Image of the Week: B-2 Iron Birds

B-2 IRON BIRDS
The image above, taken from Google Earth's historical imagery archive, depicts two rare airframes on the ramp at Palmdale. Neither of these aircraft were flyable, instead serving as static test articles. The two aircraft are the B-2 static test airframes, referred to as "iron birds". One of these airframes has since been refurbished and is now on display at the USAF Museum in Dayton, Ohio.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Khorramabad Missile Silos

INTRODUCTION

In early 2008 it was revealed that Iran had begun to employ silo basing for its missile force. The Tabriz silo complex was situated on flat, level ground and was readily identifiable, and therefore vulnerable. Recent developments uncovered in Iran indicate that silo basing of a more survivable variety may be underway.

IMAM ALI BASE

The Imam Ali missile base is located west of Khorramabad, Iran. It is subordinate to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) missile force, and has often been referred to as a production and storage facility. There are two main facilities associated with the Imam Ali missile base. The first of these is an expansive storage facility, with numerous hardened bunkers. This facility may be home to an operational unit, or alternatively it could be a mass storage facility used by the oft-associated production complex. The second facility associated with the Imam Ali missile base is far more interesting, as it has characteristics indicating that it may be an operational missile launch facility. The National Council for Resistance in Iran made reference to an operational missile facility 35 kilometers from Khorramabad in December of 2004, and this facility appears to match that description.

The two major areas of the Imam Ali missile complex can be seen in the image below:
OPERATIONAL SITE

The northwestern facility of the Imam Ali missile complex is hidden, surrounded by terrain features and only accessible via road through a single entry control point. Great care has been taken at this location to make the most use out of the terrain by constructing underground facilities, in direct contrast to the storage facility to the southeast. This implies that the northwestern facility is not only more secure but also far more secretive in nature.

Various facilities are present here, including an administrative and support area, numerous UGFs, and air defenses. An overview of the facilities present can be seen in the image below:
It has been reported that former Iranian President Khatami ordered a 15 missile Shahab-3 MRBM unit to stand up at a location near Khorramabad. Coupled with the aforementioned information on the Imam Ali base revealed in 2004, this suggests that this location is the operational Shahab-3 facility referred to by Khatami.

As an operational Shahab-3 complex, the various UGFs would likely be used to store missile and warhead components, with high-bay garages in the area being used for warhead mating and missile/TEL checkout procedures. Two 30 meter concrete strips present in the northwestern part of the facility are likely launch points for the missiles, easily accomodating the Shahab-3's towed launcher and providing presurveyed launch points. The combination of presurveyed launch points and hardened storage facilities provides the Shahab-3 unit with a more secure existance; during increased hostilities missiles and TELs can be mated and checked out prior to launch and stored in the UGFs, awaiting word to deploy and fire when needed. Once deployed, geodesic tie-in is not needed, further reducing the time required to fire a missile.

The two launch pads at the Imam Ali launch complex can be seen in the image below:
There are problems associated with using the mobile Shahab-3, however. First, a liquid fueled missile normally can only remain fueled and ready to fire for a short time before the propellant begins to evaporate or damage internal components. Granted, this depends on the propellant used and the design of the fuel tanks, but it would be remiss to ignore the issue entirely. Second, public statements regarding missile deployments by leaders of nations who are potential targets for either the American or Israeli militaries are, at best, purely idiotic. Once the location of these missile bases are known, the easiest way to eliminate the threat of these weapons is simply to target the UGF entrances, preventing the weapons from deploying to fire. While there are certain issues with such an endeavor, such as weapon accuracy, this type of aerial attack can be accomplished with a degree of success by an experienced and well-equipped air arm.

SILO BASING

Iran may have found a solution to leaders like Khatami announcing to the world the location of ballistic missile bases. One solution is the use of missile silos such as those found at Tabriz. The problem with the Tabriz silos is that they are in the open, and do not appear to be significantly hardened. The Tabriz silos are potentially vulnerable to an aerial attack and while they do represent an increase in survivability and deterrent capability, particularly in their ability to mask the readiness state of any weapons contained therein, they are not necessarily a thoroughly ideal solution to either aspect of missile deployment.

A second solution can be found at the Imam Ali missile facility. Two of the UGFs appear to have been constructed underneath a gently sloping plateau containing what appear to be missile silo openings. Deploying missile silos in such a way not only allows missiles to be fueled and readied for firing under cover, denying an adversary the knowledge that the missiles are at increased readiness, but also removes the negative impact of the UGF entrances being targeted. These facilities can also be constructed in such a manner that they would be much more difficult to detect than a facility along the lines of Tabriz, providing the Iranian missile force with a substantial boost in deterrent and offensive capabilities.

A three dimensional view of the Imam Ali silo complex can be seen in the image below. This is the only UGF which appears to feature silos, likely due to the much flatter terrain under which the UGFs were constructed.
The Imam Ali silos appear to be capped with a 6.5 meter by 6.5 meter cover, and are surrounded by various openings which may be exhaust gas vents, ventilation, or simple trial borings. The silo cover is the potential giveaway to the true nature of this facility insofar as it is virtually identical in size to the cover found on the silos at Tabriz. The main difference is that while the Tabriz silo covers split open to either side, the Imam Ali silo covers appear to be mounted on tracks intended to slide downslope as a single unit.

Details of the Imam Ali silo complex can be seen in the image below:
CONCLUSION

It has now been demonstrated that there are two potentially silo-based missile facilities within Iran. This is indicative of a continued desire by the Iranian military to enhance the survivability of its missile force, and decrease the warning that an adversary would have that missiles are being readied to fire. As the Iranian missile force continues to modernize and expand, the trend of silo basing will likely continue, resulting in a missile force that is far more dangerous than previously believed.

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

A Google Earth file containing the placemarks used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Imam Ali Missile Base
Khorramabad Missile Facility
Khorramabad Missile Facility
Tabriz Missile Silos

Image of the Week: Shamsi

SMAHSI AIRBASE
The image above depicts Shamsi AB, Pakistan, from March of 2007. Shamsi has been in the news recently with the recent discovery in Google Earth of Predator reconnaissance drones on the ramp seen in the image, albeit from imagery captured in 2006. This is the latest example where Google has blatantly censored imagery to hide something, once again pointlessly after the fact. Once the story has broken and the screen captures of the related imagery have been widely disseminated, why does Google insist on still censoring the imagery? The US government's claim that the facility is no longer used may or may not be accurate, either: the large hangar visible at the bottom of the image is a new addition since 2006, and the two clamshell-style tent structures to the left of the image are common US military structures found at various operating locations throughout the Middle Eastern theater of operations. While the facility may indeed no longer be actively used for drone operations, one does have to wonder why the facilities were improved between 2006 and 2007. A base which is not going to be employed is not typically a location where hardened or more robust structures are erected; rather, such infrastructure changes often indicate that the facility is going ot be used on a long-term basis.

Once again, this is an excellent example of why screen captures of interesting images should always be saved. One never knows when interesting or significant findings may be erased by Google's random censorship.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Predators at Shamsi

Image of the Week: FLANKER at Paris

FLANKER AT PARIS
The image above depicts a Sukhoi Su-27SMK demonstrator parked on the apron at Le Bourget for the 2005 Paris Airshow. This is illustrative of yet another interesting use for Google Earth 5's historical imagery feature: in many cases, significant events can be observed. A further look around Le Bourget on this date will reveal the static display aircraft and numerous historical Dassault products including the Mirage 4000.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

INTRODUCTION

One of the most overlooked military arsenals in the Middle East is the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force. The presence of this capability, in context with the specific weapon system employed, raises a number of significant questions about the potential nuclear ambitions of Saudi Arabia. Analysis of currently available imagery also suggests that ballistic missiles are not a capability which Saudi Arabia will be seeking to divest itself of at any point in the near future.

THE SAUDI MISSILE FORCE

At some point in the mid 1980's, Saudi Arabia chose to pursue a ballistic missile force. Friendly Islamic nations such as Pakistan did not possess a significant ballistic missile program at this time, nor did North Korea. The only other nation producing ballistic missiles which would have been amenable to an export was China. Towards the end of the 1980's China agreed to develop a conventionally-armed ballistic missile for export to the Saudis. The weapon chosen for modification was the DF-3A (CSS-2) IRBM, a nuclear-tipped weapon already in service with the Chinese military for well over a decade.

The first weapons were delivered to Saudi Arabia in 1988, and it is not known precisely how many were purchased. Sources provide varying estimates, ranging from between 30 missiles and 9 launchers to 120 missiles and 12 launchers. Identified DF-3A associated facilities inside of Saudi Arabia suggest that the number may well be far closer to the latter estimate; two facilities have been positively identified, each housing two garrisons and various support and storage facilities. These facilities are Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil, approximately 90 and 450 km southwest of Riyadh, respectively. The locations of these facilities, as well as two other facilities which may be related to the Saudi Arabian ballistic missile force and will be described later, can be seen in the image below:
THE DF-3A

The DF-3A is a single stage IRBM initially developed for the PLA's 2nd Artillery Division. Entering service in 1971, the initial DF-3 variant was a nuclear-tipped weapon, representing the first Chinese-developed ballistic missile. An improved propulsion system and other refinements were introduced in the 1980's with the DF-3A variant. The initial DF-3 had a range of 2,500 km, increased to 2,800 km in the DF-3A. Maximum range capability with a reduced payload is 4,000 km, and the weapon is credited with the ability to fly a depressed-angle profile to a range of 1,550 km, providing a limited degree of anti-missile defense. The DF-3 series weapons are road mobile, but employ prepared launch sites, allowing them to be dispersed from a garrison. Preparation time for erecting and fueling the missile is approximately two hours, and the storable liquid fuel propellant allows the missile to remain ready to fire for a short period of time.

The weapon is erected on a circular pad approximately 100 meters in diameter. A reinforced pad in the center serves as the panch point for the missile, with the support vehicles being positioned around the launcher on the pad. An example of a Saudi Arabian DF-3A launch pad can be seen in the image below:
AL SULAYYIL

The first identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is at Al Sulayyil, near the southern end of the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. This geological feature, running approximately 800 kilometers roughly south from a location north of Riyadh, provides a natural method of concealing and protecting Saudi Arabia's ballistic missile infrastructure. The complex consists of an administrative and support facility, and a large missile base contained within a secure perimeter. The Al Sulayyil facility was first described in detail by Ronen Bergman, writing for the Israeli publication Yediot Ahronot in March of 2002.

An overview of the Al Sulayyil DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
The missile compound itself is divided into three main areas: two missile garrisons with associated support facilities, and a central compound. Both garrison areas differ in their layout due to terrain constraints, but are nearly identical in terms of the facilities they possess. Each garrison area, accessed by separate entry control points within the overall complex itself, contain a garrison compound for missile launchers and support equipment, three separate bunkers ostensibly for missile and/or warhead storage, a missile handling facility for warhead mating, and a high bay garage where missiles and launchers are joined and erected for calibration before deployment.

An image of the northern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The southern missile garrison is located in close proximity to the compound's central area. The central area contains a former support area likely associated with the construction of the missile complexes, a possible launch control facility, and two bunkers.

An image of the central area and the southern missile garrison area can be seen below:
The missile garrison itself is not as expansive in the southern facility as it is in the northern facility. The reasoning behind this is not clear. Both facilities contain four identical equipment and vehicle garages and a drive through garage likely maintaining the launchers themselves. The northern garrison possesses two additional garages and a high bay garage. As high bay garages are typically employed for launcher or missile support functions, it is possible that the northern facility provides training or maintenance support for the DF-3A unit.

An image depicting the two DF-3A garrisons can be seen in the image below:
Despite reporting to the contrary which suggests that there are numerous launch pads contained within the complex, only two prepared launch sites have been identified within Al Sulayyil. It is possible that weapons may be erected from the reinforced pads or roadways surrounding many of the facilities, but this cannot be confirmed using the available imagery.

AL JOFFER

The second identified DF-3A facility in Saudi Arabia is the Al Joffer facility. As with the Al Sulayyil facility, it is located within the Jabal Tuwayq escarpment. The Al Joffer facility is located closer to the northern end of the escarpment, near Riyadh. The facilities found inside of the Al Joffer facility are virtually identical to those found at the Al Sulayyil facility, consisting of an administrative and support facility, and a secure missile complex consisting of two garrison areas and a central support area. Even the missile garrisons themselves depict the same differences as those described above in the Al Sulayyil facility. Different terrain considerations than those found at the Al Sulayyil facility result in the Al Joffer facility being more expansive, with the two missile garrisons being separated by a greater distance.

An overview of the Al Joffer DF-3A complex can be seen in the image below:
Apart from the distances involved, there are two major differences between the Al Joffer and Al Sulayyil facilities. First, Al Joffer only contains a single fixed launch pad, whereas Al Sulayyil contains two. Secondly, Al Joffer still contains an active support facility inside of the main complex in the central area. Given that the imagery was captured in 2004, this suggests that the Al Joffer facility was not fully operational before that date, providing a potential explanation for the lack of a second prepared launch pad.

In contrast, the Al Sulayyil facility, particularly the northern garrison area, has remained unchanged in imagery between 2003 and 2007, suggesting that it was the first facility to become operational with the DF-3A.

An image comparing the Al Sulayyil northern garrison's appearance in 2003 (top) and 2007 (bottom) can be seen below:
POSSIBLE FACILITIES

There are two potential facilities in Saudi Arabia that may serve the DF-3A force. One is located approximately 280 km west of Al Sulayyil near the settlement of Rawdah, while the other is located in Saudi Arabia's northwestern desert region. As with the previous two facilities, both of these locations are strategically placed inside of terrain features for protection.

Rawdah

The Rawdah complex is a massive facility consisting of numerous underground facilities (UGFs) and hardened bunkers. While the true purpose of this facility is not known, there is evidence to suggest that it supports DF-3A operations in some capacity. The complex is divided into two main areas, an support area and a separate area containing the aforementioned hardened facilities.

An overview of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the iamge below:
The support area consists of an administrative compound with support facilities, an underground drive-through complex, and two potential missile launch pads. The administrative compound is relatively nondescript, but the other facilities are worthy of further inspection. The underground drive-through facility is nearly 600 meters long. In most cases it could be viewed as simply a pass through the terrain allowing for easier travel, but the support area is connected by a two lane paved road with the outside area. The purpose of this large UGF may be for storage or for command functions. The latter is unlikely given the lack of any visible communications-related infrastructure atop the terrain under which the drive-through facility passes. The most logical assumption therefore is that the facility is designed for a storage purpose. The two possible launch pads are the most significant evidence suggesting that the Rawdah facility does support the DF-3A. One pad can be seen with six 20 meter long objects which match the dimensions of DF-3A towed transporter-erectors. This pad is of a circular configuration 90 meters across, matching those found at the Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer DF-3A facilities. The reinforced launch pad in the center is missing, suggesting that this may be a training site. The second possible launch area consists of a concrete pad enclosed by a fence. While this potential launch site differs in configuration from those positively identified at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, its dimensions would allow a DF-3A to be erected and fired.

The support area of the Rawdah complex can be seen in the image below:
The remaining facilities at Rawdah are concentrated to the northwest of the support area. This area contains numerous bunkers and UGFs, as well as two potential launch areas. The launch areas consist of a hardened pad and an extension of a roadway, locations similar if not to the circular launch pads favored by the operational garrisons, then certainly to those employed by the Chinese 2nd Artillery Division in association with certain missile types. As Chinese technicians are reported to have aided in the construction of Saudi Arabia's DF-3A facilities, it is possible that various launch pads were incorporated for evaluation. The numerous underground facilities suggest that while Rawdah may have a DF-3A support function, it likely serves other purposes as well. Precisely what is contained inside of the facilities is again not conclusively known, but some educated guesses may be made. As with the drive-through UGF to the southeast, no evidence of significant air circulation or ventilation is visible, suggesting that the various bunkers and UGFs are not intended for continued occupation. This suggests that the facilities are primarily intended for storage.

An image of the storage complex at Rawdah can be seen below:
What precisely is stored in such an isolated and expansive facility is a matter of speculation. The answer may be tied to the location itself. The Rawdah complex is located in the southwestern quadrant of Saudi Arabia, the furthest distance from past and present potential aggressors such as Iran, Iraq, and Israel. This would make the Rawdah complex ideally suited to serve as a large-scale ammunition storage facility. Dispersal of the ammunition would likely be performed by air out of the Bisha airport 120 km to the south. Transportation via road is also possible, but unlikely given the distances involved and potential security concerns. It is likely that DF-3A components stored in the facility have already been dispersed. The facility was imaged in 2004, when the Al Joffer facility may not have been fully operational as described above. The Rawdah facility's DF-3A support function may have already been terminated with the dispersal of components to Al Joffer. It is possible that DF-3A missiles may still be stored at Rawdah, and that the launch facilities may serve as the training complex for Saudi Arabian missile crews.

Western Garrison

One final location has been identified that may potentially house DF-3A related facilities. This location is only visible in low resolution imagery but does share two of the identifiable characteristics of Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer: it is contained within significant terrain, and it is isolated from major population centers. This facility is also located much closer to Israel, a potential target for the Saudi DF-3A force.

The possible western DF-3A garrison can be seen in the image below:
TARGETING OPTIONS

From their garrisons at Al Sulayyil and Al Joffer, Saudi Arabian DF-3As can range targets as far away as India and western Europe when employed to their maximum range of 4000 km. Much of Africa falls within range as well.

The image below depicts the coverage of the DF-3A ballistic missile when fired from Saudi Arabian garrisons to a range of 4000 km:
Despite the extended range capability it is likely that the weapons are only employed to their typical range of 2800 km. Extending the range requires a reduction in payload and also results in decreased accuracy. Given that the DF-3A is already a relatively inaccurate weapon, decreasing the payload would only serve to seriously diminish the combat potential of the weapon system. As seen in the image below, the Middle East, portions of Africa and eastern Europe, and western India are still within range at the standard range of 2800 km:
The most likely potential target for the Saudi Arabian DF-3A force is Iran. Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran are not the closest of nations due to religious differences and the Saudi's close relationship with the United States, to cite a few brief reasons. Saudi Arabian DF-3As are believed to be targeted on Iranian cities due to their inaccuracy and therefore their inherent unsuitability for strikes on military facilities or strategic targets.

Israel is also a potential target for Saudi Arabian ballistic missiles. The likely scenario for a launch against Israel would be to employ the DF-3A in its depressed-angle launch mode, which confers a range of 1550 km. Targeting of Israel may be the reason behind the presence of the potential launch facility in western Saudi Arabia. As seen in the image below, launching from this facility allows the DF-3A to reach Israel with ease, even when fired using a depressed angle trajectory, a likely scenario given that this would increase the chances that the weapons would be able to avoid intercept by Israeli anti-missile defenses.
NUCLEAR POTENTIAL

The inaccuracy of the DF-3A, combined with its 2,000 kg throw weight, has raised speculation as to the true Saudi Arabian intentions for the missile. Saudi Arabia is well aware of the inaccuracy of the weapon, claiming that they were not fired at Iraq in 1990/1991 to avoid civillian casualties. "King Fahd ruled out that option because of the fact that you cannot control it accurately. Our problem is that our war was not with the Iraqi people, it was with Saddam Hussein and his clique," stated Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. This is in contrast to the alleged targeting of Iranian population centers.

Saudi Arabia has been known to have had an interest in nuclear weapons for some time, dating back to the construction of a potential nuclear research center in 1975. Evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia was financially and perhaps technologically involved in the nuclear weapons programs of both Iraq and Pakistan. The Iraqi capability to develop nuclear weapons was removed in the 1980s during the Iranian and Israeli air raids on the Tammuz reactor complex southeast of Baghdad. Pakistan presents an interesting option. It has been suggested that Saudi Arabia would be provided with Pakistani nuclear weapons should Iran achieve the capability to produce nuclear weapons of its own. Pakistani warheads on Saudi Arabian weapons would not only represent a significant threat to Iran, but also to India. Saudi Arabian DF-3A garrisons are well defended and would be much more difficult for India to strike during a time of conflict, potentially providing Pakistan with an added nuclear deterrent capability due to close relations with the Kingdom.

At the end of the day, Saudi Arabia does not currently possess a nuclear warhead for the DF-3A. The nation signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988, and has stated that it would not arm the DF-3A with either nuclear or chemical warheads. Evidence of Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions cannot be ignored, however, and a nuclear-armed Iran could be the impetus needed for Saudi Arabia to finally acquire a nuclear capability for its ballistic missile force. It should be noted, however, that past Saudi Arabian assurances that chemical or nuclear warheads would not be acquired are ominously significant. Saudi Arabia did not unequivocally state that weapons of mass destruction would not be used to arm the DF-3A, raising significant questions.

If the Kingdom, being aware of the DF-3As inaccuracy, is not pursuing a nuclear or chemical warhead capability, is there a covert biological warfare program underway in Saudi Arabia? Moreover, given that Saudi Arabia is reportedly not concerned with firing the weapons at Iranian civillians, has such a program existed since before 1990? This would potentially explain the Kingdom's real reasons for not wishing to fire their weapons into Iraq, unless they view Iraqi civillians with more regard than those of Iran, reasons reinforced by the alleged nuclear partnership between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

CONCLUSION

The Saudi Arabian ballistic missile arsenal is one of the most interesting and important military aspects of the developing Middle Eastern political and military landscape. As Iran moves forward towards its alleged nuclear weapons program, Saudi Arabia may well attempt to acquire a similar capability for its missiles to serve as a deterrent. The potentially destabilizing effects of such a move, given the Kingdom's position regarding Israel, could ignite a new arms race, and even military conflict. The fact that this significant development may be related to a military capability that few individuals realize exists highlights the need for closer military analysis of potential adversarial situations worldwide.

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

A Google Earth file containing the placemarks and range rings used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Saudi Arabian Missile Forces
Saudi Arabian WMD Programs
Al Sulayyil
Saudi Arabian Missile Facilities
The DF-3

Defeating Censorship in Google Earth

INTRODUCTION

Many facilities and locations around the world appear pixellated in Google Earth for various reasons, usually because of security concerns due to the sensitive or military nature of the majority of these sites. Using the historical imagery feature in Google Earth, it is possible in some cases to defeat this censorship and view imagery of these areas. The imagery will not necessarily be the most current available, but it is still useful nonetheless.

CENSORSHIP IN GOOGLE EARTH

Censored imagery can be viewed in numerous locations inside of Google Earth. Google has often claimed that it will listen to the security concerns of national agencies and governments, but in the case of the "revealing" of the Australian nuclear reactor a few years ago claimed that it did not see a reason to censor imagery in that specific case as the same area could be viewed in other imagery sources. This begs the question as to who is actually censoring the images, and it is likely that, at least in the case of Europe, the local providers (many of whom use aerial collection platforms for national geospatial functions) are doing the censoring to comply with local restrictions. Google then acquires and uploads this imagery, which is often censored. Military facilities in France and the Netherlands are two key examples of censorship making its way into Google Earth. This is not a fault of Google in any way; Google is merely acquiring as much imagery as possible and making it available at no cost using their program. Google has not shown any major inclination to censor imagery of its own volition, even with the objections of Australia and later India being on record. Now, with the incorporation of Google Earth 5's historical imagery feature, it is possible to view imagery from potentially different providers and circumvent the censorship that exists in many areas.

DIJON

To illustrate the advantage that the historical imagery feature can provide when trying to view imagery of censored areas, consider the example of Dijon AB in France. It is commonplace in Google Earth for French military installations to be censored from view. In the case of France, the decision of what to censor appears limited to airbases, as their nuclear submarine base is clearly visible. This does raise questions as to whether the censorship has been applied only due to the wishes of the AdA, or if it was not applied correctly. In any case, Dijon AB and many others are censored in the default Google Earth view, and appear pixellated, as can be seen in the image below which was captured in 2006:
Employing the historical imagery feature allows imagery to be accessed which has not been censored, due perhaps to its inclusion into the database prior to the censorship being effected, or perhaps because it was sourced from a provider which does not believe it is responsible for censoring its products. The image below depicts Dijon AB as it appeared in 2004. There have likely not been any major alterations to the basic infrastructure in the two years that elapsed between the two images, so the historical imagery should be effective for use in analyzing the facility.
CONCLUSION

Whatever the reasoning behind the decision, Google has allowed censored imagery to be incorporated into Google Earth. Thanks to the inclusion of the historical imagery feature in Google Earth 5, many of these locations can now be viewed, albeit from earlier and less current dates. Whether or not this continues to be the case will depend on Google's realization of this potential error, or their decision to no longer allow altered imagery to be included into the data set.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Site News

A few quick notes about the site. First off, I've added a few new labels for my articles. The most prominent are Historic Imagery and Book Reviews. The first will be attached to any post incorporating Google Earth's historical imagery, and the second will be attached to...well, ok, that one should be self explanatory! Secondly, I'm considering either incorporating the comment moderation feature, whereby I will have to manually approve comments to my articles, or disabling comments altogether, relying on the forum and e-mail correspondance for feedback and inquiries. This is due to the increasing number of idiot spammers who are starting to creep into the comments, advertising all manner of things which have absolutely nothing to do with the content of the articles published here. The problem with the first method is that only users with Google accounts of some sort (blogger, gmail, etc) will be able to comment. The problem with the second method is that people will have to join the forum or send an e-mail should they wish to comment on something. What do the readers think? I haven't decided to respond in either fashion just yet, but I thought I should let you all know what I'm thinking and why.

Image of the Week: Tomcats at Oceana

TOMCATS AT NAS OCEANA
The image above is interesting from two perspectives. First, being historical imagery taken from Google Earth, it depicts a lineup of F-14 Tomcats at NAS Oceana, Virginia, in 2006 near the end of the type's service with the US Navy. Note the squadron logos near the end of each row of aircraft, including the possibly blasphemous appearance of the Jolly Rogers logo heading a line of F/A-18s! Second, examining the available imagery using the historical feature in Google Earth reveals an interesting occurrence: the most current imagery is not the imagery displayed in the default mode in Google Earth! The most current imagery dates from April of 2007, while the image displayed for the area by default in Google Earth dates from October of 2006. This is not an unheard of occurrence, with many areas of the United States following this example. One such example is Washington DC, where the Geo-eye imagery of the January 2009 Presidential inauguration can be accessed in this fashion, although it is not displayed as the default view of the capital. Interestingly, however, the first imagery captured by the Geo-eye satellite over Kutztown, Pennsylvania is absent from the data set.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the current Image of the Week at the IMINT & Analysis Forum Image of the Week discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Historical Imagery in Google Earth

INTRODUCTION

Google Earth 5 was recently released, and incorporates a wealth of new features for the user to exploit. From an analytical standpoint, the most interesting new feature is the ability to view historical imagery of many areas.

EXPLOITING HISTORICAL IMAGERY

Google Earth's new historical imagery feature allows users to examine past imagery that has been overwritten in the main viewer by either more recent or higher resolution imagery. Take Belgrade, for example. When viewed from an Eye Altitude of 50 miles, it can clearly be seen that the city and the surrounding area has been imaged over time, and that a composite mosaic of these images are currently visible to create a more complete image. For those unfamiliar with the term, the Eye Altitude is the height from which the visual vantage point on screen is being viewed. It is located at the bottom right of the image window in the Status Bar. Returning to the example of Belgrade, the historical imagery feature allows users to view the images used to provide the default view of Belgrade as a series of images, with each series building upon the last and adding the next most recent set of imagery to the screen. An excellent overview of how to fully exploit this new feature can be found here. It should be noted that not every piece of imagery visible in Google Earth's default view is available in the historical imagery feature, nor does using this feature limit the on-screen view to only the imagery captured on the date selected.

AN UNEXPECTED BENEFIT

An interesting and useful application of the historical imagery feature is that it will actually bring images into better focus at certain altitudes. To better illustrate this point, a simple exercise has been derived.

1. Open Google Earth, and click the icon to add a placemark. Copy the following coordinates into the Latitude and Longitude boxes: 56°55'57.57"N 40°32'34.96"E This will create a placemark on a mobile ICBM base near Teykovo in Russia.

2. Travel to the new placemark and zoom in so that the Eye Altitude is approximately 2500 feet.

3. Note that the date that the image was captured is August 12, 2007.

4. Under the View menu at the top left of the screen, select Historical Imagery. The Historical Imagery slider will appear along the upper left portion of the image window. The slider is currently set to coincide with the current date, which at the time of writing is 2009. Three blue lines appear in the slider, indicating images which may be selected for viewing of that particular area.

5. Set the slider to coincide with the date at which the image was captured. In this case, this will be the far right blue line. Simply drag the slider to the left until it locks into position at that date.

6. Once the slider is moved to the left from its default position, note that the image appears to have become clearer to a slight degree, helping to further accentuate many of the details. In this example, pay close attention to the three grey rectangular buildings in the center of the compound. Moving the slider to the left results in the detail on the roof of each building to become far more distinct.

As can clearly be seen, employing the historical imagery feature can be seen to provide clearer imagery. The imagery is likely loaded by Google Earth in a slightly less refined format at higher Eye Altitudes in order to facilitate quicker loading times. It should be noted that zooming in closer will result in the fully detailed image being visible, but exploiting this aspect of the historical imagery function does permit clearer images of a broader scale to be examined and saved for further use or analysis. This is exceptionally valuable when examining images containing many small objects such as vehicles or aircraft, or large facilities.

INTERESTING HISTORICAL IMAGES

The following images are examples of historical images captured in Google Earth, dealing with subjects which will be of interest to readers of this site. Examine these images, and then compare them to the default locations in Google Earth to fully comprehend the value of the historical imagery feature.

The first image depicts Bangalore, India, in February of 2007. Note that three LCA prototypes are visible on the tarmac.
The next image illustrates a useful application of the historical imagery feature. An S-300PS battery in Kaliningrad is shown, sited at a location which is mostly obscured by cloud cover in the current default imagery set. As can be seen, the historical imagery feature can be used to depict locations which may not be visible in Google Earth's default data set.
The following image depicts the parking apron at the Kazan aircraft manufacturing plant. Three Tu-160 strategic bombers can be seen. Scanning through the past imagery of this location indicates that various Tu-160s were in and out of Kazan for maintenance.
Next up is another SAM battery, this time an S-300PT battery on the Kola Peninsula. This highlights yet another advantage of having access to historical imagery in Google Earth: the default image of this location is newer, but is of a lesser resolution.
The following image depicts the Russian Navy's Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier moored at sea near Murmansk.
A series of FLANKER fighter jets can be seen on the tarmac of Luliang AB in China in the next image. Currently available imagery shows this location to have been refurbished as a new J-10 operating base; the addition of the historical imagery allows an analyst to track the history of the aircraft types operated here.
The next image depicts a deployed 64N6 battle management radar near Novosibirsk. This image allows analysts to identify the empty position currently visible in the default data set as an unoccupied 64N6 radar position.
The following image depicts the World's Ugliest Aircraft (who else was suprised that the satellite didn't break capturing the image), Boeing's X-32 demonstrator, on the ramp at Palmdale in August of 2003. This highlights one of the past disadvantages of Google Earth: sometimes new imagery removes interesting and unique sights from view. The addition of the historical imagery feature rectifies this problem to a large degree.
A third S-300P series SAM battery is seen in the image below. This is an S-300PMU battery deployed near Beijing. Current imagery shows this site to have been abandoned in the past, but its past operational status allows analysts to investigate Chinese SAM deployment patterns.
The next image is truly fascinating, showing three submarines undergoing various stages of dismantlement at Severodvinsk in Russia. The missile tubes can clearly be seen to have been removed from both the Typhoon SSBN and the Oscar SSGN.
The final example is a truly historical image, from July of 2005. It depicts the Yankee Notch SSGN conversion pierside at Nerpa. This submarine has since been scrapped, and Google Earth's historical imagery feature allows users to view it when it was still in existance, illustrating the characteristic layout of the converted SSBN.
CONCLUSION

The historical imagery feature in Google Earth 5 provides the analyst with a wealth or new data to exploit. It is now possible to conduct a degree of analysis previously available to only those users with access to other sources of imagery. Both trend and temporal analysis can be conducted, allowing the analyst to note changes occuring over time in certain areas. This new feature will certainly bring about a new appreciation for open source imagery and the analytical products which can be derived from its exploitation.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

The Google Earth Blog

Nuclear Rain: The RVSN

INTRODUCTION

It is one of the most potent military arms on the face of the planet in terms of sheer destructive force waiting to be unleashed. From its fledgling beginning during the early days of the Cold War, to the development of advanced systems to carry on the mission in the 21st Century, Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) continues to serve as Moscow's nuclear deterrent, waiting to unleash a malestrom of destruction should the need ever arise. This article will present a historical look at the ICBMs that have armed the RVSN since its inception, and an overview of the facilities, past and present, that serve as the bastions of these weapons.

NOMENCLATURE

The weapons in this article will be referred to by their native designators. The list below provides readers with both the native and Westernized (U.S. number and NATO codename) designators for these weapon systems.

R-7 (SS-6 SAPWOOD)
R-16 (SS-7 SADDLER)
R-9 (SS-8 SASIN)
R-36 (SS-9 SCARP)
UR-200 (SS-X-10 SCRAG)
UR-100 (SS-11 SEGO)
RT-2 (SS-13 SAVAGE)
RT-20 (SS-X-15 SCROOGE)
Temp-2S (SS-16 SINNER)
MR-UR-100 (SS-17 SPANKER)
R-36M (SS-18 SATAN)
UR-100N (SS-19 STILETTO)
RT-23 (SS-24 SCALPEL)
RT-2PM (SS-25 SICKLE)
RT-2PM2 (SS-27)

POLITICS AND MISSILES

Any historical discussion on the development of the Soviet ICBM force must begin with a brief discourse on the politics and key figures involved. As will become apparent, there was often competition between various designers and design bureaus to get their missile designs adopted for operational use. What should be stressed is that the three personalities involved in the development of many Soviet ICBMs and responsible for design bureaus which continued in that field once they were gone were true giants in the history of rocket and ICBM development. These personalities were Sergey Korolev, Mikhail Yangel, and Vladimir Chelomey. All of these men were pillars in the development of Soviet rocketry after the Second World War, and were in many cases a thorn in the side of politicians who had to approve or reject their designs. Politics also played a significant part in the development of many of the Soviet ICBMs; it was often the case that the designer who had the most favor with the government would get the best deal.

THE FIRST ICBM

THe first Soviet ICBM was the Korolev R-7. Development of the first Soviet ICBM was initiated in 1953, and Korolev's R-7 design was approved in 1954. Flight tests began at Baikonur in 1957, with the first test launch occurring on the 15th of May. This test flight represented the first trial of an ICBM design anywhere in the world, the first of many Soviet technological "firsts" of the Cold War. After numerous development issues, the R-7 was finally approved for service in January of 1960.

The R-7

The R-7 was a large, two stage ICBM. The missile's size and cryogenic liquid fuel made it a very ineffective strategic weapon. The cryogenic fuel loading process and launch preparation cycle took nearly a day, and a missile could not remain fully fueled for more than 24 hours. The weapon also suffered from short range; the maximum range of 8,000 km meant that the weapon would have to be sited in Siberia if it was to be capable of striking targets in the United States. Korolev did develop and field an improved R-7A variant with increased range, but this was not enough to overcome the other problems the system as a whole suffered from. As such, Kruschev canceled most of the planned deployments of the R-7. Four launch pads at the operational location near Plesetsk and two test pads at Baikonur were the only operational deployment sites of the R-7 ICBM family.

R-7 Specifications

Type: two-stage ICBM
Launched from: prepared pad
Maximum range: 8,000 km (R-7), 9,000-12,000 km (R-7A)
CEP: 5 km
Payload: 1 3-5 megaton RV
Number deployed: 6 (1960-1967)

Note: deployment figures represent the maximum number of the weapon deployed over its service life, with the time period that the weapons were operational included in parenthesis. This does not imply that the number of weapons given were available throughout the total service life, nor does it imply that all variants of a given ICBM were fielded at this strength. Currently deployed figures will be provided later in this article.

THE MOVE TO SILO BASING

In order to combat the weaknesses of the R-7, namely the limited alert time and the survivability of a weapon exposed on a fixed launch pad, the Soviet Union began to explore both storable fuels and silo basing. In 1956 Yangel was given the order to begin design work on an ICBM using storable liquid fuel. Development of Yangel's R-16 was authorized in 1958, and Korolev's complementary R-9 design, employing the more proven cryogenic fuel, was authorized for development in 1959.

The R-16

Yangel's R-16 was a two stage ICBM employing storable liquid propellant, enabling the weapon to remain fueled and ready for launch for up to 30 days, a significant improvement over the 24 hours of Korolev's R-7. The initial R-16 design was launched from a prepared surface pad complex referred to as Sheksna-N, while an improved R-16U was launched from a silo complex referred to as Sheksna-V. Sheksna-N complexes consisted of two launch pads and associated support infrastructure, while Sheksna-V complexes consisted of three silos. Flight testing of the R-16 began in October of 1960, and the weapon was approved for service in October of 1961. The silo-based R-16U was approved for service in July of 1963.

R-16 Specifications

Type: two-stage ICBM
Launched from: prepared pad (R-16), silo (R-16U)
Maximum range: 11,000-13,000 km
CEP: 2.7 km
Payload: 1 3-6 megaton RV
Number deployed: 202 (1961-1976)

The R-9

Korolev's R-9 design began flight testing in 1961, and was adopted for service in 1965. Like Yangel's R-16, Korolev's R-9 was developed with two launch modes: fixed surface pad and silo. The surface launch complex consisted of two launch pads and associated infrastructure, and was designated Dolina. This complex was unique in that it employed an automated launch preparation system, reducing preparation time to 20 minutes over the proposed non-automated Desna-N complex. The silo complex, designated Desna-V, consisted of three silos.

R-9 Specifications

Type: two-stage ICBM
Launched from: prepared pad or silo
Maximum range: 12,500 km
CEP: 8 km
Payload: 1 5 megaton RV
Number deployed: 29 (1963-1975)

The following image provides a comparison between the R-9 (upper) and R-16 (lower) silo basing concepts. Both concepts were similar in that they possessed three silos in close proximity, although the Desna-V silos featured a much larger cap. The images are to scale, having both been captured at the same viewing altitude.
EXPANDING THE FORCE

Soviet ICBM development gained new life in 1962. Government decrees now focused on development of multiple ICBMs for different roles, whereas past ICBM development programs seemed more suited to achieving an operational, viable ICBM force to serve as a deterrent in the shortest amount of time possible. The goal of the Soviet ICBM force was now to field both light and heavy ICBMs; light ICBMs would serve as force multipliers to be widely deployed as a counterpart to the American Minuteman ICBM force, and heavy ICBMs would serve as the carriers of large warheads to act as a counterpart to the American Titan II. Furthermore, two more classes of ICBM were envisioned: a massive ICBM designed to lift a truly immense payload, and a new type of weapon designed to defeat American ABM defenses. Only the latter of these two concepts would ever be operationally fielded.

The contenders for the Soviet Union's new heavy ICBM were Yangel's R-36 and Chelomey's UR-200. Chelomey's UR-200 proved problematic during testing due to issues surrounding the flight control system (it did not help matters that the UR-200 was Chelomey's first ICBM design), and the R-36 was chosen for deployment in 1964. The R-36 represented a new level of survivability in Soviet ICBM designs. Previous silo-based designs, as well as the UR-200, used clustered silos that were vulnerable to attack. The R-36 was instead based in individual OS-series silos, separated from one another by a considerable distance. This reduced the ability of inbound American ICBMs to take out a large number of Soviet missile silos in a preemptive strike, raising the deterrent value of the Soviet force.

The Soviet program to produce a lightweight ICBM resulted in various concepts being considered. These included Yangel's R-38, Chelomey's UR-100, and Korolev's RT-2. Korolev's design stemmed from his earlier work on a solid fuel missile designated RT-1, the result of a 1959 decree ordering the development of a solid fueled weapon with the intent of further increasing the readiness of deployed weapons. While the design was initially plagued by short range and a lack of sufficient expertise in producing Soviet solid fuel rocket motors, a redesigned model designated RT-1-1963 was more successful, validating the concept of a solid fueled ICBM. The early problems, however, served to doom the eventual mature RT-2 design from mass production. Kruschev had authorized a liquid fueled light ICBM alternative to be developed after the 1962 rethinking of ICBM force composition in order to ensure that a missile design emerged that was sufficient for mass production on the scale that the Soviet government desired. Yangel's R-38 and Chelomey's UR-100 were offshoots of this liquid fueled backup policy. In March of 1963 Chelomey's design was chosen for development, with Yangel's R-38 being cancelled. In the end, Korolev's RT-2 would lose out to the rival UR-100, which was designed from the start to be a reliable, mass production ICBM. The solid fuel technology was not yet mature enough in the Soviet Union to enable development of the RT-2 to proceed quickly enough to fend off Korolev's rival, and other technical and political issues related to the guidance and control systems of the RT-2 continued to delay the program.

The Soviet FOBS was a unique weapon system designed to defeat American ballistic missile early warning and defense systems. A typical ICBM is fired along a ballistic trajectory towards the target area. Knowing the locations of missile silos and launch pads enabled American analysts to predict the likely trajectories of inbound Soviet weapons and design ABM defenses accordingly. The FOBS, or Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, functioned more like a spacecraft than a true ICBM. The FOBS warhead could be placed in a fractional orbit, designed to approach the target area from an advantageous direction, which in the case of the United States would have been from the south. The two primary FOBS designs under consideration were Yangel's R-36-O, a modification of the R-36, and Korolev's GR-1. Chelomey offered a system called the GR-2, a variation of the UR-500 space launch vehicle, but this design did not proceed to flight testing. The GR-1 was itself cancelled in 1964, leaving the R-36-O as the Soviet's FOBS. Unfortunately, development of missile warning satellites in the United States effectively mitigated the advantages of such a weapon. The first of these satellites was orbited in 1971, three years after the Soviet FOBS was deployed, essentially nullifying the threat posed by the R-36-O.

The R-36

The R-36 was flight tested in its initial form from 1963 to 1966. While a single 10 megaton RV was used by initial versions, later versions employed a warhead with a yield of up to 25 megatons or a cluster of three MRVs with yields of up to 3 megatons. Yangel's efforts in making the R-36 a multi-warhead ICBM resulted in the first such flight tests in the Soviet Union.

In the course of development, a trials regiment was established at Baikonur to evaluate the command and control system linking the now-separated missile silos with the launch control facility. The layout of this regiment can be seen in the image below:
R-36 Specifications

Type: two-stage ICBM
Launched from: OS-series silo
Maximum range: 15,200 km
CEP: 1.3 km
Payload: (see text)
Number deployed: 288 (1966-1979)

The UR-100

The UR-100 began flight testing in 1965, a year ahead of the RT-2. Nearly 1,000 of these weapons would eventually be deployed, providing the Soviet Union with a legitimate counter to the American Minuteman missile force. Three improved variants were fielded. The UR-100M added improvements to the guidance systems. The UR-100K and UR-100U began to replace deployed UR-100 missiles in the mid 1970's. The chief improvements were in the propulsion and guidance systems, with the UR-100U adding a three warhead MRV assembly to the nose of the missile.

UR-100 Specifications

Type: two-stage ICBM
Launched from: OS-series silo
Maximum range: 11,000 km (UR-100), 12,000 km (UR-100K/U)
CEP: 1.4 km (UR-100), 900 m (UR-100K/U)
Payload: 1 1.1 megaton RV (UR-100), 1 1.3 megaton RV (UR-100K), 3 350 kiloton RVs (UR-100U)
Number deployed: 950 (UR-100/M, 1966-1986), 420 (UR-100K/U, 1971-1994)

The RT-2

Korolev's RT-2 would prove to be his last operational ICBM design. The missile began flight testing in 1966, and entered service in 1968. The delays associated with the program, coupled with the fact that Chelomey's UR-100 provided the Kremlin's desired lightweight ICBM at a fraction of the cost, resulted in only a token number of these first Soviet solid fueled ICBMs being fielded. An improved variant, the RT-2P, was developed and deployed to replace the original RT-2 missiles, beginning in 1972. An IRBM ofshoot of the RT-2, designated the RT-25, was briefly considered in the early 1960s but was not proceeded with.

RT-2 Specifications

Type: three stage ICBM
Launched from: OS-series silo
Maximum range: 9400 km (RT-2), 9500 km (RT-2P)
CEP: 1.9 km (RT-2), 1.5 km (RT-2P)
Payload: 1 750 kiloton RV
Number deployed: 60 (1971-1993)

The R-36-O

Yangel's FOBS variant of the R-36 began testing in 1965, and was placed into operational service in 1968. A single unit would be equipped with the R-36-O, and it was located on the grounds of the Baikonur test range. 18 silos were constructed and were controlled by four separate launch control facilities. A nuclear weapons storage site was also constructed to house the warheads for these weapons. The layout of the Baikonur R-36-O deployment can be seen in the image below:
R-36-O Specifications

Type: two stage FOBS
Launched from: OS-series silo
Maximum range: global
CEP: 1.1 km
Payload: 1 5 megaton RV
Number deployed: 18 (1969-1982)

Unbuilt Mega-ICBMs

Of the four types of ICBMs proposed in 1962, only one did not enter service. The Soviet government desired a massive ICBM with a throw weight in the range of thirty tons. Such a throw weight would allow the largets Soviet thermonuclear weapons to be lofted by ICBMs, and the largest of these weapons had a projected yield of 150 megatons. Such a weapon would not be capable of merely targeting cities or military facilities, but entire geographical regions. The three designs considered were a variation of Korolev's N-1 space launch vehicle, Chelomey's UR-500, and Yangel's R-46. The latter design was abandoned fairly quickly, as the Soviet government wanted Yangel to concentrate on the R-36. Korolev's N-1 design failed most likely because the vehicle itself was a total failure as a space launch vehicle, although various military versions of the N-1 were proposed during the course of its development. That left Chelomey's UR-500. While this weapon was never operationally deployed, it was flight tested for a short period, and when the requirement was officially dropped in 1965 the UR-500 was refined to become the Proton space launch vehicle.

SOVIET PARITY

The next generation of Soviet ICBMs would follow a similar deployment strategy as the previous generation. Heavy and light ICBMs to replace the R-36 and UR-100 were desired. The development of mobile ICBMs was given serious attention as well, and these weapons will be described separately. The desire for a UR-100 replacement resulted in the development of two competing designs, which would eventually supplement each ither in service. These were Chelomey's upgraded UR-100N and Yangel's MR-UR-100. The main requirement for these weapons apart from the expected imrovements in reliability and accuracy was the ability to be fitted inside of preexisting UR-100 silos. The MR-UR-100 was successful in this regard, while the UR-100N was not, requiring a new silo to be constructed to house the ICBM. As with many previous programs, both of these weapons would be put into service. The heavy ICBM requirement was proceeded with in the form of the Yangel R-36M, an evolution of the existing R-36.

These weapons introduced many new features not previously found in Soviet ICBMs. The two most significant were the inclusion of a cold launch capability for the MR-UR-100 and MIRV warheads. The cold launch method involved ejecting the missile from the silo by using compressed gas and firing the first stage booster at a set altitude above the ground. This would allow silos to be repaired and refurbished following an ICBM launch, potentially enabling them to be reloaded. This enables operational silos to be used for training and test launches, as well as providing them with the capability to be rearmed following a nuclear exchange in the event that sufficient stored weapons remain viable. MIRV warheads allowed a single Soviet ICBM to target geographically separated targets for the first time. This enabled the RVSN's potential target list to increase exponentially, possibly helping to increase the deterrent ability of the force. These technological advances finally allowed the RVSN to achieve both numerical and qualitative parity with the American ICBM force. Mature technology finally eliminated the lengthy preparation times often associated with earlier missiles as well, allowing launches to take place in minutes or seconds after receipt of authorized orders.

The R-36M

The R-36M was an evolution of the original Soviet heavy ICBM, the R-36. Development began in 1969, with the first test launch occurring in 1973. The initial R-36M variant entered operational service in 1974. This weapon was available in two configurations, a single warhead missile and a missile with 8 MIRVs of 550 kiloton yield. These initial weapons were replaced between 1979 and 1980 by the improved R-36MUTTH. This weapon introduced lighter weight MIRV warheads, allowing for both an increase in range and an increase in payload (from 8 to 10 MIRVs). The final example of the R-36M series was the R-36M2, which entered service in 1988 in both single warhead and MIRV'ed configurations. The latter configuration employed 10 MIRVs.

R-36M Specifications

Type: two stage ICBM
Launched from: OS-series silos
Maximum range: 10,200 to 16,000 km, depending on variant
CEP: 500 to 920 m, depending on variant
Payload: various, including 10 MIRV
Number deployed: 308 (1974-present)

The MR-UR-100

Yangel's MR-UR-100 was fielded in concert with Chelomey's UR-100N to replace the UR-100 force as the USSR's lightweight ICBM. Development began in 1970 and flight testing commenced in late 1972. Deployed in both single warhead and MIRV'ed models with three warheads, the first examples entered the operational inventory in 1975. An enhanced version with improved guidance systems providing greater accuracy and an increased payload of 4 MIRVs (550 kiloton yield), the MR-UR-100UTTH, was introduced in 1978. This weapon replaced all of the MR-UR-100s by 1983.

One variant of the MR-UR-100 was employed by the Perimeter command system. Perimeter launched ICBMs carrying systems designed to transmit launch orders to the RVSN's ICBM force in the event that the national leadership was eliminated through a preemptive strike. As the MR-UR-100 is no longer operationally deployed, it is likely that a newer weapon such as the Topol is now employed by the Perimeter system. Perimeter-configured ICBMs did not carry warheads but were solely tasked with the command and control mission.

MR-UR-100 Specifications

Type: two stage ICBM
Launched from: OS-series silos
Maximum range: 10,320 km
CEP: 920 m
Payload: various, including 4 MIRV
Number deployed: 150 (1975-1994)

The UR-100N

The UR-100N would be the last of Chelomey's ICBM designs to enter operational service. Development began in the early 1970's with the first operational missiles being fielded in 1975. Two configurations were fielded, a single warhead variant and a variant with 6 550 kiloton MIRVs. Improvements to the guidance systems of the weapon resulted in the enhanced UR-100NUTTH being fielded in 1979. These weapons replaced the deployed UR-100N ICBMs between 1980 and 1983.

UR-100N Specifications

Type: two stage ICBM
Launched from: OS-series silos
Maximum range: 10,000 km
CEP: 920 m
Payload: various, including 6 MIRV
Number deployed: 360 (1974-present)

MOBILE ICBMS

Soviet efforts to develop mobile ICBMs begain as far back as the early 1960's. The first project was the Gnom system, a unique ICBM design relying on a ramjet-powered air breathing engine for its first stage. This interesting concept did not proceed to full-scale flight tests. The next program began in 1964 when Yangel started work on the RT-20. The RT-20 was an abject failure due to a number of deficiencies. Initially conceived as a silo-based, road mobile, and rail-based weapon system, the RT-20 was only tested in its road-mobile form. Testing began in 1967 at Plesetsk, but problems with both the missile and the cumbersome tracked TEL led to its cancellation in 1969. It would not be until the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT) entered the ICBM game that mobile ICBM designs began to emerge as viable weapon systems. Even then, the development of these survivable ICBMs would initially remain troubled throughout the 1970s.

The Temp-2S

MITT's first ICBM design was the Temp-2S, the first Soviet operational road mobile ICBM. Development began in 1969, with the flight test program at Plesetsk beginning in 1972. The Temp-2S adopted a wheeled TEL design due to the glaring inadequacies of tracked vehicles discovered in Yangel's RT-20 program. Problems with the missile and the TEL design led to the program being severely curtailed, and only a token force was deployed at Plesetsk beginning in 1976. In a sense, the Temp-2S was the mobile equivalent of the R-7!

The Temp-2S was an arms control nightmare for various reasons. First, American negotiators during SALT II talks were against the deployment of mobile ICBMs as they could not be reliably accounted for using then-current verification techniques, most prominently overhead imagery. Second, the Pioner IRBM had been developed using the first and second stages of the Temp-2S missile. The Pioner was an arms control issue in its own right, and analysts were concerned that the Pioner could be mated to stored Temp-2S third stages to convert them into ICBMs. Soviet negotiators eventually relented and agreed that the Temp-2S would be abandoned and that its third stage would not be produced and stockpiled. Nevertheless, concealment efforts were developed to mask the deployment of the token Temp-2S force.

Temp-2S Specifications

Type: three stage ICBM
Launched from: TEL
Maximum range: 9,000 km
CEP: 450 m
Payload: 1 0.65-1.5 megaton RV
Number deployed: 60 (1976-1985)

The RT-2PM Topol

In 1977 MITT began development of the first Soviet road mobile ICBM to enter significant operational service, the RT-2PM. Due to the prior conflict over the Temp-2S and the fact that the SALT II treaty only authorized the development of a single new ICBM type (this was the RT-23, described later), the missile was given a designation which seemed to indicate that it was a follow-on design based on the Korolev RT-2. Developing modified variants of existing missiles was permitted under arms control agreements provided that they did not exceed a certain throw weight. In actuality, the RT-2PM was a follow on to the Temp-2S design. Flight testing at Plesetsk began in 1983, with the first operational missiles becoming available in 1985. On at least one occasion a variant with 4 MIRVs was tested, but this configuration was not deployed due to arms control reasons limiting the number of MIRV'ed ICBMs.

RT-2PM Specifications

Type: three stage ICBM
Launched from: TEL
Maximum range: 10,500 km
CEP: 200 m
Payload: 1 550 kiloton RV
Number deployed: 369 (1984-present)

The RT-23

Yangel's rail-based RT-23 began development as far back as 1969, but did not reach testing until 1982. The continued debate internally and in the arms control arena over mobile ICBMs led to the inclusion of silo basing for the new weapon in 1976 and contributed to the protracted development period. Multiple failures of missiles during testing led to the development of the improved RT-23UTTH, which was fielded in 1989, although a limited number of rail-based RT-23s were deployed in 1987. Silo-based weapons replaced UR-100NUTTH missiles on a limited scale, with rail-based weapons being located at three garrisons. A road mobile version was considered during the 1980s but was abandoned due to problems with the TEL design necessary for employing a weapon the size of the RT-23.

RT-23 Specifications

Type: two stage ICBM
Launched from: OS-series silo or railcar
Maximum range: 10,450 km
CEP: 500 m
Payload: 10 550 kiloton MIRVs
Number deployed: 92 (1986-2005)

COLD WAR CASUALTIES

The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the USSR, which resulted in the Yangel design bureau belonging to the Ukraine, led to the cancellation of a new generation of ICBMs. These were the Yangel Ikar, a follow-on to the R-36 and R-36M, MITT's Kuryer lightweight mobile ICBM, analogous to the former American Midgetman program, and the NPO Mash Albatross, an ICBM design conceived by the design bureau once headed by Chelomey. While Albatross and Ikar did not enter testing, the Kuryer was trialled in 1992 but abandoned shortly thereafter.

CURRENT SYSTEMS

The current missile systems being deployed and developed for the RVSN are MITT's RT-2PM2 and RS-24. Both of these weapons are evolutions of the RT-2PM. The appearance of the MIRV'ed RS-24 caused quite a stir in the West as the START agreements prohibit single-warhead ICBMs from being produced in MIRV'ed variants. In an apparent throwback to classic Soviet deception practices related to MITT-produced ICBMs, the new weapon was labeled the RS-24. Given that the treaty name for the RT-2PM was RS-12M, perhaps RS-36 would have been a more ironic choice. Nevertheless, examination of the RS-24 as compared to the RT-2PM2 provided concrete evidence of the weapon's true lineage.

The RT-2PM2 Topol-M

The RT-2PM2 was conceived as the replacement for the RT-2PM. It was designed to be deployed in both a silo and mobile version, allowing the RVSN to not only replace the RT-2PM as these weapons reached the end of their 15 year service lives but to replace silo based weapons as well. The single warhead missile had an increased throw weight over the RT-2PM but the warhead's yield did not increase. The increase in throw weight from 1,000 to 1,200 kg was likely intended to increase the survivability of the warhead through the use of increased and more advanced penetration aids and the future incorporation of a maneuvering RV (MaRV) designed to counter ABM defenses. Testing began in 1994 at Plesetsk and the first missiles were placed in silos at Tatischevo in 1997. The first mobile RT-2PM2 ICBMs became operational in 2006 at Teykovo.

RT-2PM2 Specifications

Type: three stage ICBM
Launched from: OS-series silos, TELs
Maximum range: 10,500 km
CEP: 350 m
Payload: 1 550 kiloton RV
Number deployed: 65 (1997-present)

The RS-24

The RS-24 is a new ICBM currently undergoing testing from Plesetsk, the first launch occurring in 2007. The RS-24 will be deployed in both silo-based and road mobile versions, with the road mobile variant currently being tested with the aim of deploying the first operational examples in late 2009 at Teykovo, likely supplementing the RT-2PM2 and replacing the remaining RT-2PM units. The silo-based variant has yet to begin testing. The rapid move from testing to operational deployment also serves to reinforce the fact that the RS-24 is merely a MIRV'ed RT-2PM2. Data from MIRV'ed RT-2PM trials may also be contributing to the test program.

RS-24 Specifications

Type: three stage ICBM
Launched from: TEL (may be silo based in the future)
Maximum range: Unknown
CEP: Unknown
Payload: 3 MIRVs of unknown yield
Number deployed: None (in development)

DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES

Soviet ICBM deployment strategies evolved as more mature and capable missile systems were inducted into operational service. Initially, the limited range of the R-7 meant that it had to be deployed in northern Russia to allow it to reach targets on American soil. Advances and refinements in propulsion technology increased the reach of the Soviet ICBMs, allowing them to be based throughout Russia in far more protected and accessible regions. One of the disadvantages of the R-7 was that the basing at Plesetsk was in a very inhospitable area, making the missiles more difficult to service and potentially having a negative impact on their reliability and readiness.

As the Soviet ICBM force became more widely deployed, attention began to be paid to survivability, resulting in the first series of silo-based ICBMs being deployed. The survivability of the force as a whole did increase, but individual regiments were not necessarily protected to a great degree due to the use of the three-silo launch complexes detailed above. As silo technology was refined, ICBMs were deployed in individual silos with increasing hardness to allow them to survive nuclear detonations within a certain proximity. The more hardened the silos, the smaller the distance between them in the missile fields. R-36 silos at Zhangistobe, for example, were usually around 10 kilometers apart. Later UR-100N silos at Tatischevo were spaced around 6 kilometers apart. The end result was the widely dispersed missile fields seen today, providing the RVSN with a widely dispersed and survivable missile force. The incorporation of mobile ICBMs into the RVSN only served to increase the survivability of the force by allowing them to deploy and launch from anywhere within their travel range from their garrisons.

CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE

As it exists today, the RVSN consists of three missile armies, all based inside of Russia. These units are the 27th Guards, 31st, and 33rd Guards missile armies. RVSN headquarters is located on the southwestern edge of Moscow, with an alternate hardened wartime command post located inside of Kosvinsky Mountain in the Urals. Eleven missile divisions make up the three missile armies, with seven mobile ICBM divisions and four silo-based ICBM divisions.

The locations of the current RVSN units can be seen in the image below. Silo-based and mobile ICBM units are denoted with different icons.
The locations of former ICBM bases can be seen in the image below. Locations which are currently equipped with different missile types than indicated are identified by smaller icons and smaller text. For example, Teykovo is a current mobile ICBM base, so its past status as a silo-based ICBM location is noted here. Note that Omsk stands out as the sole location to have only been home to pad-launched ICBMs.
27TH GUARDS MISSILE ARMY

The 27th Guards Missile Army (GMA) consists of the 14th and 60th Missile Divisions (MDs) and the 7th, 28th, and 54th Guards Missile Divisions (GMDs). Two units, the 28th GMD and 60th MD, operate silo-based ICBMs at Kozelsk and Tatischevo, respectively. The 28th GMD fields 46 UR-100NUTTH ICBMs, while the 60th MD's force consists of 51 UR-100NUTTH and 50 RT-2PM2 ICBMs. The remaining units field mobile ICBMs, predominately the RT-2PM Topol. The 7th GMD (Vypolzovo) fields 18 ICBMs, the 14th (Yoshkar Ola) fields 27, and the 54th (Teykovo) fields 24.

The following image depicts the locations of the 27th GMA's missile divisions:
The 60th MD at Tatischevo is a representative example of a Russian ICBM unit. The overall operating area consists of a centrally-located support facility surrounded by over 100 ICBM silo positions. The ICBM force is divided into 12 regiments, with each regiment being controlled by a launch control facility co-located with one of its assigned silos.

The following image depicts the 60th MD's ICBM field. Silos, launch control facilities, and the central support area are annotated.
The ICBM support area consists of seven main areas. These are as follows: an administrative and support area, a vehicle storage and maintenance area, a POL storage area, a range security force helipad, an ICBM storage and checkout area, a nuclear weapon storage site (NWSS), and a rail transfer point (RTP). NWSSs are relatively easy to identify thanks to their layered security and hardened bunkers. RTPs are where ICBMs and other components are offloaded and onloaded for transport to and from storage and overhaul facilities. These are key facilities to identify when analyzing nuclear weapon installations.

The 60th MD's support area can be seen in the image below:
ICBM silos share a common configuration for the most part, with the 60th MD being no exception. A representative silo is shown in the image below. Note the layered security fences, the entrance to the underground control bunker, and the missile silo itself.
The 54th GMD at Teykovo is being equipped with the RT-2PM2 Topol-M in its road-mobile form, with 15 weapons on hand at the time of writing, making up the bulk of its road-mobile ICBM consignment. The location of one of the RT-2PM2 garrisons may have been identified. While individual TELs are rarely seen in imagery, and the TELs for the Topol and Topol-M are difficult to differentiate in all but the highest resolution overhead imagery regardless, historical analysis of available imagery suggests that at least one garrison in the 54th GMD has been refurbished between 2005 and 2007, potentially due to the delivery of the new systems. Three images of this facility, from 2005, 2006, and 2007, can be seen below:


While the above images are not conrete evidence of the presence of Topol-M systems, the activity depicted does present circumstantial evidence that the facility was given higher regard than other garrisons in the area. Many buildings were expanded, and the single bay garages housing individual TELs were also completely refurbished. Given that the Topol missiles are nearing the end of their service lives, the evidence above suggests that this facility is going to be in use for a continued period, indicating that the newer Topol-M may be based there.

31ST MISSILE ARMY

The 31st Missile Army (MA) consists of the 13th MD, a silo based ICBM complex near Dombarovskiy, and the 42nd MD, a Topol garrison near Nizhny Tagil. The 13th MD has an active strength of 31 R-36M series ICBMs, while the 42nd MD has a strength of 36 Topol mobile ICBMs. The locations of the 31st MA's missile divisions can be seen in the image below:
33RD GUARDS MISSILE ARMY

The 33rd Guards Missile Army consists of four divisions, the 35th and 62nd MD and the 39th and 51st GMD. The 62nd MD (Uzhur) is a silo-based ICBM unit operating 34 R-36M series ICBMs. The remaining units field Topol mobile ICBMs in varying numbers: the 35th MD (Barnaul) and 39th GMD (Novosibirsk) operate 36 ICBMs each, while the 51st GMD (Irkutsk) operates 27. The locations of the 33rd GMA's facilities can be seen in the image below:
The 35th Missile Division at Barnaul is a representative example of a Topol-equipped mobile ICBM unit. The 35th MD consists of a support facility and four individual Topol garrisons, each housing up to nine TELs. The Topol garrisons act as home to the TELs when they are not field deployed.

The locations of the 35th MD's facilities can be seen in the image below:
The 35th MD's support facility consists of five main areas. As with silo-based missile facilities, there are administrative and support facilities, vehicle storage and maintenance areas, warhead storage facilities, and a rail transfer point. The main difference between a silo-based and mobile ICBM unit is the presence of a warhead mating area. This facility is identified by the presence of a number of high bay garages where TELs may be erected following payload mating in order to conduct calibration and balance checks on the missile and payload. Once a missile has been mated to a warhead, it can then be deployed to a field garrison for operational service, returning to the facility if service or scheduled maintenance checks are required, or for de-arming.

The 35th MD's support facility can be seen in the image below:
A representative example of a Topol garrison can be seen in the image below. There are nine single bay garages, one for each assigned TEL. When the TEL is not field deployed, it has the capability to erect and fire its weapon through the sliding roof of the single bay garage should the need arise. TELs are organized into regiments, with three TELs per regiment. Each regiment has its own support vehicle garage, housing the command and control, maintenance, and support vehicles that accompany field deployed TELs. Also present at each garrison are an administrative and support area, and a further vehicle storage area for other support vehicles.
FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS

During the Cold War, the deployment of ICBMs was not limited to Russia alone. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine all became home to various strategic missile units. Kazakhstan was no suprise given the presence of the Baikonur test facility, as well as other critical Soviet military operational and test facilities. Belarus and the Ukraine could be viewed as somewhat of a suprise given their much closer proximity to NATO forces, although they were still protected by the defensive infrastructure afforded the USSR by the Warsaw Pact member states.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan was home to two ICBM silo fields, at Dzherzhavinsk and Zhangistobe. Both bases were home first to the R-36 ICBM, and later the improved R-36M variant. Each unit fielded 52 operational silos. The locations of both missile fields can be seen in the image below:
Belarus and the Ukraine

Belarus was home to the 50th Missile Army. At maximum strength during the late stages of the Cold War, the 50th MA operated three Topol-equipped mobile ICBM divisions: the 33rd (Lida) and 49th (Mozyr) missile divisions, and an unidentified division based near Postavy. Each division was equipped with three garrisons for Topol TELs, with 9 TELs based at each garrison. These facilities were all former Pioner IRBM garrisons.

The Ukraine was home to the 43rd Missile Army. Two missile divisions, the 19th (Khmelnitskiy) and 46th (Pervomaysk), were equipped with various types of silo-based ICBMs. The 19th MD operated 90 silos, equipped at first with the UR-100 and later with the UR-100N. The 46th MD operated 86 silos. First equipped with the UR-100 ICBM, the 46th MD later became a mixed division, hosting both the UR-100N and the silo-based variant of the RT-23. 40 of the former and 46 of the latter made up the operational strength late in the division's history.

The following image depicts the locations of former Soviet ICBM bases in Belarus and the Ukraine, as well as two former ICBM storage facilities in the area:
IMPORTANT FACILITIES

A discussion of Soviet and Russian ICBM development and deployment would not be complete without an overview of the major facilities involved in the design, testing, and support of these systems.

Three major test facilities have been home to Soviet and Russian ICBM development programs since the creation of the Korolev R-7. These facilities are Kapustin Yar and Plesetsk in Russia, and Baikonur in Kazakhstan.

Kapustin Yar saw the initial steps taken in the development of Russian ballistic missiles when it served as the testing ground for captured German V-2 rockets after the Second World War. While it did not as extensive a role in continued ICBM testing as the other two locations, it is historically significant nonetheless and did serve as a launching point for the R-16 and RT-2.

Baikonur was the test ground for the first Soviet ICBM and home to the bulk of the Soviet space program. It was host to a plethora of Soviet ICBM trials programs, as well as the FOBS deployment area. While ICBM developmental testing has been largely restricted to Plesetsk in recent years, Baikonur still plays a significant role in the Russian space program.

A general layout of all ICBM-related test and operational deployment locations at Baikonur can be seen in the image below:
The test pad from which the R-7 made the Soviet Union's first ICBM test flight can be seen in the image below:
Plesetsk initially served as the home to the operational R-7 ICBM force, but eventually evolved into a significant ICBM test facility. The bulk of the development of Soviet and Russian mobile ICBMs took place at Plesetsk, and it has also become a significant space launch facility. Current ICBM activity includes RS-24 test firings.

An overview of the major ICBM-related test facilities at Plesetsk can be seen in the image below:
The Kura Impact Range, located on the Kamchatka peninsula, provides a secure range where long-distance Soviet and Russian ICBM tests terminated. Various telemetry stations are present, including the RSN-225 radar formerly associated with the S-225 mobile ABM system. This radar is used to track inbound ICBMs, and caused a minor uproar when it was deployed as it was recognized by American intelligence as an ABM-related asset. While some ICBM tests do terminate in the Pacific Ocean on maximum range test flights, the Kura range is a significant asset as it provides a wealth of performance and telemetry data during the reentry phase of flight. Having an RV impact on land also means that any onboard telemetry equipment may be recovered with greater ease than if the RV impacted at sea.

An overview of the Kura Impact Range can be seen in the image below:
The four major design bureaus associated with developing the Soviet and Russian ICBM force were Korolev, Yangel, MITT, and Chelomey. Chelomey's design bureau is currently known as NPO Mash. The breakup of the Soviet Union meant that half of the then-active ICBM development and production force was left in the Ukraine, effectively leaving MITT to develop the next generation of Russian ICBMs. Many component manufacturers were left in former Soviet republics as well, and this caused numerous problems as missiles began to need maintenance during the course of their post-Soviet service lives.

The locations of Korolev's design bureau, MITT, and NPO Mash can be seen in the image below:
The locations of Yangel's design bureau and associated production facility in the Ukraine can be seen in the image below:
Five major ICBM storage sites maintained the missiles not operationally deployed by the RVSN. Two of these were located outside of Russia as mentioned previously, with the remaining three facilities located near Nizhny Novgorod, Glazov, and Yekaterinburg. A typical ICBM storage facility consisted primarily of ICBM storage halls, a missile transport railcar garrison serving the trains used to transport ICBMs throughout Russia, and a rail transfer point for onloading and offloading railcars.

A typical Russian ICBM storage site can be seen in the image below:
Of the sixteen national-level nuclear weapon stockpile sites, fifteen may serve the RVSN's ICBM fleet. The sixteenth is located near Olenegorsk and is likely sited to support the Russian Northern Fleet's SLBM arsenal. Further information regarding these facilities can be obtained here.

PREEMPTIVE STRIKE VULNERABILITY

The current RVSN ICBM force presents an interesting preemptive strike scenario. The most vulnerable assets are the fixed, silo-based weapons. A single US Navy Ohio-class SSBN is capable of launching 24 Trident II SLBMs. Given that each weapon typically carries 6 MIRV warheads, each submarine can strike 144 targets with a standard payload. Two Ohio SSBNs could therefore theoretically decimate the RVSN with a preemptive strike, eliminating the entire silo-based missile force, which currently stands at 222 ICBMs.

Mobile ICBMs are far more difficult targets. Mobile ICBMs are capable of being erected and fired while in garrison thanks to sliding roof assemblies on the single bay garages housing the TELs. During a time of increased international tensions, however, they are likely to be widely dispersed to field launch sites. In this environment they would be much harder to locate, and they are available in sufficient numbers to represent a crippling retaliatory strike capability for the RVSN even if the silo-based weapons are eliminated or incapacitated. Launching enough ICBMs to blanket likely deployment areas would not be a likely option. First, this would remove a significant number of inbound warheads from targeting plans, potentially resulting in a number of military complexes surviving the initial nuclear exchange. Second, the area which would need to be covered would be extensive. This would result in an extensive quantity of radioactive fallout being released into the atmosphere, likely resulting in as much devastation to the United States and the rest of the populated world as the nuclear exchange would cause to ussia. Given these issues, a decapitating strike must be planned as an extremely covert operation during peacetime, and initiated almost at random. This would help to ensure that the maximum number of mobile ICBMs could be caught in their garrisons and be denied the opportunity to deploy into the field.

In practice, such a decapitating strike would be problematic. The RVSN would receive warning of inbound ICBMs and likely employ a launch-on-warning strategy to ensure that a retaliatory strike would succeed, effectively negating the ability of the American SSBN force to render the silo-based ICBM force nonexistant. Mobile ICBMs may be able to be targeted in such a scenario provided that they are in garrison, but it is likely that a portion of them are always deployed to field launch positions to prevent such an occurrance.

In the event of a full-scale nuclear exchange between America and Russia, given that the initiating nation would only succeed in guaranteeing a retaliatory strike, what is likely to occur is as follows. American nuclear missiles would likely target critical military facilities, to include ICBM production and storage locations, national-level nuclear stockpile sites, ICBM support facilities, and ICBM silos. This would virtually guarantee that the RVSN would not be able to be reconstituted for a potential second round of missile firings. The unfortunate side effect, of course, is that the aftermath of the initial full-scale nuclear exchange would likely be crippling to both nations, and utterly devastating to the rest of the populated world. Such is the crux of the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD); neither nation would be likely to guarantee its destruction by initiating a nuclear exchange, but equivalent nuclear arsenals are maintained on both sides to prevent either side from encountering a scenario where a preemptive strike would be an attractive option.

CONCLUSION

More advanced and survivable assets than were ever fielded during the times of leaders such as Krushchev and Gorbachev have seen the RVSN evolve into a streamlined, deadlier version of its former self. While its strength may never again be near the levels attained during the height of the Cold War, the only real loss has been in the ability to destroy the planet a number of times beyond that required to ensure a nuclear victory over the United States during a global thermonuclear conflict. With the RT-2PM and RS-24 being tested and fielded, the RVSN will remain a potent nuclear warfighting force for decades to come.

GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA

The locations and detail markings used to create this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark file here. This file will be updated as more information becomes available.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss this feauture at the IMINT & Analysis forum discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Russian Space Web
Encyclopedia Astronautica
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces

The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword, Steven Zaloga, 2002.
Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Pavel Podvig, 2001.
Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (various years)

Special thanks to Tim Brewer for contributing many of the historical ICBM silo locations.