China's DF-31 Launch Sites

INTRODUCTION

To date, some of the most elusive military-related sites inside of China have been the DF-31 ICBM garrisons and launch positions. Through careful examination and exhaustive research, the launch sites and garrisons of China's mobile ICBM fleet have been successfully identified.

MOBILE ICBM CHARACTERISTICS

When dealing with mobile ICBMs, there are a few issues to consider. First, any mobile ICBM system requires a garrison for storing TELs in peacetime. Second, the system's mobility must be considered. If the system is off-road capable, as is the case with Russia's Topol ICBM, then locating the actual launch positions becomes a wasted effort as there is simply too much area to examine. If the system is only road-mobile, however, then pre-sited launch positions may be readily identifiable as the TELs cannot travel over rough terrain to disperse into the surrounding area. The third and final point to consider is that the system will require some sort of method of deriving the precise coordinates of the launch site. Any ballistic missile requires the positional data of the launch position in order to effectively fly the proper trajectory to the impact point.

CHINESE MISSILE LAUNCH SITE DETAILS

Before setting out to locate the Chinese mobile ICBM fleet, it is important to consider examples of existing, identified mobile missile launch positions. Near Delingha in central China, many launch positions for either DF-4 or DF-21 ballistic missiles have been identified (the type of missile deployed here has been under speculation for some time).

One of the identified missile launch sites near Delingha can be seen in the image below:


The launch site is a circular concrete pad with a diameter of 70 meters. Many of these launch positions can be found in the surrounding area. All of the launch positions are connected to major roads by paved access roads, giving credibility to the fact that the DF-21 is speculated to be deployed in the area. The DF-21 TEL consists of a towed erector-launcher unit which is not off-road capable, requiring launch sites to be close to major roads allowing the TELs to disperse from garrison to the launch positions.

NANYANG ICBM DISPERSAL AREA

When setting out to track down the locations of China's DF-31 launch sites, it is important to find a credible starting point. Otherwise, the entire country must be searched, which would be an extremely difficult and time-consuming task. It is known that China's DF-31s are subordinate to the 2nd Artillery Corps, the arm of the PLA that controls China's land-based missile force. The first operational unit to equip with the DF-31 ICBM was Brigade 813. This brigade received DF-31 ICBMs as early as 1999 according to some reports, displaying them to the public during the 1999 National Day parade. A 2008 DoD report claims that less than 10 missiles are in service, however, and the test program of the DF-31 would appear to give credibility to this report as the missile has had a long and protracted development period due to technical issues. The DoD claimed that the missile had reached Initial Threat Availability in 2006, meaning that the DF-31 had managed to conduct a single successful flight test. Naming Brigade 813 as a DF-31 unit as far back as 1999 may seem a bit premature, especially given that the system was apparently only successfully tested as late as 2006. However, the 2nd Artillery Corps stood up the first DF-21 unit in 1986, with the missile being operationally deployed as early as 1991. Given that DF-31 testing began with an August 1999 launch, it is plausible that Brigade 813 was established during that time period to begin crew training on the TEL and to establish a garrison for the system.

Regardless of the actual entry date, the DF-31 is currently in service with the 2nd Artillery Corps of the PLA, and it would appear that Brigade 813 was the first unit established to operate the weapon. The only remaining fact required to locate the DF-31's launch positions is the location of Brigade 813's operational area. Open source reporting claims that Brigade 813 was initially based in Luoyang, but was relocated to Nanyang. Analysis of available imagery supports these reports.

Nanyang DF-31 Launch Sites

Nanyang is located in east-central China, approximately 850 kilometers southeast of Beijing and 180 kilometers south of Luoyang. Analysis of the surrounding area has led to the location of six DF-31 launch sites approximately 30 kilometers northwest of Nanyang. The six DF-31 launch sites can be found at the following coordinates:

33°16'33.80"N 112°20'06.49"E
33°14'23.78"N 112°17'50.82"E
33°12'46.96"N 112°18'55.43"E
33°12'02.03"N 112°18'49.17"E
33°09'44.19"N 112°15'47.01"E
33°11'48.95"N 112°18'38.92"E

The Nanyang DF-31 launch site locations can be seen in the following image:


Further evidence that these locations are DF-31 launch positions can be found in the characteristics of the DF-31 TEL itself. The DF-31's Hanyang HY4301 TEL consists of a missile launch canister mounted on a trailer which is towed by a four axle tractor. This configuration is clearly not off-road capable. That being the case, DF-31 deployed launch sites would have to be near major roads in order to facilitate dispersal of the TELs. This fact, when combined with the information that Brigade 813 is based in Nanyang, supports the conclusion that the sites identified above are in fact DF-31 ICBM launch positions.

Five of the launch sites are of a terdrop configuration. An access road connects the launch sites to a nearby main thoroughfare, allowing the road-mobile TELs to travel from garrison to the launch sites with relative ease. There appears to be a calibration marking of some sort in the center of the teardrop launch site, present at all five identified locations. This marking is likely utilized in one of two methods:

1. The TEL may have a calibration marking onboard used to line up with the center of the circle to enable calibration of the DF-31's guidance system. The importance of calibrating the missile with pre-launch coordinates was discussed previously in this article.

2. The missile tube itself may be intended to be erected directly over the circle, which may be reinforced to a greater extent in order to protect it from the exhaust gasses of the missile when it is launched. Alternatively, erecting the missile tube directly over the circle may also serve a guidance calibration function.

One of the Nanyang launch sites can be seen in the following image:


DF-31 Support Facility

A possible support facility for the deployed TELs can be found at the following coordinates: 33°11'55.92"N 112°18'35.33"E. This site features a probable administrative building of some kind, as well as a probable drive-through checkout building for deployed TELs. A possible TEL garage is also present, although the configuration does not appear to represent a drive-through structure. It is possible that this is where missile or warhead mating can occur in the field if necessary.

The support facility is also located in close proximity to two launch sites. One of the sites is the common teardrop configuration. The other site is an apparet abberation, being of circular configuration. The issue of the circular launch site will be addressed later in this article.

The Nanyang DF-31 support facility, also marked in the previous image, can be seen below:


Nanyang DF-31 Garrison Location

Two locations have been identified as potential garrison sites for Brigade 813's DF-31 ICBMs. The first location is sited approximately 10 kilometers west from the center of Nanyang, while the second location is sited approximately 30 kilometers northwest of the center of Nanyang.

The two locations can be found at the following coordinates:

33°00'44.13"N 112°24'52.49"E
33°03'53.05"N 112°12'16.70"E

The westernmost garrison location was still under construction when the image was acquired on 22 December 2003. Examination of the site within the context of a mobile ICBM base would appear to depict garages for support vehicles and equipment, and a TEL garage under construction.

The westernmost garrison site can be seen in the image below:


The easternmost garrison was imaged on 19 December 2005. Given that Brigade 813 was extablished as early as 1999 and relocated to Nanyang at some point thereafter, this is the most likely location for the DF-31 garrison. The first location would logically have been completed much earlier, especially if the launch sites were complete as of November and December 2006 when they were imaged. The easternmost garrison features what an HQ building, troop barracks, and support vehicle garages. There is also a possible TEL drive-through complex along the southwestern end of the garrison. This facility may be intended for pre-dispersal checkout, missile and/or warhead mating, or another undisclosed function. A large building along the western edge of the compond appears to be the likely location for the TEL garage. This is the only facility on the compound which a complete TEL could effectively enter and exit. A significantly taller portion of the building could also allow the TELs to be erected under cover for checkout before being dispersed. Alternatively, the TEL's launch assembly could be erected indoors to allow for the DF-31 launch tubes to be mated vertically, eliminating the need for a separate loading vehicle or system. With the launch assembly lowered and the missile tube stowed for transport, the TEL could then travel to the drive-through complex for warhead mating, although this is speculation.

The easternmost garrison site can be seen in the image below:


Western Launch Positions

The round launch site located near the support facility is clearly an aberration, given the teardrop configuration of the other five launch sites. This location could be used for TEL crew training when calibration of the missile's guidance system is not necessary (for example, when a missile is not loaded on the TEL). The fact that a round launch site is associated with the DF-31 is significant for another reason, however.

The support facility's round launch site is approximately 92 meters in diameter. Further west of the DF-31 launch area are three other launch sites, all sharing the same 92 meter diameter. These additional launch sites are located at the following coordinates:

33°17'35.95"N 111°52'48.79"E
33°15'04.30"N 111°56'40.96"E
33°11'48.49"N 111°58'03.93"E

The locations of the three launch sites can be seen in the image below:


These western launch sites appear to support a road-mobile TEL, indicating that the DF-31 may be their intended user. They are all connected to main thoroughfares via an access road, similar to the launch sites found further east. These launch sites seem to be incomplete and appear to lack concrete surfaces.

One of the western launch sites can be seen in the image below:


The obvious question is whether these launch sites are also associated with the DF-31. Given that 12 missiles has been mentioned in open-source reporting as the typical strength of a missile battalion in the 2nd Artillery Corps, it is possible that they are also subordinate to Brigade 813. These launch sites were imaged in their apparently incomplete state on 21 August 2007. DoD reporting suggests that less than 10 DF-31 ICBMs were in service as of 2008, implying that Brigade 813 was not at full strength. Given that information, it is likely that these sites were being constructed as Brigade 813 was being brought to full strength. They may have been left over from a previous ballistic missile unit (recall the similar layout of the Delingha launch site described above) and are being modified to support the DF-31. Such modifications may include strengthening the pads to support the launch of the DF-31, and possibly adding a calibration marking similar to those seen at the eastern teardrop-shaped launch sites. Alternatively, these launch sites may be related to the DF-31A, which is reported to use a new TEL. A new TEL may not be compatible with the launch sites found to the east, or the DF-31A may simply be more advanced, not requiring an off-board calibration source to acquire pre-launch coordinates.

It has been reported, however, that the TEL for the DF-31A may be an off-road capable vehicle. These launch sites appear to be configured to support a road-mobile vehicle, as mentioned above. Given that Brigade 813 will likely support a total of 12 TELs, and that they are not off-road capable, it is likely that these launch positions are in fact intended to support the DF-31 and not the DF-31A or some other missile system. This also indicates that there are a further three launch positions that have yet to be identified in the available imagery. The reason for the differing launch site configurations will remain a mystery for the present time. Until the mystery is solved, there will always be the question of whether or not the DF-31A is associated with Brigade 813 and the western launch positions. Based on the fact that the western sites were imaged in August of 2007 and that no flight test has been reported for the DF-31A, it remains the opinion of the author that the western sites support Nanyang's DF-31 force. Additionally, the DF-31A has not been associated with Brigade 813 in any open-source reporting.

The complete area of operations for Brigade 813, along with the two possible garrison locations (the western garrison may in fact be under construction to support the western launch positions), can be seen in the image below. Launch sites are marked as black triangles inside of red areas denoting the area directly surrounding the launch sites.


TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

The eastern launch positions do allow an examination of the technical characteristics of the DF-31 ICBM. Each launch site is oriented on a different azimuth, implying that the DF-31 may change aximuth in-flight after launch. The presence of the launch positions also indicates that when using the current TEL the DF-31 cannot be fired from an unsurveyed launch position. The presence of the calibration markings may also indicate that the guidance system of the DF-31 must be calibrated on-site before launch. All of these characteristics indicate that the DF-31 may not be a true survivable mobile ICBM. Eliminating the launch positions would clearly cause problems for the system unless the missile can be calibrated effectively from any location. Without the ability to disperse off-road, the TELs can be located and targeted with greater ease, reducing the effectiveness of the system as a survivable deterrent. These factors alone are likely enough to drive the development of an off-road TEL for the DF-31A.

CONCLUSION

By using effective imagery analysis techniques and available open-source information, the locations of China's DF-31 launch positions within Brigade 813 have been identified with relative certainty. Locating mobile ICBM launch positions is not an easy proposition, and it has taken a significant amount of time and effort to effectively identify the locations of Brigade 813's DF-31 launch sites. However, the relative ease with which these sites were located is yet one more factor to support the development of an off-road TEL for the DF-31A. This article has focused primarily on Brigade 813's DF-31 launch facilities. Efforts to locate and identify launch positions associated with other brigades are currently underway, and the results will be made available in a companion piece to this article.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

The DF-31 and DF-31A
Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008
Nuclear Deterrence Over Taiwan
China's Missile Threat Greater Than Believed
China Reorganizes Northern Nuclear Missile Launch Sites
Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning
DF-31 Initial Threat Availability
China's Military Posture

The Strategic Warfare Reading List

INTRODUCTION

Any serious student or researcher focusing on the concept of strategic warfare can often be hard-pressed to find suitable in-depth source material. The purpose of this article is to provide students, researchers, and historians with a reading list consisting of some of the most interesting and valuable sources that I have collected in the field of strategic warfare.

THE READING LIST

Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat - NASIC
NASIC's report detailing the current major strategic missile systems in service or development is a useful starting point when researching strategic delivery systems. Most major programs are mentioned, and basic details such as range and throw weight are provided, as well as a few choice illustrations. The only serious drawback is that the document is only 30 pages in length, meaning that there is not a great deal of detailed information about any of the systems mentioned therein. However, it is a valuable reference tool, containing data on most major missile non-US missile systems in development or service. This unclassified publication can be found online here.

US Strategic and Defensive Missile Systems 1950-2004 - Mark A Berhow
Number 36 in Osprey Publishing's Fortress Series, this volume is a short yet suprisingly detailed account of the development and deployment of American land-based defensive and strategic missile systems. While naval strategic weapons are not covered, all major US ICBM programs are given mention, as are the HAWK, NIKE and SAFEGUARD defensive missile programs. A final mention is given to the current NMD system being deployed. It should be noted that PATRIOT and THAAD, among others, are not covered, as they have not been deployed as operational defensive systems in the United States.

Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces - Pavel Podvig
This is the single, definitive reference source dealing with the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. All major delivery systems are covered, from strategic bombers to submarine launched ballistic missiles. The technical data is absolutely first rate, and a history of each program is provided. Topics such as nuclear production facilities, nuclear testing, and strategic defense are also covered in exhaustive detail. There are also extensive endnotes for each chapter, with some of them providing further details and insight into little-known weapon systems alluded to or mentioned briefly in the text. The only drawback is that Mr. Podvig's work was published in 2001, and as such does not deal with the most current systems such as the RS-24 ICBM. He does maintain a website here, which provides up-to-date information supplementing his excellent text. This is the one reference work that any serious Cold War researcher simply must obtain.

The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword - Steven J. Zaloga
This is a shorter, less technical alternative to Podvig's work. It shares the same main drawback of being slightly aged, having been published in 2002. The main advantage to Zaloga's work is that the political side of the equation is given more attention, as are many of the developmental systems which did not enter production. The work is organized chronologically, which can be an inconvenience for a researcher focusing on one type of delivery system. The chronological layout does allow for a more historical analysis to be made, allowing the reader to examine the types of delivery systems that were in development concurrently. Zaloga's work does have merit as a secondary source, or as a primary source if Podvig's work cannot be located. Space surveillance, defensive systems, and nuclear testing and production are either not covered in Zaloga's work, or are only briefly mentioned. All in all, an excellent overview of Russian strategic nuclear forces and a better source than Podvig's where the political side is concerned.

The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb - Richard Rhodes
Both of these extensive reference works offer a great deal of historical and political insight into the American nuclear weapons programs during the early days of the Cold War. Be warned; while both books tend to focus more on the political and historical implications of the programs, they do delve into the weapons development aspect and as such can get very technical.

The ABM Treaty Charade - William T. Lee
This is one of the most interesting reference works on the Cold War, and consequently it is also one of the hardest to find. It is a higly technical look at the Soviet nationwide ABM network, the existance of which was denied by Western intelligence during the run-up to the signing of the ABM Treaty. There is a healthy dose of political discourse dealing with the rationale behind the West's ignorance of the USSR's progress, as well as a concise overview of Soviet ABM programs. The bulk of the work details the evidence supporting the idea that a nationwide ABM network existed in the Soviet Union. If a copy can be obtained, this is one of the most significant and revealing works on the Cold War yet published, and the only English-language publication dealing solely with Soviet ABM programs.

Space Weapons, Earth Wars - Bob Preston et al
Anti-missile and anti-satellite systems are becoming the new rage in the field of strategic warfare. While it primarily focuses on space warfare systems from an American standpoint, delving into the rationale behind acquiring such systems and how best to employ them, this reference work is invaluable to anyone interested in the topic as there is a great deal of technical data presented that cannot be found anywhere else. Various types of systems are described, as well as the technical requirements that they must meet in order to be successful. As a RAND publication, it can be found online here.

CONCLUSION

Strategic warfare is one of the most interesting topics in the field of military studies. By using the sources listed above, any researcher will be well on his or her way to gaining a more complete understanding of the weapon systems and the political motives behind their development. As I locate more source material, I will update this article with the relevant details.

Image of the Week: Voronezh

VORONEZH

The image above depicts a facility on the grounds of Voronezh AB in Russia. Voronezh AB is home to the 455th BAP, an Su-24M FENCER D fighter-bomber unit, and the 5th ODRAO, flying the An-30 CLANK. The facility in question, located southwest of the runway near a weapon storage area, appears to be a radar cross-section (RCS) measurement facility. The north end of the facility, visible on the left side of the image above, features numerous mobile and static radar systems. While this could be easily interpreted as the position for either an ATC site associated with the airfield or an EW site associated with SAM batteries in the area, this does not appear to be the case. On the right side of the image above, there is a flat, circular pad for mounting RCS targets. The flat terrain devoid of brush on a direct line of sight from the radar systems to the circular pad indicates that this site is in fact a likely RCS range.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Image of the Week: RAF Molesworth

IMAGE OF THE WEEK

A new feature for the blog here is going to be the Image of the Week. This will be an image depicting something interesting and military related, relating to either a current or historical system or issue. The Image of the Week will appear on Fridays, and they will be tagged with the label "Image of the Week" for archiving and easy lookup.

RAF MOLESWORTH

The image above depicts the former GLCM storage area at RAF Molesworth in England. The BGM-109G Gryphon, a member of the Tomahawk family, was developed as a ground-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missile. The hardened shelters in the image above were used to house the four-round TELs. GLCMs were deployed in Europe in 1983, but had a short service life due to the INF Treaty which banned their existance. Consigned to Cold War history, the BGM-109s were withdrawn by 1991.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-The BGM-109 GLCM

Iran and the S-300PT

INTRODUCTION

Open-source reporting indicates that Iran has purchased the S-300PT SAM system from Belarus. The S-300PT will represent the most modern, advanced SAM system in Iran when it is operationally deployed.

IRANIAN S-300PT SYSTEMS

According to Jane's International Defence Review, Iran is now the owner of four S-300PT battalions. Two of these units were sourced from Belarus, and had been deployed as capital-area air defence units around Minsk. The other two units were sourced from an undisclosed nation and were recently refurbished by Belarussian technicians working at an IRGC facility in Iran, where the units were stored.

A typical Belarussian S-300PT battery consisted of twelve TELs, one 5N63 (FLAP LID) engagement radar, and one 5N66 (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar. It is therefore logical to assume that the two "battalions" obtained from Belarus were in fact two complete firing batteries worth of equipment. Combined with the other two units refurbished in Iran, this gives Iran a total deployable force of approximately four S-300PT batteries.

Jane's goes on to state that both the 5V55K and 5V55R missiles were included in the deal with Belarus, implying that the systems were of the improved S-300PT-1 or S-300PT-1A variant. Baseline S-300PT systems lacked the ability to employ the SAGG-guided 5V55R weapon, and were limited to using the command-guided 5V55K only. It is possible that the extended-range 5V55RUD was also included.

The S-300PT provides Iran with a modern, complex, and very effective SAM system. Iran's current strategic SAM systems, the HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE) and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), are limited by their single-target engagement capability. The S-300PT's 5N63 radar system can prosecute six targets simultaneously, while guiding a maximum of two missiles to each target.

The S-300PT is also a far more mobile system than its Iranian stablemates. It is not, however, a true mobile SAM system. The 5N63 radar system is not vehicle-borne, and is mounted on a towed trailer for transport. 40V6 mast assemblies are required to erect the 5N63 and 5N66 radar systems, although the 5N63 could remain on its trailer for operation if required. These factors lend the S-300PT to a fixed site layout rather than a mobile environment.

POSTULATED DEPLOYMENT

Four S-300PT batteries will result in a significant increase in overall capability, but are not enough to upgrade the entire Iranian air defense network. In order to maximize their effectiveness, Iran will likely adopt one of two deployment strategies. The systems will likely be deployed to protect either significant military facilities, or significant nuclear weapons research and production facilities, or a combination of the two.

Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend militarily significant sites, the following would be the likely locations:

-Tehran, home to Iran's military command
-Tabriz, home to Iran's silo-based missile deterrent
-Bushehr, home to an IrIAF fighter unit and S-200 battery covering much of the Persian Gulf region
-Bandar Abbas, Iran's primary naval facility in the Persian Gulf region and home to the Kilo submarine fleet

The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.


Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend significant nuclear weapons research and development sites, the four likely locations are as follows:

-Tehran, home to the nuclear research center
-Bushehr, home to the contentious nuclear reactor program
-Natanz, home to a fuel enrichment facility
-Esfahan, home to a uranium conversion facility

The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.


To illustrate the limited effect that the S-300PT's presence will have in the context of the overall Iranian air defense picture, consider the following image. In this image, the S-300PTs have been deployed at the nuclear facilities. HQ-2, S-200, and HAWK engagement zones are also displayed, the HQ-2 being denoted by dark red rings, the S-200 by light purple, and the HAWK by orange.


As can be seen, the short-range of even the 5V55RUD-equipped S-300PT does not result in a significant increase in capability. The S-300PT does have a multiple target engagement capability advantage, and this is why the system is likely to be deployed as a point defense asset to protect various facilities. To create a more potent air defense network overall, either a longer-range system would be required, or an increased number of S-300PT batteries.

HARDENED DEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS

On occasion, Iran has turned to North Korea for military assistance. It is possible that North Korea could be called upon to aid in increasing the survivability of Iran's most modern strategic SAM system through the use of hardened launch sites. North Korea has been shown to employ significant hardening techniques at S-125 (SA-3 GOA) and S-200 sites, to include the use of silos used to house the engagement radars, which are ostensibly fitted to elevating platforms. Similar techniques, if employed by the Iranians, could help to make the S-300PT systems far more survivable. Iran has shown a degree of competence in the field of hardened facilities recently with the silo-based missile complex at Tabriz, and could certainly undertake a hardened deployment of the S- 300PT on its own, but North Korean assistance in this regard may still be worthwhile given their experience with hardened siting of SAM systems.

Given the nature of the system, the S-300PT could be deployed in two separate types of hardened facility. The first would feature underground garages for the complete TELs. The second would feature much simpler hardened silos for the individual, sealed launch canisters.

The first example of a hardened site concept for the S-300PT system involves a below-ground, concrete hardened garage. Inside this garage, the 5P85 TEL is mounted. When elevated for launch, a retractable skirt would join the missile tubes with the silo opening. The silo would be covered with quick-opening launch doors, likely covered with debris or dirt when closed to assist in keeping the location hidden. A control bunker would be provided for launch crews, and an entry door would allow the removal of the TEL for maintenance or reloading. Finally, an exhaust extraction fan would prevent the buildup of toxic gasses inside the garage bay.

An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:


The alternative to basing the entire TEL inside of a hardened facility is to simply mount the individual launch canisters inside of hardened silos. These silos would be far cheaper to develop and maintain, and would require far less time to construct given their smaller scale. These remote launch facilities would consist of a number of silos, each containing four 5V55-series launch tubes. As the 5V55 missile tubes are sealed until launch, they could remain inside the silo until they are launched. The only above-ground component required would be a communications antenna, allowing launch commands to be transmitted from the fire control facility. If the radar is located in close proximity, the launch silos could be connected via more secure cables. However, using radio commands would permit the launch sites to be dispersed over greater distances, potentially making them much harder to locate. Basing the missile canisters inside of silo complexes also allows the TELs themselves to be held in reserve in the event that the silo complexes are destroyed, allowing Iran to retain the ability to redeploy the system should the need arise.

An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:


LACK OF EW SUPPORT

The main problem with such a small number of deployable batteries is that they cannot be employed to maximum effect. Doing so would involve the use of EW assets such as the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW radars to provide target acquisition data. the 5N63 engagement radar employed by the S-300PT can perform independent target acquisition functions, but the system is more effective with off-board cueing, providing quicker reaction times. A long-range radar system such as the 64N6 can also acquire targets at roughly twice the range of the 5N63, providing a greater degree of early warning and enhanced situational awareness.

As there is no evidence to suggest that Iran obtained either the 36D6 or the 64N6, it is likely that the batteries will, for the time being, be left to operate as independent units. In this regard, it is entirely possible that Iran may choose to keep its S-300PT batteries garrisoned, deploying them to predetermined locations when the need arises. The only issue with this strategy is that the S-300PT does require a semi-prepared site to operate from, and such sites, unless they are of the hardened, sub-surface variety described earlier, are easily located in overhead imagery.

CONCLUSION

The S-300PT represents the most advanced SAM system in the Iranian inventory. When the Belarussian systems are delivered, the four S-300PT batteries will represent a serious roadblock towards a limited incursion by an aggressor such as Israel seeking to destabilize the region by striking Iranian nuclear weapons production facilities. The S-300PT will not, however, close Iranian airspace to a large-scale aerial offensive. To achieve that goal, Iran must continue to pursue acquisition of more modern S-300PM-1/2 or S-400 SAM systems from Russia, and the EW systems to integrate them on a national level.

SOURCES

-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-SAM range data taken from Jane's Land-Based Air Defence
-"Iran set to acquire S-300PTs from Belarus" - Jane's International Defence Review, February 1, 2008