Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

INTRODUCTION

One of the most overlooked military arsenals in the Middle East is the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force. The presence of this capability, in context with the specific weapon system employed, raises a number of significant questions about the potential nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of currently available imagery also suggests that ballistic missiles are not a capability which Saudi Arabia will be seeking to divest itself of at any point in the near future.

THE SAUDI MISSILE FORCE

At some point in the mid 1980's, Saudi Arabia chose to pursue a ballistic missile force. Friendly Islamic nations such as Pakistan did not possess a significant ballistic missile program at this time, nor did North Korea. The only other nation producing ballistic missiles which would have been amenable to an export was China. Towards the end of the 1980's China agreed to develop a conventionally-armed ballistic missile for export to the Saudis. The weapon chosen for modification was the DF-3A (CSS-2) IRBM, a nuclear-tipped weapon already in service with the Chinese military for well over a decade.

The first weapons were delivered to Saudi Arabia in 1988, and it is not known precisely how many were purchased. Sources provide varying estimates, ranging from between 30 missiles and 9 launchers to 120 missiles and 12 launchers. Identified DF-3A associated facilities inside of Saudi Arabia suggest that the number may well be far closer to the latter estimate; two facilities have been positively identified, each housing two garrisons and various support and storage facilities. These facilities are Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil, approximately 90 and 450 km southwest of Riyadh, respectively. The locations of these facilities, as well as two other facilities which may be related to the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force and will be described later, can be seen in the image below:
THE DF-3A

The DF-3A is a single stage IRBM initially developed for the PLA's 2nd Artillery Division. Entering service in 1971, the initial DF-3 variant was a nuclear-tipped weapon, representing the first Chinese-developed ballistic missile. An improved propulsion system and other refinements were introduced in the 1980's with the DF-3A variant. The initial DF-3 had a range of 2,500 km, increased to 2,800 km in the DF-3A. Maximum range capability with a reduced payload is 4,000 km, and the weapon is credited with the ability to fly a depressed-angle profile to a range of 1,550 km, providing a limited degree of anti-missile defense. The DF-3 series weapons are road mobile, but employ prepared launch sites, allowing them to be dispersed from a garrison. Preparation time for erecting and fueling the missile is approximately two hours, and the storable liquid fuel propellant allows the missile to remain ready to fire for a short period of time.

The weapon is erected on a circular pad approximately 100 meters in diameter. A reinforced pad in the center serves as the panch point for the missile, with the support vehicles being positioned around the launcher on the pad. An example of a Saudi Arabian DF-3A launch pad can be seen in the image below:
AL SULAYYIL

The first identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is at Al Sulayyil, near the southern end of the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. This geological feature, running approximately 800 kilometers roughly south from a location north of Riyadh, provides a natural method of concealing and protecting Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile infrastructure. The complex consists of an administrative and support facility, and a large missile base contained within a secure perimeter. The Al Sulayyil facility was first described in detail by Ronen Bergman, writing for the Israeli publication Yediot Ahronot in March of 2002.

An overview of the Al Sulayyil DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
The missile compound itself is divided into three main areas: two missile garrisons with associated support facilities, and a central compound. Both garrison areas differ in their layout due to terrain constraints, but are nearly identical in terms of the facilities they possess. Each garrison area, accessed by separate entry control points within the overall complex itself, contain a garrison compound for missile launchers and support equipment, three separate bunkers ostensibly for missile and/or warhead storage, a missile handling facility for warhead mating, and a high bay garage where missiles and launchers are joined and erected for calibration before deployment.

An image of the northern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The southern missile garrison is located in close proximity to the compound's central area. The central area contains a former support area likely associated with the construction of the missile complexes, a possible launch control facility, and two bunkers.

An image of the central area and the southern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The missile garrison itself is not as expansive in the southern facility as it is in the northern facility. The reasoning behind this is not clear. Both facilities contain four identical equipment and vehicle garages and a drive through garage likely maintaining the launchers themselves. The northern garrison possesses two additional garages and a high bay garage. As high bay garages are typically employed for launcher or missile support functions, it is possible that the northern facility provides training or maintenance support for the DF-3A unit.

An image depicting the two DF-3A garrisons can be seen in the image below:
Despite reporting to the contrary which suggests that there are numerous launch pads contained within the complex, only two prepared launch sites have been identified within Al Sulayyil. It is possible that weapons may be erected from the reinforced pads or roadways surrounding many of the facilities, but this cannot be confirmed using the available imagery.

AL JOFFER

The second identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is the Al Joffer facility. As with the Al Sulayyil facility, it is located within the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. The Al Joffer facility is located closer to the northern end of the escarpment, near Riyadh. The facilities found inside of the Al Joffer facility are virtually identical to those found at the Al Sulayyil facility, consisting of an administrative and support facility, and a secure missile complex consisting of two garrison areas and a central support area. Even the missile garrisons themselves depict the same differences as those described above in the Al Sulayyil facility. Different terrain considerations than those found at the Al Sulayyil facility result in the Al Joffer facility being more expansive, with the two missile garrisons being separated by a greater distance.

An overview of the Al Joffer DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
Apart from the distances involved, there are two major differences between the Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil facilities. First, Al Joffer only contains a single fixed launch pad, whereas Al Sulayyil contains two. Secondly, Al Joffer still contains an active support facility inside of the main complex in the central area. Given that the imagery was captured in 2004, this suggests that the Al Joffer facility was not fully operational before that date, providing a potential explanation for the lack of a second prepared launch pad.

In contrast, the Al Sulayyil facility, particularly the northern garrison area, has remained unchanged in imagery between 2003 and 2007, suggesting that it was the first facility to become operational with the DF-3A.

An image comparing the Al Sulayyil northern garrison's appearance in 2003 (top) and 2007 (bottom) can be seen below:
POSSIBLE FACILITIES

There are two potential facilities in Saudi Arabia that may serve the DF-3A force. One is located approximately 280 km west of Al Sulayyil near the settlement of Rawdah, while the other is located in Saudi Arabia's northwestern desert region. As with the previous two facilities, both of these locations are strategically placed inside of terrain features for protection.

Rawdah

The Rawdah complex is a massive facility consisting of numerous underground facilities (UGFs) and hardened bunkers. While the true purpose of this facility is not known, there is evidence to suggest that it supports DF-3A operations in some capacity. The complex is divided into two main areas, an support area and a separate area containing the aforementioned hardened facilities.

An overview of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the iamge below:
The support area consists of an administrative compound with support facilities, an underground drive-through complex, and two potential missile launch pads. The administrative compound is relatively nondescript, but the other facilities are worthy of further inspection. The underground drive-through facility is nearly 600 meters long. In most cases it could be viewed as simply a pass through the terrain allowing for easier travel, but the support area is connected by a two lane paved road with the outside area. The purpose of this large UGF may be for storage or for command functions. The latter is unlikely given the lack of any visible communications-related infrastructure atop the terrain under which the drive-through facility passes. The most logical assumption therefore is that the facility is designed for a storage purpose. The two possible launch pads are the most significant evidence suggesting that the Rawdah facility does support the DF-3A. One pad can be seen with six 20 meter long objects which match the dimensions of DF-3A towed transporter-erectors. This pad is of a circular configuration 90 meters across, matching those found at the Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer DF-3A facilities. The reinforced launch pad in the center is missing, suggesting that this may be a training site. The second possible launch area consists of a concrete pad enclosed by a fence. While this potential launch site differs in configuration from those positively identified at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, its dimensions would allow a DF-3A to be erected and fired.

The support area of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the image below:
The remaining facilities at Rawdah are concentrated to the northwest of the support area. This area contains numerous bunkers and UGFs, as well as two potential launch areas. The launch areas consist of a hardened pad and an extension of a roadway, locations similar if not to the circular launch pads favored by the operational garrisons, then certainly to those employed by the Chinese 2nd Artillery Division in association with certain missile types. As Chinese technicians are reported to have aided in the construction of Saudi Arabia's DF-3A facilities, it is possible that various launch pads were incorporated for evaluation. The numerous underground facilities suggest that while Rawdah may have a DF-3A support function, it likely serves other purposes as well. Precisely what is contained inside of the facilities is again not conclusively known, but some educated guesses may be made. As with the drive-through UGF to the southeast, no evidence of significant air circulation or ventilation is visible, suggesting that the various bunkers and UGFs are not intended for continued occupation. This suggests that the facilities are primarily intended for storage.

An image of the storage complex at Rawdah can be seen below:
What precisely is stored in such an isolated and expansive facility is a matter of speculation. The answer may be tied to the location itself. The Rawdah complex is located in the southwestern quadrant of Saudi Arabia, the furthest distance from past and present potential aggressors such as Iran, Iraq, and Israel. This would make the Rawdah complex ideally suited to serve as a large-scale ammunition storage facility. Dispersal of the ammunition would likely be performed by air out of the Bisha airport 120 km to the south. Transportation via road is also possible, but unlikely given the distances involved and potential security concerns. It is likely that DF-3A components stored in the facility have already been dispersed. The facility was imaged in 2004, when the Al Joffer facility may not have been fully operational as described above. The Rawdah facility's DF-3A support function may have already been terminated with the dispersal of components to Al Joffer. It is possible that DF-3A missiles may still be stored at Rawdah, and that the launch facilities may serve as the training complex for Saudi Arabian missile crews.

Western Garrison

One final location has been identified that may potentially house DF-3A related facilities. This location is only visible in low resolution imagery but does share two of the identifiable characteristics of Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer: it is contained within significant terrain, and it is isolated from major population centers. This facility is also located much closer to Israel, a potential target for the Saudi DF-3A force.

The possible western DF-3A garrison can be seen in the image below:
TARGETING OPTIONS

From their garrisons at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, Saudi Arabian DF-3As can range targets as far away as India and western Europe when employed to their maximum range of 4000 km. Much of Africa falls within range as well.

The image below depicts the coverage of the DF-3A ballistic missile when fired from Saudi Arabian garrisons to a range of 4000 km:
Despite the extended range capability it is likely that the weapons are only employed to their typical range of 2800 km. Extending the range requires a reduction in payload and also results in decreased accuracy. Given that the DF-3A is already a relatively inaccurate weapon, decreasing the payload would only serve to seriously diminish the combat potential of the weapon system. As seen in the image below, the Middle East, portions of Africa and eastern Europe, and western India are still within range at the standard range of 2800 km:
The most likely potential target for the Saudi Arabian DF-3A force is Iran. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran are not the closest of nations due to religious differences and the Saudi's close relationship with the United States, to cite a few brief reasons. Saudi Arabian DF-3As are believed to be targeted on Iranian cities due to their inaccuracy and therefore their inherent unsuitability for strikes on military facilities or strategic targets.

Israel is also a potential target for Saudi Arabian ballistic missiles. The likely scenario for a launch against Israel would be to employ the DF-3A in its depressed-angle launch mode, which confers a range of 1550 km. Targeting of Israel may be the reason behind the presence of the potential launch facility in western Saudi Arabia. As seen in the image below, launching from this facility allows the DF-3A to reach Israel with ease, even when fired using a depressed angle trajectory, a likely scenario given that this would increase the chances that the weapons would be able to avoid intercept by Israeli anti-missile defenses.
NUCLEAR POTENTIAL

The inaccuracy of the DF-3A, combined with its 2,000 kg throw weight, has raised speculation as to the true Saudi Arabian intentions for the missile. Saudi Arabia is well aware of the inaccuracy of the weapon, claiming that they were not fired at Iraq in 1990/1991 to avoid civillian casualties. "King Fahd ruled out that option because of the fact that you cannot control it accurately. Our problem is that our war was not with the Iraqi people, it was with Saddam Hussein and his clique," stated Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. This is in contrast to the alleged targeting of Iranian population centers.

Saudi Arabia has been known to have had an interest in nuclear weapons for some time, dating back to the construction of a potential nuclear research center in 1975. Evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia was financially and perhaps technologically involved in the nuclear weapons programs of both Iraq and Pakistan. The Iraqi capability to develop nuclear weapons was removed in the 1980s during the Iranian and Israeli air raids on the Tammuz reactor complex southeast of Baghdad. Pakistan presents an interesting option. It has been suggested that Saudi Arabia would be provided with Pakistani nuclear weapons should Iran achieve the capability to produce nuclear weapons of its own. Pakistani warheads on Saudi Arabian weapons would not only represent a significant threat to Iran, but also to India. Saudi Arabian DF-3A garrisons are well defended and would be much more difficult for India to strike during a time of conflict, potentially providing Pakistan with an added nuclear deterrent capability due to close relations with the Kingdom.

At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia does not currently possess a nuclear warhead for the DF-3A. The nation signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988, and has stated that it would not arm the DF-3A with either nuclear or chemical warheads. Evidence of Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions cannot be ignored, however, and a nuclear-armed Iran could be the impetus needed for Saudi Arabia to finally acquire a nuclear capability for its ballistic missile force. It should be noted, however, that past Saudi Arabian assurances that chemical or nuclear warheads would not be acquired are ominously significant. Saudi Arabia did not unequivocally state that weapons of mass destruction would not be used to arm the DF-3A, raising significant questions.

If the Kingdom, being aware of the DF-3As inaccuracy, is not pursuing a nuclear or chemical warhead capability, is there a covert biological warfare program underway in Saudi Arabia? Moreover, given that Saudi Arabia is reportedly not concerned with firing the weapons at Iranian civillians, has such a program existed since before 1990? This would potentially explain the Kingdom's real reasons for not wishing to fire their weapons into Iraq, unless they view Iraqi civillians with more regard than those of Iran, reasons reinforced by the alleged nuclear partnership between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

CONCLUSION

The Saudi Arabian ballistic missile arsenal is one of the most interesting and important military aspects of the developing Middle Eastern political and military landscape. As Iran moves forward towards its alleged nuclear weapons program, Saudi Arabia may well attempt to acquire a similar capability for its missiles to serve as a deterrent. The potentially destabilizing effects of such a move, given the Kingdom's position regarding Israel, could ignite a new arms race, and even military conflict. The fact that this significant development may be related to a military capability that few individuals realize exists highlights the need for closer military analysis of potential adversarial situations worldwide.

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

A Google Earth file containing the placemarks and range rings used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Saudi Arabian Missile Forces
Saudi Arabian WMD Programs
Al Sulayyil
Saudi Arabian Missile Facilities
The DF-3

Defeating Censorship in Google Earth

INTRODUCTION

Many facilities and locations around the world appear pixellated in Google Earth for various reasons, usually because of security concerns due to the sensitive or military nature of the majority of these sites. Using the historical imagery feature in Google Earth, it is possible in some cases to defeat this censorship and view imagery of these areas. The imagery will not necessarily be the most current available, but it is still useful nonetheless.

CENSORSHIP IN GOOGLE EARTH

Censored imagery can be viewed in numerous locations inside of Google Earth. Google has often claimed that it will listen to the security concerns of national agencies and governments, but in the case of the "revealing" of the Australian nuclear reactor a few years ago claimed that it did not see a reason to censor imagery in that specific case as the same area could be viewed in other imagery sources. This begs the question as to who is actually censoring the images, and it is likely that, at least in the case of Europe, the local providers (many of whom use aerial collection platforms for national geospatial functions) are doing the censoring to comply with local restrictions. Google then acquires and uploads this imagery, which is often censored. Military facilities in France and the Netherlands are two key examples of censorship making its way into Google Earth. This is not a fault of Google in any way; Google is merely acquiring as much imagery as possible and making it available at no cost using their program. Google has not shown any major inclination to censor imagery of its own volition, even with the objections of Australia and later India being on record. Now, with the incorporation of Google Earth 5's historical imagery feature, it is possible to view imagery from potentially different providers and circumvent the censorship that exists in many areas.

DIJON

To illustrate the advantage that the historical imagery feature can provide when trying to view imagery of censored areas, consider the example of Dijon AB in France. It is commonplace in Google Earth for French military installations to be censored from view. In the case of France, the decision of what to censor appears limited to airbases, as their nuclear submarine base is clearly visible. This does raise questions as to whether the censorship has been applied only due to the wishes of the AdA, or if it was not applied correctly. In any case, Dijon AB and many others are censored in the default Google Earth view, and appear pixellated, as can be seen in the image below which was captured in 2006:
Employing the historical imagery feature allows imagery to be accessed which has not been censored, due perhaps to its inclusion into the database prior to the censorship being effected, or perhaps because it was sourced from a provider which does not believe it is responsible for censoring its products. The image below depicts Dijon AB as it appeared in 2004. There have likely not been any major alterations to the basic infrastructure in the two years that elapsed between the two images, so the historical imagery should be effective for use in analyzing the facility.
CONCLUSION

Whatever the reasoning behind the decision, Google has allowed censored imagery to be incorporated into Google Earth. Thanks to the inclusion of the historical imagery feature in Google Earth 5, many of these locations can now be viewed, albeit from earlier and less current dates. Whether or not this continues to be the case will depend on Google's realization of this potential error, or their decision to no longer allow altered imagery to be included into the data set.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Site News

A few quick notes about the site. First off, I've added a few new labels for my articles. The most prominent are Historic Imagery and Book Reviews. The first will be attached to any post incorporating Google Earth's historical imagery, and the second will be attached to...well, ok, that one should be self explanatory! Secondly, I'm considering either incorporating the comment moderation feature, whereby I will have to manually approve comments to my articles, or disabling comments altogether, relying on the forum and e-mail correspondance for feedback and inquiries. This is due to the increasing number of idiot spammers who are starting to creep into the comments, advertising all manner of things which have absolutely nothing to do with the content of the articles published here. The problem with the first method is that only users with Google accounts of some sort (blogger, gmail, etc) will be able to comment. The problem with the second method is that people will have to join the forum or send an e-mail should they wish to comment on something. What do the readers think? I haven't decided to respond in either fashion just yet, but I thought I should let you all know what I'm thinking and why.

Historical Imagery in Google Earth

INTRODUCTION

Google Earth 5 was recently released, and incorporates a wealth of new features for the user to exploit. From an analytical standpoint, the most interesting new feature is the ability to view historical imagery of many areas.

EXPLOITING HISTORICAL IMAGERY

Google Earth's new historical imagery feature allows users to examine past imagery that has been overwritten in the main viewer by either more recent or higher resolution imagery. Take Belgrade, for example. When viewed from an Eye Altitude of 50 miles, it can clearly be seen that the city and the surrounding area has been imaged over time, and that a composite mosaic of these images are currently visible to create a more complete image. For those unfamiliar with the term, the Eye Altitude is the height from which the visual vantage point on screen is being viewed. It is located at the bottom right of the image window in the Status Bar. Returning to the example of Belgrade, the historical imagery feature allows users to view the images used to provide the default view of Belgrade as a series of images, with each series building upon the last and adding the next most recent set of imagery to the screen. An excellent overview of how to fully exploit this new feature can be found here. It should be noted that not every piece of imagery visible in Google Earth's default view is available in the historical imagery feature, nor does using this feature limit the on-screen view to only the imagery captured on the date selected.

AN UNEXPECTED BENEFIT

An interesting and useful application of the historical imagery feature is that it will actually bring images into better focus at certain altitudes. To better illustrate this point, a simple exercise has been derived.

1. Open Google Earth, and click the icon to add a placemark. Copy the following coordinates into the Latitude and Longitude boxes: 56°55'57.57"N 40°32'34.96"E This will create a placemark on a mobile ICBM base near Teykovo in Russia.

2. Travel to the new placemark and zoom in so that the Eye Altitude is approximately 2500 feet.

3. Note that the date that the image was captured is August 12, 2007.

4. Under the View menu at the top left of the screen, select Historical Imagery. The Historical Imagery slider will appear along the upper left portion of the image window. The slider is currently set to coincide with the current date, which at the time of writing is 2009. Three blue lines appear in the slider, indicating images which may be selected for viewing of that particular area.

5. Set the slider to coincide with the date at which the image was captured. In this case, this will be the far right blue line. Simply drag the slider to the left until it locks into position at that date.

6. Once the slider is moved to the left from its default position, note that the image appears to have become clearer to a slight degree, helping to further accentuate many of the details. In this example, pay close attention to the three grey rectangular buildings in the center of the compound. Moving the slider to the left results in the detail on the roof of each building to become far more distinct.

As can clearly be seen, employing the historical imagery feature can be seen to provide clearer imagery. The imagery is likely loaded by Google Earth in a slightly less refined format at higher Eye Altitudes in order to facilitate quicker loading times. It should be noted that zooming in closer will result in the fully detailed image being visible, but exploiting this aspect of the historical imagery function does permit clearer images of a broader scale to be examined and saved for further use or analysis. This is exceptionally valuable when examining images containing many small objects such as vehicles or aircraft, or large facilities.

INTERESTING HISTORICAL IMAGES

The following images are examples of historical images captured in Google Earth, dealing with subjects which will be of interest to readers of this site. Examine these images, and then compare them to the default locations in Google Earth to fully comprehend the value of the historical imagery feature.

The first image depicts Bangalore, India, in February of 2007. Note that three LCA prototypes are visible on the tarmac.
The next image illustrates a useful application of the historical imagery feature. An S-300PS battery in Kaliningrad is shown, sited at a location which is mostly obscured by cloud cover in the current default imagery set. As can be seen, the historical imagery feature can be used to depict locations which may not be visible in Google Earth's default data set.
The following image depicts the parking apron at the Kazan aircraft manufacturing plant. Three Tu-160 strategic bombers can be seen. Scanning through the past imagery of this location indicates that various Tu-160s were in and out of Kazan for maintenance.
Next up is another SAM battery, this time an S-300PT battery on the Kola Peninsula. This highlights yet another advantage of having access to historical imagery in Google Earth: the default image of this location is newer, but is of a lesser resolution.
The following image depicts the Russian Navy's Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier moored at sea near Murmansk.
A series of FLANKER fighter jets can be seen on the tarmac of Luliang AB in China in the next image. Currently available imagery shows this location to have been refurbished as a new J-10 operating base; the addition of the historical imagery allows an analyst to track the history of the aircraft types operated here.
The next image depicts a deployed 64N6 battle management radar near Novosibirsk. This image allows analysts to identify the empty position currently visible in the default data set as an unoccupied 64N6 radar position.
The following image depicts the World's Ugliest Aircraft (who else was suprised that the satellite didn't break capturing the image), Boeing's X-32 demonstrator, on the ramp at Palmdale in August of 2003. This highlights one of the past disadvantages of Google Earth: sometimes new imagery removes interesting and unique sights from view. The addition of the historical imagery feature rectifies this problem to a large degree.
A third S-300P series SAM battery is seen in the image below. This is an S-300PMU battery deployed near Beijing. Current imagery shows this site to have been abandoned in the past, but its past operational status allows analysts to investigate Chinese SAM deployment patterns.
The next image is truly fascinating, showing three submarines undergoing various stages of dismantlement at Severodvinsk in Russia. The missile tubes can clearly be seen to have been removed from both the Typhoon SSBN and the Oscar SSGN.
The final example is a truly historical image, from July of 2005. It depicts the Yankee Notch SSGN conversion pierside at Nerpa. This submarine has since been scrapped, and Google Earth's historical imagery feature allows users to view it when it was still in existance, illustrating the characteristic layout of the converted SSBN.
CONCLUSION

The historical imagery feature in Google Earth 5 provides the analyst with a wealth or new data to exploit. It is now possible to conduct a degree of analysis previously available to only those users with access to other sources of imagery. Both trend and temporal analysis can be conducted, allowing the analyst to note changes occuring over time in certain areas. This new feature will certainly bring about a new appreciation for open source imagery and the analytical products which can be derived from its exploitation.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

The Google Earth Blog

Nuclear Rain: The RVSN

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