Friday, December 26, 2008

Image of the Week: B-2 Pavillion

"HIDDEN" B-2 AT EDWARDSThe image above depicts an outdoor pavillion at Edwards AFB, California. The southern facility at Edwards where this image was taken was formerly home to the B-2 test team when the Northrop stealth bomber was undergoing flight testing at Edwards AFB. Early on in the program, the USAF wanted to try and keep the exact details of the B-2's planform secret. While the aircraft was publicly unveiled at Palmdale, it was only shown from the front and side and the upper surfaces were not visible. This was rendered moot when an Aviation Week photographer took an image of the aircraft from an overflying aircraft and revealed the upper surface details. Earlier, when Northrop was preparing the Edwards AFB facility for use by the ATB test team, one of the enterprising designers devised the outdoor pavillion seen above, and it was found to bear a striking resemblance to the B-2. As the aircraft was still largely classified when the pavillion was created, senior officials were not very impressed! The pavillion remains today as an amusing indicator of an interesting facet of the B-2 program.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Monday, December 22, 2008

Israel vs. SAM: Iran's S-300

INTRODUCTION

On Sunday it was reported that Russia has begun delivering advanced S-300 SAM systems to Iran. Iran has been after some of the advanced variants of the S-300P series for some time, and delivery of these systems would represent a significant upgrade to the Iranian air defense network.

IRANIAN SAMS, YES OR NO?

Iran has been rumored to be a customer or recipient of S-300P variants for some time. Last year it was reported by Jane's that Iran had received S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE) SAM systems from Belarus and was preparing them for service. These reports have yet to be confirmed or conclusively debunked, but Iranian persistance in attempting to order more advanced S-300PM (SA-20 GARGOYLE) variants from Russia does cast a degree of doubt on their accuracy.

Russia was quick to respond to Iran's allegation that the S-300's were being delivered. In October Israeli Prime Minister Olmert had met with Russian leaders in Moscow and was assured that Russia would not deliver advanced S-300P series SAM systems to Iran. Shortly after Iran made its announcement on Sunday, Russian officials denied the reports and stated that they were abiding by the agreement made with PM Olmert regarding the transfer of advanced air defense weapons to Iran.

If Russia is to be believed in this case, then it would seem that the Iranian government is attempting to force Russia's hand into abiding by whatever sale agreement may have been discussed in the past. Alternatively, this could be an effort to raise eyebrows on the international stage over Israel's interference in Iranian affairs. The other side of the coin is that Russia may be acting deceptively, intending on selling the system to Iran, aiding in its setup, and only announcing the sale once the system has been delivered and emplaced. This is not as likely however as the emplacement and activation of these systems would be visible through intelligence sources.

ISRAELI OPPOSITION

The reason for Israeli opposition to a Russian sale of S-300P series SAM systems, particularly late-model S-300PMU-1 or S-300PMU-2 variants, to Iran is clear. Israel is currently preparing for a potential military strike on Iran to thwart Iranian nuclear ambitions. Regardless of whether or not Iran's nuclear intentions are truly peaceful or not, Israel's position regarding the S-300P sale or transfer is understandable. The latest S-300P variants represent some of the most advanced and capable SAM systems in the world, and would represent a significant obstacle to any Israeli air campaign against Iran. One can debate the issue of Israel objecting to a sovereign nation procuring a defensive weapon system, but the fact remains that an S-300P brigade inside of Iran would cause air planners serious problems and potentially prevent them from acting out the wishes of their leadership.

THE EW ELEMENT

The interesting facet of this entire scenario is that Israel has claimed to have developed electronic warfare systems capable of defeating the S-300P series. Israel reportedly obtained the 5N63 (FLAP LID) guidance radar of an S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE) battery sold to Croatia in 1995. Israeli claims of being able to defeat the S-300P were widely publicised in Jane's Defense Weekly and other media outlets. Israel also exercised with Greece in May and June of this year to gain further expertise against the more modern S-300PMU-1 system and its 30N6 (TOMB STONE) guidance radar.

PATH TO WAR?

It would appear that Iran has not yet received any S-300P series SAM components. Russian officials would likely not make such a strong assertion were the opposite to be true, knowing that the tell-tale emissions from the system's radar systems would belie their presence to the world once activated inside of Iran. This would certainly eventually be true for two reasons: first, Iran would have to activate the systems in order to employ them in defense of key facilities or border regions, and second, the radar systems used by the S-300P series are not employed by any other SAM system, with the exception of the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) EW radar. The presence of the guidance and battle management radars inside of Iran cannot therefor be attributed to the sale of any other SAM system. Russia also cannot claim that an advanced S-300PM series system has been supplied by an outside user, as systems missing from China and Greece, being the only other users of the advanced versions, would be missed by American intelligence sources and such an allegation could be easily disproven.

The ultimate takeaway from Israel's negotiating with Moscow in October and its August 2008 claim that if such a system was delivered to Iran that Israel would be forced to develop a counter, is that Israel's efforts to defeat the S-300P series of SAM systems may not have been as succesful as once believed. Had Israeli efforts in exploiting Croatian and Greek systems been successful in developing adequate electronic warfare systems and countertactics, Israel would likely have sat by and watched the Iranian regime spend hundreds of millions of dollars on a missile system that they knew represented a limited threat. Given Israel's work in the field of electronic warfare it is possible that reports suggesting that the S-300P could be countered by new systems were a form of deception aimed at convincing Iranian leadership that the purchase of such a ssytem was a wasted effort. In that light, the potential for an eventual S-300P SAM sale to Iran may be the catalyst that finally pushes Israel into striking Iranian nuclear facilities. The Israeli military is rightfully very concerned over the potential of advanced S-300P series SAM systems taking up residence inside of Iran, and if political pressure on Moscow is not enough to prevent a transfer than military action may be the end result.

SOURCES

Iran Says Russia Delivering S-300 Air Defense Systems
Russia denies supplying Iran with missiles capable of repelling Israeli air strike
Israel develops countermeasures to S-300 system
'We'll neutralize S-300 if they're sold to Iran'
Greece assists Israel as war with Iran looms

Blackbirds In Imagery

INTRODUCTION

One of the few aircraft to capture the attention of serious aviation buffs, casual fans, historians, and everyone else who has held it in their vision if only for a second is the Lockheed Blackbird, alternatively known to its pilots as the Sled. Born out of a requirement for a faster, higher-flying, more survivable replacement for the CIA's U-2, the Blackbird has become an aviation legend. In the spirit of the holidays, this article will detail the locations of Blackbird survivors and depict the locations of those visible in Google Earth. It's Sledding, Google Earth style!

THE BLACKBIRD

The Blackbird, also known as the Sled, the Habu, the Beast, and the Titanium Goose in its various incarnations, was created to fulfill a CIA requirement for a successor to the U-2. As the U-2 flew deep into the USSR on intelligence gathering sorties, advances in Soviet air defenses were threatening to make the CIA's original high flyer obsolete. Something more survivable was needed, and the result was the Lockheed A-12, designed for high speed and high altitude overflight of denied teritory. As it would turn out, the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers on the first day of May, 1960, ended manned overflight of the USSR. Seemingly an aircraft without a mission, the A-12 evolved into one of the mainstays of USAF Cold War intelligence gathering, the SR-71A, and had a productive intelligence gathering career in its own right.

OXCART

Out of 13 A-12s built for the CIA, only 8 remain. Two of these airframes, Articles 128 and 132, are currently on display indoors at the Central Intelligence Agency and Battleship Memorial Park in Mobile, Alabama, respectively. The rest of the surviving OXCARTs are on display outdoors and can be seen clearly in Google Earth imagery.

The first prototype of the A-12 family, Article 121, can be seen on display at Blackbird Airpark in Palmdale, California, in company with SR-71A Article 2024 and a D-21 drone:

The second A-12, also employed as a flight test airframe and the A-12 used for pole tests of the aircraft's radar cross section, is now on display at the USS Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space museum in New York City. This is the only Blackbird to be displayed on a carrier deck, and doubled as a tee box for Will Smith in the movie I Am Legend.

An image of the USS Intrepid in 2002 can be seen below, followed by an image from 2007 while the carrier was docked at Staten Island undergoing refitting and refurbishment.


A photograph of Article 122 on the deck of the USS Intrepid can be seen below:

Article 124, the fourth A-12 airframe and the only two-seat trainer, is on display at the California Science Center in Los Angeles. This aircraft, designated AT-12, was nicknamed Titanium Goose and never received the overall black paint scheme found on most other A-12s later in their flying careers.

Article 127 is on display at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Hutsville, Alabama. This aircraft is one of three OXCARTs to perform operational reconnaissance sorties out of Kadena AB, Japan. Amusingly, at one point Article 127 featured the characteristic yellow NASA fin stripe on its vertical tail surfaces. Suffice it to say that NASA never operated an A-12, the existance of which remained classified into the 1980's!

Article 128 was previously displayed at the Minnesota ANG Museum in Minneapolis before being removed for display at the CIA. An image of the aircraft on display outdoors in Minnesota is provided below.

Article 130 is on display in San Diego at the San Diego Aerospace Museum.

Article 131, the other surviving A-12 to have performed operational reconnaissance sorties (06932, the third aircraft, was lost during a training flight), is currently on display at the Birmingham Museum of Flight in Birmingham, Alabama. With three A-12s on display, Alabama currently possesses more than a third of the surviving OXCART fleet!

KEDLOCK

While the A-12 program was progressing, Lockheed realized that the airframe might be suitable for tasks other than reconnaissance. Project KEDLOCK produced an interceptor variant for the USAF, with three prototypes being constructed. The YF-12A prototypes were arguably the most advanced interceptors of their era, featuring long-range pulse-doppler AN/ASG-18 radar sets, and carrying three XAIM-47A air to air missiles.

Three YF-12As were constructed by modifying three A-12 airframes on the production line. These were aircraft 60-6934, 60-6935, and 60-6936, referred to as Articles 1001, 1002, and 1003 respectively. The first and third prototypes were written off in accidents, leaving Article 1002 as the sole survivor of the type. After a career as a flight test aircraft with NASA following the cancellation of the USAF F-12 program, Article 1002 was retired to the USAF Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio, where it resides to this day. The aircraft is currently situated in the R&D Hangar at the museum's annex facility.

The following photograph depicts the USAF Museum's YF-12A on display:

TAGBOARD

With the cancellation of manned overflights over Soviet territory, Lockheed began developing ideas for continuing a reconnaissance mission over these territories. The result was the M-21, a two-seat version of the A-12 specially configured to carry and launch a D-21 drone mounted above the rear fuselage. Despite being able to claim status as the world's fastest biplane, the M-21/D-21 combination ultimately proved to be unsuccessful, with the D-21 being modified for launch from two specially outfitted B-52H carriers under the SENIOR BOWL program. The two A-12s modified into M-21 standard were Articles 134 and 135.

06941 was lost during the fourth launch attempt of a D-21 drone, an accident which can be seen here. This video is very interesting from a historical standpoint. Apart from depicting a Mach 3 collision between two formerly classified intelligence gathering platforms, the video tears down one of the assumptions made about the D-21. It had been believed due to photographic evidence available that the leading edge probes seen on operational D-21Bs carried by the B-52H launch platforms had been added as part of the D-21B program. This can be seen to be completely untrue, as the D-21 launched from the back of 06941 possesses these same leading edge probes.

The surviving M-21 resides indoors at the Seattle Museum of Flight, complete with a mounted D-21.

A photograph of a D-21 on display at the USAF Museum can be seen below:

SENIOR CROWN

The SR-71A evolved out of the CIA's A-12 to provide the USAF with a twin-seat strategic reconnaissance aircraft capable of carrying multiple sensor fits to gather complex photographic and electronic intelligence. Operational SR-71As were based at Beale AFB in California. Not only did the SR-71A replace the CIA's A-12 at the Kadena AB operating location, but it served at RAF Mildenhall in England, gathering intelligence on Soviet and Warsaw Pact activity in Europe. Mildenhall-based Blackbirds also conducted reconnaissance over Libya in support of Operation ELDORADO CANYON, to cite a specific example of non-Communist directed operations.

19 SR-71s remain out of a total of 31 built, not including the technologically amusing SR-71C. This includes the remaining SR-71B, one of two built for pilot training. 11 SR-71s are displayed indoors, including the surviving SR-71B and SR-71C examples. These include Articles 2002, 2007 (SR-71B), 2009, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2022, 2023, 2027, and 2000 (SR-71C). Article 2013 is unique in that it is the only Blackbird on display outside the United States, residing at the Imperial War Museum in Duxford, England. The other aircraft displayed indoors reside at the following locations:

Article 2002: Pima Air Museum, Tuscon, Arizona
Article 2007: Kalamazoo Air Zoo, Battle Creek Airport, Michigan
Article 2009: Warner Robins Museum of Aviation, Warner Robins AFB, Georgia
Article 2012: Kansas Cosmosphere, Hutchinson, Kansas
Article 2015: Strategic Air Command Museum, Ashland, Nebraska
Article 2022: Evergreen Aviation Museum, McMinnville, Oregon
Article 2023: National Air & Space Museum, Udvar-Hazy annex, Washington, DC
Article 2027: USAF Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
Article 2000: Hill Aerospace Museum, Hill AFB, Utah

The following photograph depicts Article 2023 on display in the National Air & Space Museum's Udvar-Hazy annex:

The following photograph depicts Article 2027 on display in the USAF Museum's Cold War hangar:

Article 2006 was employed almost exclusively by Lockheed for flight test work supporting USAF SR-71 operations. It operated out of Palmdale, California and is currently on display at the Air Force Flight Test Center Museum at Edwards AFB, California, and can be seen in the image below:

Article 2010 was used between 1975 and 1976 to test the Big Tail modification, featuring an extended tail assembly housing various sensor fits. The aircraft was retired from service following the Big Tail test program and can currently be seen on display at the USAF Armament Museum at Eglin AFB, Florida, complete with Big Tail assembly. An image of the aircraft on display is provided below. Note that the extended tail fitting can clearly be seen.

Article 2011 is on display at the Castle Air Museum at Castle AFB, California.

Article 2014 is on display at Beale AFB, California, in company with a D-21 drone. The aircraft is mounted on a replica of one of the patches worn by SR-71 crewmembers.

Article 2018 is on display at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana but is not currently visible in Google Earth imagery. It is, however, visible in Microsoft Virtual Earth, as seen below:

Article 2019 is on display at the Virginia Aviation Museum, Richmond, Virginia.

A photograph of Article 2019 on display can be seen below:

Article 2024 can be seen on display at Blackbird Airpark as mentioned previously.

Article 2026 is on display at the March Field Air Museum, March AFB, California.

Article 2030 is on display at Heritage Field, Lackland AFB, Texas.

Article 2031 is on display at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards AFB, California.

RELATED AIRCRAFT

Three aircraft formerly involved with the Blackbird program in some capacity still exist today, and one can be seen in overhead imagery. The two B-52Hs modified to support D-21B drone launches, 60-0036 and 61-0021, are still in use. The former aircraft serves at the USAF flight test facility at Edwards AFB, while the latter is in operational service at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. A B-58 Hustler was modified to serve as a test aircraft for the AN/ASG-18 and AIM-47 combination used by the YF-12A. This aircraft was originally supporting the F-108 program, the aircraft for which the weapon systems originated before it was cancelled. This B-58, 55-665, was nicknamed Snoopy due to its long, drooping radome fitted for the AN/ASG-18. It currently resides on the range at Edwards AFB as a photographic target and can be seen in the image below:

CONCLUSION

I hope everyone has enjoyed this "holiday-themed" aviation topic. The Blackbird is one of the most interesting aircraft to ever exist, and more information on CIA A-12 operations is declassified each year, ensuring that the complete story has yet to be written. In the meantime, take note of the locations of these high performance aircraft, and take the time to go see one close to you if possible. You won't be disappointed!

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

A placemark file containing the locations of Blackbirds both indoors and outdoors can be downloaded here. This placemark also containst the locations of Snoopy and various D-21s visible at various locations not mentioned in this article.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided by Google Earth and Microsoft Virtual Earth

-Digital photographs taken by the author and may not be re-used without permission

Lockheed's SR-71 'Blackbird' Family, James Goodall and Jay Miller, Aerofax, 2002.

Sunday, December 21, 2008

The Avenue To Peace Runs Through...Piracy?

PEACE THROUGH PIRACY?

Right, I know I don't go off into the political side of things that often, but bear with me on this one.

Russia. The Ukraine. China. America. Iran.

What do all of these nations have in common?

The answer: as of today, all of them have dispatched warships to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. Some to interdict pirates, some merely to protect their own interests. The interesting issue in all of this is that most of these nations are not exceptionally fond of each other. Russia and the Ukraine are having problems. America and Iran have not had a friendly relationship since 1979. And China? The US political machine wants everyone to believe that they are the new Red Menace. Makes for good military sales figures, but not much else from a logical standpoint. But I digress.

Normally, when potentially belligerent nations are operating military hardware in close proximity to one another, bad things can happen. There is the potential for misidentification of intentions and an outbreak of hostilities. Which, plainly, is not really good for anyone.

That's why the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia represents a very interesting political avenue that should be exploited by the US government. This is an opportunity to reach out to all parties involved and establish a joint working group for combating the piracy issue. This may in turn help to break down some barriers in dealing with nations like Iran or Russia. A common goal can often be a good stepping stone to further cooperation and potentially improved relations down the line.

Sending a few warships into the Indian Ocean to eradicate pirate vessels is not going to result in the establishment of an American embassy in Tehran or the elimination of Russian opposition to all things NATO or missile defense. But in the long term establishing a good working relationship in this issue with the nations involved could at the very least break the ice and open doors previously locked should the need arise for further military or diplomatic dealings in the future. And if taking out a few pirate ships attacking Iranian cargo vessels or harassing Russian freighters means we are on the road to better relations with those nations, it would be in the best interests of the US government to open its arms to those nations in the spirit of joint cooperation.

Besides, five nations working together to obliterate pirate boats and shore positions would surely be far more effective than each nation plowing across the sea lanes looking for trouble on their own.

Friday, December 19, 2008

Image of the Week: Sinsheim

SINSHEIMThe image above depicts the Sinsheim Auto & Technik museum in Sinsheim, Germany. The museum is the only place in the world where both commercial SSTs can be viewed, having brought in a Russian Tu-144D in 2004 and a Concorde shortly thereafter. Both of these aircraft are mounted on the roof of the northern building, the Concorde to the west trailing the Tu-144D to the east. Readers will notice that neither aircraft appears in the image above. This is because the imagery of the museum was collected in 2000, four years before the arrival of the Tu-144. With 2009 right around the corner, this highlights one of the problems an analyst will face when viewing facilities and locations in Google Earth: image currency. The date an image was collected can be seen in the information bar at the bottom of the screen in Google Earth, situated between the terrain elevation figure and the Eye Altitude, or viewing altitude, figure. Referencing these imagery collection dates will allow an analyst to put the imagery in the proper historical context, and can be useful in identifying areas which have been updated with more current imagery.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Visit the Sinsheim Auto & Technik museum homepage here.

Thursday, December 18, 2008

Russian Strategic Air Defense

INTRODUCTION

Russia is a vast nation, encompassing a sizeable portion of two continents. Many areas in Russia cannot be viewed in sufficient resolution to identify any SAM assets present. As such, this article is intended to provide an overview of currently identified assets, and is not intended to be representative of the entire Russian SAM network. It is known, for example, that modern SAM systems have been deployed to various positions around Moscow that were once home to S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) batteries. A large number of these former S-25 positions are not currently visible in high resolution, and may be home to SAM systems which cannot be identified due to the lack of available imagery. The SAM systems which have been identified do, however, provide valuable insight into Russian SAM deployment strategies, allowing the overall SAM network to be analyzed even if all of the deployed assets cannot be located.

EW ASSETS

EW and GCI

Russia relies on a plethora of radar systems to provide early warning (EW) coverage of its territory. The most common systems are variants of the P-12 (SPOON REST), P-14 (TALL KING), and P-35/37 (BAR LOCK). These radars all have ranges exceeding 300 kilometers and can be found in various locations. They are most commonly deployed at airfields to perform air traffic control functions, or at dedicated EW facilities to monitor assigned airspace sectors. EW radars will often be integrated with the command and control networks of SAM systems in their vicinity to provide EW support for the organic EW radars deployed with the SAM units themselves.

Some of these deployed EW sites are situated on former SAM sites which no longer contain active missile batteries. Deploying EW assets in this fashion allows them to take advantage of the hardened revetments already in place, adding a degree of protection for the radar systems. Another method used to protect the often fragile sensor arrays of deployed EW radars is to mount the radar systems inside of protective domes. This is a common feature found in EW sites deployed in coastal regions or in regions where long term exposure to environmental conditions could damage the sensor arrays.

A representative Russian EW site can be seen in the image below:

Dual Purpose

The 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radar system is unique in the Russian air defense network. The 36D6 is a capable EW radar and as such can be found at dedicated EW sites throughout Russia. The 36D6 is also capable of interfacing with the S-300P family of strategic SAM systems to provide target track data for the engagement radar. This makes 36D6 locations particularly important. Not only can the 36D6 provide EW data for the overall network, but locations hosting a 36D6 can be augmented with S-300P series SAM systems in a time of crisis. Any 36D6 radar site should therefore be considered a potential S-300P deployment site. While Russia has not co-located 36D6 radar assets with deployed S-300P series batteries to a great degree at the present time, with only two S-300P series batteries near Moscow enjoying this advantage, nations such as China have done so to maximize the situational awareness of deployed S-300P series batteries, highlighting the potential for the same practice to be exploited by the Russian air defense network should the need arise. Analysts will note that while Russian 36D6 radar systems are not generally co-located with S-300P series batteries, they are often located in the same general area as these SAM positions, indicating that they may be performing an EW task for the SAM batteries rather than a pure EW function.

A representative Russian 36D6 site can be seen in the image below:

A representative Russian combined 36D6 and EW site can be seen in the image below:

Battle Management

The primary battle management radar employed by the Russian air defense network is the 5N64/64N6 (BIG BIRD) series. These are dedicated battle management radars designed to control deployed S-300P series SAM assets. 5N64 or 64N6 radar systems are deployed to control multiple S-300P series strategic SAM systems, providing them with target track data to support engagements. 5N64 and 64N6 radars are not deployed separately as part of the overall EW network, making their identification an indicator that S-300P series SAM assets are present in the area. As it cannot be determined which variant is deployed using the available imagery, the battle management radars will be identified as 64N6 sites throughout this article. The majority of these radars are likely the 64N6 variant, but older 5N64 radars may still be in use to support the older variants of the S-300P series.

A representative 64N6 battle management site can be seen in the following image. This site is important for two reasons. First, it is an excellent image of a 64N6 radar system, with the radar array's shadow clearly showing the characteristic fore and aft feedhorn assemblies used on the 64N6's radar array. Secondly, this system is co-located with an S-300P garrison. Both the presence of the 64N6 radar and the S-300P garrison indicate that there are operational S-300P series batteries in the area. However, no S-300P series batteries have been identified in the area, highlighting the fact that there are likely a good deal of SAM batteries operating in Russia that have yet to be identified.

AIR DEFENSE ASSETS

S-300P Series

The primary strategic SAM systems employed by the Russian air defense network are variants of the S-300P family. The S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE), S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE), and S-300PM (SA-20A GARGOYLE) are all widely deployed throughout the nation. The S-300P series SAM systems are all mobile, able to be redeployed should the need arise, allowing them to be constantly relocated to complicate targeting. The engagement ranges are as follows: S-300PT, 47 km; S-300PS, 90 km; and S-300PM, 150 km. Detailed information regarding the S-300P series of SAM systems can be found here.

Legacy Systems

Very few legacy Soviet-era strategic SAM systems are still found active inside of Russia. There is a single active S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) battery still operational in Kaliningrad, and what appear to be a small number of S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) batteries deployed on the island of Novaya Zemlya. What appear to be active S-75 and S-125 (SA-3 GOA) batteries found at the Ashuluk SAM Training Range are likely in place to serve either the training needs of Russian allies still operating these systems, or to serve as launch platforms for specially modified missiles designed to serve as targets for more modern systems.

Tactical SAMs

Tactical SAM systems are not commonly employed as part of the overall Russian air defense network. These tactical systems, such as the S-300V (SA-12 GLADIATOR/GIANT) or 9K37 (SA-11 GADFLY), are designed to be deployed in support of Russian army maneuver formations to provide mobile air defense. Some of these systems can, however, be located deployed at prepared sites, such as the S-300V battery deployed near Briobidzhan and seen in the image below. As such, given that these systems can provide air defense in their region, they are included here. Identified tactical SAM garrisons are also included as these systems could potentially also be deployed in a quasi-strategic manner to defend key facilities in their vicinity.

GENERAL LAYOUT

Russia's strategic air defense network is arranged to defend key military sites, industrial areas, and population centers. Currently deployed assets are consolidated in the vicinity of these locations to provide overlapping surveillance zones and fields of fire, increasing the network's defensive effectiveness.

Strategic SAM assets were initially subordinate to the Troops of Air Defense (PVO). With the reorganization under Yeltsin, the Russian Air Force absorbed the PVO and gained control of the strategic SAM force. Tactical SAM systems remain controlled by the Russian Army. Many tactical SAM systems are often deployed at fixed sites to provide air defense of certain areas, and as such will be included here even though they are not necessarily integrated with the strategic SAM network.

Russia is presently divided into six miltary zones, which can be seen in the image below. These military zones will be analyzed separately to provide a more detailed look at the currently deployed air defense assets therein.

Within each of these military zones, numerous air defense sites and support facilities can be identified. Identification of active air defense sites is obviously important to provide a general image of the air defense capabilities of the zone in question. Support facilities, however, are also very significant and can often provide valuable information regarding the zone's overall potential.

Most strategic SAM sites are supported by SAM garrisons housing additional equipment and often providing maintenance facilities for deployed units. These garrisons can often provide valuable information regarding the potential future strength of an air defense zone during a time of conflict. Consider the S-300P garrison near Vsevolodovo, on the outskirts of Moscow, seen in the image below.

This garrison is likely positioned to support many of the S-300PS and S-300PM batteries defending Moscow. A close examination of the equipment visible on the grounds of the facility indicates that there may be up to three S-300P series batteries in-garrison available for deployment. Being able to determine the amount of SAM equipment in-garrison provides an analyst with a rough concept of the amount of additional batteries which may be available for deployment during a time of increased tensions. This also allows an analyst to make a differentiation between peacetime and potential wartime postures for an air defense network. In the case of Russia, examination of the various SAM garrisons throughout the nation does indicate that there are a substantial number of complete batteries available for deployment should the need arise. Alternatively this provides an idea of the number of batteries potentially available for resale to foreign clients. As S-400 units replace older S-300PS and S-300PM batteries throughout Russia, for example, these older S-300P series batteries, including those held in garrison, could be available for export at a reduced rate, making them attractive options for nations like Syria or Iran who desire to upgrade their air defense networks.

Close examination of SAM garrisons and facilities also provides insight into the types of systems which could be available for deployment in a given area. The SAM garrison near Strugi-Krasnye, for example, houses S-300V components. While there are no deployed S-300V batteries identified in the area, the presence of the components at the garrison indicates that the system could be deployed in the region and potentially represents a threat to be considered.

SYMBOLOGY

The following icons will be used to depict air defense related sites within Russia:

Squares: facilities such as garrisons, test and training centers
Diamonds: EW radar sites, including 36D6 and 64N6 radar sites
Triangles: SAM sites

The icons will be color coded as follows:

Dark red: S-75
Bright red: S-300P series, S-300V, 64N6 battle management radar
Dark blue: general EW radar, 36D6 EW radar
Bright blue: S-125
Faded green: 9K37
Purple: S-200
White: an unoccupied EW radar or SAM location
Brown: a SAM garrison

Engagement zones will match the color of the icon for their respective SAM system with the exception of the 64N6 battle management radar. The 64N6 will have a blue range ring but a red icon, denoting its EW function as well as its relation to the S-300P series SAM systems.

WESTERN ZONE

The Western Zone is responsible for defense of Russia's western-most region, as well as capital area air defense of Moscow. As such, it is one of the most heavily defended zones found in Russia. Numerous advanced SAM systems are present, making the airspace above Moscow potentially the most heavily defended airspace in the world.

EW Sites

Nine EW sites provide coverage for the Western Zone. The bulk of these sites are found in the western half of the zone, situated to provide coverage of the border regions. The locations of these EW sites can be seen in the image below:

36D6 Sites

Nine 36D6 EW sites provide additional EW coverage for the Western Zone. Half of these facilities are situated to potentially support S-300PS and S-300PM batteries in the region as well. As can be seen in the image below, the 36D6 sites are able to provide coverage of roughly two thirds of the Western Zone:

64N6 Sites

Ten 64N6 sites provide battle management for the S-300PS and S-300PM batteries deployed in the Western Zone. The majority of these systems are situated around Moscow, to support the large number of SAM batteries present providing defense of the Russian capital. The locations and coverage of the 64N6 sites can be seen in the image below:

Active Sites

Air defense for the Western Zone is provided by thirteen S-300PM and two S-300PS batteries. Many of the batteries ringing Moscow are in residence at former S-25 positions. While a solitary S-300PS battery is deployed near Voronezh, the bulk of the attention in the Western Zone has been given to defending Moscow. The Moscow air defense network also features the majority of the most modern S-300PM variants found in Russia. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries are depicted in the image below:

It is known that two S-400 (SA-21) batteries have been deployed around Moscow, with the first battery being emplaced near Elektrostal. Neither of these batteries have appeared in available imagery, however, and as such they are not included here. It should be mentioned, however, that the S-400 will be replacing S-300P series batteries around Moscow and eventually throughout Russia, providing a significant increase in capability.

Inactive Sites

A total of eighty four inactive SAM sites are present in the Western Zone. Half of these are former S-25 positions, some of which may be home to unlocated S-300P series batteries which cannot be identified due to the imagery lacking sufficient resolution in those areas. Eleven S-75 and fifteen SAM sites are also present scattered throughout the area. Sixteen prepared S-300P sites can also be located. These sites, along with the other inactive sites, could be used to redeploy S-300PS and S-300PM batteries during a time of conflict, complicating targeting of these assets. They may also be used to deploy S-300P series batteries held in storage at the SAM garrisons in the area to bolster the defense of the Western Zone should the need arise.

The locations of the inactive SAM sites found in the Western Zone can be seen in the image below:

Facilities

Eleven facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Western Zone. There are six S-300P series SAM garrisons, three SAM garrisons, one SAM training facility, and one radar test facility. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:

Moscow

Given the importance placed on defending Moscow, there are a number of EW sites, SAM sites and support facilities located in close proximity around the Russian capital. In order to better illustrate their position in relation to one another, the image below is provided:

NORTHWESTERN ZONE

The Northwestern Zone encompasses a large swath of terrain. Assets deployed in the Northwestern Zone are situated to defend many strategically significant locations, such as the city of St. Petersburg and the Russian Northern Fleet facilities along the Kola Peninsula. Many of these assets also serve an important function in a strategic environment; they would represent a significant portion of the Russian EW and SAM network defending against incoming American nuclear strike aircraft approaching over the North Pole.

EW Sites

Twenty seven EW sites, one of which is unoccupied in available imagery, provide coverage for the Northwestern Zone. Roughly a third of these sites are positioned along the Kola Peninsula to provide EW coverage for the Russian Northern Fleet's facilities and to impart GCI support for interceptor aircraft based there. The locations of these EW sites can be seen in the image below:

36D6 Sites

Nine 36D6 EW sites provide additional EW coverage for the Northwestern Zone. Six of these facilities are situated to potentially support S-300PS and S-300PM batteries surrounding St. Petersburg, with a further site situated to potentially support S-300PT and S-300PM batteries on the Kola Peninsula. The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below:

64N6 Sites

Four 64N6 sites provide battle management for the S-300P series batteries deployed in the Northwestern Zone. Three of these systems are situated around St. Petersburg in support of S-300P series batteries in the area. The locations and coverage of the 64N6 sites can be seen in the image below:

Active Sites

Air defense for the Northwestern Zone is provided by three S-75 batteries, four S-300PT batteries, six S-300PS batteries, and five S-300PM batteries. The bulk of the S-300P series batteries are split between St. Petersburg and the Kola Peninsula, with three S-300PT batteries deployed to defend Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries are depicted in the image below:

Inactive Sites

Seventy nine inactive SAM sites are present in the Northwestern Zone. There are thirty nine S-75 sites, 10 S-125 sites, 17 S-200 sites, 10 S-300P series sites, and three 5V11 sites. Many of these former SAM sites can be found in areas no longer defended by active SAM batteries, providing insight into Cold War era deploment strategies. The locations of these inactive SAM sites can be seen in the image below:

Facilities

Seven facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Northwestern Zone. There are three S-300P series SAM garrisons, three SAM garrisons, and one EW training facility. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:

St. Petersburg and the Kola Peninsula

A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities surrounding St. Petersburg is provided below:

The Kola Peninsula is one of the most important strategic locations in the Northwestern Zone, providing the home to Russia's Northern Fleet and a significant portion of the sea-borne nuclear deterrent force. A closer view of the strategic air defense facilities in the area is provided in the image below:

SOUTHWESTERN ZONE

The Southwestern Zone is an important zone in terms of air defense for Russia. The zone provides surveillance and SAM coverage of Russia's southwestern flank bordering the Black Sea. Also, this zone is likely responsible for providing the air defense units deployed to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in support of Russia's military activities there.

EW Sites

Twenty eight EW sites provide coverage for the Southwestern Zone. These sites are scattered throughout the zone to provide coverage over the bulk of the territory. The locations of these EW sites can be seen in the image below:

36D6 and 64N6 Sites

Eight 36D6 and one 64N6 radar sites provide additional air surveillance of the Southwestern Zone, as well as battle management functions for S-300P series batteries in the area. The majority of the 36D6 radar sites are positioned in the western half of the zone to allow for increased coverage of the border region with the Ukraine and the offshore airspace over the Black Sea. The locations and coverage zones of these facilities can be seen in the image below:

Active Sites

Three S-300PM SAM batteries provide air defense for the Southwestern Zone. Two of these batteries are positioned to defend the area bordering the Black Sea, providing coverage of the port facility at Novorossiysk as well. The third battery is sited to defend Rostov-on-Don. This third battery is significant insofar as that there is no identified 64N6 radar in the area, indicating that the battle management complex is likely sited in a region not currently covered in sufficient resolution to facilitate identification. The locations and engagement zones of these three S-300PM batteries can be seen in the image below:

Inactive Sites

Fifty inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Southwestern Zone. There are thirty one S-75 sites, seven S-125 sites, seven S-200 sites, and five S-300P series sites. The bulk of these sites are situated around Rostov-on-Don and Volgograd, areas which no longer maintain a significant SAM presence. The locations of these inactive SAM sites can be seen in the image below:

CENTRAL ASIAN ZONE

The Central Asian Zone provides air defense for a significant portion of Russia's interior, concentrating on the western half of the interior. As the interior of the nation is less vulnerable to aerial assault, assets contained herein are less capable and more dispersed throughout the territory.

EW Sites

Fourteen EW sites provide surveillance and GCI support capabilities for the Central Asian Zone. These sites are primarily situated near populated areas and airfields. Their locations can be seen in the iamge below:

36D6 and 64N6 Sites

Three 36D6 and three 64N6 radar facilities provide expanded EW coverage and battle management support for the Central Asian Zone's air defense systems. Two of the 64N6 battle management radar sites are situated near the zone's deployed S-300P series batteries, with the third being the aforementioned example sited near Saratov where no S-300P series batteries have been identified as of yet. The locations and coverage zones of these radar assets can be seen in the image below:

Active Sites

Three S-300PS batteries provide the bulk of the active air defense coverage for the Central Asian Zone. These batteries are positioned to defend Samara and Ekaterinburg. An S-300V garrison at Orenburg is a potential source of expanded air defense for the region. The locations and engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries can be seen in the image below:

Inactive Sites

Numerous inactive SAM sites can be found scattered throughout the Central Asian Zone. Seventeen S-75 sites, fifteen S-200 sites, and two S-300P sites have been identified. Their locations can be seen in the image below:

Facilities

Five facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Central Asian Zone. These facilities consist of an S-300P garrison, the aforementioned S-300V garrison, one SAM garrison, one SAM training range, and one SAM garrison/training range combined facility. With the exception of the S-300P garrison near Saratov, the rest of the facilities are consolidated around Orenburg. This potentially indicates that Orenburg is a significant training location for tactical SAM units in the area and possibly throughout Russia as well. Strategic SAM systems likely do not train at these facilities as they employ two dedicated facilities in Russia, but tactical SAM systems could make use of the facilities with greater ease due to their shorter range. Examination of the training ranges does indicate that they have been used by tracked vehicles with regularity, providing further evidence that tactical SAM units are the primary users of these facilities. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:

SIBERIAN ZONE

The Siberian Zone provides air defense for the eastern portion of Russia's interior. As with the Central Asian Zone, assets contained herein are less capable and more dispersed throughout the territory when compared to other zones throughout Russia.

EW Sites

Twenty EW sites provide air surveillance for the Siberian Zone. One of these sites was inactive when imaged, containing no identifiable air surveillance equipment. While half of these locations have been scattered throughout the zone, there is a concentration of nine facilities in the southeastern quadrant providing air surveillance along the border with China. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:

36D6 and 64N6 Sites

One 36D6 radar and one 64N6 battle management radar provide additional EW coverage for the Siberian Zone. The 64N6 facility is located near Irkutsk to support an S-300PS battery in the area, and two more 64N6 facilities are likely unlocated near Achinsk and Novosibirsk given the presence of S-300P series batteries in these areas. The locations and coverage zones of the identified 36D6 and 64N6 radars can be seen in the image below:

Active Sites

Two S-300PT batteries and two S-300PS batteries comprise the identified air defense assets deployed in the Siberian Zone. These batteries are positioned to provide defense of Achinsk, Irkutsk, and Novosibirsk. The locations and engagement zones of these SAM batteries can be seen in the image below:

Inactive Sites

Forty inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Siberian Zone. Twenty S-75 sites, one S-125 site, fifteen S-200 sites, and four S-300P sites have been located in the region. The locations of these sites can be seen in the image below:

Facilities

Three support facilities, comprised of one S-300P garrison, one 9K37 garrison, and one EW training facility, have been identified in the Siberian Zone. The S-300P garrison is centrally located and could potentially support the entire zone. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:

FAR EASTERN ZONE

EW Sites

Forty one EW sites, two of which were inactive when imaged, provide air surveillance for the Far Eastern Zone. These facilities are primarily consolidated in three strategically significant areas: the northeast, near Alaska, the southeast, near Vladivostok, and the far east, on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:

36D6, 64N6, and 9S18M1 Sites

Three 36D6 sites, three 64N6 sites, and one 9S18M1 site are located in the Far Eastern Zone. The 64N6 and 9S18M1 sites provide support to specific SAM units, with the 64N6 sites providing battle management support for assigned S-300PS batteries and the 9S18M1 site providing EW support to a deployed 9K37 battery in the region. There is likely an unlocated 64N6 located near Vladivostok, denoted by the presence of S-300PS batteries in the area. The locations and coverage zones of these facilities can be seen in the image below:

Active Sites

Eleven active SAM batteries provide air defense for the Far Eastern Zone. Nine of these batteries are equipped with S-300PS SAM systems and defend naval facilities at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, as well as other key locations in the region. One S-300V and one 9K37 battery have also been identified deployed at prepared sites in the region as well. The locations and engagement zones of the active SAM batteries in the region can be seen in the image below:

Inactive Sites

Sixty nine inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Far Eastern Zone. These locations consist of forty two S-75 sites, six S-125 sites, one 2K12 site, eight S-200 sites, one 9K37 site, and eleven S-300P sites. The locations of these sites can be seen in the image below. Interestingly, many of these facilities have been identified on the island of Sakhalin, a location which has not seen any active SAM batteries deployed to the region. This is further evidence of the changing priorities of Russian air defense.

Facilities

Six facilities supporting air defense units in the region have been identified in the Far Eastern Zone. There are four S-300P garrisons, one 9K37 garrison, and an S-300V garrison. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:

Vladivostok and the Kamchatka Peninsula

A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities in the region surrounding Vladivostok is provided below:

A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities on the Kola Peninsula near Petropavlovsk, home of the Russian Pacific Fleet's SSBN force, can be seen in the image below:

KALININGRAD

The Kaliningrad autonomous region, located to the west of Russia along the Baltic sea, possesses numerous air defense units but is not tecnhically part of the Russian strategic air defense network. Rather, assets in this region are dedicated to the air defense of Kaliningrad and may not be integrated within the overall Russian air defense network due to the fact that Kaliningrad is geographically separated from the rest of Russia.

EW, 36D6, and 64N6 Sites

Two EW sites, four 36D6 radar sites, and one 64N6 battle management radar can be found in Kaliningrad. Their locations and coverage zones can be seen in the image below:

Active Sites

Air defense of Kaliningrad is provided by one S-200 battery, the last such battery in active service with the Russian military, and five S-300PS batteries. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries can be seen in the image below:

Inactive Sites

Six S-75 sites, one S-125 site, one 2K12 site, and three S-300P sites make up the inactive SAM sites located within Kaliningrad. The locations of these sites, as well as the aforementioned radar and SAM positions, can be seen in the image below. Also provided is the location of an S-300P garrison in the area.

For more information regarding the strategic SAM defenses of Kaliningrad, click here.

SPECIAL FACILITIES

There are eight facilities within Russia which provide test and training services for the Russian strategic SAM network.

Kapustin Yar, located in the Southwestern Zone, is the primary test facility for Russian strategic SAM systems. Ashuluk, also in the Southwestern Zone, and Telemba, in the Siberian Zone, provide training ranges for long-range strategic SAM systems. While Kapustin Yar and Telemba are not visible in sufficient resolution to make any significant analysis of their facilities, Ashuluk can be viewed in great detail. More information on these three facilities can be found here. An image of the facilities at Ashuluk is provided below for illustrative purposes:

Two EW training facilities and three generic SAM training facilities have also been located and are mentioned above in their respective zones. EW training facilities are easily identified thanks to the presence of EW radar systems in a location which precludes their use as active surveillance centers. For illustrative purposes, an image of the EW training center near St. Petersburg is provided below. Close examination will reveal that the radar systems are not mounted on raised berms to facilitate operational use, indicating that they would be hampered by structures and vegetation in the area. As these systems cannot be employed operationally but appear to be deployed in an operational fashion, this is likely a training facility and has been classified as such.

OVERALL TOTALS

Nearly seven hundred air defense related facilities have been identified in Russia and Kaliningrad. Including the sites found in Kaliningrad and along the Ashuluk training range, the total numbers are broken down as follows:

EW sites: 140
36D6 radar sites: 38
64N6 battle management radar sites: 23
9S18M1 radar sites: 1

Active S-75 sites: 4
Active S-125 sites: 1
Active S-200 sites: 1
Active 9K37 sites: 1
Active S-300V sites: 1
Active S-300PT sites: 6
Active S-300PS sites: 27
Active S-300PM sites: 21

Support facilities: 41

Inactive S-25 sites: 42
Inactive S-75 sites: 175
Inactive S-125 sites: 27
Inactive 2K12 sites: 2
Inactive S-200 sites: 78
Inactive 9K37 sites: 1
Inactive S-300P sites: 53
Inactive Dal sites: 3

LIMITATIONS

The primary limitation of the Russian air defense network is one of volume. There is simply too much airspace to ensure contiguous coverage of the entire nation. As such, there are significant gaps in coverage which could be exploited by a potential adversary. Consider the SAM engagement ranges in western Russia, as depicted in the following image:

With the placement of SAM batteries to defend strategic locations, there are significant areas where enemy aircraft could enter into Russian airspace without being threatened by an identified SAM system. While it is true that a strike package would still face a significant SAM threat when nearing a target area, not having to deal with SAM batteries enroute will result in more aircraft being available to prosecute the target.

While the SAM network's coverage is limited, the EW network coverage is robust. As seen in the image below, nearly the entire border region, as well as most of the potential target areas, are covered by the identified 36D6 and 64N6 radar systems. This does not take into account other EW assets such as the P-35/37 series, which would only add to the available EW coverage. Such a robust and overlapping EW network would likely force a strike package to employ either significant EW support, thereby giving away away its position, or a low level ingress, thereby reducing its range and potentially removing a great deal of potential strategic targets from threat of engagement.

The dark horses of the Russian SAM network are the tactical SAM batteries and potentially unlocated S-300P series batteries, having exploited their significant mobility to relocate along likely ingress routes. These mobile SAM systems could potentially be deployed to maximize their coverage, exploiting both prepared, inactive sites and unsurveyed field deployment locations. SAM batteries held in reserve such as those S-300P series batteries identified in garrison also represent a significant threat to be deployed during a time of crisis and would have to be carefully tracked in order to determine their final deployment positions.

At the end of the day, it is unlikely that Russia would be able to effectively deploy enough strategic SAM batteries to mount a contiguous defense of both its borders and the strategic targets likely to be struck during a time of conflict. The overwhelming amount of airspace present would make this a prohibitively expensive endeavour.

Furthermore, even if an attempt was made to mount this type of barrier air defense, it is likely that the deployed assets would not have sufficient overlapping coverage to deny an inbound strike package access to Russian airspace should a small number of SAM systems be incapacitated or destroyed. Fortunately for Russia, however, there are two other options present which help to mitigate these limitations.

CIS AIR DEFENSE

One solution available to Russian military forces in a time of conflict is the presence of the CIS air defense network. The CIS air defense network is an integrated cooperative involving the air defense forces of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The combined air defense forces of these nations provide an expanded air defense network along the periphery of Russia.

Continuing with the previous example of a strike package attempting to penetrate into western Russia, consider the presence of multiple 36D6 and 64N6 radar sites in Belarus and the Ukraine, as well as those deployed by Russia in Kaliningrad. These sites provide contiguous coverage along the western approaches to Russia from St. Petersburg in the north to the Georgian border in the south. Overlapping coverage provides an extremely well monitored air defense zone reaching into Poland and the majority of the Black Sea. This would severely impede the prospects of an inbound strike package successfully evading detection, allowing air defense assets within Russia to be brought to full readiness in anticipation of an aerial attack.

The coverage of 36D6 and 64N6 radar systems found in the western portion of the CIS air defense network can be seen in the image below:

Belarus and the Ukraine do not only offer air surveillance capabilities to the CIS air defense network. Multiple S-125, S-200, and S-300P series SAM batteries are also present, providing an additional layer of protection for western Russia. These SAM batteries do not provide complete coverage of the western approaches to Russia, as they are primarily deployed in accordance with the air defense requirements of their users, but they do provide yet another complication for an inbound strike package. Furthermore, there remains the chance, as with Russia, that many of the S-300P series SAM batteries could be redeployed to maximize their effectiveness. Most of the S-300P series SAM batteries in Belarus and the Ukraine are consolidated to defend key military and industrial centers and could be relocated to a degree without compromising the defensive posture at those locations.

The SAM coverage found in the western portion of the CIS air defense network, including those systems sited in Kaliningrad, can be seen in the image below:

THE AIR ELEMENT

No discussion of strategic air defense in Russia would be complete without mentioning the MiG-31 (FOXHOUND). As noted above, there are significant gaps in the SAM coverage throughout the nation. The MiG-31 is a strategic interceptor tasked with defending the periphery of Russia, and provides the ability to cover far more territory than a small number of SAM batteries. There are currently seven active MiG-31 units inside of Russia. With a combat radius of between 720 kilometers at Mach 2.35 and 1250 kilometers at Mach 0.8, the MiG-31 is well suited for patrolling those areas in Russia lacking sufficient ground-based air defense. Four aircraft can effectively monitor and cooperatively engage targets in a 1600 kilometer wide swath of airspace thanks to the presence of advanced datalinking systems allowing target data to be passed between the interceptors.

MiG-31 interceptors can be supported by A-50 (MAINSTAY) AEW&C aircraft based at Ivanovo. These aircraft can operate as airborne GCI platforms to vector MiG-31s and other air combat aircraft towards targets outside the range of the fighters' radar systems. Alternatively the A-50 can be used to vector MiG-31s towards targets while the MiG-31 closes passively with its Zaslon fire control radar shut off to deny an enemy aircraft an RWR indication giving away the MiG-31's presence. The A-50 can also be used as an airborne EW platform, monitoring airspace in regions where EW coverage is limited or non-existant.

Both the A-50 and MiG-31 may have their range extended and their loiter time increased by inflight refueling from Il-78 (MIDAS) tankers. The only limitation with this practice is the fact that Russia's Il-78 fleet is relatively small, and as such is primarily tasked to support strategic aviation units operating nuclear bombers. The long range and endurance capability of both the MiG-31 and A-50, coupled with the presence of multiple airfields and staging locations along the northern Russian coast and the Kola Peninsula allow these assets to be forward deployed in order to take advantage of their range capabilities in regions where their presence is required.

CONCLUSION

The Russian strategic air defense network possesses some of the most advanced weapon systems found anywhere in the world. Despite the fact that at first glance there are many significant coverage gaps in the SAM network, the presence of numerous systems held in garrison as well as the incorporation of an air element into the strategic air defense system makes Russian airspace arguably the most heavily defended airspace found anywhere in the world. An analyst would do well to remember that numbers and images do not tell the entire story; were every in-garrison system to be deployed, the Russian air defense network would surely represent a significant deterrent to any aerial incursion into sovereign Russian airspace, a view that is not necessarily evident at first glance when only evaluating the identified deployed assets.

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

The locations, range rings, zone borders, and other placemarks used to create this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark here. Also included are the locations of relevant strategic aviation units discussed herein.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss this feauture at the IMINT & Analysis forum discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
CIS Air Defense

Friday, December 12, 2008

Image of the Week: CSS-4 Silo

HIDDEN CSS-4 SILOThe image above depicts a DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBM silo located in southern China near Huitong. Chinese ICBM silos are very difficult to identify. As seen in the image above, they are allowed to become overgrown with vegetation and may actually be camoflaged. This is part of a denial and deception effort intended to mask their locations from overhead imaging sensors. Using effective concealment efforts can make targeting these strategic assets very difficult if the sites are effectively hidden. As shown here, however, these concealed missile sites can still be located if an observer is aware of their layout and cognizant of the relevant features that need to be identified.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Sunday, December 7, 2008

Nuclear Iran: Exposed In Imagery

Below is a link to a video, showing a presentation given by Dr. Frank Pabian at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The concept behind Dr. Pabian's presentation was to depict the effect of open source imagery as an analysis tool in nonproliferation and the response of potentially hostile nations in the form of improved denial and deception. Dr. Pabian uses the ongoing nuclear issue with Iran to illustrate this issue, also briefly touching on the Syrian reactor complex struck by Israel, showing a number of commercial images from sources such as Digital Globe and Google Earth to depict various nuclear-related facilities and the efforts that Iran and Syria have gone to in order to hide the activities at a number of these locations. Great concept, and great presentation, but where this really scores is in the amount of historical and background data taken from various sources to spell out the scope of Iran's covert nuclear program. The video runs about an hour, but it's well worth a watch and is highly recommended for anyone interested in the nuclear issue, nuclear proliferation, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Dr. Pabian on Iran

Remembering Pearl Harbor

THE USS ARIZONA MEMORIALThe image above depicts the USS Arizona memorial. The museum sits atop the resting place of the USS Arizona underneath the still waters of Pearl Harbor, and is a somber reminder of the events that transpired in December 1941 that led to America's official entry into World War II. Inside the memorial visitors can look into the waters and see the remains of the battleship as it rests on the bottom of the harbor. It's a moving experience, and one that every serious military historian should experience in person.

SOURCE

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Friday, December 5, 2008

Image of the Week: Rocket Test Stand

PAKISTANI ROCKET TEST FACILITYThe image above depicts a rocket engine test stand located adjacent to the AQ Khan nuclear research facility in Pakistan, southeast of Islamabad. A tower can be seen, used to mount the rocket motor being tested. The tower is located above a large blast trough, used to vent the rocket exhaust away from the facility. This facility is similar to the North Korean rocket test center mentioned previously, albeit on a much smaller scale.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth