Image of the Week: YF-23 RCS pole model

THE "THIRD YF-23"

Approximately 50 kilometers northeast of the RATSCAT RCS range lies a storage area for target aircraft serving a nearby weapons range. As seen in the image above from November of 2006, one of the items appears to be a YF-23 prototype. It can be said with complete certainty that the object is not one of the two flying prototypes. At the time the image was captured, AV-1 was in the restoration hangar at the USAF Museum. AV-2 was located in Hawthorne, California at the Northrop plant. The object in question is not a previously undocumented third prototype, but rather the full-scale RCS test article. With the demise of Northrop's ATF bid, the RCS test article was likely transported from the RATSCAT range to this facility for storage. While it does seem strange for such an object to be consigned to open storage, it may have been left near the RATSCAT range to allow for refurbushment and modification to support ongoing low-RCS research. The airframe could simply be trucked back to the secure RCS test facility and be prepared for further testing as needed, without having to expose it to a more publicly accessible test facility. In that light, perhaps the final legacy of the YF-23 program has et to be written.

SOURCE

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Update

Thought I'd feed everyone an update on a few things.

First off, IMINT & Analysis has made it into Jane's Missiles and Rockets once again, this time in the May issue for the discovery of potential DF-31 launch sites around Nanyang.

Secondly, the guys at Ogle Earth have often found my articles interesting but have decried the lack of downloadable content. I thought about that for a bit, and have decided that they may be on to something. So, from now on, there will be a link to download a Google Earth placemark file at the end of each article, where appropriate. Image of the Week features will not contain downloads as they are just a single place (i.e., extrapolate the coordinates from the image and mark it yourself if you're interested), and text-based articles such as the forthcoming S-300P feature won't either. I may or may not go back and provide downloadable content for older articles. If there is one that you want to see, leave a comment to this post and let me know. I save all of that stuff so it won't be an issue.

Thirdly, in light of my second point, here is the download link to the file containing the Google Earth placemarks from the Russian nuclear complexes article: Right click, save as I'll have to be a bit creative as to where I upload these, so if anybody has a good idea, let me know. Blogger.com won't let you upload files! The Google Earth community forum was hosting the file for about thirty seconds before moderator TheLedge complained that it was a duplicate of an existing placemark, obviously ignorant of the fact that most of the sites were not actually marked, especially the storage sites. I can leave the SAM site placemark there for now as I started the file long enough ago to have ownership of the process, but clearly I need someplace else to get these files hosted.

That's it for now. I'll be busy for the next two weeks so there may not be any major articles posted apart from the Image of the Week, but I will try to get some things finalized. Once these two weeks are up I'll have a lot more time available so major articles will be posted with greater frequency.

As always, comments are welcome and encouraged. And if there's a certain location or topic you'd like to see covered, let me know!

Image of the Week: China's L-15

CHINA'S L-15

The image above depicts two examples of the Hongdu L-15, a new fast-jet trainer being evaluated by the PLAAF. The L-15 is competing with the GAIC JL-9 for an order with the PLAAF. The L-15 is by far the more advanced design, with the JL-9 representing yet another iteration of the J-7 (FISHBED), albeit with a reprofiled nose section containing side mounted air intakes. Hongdu's L-15 was designed with the assistance of Russia's OKB Yakovlev, which helps explain the marked similarity to the Yak-130. The L-15 represents a more capable aircraft than the Yak-130, however, enjoying supersonic performance. This enables the L-15 to be employed as a LIFT aircraft training PLAAF aviators destined to take flight in J-8, J-10, or J-11 fighter aircraft.

SOURCE

-Satellite image provided courtesy of Google Earth

Soviet and Russian Nuclear Weapons Complexes

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union began its nuclear weapons program on the 11th of February, 1943. After initial successes, the nuclear weapons design and production complex grew exponentally, eventually comprising a host of facilities spread around the Soviet Union. These facilities were some of the most guarded installations during the Cold War.

TEN CLOSED CITIES

At the height of the Cold War, the bulk of the nuclear weapon development and production activity was concentrated at ten locations inside of Russia, with Novaya Zemlya and Kazakhstan providing the primary test locations for evaluating the performance of nuclear weapons. The ten locations inside of Russia were often described as "closed cities", locations so secretive that they were virtually unknown outside of the intelligence community. Initially, these self-sufficient locations did not appear on any maps, and any aerial overflight, civillian or military, was banned.

Security restrictions began to relax once the USSR had fielded a number of nuclear weapons, but they did not disappear entirely. The areas remained secured by fences and controlled by armed guards. Air defenses also remained, with each site no more than 200 kilometers from an S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) strategic SAM site. Nearly all of the sites were under the protection of multiple S-200 batteries. In most cases the SAM sites were located far enough from the closed cities to provide a layered defense without divulging the location of the cities themselves.

The following image depicts the locations and codenames of the ten closed nuclear facilities inside of the former USSR:



FISSILE MATERIAL

Five of the closed cities were primarily tasked with the production of fissile material, either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, for use in nuclear weapons. Natural uranium is primarily composed of the isotopes U234, U235 and U238. In natural uranium U238 is the most predominat, approximately 99% by volume. U235 is the isotope required for nuclear weapons production, and HEU typically comprises over 20% of U235 by volume. Weapons-grade material is typically composed of 85% U235 by volume, but a percentage greater than 20 is sufficient for weaponization. Gasseous uranium, uranium hexaflouride, is commonly enriched through either gasseous diffusion or by gas centrifuge.

Two of the closed cities in the former USSR were tasked with the production of HEU, Krasnoyarsk-45 and Sverdlovsk-44. Sverdlovsk-44 was the first HEU production facility in the USSR, producing weapons-grade material from 1949 to 1989. The facility still enriches uranium for use in nuclear power plants. Krasnoyarsk-45 was established in 1955, and like its predecessor remains a production facility for reactor fuel.

The following image depicts the uranium enrichment complex at Sverdlovsk-44:



The following image depicts the uranium enrichment complex at Krasnoyarsk-45:



Chelyabinsk-65 and Krasnoyarsk-26 were tasked with the production of plutonium for the USSR's nuclear weapons program. Chelyabinsk-65 was the first plutonium production center in the USSR, established in 1948. Krasnoyarsk-26 was established 10 years later. Chelyabinsk-65's plutonium production reactors were shut down by 1992, but Krasnoyarsk-26 still contains an operational reactor for plutonium production. This reactor, ADE-2, will serve until 2010, when it will be deactivated. Two other plutonium production reactors at Krasnoyarsk-26 have been deactivated. Krasnoyarsk-26 is unique in that it is the only one of the ten nuclear facilities to be housed entirely underground. Chelyabinsk-65 has its own, more ominous claim to fame: a 1957 explosion resulting in the deaths of over 200 people. Chelyabinsk-65 is also infamous for the use of Lake Karachay as a dumping ground for nuclear waste.

The following image depicts the Chelyabinsk-65 complex:



The following image depicts the location of the Krasnoyarsk-26 complex:



The fifth and final weapons-grade material production facility, Tomsk-7, produced both HEU and plutonium. Five reactors were present for plutonium production, as well as a large enrichment facility for producing HEU, similar to that seen at Krasnoyarsk-45. Only one of the five reactors remains operational, ADE-5, and it is due to be shut down in June of 2008. ADE-4 was the last reactor to be shut down, in April of 2008.

The following image depicts the nuclear material production complex Tomsk-7:



WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DESIGN

Nuclear weapons were designed at two facilities in the former USSR, Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. Arzamas-16 was the first nuclear weapons design facility in the USSR, established in 1946. It is presently home to two organizations, the Avangard warhead assembly/disassembly facility and the VNIIEF nuclear weapons design institute. The Avangard facilities are housed within the main complex. VNIIEF has facilities throughout the closed city, and also oversees the range complex south of the city. This range complex is used to test various high explosives, many of which are used in nuclear warheads.

The following image depicts the Avangard facilities at Arzamas-16:



The following image depicts the VNIIEF range area at Arzamas-16:



Chelyabinsk-70 was established in the 1950's as an alternative nuclear weapons design facility, containing the VNIITF weapons design institute. The intention was to reduce the workload on scientists at Arzamas-16 as well as to enhance the survivability of the nuclear weapons design knowledge base in the event of a war with the United States. Chelyabinsk-70 evolved into an integral part of the Soviet and Russian nuclear weapons design complex. While many types of nuclear warheads were designed by both facilities, Chelyabinsk-70 was solely responsible for warheads used in artillery shells, gravity bombs, and SLBMs.

The following image depicts the Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear weapons research and design facility:



WEAPONS PRODUCTION

Nuclear weapons were assembled at four locations: Arzamas-16, Penza-19, Sverdlovsk-45, and Zlatoust-36. Warhead components themselves were sourced from separate locations. Chelyabinsk-65 and Tomsk-7 produced the HEU and plutonium components used in the physics packages of nuclear weapons. Penza-19 assembled various electronic components used in nuclear weapons.

Sverdlovsk-45 was the USSR's largest warhead assembly complex. It was initially established as an HEU production plant, but converted to warhead assembly in the late 1950s. Zlatoust-36 and Penza-19 assembled nuclear warheads, but did not asemble the physics packages. These were sourced from Arzamas-16 or Sverdlovsk-45, which were the only two locations to actually assemble HE and nuclear material into physics packages for nuclear weapons.

The following image depicts the facilities at Sverdlovsk-45:



The following image depicts the facilities at Zlatoust-36:



The following image depicts the facilities at Penza-19:



The four weapons production facilities are also designated sites for warhead disassembly. Fissile material is then transferred to Krasnoyarsk-45, Sverdlovsk-44, or Tomsk-7 for reprocessing (blending down of HEU) or sent to Chelyabinsk-65 or Tomsk-7 for long-term storage.

WEAPONS STORAGE

There are numerous national-level nuclear warhead stockpile sites inside of Russia. Sixteen sites have been identified, two of which are located at Nizhnaya Tura. A seventeenth site is thought to exist near Olenegorsk, but cannot be identified with the information currently available. Identified nuclear warhead stockpile locations are located at the following coordinates:

51°21'37.38"N 41°55'18.28"E Borisoglebsk
56°12'58.72"N 28°18'41.80"E Bulyzhino
59°06'00.45"N 38°37'08.31"E Chebsara
56°17'12.39"N 93°34'55.53"E Dodonovo
50°33'48.10"N 35°44'15.61"E Golovchino
55°24'41.21"N 60°12'03.70"E Karabash
48°10'53.92"N 135°01'36.77"E Khabarovsk
50°17'33.43"N 137°28'16.61"E Komsomolsk-na-Amur
51°11'07.66"N 46°01'07.57"E Krasnoarmeyskoye
51°14'57.26"N 128°00'53.38"E Malaya Sazanka
55°25'43.73"N 35°46'15.33"E Mozhaysk
58°36'57.76"N 59°39'06.51"E Nizhnaya Tura (north)
58°33'46.58"N 59°37'53.70"E Nizhnaya Tura (south)
54°48'27.31"N 58°38'18.00"E Yuryuzan
53°27'16.79"N 102°35'54.23"E Zalari
53°33'38.80"N 33°58'22.80"E Zhukovka

The following image depicts the locations of nuclear stockpile facilities in western Russia:



The following image depicts the locations of nuclear stockpile facilities in eastern Russia:



It is interesting to note that neither Arzamas-16 nor Penza-19 are in close proximity to a stockpile facility. Both Sverdlovsk-45 and Zlatoust-36 have stockpile facilities located nearby, suggesting that they are or were the primary mass production facilities for nuclear weapons. Sverdlovsk-45 has been described as the primary production center for nuclear weapons, a fact which would appear to be supported by the presence of two stockpile sites at Nizhnaya Tura to the west.

While the various national level stockpile sites do not share common layouts, many of them do share common features. The site at Borisoglebsk is an excellent example. The storage facility is accessed by a single point of entry and is surrounded by a securty zone consisting of a 45 meter clearing containing two fencelines. Each bunker is enclosed by a further three fences. A firing range is available for security forces, as are three helipads. Support facilities are located to the northwest adjacent to the rail transfer point, which provides the means for distributing the nuclear weapons to operational users.

The following image depicts the Borisoglebsk national nuclear stockpile facility:



Many front-line units also maintain their own nuclear weapons. These units are typically strategic nuclear forces, such as strategic bomber wings. The following image depicts one such facility, the nuclear weapon storage area at Engels AB, containing the nuclear cruise missiles for the base's Tu-95MS (BEAR-H) and Tu-160 (BLACKJACK) strategic bombers.



CONCLUSION

With the end of the Cold War, the Russian nuclear weapons design and production complex has begun to decrease in scope and complexity. Many installations are being reprioritized to civillian purposes, or shut down altogether. While the threat of nuclear annihilation is no longer a predominant threat in the minds of Russian and Western leaders, the dismantlement of Russia's nuclear program has led to new security concerns over the safeguarding of nuclear materials removed from deactivated warheads. The Russian nuclear complex may no longer be in the business of mass production of warheads and fissile material, but it would seem that its most important work is yet to come.

SOURCES

-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Russian Nuclear Weapons Facilities
New Perspectives on Russia's Ten Secret Cities
Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union
The Cold War Atomic Intelligence Game, 1945-1970
Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, by Pavel Podvig

Image of the Week: USS Intrepid

USS INTREPID

The image above depicts the current location of the USS Intrepid. The USS Intrepid is normally docked on the west side of Manhattan as part of the Intrepid Sea, Air & Space Museum. It recently moved to New Jersey for refurbishment, and is currently docked at Homeport Pier in Staten Island for final fitting out and refurbishment in anticipation for a return to Manhattan later this year. This image highlights one of the issues when using Google Earth imagery. Often times areas in close proximity will display imagery from vastly different time periods. The USS Intrepid can still clearly be seen docked on Manhattan's west side in current imagery, which is obviously outdated. Users must be able to exploit Google Earth's features to effectively date the imagery they are using to ensure that it is taken in the proper context!

SOURCE

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Image of the Week: Baikonur

BAIKONUR

The above image depicts two large SLV launch pads at Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. These large pads were initially constructed to support the massive Korolev N-1 rocket designed to carry the USSR's Cosmonauts to the Moon. The N-1 suffered through a long and troublesome development period, ending when the USSR cancelled its manned lunar exploration program. These launch pads were later reconfigured to support the massive Energiya SLV. The Energiya booster was designed to launch heavy objects such as the Buran orbiter and the Polius laser array. Despite the decaying nature of the facilities evident in the image, these two launch pads at Baikonur represent some of the most significant historical sites in the field of space exploration.

SOURCE

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Image of the Week: Cairo

CAIRO SAM GARRISON

The above image depicts a SAM garrison facility in southeastern Cairo, Egypt. The image was acquired on July 14, 2005 and depicts the first sighting of Egypt's Buk-M1-2 (SA-11B GADFLY) SAM system. Egypt's purchase of the Buk-M1-2 was reportedly made in 2005 and the image would appear to indicate that deliveries began shortly thereafter. The inset image depicts a Buk-series TELAR operationally deployed in Srednebelaya, Russia. Comparison of the objects in the two images does confirm that the vehicles seen in Cairo are in fact the Buk-M1-2 TELARs. The Buk-M1-2 provides Egypt with a modern, mobile SAM system that can complement or replace existing assets. The system enjoys a 45 kilometer range, a marked improvement over the earlier Buk models thanks to the inclusion of the 9M317 missile from the Buk-M2 (SA-X-17 GRIZZLY) SAM system, which was designed as the follow-on to the Buk-M1.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Egyptian President Reinforces Friendship with Russia

The Cypriot Missile Crisis

INTRODUCTION

Between January of 1997 and December of 1998 a conflict was brewing in the eastern Mediterranean that threatened to launch an armed conflict between two NATO powers, Greece and Turkey. The Cypriot government, much to the apparent dismay of its eastern neighbors in Ankara, made a bold move by purchasing the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) strategic SAM system from Russia. What followed was a chain of events that threatened to result in open warfare.

CYPRIOT AIR DEFENSE ISSUES

The island nation of Cyprus has had a long and sometimes violent history. Currently, the internationally recognized government of Cyprus controls approximately two thirds of the island, with roughly 35,000 Turkish troops occupying the remaining third, a situation that has existed since 1974. The government of Cyprus enjoys support from the Greek government in Athens, with the Turkish government in Ankara supporting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the occupied territory.

In 1995, the government of Cyprus began to examine the possibility of procuring an air defense system. Turkish military aircraft had frequently been seen over the skies of Cyprus with no regard to territorial sovereignty, and the December 1995 announcement of the sale of the ATACMs missile system to the Turkish military represented a new threat system capable of hitting targets in Cyprus from the safety of Turkey.

Cypriot Foreign Minister Alecos Michaelides announced the purchase of the Russian S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system on January 5th, 1997. The terms of the deal were not disclosed, with estimates of between $230 million and $600 million appearing in the open press. The S-300PMU-1 appeared to be an ideal fit for Cyprus with regard to the threats it faced. The 150 kilometer range SAM system would allow Cyprus to monitor the airspace over the entire island, and the associated 64N6E (BIG BIRD D) EW and battle management radar would provide adequate early warning of any inbound Turkish military aircraft. The system was also advertised as having an ATBM capability, allowing it to deal with the forthcoming ATACMs missile system being procured for the Turkish military.

A NEW MISSILE CRISIS

Turkish reaction to the Cypriot SAM purchase was extremely stern. On the 11th of January in 1997 the Washington Times reported that Turkey threatened a pre-emptive strike against Cyprus in order to block the deployment of the missiles. The political back and forth proceeded as the rest of Europe awaited the outcome.

The stern reaction by the Turkish government does not appear to have been logical. Firstly, the S-300PMU-1 is a defensive asset. While the associated radar systems would have been able to peer into a portion of Turkey, no military air bases came under the coverage of either the 150 kilometer engagement range of the missile system of the 300 kilometer detection range of the 64N6E EW radar. Secondly, Turkey formally recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 (being the only nation to do so). By default, that admission recognizes the Turkish occupied portion of Cyprus as a separate independent nation from the rest of Cyprus. With the de facto admission of the sovereignty of Greek-supported Cyprus, Turkey had no basis for threatening a sovereign nation or interfering in its internal affairs. In a similar vein, Turkey was incensed in June of 1997 when Greek F-16s landed at Paphos Air Base in Cyprus, as a part of expanding defense ties between the two nations due in no small part to Turkish aggression over the S-300PMU-1 purchase. Once again, Turkey insisted on governing the internal affairs of an admittedly sovereign nation. The Turkish reaction was to examine the possibility of an airstrike against Paphos, irregardless of the fact that this would certainly lead to a confrontation with Greece.

The Russian reaction to the evolving crisis was certainly interesting. Russia fervently maintained that the sale would proceed. After the Turkish government began to board and search vessels travelling to Cyprus, the Russian reaction became far more ominous. In October of 1997 the Russian Ambassador to Cyprus, Georgy Muratov, went so far as to state that any Turkish interference with the delivery of the missile systems would be treated as an act of war. Later, Russia examined the possibility of escorting the transport vessels with a naval surface action group, containing both the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the guided missile cruiser Peter the Great. This would appear to be an overly aggressive posture to protect a simple export sale of a few SAM batteries, but Russia wanted to ensure that their entry into the arms market in Western Europe was not interfered with.

Despite continued threats from Turkey, the Cypriot government seemed willing to negotiate over the issue of the SAM systems. Various proposals were made to the Turkish government in an attempt to dissolve the crisis, but all were rejected. Perhaps the most interesting was a proposal from Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides to disarm the Cypriot national guard and place the funds from the defense budget in a UN account to improve infrastructure in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. His proposal was rejected by the Turkish government. In the end, President Clerides negotiated an agreement with Greece whereby the S-300PMU-1 components would be delivered to the Greek island of Crete, where they would remain under Cypriot control. Turkey decired this move as well.

CYPRIOT S-300PMU-1 FACILITIES

While no S-300PMU-1 SAM systems were ever deployed to Cyprus, Russian technicians did travel to the island nation and construct three sites, two for the missile systems and one for the 64N6E EW and battle management radar. One missile site, along with the 64N6E site, was constructed atop Mount Olympus. The second missile site was constructed in the western part of the island near Drousha. Imagery obtained of the Mount Olympus sites in September of 2003 depicts unused but complete facilities, suggesting that the S-300PMU-1 batteries would have been able to become operational in short order had they been delivered.

The Cypriot S-300PMU-1 facilities were located at the following coordinates:

34°56'39.26"N 32°51'49.19"E (Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1)
34°57'47.46"N 32°22'34.23"E (Drousha S-300PMU-1)
33°56'18.09"N 32°51'40.93"E (Mount Olympus 64N6E EW site)

The following image depicts the location of the aforementioned facilities on the island of Cyprus:


The following image depicts the coverage provided by the S-300PMU-1 components had they been deployed. S-300PMU-1 range rings are red, while the blue ring denotes the range of the 64N6E EW radar.


As can be seen in the image above, the system did not pose a significant threat to Turkish interests. It did, however, have the ability to monitor a great deal of airspace in Lebanon, perhaps representing the source of alleged Israeli objections to the deployment of the systems.

The S-300PMU-1 sites constructed on Cyprus exhibited a layout not before seen in any other S-300P family SAM deployment. It is possible that the sites were constructed with regard to the potential threat posed by the Turkish ATACMS missile system. Nevertheless, certain features can still be positively identified. Each site features four revetments, each intended to house a single TEL. Two TET pads for emplacing 40V6 mast assemblies, capable of mounting either the 30N6E1 (TOMB STONE) engagement radar or the 76N6E (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar, are present. If mobility is desired, what appears to be a raised berm for mounting the 30N6E1 is also provided. Various support facilities are present as well.

The following image depicts the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site:


Although it is of considerably lower resolution, the following image depicts the Drousha S-300PMU-1 site. The lower resolution does not preclude the identification of various elements of the site.


The following image has been constructed by extracting various system components from other imagery in order to depict what an operational S-300PMU-1 site may have looked like:


The 64N6E site is located adjacent to the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 site. In this instance, many of the site elements take on a more traditional appearance and can be found in nearly identical fashion at other 64N6-series sites worldwide. The most prominent features are the typical command bunker, a bunker for support vehicles, and what appears to be a raised berm for housing the 64N6E radar system. Alternatively, there is a radome which may also have been intended to house the 64N6E radar array. Protecting the radar array in such a fashion is not out of the question due to the fixed nature of the site.

The following image depicts the Mount Olympus 64N6E site:


The presence of only two prepared sites configured to support an S-300PMU-1 battery would seem to indicate that only two batteries were ordered.

THE S-300PMU-1 ON CRETE

Following Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides' December 1998 decision not to deploy the Russian strategic SAM system on Cyprus, the Greek government agreed to allow the weapons to be deployed on the Greek island of Crete. Turkey continued to complain, as it was stated that the systems would still be under Cypriot ownership, but the relocation of the systems to Crete would effectively neutralize them as they would no longer have the range necessary to threaten Turkish airspace. Naturally, the issue of a future deployment of the SAMs to Cyprus was not addressed, ostensibly to placate the Turkish government into backing down from threatening military action against the defensive systems. In return for not deploying the S-300PMU-1 in Cyprus, Greece agreed to transfer a number of Tor-M1 TELARs to Cyprus for air defense.

S-300PMU-1 components were delivered to Crete by Russia in April of 1999. Initially, the S-300PMU-1 components were located at Nikos Kazantzakis. Shortly thereafter, at least some of the components were transferred to Tympaki, where the support facilities for the system had been located. By 2004, an S-300PMU-1 battery had been relocated back to Nikos Kazantzakis, along with the associated 64N6E EW radar complex. This battery was deployed to provide air defense for the 2004 Summer Olympics being held in Athens. Analysis of open source imagery indicates that the battery deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis remained there as of June 2007, with the 64N6 radar no longer deployed. Elements of a second battery were still present at Tympaki as of January 2005.

The S-300PMU-1 facilities on the island of Crete are located at the following coordinates:

35°20'33.79"N 25°10'58.77"E (Nikos Kazantzakis)
35°19'52.02"N 25°13'20.74"E (64N6E EW site)
35°04'02.43"N 24°45'10.01"E (Tympaki)

The locations of the aforementioned sites can be seen in the following image:


The Nikos Kazantzakis S-300PMU-1 deployment is organized in two areas on the grounds of Heraklion International Airport. The actual deployment site lies along the northeastern end of the main runway, with a garrison area for system components being found to the southeast of the airport terminal.

The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 components deployed at Nikos Kazantzakis:


The following image depicts the garrison area at Nikos Kazantzakis:


Interestingly, it would appear that there are two 30N6E1 engagement radars at Nikos Kazantzakis, suggesting that more than two batteries may have been delivered. Standard practice is to purchase one engagement radar for each battery. It is also possible that the second radar was deployed from Tympaki to support the continued operation of the system after the Olympics and simply has not been redeployed.

Open source photographs of the 64N6E radar system in operation has allowed the early warning and battle management site to be located. When the image was captured in June of 2007 the 64N6E had been removed, but the location is correct based on analysis of terrain features in the area. The photographs used to determine the location of the 64N6E emplacement will not be posted here in order to respect the copyrights of the respective owners.

The 64N6E location can be seen in the image below:


The Tympaki S-300PMU-1 garrison and support facility is located on the grounds of the former Tympaki Air Base along the southern coast of Crete. While the system was deployed to Nikos Kazantzakis for operational use in 2004, there is nothing precluding an S-300PMU-1 battery from operating at Tympaki. Imagery acquired in January of 2005 depicted a nearly complete battery in residence, supporting the theory that only two batteries were delivered (the second battery likely still residing at Nikos Kazantzakis). A 30N6E1 engagement radar can be seen in operation, as well as three TELs and a stowed 40V6 mast assembly for the 76N6E low altitude detection radar. The only limiting factor to operating an S-300PMU-1 battery out of Tympaki would be terrain. A large mountain range bisects the two S-300PMU-1 facilities on either coast, which would cause problems if the 64N6E EW and battle management radar was emplaced at the previously identified location east of Nikos Kazantzakis to support both batteries.

The following image depicts the S-300PMU-1 facility at Tympaki:


In December of 2007, Cypriot ownership of the S-300PMU-1 strategic SAM system came to an end. An agreement was signed to formally transfer ownership of the systems to Greece, effectively ending a ten year political incident. Formal Greek inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the Hellenic air defense network would fill a large gap along the southern flank of Greek territory. As the following image demonstrates, activating both S-300PMU-1 batteries would provide air defense for the entire island of Crete and a large portion of the surrounding airspace. The range of the 64N6E radar is illustrated as a blue ring, with red rings denoting the engagement zones of S-300PMU-1 batteries deployed at each identified associated location.


Greece currently relies on three PATRIOT and two HAWK batteries for air defense. The following image illustrates that the inclusion of the S-300PMU-1 into the overall air defense network would allow for a significant increase in capability along Greece's southern flanks. S-300PMU-1 and PATRIOT ranges are depicted as red rings, HAWK ranges are depicted as orange rings, and the 64N6E radar range is depicted as a blue ring.


REPLACING THE S-300

With the S-300PMU-1 out of the equation, Cyprus still sought a solution to the air defense question. A long-range system was clearly no longer a viable option unless Cyprus desired to continue enhancing the Greek air defense network. Cypriot officials were not overly enamored of the Tor-M1 systems provided by Greece, as they had a short range precluding any significant impact on the nation's air defense posture. Cyprus may have found a solution in another Russian SAM product, the Buk-M1 (SA-11 GADFLY).

In March of 1999 Turkish newspapers were reporting the sale of the Buk-M1 to Cyprus. While not a strategic SAM system in the vein of the S-300PMU-1, the Buk-M1 has a respectable engagement range of 35 kilometers and also enjoys an advertised ATBM capability. Being a tactical system not tied to a fixed, prepared site, the Buk-M1 is also highly mobile, complicating any potential targeting efforts.

Examination of military installations in Cyprus has resulted in the location of two facilities which may be home to Cypriot Buk-M1 components. Imagery captured in October of 2003 depicts what may be a garrison facility as well as a hardened storage site for housing missile reloads or system components themselves.

The garrison site, located at 34°54'27.17"N 33°20'22.88"E, can be seen in the image below. The site appears to be well maintained and displays features in common with the Mount Olympus S-300PMU-1 facilities, suggesting possible Russian invovlement in its construction.


The hardened storage facility, located at 34°53'51.77"N 33°20'14.42"E, can be seen in the image below. A possible 9A310 TELAR can be seen in the entrance of one of the bunkers. The object compares well with field deployed 9A310 TELARs identified in Russia.


While the S-300PMU-1 purchase was widely reported, it would appear that any Buk-M1 deal has been kept out of the public eye. This was likely done in an effort to avoid yet another diplomatic exercise with Turkey. It is possible that Greece acted as the buyer for Cyprus. A Ria Novosti article in December of 2007 alleged that Greece had procured the Buk-M1-2 system at some point in the past, a 45 kilometer evolution of the Buk-M1 incorporating the 9M317 missile from the Buk-M2 system. Whatever the case may be, the evidence suggests that Cyprus has in fact procured some variant of the Buk family to solve its air defense question.

CONCLUSION

Despite continued posturing by the Turkish government after the plan to deliver the S-300PMU-1 systems to Crete was announced, the conflict rapidly abated. While the issue of Cyprus itself still remains unresolved, on this occasion cooler heads prevailed to ensure that the once-likely military conflict did not transpire. What remains is perhaps a new understanding of the many issues facing the nations resolved to end the political conflict continuing to grasp the island nation.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Turkey opposed to new deployment
S-300PMU-1 deployment cancelled
Athens speaks on Crete deployment
Conflict averted
International lawlessness
Greek MoD on Crete deployment
Disarmament diplomacy
S-300s transferred to Greece
Countdown to conflict?
Cypriot crisis timeline
Effect of missile sale on Cyprus situation
Cyprus knot
A case of brinkmanship
Russian missiles arrive in Greece
Cyprus to receive Tor-M1
Greek Buk-M1-2?
Cypriot Buk-M1 purchase
S-300s to Tympaki
S-300s defend Athens Olympics