Tuesday, June 4, 2013

Comments, Current Events

Comments are still OK, don't worry.  Just to reiterate a few old "rules" though:

1.  Say whatever you want.  I'm not a censor.  I'll even usually reply.  I bring this up because sometimes I get comments that do sit in the box for a day or two.  The reason behind that is usually because it's a piece of information that is interesting or relevant and I want to examine it, and the comment inbox is a safe place to store it so I don't forget where it was posted and then lose it.

2.  That being said, comments are still moderated.  This means I have to hit a button that says 'publish" for your comment to show up.  Why?  Because I get way too many spam comments.  Spam I will censor.  Pretty much anything else is fair game.

Here's a good spam comment that showed up right after I posted this:  "I'm impressed, I have to admit. Seldom do I encounter a blog that's both educative and engaging, and let me tell you, you've hit the nail on the head. The problem is an issue that too few people are speaking intelligently about. I'm very happy I came across this during my hunt for something relating to this. Also visit my blog legal amphetamines"

See what I mean?  There has to be some sort of comment generator these idiots are using, because I'll get the same one multiple times with the only difference being the website they want you to visit.  They're smart about it too, they only post on older articles, very rarely the most current feature.

Anyway, I assume nobody really wants legal amphetamines.  Although it'll be interesting to see what the words legal amphetamines do to my incoming traffic for the next few days.  I wonder if anyone monitors websites looking for the words legal amphetamines because I'm relatively certain spam comment websites are not really pointing you to legit legal amphetamines.  There might be a search engine designed to find the phrase legal amphetamines on websites to track people who are after said legal amphetamines.

LEGAL AMPHETAMINES!

Fun over, on to the news.


Well this should be self-explanatory.  The contract doesn't have to be fulfilled until about this time next year, so there's no rush.  You do have to wonder why Russia is still dragging their feet, though.  If you're trying to avoid the West going in and screwing up one of your export markets, why would you present them with what amounts to a "bomb by this date" ultimatum?  

This may be the result of Russia both wanting to finalize the deal, while at the same time giving the West time to think about what blowing up a Syrian S-300P series site would mean.  Because it'd probably be host to Russian advisors and trainers for 6 months or so after delivery, you know.  It could also be that Syrian crews just haven't started training or completed the training course yet.  In which case delivering the systems would make them amount to really expensive bombing targets.

Speaking of which, Israel is still barking about blowing the things up if they're delivered because of the threat.  I.E. the Syrian IADS would be credible for the first time since about, oh, 1986 or so.  What I still want to know is what happened to their countermeasures that they were so sure would defeat an S-300P series system?  If the system represents no real threat (and assuming they haven't drank whatever the Turks did in the 90s), why go to the effort of locating and striking them, especially if you're blatantly risking irritating Russia in the process by potentially killing Russian nationals?  Isn't it better to sit back and laugh as Assad spends himself into a hole?

Wait, I know.  Clearly Russia upgraded to Windows 8, rendering the Israeli electronic countermeasure and intrusion stuff irrelevant.


France claims that analysis proves that sarin gas, which is a chemical weapon and therefore a WMD, was used somewhere in Syria on more than one occasion.

And of course France isn't telling which side used the stuff...which was what I was going to say when the first report came out and they weren't talking.

Now, however, they're claiming that it was Assad's forces and/or regime supporters (diplomat speak for Hezbollah).  Said claims conveniently being made as I was in the process of typing here.  Stupid media.  If they're not blowing things way out of proportion, they're being inconveniently timely with their reporting.

Well, now we're really going to see what the "proper" interpretation of terms like "game changer" and "red line" is, aren't we?  Not that I do or don't think we should be bothering with the non-Assad guys (like I mentioned in another post, supporting such types has worked out so famously for us in the past...), but if I say there will be bombs if you do X, and you go and do X, then it can be argued that there should be bombs.  Otherwise why should anyone take me seriously?

Not that I'm sure anyone should in the first place.

Probably shouldn't take me seriously either.

Sunday, June 2, 2013

Current Events

One of the things I'll be trying to do here on a more regular basis is to actually comment on some worldwide military developments or events which I find interesting, amusing, or both.  Some things are relevant even if they don't come with nice overheads!  So with that in mind, here are a few topics that have appeared over the last few days (or weeks, or months...):


Iraq:  mythically overrated by the media, massively bombed twice.  Syria, Libya, Iran, and the DPRK were all advised to take notice, given their reliance on the same supposedly mythical yet in reality old-technology weapon systems for air defense.  Looks like Syria is learning the lesson that Iran thinks can be solved by welding together oil cans.  Buk-M2E systems, Chinese JY-27 and Type 120 radars, and now, by 2014 apparently, some variant of the S-300.  Most likely the S-300PMU-2, the current production export model of the P series, although I could make an argument for the S-300VM for added ATBM capability against Israeli weapons.

This is the Russian government enacting a new type of "missile diplomacy", wherein they deploy their own or supply modern system components to someone else to ensure that the West stays out of some given situation/gets a message/etc.  And you know what?  Can't blame them for it.

The last time I checked, the S-300P was not a Kalashnikov or shoulder-fired SAM, and therefore not on the UN Arms Control Register.  Nor is it typically part of any sort of arms embargo, of which Syria is not under anyway.  And, despite ridiculous Turkish theories, the weapon is not a credible surface-to-surface threat.  So there is no reason for the sale not to proceed, unless of course the West really does have designs on entering Syria and sorting things out in the manner that it wants them sorted out.  

And if the EU can decide it's OK to sell weapons to the anti-Assad crowd in Syria, they've got no real leg to stand on when Russia actually conducts a formal, legal transaction on the state-to-state level.  Although in the EU's defense the idea of supporting a rebel force with light arms has never, ever blown up in anyone's face down the line.  

Oh, wait...

If you ask me, this will either 1) force the West to run in half-cocked without taking the time to think things through and end up creating a bigger mess in the long run (which we arguably did in Iraq despite having said time to think about it first), or 2) make everyone back off while the situation, uh...basically solves itself.

Harsh?  Yup.  But look at it this way.  Either the world wants/needs external actors to intervene in the internal affairs of states when things go awry, or it doesn't.  That's the question:  should we intervene because Assad is a bad guy?  Should we stay out of it because it's a situation precipitated internally by internal forces?  That's a whole different argument, which isn't the point here.

Or maybe Russia really does want us to intervene.  Because if the West does eventually go in there after the missiles are operational, Almaz-Antey will be able to sell them for a billion dollars per unit with all of the publicity they're going to get.  Or maybe this is all a really convoluted ploy to get Israel to bomb Syria again, claiming that sophisticated weapon systems that Hezbollah would not be able to operate or maintain in a million years are being...transferred to Hezbollah!

Really.  Buk-M2Es for Hezbollah?  That was the best argument they could come up with?

NEXT.


Now this is interesting.  Saudi Arabia procured the DF-3A in the mid-80s, and signed the NPT in 1988 to assure the US government that no, they weren't trying to go nuclear (although allegations of Pakistani and Iraqi nukes were made for years).  Now, with the Kingdom starting to be wary of Shi'a Iran's nuclear (alleged) ambitions, they might be reconsidering the world's most fatal mushrooms.  And replacing the DF-3A as the potential launch platform.  

The difference is that with the DF-3A, they had an inaccurate IRBM basically useful for nuclear warhead transport through the atmosphere.  The DF-21 is far more accurate, terminally guided in some versions, making it useable as a conventional strike weapon where the DF-3A is really not.  

The nuclear weapons acquisition is the best part of the story.  If they go this route, then they're breaching the NPT, provided they don't withdraw first.  If they don't withdraw, prepare for much hilarity as Iran and its supporters raise hell about the double standard.  Because you don't really think we'd actually sanction the almighty oil supplier, do you?

For more on Saudi, the DF-3A, and associated information, my next JIR article will be on this very topic.

NEXT.

Iran has a stealth fighter

Yeah, I'm not linking to that.  If you want a good laugh, go find the pictures yourself.  But this is why nobody takes Iran seriously:  they abuse the idea of deception to the point where all it does is make us laugh.  Plus, their supposedly legitimate programs are also either 1) abused by deception, or 2) just hilarious.  Remember the lawnmower engine powered "stealth" flying boat things?  The photoshopped missile launch salvoes?  The welded together oil cans allegedly holding SAMs inside?  This one beat all of them.  

Iran:  demonstrating a lack of aerodynamics, LO design, and cockpit ergonomics all at the same time!  Although, we really should've figured the first one out when their crowning aeronautical achievement was putting a second vertical fin on an F-5.

NEXT.

What I'm looking for this week:

-Where are Venezuela's S-300VM systems based?  Their Pechoras?

Azeri Favorit Located

In July of 2010, various media reports indicated that Russia was completing a sale of S-300PMU-2 Favorit (SA-20B GARGOYLE) SAM systems to Azerbaijan.  Something of an uproar ensued, with Russia and Azerbaijan denying the sale and Armenia expressing its displeasure.  Then, in June of 2011, two S-300PMU-2 TELs appeared in an Azeri military parade in Baku.  Clearly the sale had gone through, despite the denials from all parties involved.

Now, following an imagery update in May of 2013, the location of Azerbaijan's Favorit SAM systems can be disclosed.  Sited on the coastline northwest of Sumgait, the Favorit batteries appear sited to defend the capital area.  The 200 kilometer range of the Favorit's 48N6E2 (GARGOYLE mod 1) interceptor also provides the system with a degree of capability over western Azerbaijan, although the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains just out of reach.


Azerbaijan deploys two Favorit batteries and a single battle management complex.  Each battery possesses a 30N6E2 (TOMB STONE) engagement radar and a 96L6E acquisition radar, with four 5P85TE2 TELs.  The northern battery also possesses two 40V6 series mast assemblies adjacent to the two radar systems.  The central position employs the 64N6E2 (BIG BIRD D) battle management radar.

The southern site is emplaced on a reprofiled former S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) position, with the northern site emplaced on a newly built semi-hardened position.  The site buildup suggests a permanent deployment location.  However, the mobility of the S-300PMU-2 allows it to redeploy in a very short period of time.

The S-300PMU-2 represents the most advanced SAM system in the region, and is easily the most capable air defense system in the Azerbaijani inventory.  The 200 kilometer engagement range is supported by 300 kilometer range surveillance and tracking capability from the associated 64N6E2 and 96L6E radars, systems capable of monitoring the bulk of both Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.  The six target engagement capability of the system, effectively doubled by deploying two batteries, effectively negates any aerial threat posed by the Armenian military.  Furthermore, the ATBM capability of the system removes Soviet-era SCUD missiles from the threat picture.

With the deployment of the S-300PMU-2, Azerbaijan has taken a significant step to upgrading its air defense capability.  The ability of the Favorit, coupled with the state of the Armenian military, significantly reduces the threat of an armed conflict between the two nations in the future, or at the very least enables Azerbaijan to remove the Armenian air and missile threat from the equation.

Let's try this again...

So let's try this whole "restarting" thing again, shall we? The past six months or so has been busy, irritating, profitable, and a whole bunch of other adjectives I won't print here! However, life has finally calmed down and organized itself in such a fashion that I can give a lot more time to fun things like this (some of you may have noticed my lack of activity on various websites as well, same reasons apply). So, the current plan is as follows:

1. Figure out some way to re-work and re-launch I&A
2. Post anything I find amusing here
3. Try and locate the long-term consistency that has, so far, avoided me like the plague

A few current projects in various stages of completion:

1. An updated and expanded look at the S-300P/400 series, to be published as a separate PDF file (the old look was in a past I&A issue)
2. An update to my history of the Falcon missile family
3. An I&A special report covering Syria's air defense posture, with an assessment of what the S-300P (PMU-2?) procurement will mean going forward

Also note that the SAM Site Overview has been updated below.  Additionally, the past issues of I&A are still available.  Here are the download links for what I'm referring to as Volumes 1 (2011) and 2 (2012):

Volume 1:  Download
Volume 2:  Download

With all this in mind, I've still got a backlog of communications to get through regarding various things, so if you contacted me at one point and haven't heard back, I'll be getting to it. If you want to re-contact me, that's fine as well, it'll make sure you don't get lost in the shuffle.

So. Who do I want to irritate today?

Tuesday, October 30, 2012

Red October

I should have the October I&A finished by the end of next week.  The biggest issue has been the Russian air defense overview.  Russia moved to four OSCs rather than the previous military zones, meaning I had to change all of the placemark files (said changes will show up in the next SAM Site Overview update as well).  This is causing some problems with map generation, as the new OSCs are (except for the Southern OSC) a lot bigger than the previous military zones.  I'm trying to find a map style or template that works best to show the entire zone and it's taking a bit longer than I wanted it to.  Everything else was relatively simple to update.

Wednesday, October 10, 2012

August/September I&A

See what I did there?  The current issue of I&A has begun distribution.  Due to my different workload this semester I didn't get around to 1) doing this on anything close to a normal schedule, and 2) get around to a separate September issue.
 
Also, don't expect to see anything else "new" from I&A until 2013.  The next two issues will be October and December, focusing on Russia and China and primarily consisting of updated articles on air defense, strategic forces, etc.  There won't be anything in November, the idea is to leave a lot of space open to ensure that all of the updating is complete on time (in theory). 
 
Because of the current workload issue, I may go to a bimonthly schedule in 2013.  We'll see.  If I get things under control the rest of the year, I may be able to retain the hypothetical monthly schedule.
 
Finally, anything notable will appear either here or as an I&A special report for the rest of the year for the reasons listed above.  I also have a rather large (over 100 sites) update to the SAM Site Overview to process as well.

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

August I&A

A brief update:  the August I&A is being finalized, but may require some work on Saturday to complete given my new schedule.  I now teach five days a week instead of my more typical two, but I can't complain.  As such you may see it in your inbox during the first week of September rather than over the weekend.
 
There are two outstanding contributor pieces focusing on China and Pakistan, as well as two pieces of my own covering air defense updates in the Caucasus region and a new method of classifying military locations in Google Earth (or any other GIS program for that matter).
 
Remember that September will be a new issue, but October will not; October will be an updated, consolidated Russia-centric issue.  Then November will be new, and December will be a repeat of October but China-focused.

Also, the next Jane's Intelligence Review contains an article I wrote covering present and future upgrades to Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.  We got some great satellite imagery in there of some of the new Voronezh BMEW radars, and a few other interesting locations.

Lastly, if you heard someone on Voice of America talking about SAMs in Syria...yeah, that was me.
 
I'll get back to work now.