanced SAM systems from Russia.
Another important issue to address is the fact that there are two noticeable gaps in Syrian SAM coverage, which can be seen in the overview graphic provided above. While these areas are in fact covered by SA-5 sites, they lack any sort of low-altitude coverage or close-in defense. Approximately midway between Damascus and Hims, and midway between Al Lathqiyah and Halab, are large gaps in the SAM coverage, areas where there are not even identified empty sites where fixed systems such as the SA-2 or SA-3 could be emplaced if needbe. These gaps are not necessarily an invitation to invasion, however, as key targets such as the capital are still heavily defended.
The first area to be examined is the area surrounding the capital of Damascus. Damascus is defended by eight SA-2 sites, five SA-3 sites, and nineteen SA-6 sites. Two of Syria's five active SA-5 sites are also located in close vicinity to the capital. Nine empty dispersal sites are also in the area, providing for an increase in defensive capabilities in the area should the need arise. SAM coverage of the capital is relatively robust even without the addition of further SAM sites, and careful placement of SA-3 and SA-6 batteries provides overlapping close-in defense in conjunction with the longer-range SA-2 sites. A number of the SA-6 sites are also positioned to defend the border area to the west.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Damascus:
Apart from the capital, the most important piece of real estate in Syria may be that in the southwest, adjacent to the Golan Heights. This area is defended by six SA-2 sites, five SA-3 sites, and seven SA-6 sites. One of the SA-5 sites located south of Damascus also can provide coverage of this area. While there are only two identified dispersal sites in the area, the large concentration of SAM systems provides a very well put together air defense network over southwestern Syria. The large number of SA-6 sites is clearly meant to counter the threat posed by Israeli air force fighter aircraft, the SA-6 being more maneuverable and better suited to engaging fast jets than the more strategic-oriented SA-2 and SA-3 systems.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage of southwestern Syria:
The Golan-area SAM network is clearly oriented to provide a sort of barrier air defense against airborne threats ingressing from the west. The same sort of barrier air defense network can be found along Syria's Mediterranean coastline to the north. Extending from Al Lathqiyah to Tartus, five SA-2 and eleven SA-3 sites provide air defense along Syria's northwestern border with the sea. There are also two SA-5 sites in the area to provide long-range air defense over open water. Eight dispersal sites in the area are situated to provide an increase in defensive capability in the area. In the end, however, the current status of Syria's northwestern air defense network is such that it provides an easy point of ingress into the nation's inner territory. By eliminating two SA-2 and one SA-3 sites, an enemy can gain access to Syrian airspace at low level, thereby avoiding an engagement by the SA-5 sites in the area. This leaves the task of intercepting these intruders to the inadequate interceptor force of obsolete MiG-23 and MiG-25 interceptors, along with GCI-constrained early model MiG-29s.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage of Syria's northwestern coastline:
The remainder of Syrian SAM sites are concentrated around the cities of Hims, Hama and Halab, and Tiyas air base in the central portion of the nation. Hims is defended by four SA-2, three SA-3, and four SA-6 sites, with a nearby SA-5 site and five dispersal sites providing added firepower if necessary. Hama is defended by a single SA-2 and a single SA-3 site, with one dispersal site present in the area. Halab is defended by four SA-2 and five SA-3 sites, with three dispersal sites present in the area. Tiyas AB is defended by two SA-2 and two SA-3 sites, with three dispersal sites available if necessary. None of these locations enjoy air defenses nearly as robust or organized as that surrounding Damascus, but they do provide a heightened degree of security and are overlapping and redundant to a limited degree. They may not be able to fend off a full-scale air assault, but they should be able to deal with a limited strike.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Hims:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Hama:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Halab:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Tiyas AB:
CONCLUSION
Syria's SAM network is very robust on paper, and would appear to offer a significant degree of protection at first glance, but this is not necessarily the case. Against a limited opponent, the Syrian air defense network should be able to hold its own. But, the reliance on Soviet-era SAM systems provides a serious handicap when facing a modern opponent. There are also two obvious gaps in the coverage which would need to be filled in order to provide a true barrier air defense capability over the entire western part of the nation. Clearly, it is time for Syria to modernize its air defense network, especially given the recent propensity for Israeli activity over its skies.
SOURCES
-SAM ranges taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.
-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.
Of all the Middle Eastern nations, Syria would appear to have one of the most robust SAM networks. Multiple SAM sites provide redundancy, allowing for overlapping coverage in critical areas and protecting against a loss of capability should one site be eliminated. It should come as no suprise that evidence of a recent illegal incursion into sovereign Syrian airspace by the Israeli air force was found in an area largely undefended by SAM systems.
SAM SYSTEMS
The Syrian air defense network relies primarily on Soviet-era SAM systems. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: SA-2 GUIDELINE, SA-3 GOA, SA-5 GAMMON, and SA-6 GAINFUL.
Currently, there are 97 active SAM sites inside of Syria. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. SA-2 sites are red, SA-3 sites are blue, SA-5 sites are purple, and SA-6 sites are green. Empty sites are denoted by white icons.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Syrian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, SA-2 range rings are red, SA-3 rings are blue, SA-5 rings are purple, and SA-6 rings are green.
SA-2 GUIDELINE
There are currently 30 active SA-2 sites at the following locations:
36 14' 22.60" N 37 18' 23.92" E
36 03' 24.09" N 37 10' 16.04" E
35 57' 13.79" N 37 16' 06.58" E
36 04' 12.06" N 37 20' 29.65" E
35 13' 45.77" N 36 52' 18.48" E
35 40' 24.99" N 35 47' 15.39" E
35 36' 20.83" N 35 51' 56.57" E
35 24' 45.85" N 35 55' 19.86" E
35 10' 04.21" N 36 03' 06.47" E
34 50' 43.56" N 35 54' 54.95" E
34 49' 59.87" N 36 41' 59.26" E
34 40' 20.40" N 36 43' 21.47" E
34 39' 13.58" N 36 44' 35.90" E
34 36' 33.46" N 36 40' 39.68" E
34 27' 00.19" N 37 39' 57.33" E
34 28' 47.08" N 37 37' 50.90" E
33 38' 13.45" N 36 53' 20.08" E
33 32' 50.16" N 36 46' 29.99" E
33 35' 19.54" N 36 37' 06.35" E
33 21' 28.37" N 36 06' 37.49" E
33 29' 53.35" N 36 37' 08.44" E
33 26' 07.02" N 36 30' 53.34" E
33 23' 19.67" N 36 43' 42.86" E
33 17' 01.96" N 36 23' 40.16" E
33 06' 24.58" N 36 36' 45.17" E
33 02' 07.52" N 36 12' 03.35" E
32 49' 52.17" N 36 13' 40.58" E
32 48' 13.79" N 36 19' 30.70" E
32 42' 17.13" N 36 14' 53.99" E
32 35' 52.28" N 36 21' 12.33" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-2 sites:
SA-3 GOA
There are currently 32 active SA-3 sites at the following locations:
36 17' 51.31" N 37 09' 34.63" E
36 13' 16.96" N 37 04' 51.69" E
35 38' 55.23" N 37 06' 48.03" E
36 11' 20.09" N 37 27' 13.60" E
35 58' 49.86" N 37 25' 32.69" E
35 23' 54.14" N 36 54' 02.93" E
35 37' 53.32" N 35 47' 09.01" E
35 33' 48.45" N 35 44' 15.29" E
35 30' 55.46" N 35 48' 58.88" E
35 28' 41.92" N 35 52' 44.63" E
35 19' 52.45" N 35 55' 27.85" E
35 12' 36.57" N 36 15' 24.91" E
35 02' 57.07" N 35 54' 17.33" E
34 55' 08.54" N 35 53' 22.21" E
34 50' 52.71" N 35 59' 23.50" E
34 43' 31.87" N 35 59' 21.25" E
34 40' 57.18" N 36 04' 33.37" E
34 42' 25.16" N 36 47' 17.55" E
34 32' 56.12" N 36 38' 04.93" E
34 32' 42.00" N 36 45' 08.29" E
34 32' 06.07" N 37 35' 05.57" E
34 31' 17.63" N 37 41' 01.54" E
33 33' 34.31" N 36 18' 22.28" E
33 26' 46.27" N 36 18' 52.61" E
33 32' 20.57" N 36 27' 16.79" E
33 28' 25.37" N 36 06' 56.16" E
33 21' 11.45" N 36 32' 53.60" E
32 59' 34.32" N 36 20' 42.87" E
32 56' 09.83" N 36 12' 37.84" E
32 46' 16.58" N 36 10' 42.73" E
32 42' 05.58" N 36 23' 41.63" E
32 36' 24.93" N 36 14' 45.69" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-3 sites:
SA-5 GAMMON
There are currently 5 active SA-5 sites at the following locations:
35 09' 18.84" N 36 15' 29.51" E
34 57' 23.39" N 36 15' 28.67" E
34 37' 32.98" N 36 46' 18.83" E
33 32' 37.99" N 36 41' 10.92" E
33 10' 48.46" N 36 34' 52.32" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-5 sites:
SA-6 GAINFUL
There are currently 30 active SA-6 sites at the following locations:
34 38' 16.77" N 36 50' 41.08" E
34 38' 50.18" N 36 44' 02.47" E
34 35' 30.41" N 36 42' 54.05" E
34 27' 14.54" N 36 57' 42.26" E
33 54' 31.31" N 36 53' 51.70" E
33 43' 51.05" N 36 44' 58.59" E
33 43' 04.01" N 36 29' 40.89" E
33 45' 39.84" N 36 00' 38.81" E
33 39' 20.57" N 35 57' 31.46" E
33 39' 15.92" N 35 59' 44.30" E
33 38' 32.23" N 36 03' 14.28" E
33 36' 26.82" N 36 05' 22.55" E
33 32' 32.30" N 36 42' 28.88" E
33 37' 06.92" N 36 39' 09.71" E
33 35' 25.10" N 36 34' 18.25" E
33 32' 30.71" N 36 35' 46.14" E
33 28' 14.56" N 36 38' 39.46" E
33 34' 39.70" N 36 12' 16.82" E
33 33' 28.02" N 36 09' 26.14" E
33 24' 21.97" N 36 09' 12.80" E
33 25' 31.15" N 36 06' 44.76" E
33 20' 41.33" N 36 08' 17.10" E
33 18' 53.87" N 36 12' 02.74" E
33 16' 20.55" N 36 09' 56.66" E
33 04' 13.62" N 36 13' 31.90" E
33 03' 29.14" N 36 10' 18.70" E
32 51' 09.39" N 36 12' 03.50" E
32 48' 41.35" N 36 08' 10.67" E
32 47' 41.25" N 36 11' 53.29" E
32 46' 02.93" N 36 05' 53.48" E
The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-6 sites:
EMPTY SITES
There are currently 31 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Syria. These sites have been identified as either SA-2, SA-3, or SA-5 sites, based on their configurations.
Syria's empty SAM sites are located at the following coordinates:
SA-2 36 09' 03.04" N 36 59' 05.75" E
SA-2 35 45' 15.89" N 36 57' 28.80" E
SA-2 35 33' 02.94" N 36 54' 09.67" E
SA-2 35 31' 58.81" N 35 49' 08.27" E
SA-2 35 15' 09.81" N 35 56' 14.41" E
SA-2 35 07' 49.90" N 35 57' 43.20" E
SA-2 34 47' 53.82" N 36 00' 49.81" E
SA-2 34 51' 04.53" N 35 59' 33.97" E
SA-2 34 57' 57.64" N 35 55' 35.07" E
SA-2 34 42' 05.06" N 36 12' 16.26" E
SA-2 34 40' 53.75" N 36 27' 57.81" E
SA-2 34 47' 23.26" N 36 36' 56.66" E
SA-2 34 36' 52.02" N 36 35' 48.04" E
SA-2 34 35' 56.57" N 36 40' 55.83" E
SA-2 34 31' 00.74" N 37 41' 08.36" E
SA-2 34 26' 59.27" N 36 57' 28.76" E
SA-2 33 36' 02.26" N 36 48' 39.67" E
SA-2 33 32' 50.59" N 36 41' 04.93" E
SA-2 33 35' 19.36" N 36 37' 00.77" E
SA-2 33 34' 51.11" N 36 38' 25.80" E
SA-2 33 33' 17.64" N 36 09' 36.82" E
SA-2 33 33' 18.14" N 36 10' 14.71" E
SA-2 33 29' 28.24" N 36 24' 59.08" E
SA-2 33 26' 54.63" N 36 24' 55.35" E
SA-2 32 54' 23.49" N 36 23' 01.42" E
SA-3 36 08' 14.98" N 37 06' 07.48" E
SA-3 35 07' 03.27" N 35 53' 52.17" E
SA-3 34 29' 27.20" N 37 37' 36.67" E
SA-3 34 30' 00.61" N 37 43' 01.38" E
SA-3 33 28' 23.73" N 36 07' 23.69" E
SA-5 32 47' 55.18" N 36 17' 42.85" E
These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.
An overview of empty Syrian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK
The Syrian air defense network would appear to be concentrated in six areas. These areas are around the cities of Hims, Halad, and Damascus, Tiyas air base, the Mediterranean coastal area, and the area adjacent to the Golan Heights. These SAM concentrations are emplaced to defend against obvious potential threat ingress routes. The largest perceived threat to Syrian sovereign airspace is Israeli air force activity. Syria enjoyed a relatively equitable relationship with Iraq, and as such did not see a need to deploy air defense assets in the eastern part of the nation. This "empty" airspace could easily be patrolled by MiG-23, MiG-25, or MiG-29 interceptors if the need arose.
There are important issues with the Syrian SAM network that need to be addressed. The main issue is the nature of the SAM systems themselves. All of the SAM systems in the Syrian inventory have a single-target engagement capability. Some of the SA-5 sites have been noted with multiple SQUARE PAIR engagement radars, allowing those sites to engage multiple targets (one per engagement radar), but the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 sites can only engage one target per site. This leaves the Syrian air defense network open to saturation. Another issue is the employment of the SA-6 in a strategic role tied to fixed sites to provide close-in defense. The SA-6 has been exploited thouroughly by both the American and Israeli militaries and as such cannot be counted on to reliably defend against an airborne threat. The same could be said of the SA-2 and SA-3 SAM systems as well, of course, but the SA-6 suffers from the additional drawback of being constrained to a fixed location. The SA-6 is most effective on the move, whereby it can catch opposing aircraft off-guard by appearing in new locations that were previously undocumented. This may be a part of the Syrian strategy, but for now, the SA-6 remains a stationary target insofar as how it is currently deployed. Syrian reliance on aging and well-known Soviet-era SAM systems is a serious defensive liability. This is certainly part of the impetus behind Syria's current drive to purchase more advanced SAM systems from Russia.
Another important issue to address is the fact that there are two noticeable gaps in Syrian SAM coverage, which can be seen in the overview graphic provided above. While these areas are in fact covered by SA-5 sites, they lack any sort of low-altitude coverage or close-in defense. Approximately midway between Damascus and Hims, and midway between Al Lathqiyah and Halab, are large gaps in the SAM coverage, areas where there are not even identified empty sites where fixed systems such as the SA-2 or SA-3 could be emplaced if needbe. These gaps are not necessarily an invitation to invasion, however, as key targets such as the capital are still heavily defended.
The first area to be examined is the area surrounding the capital of Damascus. Damascus is defended by eight SA-2 sites, five SA-3 sites, and nineteen SA-6 sites. Two of Syria's five active SA-5 sites are also located in close vicinity to the capital. Nine empty dispersal sites are also in the area, providing for an increase in defensive capabilities in the area should the need arise. SAM coverage of the capital is relatively robust even without the addition of further SAM sites, and careful placement of SA-3 and SA-6 batteries provides overlapping close-in defense in conjunction with the longer-range SA-2 sites. A number of the SA-6 sites are also positioned to defend the border area to the west.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Damascus:
Apart from the capital, the most important piece of real estate in Syria may be that in the southwest, adjacent to the Golan Heights. This area is defended by six SA-2 sites, five SA-3 sites, and seven SA-6 sites. One of the SA-5 sites located south of Damascus also can provide coverage of this area. While there are only two identified dispersal sites in the area, the large concentration of SAM systems provides a very well put together air defense network over southwestern Syria. The large number of SA-6 sites is clearly meant to counter the threat posed by Israeli air force fighter aircraft, the SA-6 being more maneuverable and better suited to engaging fast jets than the more strategic-oriented SA-2 and SA-3 systems.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage of southwestern Syria:
The Golan-area SAM network is clearly oriented to provide a sort of barrier air defense against airborne threats ingressing from the west. The same sort of barrier air defense network can be found along Syria's Mediterranean coastline to the north. Extending from Al Lathqiyah to Tartus, five SA-2 and eleven SA-3 sites provide air defense along Syria's northwestern border with the sea. There are also two SA-5 sites in the area to provide long-range air defense over open water. Eight dispersal sites in the area are situated to provide an increase in defensive capability in the area. In the end, however, the current status of Syria's northwestern air defense network is such that it provides an easy point of ingress into the nation's inner territory. By eliminating two SA-2 and one SA-3 sites, an enemy can gain access to Syrian airspace at low level, thereby avoiding an engagement by the SA-5 sites in the area. This leaves the task of intercepting these intruders to the inadequate interceptor force of obsolete MiG-23 and MiG-25 interceptors, along with GCI-constrained early model MiG-29s.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage of Syria's northwestern coastline:
The remainder of Syrian SAM sites are concentrated around the cities of Hims, Hama and Halab, and Tiyas air base in the central portion of the nation. Hims is defended by four SA-2, three SA-3, and four SA-6 sites, with a nearby SA-5 site and five dispersal sites providing added firepower if necessary. Hama is defended by a single SA-2 and a single SA-3 site, with one dispersal site present in the area. Halab is defended by four SA-2 and five SA-3 sites, with three dispersal sites present in the area. Tiyas AB is defended by two SA-2 and two SA-3 sites, with three dispersal sites available if necessary. None of these locations enjoy air defenses nearly as robust or organized as that surrounding Damascus, but they do provide a heightened degree of security and are overlapping and redundant to a limited degree. They may not be able to fend off a full-scale air assault, but they should be able to deal with a limited strike.
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Hims:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Hama:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Halab:
The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Tiyas AB:
CONCLUSION
Syria's SAM network is very robust on paper, and would appear to offer a significant degree of protection at first glance, but this is not necessarily the case. Against a limited opponent, the Syrian air defense network should be able to hold its own. But, the reliance on Soviet-era SAM systems provides a serious handicap when facing a modern opponent. There are also two obvious gaps in the coverage which would need to be filled in order to provide a true barrier air defense capability over the entire western part of the nation. Clearly, it is time for Syria to modernize its air defense network, especially given the recent propensity for Israeli activity over its skies.
SOURCES
-SAM ranges taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.
-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.
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