INTRODUCTION
Russia is a vast nation, encompassing a sizeable portion of two continents. Many areas in Russia cannot be viewed in sufficient resolution to identify any SAM assets present. As such, this article is intended to provide an overview of currently identified assets, and is not intended to be representative of the entire Russian SAM network. It is known, for example, that modern SAM systems have been deployed to various positions around Moscow that were once home to S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) batteries. A large number of these former S-25 positions are not currently visible in high resolution, and may be home to SAM systems which cannot be identified due to the lack of available imagery. The SAM systems which have been identified do, however, provide valuable insight into Russian SAM deployment strategies, allowing the overall SAM network to be analyzed even if all of the deployed assets cannot be located.
EW ASSETS
EW and GCI
Russia relies on a plethora of radar systems to provide early warning (EW) coverage of its territory. The most common systems are variants of the P-12 (SPOON REST), P-14 (TALL KING), and P-35/37 (BAR LOCK). These radars all have ranges exceeding 300 kilometers and can be found in various locations. They are most commonly deployed at airfields to perform air traffic control functions, or at dedicated EW facilities to monitor assigned airspace sectors. EW radars will often be integrated with the command and control networks of SAM systems in their vicinity to provide EW support for the organic EW radars deployed with the SAM units themselves.
Some of these deployed EW sites are situated on former SAM sites which no longer contain active missile batteries. Deploying EW assets in this fashion allows them to take advantage of the hardened revetments already in place, adding a degree of protection for the radar systems. Another method used to protect the often fragile sensor arrays of deployed EW radars is to mount the radar systems inside of protective domes. This is a common feature found in EW sites deployed in coastal regions or in regions where long term exposure to environmental conditions could damage the sensor arrays.
A representative Russian EW site can be seen in the image below:
Dual Purpose
The 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radar system is unique in the Russian air defense network. The 36D6 is a capable EW radar and as such can be found at dedicated EW sites throughout Russia. The 36D6 is also capable of interfacing with the S-300P family of strategic SAM systems to provide target track data for the engagement radar. This makes 36D6 locations particularly important. Not only can the 36D6 provide EW data for the overall network, but locations hosting a 36D6 can be augmented with S-300P series SAM systems in a time of crisis. Any 36D6 radar site should therefore be considered a potential S-300P deployment site. While Russia has not co-located 36D6 radar assets with deployed S-300P series batteries to a great degree at the present time, with only two S-300P series batteries near Moscow enjoying this advantage, nations such as China have done so to maximize the situational awareness of deployed S-300P series batteries, highlighting the potential for the same practice to be exploited by the Russian air defense network should the need arise. Analysts will note that while Russian 36D6 radar systems are not generally co-located with S-300P series batteries, they are often located in the same general area as these SAM positions, indicating that they may be performing an EW task for the SAM batteries rather than a pure EW function.
A representative Russian 36D6 site can be seen in the image below:
A representative Russian combined 36D6 and EW site can be seen in the image below:
Battle Management
The primary battle management radar employed by the Russian air defense network is the 5N64/64N6 (BIG BIRD) series. These are dedicated battle management radars designed to control deployed S-300P series SAM assets. 5N64 or 64N6 radar systems are deployed to control multiple S-300P series strategic SAM systems, providing them with target track data to support engagements. 5N64 and 64N6 radars are not deployed separately as part of the overall EW network, making their identification an indicator that S-300P series SAM assets are present in the area. As it cannot be determined which variant is deployed using the available imagery, the battle management radars will be identified as 64N6 sites throughout this article. The majority of these radars are likely the 64N6 variant, but older 5N64 radars may still be in use to support the older variants of the S-300P series.
A representative 64N6 battle management site can be seen in the following image. This site is important for two reasons. First, it is an excellent image of a 64N6 radar system, with the radar array's shadow clearly showing the characteristic fore and aft feedhorn assemblies used on the 64N6's radar array. Secondly, this system is co-located with an S-300P garrison. Both the presence of the 64N6 radar and the S-300P garrison indicate that there are operational S-300P series batteries in the area. However, no S-300P series batteries have been identified in the area, highlighting the fact that there are likely a good deal of SAM batteries operating in Russia that have yet to be identified.
AIR DEFENSE ASSETS
S-300P Series
The primary strategic SAM systems employed by the Russian air defense network are variants of the S-300P family. The S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE), S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE), and S-300PM (SA-20A GARGOYLE) are all widely deployed throughout the nation. The S-300P series SAM systems are all mobile, able to be redeployed should the need arise, allowing them to be constantly relocated to complicate targeting. The engagement ranges are as follows: S-300PT, 47 km; S-300PS, 90 km; and S-300PM, 150 km. Detailed information regarding the S-300P series of SAM systems can be found here.
Legacy Systems
Very few legacy Soviet-era strategic SAM systems are still found active inside of Russia. There is a single active S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) battery still operational in Kaliningrad, and what appear to be a small number of S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) batteries deployed on the island of Novaya Zemlya. What appear to be active S-75 and S-125 (SA-3 GOA) batteries found at the Ashuluk SAM Training Range are likely in place to serve either the training needs of Russian allies still operating these systems, or to serve as launch platforms for specially modified missiles designed to serve as targets for more modern systems.
Tactical SAMs
Tactical SAM systems are not commonly employed as part of the overall Russian air defense network. These tactical systems, such as the S-300V (SA-12 GLADIATOR/GIANT) or 9K37 (SA-11 GADFLY), are designed to be deployed in support of Russian army maneuver formations to provide mobile air defense. Some of these systems can, however, be located deployed at prepared sites, such as the S-300V battery deployed near Briobidzhan and seen in the image below. As such, given that these systems can provide air defense in their region, they are included here. Identified tactical SAM garrisons are also included as these systems could potentially also be deployed in a quasi-strategic manner to defend key facilities in their vicinity.
GENERAL LAYOUT
Russia's strategic air defense network is arranged to defend key military sites, industrial areas, and population centers. Currently deployed assets are consolidated in the vicinity of these locations to provide overlapping surveillance zones and fields of fire, increasing the network's defensive effectiveness.
Strategic SAM assets were initially subordinate to the Troops of Air Defense (PVO). With the reorganization under Yeltsin, the Russian Air Force absorbed the PVO and gained control of the strategic SAM force. Tactical SAM systems remain controlled by the Russian Army. Many tactical SAM systems are often deployed at fixed sites to provide air defense of certain areas, and as such will be included here even though they are not necessarily integrated with the strategic SAM network.
Russia is presently divided into six miltary zones, which can be seen in the image below. These military zones will be analyzed separately to provide a more detailed look at the currently deployed air defense assets therein.
Within each of these military zones, numerous air defense sites and support facilities can be identified. Identification of active air defense sites is obviously important to provide a general image of the air defense capabilities of the zone in question. Support facilities, however, are also very significant and can often provide valuable information regarding the zone's overall potential.
Most strategic SAM sites are supported by SAM garrisons housing additional equipment and often providing maintenance facilities for deployed units. These garrisons can often provide valuable information regarding the potential future strength of an air defense zone during a time of conflict. Consider the S-300P garrison near Vsevolodovo, on the outskirts of Moscow, seen in the image below.
This garrison is likely positioned to support many of the S-300PS and S-300PM batteries defending Moscow. A close examination of the equipment visible on the grounds of the facility indicates that there may be up to three S-300P series batteries in-garrison available for deployment. Being able to determine the amount of SAM equipment in-garrison provides an analyst with a rough concept of the amount of additional batteries which may be available for deployment during a time of increased tensions. This also allows an analyst to make a differentiation between peacetime and potential wartime postures for an air defense network. In the case of Russia, examination of the various SAM garrisons throughout the nation does indicate that there are a substantial number of complete batteries available for deployment should the need arise. Alternatively this provides an idea of the number of batteries potentially available for resale to foreign clients. As S-400 units replace older S-300PS and S-300PM batteries throughout Russia, for example, these older S-300P series batteries, including those held in garrison, could be available for export at a reduced rate, making them attractive options for nations like Syria or Iran who desire to upgrade their air defense networks.
Close examination of SAM garrisons and facilities also provides insight into the types of systems which could be available for deployment in a given area. The SAM garrison near Strugi-Krasnye, for example, houses S-300V components. While there are no deployed S-300V batteries identified in the area, the presence of the components at the garrison indicates that the system could be deployed in the region and potentially represents a threat to be considered.
SYMBOLOGY
The following icons will be used to depict air defense related sites within Russia:
Squares: facilities such as garrisons, test and training centers
Diamonds: EW radar sites, including 36D6 and 64N6 radar sites
Triangles: SAM sites
The icons will be color coded as follows:
Dark red: S-75
Bright red: S-300P series, S-300V, 64N6 battle management radar
Dark blue: general EW radar, 36D6 EW radar
Bright blue: S-125
Faded green: 9K37
Purple: S-200
White: an unoccupied EW radar or SAM location
Brown: a SAM garrison
Engagement zones will match the color of the icon for their respective SAM system with the exception of the 64N6 battle management radar. The 64N6 will have a blue range ring but a red icon, denoting its EW function as well as its relation to the S-300P series SAM systems.
WESTERN ZONE
The Western Zone is responsible for defense of Russia's western-most region, as well as capital area air defense of Moscow. As such, it is one of the most heavily defended zones found in Russia. Numerous advanced SAM systems are present, making the airspace above Moscow potentially the most heavily defended airspace in the world.
EW Sites
Nine EW sites provide coverage for the Western Zone. The bulk of these sites are found in the western half of the zone, situated to provide coverage of the border regions. The locations of these EW sites can be seen in the image below:
36D6 Sites
Nine 36D6 EW sites provide additional EW coverage for the Western Zone. Half of these facilities are situated to potentially support S-300PS and S-300PM batteries in the region as well. As can be seen in the image below, the 36D6 sites are able to provide coverage of roughly two thirds of the Western Zone:
64N6 Sites
Ten 64N6 sites provide battle management for the S-300PS and S-300PM batteries deployed in the Western Zone. The majority of these systems are situated around Moscow, to support the large number of SAM batteries present providing defense of the Russian capital. The locations and coverage of the 64N6 sites can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Air defense for the Western Zone is provided by thirteen S-300PM and two S-300PS batteries. Many of the batteries ringing Moscow are in residence at former S-25 positions. While a solitary S-300PS battery is deployed near Voronezh, the bulk of the attention in the Western Zone has been given to defending Moscow. The Moscow air defense network also features the majority of the most modern S-300PM variants found in Russia. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries are depicted in the image below:
It is known that two S-400 (SA-21) batteries have been deployed around Moscow, with the first battery being emplaced near Elektrostal. Neither of these batteries have appeared in available imagery, however, and as such they are not included here. It should be mentioned, however, that the S-400 will be replacing S-300P series batteries around Moscow and eventually throughout Russia, providing a significant increase in capability.
Inactive Sites
A total of eighty four inactive SAM sites are present in the Western Zone. Half of these are former S-25 positions, some of which may be home to unlocated S-300P series batteries which cannot be identified due to the imagery lacking sufficient resolution in those areas. Eleven S-75 and fifteen SAM sites are also present scattered throughout the area. Sixteen prepared S-300P sites can also be located. These sites, along with the other inactive sites, could be used to redeploy S-300PS and S-300PM batteries during a time of conflict, complicating targeting of these assets. They may also be used to deploy S-300P series batteries held in storage at the SAM garrisons in the area to bolster the defense of the Western Zone should the need arise.
The locations of the inactive SAM sites found in the Western Zone can be seen in the image below:
Facilities
Eleven facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Western Zone. There are six S-300P series SAM garrisons, three SAM garrisons, one SAM training facility, and one radar test facility. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
Moscow
Given the importance placed on defending Moscow, there are a number of EW sites, SAM sites and support facilities located in close proximity around the Russian capital. In order to better illustrate their position in relation to one another, the image below is provided:
NORTHWESTERN ZONE
The Northwestern Zone encompasses a large swath of terrain. Assets deployed in the Northwestern Zone are situated to defend many strategically significant locations, such as the city of St. Petersburg and the Russian Northern Fleet facilities along the Kola Peninsula. Many of these assets also serve an important function in a strategic environment; they would represent a significant portion of the Russian EW and SAM network defending against incoming American nuclear strike aircraft approaching over the North Pole.
EW Sites
Twenty seven EW sites, one of which is unoccupied in available imagery, provide coverage for the Northwestern Zone. Roughly a third of these sites are positioned along the Kola Peninsula to provide EW coverage for the Russian Northern Fleet's facilities and to impart GCI support for interceptor aircraft based there. The locations of these EW sites can be seen in the image below:
36D6 Sites
Nine 36D6 EW sites provide additional EW coverage for the Northwestern Zone. Six of these facilities are situated to potentially support S-300PS and S-300PM batteries surrounding St. Petersburg, with a further site situated to potentially support S-300PT and S-300PM batteries on the Kola Peninsula. The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below:
64N6 Sites
Four 64N6 sites provide battle management for the S-300P series batteries deployed in the Northwestern Zone. Three of these systems are situated around St. Petersburg in support of S-300P series batteries in the area. The locations and coverage of the 64N6 sites can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Air defense for the Northwestern Zone is provided by three S-75 batteries, four S-300PT batteries, six S-300PS batteries, and five S-300PM batteries. The bulk of the S-300P series batteries are split between St. Petersburg and the Kola Peninsula, with three S-300PT batteries deployed to defend Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries are depicted in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Seventy nine inactive SAM sites are present in the Northwestern Zone. There are thirty nine S-75 sites, 10 S-125 sites, 17 S-200 sites, 10 S-300P series sites, and three 5V11 sites. Many of these former SAM sites can be found in areas no longer defended by active SAM batteries, providing insight into Cold War era deploment strategies. The locations of these inactive SAM sites can be seen in the image below:
Facilities
Seven facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Northwestern Zone. There are three S-300P series SAM garrisons, three SAM garrisons, and one EW training facility. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
St. Petersburg and the Kola Peninsula
A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities surrounding St. Petersburg is provided below:
The Kola Peninsula is one of the most important strategic locations in the Northwestern Zone, providing the home to Russia's Northern Fleet and a significant portion of the sea-borne nuclear deterrent force. A closer view of the strategic air defense facilities in the area is provided in the image below:
SOUTHWESTERN ZONE
The Southwestern Zone is an important zone in terms of air defense for Russia. The zone provides surveillance and SAM coverage of Russia's southwestern flank bordering the Black Sea. Also, this zone is likely responsible for providing the air defense units deployed to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in support of Russia's military activities there.
EW Sites
Twenty eight EW sites provide coverage for the Southwestern Zone. These sites are scattered throughout the zone to provide coverage over the bulk of the territory. The locations of these EW sites can be seen in the image below:
36D6 and 64N6 Sites
Eight 36D6 and one 64N6 radar sites provide additional air surveillance of the Southwestern Zone, as well as battle management functions for S-300P series batteries in the area. The majority of the 36D6 radar sites are positioned in the western half of the zone to allow for increased coverage of the border region with the Ukraine and the offshore airspace over the Black Sea. The locations and coverage zones of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Three S-300PM SAM batteries provide air defense for the Southwestern Zone. Two of these batteries are positioned to defend the area bordering the Black Sea, providing coverage of the port facility at Novorossiysk as well. The third battery is sited to defend Rostov-on-Don. This third battery is significant insofar as that there is no identified 64N6 radar in the area, indicating that the battle management complex is likely sited in a region not currently covered in sufficient resolution to facilitate identification. The locations and engagement zones of these three S-300PM batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Fifty inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Southwestern Zone. There are thirty one S-75 sites, seven S-125 sites, seven S-200 sites, and five S-300P series sites. The bulk of these sites are situated around Rostov-on-Don and Volgograd, areas which no longer maintain a significant SAM presence. The locations of these inactive SAM sites can be seen in the image below:
CENTRAL ASIAN ZONE
The Central Asian Zone provides air defense for a significant portion of Russia's interior, concentrating on the western half of the interior. As the interior of the nation is less vulnerable to aerial assault, assets contained herein are less capable and more dispersed throughout the territory.
EW Sites
Fourteen EW sites provide surveillance and GCI support capabilities for the Central Asian Zone. These sites are primarily situated near populated areas and airfields. Their locations can be seen in the iamge below:
36D6 and 64N6 Sites
Three 36D6 and three 64N6 radar facilities provide expanded EW coverage and battle management support for the Central Asian Zone's air defense systems. Two of the 64N6 battle management radar sites are situated near the zone's deployed S-300P series batteries, with the third being the aforementioned example sited near Saratov where no S-300P series batteries have been identified as of yet. The locations and coverage zones of these radar assets can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Three S-300PS batteries provide the bulk of the active air defense coverage for the Central Asian Zone. These batteries are positioned to defend Samara and Ekaterinburg. An S-300V garrison at Orenburg is a potential source of expanded air defense for the region. The locations and engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Numerous inactive SAM sites can be found scattered throughout the Central Asian Zone. Seventeen S-75 sites, fifteen S-200 sites, and two S-300P sites have been identified. Their locations can be seen in the image below:
Facilities
Five facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Central Asian Zone. These facilities consist of an S-300P garrison, the aforementioned S-300V garrison, one SAM garrison, one SAM training range, and one SAM garrison/training range combined facility. With the exception of the S-300P garrison near Saratov, the rest of the facilities are consolidated around Orenburg. This potentially indicates that Orenburg is a significant training location for tactical SAM units in the area and possibly throughout Russia as well. Strategic SAM systems likely do not train at these facilities as they employ two dedicated facilities in Russia, but tactical SAM systems could make use of the facilities with greater ease due to their shorter range. Examination of the training ranges does indicate that they have been used by tracked vehicles with regularity, providing further evidence that tactical SAM units are the primary users of these facilities. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
SIBERIAN ZONE
The Siberian Zone provides air defense for the eastern portion of Russia's interior. As with the Central Asian Zone, assets contained herein are less capable and more dispersed throughout the territory when compared to other zones throughout Russia.
EW Sites
Twenty EW sites provide air surveillance for the Siberian Zone. One of these sites was inactive when imaged, containing no identifiable air surveillance equipment. While half of these locations have been scattered throughout the zone, there is a concentration of nine facilities in the southeastern quadrant providing air surveillance along the border with China. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
36D6 and 64N6 Sites
One 36D6 radar and one 64N6 battle management radar provide additional EW coverage for the Siberian Zone. The 64N6 facility is located near Irkutsk to support an S-300PS battery in the area, and two more 64N6 facilities are likely unlocated near Achinsk and Novosibirsk given the presence of S-300P series batteries in these areas. The locations and coverage zones of the identified 36D6 and 64N6 radars can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Two S-300PT batteries and two S-300PS batteries comprise the identified air defense assets deployed in the Siberian Zone. These batteries are positioned to provide defense of Achinsk, Irkutsk, and Novosibirsk. The locations and engagement zones of these SAM batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Forty inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Siberian Zone. Twenty S-75 sites, one S-125 site, fifteen S-200 sites, and four S-300P sites have been located in the region. The locations of these sites can be seen in the image below:
Facilities
Three support facilities, comprised of one S-300P garrison, one 9K37 garrison, and one EW training facility, have been identified in the Siberian Zone. The S-300P garrison is centrally located and could potentially support the entire zone. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
FAR EASTERN ZONE
EW Sites
Forty one EW sites, two of which were inactive when imaged, provide air surveillance for the Far Eastern Zone. These facilities are primarily consolidated in three strategically significant areas: the northeast, near Alaska, the southeast, near Vladivostok, and the far east, on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
36D6, 64N6, and 9S18M1 Sites
Three 36D6 sites, three 64N6 sites, and one 9S18M1 site are located in the Far Eastern Zone. The 64N6 and 9S18M1 sites provide support to specific SAM units, with the 64N6 sites providing battle management support for assigned S-300PS batteries and the 9S18M1 site providing EW support to a deployed 9K37 battery in the region. There is likely an unlocated 64N6 located near Vladivostok, denoted by the presence of S-300PS batteries in the area. The locations and coverage zones of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Eleven active SAM batteries provide air defense for the Far Eastern Zone. Nine of these batteries are equipped with S-300PS SAM systems and defend naval facilities at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, as well as other key locations in the region. One S-300V and one 9K37 battery have also been identified deployed at prepared sites in the region as well. The locations and engagement zones of the active SAM batteries in the region can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Sixty nine inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Far Eastern Zone. These locations consist of forty two S-75 sites, six S-125 sites, one 2K12 site, eight S-200 sites, one 9K37 site, and eleven S-300P sites. The locations of these sites can be seen in the image below. Interestingly, many of these facilities have been identified on the island of Sakhalin, a location which has not seen any active SAM batteries deployed to the region. This is further evidence of the changing priorities of Russian air defense.
Facilities
Six facilities supporting air defense units in the region have been identified in the Far Eastern Zone. There are four S-300P garrisons, one 9K37 garrison, and an S-300V garrison. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
Vladivostok and the Kamchatka Peninsula
A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities in the region surrounding Vladivostok is provided below:
A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities on the Kola Peninsula near Petropavlovsk, home of the Russian Pacific Fleet's SSBN force, can be seen in the image below:
KALININGRAD
The Kaliningrad autonomous region, located to the west of Russia along the Baltic sea, possesses numerous air defense units but is not tecnhically part of the Russian strategic air defense network. Rather, assets in this region are dedicated to the air defense of Kaliningrad and may not be integrated within the overall Russian air defense network due to the fact that Kaliningrad is geographically separated from the rest of Russia.
EW, 36D6, and 64N6 Sites
Two EW sites, four 36D6 radar sites, and one 64N6 battle management radar can be found in Kaliningrad. Their locations and coverage zones can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Air defense of Kaliningrad is provided by one S-200 battery, the last such battery in active service with the Russian military, and five S-300PS batteries. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Six S-75 sites, one S-125 site, one 2K12 site, and three S-300P sites make up the inactive SAM sites located within Kaliningrad. The locations of these sites, as well as the aforementioned radar and SAM positions, can be seen in the image below. Also provided is the location of an S-300P garrison in the area.
For more information regarding the strategic SAM defenses of Kaliningrad, click here.
SPECIAL FACILITIES
There are eight facilities within Russia which provide test and training services for the Russian strategic SAM network.
Kapustin Yar, located in the Southwestern Zone, is the primary test facility for Russian strategic SAM systems. Ashuluk, also in the Southwestern Zone, and Telemba, in the Siberian Zone, provide training ranges for long-range strategic SAM systems. While Kapustin Yar and Telemba are not visible in sufficient resolution to make any significant analysis of their facilities, Ashuluk can be viewed in great detail. More information on these three facilities can be found here. An image of the facilities at Ashuluk is provided below for illustrative purposes:
Two EW training facilities and three generic SAM training facilities have also been located and are mentioned above in their respective zones. EW training facilities are easily identified thanks to the presence of EW radar systems in a location which precludes their use as active surveillance centers. For illustrative purposes, an image of the EW training center near St. Petersburg is provided below. Close examination will reveal that the radar systems are not mounted on raised berms to facilitate operational use, indicating that they would be hampered by structures and vegetation in the area. As these systems cannot be employed operationally but appear to be deployed in an operational fashion, this is likely a training facility and has been classified as such.
OVERALL TOTALS
Nearly seven hundred air defense related facilities have been identified in Russia and Kaliningrad. Including the sites found in Kaliningrad and along the Ashuluk training range, the total numbers are broken down as follows:
EW sites: 140
36D6 radar sites: 38
64N6 battle management radar sites: 23
9S18M1 radar sites: 1
Active S-75 sites: 4
Active S-125 sites: 1
Active S-200 sites: 1
Active 9K37 sites: 1
Active S-300V sites: 1
Active S-300PT sites: 6
Active S-300PS sites: 27
Active S-300PM sites: 21
Support facilities: 41
Inactive S-25 sites: 42
Inactive S-75 sites: 175
Inactive S-125 sites: 27
Inactive 2K12 sites: 2
Inactive S-200 sites: 78
Inactive 9K37 sites: 1
Inactive S-300P sites: 53
Inactive Dal sites: 3
LIMITATIONS
The primary limitation of the Russian air defense network is one of volume. There is simply too much airspace to ensure contiguous coverage of the entire nation. As such, there are significant gaps in coverage which could be exploited by a potential adversary. Consider the SAM engagement ranges in western Russia, as depicted in the following image:
With the placement of SAM batteries to defend strategic locations, there are significant areas where enemy aircraft could enter into Russian airspace without being threatened by an identified SAM system. While it is true that a strike package would still face a significant SAM threat when nearing a target area, not having to deal with SAM batteries enroute will result in more aircraft being available to prosecute the target.
While the SAM network's coverage is limited, the EW network coverage is robust. As seen in the image below, nearly the entire border region, as well as most of the potential target areas, are covered by the identified 36D6 and 64N6 radar systems. This does not take into account other EW assets such as the P-35/37 series, which would only add to the available EW coverage. Such a robust and overlapping EW network would likely force a strike package to employ either significant EW support, thereby giving away away its position, or a low level ingress, thereby reducing its range and potentially removing a great deal of potential strategic targets from threat of engagement.
The dark horses of the Russian SAM network are the tactical SAM batteries and potentially unlocated S-300P series batteries, having exploited their significant mobility to relocate along likely ingress routes. These mobile SAM systems could potentially be deployed to maximize their coverage, exploiting both prepared, inactive sites and unsurveyed field deployment locations. SAM batteries held in reserve such as those S-300P series batteries identified in garrison also represent a significant threat to be deployed during a time of crisis and would have to be carefully tracked in order to determine their final deployment positions.
At the end of the day, it is unlikely that Russia would be able to effectively deploy enough strategic SAM batteries to mount a contiguous defense of both its borders and the strategic targets likely to be struck during a time of conflict. The overwhelming amount of airspace present would make this a prohibitively expensive endeavour.
Furthermore, even if an attempt was made to mount this type of barrier air defense, it is likely that the deployed assets would not have sufficient overlapping coverage to deny an inbound strike package access to Russian airspace should a small number of SAM systems be incapacitated or destroyed. Fortunately for Russia, however, there are two other options present which help to mitigate these limitations.
CIS AIR DEFENSE
One solution available to Russian military forces in a time of conflict is the presence of the CIS air defense network. The CIS air defense network is an integrated cooperative involving the air defense forces of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The combined air defense forces of these nations provide an expanded air defense network along the periphery of Russia.
Continuing with the previous example of a strike package attempting to penetrate into western Russia, consider the presence of multiple 36D6 and 64N6 radar sites in Belarus and the Ukraine, as well as those deployed by Russia in Kaliningrad. These sites provide contiguous coverage along the western approaches to Russia from St. Petersburg in the north to the Georgian border in the south. Overlapping coverage provides an extremely well monitored air defense zone reaching into Poland and the majority of the Black Sea. This would severely impede the prospects of an inbound strike package successfully evading detection, allowing air defense assets within Russia to be brought to full readiness in anticipation of an aerial attack.
The coverage of 36D6 and 64N6 radar systems found in the western portion of the CIS air defense network can be seen in the image below:
Belarus and the Ukraine do not only offer air surveillance capabilities to the CIS air defense network. Multiple S-125, S-200, and S-300P series SAM batteries are also present, providing an additional layer of protection for western Russia. These SAM batteries do not provide complete coverage of the western approaches to Russia, as they are primarily deployed in accordance with the air defense requirements of their users, but they do provide yet another complication for an inbound strike package. Furthermore, there remains the chance, as with Russia, that many of the S-300P series SAM batteries could be redeployed to maximize their effectiveness. Most of the S-300P series SAM batteries in Belarus and the Ukraine are consolidated to defend key military and industrial centers and could be relocated to a degree without compromising the defensive posture at those locations.
The SAM coverage found in the western portion of the CIS air defense network, including those systems sited in Kaliningrad, can be seen in the image below:
THE AIR ELEMENT
No discussion of strategic air defense in Russia would be complete without mentioning the MiG-31 (FOXHOUND). As noted above, there are significant gaps in the SAM coverage throughout the nation. The MiG-31 is a strategic interceptor tasked with defending the periphery of Russia, and provides the ability to cover far more territory than a small number of SAM batteries. There are currently seven active MiG-31 units inside of Russia. With a combat radius of between 720 kilometers at Mach 2.35 and 1250 kilometers at Mach 0.8, the MiG-31 is well suited for patrolling those areas in Russia lacking sufficient ground-based air defense. Four aircraft can effectively monitor and cooperatively engage targets in a 1600 kilometer wide swath of airspace thanks to the presence of advanced datalinking systems allowing target data to be passed between the interceptors.
MiG-31 interceptors can be supported by A-50 (MAINSTAY) AEW&C aircraft based at Ivanovo. These aircraft can operate as airborne GCI platforms to vector MiG-31s and other air combat aircraft towards targets outside the range of the fighters' radar systems. Alternatively the A-50 can be used to vector MiG-31s towards targets while the MiG-31 closes passively with its Zaslon fire control radar shut off to deny an enemy aircraft an RWR indication giving away the MiG-31's presence. The A-50 can also be used as an airborne EW platform, monitoring airspace in regions where EW coverage is limited or non-existant.
Both the A-50 and MiG-31 may have their range extended and their loiter time increased by inflight refueling from Il-78 (MIDAS) tankers. The only limitation with this practice is the fact that Russia's Il-78 fleet is relatively small, and as such is primarily tasked to support strategic aviation units operating nuclear bombers. The long range and endurance capability of both the MiG-31 and A-50, coupled with the presence of multiple airfields and staging locations along the northern Russian coast and the Kola Peninsula allow these assets to be forward deployed in order to take advantage of their range capabilities in regions where their presence is required.
CONCLUSION
The Russian strategic air defense network possesses some of the most advanced weapon systems found anywhere in the world. Despite the fact that at first glance there are many significant coverage gaps in the SAM network, the presence of numerous systems held in garrison as well as the incorporation of an air element into the strategic air defense system makes Russian airspace arguably the most heavily defended airspace found anywhere in the world. An analyst would do well to remember that numbers and images do not tell the entire story; were every in-garrison system to be deployed, the Russian air defense network would surely represent a significant deterrent to any aerial incursion into sovereign Russian airspace, a view that is not necessarily evident at first glance when only evaluating the identified deployed assets.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
The locations, range rings, zone borders, and other placemarks used to create this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark here. Also included are the locations of relevant strategic aviation units discussed herein.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss this feauture at the IMINT & Analysis forum discussion thread found here.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
CIS Air Defense
Russia is a vast nation, encompassing a sizeable portion of two continents. Many areas in Russia cannot be viewed in sufficient resolution to identify any SAM assets present. As such, this article is intended to provide an overview of currently identified assets, and is not intended to be representative of the entire Russian SAM network. It is known, for example, that modern SAM systems have been deployed to various positions around Moscow that were once home to S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) batteries. A large number of these former S-25 positions are not currently visible in high resolution, and may be home to SAM systems which cannot be identified due to the lack of available imagery. The SAM systems which have been identified do, however, provide valuable insight into Russian SAM deployment strategies, allowing the overall SAM network to be analyzed even if all of the deployed assets cannot be located.
EW ASSETS
EW and GCI
Russia relies on a plethora of radar systems to provide early warning (EW) coverage of its territory. The most common systems are variants of the P-12 (SPOON REST), P-14 (TALL KING), and P-35/37 (BAR LOCK). These radars all have ranges exceeding 300 kilometers and can be found in various locations. They are most commonly deployed at airfields to perform air traffic control functions, or at dedicated EW facilities to monitor assigned airspace sectors. EW radars will often be integrated with the command and control networks of SAM systems in their vicinity to provide EW support for the organic EW radars deployed with the SAM units themselves.
Some of these deployed EW sites are situated on former SAM sites which no longer contain active missile batteries. Deploying EW assets in this fashion allows them to take advantage of the hardened revetments already in place, adding a degree of protection for the radar systems. Another method used to protect the often fragile sensor arrays of deployed EW radars is to mount the radar systems inside of protective domes. This is a common feature found in EW sites deployed in coastal regions or in regions where long term exposure to environmental conditions could damage the sensor arrays.
A representative Russian EW site can be seen in the image below:
Dual Purpose
The 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radar system is unique in the Russian air defense network. The 36D6 is a capable EW radar and as such can be found at dedicated EW sites throughout Russia. The 36D6 is also capable of interfacing with the S-300P family of strategic SAM systems to provide target track data for the engagement radar. This makes 36D6 locations particularly important. Not only can the 36D6 provide EW data for the overall network, but locations hosting a 36D6 can be augmented with S-300P series SAM systems in a time of crisis. Any 36D6 radar site should therefore be considered a potential S-300P deployment site. While Russia has not co-located 36D6 radar assets with deployed S-300P series batteries to a great degree at the present time, with only two S-300P series batteries near Moscow enjoying this advantage, nations such as China have done so to maximize the situational awareness of deployed S-300P series batteries, highlighting the potential for the same practice to be exploited by the Russian air defense network should the need arise. Analysts will note that while Russian 36D6 radar systems are not generally co-located with S-300P series batteries, they are often located in the same general area as these SAM positions, indicating that they may be performing an EW task for the SAM batteries rather than a pure EW function.
A representative Russian 36D6 site can be seen in the image below:
A representative Russian combined 36D6 and EW site can be seen in the image below:
Battle Management
The primary battle management radar employed by the Russian air defense network is the 5N64/64N6 (BIG BIRD) series. These are dedicated battle management radars designed to control deployed S-300P series SAM assets. 5N64 or 64N6 radar systems are deployed to control multiple S-300P series strategic SAM systems, providing them with target track data to support engagements. 5N64 and 64N6 radars are not deployed separately as part of the overall EW network, making their identification an indicator that S-300P series SAM assets are present in the area. As it cannot be determined which variant is deployed using the available imagery, the battle management radars will be identified as 64N6 sites throughout this article. The majority of these radars are likely the 64N6 variant, but older 5N64 radars may still be in use to support the older variants of the S-300P series.
A representative 64N6 battle management site can be seen in the following image. This site is important for two reasons. First, it is an excellent image of a 64N6 radar system, with the radar array's shadow clearly showing the characteristic fore and aft feedhorn assemblies used on the 64N6's radar array. Secondly, this system is co-located with an S-300P garrison. Both the presence of the 64N6 radar and the S-300P garrison indicate that there are operational S-300P series batteries in the area. However, no S-300P series batteries have been identified in the area, highlighting the fact that there are likely a good deal of SAM batteries operating in Russia that have yet to be identified.
AIR DEFENSE ASSETS
S-300P Series
The primary strategic SAM systems employed by the Russian air defense network are variants of the S-300P family. The S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE), S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE), and S-300PM (SA-20A GARGOYLE) are all widely deployed throughout the nation. The S-300P series SAM systems are all mobile, able to be redeployed should the need arise, allowing them to be constantly relocated to complicate targeting. The engagement ranges are as follows: S-300PT, 47 km; S-300PS, 90 km; and S-300PM, 150 km. Detailed information regarding the S-300P series of SAM systems can be found here.
Legacy Systems
Very few legacy Soviet-era strategic SAM systems are still found active inside of Russia. There is a single active S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) battery still operational in Kaliningrad, and what appear to be a small number of S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) batteries deployed on the island of Novaya Zemlya. What appear to be active S-75 and S-125 (SA-3 GOA) batteries found at the Ashuluk SAM Training Range are likely in place to serve either the training needs of Russian allies still operating these systems, or to serve as launch platforms for specially modified missiles designed to serve as targets for more modern systems.
Tactical SAMs
Tactical SAM systems are not commonly employed as part of the overall Russian air defense network. These tactical systems, such as the S-300V (SA-12 GLADIATOR/GIANT) or 9K37 (SA-11 GADFLY), are designed to be deployed in support of Russian army maneuver formations to provide mobile air defense. Some of these systems can, however, be located deployed at prepared sites, such as the S-300V battery deployed near Briobidzhan and seen in the image below. As such, given that these systems can provide air defense in their region, they are included here. Identified tactical SAM garrisons are also included as these systems could potentially also be deployed in a quasi-strategic manner to defend key facilities in their vicinity.
GENERAL LAYOUT
Russia's strategic air defense network is arranged to defend key military sites, industrial areas, and population centers. Currently deployed assets are consolidated in the vicinity of these locations to provide overlapping surveillance zones and fields of fire, increasing the network's defensive effectiveness.
Strategic SAM assets were initially subordinate to the Troops of Air Defense (PVO). With the reorganization under Yeltsin, the Russian Air Force absorbed the PVO and gained control of the strategic SAM force. Tactical SAM systems remain controlled by the Russian Army. Many tactical SAM systems are often deployed at fixed sites to provide air defense of certain areas, and as such will be included here even though they are not necessarily integrated with the strategic SAM network.
Russia is presently divided into six miltary zones, which can be seen in the image below. These military zones will be analyzed separately to provide a more detailed look at the currently deployed air defense assets therein.
Within each of these military zones, numerous air defense sites and support facilities can be identified. Identification of active air defense sites is obviously important to provide a general image of the air defense capabilities of the zone in question. Support facilities, however, are also very significant and can often provide valuable information regarding the zone's overall potential.
Most strategic SAM sites are supported by SAM garrisons housing additional equipment and often providing maintenance facilities for deployed units. These garrisons can often provide valuable information regarding the potential future strength of an air defense zone during a time of conflict. Consider the S-300P garrison near Vsevolodovo, on the outskirts of Moscow, seen in the image below.
This garrison is likely positioned to support many of the S-300PS and S-300PM batteries defending Moscow. A close examination of the equipment visible on the grounds of the facility indicates that there may be up to three S-300P series batteries in-garrison available for deployment. Being able to determine the amount of SAM equipment in-garrison provides an analyst with a rough concept of the amount of additional batteries which may be available for deployment during a time of increased tensions. This also allows an analyst to make a differentiation between peacetime and potential wartime postures for an air defense network. In the case of Russia, examination of the various SAM garrisons throughout the nation does indicate that there are a substantial number of complete batteries available for deployment should the need arise. Alternatively this provides an idea of the number of batteries potentially available for resale to foreign clients. As S-400 units replace older S-300PS and S-300PM batteries throughout Russia, for example, these older S-300P series batteries, including those held in garrison, could be available for export at a reduced rate, making them attractive options for nations like Syria or Iran who desire to upgrade their air defense networks.
Close examination of SAM garrisons and facilities also provides insight into the types of systems which could be available for deployment in a given area. The SAM garrison near Strugi-Krasnye, for example, houses S-300V components. While there are no deployed S-300V batteries identified in the area, the presence of the components at the garrison indicates that the system could be deployed in the region and potentially represents a threat to be considered.
SYMBOLOGY
The following icons will be used to depict air defense related sites within Russia:
Squares: facilities such as garrisons, test and training centers
Diamonds: EW radar sites, including 36D6 and 64N6 radar sites
Triangles: SAM sites
The icons will be color coded as follows:
Dark red: S-75
Bright red: S-300P series, S-300V, 64N6 battle management radar
Dark blue: general EW radar, 36D6 EW radar
Bright blue: S-125
Faded green: 9K37
Purple: S-200
White: an unoccupied EW radar or SAM location
Brown: a SAM garrison
Engagement zones will match the color of the icon for their respective SAM system with the exception of the 64N6 battle management radar. The 64N6 will have a blue range ring but a red icon, denoting its EW function as well as its relation to the S-300P series SAM systems.
WESTERN ZONE
The Western Zone is responsible for defense of Russia's western-most region, as well as capital area air defense of Moscow. As such, it is one of the most heavily defended zones found in Russia. Numerous advanced SAM systems are present, making the airspace above Moscow potentially the most heavily defended airspace in the world.
EW Sites
Nine EW sites provide coverage for the Western Zone. The bulk of these sites are found in the western half of the zone, situated to provide coverage of the border regions. The locations of these EW sites can be seen in the image below:
36D6 Sites
Nine 36D6 EW sites provide additional EW coverage for the Western Zone. Half of these facilities are situated to potentially support S-300PS and S-300PM batteries in the region as well. As can be seen in the image below, the 36D6 sites are able to provide coverage of roughly two thirds of the Western Zone:
64N6 Sites
Ten 64N6 sites provide battle management for the S-300PS and S-300PM batteries deployed in the Western Zone. The majority of these systems are situated around Moscow, to support the large number of SAM batteries present providing defense of the Russian capital. The locations and coverage of the 64N6 sites can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Air defense for the Western Zone is provided by thirteen S-300PM and two S-300PS batteries. Many of the batteries ringing Moscow are in residence at former S-25 positions. While a solitary S-300PS battery is deployed near Voronezh, the bulk of the attention in the Western Zone has been given to defending Moscow. The Moscow air defense network also features the majority of the most modern S-300PM variants found in Russia. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries are depicted in the image below:
It is known that two S-400 (SA-21) batteries have been deployed around Moscow, with the first battery being emplaced near Elektrostal. Neither of these batteries have appeared in available imagery, however, and as such they are not included here. It should be mentioned, however, that the S-400 will be replacing S-300P series batteries around Moscow and eventually throughout Russia, providing a significant increase in capability.
Inactive Sites
A total of eighty four inactive SAM sites are present in the Western Zone. Half of these are former S-25 positions, some of which may be home to unlocated S-300P series batteries which cannot be identified due to the imagery lacking sufficient resolution in those areas. Eleven S-75 and fifteen SAM sites are also present scattered throughout the area. Sixteen prepared S-300P sites can also be located. These sites, along with the other inactive sites, could be used to redeploy S-300PS and S-300PM batteries during a time of conflict, complicating targeting of these assets. They may also be used to deploy S-300P series batteries held in storage at the SAM garrisons in the area to bolster the defense of the Western Zone should the need arise.
The locations of the inactive SAM sites found in the Western Zone can be seen in the image below:
Facilities
Eleven facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Western Zone. There are six S-300P series SAM garrisons, three SAM garrisons, one SAM training facility, and one radar test facility. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
Moscow
Given the importance placed on defending Moscow, there are a number of EW sites, SAM sites and support facilities located in close proximity around the Russian capital. In order to better illustrate their position in relation to one another, the image below is provided:
NORTHWESTERN ZONE
The Northwestern Zone encompasses a large swath of terrain. Assets deployed in the Northwestern Zone are situated to defend many strategically significant locations, such as the city of St. Petersburg and the Russian Northern Fleet facilities along the Kola Peninsula. Many of these assets also serve an important function in a strategic environment; they would represent a significant portion of the Russian EW and SAM network defending against incoming American nuclear strike aircraft approaching over the North Pole.
EW Sites
Twenty seven EW sites, one of which is unoccupied in available imagery, provide coverage for the Northwestern Zone. Roughly a third of these sites are positioned along the Kola Peninsula to provide EW coverage for the Russian Northern Fleet's facilities and to impart GCI support for interceptor aircraft based there. The locations of these EW sites can be seen in the image below:
36D6 Sites
Nine 36D6 EW sites provide additional EW coverage for the Northwestern Zone. Six of these facilities are situated to potentially support S-300PS and S-300PM batteries surrounding St. Petersburg, with a further site situated to potentially support S-300PT and S-300PM batteries on the Kola Peninsula. The locations and coverage zones of these sites can be seen in the image below:
64N6 Sites
Four 64N6 sites provide battle management for the S-300P series batteries deployed in the Northwestern Zone. Three of these systems are situated around St. Petersburg in support of S-300P series batteries in the area. The locations and coverage of the 64N6 sites can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Air defense for the Northwestern Zone is provided by three S-75 batteries, four S-300PT batteries, six S-300PS batteries, and five S-300PM batteries. The bulk of the S-300P series batteries are split between St. Petersburg and the Kola Peninsula, with three S-300PT batteries deployed to defend Severodvinsk and Arkhangelsk. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries are depicted in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Seventy nine inactive SAM sites are present in the Northwestern Zone. There are thirty nine S-75 sites, 10 S-125 sites, 17 S-200 sites, 10 S-300P series sites, and three 5V11 sites. Many of these former SAM sites can be found in areas no longer defended by active SAM batteries, providing insight into Cold War era deploment strategies. The locations of these inactive SAM sites can be seen in the image below:
Facilities
Seven facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Northwestern Zone. There are three S-300P series SAM garrisons, three SAM garrisons, and one EW training facility. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
St. Petersburg and the Kola Peninsula
A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities surrounding St. Petersburg is provided below:
The Kola Peninsula is one of the most important strategic locations in the Northwestern Zone, providing the home to Russia's Northern Fleet and a significant portion of the sea-borne nuclear deterrent force. A closer view of the strategic air defense facilities in the area is provided in the image below:
SOUTHWESTERN ZONE
The Southwestern Zone is an important zone in terms of air defense for Russia. The zone provides surveillance and SAM coverage of Russia's southwestern flank bordering the Black Sea. Also, this zone is likely responsible for providing the air defense units deployed to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in support of Russia's military activities there.
EW Sites
Twenty eight EW sites provide coverage for the Southwestern Zone. These sites are scattered throughout the zone to provide coverage over the bulk of the territory. The locations of these EW sites can be seen in the image below:
36D6 and 64N6 Sites
Eight 36D6 and one 64N6 radar sites provide additional air surveillance of the Southwestern Zone, as well as battle management functions for S-300P series batteries in the area. The majority of the 36D6 radar sites are positioned in the western half of the zone to allow for increased coverage of the border region with the Ukraine and the offshore airspace over the Black Sea. The locations and coverage zones of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Three S-300PM SAM batteries provide air defense for the Southwestern Zone. Two of these batteries are positioned to defend the area bordering the Black Sea, providing coverage of the port facility at Novorossiysk as well. The third battery is sited to defend Rostov-on-Don. This third battery is significant insofar as that there is no identified 64N6 radar in the area, indicating that the battle management complex is likely sited in a region not currently covered in sufficient resolution to facilitate identification. The locations and engagement zones of these three S-300PM batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Fifty inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Southwestern Zone. There are thirty one S-75 sites, seven S-125 sites, seven S-200 sites, and five S-300P series sites. The bulk of these sites are situated around Rostov-on-Don and Volgograd, areas which no longer maintain a significant SAM presence. The locations of these inactive SAM sites can be seen in the image below:
CENTRAL ASIAN ZONE
The Central Asian Zone provides air defense for a significant portion of Russia's interior, concentrating on the western half of the interior. As the interior of the nation is less vulnerable to aerial assault, assets contained herein are less capable and more dispersed throughout the territory.
EW Sites
Fourteen EW sites provide surveillance and GCI support capabilities for the Central Asian Zone. These sites are primarily situated near populated areas and airfields. Their locations can be seen in the iamge below:
36D6 and 64N6 Sites
Three 36D6 and three 64N6 radar facilities provide expanded EW coverage and battle management support for the Central Asian Zone's air defense systems. Two of the 64N6 battle management radar sites are situated near the zone's deployed S-300P series batteries, with the third being the aforementioned example sited near Saratov where no S-300P series batteries have been identified as of yet. The locations and coverage zones of these radar assets can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Three S-300PS batteries provide the bulk of the active air defense coverage for the Central Asian Zone. These batteries are positioned to defend Samara and Ekaterinburg. An S-300V garrison at Orenburg is a potential source of expanded air defense for the region. The locations and engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Numerous inactive SAM sites can be found scattered throughout the Central Asian Zone. Seventeen S-75 sites, fifteen S-200 sites, and two S-300P sites have been identified. Their locations can be seen in the image below:
Facilities
Five facilities supporting the air defense network have been identified in the Central Asian Zone. These facilities consist of an S-300P garrison, the aforementioned S-300V garrison, one SAM garrison, one SAM training range, and one SAM garrison/training range combined facility. With the exception of the S-300P garrison near Saratov, the rest of the facilities are consolidated around Orenburg. This potentially indicates that Orenburg is a significant training location for tactical SAM units in the area and possibly throughout Russia as well. Strategic SAM systems likely do not train at these facilities as they employ two dedicated facilities in Russia, but tactical SAM systems could make use of the facilities with greater ease due to their shorter range. Examination of the training ranges does indicate that they have been used by tracked vehicles with regularity, providing further evidence that tactical SAM units are the primary users of these facilities. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
SIBERIAN ZONE
The Siberian Zone provides air defense for the eastern portion of Russia's interior. As with the Central Asian Zone, assets contained herein are less capable and more dispersed throughout the territory when compared to other zones throughout Russia.
EW Sites
Twenty EW sites provide air surveillance for the Siberian Zone. One of these sites was inactive when imaged, containing no identifiable air surveillance equipment. While half of these locations have been scattered throughout the zone, there is a concentration of nine facilities in the southeastern quadrant providing air surveillance along the border with China. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
36D6 and 64N6 Sites
One 36D6 radar and one 64N6 battle management radar provide additional EW coverage for the Siberian Zone. The 64N6 facility is located near Irkutsk to support an S-300PS battery in the area, and two more 64N6 facilities are likely unlocated near Achinsk and Novosibirsk given the presence of S-300P series batteries in these areas. The locations and coverage zones of the identified 36D6 and 64N6 radars can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Two S-300PT batteries and two S-300PS batteries comprise the identified air defense assets deployed in the Siberian Zone. These batteries are positioned to provide defense of Achinsk, Irkutsk, and Novosibirsk. The locations and engagement zones of these SAM batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Forty inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Siberian Zone. Twenty S-75 sites, one S-125 site, fifteen S-200 sites, and four S-300P sites have been located in the region. The locations of these sites can be seen in the image below:
Facilities
Three support facilities, comprised of one S-300P garrison, one 9K37 garrison, and one EW training facility, have been identified in the Siberian Zone. The S-300P garrison is centrally located and could potentially support the entire zone. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
FAR EASTERN ZONE
EW Sites
Forty one EW sites, two of which were inactive when imaged, provide air surveillance for the Far Eastern Zone. These facilities are primarily consolidated in three strategically significant areas: the northeast, near Alaska, the southeast, near Vladivostok, and the far east, on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
36D6, 64N6, and 9S18M1 Sites
Three 36D6 sites, three 64N6 sites, and one 9S18M1 site are located in the Far Eastern Zone. The 64N6 and 9S18M1 sites provide support to specific SAM units, with the 64N6 sites providing battle management support for assigned S-300PS batteries and the 9S18M1 site providing EW support to a deployed 9K37 battery in the region. There is likely an unlocated 64N6 located near Vladivostok, denoted by the presence of S-300PS batteries in the area. The locations and coverage zones of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Eleven active SAM batteries provide air defense for the Far Eastern Zone. Nine of these batteries are equipped with S-300PS SAM systems and defend naval facilities at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, as well as other key locations in the region. One S-300V and one 9K37 battery have also been identified deployed at prepared sites in the region as well. The locations and engagement zones of the active SAM batteries in the region can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Sixty nine inactive SAM sites have been identified in the Far Eastern Zone. These locations consist of forty two S-75 sites, six S-125 sites, one 2K12 site, eight S-200 sites, one 9K37 site, and eleven S-300P sites. The locations of these sites can be seen in the image below. Interestingly, many of these facilities have been identified on the island of Sakhalin, a location which has not seen any active SAM batteries deployed to the region. This is further evidence of the changing priorities of Russian air defense.
Facilities
Six facilities supporting air defense units in the region have been identified in the Far Eastern Zone. There are four S-300P garrisons, one 9K37 garrison, and an S-300V garrison. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below:
Vladivostok and the Kamchatka Peninsula
A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities in the region surrounding Vladivostok is provided below:
A closer view of the SAM locations and support facilities on the Kola Peninsula near Petropavlovsk, home of the Russian Pacific Fleet's SSBN force, can be seen in the image below:
KALININGRAD
The Kaliningrad autonomous region, located to the west of Russia along the Baltic sea, possesses numerous air defense units but is not tecnhically part of the Russian strategic air defense network. Rather, assets in this region are dedicated to the air defense of Kaliningrad and may not be integrated within the overall Russian air defense network due to the fact that Kaliningrad is geographically separated from the rest of Russia.
EW, 36D6, and 64N6 Sites
Two EW sites, four 36D6 radar sites, and one 64N6 battle management radar can be found in Kaliningrad. Their locations and coverage zones can be seen in the image below:
Active Sites
Air defense of Kaliningrad is provided by one S-200 battery, the last such battery in active service with the Russian military, and five S-300PS batteries. The locations and engagement zones of these batteries can be seen in the image below:
Inactive Sites
Six S-75 sites, one S-125 site, one 2K12 site, and three S-300P sites make up the inactive SAM sites located within Kaliningrad. The locations of these sites, as well as the aforementioned radar and SAM positions, can be seen in the image below. Also provided is the location of an S-300P garrison in the area.
For more information regarding the strategic SAM defenses of Kaliningrad, click here.
SPECIAL FACILITIES
There are eight facilities within Russia which provide test and training services for the Russian strategic SAM network.
Kapustin Yar, located in the Southwestern Zone, is the primary test facility for Russian strategic SAM systems. Ashuluk, also in the Southwestern Zone, and Telemba, in the Siberian Zone, provide training ranges for long-range strategic SAM systems. While Kapustin Yar and Telemba are not visible in sufficient resolution to make any significant analysis of their facilities, Ashuluk can be viewed in great detail. More information on these three facilities can be found here. An image of the facilities at Ashuluk is provided below for illustrative purposes:
Two EW training facilities and three generic SAM training facilities have also been located and are mentioned above in their respective zones. EW training facilities are easily identified thanks to the presence of EW radar systems in a location which precludes their use as active surveillance centers. For illustrative purposes, an image of the EW training center near St. Petersburg is provided below. Close examination will reveal that the radar systems are not mounted on raised berms to facilitate operational use, indicating that they would be hampered by structures and vegetation in the area. As these systems cannot be employed operationally but appear to be deployed in an operational fashion, this is likely a training facility and has been classified as such.
OVERALL TOTALS
Nearly seven hundred air defense related facilities have been identified in Russia and Kaliningrad. Including the sites found in Kaliningrad and along the Ashuluk training range, the total numbers are broken down as follows:
EW sites: 140
36D6 radar sites: 38
64N6 battle management radar sites: 23
9S18M1 radar sites: 1
Active S-75 sites: 4
Active S-125 sites: 1
Active S-200 sites: 1
Active 9K37 sites: 1
Active S-300V sites: 1
Active S-300PT sites: 6
Active S-300PS sites: 27
Active S-300PM sites: 21
Support facilities: 41
Inactive S-25 sites: 42
Inactive S-75 sites: 175
Inactive S-125 sites: 27
Inactive 2K12 sites: 2
Inactive S-200 sites: 78
Inactive 9K37 sites: 1
Inactive S-300P sites: 53
Inactive Dal sites: 3
LIMITATIONS
The primary limitation of the Russian air defense network is one of volume. There is simply too much airspace to ensure contiguous coverage of the entire nation. As such, there are significant gaps in coverage which could be exploited by a potential adversary. Consider the SAM engagement ranges in western Russia, as depicted in the following image:
With the placement of SAM batteries to defend strategic locations, there are significant areas where enemy aircraft could enter into Russian airspace without being threatened by an identified SAM system. While it is true that a strike package would still face a significant SAM threat when nearing a target area, not having to deal with SAM batteries enroute will result in more aircraft being available to prosecute the target.
While the SAM network's coverage is limited, the EW network coverage is robust. As seen in the image below, nearly the entire border region, as well as most of the potential target areas, are covered by the identified 36D6 and 64N6 radar systems. This does not take into account other EW assets such as the P-35/37 series, which would only add to the available EW coverage. Such a robust and overlapping EW network would likely force a strike package to employ either significant EW support, thereby giving away away its position, or a low level ingress, thereby reducing its range and potentially removing a great deal of potential strategic targets from threat of engagement.
The dark horses of the Russian SAM network are the tactical SAM batteries and potentially unlocated S-300P series batteries, having exploited their significant mobility to relocate along likely ingress routes. These mobile SAM systems could potentially be deployed to maximize their coverage, exploiting both prepared, inactive sites and unsurveyed field deployment locations. SAM batteries held in reserve such as those S-300P series batteries identified in garrison also represent a significant threat to be deployed during a time of crisis and would have to be carefully tracked in order to determine their final deployment positions.
At the end of the day, it is unlikely that Russia would be able to effectively deploy enough strategic SAM batteries to mount a contiguous defense of both its borders and the strategic targets likely to be struck during a time of conflict. The overwhelming amount of airspace present would make this a prohibitively expensive endeavour.
Furthermore, even if an attempt was made to mount this type of barrier air defense, it is likely that the deployed assets would not have sufficient overlapping coverage to deny an inbound strike package access to Russian airspace should a small number of SAM systems be incapacitated or destroyed. Fortunately for Russia, however, there are two other options present which help to mitigate these limitations.
CIS AIR DEFENSE
One solution available to Russian military forces in a time of conflict is the presence of the CIS air defense network. The CIS air defense network is an integrated cooperative involving the air defense forces of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The combined air defense forces of these nations provide an expanded air defense network along the periphery of Russia.
Continuing with the previous example of a strike package attempting to penetrate into western Russia, consider the presence of multiple 36D6 and 64N6 radar sites in Belarus and the Ukraine, as well as those deployed by Russia in Kaliningrad. These sites provide contiguous coverage along the western approaches to Russia from St. Petersburg in the north to the Georgian border in the south. Overlapping coverage provides an extremely well monitored air defense zone reaching into Poland and the majority of the Black Sea. This would severely impede the prospects of an inbound strike package successfully evading detection, allowing air defense assets within Russia to be brought to full readiness in anticipation of an aerial attack.
The coverage of 36D6 and 64N6 radar systems found in the western portion of the CIS air defense network can be seen in the image below:
Belarus and the Ukraine do not only offer air surveillance capabilities to the CIS air defense network. Multiple S-125, S-200, and S-300P series SAM batteries are also present, providing an additional layer of protection for western Russia. These SAM batteries do not provide complete coverage of the western approaches to Russia, as they are primarily deployed in accordance with the air defense requirements of their users, but they do provide yet another complication for an inbound strike package. Furthermore, there remains the chance, as with Russia, that many of the S-300P series SAM batteries could be redeployed to maximize their effectiveness. Most of the S-300P series SAM batteries in Belarus and the Ukraine are consolidated to defend key military and industrial centers and could be relocated to a degree without compromising the defensive posture at those locations.
The SAM coverage found in the western portion of the CIS air defense network, including those systems sited in Kaliningrad, can be seen in the image below:
THE AIR ELEMENT
No discussion of strategic air defense in Russia would be complete without mentioning the MiG-31 (FOXHOUND). As noted above, there are significant gaps in the SAM coverage throughout the nation. The MiG-31 is a strategic interceptor tasked with defending the periphery of Russia, and provides the ability to cover far more territory than a small number of SAM batteries. There are currently seven active MiG-31 units inside of Russia. With a combat radius of between 720 kilometers at Mach 2.35 and 1250 kilometers at Mach 0.8, the MiG-31 is well suited for patrolling those areas in Russia lacking sufficient ground-based air defense. Four aircraft can effectively monitor and cooperatively engage targets in a 1600 kilometer wide swath of airspace thanks to the presence of advanced datalinking systems allowing target data to be passed between the interceptors.
MiG-31 interceptors can be supported by A-50 (MAINSTAY) AEW&C aircraft based at Ivanovo. These aircraft can operate as airborne GCI platforms to vector MiG-31s and other air combat aircraft towards targets outside the range of the fighters' radar systems. Alternatively the A-50 can be used to vector MiG-31s towards targets while the MiG-31 closes passively with its Zaslon fire control radar shut off to deny an enemy aircraft an RWR indication giving away the MiG-31's presence. The A-50 can also be used as an airborne EW platform, monitoring airspace in regions where EW coverage is limited or non-existant.
Both the A-50 and MiG-31 may have their range extended and their loiter time increased by inflight refueling from Il-78 (MIDAS) tankers. The only limitation with this practice is the fact that Russia's Il-78 fleet is relatively small, and as such is primarily tasked to support strategic aviation units operating nuclear bombers. The long range and endurance capability of both the MiG-31 and A-50, coupled with the presence of multiple airfields and staging locations along the northern Russian coast and the Kola Peninsula allow these assets to be forward deployed in order to take advantage of their range capabilities in regions where their presence is required.
CONCLUSION
The Russian strategic air defense network possesses some of the most advanced weapon systems found anywhere in the world. Despite the fact that at first glance there are many significant coverage gaps in the SAM network, the presence of numerous systems held in garrison as well as the incorporation of an air element into the strategic air defense system makes Russian airspace arguably the most heavily defended airspace found anywhere in the world. An analyst would do well to remember that numbers and images do not tell the entire story; were every in-garrison system to be deployed, the Russian air defense network would surely represent a significant deterrent to any aerial incursion into sovereign Russian airspace, a view that is not necessarily evident at first glance when only evaluating the identified deployed assets.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
The locations, range rings, zone borders, and other placemarks used to create this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark here. Also included are the locations of relevant strategic aviation units discussed herein.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss this feauture at the IMINT & Analysis forum discussion thread found here.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
CIS Air Defense
28 comments:
Yes, present Russian Air Defense network looks very clumsy. If I count 381 former Soviet inactive AD sites and compare this number with current amount of 54 sites the conclusion is obvious: Russia possesses now only deplorable remnants of USSR's PVO system. In fact only Moscow area is highly defended by strong SAM ring. Besides only St. Petersburg, Kola Peninsula and Vladivostok regions have some kind of AD network but not sufficient to repel enemy air attacks. The rest of country is open to enemy's strike assets penetration. For instance Caucasus area is defended only by three S-300P batteries which seems ridiculous. Moreover we should assume that older EW radars are very prone to modern ECM techniques and they cannot detect low-level flying targets like ALCMs/SLCMs and bombers of B-1B and F-15E type. Additionally I suppose stealth targets are also outside Russian AD systems reach in spite of accusations that Russian VHF band EW radars can catch them. Also note I do not think Russia can realistically count on Ukrainian help to screen its Western frontier.
All in all Russian AD system is now very weak against US/NATO threat in Europe and even against Chinese air penetration (thanks to PLAAF's Su-30MK/J-11B family of jets) in the Far East. Its future prospects are very disappointing. I do not believe S-400 acquisition level will be sufficient to replace all S-300P batteries - anyway present in quite insufficient numbers at this moment.
Impressive analysis, Sean. I have no idea how you have time to do it and, say, eat and sleep too.
SOC,
You are great.
I too wonder like RB if you do sleep at all.
Keep up the fantastic work.
Hope to see the UGABs soon.
Absolutely amazing analysis. It is very helpful to me also. Thanks a lot!
But as Observer said, Ukraine may not be able to be counted on in the event of a strike package incursion from the west. That may change, but I have a feeling that Ukraine may not be under the CIS's mutual air defense network for long.
Observer: First off, with increased cpabilities, you don't have to replace S-300Ps with S-400s on a one-for-one basis. Also most of those empty PVO era sites featured much shorter range systems than the present S-300P family. The empty portions of Russia's airspace? That's why the MiG-31 exists. Russia's air defense network isn't designed to defend every square inch of airspace. Look at China, neither is its. China follows pretty much the same type of deployment strategy.
RB: sleep is often scarce sometimes but I manage. Pizza delivery is key for aiding the food requirement as well!
CayceG: yeah, the Ukraine might not be on Russia's friends list very much longer. But as the CIS air defense network stands currently, they still play a part in defending the former Soviet Union's western flank.
Sean, how efective are the russian EW radars against US stealth airplanes? And in general, how effective is a S300-P against the NATO/US planes?
Any radar can find a stealth plane. It just depends on whether or not you find it at a reasonable distance, or when it's right on top of you and inside the minimum engagement zone of your SAM complexes. The 30N6, 36D6, and 64N6 have a decent counter-stealth capability, but older, legacy systems like the P-35/37 will be less effective.
The S-300P series is arguably the most advanced SAM system in the world apart from the new S-400, and the latest variants are very effective. The advantages the S-300P series enjoy are long range and the ability to engage jamming targets as well as PGMs like the HARM.
Hi SOC,
Your work elaborating such map was impressive. I suggest that you make, if it is possible, a map with the coverage of the A-135 Anti-Ballistic Missile System, deployed around Moscow!
SOC: I think you seriously overestimate Russian AD systems capabilities and Russia's current poor situation. I tell you why:
- in fact S-400 should replace S-300P systems in one-for-one basis because you missed point that present threats are more advanced than those PVO faced during S-300P deployment time. For example S-300P cannot engage stealth cruise missiles and also both stealth planes and UAVs. Moreover note that now NATO countries are in process of fielding new generation of stealth or partially stealth fighters (F-22, F-35, Rafale, Typhoon) and about 11000 conventional-stealth ALCMs of JASSM, Taurus, Apache, Tac Tomahawk types.
- shorter range of earlier Soviet SAMs does not matter much in this aspect because their much higher number enabled to close those huge gaps Russian AD system now has. Simply S-300P longer range does not compensate very moderate amount of firing batteries.
- I do not think at present MiG-31s can really fill gaps in undefended by SAM sectors because their number dropped from above 350 in 1991 to 120 planes at best currently in active service. Besides these sophisticated fighters are now quite old and constantly withdrawn from service due to lack of proper maintenance arose from financial reasons.
- it is known that meter-band EW radars can detect stealth planes but their range-bearing accuracy is so limited that they cannot give valuable data to essentially "stealth-blind" SAM tracking and engagement radars. Also old P-35/37 (what you know about P-18/19 radars?) post-Soviet EW radars are not very reliable now. Unfortunately as far as I know number of modern Nebo-SVU radar systems is very limited. However that is why B-2 bomber are now modernized in advance to fly at very low altitudes.
- it is not true S-300PT/PS/PM systems are still "the most advanced SAM systems in the world". S-300P is 1970s vintage system and versions (not most modern export S-300PMU-2) Russia currently has are surely worse as compared to Patriot PAC-3 (PAC-2 GEM+) and AEGIS (SM-2MR Blk. IIIB, SM-2ER Blk. IVA, SM-6) US systems. I can underline here their outdated electronics and thus rather weak self-defense against modern ECM assets, vulnerability to detection by ISR platforms (RC-135V, EP-3E, Global Hawk) and destruction by latest version of HARM missile (AGM-88E with active-passive radar homing fielded since 2010).
- if Ukraine sells now weapon to Georgia to fight Russians I seriously doubt Russo-Ukrainian military cooperation will be continued. Latest news are as follows: Russia ends cooperation with Ukrainian military industry...no joint AD system is imaginable in such circumstances.
In sum Russian AD capability will worsen in the future taking into account more and more advanced threats.
Info on the Soviet and Russian ABM systems can be seen here:
http://geimint.blogspot.com/2007/06/russian-strategic-defense-part-2-abm.html
To Observer:
The S-400 has been developed to deal with far more advanced threats than the low altitude, low RCS cruise missile type targets the S-300P was designed to deal with initially.
120 MiG-31s active, with 4 aircraft able to monitor a 1600 kilometer wide piece of airspace. It'd be a stretch, but they could still cover a good deal of territory if there are only 120 active. That should change soon, by the way, since the MiG-31BM upgrade program has started to move forward.
Ukraine's participation or lack thereof in the CIS air defense network is up for debate, but as they are still technically a participant until they state otherwise they were included.
PATRIOT has nothing on the modern S-300PM variants. The ATBM capability PAC-3 added was designed into the 48N6 missile and the 5V55/5N63 combination used by the S-300PT and S-300PS proved capable of downing missiles during testing at Sary Shagan early on. PAC-3 was PATRIOT playing catch-up. True, AEGIS SAMs are another story entirely, but I am referring to land-based systems. Nobody has been smart enough to make a land-mobile SM-3 or SM-4 as of yet. It'd outclass anything PATRIOT can offer. Remove AEGIS SAMs, and the S-300PM/S-400 offer far more capability than PATRIOT. The SAGG guidance method is more advanced than PATRIOT's TVM, the latest missiles offer far more range, the ECCM protection is robust, and the system can engage PGMs and ARMs if needbe (although in practice they'd likely be targeted by co-located short-range systems like Tor or Buk-M1). Vulnerability to detection by ISR assets? PATRIOT has the same problem. That's something you live with as a SAM system that must radiate in order to kill things. "Outdated" electronics? Just because it's older doesn't mean it won't work as good or better. Compare the M-16 with the AK-47 in Vietnam. There is a pervasive belief that Russians are backwards and cannot make anything on par with what the West has to offer. That's a biased and incorrect assumption.
Lastly, some of the coverage gaps may close up if Google decides to actually provide more imagery in Russia instead of constantly updating cities in the US and Western Europe. I could do with more coverage of China too, for that matter! But they aren't trying to cover the whole nation, they didn't even manage that with all their SAM deployments in the Cold War. That'd be ridiculously expensive and a waste of time to attempt. Better to concentrate assets where they can protect key targets. That's a tenet of strategic air defense.
Sean, the information on the mentioned link only refers to satellite images of the A-153's sites. What I am asking for is a map with the coverage of the system, the area that is protected by the A-135. We know that the range of the 53T6 interceptors is about 80 kilometers, but russian authorities said many times that an area of hundreds if not thousands of kilometers around Moscow is protected. So, what is the real size of this aforementioned area?
Sorry. " satellite images of the A-135's sites".
To SOC:
- As for S-300P capabilities. Why didn't you specify more precisely what threats? The truth is that S-300P was designed to be able to destroy FB-111 and B-1B bombers and also first generation ALCMs like AGM-86. However this system is unable to deal with true stealth assets like B-2, F-22, F-35, AGM-129 and JASSM which now become standard. You can only guess that S-400 could cope with them but it is almost impossible. Why? I do not even mean its technical characteristics but these deplorable numbers Russia is to replace all S-300P systems. Look how many enemy PGMs can strike targets defended by Russian SAMs. Simply future Russian AD would be easily saturated and targets destroyed in single enemy ALCM/SLCM salvo.
- Firstly, understand fighters are not AWACS planes! They should destroy enemy cruise missiles, not detect them. That is a crucial fact here: Russia lacks significant amount of dedicated AWACS platforms because several active A-50s have no practical value. I am sure only AWACS can be viewed as main AD detection systems in Russian strategic situation. Secondly Zaslon radar can detect older ALCMs at maximum 65 km, not 1200 km range. Moreover each MiG-31 can carry only four R-33 missiles which is too low number to repel spotted ALCMs salvo by four Foxhounds.
Thirdly, no MiG-31BM upgrade is scheduled in Russia. In fact Russia lost capability to produce newer MiG-31M version in 1994 and BM upgrade was canceled in late 1990s due to downfall of needed R&D base.
- Ukraine now tries to join NATO so it is almost certain Russo-Ukrainian military ties will cease to exist in the future unless pro-Russian forces take real power on Ukraine.
- You probably do not know much about Patriot vs. S-300P modernization path. In short, since Cold War's end Patriot was significantly modernized about three times while Russia practically stopped S-300P modernization program for its own forces in 1993. Later variants were only exported abroad. Note many S-300P parameters were worse than Patriot ones even then. You are not right about ECCM issue: S-300P engagement radar works constantly on one of several dozens preprogrammed frequencies (solution found in almost all Soviet SAM systems of that era) while Patriot radar is multiple random PRF design. Therefore S-300P radar can be jammed far more easily. Also PAC-3 anti-missile has active radar guidance which is more advanced and effective than 5V55/48N6 SAGG guidance. Additionally recent PAC-2 GEM+ missiles are surely more reliable in respect to ECCM, detection of low-RCS targets and low-level engagements than 5V55/48N6 missiles.
Besides S-400 system is developed for 20 years and still not fully complete. Up to now Russia deployed only one incomplete firing battery without some crucial elements which indicates this system is still at design stage. To be honest you should compare S-400 to its Western counterparts i.e. SAMP-T and MEADS systems.
- In theory Patriot can be detected by enemy ISR platforms but first Russia now completely lacks such ISR assets so Patriot is safe in this context. Second it is obvious that Russia do not posses modern secured datalink systems of JTDIS/Link-16 class and that is why internal PVO communication is presumably easily detectable by Western ISR platforms. That way NATO could easily locate S-300P batteries dislocation during conflict for example.
- Russian outdated technology is a basic fact! Even USSR was backward in electronics about decade behind the West. Now Russia after 20 years of "military diet" is even more backward. They now import thermal imagers from the West because Russia cannot build them since 30 years for instance. Here you are another good proof: Russian S-300P systems are all older versions than most up to date export variants. Now Russian S-300P is 20-30 years old and not significantly upgraded technology - in S-300P data are stored in magnetic tapes memory! Your AK-47/M16 comparison do not apply here because we talk about far most advanced and complex systems.
- Yes, Russia cannot build Soviet era huge SAM belt but now it seems that future Russian anti-air capabilities will be inadequate even to defend key military and industrial installations. Note your data suggest that Russian ICBM bases and strategic airfields are not screened by SAMs now. What if S-400 batteries will be far less than current S-300P ones?
-The S-300P variants stopped being procured for Russian air defense units because they were trying to get the S-400 into service. As it stands right now, two batteries are in service, and the only component they may be missing is the 400-kilometer 40N6 missile. That may be a ruse, however, as the 48N6 was tested to that range in the mid 1980s, meaning that they may already have a 400km capability right now.
-The MiG-31BM is most assuredly an active project, the first examples are at Akhtubinsk for weapons trials as we speak.
-Yes, you can oversaturate the Russian AD network, I never tried to claim otherwise.
-What ISR assets do you think Russia lacks? Don't forget the Kh-31, designed to take out PATRIOT radars, either.
-Moscow, Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok, Murmansk/Sevastopol, Engels AB...defended by S-300P batteries. Mobile ICBMs need no SAM defense as they will be dispersed to field launch sites during war anyway, likely days or weeks before the actual shooting starts. What other major strategic targets are lacking coverage? And do recall that I did mention that this is only an analysis of the presently visible assets, there may be a large number in areas with poor coverage.
Also, take in the fact that what else are defending the S-300 and other systems? The Buk M1/M2's and Tor-M1/M2's. Those where designed to take out strategic weapons like cruise missiles. And it really is up to the radar to detect stealth planes, and newer radar that is out can easily detect them (apparently the Mig-31 PESA radar can detect stealth targets, so I doubt a S-300 system cannot). Also, keep in mind that these specific systems have a variety of ranges, and depending on the missiles used. It is stated that Russia has the most prestigious missile/air defense system around. Bring in the fact the number of troops and the strategic ballistic missiles (nuclear and non nuclear), will state that no country will make a mistake in attacking Russia.
Whats this nonsense about only 120 MiG-31s being in service?
There may be as few as 120 active, meaning flyable likely due to amintenance shortages. There are certainly a whole lot more than 120 airframes in existance. Hell, there may be that many on the ramp at Rzhev alone.
There are seven active units as of 2007 flying MiG-31s, meaning that there should be roughly 170 aircraft assigned, with the bulk of the rest from former units sitting at either Nizhny-Novgorod or Rzhev. Once the BM upgrade program really gets going some of those may be returned to service and see old units reactivated. I don't know if 120 active airframes is entirely accurate, but seven operational units (not counting jets assigned to Akhtubinsk or Lipetsk) as of the end of 2007 is a number I have some confidence in.
In the early 60s no one in the US believed that USSR could ever bring down a US plane. They were so confident that risked sending U2 spy planes into the Soviet Union. And then the unthinkable happened: A U2 plane shot down by the USSR's AD system.
One should always take into account past events when analyzing the military situation of a country with incomplete data.
- You forgot that S-300P acquisition was stopped about 12-14 years ago and no other SAM systems have been bought since then! So Russia was hit by huge generational and hardware gap.
- only one S-400 experimental battery in on duty now. It lacks not only 400 km range missile but also crucial radar system. In fact it is not battle-ready. Besides this Elektrostal localization is a Russian fake unfortunately widely reproduced on the West with unknown reasons. The sole S-400 unit was placed on the Caucasus identically as also unique and incomplete Iskander missiles battery.
- Yes, "on paper" MiG-31BM is still "active" project exactly as Severodvinsk-class nuclear sub and "400 km S-400 missile" are. ;)
- Russia lacks almost all ISR platforms! I can tell you what they have now: several dozens basic photo-reconnaissance Su-24MR tactical planes (many of their recon pods are not in working conditions due to age), several Tu-22MR mainly photo-recon platforms (one of them was shot down during Georgian war - this is a good proof of its really "powerful" recon equipment range). No ELINT, ECM, UAV assets at all because entire Tu-16R, Tu-22R, Tu-95RC, Su-24MR, MiG-25RB and Tu-143 Reis fleet was scrapped. Moreover I doubt H-31P (AS-17) missile is now in Russian inventory in noticeable numbers. This project was finishing in time of USSR's collapse. So I do not think many H-31 missiles was introduced later. In fact H-31 variants were exclusively exported abroad but Russian aviation seems to still use older H-27, H-28 and H-58 missiles or not use them at all (vide Georgia's crisis). I must mention H-31P was readied against first PATRIOT version 20 years ago so it is highly unlikely it is identically good against PAC-3 now without substantial modernization (longer range, better ECCM, GLONASS guidance - look at AGM-88D/E variants for comparison).
- as for strategic bomber bases you forgot to mention Ukrainka, Tiksi, Anadyr and Vorkuta airfields. Moreover what about tactical aviation bases? Mobile ICBM bases and dispersion areas surely need SAM protection because B-2 bomber was designed mainly as SS-24 and SS-25 killer.
@Observer
from where do you derive your info?
Or you have a really good sources withing the Russian Armed Forces or you just don't like them at all?
i dont want to disapoint Observer, but...
About very expencive "stealth" nonsence. S-400 detect them as well as updated s-300. but it is not all story. Russia has a lot of other, already active systems, (like Barrier or Nebo which is not mentioned here), these guys can detect any "stealth" object using because radar transmiters located far away from receivers and other tech. There are SEVERAL s-400 on duty already, not one. There are 300+ mig-31, not 120 (and they about to be upgraded). There are S-500 in development. There are a lot of other air defence systems like TOR, Tunguska, Pantcir and so on. There are navy based air defence systems.
You may argue, but there is nothing as powerful as Russian air defence anywhere in the world.
also, there is no F-35 (yet). 20 B-2 can be detected and it is slow and easy target. F-22... it is not a bomber, there is only 113 fighters been produced according to Lokhid Martin and there are only 62% of them is "operational" according to chief pentagon weapons buyer. Now LM wans 8.5 billins "for f-22 improvements". Anyway, nor f-22 or f-35 has a range, unless you beleive Russain PVO would allow them to be refueled :)
P.S. i guess you aren't seriously thinking Russia will not respond with ICBM in case someone would want to "penetrate" its air space? it is not Iraq/Vietnam/Serbia/Korea buddy
One of the biggest weapon in the russian air defense is the threat of retaliation with ICBMs. That's a powerfull weapon... maybe this is why russians may got relaxed in the last few years.
хорошая работа, Василий
надеюсь, нам еще некоторое время удастся водить янки за нос, убеждая будто у нас против них что-то есть
Отличный фотошоп
Весёлый пост))))))))))))) Шутка понедельника))))))))))увахахахахахаха)))))))))))))))
"Не надо пытаться стать героем, Василий! Просто уничтожь танк!!!" COD4
Да ладно, чего там...
Самолёты пропили, ракеты попилили.
Ох, мы все умрём :(
бгггг...мощно...пусть народ и впредь так заблуждается :))
Thanks for this post
Post a Comment