INTRODUCTIONMany individuals may be suprised to know the identity of the largest and most capable SAM network in Europe outside of Russia. The distinction goes to the Ukraine, the inheritor of numerous legacy Soviet SAM systems and facilities after the fall of the USSR. More importantly, many of these systems were top of the line during the 1980s, providing a very solid technology base on which the Ukraine would be able to rely going towards and into the 21st century.
AIR DEFENSE ASSETSThe Ukrainian Air Defense Force is responsible for operating the radar and SAM systems tasked with defending Ukrainian airspace. The force is subordinate to the Ukrainian Air Force, and operates S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE), S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE), S-300V1 (SA-12A GLADIATOR), and Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) SAM systems. The Ukrainian Army operates separate, subordinate SAM assets for providing battlefield air defense.
Over two hundred air defense related facilities have been identified in the Ukraine. There are a total of 36 active and 106 inactive SAM sites, as well as 76 supporting facilities. These locations are broken down as follows:
EW sites: 36
36D6 radar sites: 20
64N6 battle management radar sites: 9
SAM Garrisons: 1
S-300P Garrisons: 3
S-300V Garrisons: 1
9K37 Garrisons: 2
SAM Training Ranges: 3
Active S-125 sites: 2
Active S-200 sites: 5
Active S-300PT sites: 16
Active S-300PS sites: 12
Active S-300V sites: 1
Inactive S-75 sites: 58
Inactive S-125 sites: 16
Inactive 2K12 sites: 1
Inactive S-200 sites: 11
Inactive 9K37 sites: 1
Inactive S-300P sites: 19
SYMBOLOGYThe following icons will be used to depict air defense related sites within the Ukraine:
Squares: facilities such as garrisons, test and training centers
Diamonds: EW radar sites
Hexagons: 36D6 radar sites
Circles: 64N6 radar sites
Triangles: SAM sites
The icons will be color coded as follows:
Dark blue: general EW radar, 36D6 EW radar, 64N6 battle management radar
Bright blue: S-125
Purple: S-200
Bright red: S-300PT, S-300PS
Orange: S-300V
Faded green: 9K37
White: an unoccupied EW radar or SAM location
Brown: a SAM garrison
Engagement zones will match the color of the icon for their respective system.
EW ASSETSEarly warning over the Ukraine is provided by various radar sites located throughout the nation. These sites typically host one or more types of EW radar, as well as height finding and IFF interrogation systems. There are twenty-eight active EW sites, with eight additional inactive sites available for network expansion or asset redeployment should the need arise. Twenty 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) and eight 64N6 (BIG BIRD) sites provide target identification and battle management functions for the Ukrainian SAM network. Three 36D6 sites are co-located with SAM systems, possibly providing direct support to those batteries. The 36D6 and 64N6 radars are positioned to provide overlapping coverage. These systems are capable of monitoring virtually all of the Ukraine's airspace, as well as significant portions of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
The locations of the Ukrainian EW assets, including the 36D6 and 64N6 sites, can be seen in the image below:
The coverage zones of the 36D6 radar sites can be seen in the image below:
The coverage zones of the identified 64N6 battle management radar sites can be seen in the image below. A further 64N6 is likely positioned near L'viv, as there is an S-300PT battery deployed at a prepared site in the area.
THE S-200V....D?The S-200 is the longest-range SAM asset available to the Ukrainian Air Defense Force. Five active S-200 batteries provide air defense over all but the far eastern region of the nation between Kharkov and Lugansk. A further eleven inactive S-200 sites remain, although these are likely to be reused as homes for mobile assets such as the S-300PS if at all, due to the time required to redeploy an S-200 battery.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that the 250 kilometer range S-200V is in service, but the October 2001 shootdown of a Russian airliner over the Black Sea by an errant S-200 would seem to indicate that the 300 kilometer range S-200D is the variant operated by the Ukraine. The Russian airliner was reportedly no closer than 250 kilometers to the launch site and flying towards the Russian coastline. Hitting a crossing target at 250 kilometers would be nearly impossible with an S-200V, but would be within the capability of the S-200D.
The locations of the Ukraine's S-200 batteries, inactive S-200 sites, and relevant coverage zones for the active sites can be seen in the image below:
S-300P PROMINENCEThe S-200 is the longest-ranged Ukrainian-operated SAM system, but the S-300P variants represent the most capable and widely deployed systems. Twenty-eight S-300P series SAM batteries are in active service; sixteen batteries are equipped with the S-300PT, while 12 are equipped with the more capable S-300PS. Examining these sites in conjunction with the nineteen inactive S-300P sites provides a great deal of insight into the deployment strategy of air defense assets within the Ukraine.
The S-300PT and S-300PS batteries are deployed to protect the most critical political, urban, military, and industrial areas in the nation. Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa were each defended by no fewer than six batteries, while Nikolayev and Sevastopol were defended by no less than five apiece.
The following image depicts the locations of the Ukraine's S-300P series batteries, inactive S-300P series sites, and relevant coverage zones for the active sites:
Standard deployment practice deduced through imagery analysis indicates that a full-strength S-300PT battery has twelve TELs, while a full-strength S-300PS battery has eight TELs. Each battery is equipped with a 5N63 or 5N63S (FLAP LID) engagement radar, as well as a 5N66 or 5N66M (CLAM SHELL) low-altitude detection radar. 40V6 series mast assemblies are commonly employed for both radar systems.
The capital of Kiev is the only location which remains defended by a full complement of S-300P series batteries. All six sites remain active, four operating the S-300PT and two the S-300PS. Kharkov (S-300PT), Odessa (S-300PS), and Sevastopol (S-300PS) are currently defended by three active batteries apiece, as is Nikolayev (S-300PT). Dnepropetrovsk falls somewhere in the middle, with four active S-300PT batteries remaining in the area.
The following image depicts the layout of the S-300PT and S-300PS batteries around Kiev, along with other air defense associated sites in the area:
The following image depicts the coverage of the air defense assets deployed around Kiev. Note the significant degree of overlap present in the S-300PT and S-300PS batteries.
The S-300PT and S-300PS can be redeployed adjacent to 36D6 EW radars to take advantage of added target acquisition support as well, should the need arise. Two S-300P batteries, near Dnepropetrovsk (S-300PT, seen in the image below) and Pervomaysk (S-300PS), currently possess on-site 36D6 EW radars, indicating that this type of interoperability is practiced within the Ukraine.
Recent activity near Odessa suggests that the older S-300PT may be being phased out, or at the very least redeployed to less important regions. A site south of Odessa was imaged in 2004, and was seen to be home to both an S-300PT and an S-300PS battery. As can be seen in the image below, the S-300PT battery occupied the site proper, with the S-300PS battery being deployed along the southeastern periphery.
In 2007, the same site was reimaged, with the S-300PS battery seen to have taken over occupation of the site proper, with the S-300PT battery having been removed.
Evidence of this sort of realignment or redeployment can be seen at other locations in the Ukraine as well. S-300PT batteries are deployed predominantly at older-style S-300P sites, containing six revetments for two TELs apiece, or four revetments for three TELs apiece and a position for a mast-mounted 5N63 in the center. S-300PS batteries are deployed predominantly at newer-style sites, featuring four TEL revetments and a significant raised berm in the center for the mobile 5N63S engagement radar. It is likely that the S-300PT sites were built over old S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) locations, perhaps explaining the similar launcher revetment placement. At any rate, an S-300PS battery northwest of Kiev is deployed at what would typically be a six-revetment S-300PT site. This likely indicates that the S-300PS replaced an S-300PT battery at this location at some point prior to 2003, when the earliest available imagery was captured. Furthermore, the native language website for the MoD no longer claims that the S-300PT is operated, only listing the S-300PS. It is therefore possible that the S-300PT is in fact being phased out, or may have been already. The latter case is a distinct possibility given that there is no 2009 imagery available of any S-300PT battery location.
S-125....STILL SERVING ON?One strategic-level SAM asset which may still be operated by the Ukrainian Air Defense Force is the S-125 (SA-3 GOA). The S-125 was imaged at two active locations in 2002 and 2003, but has not been mentioned in the Ukrainian MoD's
annual White Book as far back as 2005. The latter fact indicates that the system is not currently being trained on or funded for service life extensions, occurrences which would be necessary for the system to remain viable into the future. Given that these events have not taken place, it is likely that the Ukrainian S-125 batteries were removed from service between 2003 and 2005. While further analysis is necessary to make a definitive statement to that extent, the evidence does suggest it to be the case.
"TACTICAL" SAMSThere are two tactical SAM systems which serve in the Ukrainian air defense network. The Ukraine operates both 9K37 Buk and S-300V1 systems, with a portion of these systems being subordinate to the Air Defense Force. The Ukrainian MoD claims that the Army operates the Buk-M variant, with the Air Defense Force operating the Buk-M1. The MoD also claims that the Army and Air Defense Force operates the S-300V1 (SA-12A GLADIATOR), indicating that the Ukraine may not be in possession of the S-300V2 (SA-12B GIANT) ATBM system.
The Buk issue is somewhat complicated, as there is no known specific "Buk-M" variant. The term has been used by Russia to refer to both Buk-M1 and Buk-M1-2 systems collectively. Alternatively, this may indicate a local modification of the original Buk system. The original Buk system was present in the Ukraine as late as 2005, as evidenced by the sighting of a 9S18 Kupol (TUBE ARM) target acquisition radar at a Buk-affiliated SAM garrison. This can be seen in the image below:
Two Buk garrisons and two S-300V1 garrisons have been identified, with S-300V1 components seen field deployed near one garrison. The garrison affiliations cannot be effectively determined, as the Ukrainian Army and Air Defense Force each operate both systems, although the Zolotonosha garrison displaying the Kupol radar may be affiliated with the Ukrainian Army if the original Kupol radar was in fact retained in the Ukraine's "Buk-M" system.
SUPPORT FACILITIESIdentified support facilities for the Ukrainian Air Defense Force consist of numerous SAM garrisons and three SAM training facilities. Ukrainian SAM units have also been known to travel to Telemba in Russia to conduct missile firings. Identified SAM garrisons, including those supporting Army S-300V1 assets, and SAM training ranges can be seen in the image below:
OVERALL COVERAGEThe Ukrainian SAM network was inherited from the USSR following the collapse of the latter nation. Air defense assets are organized to defend key population centers and geographic regions. The capital of Kiev, key industrial and urban centers Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Nikolayev, and Odessa, and the Crimean peninsula are home to the majority of the assets. Other assets are scattered throughout the nation and along the western border.
The following image depicts the locations of all air defense oriented sites, both active and inactive, throughout the nation:
The following image depicts the total coverage of identified EW and SAM assets deployed throughout the nation:
As can be seen in the images above, the Ukraine enjoys near-total nationwide EW coverage and boasts a layered SAM defense network around multiple key locations. While the network no longer faces the threat of a war against NATO, and has downsized significantly since the fall of the USSR as a result, the Ukraine remains very well equipped to defend itself from aerial attack.
The possible recent retirement of the S-300PT by the Air Defense Force will not necessarily impart a significant loss of capability in terms of overall coverage to the network. While the S-200 is not well suited for engaging maneuverable, non-cooperative, or low-RCS targets, it can deter any ISR platforms or other large combat aircraft from approaching Ukrainian airspace. Given that the S-300PS has a maximum engagement range of nearly double that of the S-300PT, 90 kilometers to 47, it would be possible to redeploy S-300PS batteries around key locations in a fashion which would allow S-300PT batteries to be retired. Having fewer batteries would certainly mean that fewer targets could be engaged at a given time, but the longer engagement range would alleviate some of this loss by allowing targets to be engaged further down range, with more targets engaged following intercept of the first wave. This would be a sensible redistribution of assets, allowing the capability to be virtually retained by only operating roughly half of the assets. This would result in an appropriate reduction in yearly operating and training costs as well. This course of action would necessitate removing and redeploying the solitary S-300PS batteries near Khakovka, Kherson, and Pervomaysk, and the resulting gaps in coverage would need to be assessed to ensure that they represent acceptable degradations of the overall network.
The potential gaps in the air defense network which would be caused by a redeployment of S-300PS assets could be filled by the Buk or S-300V1 batteries tasked with an Air Defense Force mission. These mobile units are capable of serving as effective "gap fillers" and complements to the longer-range strategic SAM systems. Buk or S-300V1 batteries could also be deployed to provide close-in defense of key facilities, taking some of the workload from S-300P series batteries. Alternatively, they could be deployed along the nation's periphery underneath known or potential ingress routes in an attempt to ambush inbound aircraft during wartime.
Mobile assets such as the S-300PS, Buk, and S-300V1 are capable of operating wherever they are required, virtually anywhere in the nation. 64N6 coverage and 36D6 deployment can provide these systems with battle management and target acquisition support wherever they may deploy, thanks to the robust EW network. As S-300PS SAMs are typically deployed at prepared sites, the large network of inactive SAM facilities in the nation represent potential deployment sites, or locations for field training exercises.
There are over 100 inactive SAM sites of various configuration in the Ukraine, the locations of which can be seen in the image below:
Often it may be important to analyze the former SAM locations in a historical sense. The Soviet military had placed two ICBM units in the Ukraine under the command of the 43rd Missile Army. These were the 19th Missile Division near Khmelnitskiy and the 46th Missile Division near Pervomaisk. It is interesting to note that, while numerous inactive SAM sites are located near Pervomaisk (including a current S-300PS battery), no serious SAM defenses were apparently placed near Khmelnitskiy. This would seem to indicate that the defense of ICBM batteries was not a significant priority, or that this mission was primarily handled by aerial assets.
The locations of the Pervomaisk ICBM silos and nearby SAM sites can be seen in the image below:
FUTURE EFFORTSDespite the modern, robust nature of the Ukrainian air defense network, it will require modernization in the future. The S-200 and S-300PS systems will likely require replacement in the 2015-2020 timeframe. Even without taking service life into account, both systems are likely nearing (S-300PS) or past (S-200) their prime, thanks to constant development of ECM and SEAD/DEAD systems and tactics throughout the world. Some older systems and components may require replacement much sooner, after various failed launches during training in 2008.
The simplest option would be to procure S-300PMU-2 Favorit (SA-20B GARGOYLE) or S-400 (SA-21) systems from Russia, as they would be able to operate within the existing EW and battle management networks. This could also be packaged together with Buk-M2E (SA-17 GRIZZLY) systems as Buk-M1 replacements. Current tensions with Russia regarding Ukrainian desires to join NATO and the nation's support of Georgia have been well-publicized, but may not be enough to impede an arms deal of this expense. The Ukraine is a member of the CIS Air Defense Network and has shared information in that capacity with Russia, continuing to do so through 2009, and participates in various multinational exercises related to the network as well. Russia and the Ukraine also do well over $10 billion USD in trade annually, demonstrating that while the governments do have issues they are still able to coexist and cooperate in other areas.
After the breakup of the USSR, the Ukraine began to research many indigenous missile systems, including the Grom/Sapsan SRBM and Korshun GLCM. An IR-guided AAM, the Izdelie 611 "Gran" is also under development, and could represent a stepping stone towards a new SAM design. No evidence of any BVR AAM development has surfaced in the Ukraine, but a viable WVR AAM could lead designers down that path in the future. A BVR system, particularly an active or passive radar missile, would certainly be a candidate for surface-launch as a SAM system. Such a weapon could potentially replace the Buk systems, as well as S-300PS systems in a boosted form for extended range. This option remains less attractive than pursuing Russian-made SAM systems, however, as indigenous radars may be required and development could consume a decade or more given that the Ukraine is basically starting from scratch. An alternative but more complicated solution would be to merely develop a SAM to replace the 5V55-series missiles employed by the S-300PS. This would enable the system to retain the guidance systems and components of the S-300PS, while rejuvenating its service life through the addition of a new missile with a new solid rocket motor.
The last option would be to purchase a foreign-made, non-Russian SAM system. NATO entry could theoretically open the doors necessary for a Patriot or MEADS purchase. While these systems would certainly be viable, they would potentially require a new EW network for support, further increasing the overall cost of modernization. This EW requirement stems from the issues many nations have had, particularly Greece with the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) and Patriot, at getting Russian-made and Western-made SAM systems to operate cooperatively. In that light, a Russian-made SAM system purchase would be far more logical.
CONCLUSIONThe Ukrainian Air Defense Force remains a very capable, modern SAM network. With a renewed focus on training and professionalism in the Ukrainian armed forces as a whole since 2005, the Air Defense Force stands ready to take on any regional aggressor and defend the citizenry underneath its umbrella. It will be very interesting to watch as the network evolves in the coming decade.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONFeel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found
here.
SOURCES-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Ukraine's Air Defense ForceFailed Firings in 2008Ukraine and the S-200DThe Ukrainian Air Defense Force (in Ukrainian)
The above image depicts a Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) tactical SAM garrison near Srednebelaya in Russia's Far East. While the garrison had been identified prior to historic imagery becoming available, the facility may be used to illustrate an advantage to examining historical imagery when attempting to determine the inventory of assigned units. The baseline image of the site, used to identify the occupants as Buk tactical SAMs, was captured in August of 2007 and depicts a number of 9A310 TELARs as well as a deployed Buk battery. Examining the historical imagery for the facility, we are provided with the image seen above, captured in May of 2006. In this image, a number of 9A310 TELARs can be identified, as well as 9A39 loader-launchers. Identifying tactical SAM units can be difficult at this resolution for untrained analysts, but the 2006 image depicts the TELARs with their turrets rotated, making them much easier to identify. This highlights the advantage of historical imagery when identifying garrisons or other major facilities. Different equipment may be viewed in different imagery, and an image such as the one above may make identification far easier and much less time consuming.
The above image depicts a Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) tactical SAM garrison near Srednebelaya in Russia's Far East. While the garrison had been identified prior to historic imagery becoming available, the facility may be used to illustrate an advantage to examining historical imagery when attempting to determine the inventory of assigned units. The baseline image of the site, used to identify the occupants as Buk tactical SAMs, was captured in August of 2007 and depicts a number of 9A310 TELARs as well as a deployed Buk battery. Examining the historical imagery for the facility, we are provided with the image seen above, captured in May of 2006. In this image, a number of 9A310 TELARs can be identified, as well as 9A39 loader-launchers. Identifying tactical SAM units can be difficult at this resolution for untrained analysts, but the 2006 image depicts the TELARs with their turrets rotated, making them much easier to identify. This highlights the advantage of historical imagery when identifying garrisons or other major facilities. Different equipment may be viewed in different imagery, and an image such as the one above may make identification far easier and much less time consuming.
