INTRODUCTION
To date, some of the most elusive military-related sites inside of China have been the DF-31 ICBM garrisons and launch positions. Through careful examination and exhaustive research, the launch sites and garrisons of China's mobile ICBM fleet have been successfully identified.
MOBILE ICBM CHARACTERISTICS
When dealing with mobile ICBMs, there are a few issues to consider. First, any mobile ICBM system requires a garrison for storing TELs in peacetime. Second, the system's mobility must be considered. If the system is off-road capable, as is the case with Russia's Topol ICBM, then locating the actual launch positions becomes a wasted effort as there is simply too much area to examine. If the system is only road-mobile, however, then pre-sited launch positions may be readily identifiable as the TELs cannot travel over rough terrain to disperse into the surrounding area. The third and final point to consider is that the system will require some sort of method of deriving the precise coordinates of the launch site. Any ballistic missile requires the positional data of the launch position in order to effectively fly the proper trajectory to the impact point.
CHINESE MISSILE LAUNCH SITE DETAILS
Before setting out to locate the Chinese mobile ICBM fleet, it is important to consider examples of existing, identified mobile missile launch positions. Near Delingha in central China, many launch positions for either DF-4 or DF-21 ballistic missiles have been identified (the type of missile deployed here has been under speculation for some time).
One of the identified missile launch sites near Delingha can be seen in the image below:
The launch site is a circular concrete pad with a diameter of 70 meters. Many of these launch positions can be found in the surrounding area. All of the launch positions are connected to major roads by paved access roads, giving credibility to the fact that the DF-21 is speculated to be deployed in the area. The DF-21 TEL consists of a towed erector-launcher unit which is not off-road capable, requiring launch sites to be close to major roads allowing the TELs to disperse from garrison to the launch positions.
NANYANG ICBM DISPERSAL AREA
When setting out to track down the locations of China's DF-31 launch sites, it is important to find a credible starting point. Otherwise, the entire country must be searched, which would be an extremely difficult and time-consuming task. It is known that China's DF-31s are subordinate to the 2nd Artillery Corps, the arm of the PLA that controls China's land-based missile force. The first operational unit to equip with the DF-31 ICBM was Brigade 813. This brigade received DF-31 ICBMs as early as 1999 according to some reports, displaying them to the public during the 1999 National Day parade. A 2008 DoD report claims that less than 10 missiles are in service, however, and the test program of the DF-31 would appear to give credibility to this report as the missile has had a long and protracted development period due to technical issues. The DoD claimed that the missile had reached Initial Threat Availability in 2006, meaning that the DF-31 had managed to conduct a single successful flight test. Naming Brigade 813 as a DF-31 unit as far back as 1999 may seem a bit premature, especially given that the system was apparently only successfully tested as late as 2006. However, the 2nd Artillery Corps stood up the first DF-21 unit in 1986, with the missile being operationally deployed as early as 1991. Given that DF-31 testing began with an August 1999 launch, it is plausible that Brigade 813 was established during that time period to begin crew training on the TEL and to establish a garrison for the system.
Regardless of the actual entry date, the DF-31 is currently in service with the 2nd Artillery Corps of the PLA, and it would appear that Brigade 813 was the first unit established to operate the weapon. The only remaining fact required to locate the DF-31's launch positions is the location of Brigade 813's operational area. Open source reporting claims that Brigade 813 was initially based in Luoyang, but was relocated to Nanyang. Analysis of available imagery supports these reports.
Nanyang DF-31 Launch Sites
Nanyang is located in east-central China, approximately 850 kilometers southeast of Beijing and 180 kilometers south of Luoyang. Analysis of the surrounding area has led to the location of six DF-31 launch sites approximately 30 kilometers northwest of Nanyang. The six DF-31 launch sites can be found at the following coordinates:
33°16'33.80"N 112°20'06.49"E
33°14'23.78"N 112°17'50.82"E
33°12'46.96"N 112°18'55.43"E
33°12'02.03"N 112°18'49.17"E
33°09'44.19"N 112°15'47.01"E
33°11'48.95"N 112°18'38.92"E
The Nanyang DF-31 launch site locations can be seen in the following image:
Further evidence that these locations are DF-31 launch positions can be found in the characteristics of the DF-31 TEL itself. The DF-31's Hanyang HY4301 TEL consists of a missile launch canister mounted on a trailer which is towed by a four axle tractor. This configuration is clearly not off-road capable. That being the case, DF-31 deployed launch sites would have to be near major roads in order to facilitate dispersal of the TELs. This fact, when combined with the information that Brigade 813 is based in Nanyang, supports the conclusion that the sites identified above are in fact DF-31 ICBM launch positions.
Five of the launch sites are of a terdrop configuration. An access road connects the launch sites to a nearby main thoroughfare, allowing the road-mobile TELs to travel from garrison to the launch sites with relative ease. There appears to be a calibration marking of some sort in the center of the teardrop launch site, present at all five identified locations. This marking is likely utilized in one of two methods:
1. The TEL may have a calibration marking onboard used to line up with the center of the circle to enable calibration of the DF-31's guidance system. The importance of calibrating the missile with pre-launch coordinates was discussed previously in this article.
2. The missile tube itself may be intended to be erected directly over the circle, which may be reinforced to a greater extent in order to protect it from the exhaust gasses of the missile when it is launched. Alternatively, erecting the missile tube directly over the circle may also serve a guidance calibration function.
One of the Nanyang launch sites can be seen in the following image:
DF-31 Support Facility
A possible support facility for the deployed TELs can be found at the following coordinates: 33°11'55.92"N 112°18'35.33"E. This site features a probable administrative building of some kind, as well as a probable drive-through checkout building for deployed TELs. A possible TEL garage is also present, although the configuration does not appear to represent a drive-through structure. It is possible that this is where missile or warhead mating can occur in the field if necessary.
The support facility is also located in close proximity to two launch sites. One of the sites is the common teardrop configuration. The other site is an apparet abberation, being of circular configuration. The issue of the circular launch site will be addressed later in this article.
The Nanyang DF-31 support facility, also marked in the previous image, can be seen below:
Nanyang DF-31 Garrison Location
Two locations have been identified as potential garrison sites for Brigade 813's DF-31 ICBMs. The first location is sited approximately 10 kilometers west from the center of Nanyang, while the second location is sited approximately 30 kilometers northwest of the center of Nanyang.
The two locations can be found at the following coordinates:
33°00'44.13"N 112°24'52.49"E
33°03'53.05"N 112°12'16.70"E
The westernmost garrison location was still under construction when the image was acquired on 22 December 2003. Examination of the site within the context of a mobile ICBM base would appear to depict garages for support vehicles and equipment, and a TEL garage under construction.
The westernmost garrison site can be seen in the image below:
The easternmost garrison was imaged on 19 December 2005. Given that Brigade 813 was extablished as early as 1999 and relocated to Nanyang at some point thereafter, this is the most likely location for the DF-31 garrison. The first location would logically have been completed much earlier, especially if the launch sites were complete as of November and December 2006 when they were imaged. The easternmost garrison features what an HQ building, troop barracks, and support vehicle garages. There is also a possible TEL drive-through complex along the southwestern end of the garrison. This facility may be intended for pre-dispersal checkout, missile and/or warhead mating, or another undisclosed function. A large building along the western edge of the compond appears to be the likely location for the TEL garage. This is the only facility on the compound which a complete TEL could effectively enter and exit. A significantly taller portion of the building could also allow the TELs to be erected under cover for checkout before being dispersed. Alternatively, the TEL's launch assembly could be erected indoors to allow for the DF-31 launch tubes to be mated vertically, eliminating the need for a separate loading vehicle or system. With the launch assembly lowered and the missile tube stowed for transport, the TEL could then travel to the drive-through complex for warhead mating, although this is speculation.
The easternmost garrison site can be seen in the image below:
Western Launch Positions
The round launch site located near the support facility is clearly an aberration, given the teardrop configuration of the other five launch sites. This location could be used for TEL crew training when calibration of the missile's guidance system is not necessary (for example, when a missile is not loaded on the TEL). The fact that a round launch site is associated with the DF-31 is significant for another reason, however.
The support facility's round launch site is approximately 92 meters in diameter. Further west of the DF-31 launch area are three other launch sites, all sharing the same 92 meter diameter. These additional launch sites are located at the following coordinates:
33°17'35.95"N 111°52'48.79"E
33°15'04.30"N 111°56'40.96"E
33°11'48.49"N 111°58'03.93"E
The locations of the three launch sites can be seen in the image below:
These western launch sites appear to support a road-mobile TEL, indicating that the DF-31 may be their intended user. They are all connected to main thoroughfares via an access road, similar to the launch sites found further east. These launch sites seem to be incomplete and appear to lack concrete surfaces.
One of the western launch sites can be seen in the image below:
The obvious question is whether these launch sites are also associated with the DF-31. Given that 12 missiles has been mentioned in open-source reporting as the typical strength of a missile battalion in the 2nd Artillery Corps, it is possible that they are also subordinate to Brigade 813. These launch sites were imaged in their apparently incomplete state on 21 August 2007. DoD reporting suggests that less than 10 DF-31 ICBMs were in service as of 2008, implying that Brigade 813 was not at full strength. Given that information, it is likely that these sites were being constructed as Brigade 813 was being brought to full strength. They may have been left over from a previous ballistic missile unit (recall the similar layout of the Delingha launch site described above) and are being modified to support the DF-31. Such modifications may include strengthening the pads to support the launch of the DF-31, and possibly adding a calibration marking similar to those seen at the eastern teardrop-shaped launch sites. Alternatively, these launch sites may be related to the DF-31A, which is reported to use a new TEL. A new TEL may not be compatible with the launch sites found to the east, or the DF-31A may simply be more advanced, not requiring an off-board calibration source to acquire pre-launch coordinates.
It has been reported, however, that the TEL for the DF-31A may be an off-road capable vehicle. These launch sites appear to be configured to support a road-mobile vehicle, as mentioned above. Given that Brigade 813 will likely support a total of 12 TELs, and that they are not off-road capable, it is likely that these launch positions are in fact intended to support the DF-31 and not the DF-31A or some other missile system. This also indicates that there are a further three launch positions that have yet to be identified in the available imagery. The reason for the differing launch site configurations will remain a mystery for the present time. Until the mystery is solved, there will always be the question of whether or not the DF-31A is associated with Brigade 813 and the western launch positions. Based on the fact that the western sites were imaged in August of 2007 and that no flight test has been reported for the DF-31A, it remains the opinion of the author that the western sites support Nanyang's DF-31 force. Additionally, the DF-31A has not been associated with Brigade 813 in any open-source reporting.
The complete area of operations for Brigade 813, along with the two possible garrison locations (the western garrison may in fact be under construction to support the western launch positions), can be seen in the image below. Launch sites are marked as black triangles inside of red areas denoting the area directly surrounding the launch sites.
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
The eastern launch positions do allow an examination of the technical characteristics of the DF-31 ICBM. Each launch site is oriented on a different azimuth, implying that the DF-31 may change aximuth in-flight after launch. The presence of the launch positions also indicates that when using the current TEL the DF-31 cannot be fired from an unsurveyed launch position. The presence of the calibration markings may also indicate that the guidance system of the DF-31 must be calibrated on-site before launch. All of these characteristics indicate that the DF-31 may not be a true survivable mobile ICBM. Eliminating the launch positions would clearly cause problems for the system unless the missile can be calibrated effectively from any location. Without the ability to disperse off-road, the TELs can be located and targeted with greater ease, reducing the effectiveness of the system as a survivable deterrent. These factors alone are likely enough to drive the development of an off-road TEL for the DF-31A.
CONCLUSION
By using effective imagery analysis techniques and available open-source information, the locations of China's DF-31 launch positions within Brigade 813 have been identified with relative certainty. Locating mobile ICBM launch positions is not an easy proposition, and it has taken a significant amount of time and effort to effectively identify the locations of Brigade 813's DF-31 launch sites. However, the relative ease with which these sites were located is yet one more factor to support the development of an off-road TEL for the DF-31A. This article has focused primarily on Brigade 813's DF-31 launch facilities. Efforts to locate and identify launch positions associated with other brigades are currently underway, and the results will be made available in a companion piece to this article.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
The DF-31 and DF-31A
Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008
Nuclear Deterrence Over Taiwan
China's Missile Threat Greater Than Believed
China Reorganizes Northern Nuclear Missile Launch Sites
Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
DF-31 Initial Threat Availability
China's Military Posture
To date, some of the most elusive military-related sites inside of China have been the DF-31 ICBM garrisons and launch positions. Through careful examination and exhaustive research, the launch sites and garrisons of China's mobile ICBM fleet have been successfully identified.
MOBILE ICBM CHARACTERISTICS
When dealing with mobile ICBMs, there are a few issues to consider. First, any mobile ICBM system requires a garrison for storing TELs in peacetime. Second, the system's mobility must be considered. If the system is off-road capable, as is the case with Russia's Topol ICBM, then locating the actual launch positions becomes a wasted effort as there is simply too much area to examine. If the system is only road-mobile, however, then pre-sited launch positions may be readily identifiable as the TELs cannot travel over rough terrain to disperse into the surrounding area. The third and final point to consider is that the system will require some sort of method of deriving the precise coordinates of the launch site. Any ballistic missile requires the positional data of the launch position in order to effectively fly the proper trajectory to the impact point.
CHINESE MISSILE LAUNCH SITE DETAILS
Before setting out to locate the Chinese mobile ICBM fleet, it is important to consider examples of existing, identified mobile missile launch positions. Near Delingha in central China, many launch positions for either DF-4 or DF-21 ballistic missiles have been identified (the type of missile deployed here has been under speculation for some time).
One of the identified missile launch sites near Delingha can be seen in the image below:
The launch site is a circular concrete pad with a diameter of 70 meters. Many of these launch positions can be found in the surrounding area. All of the launch positions are connected to major roads by paved access roads, giving credibility to the fact that the DF-21 is speculated to be deployed in the area. The DF-21 TEL consists of a towed erector-launcher unit which is not off-road capable, requiring launch sites to be close to major roads allowing the TELs to disperse from garrison to the launch positions.
NANYANG ICBM DISPERSAL AREA
When setting out to track down the locations of China's DF-31 launch sites, it is important to find a credible starting point. Otherwise, the entire country must be searched, which would be an extremely difficult and time-consuming task. It is known that China's DF-31s are subordinate to the 2nd Artillery Corps, the arm of the PLA that controls China's land-based missile force. The first operational unit to equip with the DF-31 ICBM was Brigade 813. This brigade received DF-31 ICBMs as early as 1999 according to some reports, displaying them to the public during the 1999 National Day parade. A 2008 DoD report claims that less than 10 missiles are in service, however, and the test program of the DF-31 would appear to give credibility to this report as the missile has had a long and protracted development period due to technical issues. The DoD claimed that the missile had reached Initial Threat Availability in 2006, meaning that the DF-31 had managed to conduct a single successful flight test. Naming Brigade 813 as a DF-31 unit as far back as 1999 may seem a bit premature, especially given that the system was apparently only successfully tested as late as 2006. However, the 2nd Artillery Corps stood up the first DF-21 unit in 1986, with the missile being operationally deployed as early as 1991. Given that DF-31 testing began with an August 1999 launch, it is plausible that Brigade 813 was established during that time period to begin crew training on the TEL and to establish a garrison for the system.
Regardless of the actual entry date, the DF-31 is currently in service with the 2nd Artillery Corps of the PLA, and it would appear that Brigade 813 was the first unit established to operate the weapon. The only remaining fact required to locate the DF-31's launch positions is the location of Brigade 813's operational area. Open source reporting claims that Brigade 813 was initially based in Luoyang, but was relocated to Nanyang. Analysis of available imagery supports these reports.
Nanyang DF-31 Launch Sites
Nanyang is located in east-central China, approximately 850 kilometers southeast of Beijing and 180 kilometers south of Luoyang. Analysis of the surrounding area has led to the location of six DF-31 launch sites approximately 30 kilometers northwest of Nanyang. The six DF-31 launch sites can be found at the following coordinates:
33°16'33.80"N 112°20'06.49"E
33°14'23.78"N 112°17'50.82"E
33°12'46.96"N 112°18'55.43"E
33°12'02.03"N 112°18'49.17"E
33°09'44.19"N 112°15'47.01"E
33°11'48.95"N 112°18'38.92"E
The Nanyang DF-31 launch site locations can be seen in the following image:
Further evidence that these locations are DF-31 launch positions can be found in the characteristics of the DF-31 TEL itself. The DF-31's Hanyang HY4301 TEL consists of a missile launch canister mounted on a trailer which is towed by a four axle tractor. This configuration is clearly not off-road capable. That being the case, DF-31 deployed launch sites would have to be near major roads in order to facilitate dispersal of the TELs. This fact, when combined with the information that Brigade 813 is based in Nanyang, supports the conclusion that the sites identified above are in fact DF-31 ICBM launch positions.
Five of the launch sites are of a terdrop configuration. An access road connects the launch sites to a nearby main thoroughfare, allowing the road-mobile TELs to travel from garrison to the launch sites with relative ease. There appears to be a calibration marking of some sort in the center of the teardrop launch site, present at all five identified locations. This marking is likely utilized in one of two methods:
1. The TEL may have a calibration marking onboard used to line up with the center of the circle to enable calibration of the DF-31's guidance system. The importance of calibrating the missile with pre-launch coordinates was discussed previously in this article.
2. The missile tube itself may be intended to be erected directly over the circle, which may be reinforced to a greater extent in order to protect it from the exhaust gasses of the missile when it is launched. Alternatively, erecting the missile tube directly over the circle may also serve a guidance calibration function.
One of the Nanyang launch sites can be seen in the following image:
DF-31 Support Facility
A possible support facility for the deployed TELs can be found at the following coordinates: 33°11'55.92"N 112°18'35.33"E. This site features a probable administrative building of some kind, as well as a probable drive-through checkout building for deployed TELs. A possible TEL garage is also present, although the configuration does not appear to represent a drive-through structure. It is possible that this is where missile or warhead mating can occur in the field if necessary.
The support facility is also located in close proximity to two launch sites. One of the sites is the common teardrop configuration. The other site is an apparet abberation, being of circular configuration. The issue of the circular launch site will be addressed later in this article.
The Nanyang DF-31 support facility, also marked in the previous image, can be seen below:
Nanyang DF-31 Garrison Location
Two locations have been identified as potential garrison sites for Brigade 813's DF-31 ICBMs. The first location is sited approximately 10 kilometers west from the center of Nanyang, while the second location is sited approximately 30 kilometers northwest of the center of Nanyang.
The two locations can be found at the following coordinates:
33°00'44.13"N 112°24'52.49"E
33°03'53.05"N 112°12'16.70"E
The westernmost garrison location was still under construction when the image was acquired on 22 December 2003. Examination of the site within the context of a mobile ICBM base would appear to depict garages for support vehicles and equipment, and a TEL garage under construction.
The westernmost garrison site can be seen in the image below:
The easternmost garrison was imaged on 19 December 2005. Given that Brigade 813 was extablished as early as 1999 and relocated to Nanyang at some point thereafter, this is the most likely location for the DF-31 garrison. The first location would logically have been completed much earlier, especially if the launch sites were complete as of November and December 2006 when they were imaged. The easternmost garrison features what an HQ building, troop barracks, and support vehicle garages. There is also a possible TEL drive-through complex along the southwestern end of the garrison. This facility may be intended for pre-dispersal checkout, missile and/or warhead mating, or another undisclosed function. A large building along the western edge of the compond appears to be the likely location for the TEL garage. This is the only facility on the compound which a complete TEL could effectively enter and exit. A significantly taller portion of the building could also allow the TELs to be erected under cover for checkout before being dispersed. Alternatively, the TEL's launch assembly could be erected indoors to allow for the DF-31 launch tubes to be mated vertically, eliminating the need for a separate loading vehicle or system. With the launch assembly lowered and the missile tube stowed for transport, the TEL could then travel to the drive-through complex for warhead mating, although this is speculation.
The easternmost garrison site can be seen in the image below:
Western Launch Positions
The round launch site located near the support facility is clearly an aberration, given the teardrop configuration of the other five launch sites. This location could be used for TEL crew training when calibration of the missile's guidance system is not necessary (for example, when a missile is not loaded on the TEL). The fact that a round launch site is associated with the DF-31 is significant for another reason, however.
The support facility's round launch site is approximately 92 meters in diameter. Further west of the DF-31 launch area are three other launch sites, all sharing the same 92 meter diameter. These additional launch sites are located at the following coordinates:
33°17'35.95"N 111°52'48.79"E
33°15'04.30"N 111°56'40.96"E
33°11'48.49"N 111°58'03.93"E
The locations of the three launch sites can be seen in the image below:
These western launch sites appear to support a road-mobile TEL, indicating that the DF-31 may be their intended user. They are all connected to main thoroughfares via an access road, similar to the launch sites found further east. These launch sites seem to be incomplete and appear to lack concrete surfaces.
One of the western launch sites can be seen in the image below:
The obvious question is whether these launch sites are also associated with the DF-31. Given that 12 missiles has been mentioned in open-source reporting as the typical strength of a missile battalion in the 2nd Artillery Corps, it is possible that they are also subordinate to Brigade 813. These launch sites were imaged in their apparently incomplete state on 21 August 2007. DoD reporting suggests that less than 10 DF-31 ICBMs were in service as of 2008, implying that Brigade 813 was not at full strength. Given that information, it is likely that these sites were being constructed as Brigade 813 was being brought to full strength. They may have been left over from a previous ballistic missile unit (recall the similar layout of the Delingha launch site described above) and are being modified to support the DF-31. Such modifications may include strengthening the pads to support the launch of the DF-31, and possibly adding a calibration marking similar to those seen at the eastern teardrop-shaped launch sites. Alternatively, these launch sites may be related to the DF-31A, which is reported to use a new TEL. A new TEL may not be compatible with the launch sites found to the east, or the DF-31A may simply be more advanced, not requiring an off-board calibration source to acquire pre-launch coordinates.
It has been reported, however, that the TEL for the DF-31A may be an off-road capable vehicle. These launch sites appear to be configured to support a road-mobile vehicle, as mentioned above. Given that Brigade 813 will likely support a total of 12 TELs, and that they are not off-road capable, it is likely that these launch positions are in fact intended to support the DF-31 and not the DF-31A or some other missile system. This also indicates that there are a further three launch positions that have yet to be identified in the available imagery. The reason for the differing launch site configurations will remain a mystery for the present time. Until the mystery is solved, there will always be the question of whether or not the DF-31A is associated with Brigade 813 and the western launch positions. Based on the fact that the western sites were imaged in August of 2007 and that no flight test has been reported for the DF-31A, it remains the opinion of the author that the western sites support Nanyang's DF-31 force. Additionally, the DF-31A has not been associated with Brigade 813 in any open-source reporting.
The complete area of operations for Brigade 813, along with the two possible garrison locations (the western garrison may in fact be under construction to support the western launch positions), can be seen in the image below. Launch sites are marked as black triangles inside of red areas denoting the area directly surrounding the launch sites.
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
The eastern launch positions do allow an examination of the technical characteristics of the DF-31 ICBM. Each launch site is oriented on a different azimuth, implying that the DF-31 may change aximuth in-flight after launch. The presence of the launch positions also indicates that when using the current TEL the DF-31 cannot be fired from an unsurveyed launch position. The presence of the calibration markings may also indicate that the guidance system of the DF-31 must be calibrated on-site before launch. All of these characteristics indicate that the DF-31 may not be a true survivable mobile ICBM. Eliminating the launch positions would clearly cause problems for the system unless the missile can be calibrated effectively from any location. Without the ability to disperse off-road, the TELs can be located and targeted with greater ease, reducing the effectiveness of the system as a survivable deterrent. These factors alone are likely enough to drive the development of an off-road TEL for the DF-31A.
CONCLUSION
By using effective imagery analysis techniques and available open-source information, the locations of China's DF-31 launch positions within Brigade 813 have been identified with relative certainty. Locating mobile ICBM launch positions is not an easy proposition, and it has taken a significant amount of time and effort to effectively identify the locations of Brigade 813's DF-31 launch sites. However, the relative ease with which these sites were located is yet one more factor to support the development of an off-road TEL for the DF-31A. This article has focused primarily on Brigade 813's DF-31 launch facilities. Efforts to locate and identify launch positions associated with other brigades are currently underway, and the results will be made available in a companion piece to this article.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
The DF-31 and DF-31A
Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008
Nuclear Deterrence Over Taiwan
China's Missile Threat Greater Than Believed
China Reorganizes Northern Nuclear Missile Launch Sites
Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
DF-31 Initial Threat Availability
China's Military Posture
6 comments:
Excellent post as always and great source of information its hard to find anywhere else on internet.
I have one idea on the theme for Forthcoming Articles.
-> decoys for ICBM/SLBM , theirs realibility, what types exists, ways of using them etc ...
I tried to search a bit about Kaktus and Krot (active radar jammer)and about some new versions recently showed in Moscow but there is little or no information about such systems and any spacs about theirs efficiency.
Hope you will accept it.
Until next reading.
Vitkor
Victor, in the Iranian context, you're correct to point out the use of ballistic missile decoys, examples of which have turned up at past military parades in Tehran.
I don' t know if DF 31 ICBM is operational.It ' s very important for China to have solid propellant ICBM.There is a rumor that he first successful flight test was only carried out in September 2006. It ' s also difficult to have information about the developpement of Julang 2 ICBMs and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Type 094.I don' t know when Indian Surya ICBM will be operational.
Near the northern launch pad, there seem to be something that looks like a trailer about the same length as DF-31 TEL.
33°16'23.03"N
112°19'32.08"E
I see what you're looking at, but I don't think it's a TEL. Looks like part of the road to me.
Hi SOC!
The support facility still under construction includes a long vehicle 33° 3'46.21"N 112°12'15.95"E - could this be a DF-31 TEL ?
Post a Comment