The Chinese SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s, the Chinese military finally began to give proper attention to developing an adequate air defense network capable of providing a credible defense of key areas. Thanks to the import of advanced SAM systems from Russia, as well as the rapid progress made in the development and fielding of indigenous SAM systems, the Chinese air defense network entered the 21st Century as a credible and potent facet of the Chinese military machine.

SAM SYSTEMS

The Chinese air defense network relies primarily on Soviet and Russian imported systems, as well as reverse-engineered and indigenous systems. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE), HQ-9, KS-1A, FM-90, S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE), and S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE). These sites are supported by 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) and 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW radar systems.

Currently, there are 65 active SAM sites which have been identified inside of China. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. HQ-2 sites are red, HQ-9 sites are green, KS-1A sites are yellow, FM-90 sites are blue, S-300PMU sites are purple, and S-300PMU-1 sites are orange. Empty sites are denoted by white icons. EW sites, of which there are 12, are blue.


The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Chinese air defense sites. Following the color scheme identified above, HQ-2 range rings are dark red, HQ-9 rings are green, KS-1A rings are yellow, FM-90 rings are blue, S-300PMU rings are purple, and S-300PMU-1 rings are orange. EW radar range rings are blue.


HQ-2

There are currently 47 active HQ-2 sites at the following coordinates:

43 57' 56.48" N 87 26' 04.35" E
43 56' 56.92" N 87 40' 25.23" E
43 46' 05.28" N 87 28' 24.39" E
41 05' 15.95" N 100 31' 13.54" E
41 05' 04.24" N 100 31' 10.77" E
38 29' 25.41" N 105 59' 57.04" E
38 29' 20.77" N 105 59' 47.49" E
40 39' 19.23" N 109 36' 43.02" E
40 39' 28.36" N 110 03' 41.50" E
40 42' 18.63" N 114 57' 11.74" E
40 51' 25.09" N 115 51' 25.09" E
40 21' 12.52" N 115 52' 58.29" E
40 39' 52.53" N 115 02' 44.28" E
39 58' 49.55" N 115 42' 41.87" E
40 18' 11.86" N 115 38' 22.04" E
40 13' 16.97" N 115 24' 56.77" E
40 27' 32.15" N 116 01' 11.44" E
40 21' 33.06" N 116 21' 08.72" E
40 12' 36.39" N 116 51' 02.93" E
40 57' 16.65" N 117 57' 18.72" E
39 07' 56.67" N 117 37' 31.02" E
38 51' 41.70" N 117 26' 09.17" E
38 46' 59.13" N 117 00' 18.79" E
42 04' 19.37" N 121 44' 02.18" E
39 00' 25.39" N 121 37' 43.17" E
37 46' 13.80" N 120 47' 42.16" E
36 32' 03.30" N 104 08' 54.96" E
34 26' 50.92" N 107 21' 28.94" E
34 39' 27.90" N 108 58' 08.92" E
30 59' 49.15" N 103 45' 30.21" E
30 13' 01.52" N 103 30' 21.10" E
30 52' 13.84" N 114 26' 22.44" E
30 19' 25.46" N 114 12' 53.40" E
32 27' 14.41" N 118 49' 31.58" E
32 17' 54.73" N 119 11' 36.01" E
31 36' 14.45" N 118 59' 57.68" E
31 14' 32.63" N 121 44' 29.17" E
30 52' 57.09" N 121 52' 19.96" E
25 35' 33.94" N 119 26' 57.85" E
24 40' 09.12" N 118 16' 51.74" E
24 34' 06.07" N 117 39' 37.66" E
24 30' 04.50" N 117 52' 35.91" E
23 30' 44.34" N 113 16' 37.04" E
23 09' 41.30" N 113 23' 32.51" E
23 09' 05.76" N 113 23' 56.26" E
23 08' 33.07" N 113 03' 18.99" E
21 23' 24.91" N 110 11' 22.25" E

The following image depicts the coverage provided by China's HQ-2 systems:


HQ-9

There are currently three active HQ-9 sites at the following coordinates:

41 04' 38.63" N 100 31' 18.03" E
34 37' 14.21" N 108 42' 23.62" E
40 21' 20.79" N 116 41' 01.81" E

The following image depicts the coverage provided by China's HQ-9 systems:


KS-1A

There are currently two active KS-1A sites at the following coordinates:

23 27' 13.40" N 116 43' 08.78" E
24 54' 51.79" N 102 33' 47.22" E

The following image depicts the coverage provided by China's KS-1A systems:


FM-90

There is currently one active FM-90 site at the following coordinates:

39 59' 51.16" N 117 03' 41.29" E

The following image depicts the coverage provided by China's FM-90 systems:


S-300PMU

There are currently four active S-300PMU sites at the following coordinates:

39 22' 44.83" N 116 07' 52.16" E
39 54' 35.31" N 117 43' 05.32" E
28 45' 43.43" N 115 50' 29.83" E
28 45' 06.19" N 115 50' 27.32" E

The following image depicts the coverage provided by China's S-300PMU systems:


S-300PMU-1

There are currently eight active S-300PMU-1 sites at the following coordinates:

39 33' 46.38" N 116 24' 53.92" E
39 34' 36.23" N 116 45' 38.76" E
31 49' 24.13" N 121 51' 00.74" E
31 29' 24.62" N 121 16' 43.06" E
30 52' 53.43" N 121 52' 16.39" E
30 50' 17.44" N 121 33' 41.51" E
25 34' 34.83" N 119 27' 15.47" E
25 01' 59.85" N 118 48' 26.28" E

The following image depicts the coverage provided by China's S-300PMU-1 systems:


EW SITES

There are currently 12 active 36D6 and 64N6 EW radar sites at the following coordinates:

36D6 39 22' 43.26" N 116 07' 45.25" E
36D6 39 34' 30.54" N 116 45' 36.03" E
36D6 39 54' 40.50" N 117 42' 59.92" E
36D6 31 49' 27.83" N 121 50' 57.51" E
36D6 31 29' 20.32" N 121 16' 45.34" E
36D6 30 52' 48.49" N 121 52' 14.60" E
36D6 30 50' 21.37" N 121 33' 45.26" E
36D6 25 34' 29.47" N 119 27' 17.96" E
36D6 25 01' 56.02" N 118 48' 26.63" E
36D6 28 45' 00.62" N 115 50' 26.92" E
64N6 39 33' 58.53" N 116 24' 19.77" E
64N6 31 17' 24.08" N 121 41' 11.47" E

The following image depicts the coverage provided by China's EW radar systems:


EMPTY SITES

There are currently 19 unoccupied, prepared SAM and EW radar sites inside of China. These sites have been identified as to their projected occupant based on their configurations.

China's empty SAM and EW radar sites are located at the following coordinates:

HQ-2 41 38' 51.28" N 86 20' 57.95" E
HQ-2 40 14' 05.32" N 97 11' 45.09" E
HQ-2 40 13' 06.48" N 97 12' 09.83" E
HQ-2 36 49' 11.60" N 100 45' 47.72" E
HQ-2 36 48' 54.95" N 100 45' 53.60" E
HQ-2 35 53' 56.62" N 103 16' 31.59" E
HQ-2 34 44' 25.71" N 108 03' 23.04" E
HQ-2 28 20' 34.38" N 116 14' 29.46" E
HQ-2 21 23' 07.25" N 110 11' 31.92" E
HQ-6 30 30' 09.47" N 104 18' 13.51" E
HQ-9 36 32' 14.19" N 104 08' 34.30" E
S-300P 39 48' 24.03" N 117 02' 41.85" E
S-300P 40 06' 55.22" N 116 59' 21.36" E
S-300P 39 00' 18.45" N 121 24' 00.40" E
S-300P 38 47' 07.00" N 121 09' 36.08" E
S-300P 37 45' 44.44" N 120 43' 09.59" E
S-300P 36 21' 30.04" N 120 15' 02.68" E
S-300P 24 40' 06.99" N 118 16' 58.96" E
64N6 39 00' 57.26" N 121 24' 08.86" E

These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting, a task which can be especially effective when highly mobile SAM systems are employed. Empty, unoccupied sites can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector. Many of these sites, particularly those associated with newer systems such as the HQ-9 and the S-300P family, may have already been constructed in anticipation of the delivery of the systems to occupy them.

An overview of unoccupied Chinese SAM sites is provided in the following image:


THE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK

Point Defense

The current structure of the Chinese air defense system lends itself to point defense rather than true national defense. Over 70% of the deployed SAM systems are relatively short-ranged HQ-2 variants, capable of engaging a single target per battery to a range of 35 kilometers. There are large areas of the nation which remain undefended by any strategic SAM assets, although in truth many of these areas, particularly those in Western China, are largely uninhabited, or are simply not under any projected threat due to geographical constraints and political realities.

National S-300 Coverage

In an effort to enhance the capability of the air defense networks, S-300PMU systems were ordered from Russia in 1991. These systems were delivered in 1993 and placed on combat duty around Beijing. S-300PMU-1 systems were ordered in 1994, with deliveries being complete in 2004. The latest acquisition has been S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE) systems. Separate orders were placed in 2004 and 2006 for the S-300PMU-2; according to the US DoD, deliveries should begin to take place within the next few years. S-300PMU-1 systems were initially positioned to defend Beijing and Shanghai, with further deployments along the Formosa Strait. The addition of S-300PMU-1 systems around Beijing likely allowed for some S-300PMU batteries to be redeployed around Nanchang.

The S-300P series SAM systems brought a significant increase in capability to the Chinese air defense network. For the first time, individual SAM sites would enjoy multiple target engagement capability. The effective area of coverage was also greatly increased, as even the S-300PMU possessed a range nearly three times that of the HQ-2.

Primary Areas Of Coverage

The first area to be examined is the area surrounding the capital Beijing. Beijing is defended by 14 HQ-2 sites, 1 HQ-9 site, 1 FM-90 site, 2 S-300PMU sites, and 2 S-300PMU-1 sites. Two unoccupied S-300P sites provide the ability to enhance the air defense of the capital should the need arise. Air defense of the capital is extremely layered. Long-range HQ-9 and S-300P family SAMs provide the most capable element of the network, with the five sites capable of engaging a total of 30 simultaneous targets, or six per battery. Shorter-range HQ-2 and FM-90 sites provide close-in defense against targets approaching from the north or the southeast. While the HQ-2 sites can only engage one target per battery at a time, the FM-90 can engage three simultaneous targets. The extrememly short range of the FM-90 when compared to the other systems makes its impact negligible at best, however, apart from perhaps serving as a last-ditch defensive system against cruise missiles. The impact of the single target engagement capability of the HQ-2 is compensated for by placing the sites in close enough proximity to allow for overlapping areas of coverage. As it stands, the systems deployed around Beijing provide it with a robust air defense network capable of dealing with both high performance and low RCS targets. One of the strengths of the Beijing network is the presence of 36D6 and 64N6 EW radars co-located with the various S-300P systems. These radars provide very long range target acquisition and handoff to the various SAM batteries in the area. While they are designed to work with the S-300P family of SAM systems, it is likely that the other SAM systems in the area can accept target handoffs from the EW assets, in particular the 64N6 battle management radar facility.

The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Beijing:


The main limiting factor affecting SAM operations in the Beijing area is the terrain to the north and west of the city. Many of the HQ-2 sites are placed in valleys where the terrain would negatively impact the engagement radar's field of view. The HQ-2 does have a degraded performance at low altitude, although not to the extent of most legacy S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) systems, and the terrain where many of the sites have been placed precludes their ability to engage low-to-medium altitude targets at certain ranges.

Consider the example of the HQ-2 site situated near Chai-t'ang at 39 58' 49.55" N 115 42' 41.87" E The Chai-t'ang HQ-2 site and the nearby terrain can be seen in the 3D image below:


Along an azimuth of approximately 310 degrees, there is a 4500 foot peak located 5.7 kilometers from the SAM site. The peak can be seen in the upper left corner of the above image. The site itself is situated at an altitude of 1257 feet above sea level, so the peak is in reality a 3423 foot high object in the radar's field of view along that bearing. Given that information, it can be determined that an object flying a reciprocal heading below 23,500 feet above sea level at a range of 35 kilometers cannot be engaged by the system. Moreover, if the object is flying at an altitude of below 1850 feet, it will be able to pass within the 7 kilometer minimum engagement range of the system. This example clearly illustrates the negative impact that even a minimal amount of terrain in the area can have on the effectiveness of a SAM system.

For an illustrated example of the engagement issue described above, consult the following graphic:


The Shanghai area is protected by four HQ-2 sites and four S-300PMU-1 sites. The presence of four S-300PMU-1 sites in the area has served to make the airspace over Shanghai one of the most heavily defended in all of China, even more so than that over Beijing. As is the case around Beijing, the S-300P sites benefit from a significant amount of EW radar support. Each battery is deployed with a 36D6 EW radar for target acquisition, with a centrally located 64N6 radar providing longer-range coverage and overall battle management.

The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Shanghai:


The one area in China which may realistically need to call on the air defense network at some point in the future is the coastal area bordering the Formosa Strait. This area, stretching from Fuzhou in the north to Shantou in the south, is defended by four HQ-2 sites, one KS-1A site, and two S-300PMU-1 sites. One unoccupied S-300P family SAM site, under construction as of February 2005, is also located in the area. This site, which has likely been completed since the date of the available imagery, is positioned to ostensibly provide a home for one of China's as-yet undelivered S-300PMU-2 batteries, or an older S-300P series battery unlocated by an S-300PMU-2 deployment in the north. The HQ-2 and KS-1A batteries can only provide short-range point defense, adding little to the cross-strait air defense picture. The KS-1A does enjoy an increased engagement range over the HQ-2, 50 km to 35 km, and can engage three targets per battery, but still lacks the range to provide any serious air defense of the strait. That being said, the presence of two S-300PMU-1 batteries in the area provide an overlapping area of coverage that encompasses the bulk of the airspace over the strait. These two batteries, supported by two co-located 36D6 EW radar stations, represent a serious threat to any inbound air-breathing target approaching the Chinese coast.

The following image depicts the SAM coverage in the vicinity of the Formosa Strait:


In the cases of both Shanghai and the Formosa Strait, terrain is nowhere near the factor as it is around Beijing. The potential off-shore threat ingress routes are relatively unobstructed, and the open waters provide no terrain concerns for obvious reasons. There are some high peaks situated near the HQ-2 sites located along the Strait, but they are not necessarily a significantly important factor as the S-300PMU-1 sites possess the ability to engage targets well offshore. That being said, terrain is still a factor for many HQ-2 sites throughout China, severely limiting their combat effectiveness in some cases. This draws into question the intelligence behind placing the sites in clearly compromised positions, when they could have been simply sited atop the nearby peaks and suffered no ill effects from terrain interfering with the radar picture. Most of those HQ-2 sites, however, are situated so far inland that were they called upon to defend Chinese airspace, their locations and the effect of the surrounding terrain would be the least of China's problems. It is likely that the SAM sites in these areas are only intended to provide a last line of defense, with airborne interceptors providing the bulk of the air defense coverage.

MODERNIZATION

The Chinese air defense network is currently in a transitional phase. Until the 1990s, China was forced to rely on aging HQ-2 systems to provide the bulk of its ground-based air defense. The influx of advanced Russian SAM systems such as the S-300PMU-1 served to make the Chinese air defense network far more robust and capable, combining long range with multiple target engagement capability, two features lacking in the HQ-2. China has also pursued the development of indigenous SAM systems to supplement the Russian systems. The primary strategic SAM systems currently being deployed are the KS-1A, a direct follow-on to the HQ-2, and the HQ-9, an analog to the S-300PMU.

Various short range systems have also been produced, and they are often situated at prepared sites to provide close-in defense of point targets and strategic SAM assets. The most current short-range systems being deployed are the FM-90 and the HQ-6. Only one example of each site can currently be located inside of China, with the FM-90 being deployed near Beijing and an unoccupied HQ-6 site being present near Chengdu.

Beijing's FM-90 battery can be seen in the image below:


Chengdu's HQ-6 site can be seen in the image below:


Apart from the appearance of new SAM systems, the modernization of existing SAM sites can be examined in open-source imagery. A prime example is the modernization of the SAM site located in the southeastern portion of Shanghai. In June of 2002, this site, as can be seen in the image below, was occupied by an active HQ-2 battery:


The aforementioned HQ-2 site was later reprofiled to serve as the home to an S-300PMU-1 battery, and was occupied by May of 2006, as can be seen in the image below:


It would appear that it takes approximately five months to reconfigure an HQ-2 site to house an S-300P series battery. The Tieshan HQ-2 site was unoccupied by November of 2005, as can be seen in the image below. Note the presence of an HQ-2 engagement radar and launch rail in the lower right portion of the image. This is a common practice with HQ-2 sites which are being reprofiled, as it allows them to retain a degree of air defense capability while they await reconfiguration and reoccupation.


By April of 2006, the Tieshan HQ-2 site was reconfigured to support an S-300P series battery, as can be seen in the image below, although the site is currently unoccupied:


Some sites, as is the case with the Jiaomei site depicted below, retained their HQ-2 batteries after modernization, ostensibly in anticipation of receiving an S-300P series battery at a later date:


The modernization efforts also involved the creation of new SAM sites throughout the country. These sites could serve as home to new systems being procured, or could serve as redeployment locations for existing units during wartime. An example of a new SAM site which was constructed from the ground up is the currently unoccupied S-300P series SAM site found near Zhonghuabu. This site was completed by February of 2006, and examination of the area in earlier imagery illustrates the fact that there was no SAM site present in the area before the new site was constructed.

The unoccupied Zhonghuabu S-300P series SAM site can be seen in the image below:


PROJECTED NETWORK STRUCTURE

With a plethora of new, more modern SAM systems being fielded, and with new S-300PMU-2 batteries due to be delivered over the next few years, the future architecture of the Chinese air defense network can be theorized. The key elements to consider are the deployment of the new S-300PMU-2 batteries, the replacement of obsolete HQ-2 systems with newer KS-1A batteries, and the potential locations for new SAM site locations.

With seven S-300P series SAM sites currently unoccupied within China, there is a good deal of room to expand the deployed force to accomodate the incoming S-300PMU-2 systems. The S-300PMU-2 enjoys an increased range of up to 200 kilometers, 50 kilometers than the current Chinese standout, the S-300PMU-1. This is due to the incorporation of the 48N6E2 missile, supplementing the 48N6E found in the older system. With newer and longer ranged S-300P variants poised to enter service, one option open to the Chinese air defense network is the reorganization of existing S-300P family assets to place the longer-ranged systems in areas where their increased capabilities will have the best effect.

For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that the S-300PMU batteries and their associated 36D6 EW radars will remain in place, and that existing 36D6 radar systems would be removed from sites retasked to support the S-300PMU-2. S-300PMU systems remain in place due to the fact that there is no logical reason to redeploy them elsewhere when more capable systems are available, and 36D6 radar systems deployed with S-300PMU-1 batteries would be outranged by the S-300PMU-2's 48N6E2 missile. Also, S-300PMU-1 and 64N6 positions surrounding Shanghai have not been altered, and therefore will not be discussed.

The new S-300PMU-2 batteries will likely be deployed in two areas: the area surrounding Beijing, and the Formosa Strait operating area. The added range of the S-300PMU-2 makes these two locations likely homes for different reasons. The S-300PMU-2's longer range would be well suited for defending the skies over Beijing as it would allow the interception of inbound targets at increased range. With two S-300PMU-1 batteries already in place around Beijing and two unoccupied sites available, it can therefore be assumed that four batteries will be in place around Beijing. The missile system's range is also a factor when considering the Formosa Strait, as it would provide an expanded intercept capability consuming the bulk of the airspace over the water as well as reaching up to 30 kilometers inland over the northern half of the island of Formosa. Two existing S-300PMU-1 batteries and one unoccupied site in the area could provide a home for three S-300PMU-2 batteries.

Deploying the S-300PMU-2 in the pattern described above will displace four S-300PMU-1 batteries. These batteries can then be used to occupy the remaining four unoccupied S-300P family sites located throughout the northeastern portion of China. Two sites near Dalian and one near Penglai would provide coverage for the bulk of the Bohai Gulf, including the new SSBN facility at Xiaopingdao and the naval construction yards of Dalian. The remaining site near Qingdao would provide coverage for the naval bases in the area, including the current home port of China's Xia-class SSBN. This is an extremely likely course of action given the current state of the air defense network in the area, consisting solely of two active HQ-2 batteries and the aforementioned unoccupied sites.

The current air defense coverage of the Bohai Gulf can be seen in the following image:


Battle management would be expanded to take into account the new SAM deployments as well. An unoccupied 64N6 radar position located near Yingchengzi would provide coverage for the Bohai Gulf. It can also be postulated that a 64N6 radar set would be deployed to support the southern S-300PMU-2 batteries defending the Formosa Strait, as the existing 36D6 radar systems would be removed for the aforementioned reason.

With the aforementioned deployment and redeployment of S-300P series SAM systems, the Chinese S-300P batteries and their associated EW radars would be located at the following positions:

S-300PMU 39 22' 44.83" N 116 07' 52.16" E
S-300PMU 39 54' 35.31" N 117 43' 05.32" E
S-300PMU 28 45' 43.43" N 115 50' 29.83" E
S-300PMU 28 45' 06.19" N 115 50' 27.32" E
S-300PMU-1 39 00' 18.45" N 121 24' 00.40" E
S-300PMU-1 38 47' 07.00" N 121 09' 36.08" E
S-300PMU-1 37 45' 44.44" N 120 43' 09.59" E
S-300PMU-1 36 21' 30.04" N 120 15' 02.68" E
S-300PMU-1 31 49' 24.13" N 121 51' 00.74" E
S-300PMU-1 31 29' 24.62" N 121 16' 43.06" E
S-300PMU-1 30 52' 53.43" N 121 52' 16.39" E
S-300PMU-1 30 50' 17.44" N 121 33' 41.51" E
S-300PMU-2 25 34' 34.83" N 119 27' 15.47" E
S-300PMU-2 25 01' 59.85" N 118 48' 26.28" E
S-300PMU-2 24 40' 06.99" N 118 16' 58.96" E
S-300PMU-2 39 33' 46.38" N 116 24' 53.92" E
S-300PMU-2 39 34' 36.23" N 116 45' 38.76" E
S-300PMU-2 39 48' 24.03" N 117 02' 41.85" E
S-300PMU-2 40 06' 55.22" N 116 59' 21.36" E
36D6 39 22' 43.26" N 116 07' 45.25" E
36D6 39 54' 40.50" N 117 42' 59.92" E
36D6 28 45' 00.62" N 115 50' 26.92" E
64N6 39 00' 57.26" N 121 24' 08.86" E
64N6 39 33' 58.53" N 116 24' 19.77" E
64N6 31 17' 24.08" N 121 41' 11.47" E
64N6 25 02' 03.28" N 118 48' 13.77" E

The coverage area of China's rearranged S-300P series SAM batteries is shown in the following image:


It can be seen in the image above that there are two obvious gaps in the coverage of the new network. The first can be found between Qingdao and Shanghai, with the second being found between Shanghai and Fuzhou. Given the proximity to Japan and South Korea, the first coverage gap should be deemed to be the more significant. Formosan aircraft desiging to strike at Chinese positions between and behind the area between Fuzhou and Shantou would have to go far out of their way to circumnavigate the S-300PMU-2's engagement range, so the southern gap is of less strategic significance.

When determining the best method of sealing the northern gap, and thereby providing a nearly contiguous line of defense from Chengzitan in the north to Shantou in the south, there are two important variables to consider. Firstly, the Qingdao S-300PMU-1 battery is not sufficiently positioned to fully take advantage of the 64N6 EW site near Dalian. Secondly, China's S-300PMU-2 order is believed to include a minimum of eight batteries, leaving one battery unaccounted for in the redistribution of assets described above. By placing the extant S-300PMU-2 battery near Batan and an associated 64N6 EW radar near Lianyugang, the gap is effectively closed, and the Qingdao S-300PMU-1 battery gains full situational awareness. The new assets are postulated to be located at the following coordinates:

S-300PMU-2 34 16' 38.23" N 120 08' 53.09" E
64N6 34 36' 27.23" N 119 23' 16.85" E

The effect of this new deployment can be seen in the image below:


With regards to the southern gap, there are two options. First, given that the eighth S-300PMU-2 battery has now been accounted for, the deployment of an indigenous HQ-9 battery is a possible solution. This does not represent the best course of action, however. The level of interoperability between the HQ-9 and the Russian-made 36D6 and 64N6 EW radars supporting the S-300P series systems is unknown. It is possible that the HQ-9 is not fully compatible with the Russian-made radar systems, and as such there would potentially be a degradation of the overall network as a result. If the network is based primarily on inputs from the 64N6 battle management stations, then there would be a portion of the network lacking situational awareness. A more plausible solution, therefore, is to forward deploy one of the S-300PMU batteries from Nanchang. This allows the system to remain contiguous and the overall network to function as a whole, as the associated 36D6 EW radar system is compatible with the 64N6 battle management stations which would be deployed in the area as previously discussed. A further option would be to simply rely on airborne interceptors to act as gap fillers in the area, but this would deny the overall network the input from the 36D6 EW radar which would be present as part of the S-300PMU battery.

Covering The Strait

The air defense network bordering the Formosa Strait remains a prime candidate for future reorganization. Replacement of legacy systems with newer, more capable models has already been noticed. The KS-1A site situated north of Shantou was previously home to an HQ-2 battery as recently as 2005. By 2007, the HQ-2 components had been replaced by the newer, more capable system.

The following image depicts the Shantou HQ-2 site as it appeared in 2005:


The following image depicts the Shantou KS-1A site as it appeared in 2007:


The HQ-2 has also apparently given way to the S-300P series in the area. The unoccupied S-300P site located near Xindian can be identified as a former HQ-2 site based on the continued presence of HQ-2 components in the immediate area. Currently available imagery captured in February of 2005 clearly illustrates the construction efforts which were ongoing at the time. While the site was being reworked, the HQ-2 battery was redeployed in an adjacent area to continue providing air defense, albeit at a reduced capacity with only four launch rails being employed.

The following image depicts the S-300P site construction at Xindian:


With the above information in mind, it can be postulated that in the future, existing HQ-2 sites not already associated with future S-300P locations will likely be retasked as KS-1A sites. Given this information, and taking into account the future deployment strategy for the S-300P series batteries previously discussed, the future air defense network along the Formosa Strait will likely resemble the following illustration:


Note that the Jiaomei S-300P site currently occupied by an HQ-2 battery has not been reoccupied by an S-300P series battery, but rather by a KS-1A battery. This is due to the fact that the Jiaomei site is something of an enigma, possessing what appears to be six launch positions, four of them of the type found on S-300P series sites and two of them of the type found on the KS-1A site near Kunming. This would appear to indicate that the site is capable of accepting either system. For the purpose of this analysis, the site is considered to be either a current HQ-2 site or a future KS-1A site, although the prospect of a future S-300P series deployment cannot be ruled out, either as a new addition or a redeployment from a currently occupied location.

This unorthodox site layout can also be seen at the Longtian HQ-2 site seen in the image below. It is possible that this site layout was developed for the Formosa Strait air defense network to allow the deployment and relocation of multiple types of SAM systems based on availability and operational need. It should be noted that neither the Longtian site nor the Jiaomei site appear to possess raised berms for the engagement radar which are associated with S-300P series SAM sites, providing an indication that perhaps they are intended to primarily serve as HQ-2/KS-1A sites, with the ability to support an S-300P series battery should the need arise, and further validating the decision to postulate that they will be occupied by KS-1A batteries in the future.


The Bohai Gulf

With two HQ-2 sites currently providing the only air defense over the Bohai Gulf, it is likely that this region will face reorganization at some point in the future. As was the case with the Formosa Strait, the S-300P series deployment strategy has already been examined. However, given the strategic nature of many of the facilities in the area, it is likely that the HQ-2 batteries will give way to KS-1A batteries as well.

The postulated future air defense network in the Bohai Gulf area, based on the replacement of HQ-2 batteries with KS-1A batteries and the complete occupation of S-300P series sites in the area, can be seen in the image below:


HQ-9 Deployments

With the attention given to deploying the long-range S-300PMU-1 and S-300PMU-2 SAM systems along the eastern periphery of China, one question that must be asked is where the HQ-9 batteries will deploy. Currently, there are two active HQ-9 batteries inside of China, with a third unit deployed for system trials at Shuangchengzi. There is one unoccupied HQ-9 site situated inside of China, near Baiyim, and this site may hold the first part of the answer to uncovering China's future deployment strategy of the HQ-9 SAM system. Recall the example of the Xindian S-300P site. In that example, it was determined that the location had previously been home to an HQ-2 site, based on the presence of HQ-2 components in the area while the site was being reprofiled to accept an S-300P series battery. The same can be said of the Baiyim HQ-9 site. In this example, there are three HQ-2 launch rails deployed with an engagement radar in an area adjacent to where the HQ-9 site was constructed. This would indicate, as was the case at Xindian, that the SAM site was previously arranged to support an HQ-2 battery.

The Baiyim HQ-2 and HQ-9 locations can be seen in the image below:


The second part of this equation is the deployment of an HQ-9 battery north of Xian. Xian, like Baiyim, is located deep within Chinese territory. While there are no HQ-2 components in the immediate vicinity (an unlikely occurrence as the site is occupied by an HQ-9 battery), there are two other HQ-2 batteries deployed at prepared sites in the area. It is therefore plausible that the Xian HQ-9 battery displaced an HQ-2 battery following modification of the site to accept the new SAM system.

HQ-2 Replacements

Taking into account the Baiyim and Xian HQ-9 deployments, it can be postulated that HQ-9 batteries will be deployed to replace inland HQ-2 batteries, greatly increasing the effectiveness of the air defense network in those areas. The only question that must then be answered is which batteries will be replaed by the HQ-9 and which batteries will be replaced by the KS-1A, but there is not enough evidence to support drawing a definitive conclusion in that regard. It would seem, given the Shantou KS-1A deployment, that coastal HQ-2 batteries may be replaced by the KS-1A, with inland batteries being replaced by the HQ-9.

The exception to the above strategy is the deployment of the HQ-9 battery near Beijing. This should not be seen as an abberation, however. The HQ-9 production and checkout facilities are located in Beijing, and the presence of an operational HQ-9 battery in the area would serve to evaluate the system in an operational context. The prospect that Beijing-area HQ-2 batteries could be replaced by HQ-9 batteries cannot, however, be ruled out, given the strategic significance of the area.

The deployment of an inland KS-1A battery near Kunming would also seem to refute the concept of replacing coastal HQ-2 batteries with the new KS-1A system. It is therefore possible that the HQ-9 and KS-1A will be deployed geographically, with northern HQ-2 batteries being replaced by the HQ-9 and southern HQ-2 batteries being replaced by the KS-1A. To reiterate, there is simply not enough information available at this juncture to draw a definitive conclusion one way or the other.

CONCLUSION

The ever-evolving nature of the Chinese air defense network is an interesting process to observe. No longer reliant on obsolete HQ-2 SAM systems, the new generation systems being fielded in increasing numbers will ensure that Chinese airspace remains well defended well into the 21st Century. This will serve to maintain the peace and security in the region by providing a credible deterrent against incursion into Chinese airspace.

SOURCES

-SAM and EW radar ranges taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.
-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

-Range rings constructed using the Google Earth Circle Generator

China's S-300 Systems
"US DoD examines China's military rise," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, July 01, 2007

HQ-2 SAM System Site Analysis
HQ-9 SAM System Site Analysis
KS-1A SAM System Site Analysis
S-300P SAM System Site Analysis

Current Developments

INTRODUCTION

Just a quick note to keep you all informed on the current goings-on related to this site and its content.

IMINT & ANALYSIS FEATURED IN JANE'S

As online subscribers have no doubt discovered, Jane's Missiles & Rockets has two articles in their February print edition featuring the work of this website. In "Iran may have lined up S-300 SAM systems", my work detailing Iran's air defense network is discussed. "China deploys KS-1A SAM" is a report detailing my discovery of the first KS-1A SAM site in China, featured first on this blog a month ago. Hopefully I can contribute more to Jane's and other industry-related publications in the future.

FORTHCOMING PROJECTS

The next three articles for this site are being prepared, and they are going to take a little bit of time, so bear with me. The most extensive is going to be an analysis of China's air defense network, with a good deal of future projection mixed in. Special attention will be given to air defenses along the Taiwan Strait. The other two articles are going to be a feature on Russian space surveillance facilities (inspired by my recent discovery of the Far East Krona site in Google Earth) and an analysis of the impact of the S-300PT in Iranian service.

SAM SITE PROJECTS

The SAM Site .kmz file for Google Earth is still updated on a regular basis whenever I have enough new locations to warrant uploading a new file. I am also looking at developing a document based on that data, something along the lines of a guide to worldwide SAM systems broken down by nation, and featuring location data and information on the numbers and types of individual components at each location.

THE S-300P

I am still preparing what should be the definitive look at the S-300P SAM system, to replace an earlier article on this site, as well as numerous other things. Smaller-scope articles will still be posted as time permits, but my current primary focus is on the Chinese article, so bear with me if the site appears stagnant for a week or so.

CONCLUSION

As always, comments are welcome and encouraged. I'd encourage visitors to post a comment to this thread to suggest ideas for future articles as well.

China's J-10: An Imagery Analysis

INTRODUCTION

The most important modernisation program underway within China's PLAAF is the introduction of the Chengdu J-10 into widespread service. The J-10 is a modern, 4th generation fighter aircraft combining a canard-delta layout with modern avionics and a BVR air-to-air weapon system. Careful analysis of current and past open-source overhead imagery has provided a detailed look at the current status of the J-10 program insofar as operational deployment is concerned. This highlights the value of overhead imagery as an analysis tool, as the J-10 program was not even officially acknowledged by the Chinese military until late 2006. Such secrecy is common in China, and goes a long way towards discrediting the various designs purported to represent the next-generation XXJ, which were revealed as far back as 2002. The fact that China refused to acknowledge an aircraft already visible in hundreds of photographs but at the same time was releasing images of the designs competing for a new stealthy fighter program would seem to be an obvious contradiction in policy, but that is another issue entirely.

TEST FACILITIES

Chengdu

Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) is the manufacturer of the J-10 fighter aircraft. Many of the early flight tests took place from Chengdu's facility located northwest of Chengdu in central China. Many of the prototypes are still located at the CAC facility and continue to serve various purposes in the continued development of the J-10.

The following image depicts the J-10 area at CAC's flight test facility:


Xian-Yanliang
Xian-Yanliang is home to the Chinese Flight Test Establishment, or CFTE. The CFTE handles the bulk of the flight test programs for the PLAAF, and as such evaluated the J-10 extensively. Xian-Yanliang is located to the northeast of Xian in central China.

The following image depicts a J-10 on the ramp at the CFTE facility:


Dingxin AB
Dingxin airbase, located in north central China near the Shuangchengzi missile test range, is home to a great deal of PLAAF flight test efforts. Pockmarked terrain and targets marked in the desert indicate that among other things, Dingxin is home to weapons integration testing. As such, J-10s have deployed to Dingxin on various occasions beginning in 2002 to conduct trials of the weapon system, including integration of the PL-12 ARH MRAAM.

The following image depicts a lineup of six J-10s on the ramp at Dingxin:


Imagery available in October of 2006 depicted three J-10s on the ramp at Dingxin, with one of the aircraft participating in an apparent display lineup for government or military officials, as seen in the images below:



Cangzhou AB and Jiugucheng AB

J-10s are visible in residence at two airbases known to be subordinate to the Chinese Flight Test & Training Center (FTTC). The FTTC is based at Cangzhou AB south of Beijing. It has been reported that between six and ten J-10s were delivered to Cangzhou in March of 2003 to form the 13th Operational Trials Regiment. Recent imagery taken from 2006 and 2007, however, suggests that six aircraft were delivered to Jiugucheng AB further south, a location also associated with the FTTC in some sources. This does not indicate that no J-10s were operated or are currently operated from Cangzhou AB, but as no J-10s are visible in available imagery of Cangzhou AB one can only speculate as to the status of any J-10 unit at that location.

At least three J-10s are still visible on the ramp at Jiugucheng AB, with six shelters having been constructed for housing the new fighters. The following two images illustrate the alteration of the ramp area. The first image depicts three J-10s sitting behind three of the four hangars, while the second image illustrates the fact that at least two more hangars have been constructed for the J-10s in residence, with a further eight hangars having been constructed for additional aircraft:



If the J-10 Operational Trials Regiment was in fact based at Cangzhou AB, it is possible that the unit based at Jiugucheng is the operational conversion unit tasked with pilot training for J-10 crews. Conversely, the opposite may be true; the OTR may have been based at Jiugucheng AB, with the larger 10 aircraft OCU being located at Cangzhou AB. Whatever the case may be, it is obvious that the J-10 has operated at some point in the past from Jiugucheng AB in some capacity, and the construction of the new hangar spaces does seem to indicate a more permanent presence than an Operational Trials Regiment, whose aircraft may have been reapportioned to operational units following the certicifation of the J-10 for operational service in 2004.

OPERATIONAL UNITS

Liuliang AB

The first operational J-10 unit was the 131st Air Regiment of the 44th Fighter Division. This unit formed between July and August of 2004.

The following image depicts the 28 shelters for the J-10s based at Liuliang AB, as seen in photographs of the PLAAF induction ceremony:


Changxing AB

The second operational J-10 unit formed in early 2006 at Changxing AB near Shanghai.

The following image depicts the 28 shelters for the J-10s based at Changxing AB, as well as a solitary J-10 parked on the open ramp:


Siuxi AB

The most recent J-10 unit known to have been formed became operational in 2007 at Siuxi AB, located in southern China north of Hainan Island. Currently available imagery is outdated and does not yet indicate any evidence of J-10 operations from this location.

CURRENT INVENTORY

The following image illustrates the current airbases where J-10s are known to operate or have operated in the past, as described above:


Analysis of the hangar spaces at Liuliang and Changxing air bases indicates that an operational J-10 regiment would consist of no fewer than 28 aircraft. Discounting test aircraft and accounting for the fact that the 4th Air Regiment is known to be operating out of Siuxi AB despite the fact that currently available imagery does not depict any newly constructed hangars for the J-10 unit, there should be no less than 84 J-10s between the three operational units, provided that they are all at full strength. There are also up to 16 other trials aircraft spread between Jiugucheng and Cangzhou airbases, indicating that over 100 J-10s may have been produced to date when the various flight test articles held by Chengdu are accounted for.

The next J-10 unit to enter operational service will most likely be found in either the Nanjing or Guangzhou Military Region. Found across the strait from Formosa, the presence of a J-10 unit in this geographical region would fill a current gap between Changxing and Siuxi airbases.

CONCLUSION

Replacing the large numbers of J-7s with the new J-10 is a top priority for the PLAAF. The J-10 is by far the most advanced aircraft yet to be produced by the Chinese military aviation complex, and as such will enable the PLAAF to be far more effective in a modern air combat environment. With hundreds of FLANKER-family aircraft already in service, and up to 300 J-10s projected to be produced, the PLAAF is rapidly becoming one of the more modern and well equipped air arms in the world, a welcome change from as recently as ten years ago when FLANKERs were scarce, and aged designs like the J-7 and J-8 were relied upon to provide the bulk of the Chinese air combat force.

SOURCES

-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

Scramble
Sinodefence
Chinese Military Aviation

Effective Searching in Google Earth

INTRODUCTION

I am often asked about the time and effort it takes to peruse through Google Earth's high resolution imagery to locate various items, most often SAM sites, of which I have catalogued over 1400. Locating military installations and other interesting objects can be a time consuming endeavor, but it can be made far easier with a few simple techniques. In this article I will share some of those techniques which have served me well in the past, with the hope that your experience viewing imagery through such sources as Google Earth will be that much more enjoyable and interesting.

COMPUTER SETTINGS

To begin, we will exmamine some of the basic computer settings that are helpful in examining imagery. My monitor is a widescreen display with a resolution of 1920 x 1200 pixels. Setting your screen to the maximum resolution is helpful when viewing imagery sources as it aids in bringing out some of the fine detail that can be seen. Inside the Google Earth options menu, set the Detail Area to the maximum setting of 1024 x 1024. Even with a widescreen monitor, with the Placemark and Layer tabs expanded on the left of the screen the entire imagery display will then display eitirely in full detail, without any of the areas surrounding the very center of the image being blurred. This will greatly aid in examining what you see before you on your monitor.

BEGINNING EXAMINATION

In the bottom right of the imagery display area in Google Earth, you will notice a label called "Eye alt", followed by a series of numbers and an abbreviation. What these numbers are telling you is the alttude, in either feet or miles, that you are viewing the image from. I have found that the optimal viewing altitude for quick perusal of a given area is 15,000 feet.

When imagery is added into Google Earth, it is usually in the form of strips of either satellite or aerial imagery. These strips are in reality collections of square-shaped images that have been combined together into a mosaic. With my monitor settings, each individual square can be broken up into six rows, with each row being approximately three and a half screens across. Each section can then be examined relatively quickly, by viewing each screen one at a time until each section of imagery has been analysed.

The following graphic illustrates this concept. Notice that coordinates are provided where a single square of imagery can be examined in this fashion, making it easier for you to determine the dimensions of the area based on your own computer's monitor settings.


The key here is to keep an eye out for new areas of high-resolution coverage to examine. When I started my SAM site file, there was very little high-resolution imagery outside of the United States and Western Europe. I kept abreast of imagery updates to Google Earth through the Google Earth Blog, found here. Each time a new area appeared, I went through it to see what I could find.

It should also be noted that "Eye alt" is completely unrelated to the altitude of the terrain found in the lower left corner, denoted by "elev" for elevation. Regardless of the terrain's elevation, your "Eye alt" should be at 15,000 feet. This will give you the same viewpoint at all times. Setting the elevation to 15,000 feet can result in some issues, especially when the terrain is elevated around 5 or 10 thousand feet. You will end up with a much closer viewpoint and have to spend a lot longer examining a given area.

THE HUNT IS ON

Once you have found a pattern for examining an area of imagery, the trick is to find items of interest to tag for identification. There are two ways to do this.

The first method of identifying interesting locations is to simply create a folder and insert a placemark where something of interest may be located. These items can then be revisited later once the area has been thoroughly examined. Close-up inspection will often divulge the identity of the structure or facility.

The second method requires a little more time and patience, and a degree of knowledge. I have been examining SAM sites, for example, for quite some time now. I personally find it easier to immediately identify the sites to save myself the trouble of having to reexamine them and rename the placemarks. Some sites, like those of SA-1 or SA-5 systems, can be readily identified even from 15,000 feet, but others may have to be zoomed in on to clarify their type. The problem here is that you have to be careful when zooming back out to keep your screen centered on the same location it was before you zoomed in. This allows you to avoid skipping something potentially interesting because you reset your screen to a new area when you zoomed back out.

Finding something that looks interesting is a relatively simple task from a 15,000 foot vantage point. Consider the image below. It was screen captured from an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet in Belarus. Residential areas, fields, and forests can be seen, as well as a number of roads. Two facilities in the center of the image stand out immediately. They do so because they are markedly different from their surroundings, seeming "out of place" in a rural area. The northern facility is clearly rectangular and isolated from the surrounding areas, while the southern area has been cleared out from a patch of trees in an interesting pattern. As it turns out, the northern facility houses the 64N6 search radar for the S-300PMU SAM battery in the southern facility.


The simple rule here is to merely see if anything catches your eye. You may end up locating a power plant or a factory, but this can be determined later when you closely examine your finds. With a little bit of experience you will gain a feel for the types of sites and objects that you are looking for and will be able to pick them out of their surroundings with greater ease.

IDENTIFYING OBJECTS

Locating something is only half of the equation. The next step is to identify what you are looking at. There are many ways to do this.

First, the simplest method of identifying something is to see if someone else has done the work for you! In the layers tab of Google Earth, expand the "Gallery" menu and click on the "Google Earth Community" box. This will insert any placemarks that Google Earth users have uploaded into the server. If your location has already been examined, chances are it has a placemark attached to it, which you can then view in Google Earth, and copy into your own file if you desire. This does have an advantage, as you then have a baseline for comparing other items you find if a like item has already been marked. Do take note that the accuracy of placemarks in Google Earth is not guaranteed, however.

The alternative is to identify the locations yourself. This can be a very time consuming endeavor. To be frank, in order to do this effectively, it does help a great deal to have some knowledge about what you are trying to identify. This knowledge can come from personal experience, or from external sources. If you are trying to identify a SAM system, for example, a publication such as Jane's Land Based Air Defence can be of great value. While Jane's does not provide any detail regarding site layouts, it does provide you with some useful information. There are pictures of most of the relevant equipment, for example. It takes a bit of thought to equate a side-on photograph to a piece of top-down imagery, but it can be done. The dimensions provided are very valuable, as they give you a yardstick to compare your finding to. If you are examining a SAM site, for example, and you have determined that the launch rails should be 30 feet long, any potential matches can be measured in Google Earth using the ruler tool found at the top of the screen (do take care to chage the unit of measurement to whatever you have found; if you have been given a length in meters, for example, make sure you aren't measuring in feet!). If you find a number of objects that are 20 feet long, then you are obviously not looking at that particular SAM system. Jane's also provides a list of users for each SAM system. A list of nations associated with what it is you are hunting for can save you a lot of time. For example, according to Jane's the nation of Brazil has no SAM systems identifiable in Google Earth imagery (i.e. large, static SAM sites, not man-portable units or those mounted on small, unidentifable vehicles). That saved me from having to take the time out to examine all of the imagery in Brazil. Organizing your search in a fashion similar to this will make it a lot easier as you won't get frustrated searching for and not finding things in places that they have no business being in the first place!

To be blunt, successfully identifying objects will take some practice, but once you have become proficient it is a much smoother process. It all boils down to the amount of effort you put into the process.

OTHER TRICKS

There are some other tricks to identifying objects in Google Earth.

If you are looking for facilities in a given area, you might do well to locate a map with the facilities marked. Maps can be inserted into Google Earth as Overlays. Overlays place objects such as photographs or maps over the visible imagery. Their transparency can be adjusted so that you can view the imagery through the map. Overlays can be tricky to insert. You have to be careful to match the map to the imagery, and that can take some time to get right. Otherwise, the locations on the map will not match up with the imagery, and the map will be of no help whatsoever.

I used an overlay map to aid in identifying the inner and outer SA-1 SAM rings around Moscow. To do this, I located a map of the SA-1 locations in the CIA's FOIA archives available on the web. The map can be seen below:


Once I had matched the map up with the imagery, I simply adjusted the transparency factor and browsed the area. Fortunately, SA-1 sites are enormous and were easily identifiable even in low-resolution areas, and I had all of them mapped out in short order.

Another technique is to locate an external source of locations far less irritating than something requiring the creation of an overlay. One fine example is Google Earth user LeX2's website depicting SA-5 SAM sites, found here. By zooming in on his map, I was able to then extrapolate the locations of the facilities by searching the same areas in Google Earth. At one point, we had both been identifying SAM sites for a while, and as he had concentrated on SA-5 sites, he inquired about incorporating his sites into my SAM catalog. I enthusiastically agreed, as it would save me the time of finding them myself, and he had located numerous sites in low resolution areas that I would normally not have concentrated on anyway.

This brings us to the third trick, the Google Earth Community, found here. By joining the community, you can post findings on the forum which will eventually be entered into the server to be viewed by everyone in Google Earth. The benefits of this community are sections dedicated for like-minded individuals, such as those of us who primarily hunt down military objects. There is a substantial knowledge base there, and chances are that someone will be able to help you identify something that has you stumped. My SAM site project began at the community as a file containing the aforementioned SA-1 rings, and through the interaction with and encouragement from users there has evolved into the 1400+ site database that it is today.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the steps for successfully browsing and identifying objects are as follows: set your viewing altitude to 15,000 feet, break the area up into portions denoted by the area encapsulated by the viewing area on your screen, and move piece by piece through a given piece of imagery, marking down the locations of interesting items as you progress. Who knows what you may find! Keep in mind that this is can be very time consuming, however, and may end up with you creating your own blog!

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery of Belarus provided courtesy of Google Earth.

SAM Test and Training Ranges in Russia and China

INTRODUCTION

Some of the most important facilities with regard to national air defense are the test and training ranges where air defense weapon systems are developed by engineers and trained on by their crews. The Russian and Chinese air defense networks have benefitted from the use of numerous test and training ranges, resulting in the operational fielding of such systems as the S-400 and HQ-9.

SAM TEST FACILITIES

SAM test facilities are expansive ranges dominating the areas where they are found. These test ranges have massive impact areas where aerial targets and missile bodies will come to rest after a test launch, making them some of the largest military facilities in existance. The three primary SAM test ranges to be examined are Kapustin Yar in Russia, Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan, and Shuangchengzi in China.

KAPUSTIN YAR

The Kapustin Yar missile and rocket test facility, located roughly 90 kilometers east of Volgograd has been home to some of the most significant and interesting test programs in the Soviet and Russian militaries. Kapustin Yar has long been home to Russia's SSM testing grounds. The first ballistic missile to be fired inside of Russia, a German V-2, was launched from the grounds at Kapustin Yar. Kapustin Yar has also been home to a number of other programs, ranging from the Burya cruise missile test program from 1957 to 1960, to the S-400 (SA-21) advanced SAM system tested today. Insofar as SAM development is concerned, Kapustin Yar has always been home to tactical SAM system development, and early strategic SAM system development. Beginning with the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), however, strategic SAM system development was moved to the more expansive range facilities at Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. Following the break-up of the USSR, strategic SAM development was relocated back to Kapustin Yar, making it once again the hub of Russian surface to air missile development activity. Trials of SAM systems began as far back as 1948, when the first launch SAM launch sites were built at Kapustin Yar for testing captured German designs. Development of the first SAM systems progressed until 1952, when the first S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) SAMs were test-fired at Kapustin Yar.

The following image depicts the SAM development facilities at Kapustin Yar, along with some interesting historical and present-day locations:


The primary SAM test facility at Kapustin Yar is located in the northwestern corner of the massive complex. Seven launch sites provide the necesary infrastructure for conducting trials of new SAM systems, including the current S-400 system. One of the launch sites is an early S-25 launch complex. An administrative and housing area is also provided, as well as a missile checkout and storage area. The area occupied by the SAM test range was once also used to trial early ballistic missiles, such as the R-1, R-2, and R-5 SRBMs, and to that end a nuclear warhead storage facility was also constructed on the site, although it is probably no longer actively used.

The following image depicts the primary SAM development area at Kapustin Yar:


It would appear that the grounds of another former S-25 site on the Kapustin Yar range are being used for SAM development as well. Located in the southeastern portion of the range complex, this S-25 site contains 9A310 TELARs associated with the Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) family of SAM systems. An EW radar and an interesting display of two S-200 missiles are also present. One source describes this area as being associated with training, and this cannot be ruled out. It is also possible that these TELARs are associated with the Buk-M1-2 development program.

The following image depicts the southeastern SAM test site at Kapustin Yar:


The following image provides a close-up view of the 9A310 TELARs at the southeastern SAM area:


SARY SHAGAN

Sary Shagan has long been associated with the development of anti-ballistic missile systems. Until the fall of the Soviet Union, however, it was also home to the development programs of Russian strategic SAM systems beginning with the S-200. The massive range complex was well-suited to trialling very long range missile systems such as the S-200, with a maximum range topping out in the latest variants at 300 kilometers. While Russian SAM strategic development has since relocated to Kapustin Yar, the facility is still used by both the Russians (for ABM development) and the Kazakh government (for SAM development and training purposes).

The following image depicts the SAM test area at Sary Shagan:


The primary SAM test area at Sary Shagan consists of four facilities. The first is a large garrison and administrative complex. Launch facilities consist of three sites. The first two, an S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) and an S-200 site, are unoccupied. The third site is a nontraditional S-125 (SA-3 GOA) site. This site is currently being used to develop and trial the S-125-2T modification for the Kazakh armed forces. The most recent series of trials took place in late September of 2007.

The following image depicts the S-125-2T development area at Sary Shagan:


Launch complexes C and G are believed to be associated with training activity, but may also be used to support various trials programs. Neither facility features any notable activity or structures in current imagery. It should be noted that these facilities may have supported the S-300P (SA-10 GRUMBLE) trials program, which was conducted at Sary Shagan beginning in 1973.

SHUANGCHENGZI

The development of Chinese SAM systems takes place at the Shuangchengzi SAM development center located in north-cenral China. The Shuangchengzi SAM development center is located on the expansive Shuangchengzi military complex, which also includes various SLV and ballistic missile launch facilities, as well as Dingxin airbase. The site consists of a large administrative and garrison area, as well as multiple launch facilities for testing current Chinese SAM systems.

The following image provides an overview of the SAM development facility at Shuangchengzi:


Two HQ-2 launch sites are located on the grounds of the Shuangchengzi SAM development center. Both sites feature two revetted launch positions, while the northernmost site also features two non-revetted, "open" launch positions, one of which is currently occupied by a launch rail. The southern launch site also features unusual square launch positions, which may be asociated with development of the KS-1A SAM system.

The following image depicts the HQ-2 launch areas at Shuangchengzi:


The most capable SAM system yet to be trialled at Shuangchengzi is the HQ-9, a strategic SAM system comparable to the Russian S-300PM (SA-10B GRUMBLE). The test area for the HQ-9 features four typical rectangular launch pads found at operational HQ-9 sites in China, a central area for the engagement radar, and a large complex most likely housing command and control facilities for the HQ-9 test site.

The following image depicts the HQ-9 test site at Shuangchengzi:


SAM TRAINING RANGES

SAM training ranges are an integral part of the operational effectiveness of any air defense network. Many SAM systems are deployed to protect populated areas, and during peacetime they are not viable for use in training launches due to the large populated areas nearby. The primary SAM training ranges to be examined are Ashuluk and Telemba in Russia, Emba in Kazakhstan, and Liuyuan and Shandan in China.

ASHULUK

Ashuluk SAM firing range, located approximately 110 kilometers north of Astrakhan in southwestern Russia, is the primary SAM training range in the Russian Federation. This large complex, situated near the border with Kazakhstan, has hosted not only Russian crews but CIS crews as well. As recently as October of 2007, Ukranian S-300P units traveled to Ashuluk to conduct live missile firings.

The Ashuluk range complex consists of numerous prepared S-75, S-200, and S-300P launch facilities, allowing strategic SAM units from Russia and the CIS to conduct missile firings. There are a total of ten S-75 sites, one S-200 site, and two S-300P sites on the range. One of the S-75 sites has been fitted with S-125 components, allowing firing of the S-125 on the range as well. A large EW radar complex is situated to the west of the launch complexes, ostensibly providing telemetry data and target acquisition functions. Two garrisons are located to the southwest of the EW complex, as well as a large administrative area. S-75 and S-125 components located on the grounds of the training range may also be used to fire the RM-75 and RM-5V27 aerial targets.

The following image depicts an overview of the Ashuluk SAM training range:


As the most advanced SAM system in widespread use throughout the CIS, the S-300P is a likely choice to be located at the training range at any given time. Indeed, there are S-300P components visible in both garrisons. While the TELs cannot be differentiated in the available imagery betwen the 5P85S or 5P85D variant, they are clearly mobile 8x8 TELs and not the towed variety, indicating that the systems found there are either S-300PS or S-300PM/PMU variants.

The following images depict the S-300P components located in the garrisons at Ashuluk:



The most recent advanced SAM system to take advantage of the Ashuluk training range is the S-400. Current imagery appears to depict what may be S-400 components undergoing training at Ashuluk. Two probable 92N6 TERs are present, as well as a 64N6 EW radar and multiple 5P85T2 TELs. It is these TELs which provide the most significant evidence that this unit may be the first operational S-400 unit, imaged here before travelling to its operational site at Electrostal outside of Moscow. The 5P85T2 TELs are towed, similar to the S-300PM-1's 5P85T. The difference is that the 5P85T is around 47 feet in length, while these TELs appear to be closer to 53 feet in length. The 5P85T2 is towed by a new BAZ-6402 tractor, which is a larger vehicle than the KRAQ-260 used to tow the 5P85T. There is also a 96L6 radar vehicle present southwest of the S-400 components.

The following image depicts the probable S-400 battery undergoing training at Ashuluk:


The following image depicts the 96L6 radar vehicle located at Ashuluk:


TELEMBA

Located 90 kilometers north of Chita, the Telemba SAM firing range is active in training both Russian and CIS air defense forces. In September of 2006, the Ukraine used the Telmba range to conduct live firings of S-200 and S-300P SAM systems following the suspension of launch activity at the Ukraine's Chauda range facility in 2001 after the accidental downing of an airliner. Telemba recently held part of the Combat Commonwealth 2007 exercise, hosting Russian and Belarussian air defense forces in June.

Analysis of the Telemba range facilities seems to depict four firing positions. Garrison and administrative facilities are likely located in nearby Antipinskoye. Access to the range facilities appears to be via a road leading from Antipinskoye as well.

The following image depicts the Telemba SAM training range:


EMBA

The Emba SAM range in Kazakhstan was employed by the Soviet Union, and later through joint agreement Russia and Kazakhstan, for development work and training. Emba was a massive complex located in Kazakhstan, and until 1999 was leased by the Russian government, at which time the operations there were relocated to Kapustin Yar. Emba was employed primarily to test tactical SAM systems. Both the Buk and S-300V (SA-12) were tested at Emba. The Russian MoD reported in 2001 that there was still a small contingent working out of Emba, in support of operations at Sary Shagan. Apart from this activity, the facility appears to be abandoned, with Kazakh crews now training at Sary Shagan or at batteries near Astan or Astana and Russian crews training at either Ashuluk or Telemba.

The following image depicts the Emba SAM complex:


LIUYUAN

The Liuyuan SAM training range, located in north central China approximately 25 kilometers southwest of Liuyuan, provides PLA air defense troops with a relatively isolated facility to conduct live missile firings. Liuyuan consists of three launch areas and various bivouac areas. When the area is in use, these bivouac areas are occupied by tents for the SAM crews. Parking areas are also provided for the support equipment needed to move and operate a SAM battery.

The following image depicts the Liuyuan SAM training range:


The following image depicts one of the unoccupied launch areas at the Liuyuan SAM training range:


SHANDAN

Chinese SAM crews also train at the Shandan training complex. This complex, situated around the city of Shandan, consists of two training areas, located to the north and to the south of the city.

The following image provides an overview of the Shandan training complex:


The northern facility at Shandan is the smaller and less built up of the two. This facility consists of seven launch positions, each one having two revetments for launch vehicles or launch rails and a pad for mounting an engagement radar. A central command structure us also present, as well as administrative areas.

The following image depicts the northern Shandan training range:


The southern training area at Shandan is significantly more expansive than the northern facility. There are six launch areas, each one consisting of two launch pads and a pad for the engagement radar and associated equipment. A large parking area for support equipment is also provided, as are two separate garrisons. There is a separate, seventh launch area, which appears to be a dedicated HQ-2 training facility. Lastly, the administrative areas are far more expansive than those at Shandan's northern site.

The following image depicts the southern Shandan training range:


The following image depicts two launch positions at Shandan South, which are occupied by HQ-2 units:


CONCLUSION

SAM test and training ranges are interesting places to observe in imagery, and are vital to building and operating an effective air defense network in any nation.

SOURCES

-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Ukraine to train in Telemba
CIS air defense exercise at Telemba
The Russian MoD
Kapustin Yar
Kapustin Yar
S-25 Development
The S-125-2T
Emba Test Range

Surface-to-air Missile Weapons of the National Air Defense Forces, Mikhail Perov, 2001

US Restricted and Classified Test Sites

INTRODUCTION

The widespread availability of open-source overhead imagery thanks to applications like Google Earth and NASA World Wind has provided the public with the chance to view many restricted and classified test locations within the United States. While details of the test programs associated with some of these facilities are obviously not going to be discernable, the availability of open-source imagery nevertheless allows individuals to view sensitive facilities that normally would be hidden by terrain, and sometimes heavy security.

This article is not intended to be an all-inclusive list of classified test facilities, nor an in-depth examination of Area 51, but rather an overview of some of the most significant and interesting test sites in the country.

RCS RANGES

Some of the most significant defense-related facilities in the United States are Radar Cross Section (RCS) test ranges. These facilities, being either contractor or government operated, conduct some of the most sensitive test programs in the defense industry. RCS ranges are used to test the radar signatures of various objects, most significantly with the aim of measuring their ability to evade radar detection against various radar types. Stealth platforms like the HAVE BLUE were tested at an RCS range in order to validate the design before flight testing, for example, to ensure that the RCS of the aircraft would meet the requirements of the test program. Due to the sensitive nature of the testing conducted at these facilities, they are typically located in isolated areas.

The primary outdoor RCS test ranges can be located at the following coordinates:

Boardman: 45°44'53.55"N 119°47'10.02"W
Grey Butte: 34°34'13.01"N 117°40'11.27"W
Helendale: 34°49'30.40"N 117°17'45.83"W
Junction Ranch: 36°02'15.81"N 117°30'10.69"W
Kirtland AFB: 34°57'33.77"N 106°29'59.27"W
RATSCAT: 33°10'59.71"N 106°34'23.81"W
Tejon: 34°55'27.49"N 118°31'44.76"W

The following image depicts the relative locations of the various outdoor RCS test ranges listed above:


Boardman

Located in an isolated area west of Boardman, Oregon, the Boardman RCS range is owned and operated by Boeing. The facility consists of a radar array at the west end and a pylon for mounting test articles at the east end. The pylon can be covered by a large, moveable hangar, to protect sensitive test objects from view. When RCS testing is ongoing, the hangar slides out of the field of view of the radar sensors on a set of rails. The sliding shelter concept is similar to what was used at the former Grey Butte RCS test range.

The following image depicts the Boeing Boardman RCS test range:


Grey Butte

The former Grey Butte RCS test range is located 25 miles south by southeast of Edwards AFB in California. The Grey Butte facility was operated by McDonnell Douglas in the past, before being acquired by Boeing when the two companies merged. In 1999 the facility was closed down, being sold to General Atomics, who currently uses the facility to conduct UAV research. The former RCS test range consisted of a primary antenna array at the west end, with various target positions scattered around the range. The primary RCS test article position was directly east of the antenna array, and was hidden by a retractable hangar, which may have inspired Boeing to use a similar system at their Boardman facility.

The Grey Butte facility is interesting insofar as the location of the aforementioned retractable hangar is concerned. At the Boardman facility, the hangar retracts southeast to place the structure outside the field of view of the radar being used to measure the test article's signature. In the Grey Butte facility, the hangar retracted directly aft of the test article's location. This is interesting because it would seem to indicate that the hangar was still within the field of view of the radar arrays targeting the test article. There are two possible explanations for this apparent discrepancy. First, radar sets with a very narrow beamwidth may have been employed. This would have allowed them to target the RCS test article, with any extraneous radar energy simply passing it by and travelling straight through the open hangar bay. The second possibility is more abstract, and far less likely, although it does raise some interesting questions. It is known that the Russian defense industry has been experimenting with ionized plasma as an RCS-reduction method. A similar system (or some other RCS-reduction method) could, in theory, have been employed at Grey Butte to hide the hangar structure.

The following annotated image depicts the former Grey Butte RCS test range:


Helendale

Lockheed Martin's Helendale RCS test range, situated 32 miles east by southeast of Edwards AFB, is one of the most storied RCS test ranges in the country. The range area consists of an antenna array at the southern end, with two secondary target positions situated 425 meters and 1520 meters downrange. The primary test article facility is a large structure situated 2300 meters from the radar array. This is a large, underground complex, with a sliding roof hiding the retractable primary test pylon. A mobile radar antenna is also present, which moves off to the west when not in use to allow the radar sensors to the south a clear field of view to measure the primary test article.

The following annotated image depicts Lockheed-Martin's Helendale RCS test range:


Tejon

The Tejon RCS test range is owned and operated by Northrop-Grumman (previously Northrop, before the merger). Located 35 miles west of Edwards AFB, the Tejon RCS range consists of two separate, co-located facilities. The older, larger north complex features an antenna array and four target positions, while the newer south complex features two separate antenna-target combinations.

The following annotated image depicts Northrop-Grumman's Tejon RCS test range:


Not all RCS test ranges are operated by private contractors. The US DoD operates three outdoor RCS test ranges in California and New Mexico.

Junction Ranch

The Junction Ranch RCS test range is operated by the US Navy. It is situated on the massive China Lake range complex, located 27 miles north by northeast of China Lake NWC.

The following annotated image provides an overview of the USN's Junction Ranch RCS test range:


Being a US Navy complex, the Junction Ranch RCS range has a few unique features. Firstly, there are two separate test sites. The "dry" site is a conventional RCS test range employing a radar array and pole-mounted test objects.

The following annotated image depicts the "dry" RCS test range at Junction Ranch:


The second range is unique in that it is a "wet" facility, designed to test replicas of seagoing objects which are mounted in a water pool. Three miles to the southeast a radar facility is located atop the surrounding mountains to enable RCS testing of objects placed in the pool. Both of these locations are depicted in the overview image above.

RATSCAT

The RATSCAT Advanced Measurement System (RAMS) site is located 35 miles northwest of Holloman AFB, New Mexico. RAMS represents the most advanced low-RCS test range in the country, and as such is isolated in the White Sands Missile Range. Holloman AFB is also home to various other RCS test facilities operating under the direction of the National RCS Test Facility, with the capability to measure both pole models and in-flight models or aircraft.

The following image depicts the RATSCAT Advanced Measurement System site:


Kirtland AFB

Kirtland AFB in Albuquerqe, New Mexico is also the home to an unidentified RCS test facility. Some sources indicate that the facility may be associated with the Sandia National Laboratory, which also operates some facilities on the Kirtland range.

The following image depicts the RCS test range located on the Kirtland AFB range:


There are two other significant outdoor RCS facilities visible in the United States. They are associated with one of the most secretive military installations on the planet.

AREA 51

Area 51, also known as Groom Lake, Watertown Strip, Dreamland, or The Ranch, is one of the US government's most highly classified test facilities. The activities which take place at Area 51 are some of the military's most sensitive test programs, and have included the flight testing of the U-2, the A-12, and the HAVE BLUE stealth technology demonstrator.

The following image provides an overview of the expansive Area 51 complex:


Area 51 is home to some unique structures, both historical and current. The original AQUATONE and OXCART hangars can still be seen, with the OXCART hangars likely having served as the home to the RED HAT aircraft. The 24,000 foot runway, the longest in the world, is still present as well, but this is believed to no logner be operational, as denoted by the X markings on the northern end and the fact that the new runway uses the same numbers.

The following annotated image depicts some of the most interesting and significant facilities located at Area 51:


Various test facilities are located at Area 51. The location where the A-12 was pole-mounted for RCS testing can still be seen adjacent to the lakebed's western edge. The DYCOMS radar sensor system can also be seen. DYCOMS is an airborne RCS test system used to evaluate the radar signatures of aircraft which overfly the facility.

The following annotated image depicts Area 51's DYCOMS RCS test facility:


A facility which has been referred to as the QUICK KILL radar site is also present adjacent to the DYCOMS facility. The terminology may indicate that this is an electromagnetic weapon of some sort, designed to disable electronic systems.

Area 51 is not the only significant test site in the Nevada Desert. Some of them, by nature, may even be more secretive.

TONOPAH ELECTRONIC COMBAT RANGE

Located near Tonopah Test Range, the former home of the then-classified SENIOR TREND fleet, is an expansive complex housing what may be some of the most secretive items in the United States. A vast electronic combat range containing numerous radar systems is home to more than a few examples of Soviet and Russian radar systems. While their presence may be an open secret, as it has been stated in the past that the OXCART was tested against Soviet radar systems, the means of their acquisition is understandably highly classified. One can speculate that some systems may have been sourced from cash-strapped former Soviet republics, in the same manner that Moldova's MiG-29 fleet was acquired.

The following annotated image provides an overview of the most prominent features of the Tonopah Electronic Combat Range:


Not all of the radar systems present at the Tonopah site can be identified, due to the resolution of the imagery, and some of them may not even be radar systems at all. However, some of the radars are readily identifiable due to their large size. Situated around what appears to be the primary facility are four raised berms, each appearing to house a radar system. The northern and eastern berms are home to Soviet-era P-35 (BAR LOCK) E/F band EW radars. Just south of the main facility is another pad which appears to house an RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) engagement radar associated with the S-125 (SA-3 GOA) SAM system.

The following annotated image depicts the main test area at the Tonopah Electronic Combat Range:


TOLICHA PEAK ELECTRONIC COMBAT RANGE

The radar range near Tonopah is not the only electronic combat facility in the Nevada desert. At 37°18'58.48"N 116°46'50.93"W the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range can be found.

The following annotated image provides an overview of the most prominent features of the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range:


The mainstream belief is that the Tolicha Peak facility houses numerous radar systems to support RED FLAG operations, given its proximity to two mock airfields. A more detailed examination provides an alternative, that of foreign SAM system exploitation and testing. Elements of S-125 (SA-3 GOA), S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), and S-300PS/PM (SA-10B GRUMBLE) SAM systems can be found on the grounds of Tolicha Peak.

The following annotated image depicts what is likely an S-125 facility at Tolicha Peak. The object to the west of the RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) radar system would appear to be some sort of three-round launcher, or an unusual radar system, and does not resemble the 5P71 or 5P73 launchers found at operational S-125 sites around the globe, and as such may be some sort of dedicated test equipment.


The following annotated image depicts an S-200 launch site at Tolicha Peak. There would appear to be a second missile, albeit with the control surfaces removed, nearby. The 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radar is not colocated with the launch facility and was not readily identified, but the facility 0.47 kilometers to the southwest is a candidate.


The most interesting facility found at Tolicha Peak is the S-300P launch site. It would appear that a nearly complete collection of radars is present, as well as two TELs and a 40V6 mast assembly. The 40V6 is used to mount either the 30N6 (FLAP LID) engagement radar or the 76N6 (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar on a 23.8 meter mast to provide better performance in areas with varied terrain or vegetation. The shadow cast by the southern 5P85 TEL seems to indicate that it is a 5P85S, complete with the control compartment for controlling the adjacent 5P85D TEL. The vehicle which is most likely the 30N6 engagement radar vehicle appears to have the radar array lowered in the travel configuration. Given the presence of the mobile TELs and the mobile 30N6 radar, the system present here is likely either an S-300PS or S-300PM.

The following annotated image depicts the Tolicha Peak S-300PS/PM facility:


Close examination of the terrain in the vicinity of the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range would seem to display impact craters, providing further evidence that actual SAM firings may be taking place here. As the United States does not actively list any of the aforementioned SAM systems in its operational inventory, it is likely that some sort of test work does take place here. It is also possible that the associated radar systems are in fact also used against aircraft flying on the Nellis AFB Range to provide more realistic electronic combat training.

JACKASS FLATS

Jackass Flats is situated 45 miles southeast of the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range, and was the home to some of the most interesting experimental programs to be conducted in the Nevada desert.

Pluto

Located on the eastern portion of Jackass Flats is the remains of one of the most interesting and potentially catastrophically dangerous weapons programs of the Cold War. Project Pluto was intended to culminate with the development of a nuclear powered cruise missile. A facility was constructed to test conceptual nuclear engine designs for Project Pluto. The vast facility consisted of three main areas. Firstly, there was a reactor assembly building where the Tory-series reactors were constructed and then disassembled for analysis post-firing. Secondly, there was a separate reactor test facility situated 2 miles from the assembly facility, where the test firings would occur. Lastly, there was a complex consisting of 25 miles of piping designed to provide the compressed air necessary for testing the reactor, as it was intended to operate as a ramjet and could not function with still air. Current imagery indicates that the piping has since been removed, but the structures remain, as does the railway which used an automated railcar to transport the test articles between the two facilities.

The following annotated image depicts the Project Pluto facilities at Jackass Flats:


HENRE

Jackass Flats was home to a second nuclear-related test. The High Energy Neutron Reaction Experiment (HENRE) program used a linear accelerator to provide neutrons which would be used in a radiation measurement test program. The 1,527 foot tower used in the HENRE program was previously a resident of the Yucca Flat test area, and was employed in the BREN program. It was relocated to Jackass Flats to support the HENRE program in 1966.

The following image depicts the HENRE test tower at Jackass Flats:


NRDS

The Nuclear Rocket Development Site (NRDS) at Jackass Flats was used to test nuclear rocket engines under the auspices of various test programs. The facility consisted of numerous structures, including the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (R-MAD) and Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly (E-MAD) stations. There were three test stands, Test Cell A, Test Cell C, and Engine Test Stand 1 (ETS-1). Rocket engines, much like those tested at the Pluto facility, were transported using an automated rail system.

The following annotated image provides an overview of the NRDS:


Test Cell A was the location for the Kiwi-TNT destructive test which consisted of the obliteration of a nuclear rocket engine to simulate a potential accident during launch of a nuclear-powered rocket.

The following annotated image depicts one of the engine transportation railcars remaining at the E-MAD facility:


SOURCES

Radar Ranges of the Mojave
Gray Butte Radar Cross-Section Facility
Building Map of Area 51
RCS Ranges
The HENRE Program
Project Pluto
The NRDS (PDF file)
More on the NRDS (PDF file)

-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth, Microsoft Virtual Earth, and NASA World Wind. USGS imagery was provided by the latter two sources.

-All information contained in this article is sourced from the public domain, principally the World Wide Web, and is not intended to imply the dissemination of, nor does it contain, restricted or classified material.

-For more information on NASA's World Wind application, reference the following: LINK