Showing posts with label Current Events. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Current Events. Show all posts

Thursday, June 27, 2013

Current Events, Updates

Things have been a bit sporadic for the past few weeks, so I figured I'd explain why.  Basically, my Windows 7 laptop that was the tool for all of my amusing activities decided to develop a consistently recurring Blue Screen of Death problem.  After numerous system restores (and not the Windows kind, the delete and re-install everything kind), the problem has not gone away, so I'm now back on the old laptop.  No real problem, it just means I've had to save files, move stuff around, and re-install programs like Google Earth and GIMP on this thing.  So, things should be a bit more sane for now.  This thing is at least far more stable than the other one, apparently.  I'm told that it may have to do with this one's Intel processor vs. the other one's AMD chip, but that's so far beyond my computer brainpower that it's not even funny.  I was able to mess with this one to get it functioning a lot faster, so it's less irritating to have to go back to it now.  So, I can now work on finishing a lot of things I had thought I'd be finishing on the other one.

Projects still in the pipe include:

-A standalone document representing an updated and expanded I&A piece on the S-300P/400 SAM family
-A look at Syria's IADS, which may or may not be completed in a timely manner if it continues to look like nobody's going to do anything NFZ related.
-The still in progress Falcon missile history update

I also have a massive backlog of e-mail in my Gmail account.  If you've tried corresponding through that address recently, but have not gotten a reply, this is why.  I hope to begin clearing those out this weekend.

One other thing that will likely get posted this weekend is...well, basically a look at some open source data.  Some of you will find it amusing, but I bet a lot of you will think I've lost my mind, due to one of the focuses.  Well, no more hiding.  Time to publish and take my place alongside Those Guys, and try to beat the cold hard facts into the brains of the rest of you.

Now, some current events of amusement from the past week or so:

Arms Control:  the US has come up with an idea to reduce US and Russian nuclear arsenals again.  Russia is not pleased, citing ABM concerns.  China thinks it's a great idea.  Now, a lot of people have come out on both sides of this, and I find myself somewhere in the middle.  I support the presence, continued development, and potential use of nuclear weapons when required.  That being said, I would agree that the stockpile we currently maintain is both 1) old and in need of updating or replacing, and 2) numerically bloated given the actual threat picture.  So if we want to cut down again, I see no reason why not.  Russia's argument, however, holds zero water.  This is the same old "ABM systems nullify our deterrent" argument that's been around since we came up with the idea of European-based ABMs.  Well, sorry Russia, but you get zero credibility points.  Why?  Because they're developing their own upgraded and new-build ABM systems themselves!  Were Russia to stop such development (which in reality would be asinine from various standpoints), they'd then have an accurate argument.  But as long as BOTH SIDES can potentially intercept enemy ICBM RVs, then neither one gets to argue.

Snowden:  put him in jail.  Same with the Army guy and the alleged rapist.  The first two, simply put, violated non-disclosure agreements to which there are clear consequences.  The third guy?  At the very least an accessory to Army guy, and therefore also liable.  Which means he'll probably end up escaping London and get made an Admin at ATS or something equally ridiculous.

Monday, June 17, 2013

No NFZ for you!

A few interesting things regarding Syria lately.

First off, Russia says we're not allowed to use the F-16s and Patriot SAMs in Jordan to make an NFZ in Syria.  International law or something.  Which is of course a ridiculous argument.  Lets say the UN decided it was NFZ time (for the sake of debate, ignoring whether the UN does anything productive).  Jordan decides to play along.  Well, then all those nice toys stockpiled over there become fair game.  What Russia probably meant to say was that we can't do it unilaterally.  Or, that they don't want us to do it unilaterally, that's more accurate.  Then they have a point.  I'm curious to know if the Vipers are CGs or CJs, because the latter would make covert NFZ plans more credible for reasons that should be obvious.

Second, Russia is at the G8 complaining about Syria.  So are we, obviously.  My favorite part is when they argue that "our" evidence of sarin use by Assad is not up to standards, or whatever they mean.  Which is amusing, because where were the similar comments when France (and I think a UN arm?) made the same statements a short while ago?  Oh, but this time it's the US, so it has to be wrong.  A little consistency would be nice.  At least it'd make them appear actually concerned and not just out to be on whatever side we're not.

At this rate, my "idiocy is bipartisan" mantra may have to be altered to "idiocy transcends borders."

And really, Russia, come on.  If you're so gung-ho about Assad staying in charge (or at least keeping the US out of Syria (although that's already a fail)), plop an S-400 battery at your naval port.  Or one of the extant S-300PM batteries that the S-400s are displacing in Russia.  In fact an S-300PM could be a better idea, because then when everything cools off, you announce that by the way, the Syrians have been training for the past year and are keeping these.

Also, if I am off and on here in the next week or so, I'm having computer issues.  I've got a Windows 7 laptop that I've been using for a while now, and it's been doing this random blue screen thing that was really starting to get annoying.  So, system restore!  An easy process when you save everything to an external drive.  But if it starts up again, there may be further restoration/driving over it with my car.  So don't worry, I'm "back" regardless, there just may be technical difficulties from time to time until I get this completely sorted out.

Friday, June 14, 2013

Arming "rebels" is a great idea and never backfires!

So, now we're going to give more arms and support to Syria's "rebel" forces.  Somebody tell me just why this is a bright idea.  For one, this pretty much proves that whatever they're teaching in history class at a certain Ivy League school, they're leaving out the history of Al Qaeda bit.  You know, the part where "rebels" are given arms and support to overthrow an enemy, and then they later turn around and bite us in the ass.

I'm going to attribute this decision to a few different possible factors.

1.  We're going to fight a proxy war with Iran; we could care less about Syria, but what we want is to be able to engage Hezbollah inside of Syria.  Iran can't or won't do anything serious itself, so it relies on its Hezbollah proxy to fight for it, far enough away that it thinks we won't notice what's really going on.  Well, we see you, Iran, you and your photoshop missiles and hilarious "aircraft" designs.  We can't or won't do anything about Iran (and this is completely independent of the should we or shouldn't we argument so don't even start), so this will work instead.  Except that support and assistance has a way of turning into a massive debacle and sucking us in way too deep into something largely irrelevant, but I guess the plus side here is that Syria isn't covered in jungle?  Although why Hezbollah matters is another question, given that I haven't heard of them launching rockets across the Mexican border yet.

2.  It's Egypt all over again.  And no, not Egypt of a few years ago, Egypt of a few decades ago.  As in we're only picking this side because the "bad guys" (i.e. Russia and in Syria's case also China) are on the opposite side of the fence.  Which turned out to be such a stellar political decision back then. 

3.  We waited too long to do anything militarily productive.  I've been saying for a while now that relying on Soviet-era IADS components gets you bombed, apparently if you don't follow our rules.  See Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Libya.  Syria, with modern Chinese radars and modern Russian SAMs (even though Russia currently lacks the stones to just airlift S-300PMU-2 components using An-124s...at least I think they'd fit given that it could airlift Pioner), has moved away from the bombable model of air defense, which has given us pause.  Notice how a lot of the NFZ stuff disappeared with a quickness when all of the fun new toys started to be either delivered or reported in service, or it became obvious that Russia might eventually send the S-300PMU-2s that Syria ordered.  Which incidentially would mean the inclusion of Russian advisors and trainers, who might get bombed, and we don't want that...but aren't you supposed to want to bomb the "bad guys"?  Now I'm confused.

In reality, everyone should step back and let the situation play itself out.  Because I can't for the life of me see where this results in a "win" if we start trying to play nationbuilder again.  I understand that there is a certain need to play geopolitics and make it look like we're standing up to the "bad guys", but in reality none of us should be involved.  Why not engage Russia and China and get everyone to take a step back, because relations with those two are far more valuable and important in the long run than whatever happens to Syria.  If you want to look good to the international players, at least make yourself look good to the ones that actually matter.

Oh wait, I forgot...if they aren't the "bad guys", how can we justify billions of dollars for overpriced and unnecessary hardware like the F-35...

And before the inevitable question comes up, no, I am not necessarily against bombing things or sticking our nose into someone else's business when there's a definite endgame that will be to our benefit.  We have just as much right to act in our own national interest as anyone else does, despite what the rest of the world wants you to think.  But once again, someone really needs to explain to me how this one is in our national interest, because I'm just not seeing it.

...but there's also...

Nope.  Not going there.

Yet.

Tuesday, June 4, 2013

Comments, Current Events

Comments are still OK, don't worry.  Just to reiterate a few old "rules" though:

1.  Say whatever you want.  I'm not a censor.  I'll even usually reply.  I bring this up because sometimes I get comments that do sit in the box for a day or two.  The reason behind that is usually because it's a piece of information that is interesting or relevant and I want to examine it, and the comment inbox is a safe place to store it so I don't forget where it was posted and then lose it.

2.  That being said, comments are still moderated.  This means I have to hit a button that says 'publish" for your comment to show up.  Why?  Because I get way too many spam comments.  Spam I will censor.  Pretty much anything else is fair game.

Here's a good spam comment that showed up right after I posted this:  "I'm impressed, I have to admit. Seldom do I encounter a blog that's both educative and engaging, and let me tell you, you've hit the nail on the head. The problem is an issue that too few people are speaking intelligently about. I'm very happy I came across this during my hunt for something relating to this. Also visit my blog legal amphetamines"

See what I mean?  There has to be some sort of comment generator these idiots are using, because I'll get the same one multiple times with the only difference being the website they want you to visit.  They're smart about it too, they only post on older articles, very rarely the most current feature.

Anyway, I assume nobody really wants legal amphetamines.  Although it'll be interesting to see what the words legal amphetamines do to my incoming traffic for the next few days.  I wonder if anyone monitors websites looking for the words legal amphetamines because I'm relatively certain spam comment websites are not really pointing you to legit legal amphetamines.  There might be a search engine designed to find the phrase legal amphetamines on websites to track people who are after said legal amphetamines.

LEGAL AMPHETAMINES!

Fun over, on to the news.


Well this should be self-explanatory.  The contract doesn't have to be fulfilled until about this time next year, so there's no rush.  You do have to wonder why Russia is still dragging their feet, though.  If you're trying to avoid the West going in and screwing up one of your export markets, why would you present them with what amounts to a "bomb by this date" ultimatum?  

This may be the result of Russia both wanting to finalize the deal, while at the same time giving the West time to think about what blowing up a Syrian S-300P series site would mean.  Because it'd probably be host to Russian advisors and trainers for 6 months or so after delivery, you know.  It could also be that Syrian crews just haven't started training or completed the training course yet.  In which case delivering the systems would make them amount to really expensive bombing targets.

Speaking of which, Israel is still barking about blowing the things up if they're delivered because of the threat.  I.E. the Syrian IADS would be credible for the first time since about, oh, 1986 or so.  What I still want to know is what happened to their countermeasures that they were so sure would defeat an S-300P series system?  If the system represents no real threat (and assuming they haven't drank whatever the Turks did in the 90s), why go to the effort of locating and striking them, especially if you're blatantly risking irritating Russia in the process by potentially killing Russian nationals?  Isn't it better to sit back and laugh as Assad spends himself into a hole?

Wait, I know.  Clearly Russia upgraded to Windows 8, rendering the Israeli electronic countermeasure and intrusion stuff irrelevant.


France claims that analysis proves that sarin gas, which is a chemical weapon and therefore a WMD, was used somewhere in Syria on more than one occasion.

And of course France isn't telling which side used the stuff...which was what I was going to say when the first report came out and they weren't talking.

Now, however, they're claiming that it was Assad's forces and/or regime supporters (diplomat speak for Hezbollah).  Said claims conveniently being made as I was in the process of typing here.  Stupid media.  If they're not blowing things way out of proportion, they're being inconveniently timely with their reporting.

Well, now we're really going to see what the "proper" interpretation of terms like "game changer" and "red line" is, aren't we?  Not that I do or don't think we should be bothering with the non-Assad guys (like I mentioned in another post, supporting such types has worked out so famously for us in the past...), but if I say there will be bombs if you do X, and you go and do X, then it can be argued that there should be bombs.  Otherwise why should anyone take me seriously?

Not that I'm sure anyone should in the first place.

Probably shouldn't take me seriously either.

Sunday, June 2, 2013

Current Events

One of the things I'll be trying to do here on a more regular basis is to actually comment on some worldwide military developments or events which I find interesting, amusing, or both.  Some things are relevant even if they don't come with nice overheads!  So with that in mind, here are a few topics that have appeared over the last few days (or weeks, or months...):


Iraq:  mythically overrated by the media, massively bombed twice.  Syria, Libya, Iran, and the DPRK were all advised to take notice, given their reliance on the same supposedly mythical yet in reality old-technology weapon systems for air defense.  Looks like Syria is learning the lesson that Iran thinks can be solved by welding together oil cans.  Buk-M2E systems, Chinese JY-27 and Type 120 radars, and now, by 2014 apparently, some variant of the S-300.  Most likely the S-300PMU-2, the current production export model of the P series, although I could make an argument for the S-300VM for added ATBM capability against Israeli weapons.

This is the Russian government enacting a new type of "missile diplomacy", wherein they deploy their own or supply modern system components to someone else to ensure that the West stays out of some given situation/gets a message/etc.  And you know what?  Can't blame them for it.

The last time I checked, the S-300P was not a Kalashnikov or shoulder-fired SAM, and therefore not on the UN Arms Control Register.  Nor is it typically part of any sort of arms embargo, of which Syria is not under anyway.  And, despite ridiculous Turkish theories, the weapon is not a credible surface-to-surface threat.  So there is no reason for the sale not to proceed, unless of course the West really does have designs on entering Syria and sorting things out in the manner that it wants them sorted out.  

And if the EU can decide it's OK to sell weapons to the anti-Assad crowd in Syria, they've got no real leg to stand on when Russia actually conducts a formal, legal transaction on the state-to-state level.  Although in the EU's defense the idea of supporting a rebel force with light arms has never, ever blown up in anyone's face down the line.  

Oh, wait...

If you ask me, this will either 1) force the West to run in half-cocked without taking the time to think things through and end up creating a bigger mess in the long run (which we arguably did in Iraq despite having said time to think about it first), or 2) make everyone back off while the situation, uh...basically solves itself.

Harsh?  Yup.  But look at it this way.  Either the world wants/needs external actors to intervene in the internal affairs of states when things go awry, or it doesn't.  That's the question:  should we intervene because Assad is a bad guy?  Should we stay out of it because it's a situation precipitated internally by internal forces?  That's a whole different argument, which isn't the point here.

Or maybe Russia really does want us to intervene.  Because if the West does eventually go in there after the missiles are operational, Almaz-Antey will be able to sell them for a billion dollars per unit with all of the publicity they're going to get.  Or maybe this is all a really convoluted ploy to get Israel to bomb Syria again, claiming that sophisticated weapon systems that Hezbollah would not be able to operate or maintain in a million years are being...transferred to Hezbollah!

Really.  Buk-M2Es for Hezbollah?  That was the best argument they could come up with?

NEXT.


Now this is interesting.  Saudi Arabia procured the DF-3A in the mid-80s, and signed the NPT in 1988 to assure the US government that no, they weren't trying to go nuclear (although allegations of Pakistani and Iraqi nukes were made for years).  Now, with the Kingdom starting to be wary of Shi'a Iran's nuclear (alleged) ambitions, they might be reconsidering the world's most fatal mushrooms.  And replacing the DF-3A as the potential launch platform.  

The difference is that with the DF-3A, they had an inaccurate IRBM basically useful for nuclear warhead transport through the atmosphere.  The DF-21 is far more accurate, terminally guided in some versions, making it useable as a conventional strike weapon where the DF-3A is really not.  

The nuclear weapons acquisition is the best part of the story.  If they go this route, then they're breaching the NPT, provided they don't withdraw first.  If they don't withdraw, prepare for much hilarity as Iran and its supporters raise hell about the double standard.  Because you don't really think we'd actually sanction the almighty oil supplier, do you?

For more on Saudi, the DF-3A, and associated information, my next JIR article will be on this very topic.

NEXT.

Iran has a stealth fighter

Yeah, I'm not linking to that.  If you want a good laugh, go find the pictures yourself.  But this is why nobody takes Iran seriously:  they abuse the idea of deception to the point where all it does is make us laugh.  Plus, their supposedly legitimate programs are also either 1) abused by deception, or 2) just hilarious.  Remember the lawnmower engine powered "stealth" flying boat things?  The photoshopped missile launch salvoes?  The welded together oil cans allegedly holding SAMs inside?  This one beat all of them.  

Iran:  demonstrating a lack of aerodynamics, LO design, and cockpit ergonomics all at the same time!  Although, we really should've figured the first one out when their crowning aeronautical achievement was putting a second vertical fin on an F-5.

NEXT.

What I'm looking for this week:

-Where are Venezuela's S-300VM systems based?  Their Pechoras?

Thursday, July 5, 2012

Going "Live"

UPDATE:  No word yet as to the time, so it may be pushed to early next week.  I assume that the BBC might be paying a lot of attention to that Andy Murray guy right about now...

Either tonight or tomorrow I'll be doing a live radio interview with the BBC on 5 Live.  You can listen in online at the link, it'll be sometime between 2000 and 2200 (that's 8PM - 10PM in US Eastern Time).  I should have a bit more info regarding the schedule later today, at which point I'll post an update.

The topic will be the Syrian air defense situation, including the Turkish RF-4E shootdown.

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

BBC on Syria; July I&A

Here's something from the BBC that you all might find interesting:  CLICK 

In other news, the topics for July's I&A are shaping up as follows:

-A look at BDA of Libyan SAM sites struck in 2011, with an eye to what this represents as far as current SEAD/DEAD tactics go (seems like this might be relevant in the near future)

-A look at the ROK's ADD complexes

-A follow-on to the I&A special report published over the weekend examining the coverage of Chinese-sourced EW assets located in Syria

Those are all well on their way to being done, and I'm still looking at a few other ideas.  One idea is to explain the problems with this article.

I'm also re-working the layout for the imagery template I use in I&A.  The big one, like the one I posted here for the captured Syrian Type 120 EW site.  I currently have two issues to resolve, and one idea to incorporate.  First, I need to shrink the upper border a bit, to give more space to the image.  And maybe add a surrounding border as well.  Secondly, I need to figure out how to save the finished images properly so that they don't screw up the color.  Look at any of the big images in I&A, including the maps.  Any time I use red (which is a lot), the red parts look ugly in the saved image.  Nice and bright on-screen during creation, not so much after the save.  This is an image issue, not an issue converting to PDF, as it does this to the saved image before I do anything else with it.  The idea I'll be including at some point is to generate a system of identifiers for each location I show.  This can then be cross-referenced with the SAM Site Overview placemarks. 

And now I have a nice six-day weekend for the holiday, to spend working on my next IHS Jane's feature and some of July's I&A.

Monday, July 2, 2012

The Strong Get Stronger

Two recent events significantly increase the effectiveness of what is already the world's most capable air defense network.  Simply put, the strong are getting stronger.

On 28 June, Ria Novosti reported that the new missile for the S-400 passed state trials, and would soon be delivered to operational S-400 batteries.  Whether this is the rumored 40N6 or not is up for debate, as is the actual genesis of the 40N6, but the classification of the new weapon as "long range" seems to indicate that the S-400 will soon have it's full design range capability of 400 kilometers at its disposal.  The "long-range" classification also appears to eliminate a 9M96 variant from consideration, a weapon long associated with the S-400 complex.

While mention of the potential 40N6 deployment has appeared in various sources, an earlier announcement seems to have largely been ignored.  In January, reports stated that S-300PM batteries had completed upgrades to Favorit-S standard.  This increases the maximum engagement range of the system from 150 to 200 kilometers, by incorporating the newer 48N6D missile.  Although still short of the S-400's 250 kilometer range against most non-cooperative targets with the 48N6DM, the Favorit-S represents a solid increase in system effectiveness, blostered by the introduction of newer electronic components. 

As the new S-400 continues to enter service, modernized Favorit-S systems present three possibilities.  First, they can be used as gap-fillers, backing up S-400 batteries uploaded with the longer-range 40N6.  This represents a useful role, given that the 40N6 likely possesses a reduced capability at range to engage non-cooperative targets.  Additionally, modernized Favorit-S batteries displaced by the introduction of S-400 units can be redeployed around Russia as replacements for older S-300PT and S-300PS batteries.  Lastly, Favorit-S batteries, displaced by S-400 batteries and not required elsewhere in the nation, could potentially represent a viable export target for a nation lacking the resources to acquire the more expensive S-400 but requiring an air defense upgrade.  As such they could also be passed on to states such as Kazakhstan or Belarus as replacements for extant S-300PS and S-300PMU systems while awaiting delivery of S-400 batteries.

Regardless of the details, one thing is clear:  the Russian air defense network is becoming increasingly potent. 

Users of the SAM Site Overview file will see these changes reflected during the next update.  S-300PM range rings will be altered to reflect a 200 kilometer range, and separate 400 kilometer range rings will be added for the S-400 to denote it's two-missile selection.

Sunday, July 1, 2012

I&A Special Report: Chinese Radars in Syria

Interested readers can download an I&A special report on Chinese radars in Syria here:  CLICK

There are, at present, three different Chinese radar types identified:  the Type 120, the JY-27 (WIDE MAT), and the JYL-1.  The last identification is the least conclusive but appears accurate based on imagery analysis and examination of various photographs of Chinese radar systems.


Saturday, June 30, 2012

Captured Syrian Radar Position

UPDATE:  thanks to PS860 posting in the comments, the unidentified array is a 1RL23 (SCORE BOARD) IFF system.  It's also a very small unit, and due to the size I misidentified the position in the imagery below.  It actually sits east of the domed structure, and does not appear visible in the imagery.  At least I got the IFF interrogator part right!

Rebel forces recently captured a radar site in northwestern Syria on 26 June, and subsequently released a video showing various radar systems.  The image below depicts the radar site as it appeared in August of 2011.  The site is located among the Sheikh Barakat ruins roughly 2.5 kilometers west of Dar Ta izzah in northwestern Syria, roughly 12 kilometers from the Turkish border.

The site is noteworthy as it contains both FSU and Chinese EW sensors.  An FSU P-12/18 (SPOON REST) radar system is present alongside a newer Chinese Type 120 2D surveillance radar.  A third as yet unidentified array also appears in the video, and may represent either an additional radar array or an IFF interrogator.

The Type 120, along with JY-27 (WIDE MAT) radars noted at two other EW complexes east of Damascus, highlight the Chinese industry's connection with Syria.  Given that the Type 120 represents a target acquisition sensor for SAM support in Chinese service, it is prudent to speculate as to whether Syria has acquired modern Chinese SAM systems to improve its air defense network. 

The Type 120 first appeared in imagery of the Dar Ta izzah EW complex in June 2010, with the JY-27 present at one of the southern EW sites as early as August of 2009.  It is therefore likely that the arms shipment containing these sensors was delivered no later than early 2009.


Thursday, May 17, 2012

Google Boats?

According to a news piece posted by AOL, Google is developing the ability to track and display the locations of ships at sea.

All of them.

Well, at least those actively using AIS transponders, but still.

This is a pretty interesting development, if you ask me.  Some of the benefits are obvious, and are mentioned in the article.

Then there's the fact that you could theoretically track the movement of military forces worldwide.  Provided they operate with AIS transponders active, that is.

I'd think that this represents a great tool to exploit off of the Horn of Africa.  Military vessels in the area with transponders active could act like homing beacons for shipping in the area, guiding them through protected waters and serving as a pirate deterrent.  The authors naturally assume that such new technology would obviously represent some sort of terrorist tool for attacking targets (because what else is Google Earth but a mapping program of terrorist targets, right?), but if American, Chinese, or whoever's naval units are operating in the clear, hey, go ahead and try it.  I'm willing to bet that in the battle of terrorist vs. 5 inch round or terrorist vs. CIWS, the winner will not be the guy with nefarious intentions.  Plus, in case they haven't noticed, terrorists and pirates are already attacking boats.

The really interesting bit of the article is Google's plan to map the entire seafloor in high resolution over five years.  Again, the assumption is that this will lead to all sorts of security problems when crashed spy satellites are located and the Chinese or Russians go out to lift them off the bottom.  Always with the negative waves, Moriarity.  Always with the negative waves.  Me, I'd like to see them locate Jack Weeks' A-12, to finally put an end to one of the unsolved tragedies of the CIA's OXCART program.

Of course, locating K-129 would be amusing too...we'd then know just how much of the sub was lifted off of the bottom by the CIA.  I'm not sure which would be more amusing, finding only a few pieces of the sub on the bottom, or the entire thing.

The article closes with the following line from an unnamed intelligence community source, after a brief bit about how Google services have little intelligence utility whatsoever in their minds:  "Just because you have the data, doesn't mean you can analyze the data or know how to use it."

Sure, I'll take that as a challenge.  Or maybe a mission statement...

And see?  I told you I'd be posting here again.

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

Iranian Silos Unveiled

So Iran is conducting another wargame, Great Prophet 6. No big deal, everybody does it. Apart from the military and political benefits, they present fun opportunities for politicians and military officials to make bold, asinine, and non-credible statements to the press. Plus, you often get nice videos showing things like missile firings.

Speaking of videos and Iranian exercises, here's a link to a Youtube video purportedly showing some of the Great Prophet 6 exercise footage:

Youtube


Pay attention to what shows up at the 15 second mark: that'd be the inside of an apparent Iranian missile silo. Iran claims that the silos are automated, allowing remote firing of the weapons.

For amusement, let's quote Lebanon's Daily Star:

"An officer in Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guard, which is in charge of the missile program, said Tehran has constructed “numerous” underground missile silos which satellites can’t detect."

Except, you know, for the ones near Tabriz.

Another Lebanese source, Al-Manar, claims that the silos were used on the 27th.

What does all of this mean? First off, it means that Iranian silo-based missiles should certainly be considered an operational element in the ballistic missile force. Additionally, it raises a few questions about Iranian silo-building capabilities. Why did it take this long for the capability to be revealed? Were there issues with the communication and control system? Will this prevent a more widespread deployment of silo-based weapons? Or was Iran merely taking its time to work everything out, prior to initiating a large-scale silo-based deployment system?

Whatever the answers, perhaps Iranian silo-based deployment concepts, including coffin-launched systems elsewhere in the nation, will now get more attention. Look for more on this to appear here in the future.

Monday, March 21, 2011

Libyan Update

Following the initial cruise missile strikes on 19 March, the Pentagon released a document illustrating the general areas where targets were attacked. As expected for an attack on Libyan IADS architecture, the strike locations corresponded to regions with deployed EW assets and S-75, S-125, and S-200 missile batteries.

The graphic below illustrates the post-strike state of the Libyan IADS, presuming that all SAM systems were disabled in regions targeted by cruise missile strikes.
While the Qaddafi regime is no longer assessed to control operational strategic SAM batteries in the NFZ region, numerous EW facilities still remain. These facilities allow the regime to maintain a degree of situational awareness, provided they are not under constant electronic attack. Furthermore, no effort was made to strike S-75 or S-125 batteries deep inland. Sabha is still defended by an S-75 and S-125 battery, and contains a garrison facility which could be used to reconstitute SAM units damaged or destroyed in the March 19th attacks.

If the coalition is unwilling to strike targets outside the established NFZ, the Qaddafi regime may be able to transport SAM components to its periphery. This would theoretically enable targets operating in the southern portions of the NFZ to be engaged, creating an interesting scenario where the coalition would have to either restrict flight in sections of the NFZ or attack targets outside of the NFZ to maintain its integrity. Such a course of action could potentially see increased protest from nations such as China and India, bringing into question the continued value and effectiveness of the NFZ as a whole. Also, Western nations attacking targets outside of the NFZ could result in a significant loss of support from the Arab League.

If there is a lesson to be learned from the March 19th decapitation strikes on Qaddafi's IADS, it is that nations relying on Soviet-era SAM systems no longer pose a significant threat to a modern, well-equipped military arm. While current-generation Russian-made SAM systems rank among the most sophisticated and capable in the world, the era in which nations could rely on elderly Soviet-era systems such as the S-75 or S-200 to provide a credible degree of air defense capability has decisively ended. Claims by the Pentagon that Libya possessed a high-threat IADS network were technologically unfounded, in much the same way that the same claims made about iraq in 1991 were also proven to be extreme exaggerations.

Sunday, March 20, 2011

Libya Update; Graphing

As we are all aware by now, UN-backed military action is being taken against Libya. As predicted earlier, the opening salvo consisted primarily of cruise missile strikes against the air defense network, opening the door for allied aircraft to operate over Libya in a lower threat environment.

In an amusing development, here's CNN's John King saying pretty much the exact same thing I did once he gets around to talking about the air defenses: VIDEO Readers have already noted that the range rings and color schemes used to identify Libyan SAM sites are the same ones I used in the SAM Site Overview! It appears that my SAM Site Overview file is now a CNN media source, they even used the native system designators that I do rather than the more common Westernised names usually found in the Western press and media when dealing with Soviet-era systems. My attempts to control the world are clearly moving ahead as planned. Seriously, if anyone else notices something like this, let me know. I do track stuff like this, in part to make my resume more amusing and in part because it adds credibility when I am asked to provide organizations with information.

In an unrelated note, who knows of a good graphing program? I want to make a graph showing SAM system engagement envelopes similar to the HQ-2 graph done here that I used a while back:
What I want to do (ignoring the text bits) is show the engagement zone as an area graph, but be able to overlay multiple zones on top of each other. Picture the blue part of the above HQ-2 zone overlaid on top of a different colored HQ-9 zone, for instance, showing the disparity in capabilities. Using a graphing or charting application will allow me to do this in much less time than having to draw the entire thing manually, which is what I did for the HQ-2 graph. Either MS Excel is not cooperating, or I have no clue what I'm doing. Either one is possible. So if you have an idea of a program that I can use to graph areas like that, with set minimum and mazimum values in the X (range) and Y (altitude) axes, let me know. Just don't bring up gnuplot; I tried that one and it made my programming-illiterate brain hurt.

Saturday, March 19, 2011

Libyan NFZ: The SAM Threat

LIBYAN SAM THREAT TO UN OPERATIONS

On 17 March 2011 the UNSC voted to enforce a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) over Libya, in response to the conflict between Qaddafi's regime and separatist forces. The Libyan military operates numerous Soviet-era strategic SAM systems which represent the most likely threat to allied aircraft enforcing the NFZ. Libyan SAM systems include the S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON). Numerous AAA, MANPADS', and tactical SAM systems are also operated, but represent a considerably reduced threat given their limited effectiveness above 20,000 feet.

LIBYAN SAM DEPLOYMENT

The graphic presented below illustrates the pre-conflict state of Libyan strategic air defenses. Major military airfields, active EW radar sites, and operational strategic SAM coverage zones are marked. It should be noted that the graphics presented here depict identified dedicated EW facilities. Many SAM batteries possess their own organic EW elements; simply targeting the known EW facilities does not necessarily prevent the SAM force from receiving the target track data necessary to prosecute an engagement.
The majority of contested territory is along the northern coastline of Libya, shown in the graphic below. This is advantageous to any allied aircraft entering the theater of operations, as they do not have to travel deep into Libya to enforce the NFZ in support of separatist forces. Furthermore, ISR and support aircraft can be operated offshore under the protection of CAPs and naval air defense systems.
Separatist forces are concentrated along the eastern coastline of the nation from Benghazi to Tobruk and the Egyptian border. As the air defense forces in these regions are likely no longer under Qaddafi's control, the graphic below indicates the likely pro-Qaddafi SAM threat picture facing NFZ operations.
Numerous SAM garrisons and unoccupied, prepared strategic SAM sites present an opportunity for pro-Qaddafi forces to reinforce their positions prior to the start of NFZ operations. Reinforcing the strategic SAM network in this fashion will present an increased SAM threat to allied aircraft and offer increased overlapping coverage zones around key military installations. A potential reinforced pro-Qaddafi SAM network is illustrated in the graphic below.
The majority of the command and control facilities for the pro-Qaddafi regime, as well as the seat of power, are consolidated in and around the capital of Tripoli. The following two graphics depict the current operational SAM network around Tripoli, as well as a potentially reinforced network employing currently inactive positions.
ENFORCING THE NFZ

The true nature of the SAM threat to NFZ operations will become apparent when operations commence. Should allied forces choose to enforce the NFZ over the entire region, it is likely that SEAD or DEAD operations will commence against the bulk of identified pro-Qaddafi SAM sites. However, should NFZ enforcement be limited initially to protecting separatist-controlled areas in the eastern portion of the nation, it is possible that few of the pro-Qaddafi SAM sites would be targeted as they would be unable to engage allied aircraft.

The exception to the latter scenario is the S-200. The S-200 enjoys a 250 km range against cooperative targets such as ISR and support aircraft. Given that allied aircraft will likely be based out of European territories or operate from USN CVNs, heavy use of inflight refueling should be expected. Eliminating pro-Qaddafi S-200 batteries would enable allied ISR and support aircraft to operate much closer to the Libyan coastline.

Should allied forces choose to enforce the NFZ over the entire nation and consequently engage active S-75 and S-125 SAM batteries, the capability of the pro-Qaddafi SAM network could be significantly degraded with a relatively small number of sorties. The Libyan SAM inventory is constrained by the reliance on Soviet-era systems. The S-75, S-125, and S-200 are limited by the fact that each engagement radar can only prosecute a single target. S-200 batteries are often bolstered by multiple 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars to allow the battery to engage multiple targets, but the single-target limitation significantly reduces the effectiveness of the network as a whole. Furthermore, over-reliance on aging technology places the network at significant risk for electronic warfare interference. The US military, for example, has faced the S-75 and S-125 over Iraq and the former Yugoslavia and is well-versed on countertactics and electronic attack procedures to mitigate the threat posed by such systems. While measures may have been taken to allow the S-75 and S-125 to remain viable in Libyan service, at this point they do not present significant risks to a modern military force. That is not to suggest that they present no risk whatsoever, but rather that they are no longer considered to be high-threat systems based on their age and known technical performance.

Aerial attacks against separatist positions appear to have been curtailed in favor of ground assault and artillery bombardment. In this light, the provision of the NFZ calling for protection of civillian under threat from pro-Qaddafi forces could allow operations over regime-controlled areas. A potential military campaign could begin with strikes against SAM positions and EW facilities, followed by strikes against pro-Qaddafi forces threatening or engaged with separatist forces, particularly those near Benghazi. Given the limited number of SAM sites located in territory held by the Qaddafi regime, it is likely that the capability of the strategic SAM network to prosecute targets could be significantly curtailed within 24 hours. Cruise missiles could be employed to strike identified SAM sites, forgoing the expense of a significant SEAD or DEAD operation and allowing combat aircraft to be tasked to protect separatist forces.

CONCLUSION

With the decision to enact a NFZ over Libya, the strategic SAM network represents the most significant threat to allied aircraft tasked with its enforcement. However, due to the single-target engagement capability of Libyan S-75 and S-125 batteries, the network is far less capable than it appears at first glance. Libya negotiated for the purchase of S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE) advanced SAM systems from Russia in 2010 but at this date no sale has been completed and no deliveries have been reported. Had Libya moved to upgrade its air defense network in recent years, the issue of allied aircraft enforcing a NFZ could have become a far more complicated task. Once again, a nation relying on an aged air defense network will potentially be at risk in large part because it failed to upgrade its capability. As an interesting footnote, it will be important to monitor Iran following the cessation of action against Qaddafi's regime. Perhaps the destruction of yet another aging air defense network will be the final catalyst pushing Iran to modernize it's own defenses.

SOURCES

Positional information derived from Google Earth. Range data used to create engagement zones sourced from Jane's Land-Based Air Defence. Graphics created using GIMP 2.0.

Monday, September 6, 2010

Does All of Our Intelligence Data Pass The "So What" Test?

Data relevance is critical to achieving success in the Intelligence Community (IC). Simply put, everything that we do must pass the “so what?” test, and we need to move away from creating intelligence data for intelligence’ sake. This means that every intelligence product and briefing should have a clear goal and tangible outcomes.

The unfortunate reality is that many of the IC’s efforts do not come close to passing this test. All too often, our intelligence lacks relevance or does not tangibly support a mission. The main issue is a lack of insight into goals based on achieving measurable outcomes.

The following is an example of viable intelligence that would clearly pass the “so what?” test based on tangible outcomes. Imagine that we have identified and then targeted a Taliban kidnapping ringleader, and our intel products/briefings make the argument that we have this terrorist's pattern of life and furthermore, by removing him, we will halt kidnappings in this region for a three-month period. This provides our Commander with a clear “so what?” This intelligence matters. Our Commander and staff, primarily his Operations Officer, are able to analyze the means available to them and formulate an appropriate plan to intervene. By collecting and providing the data needed to remove this leader, the key outcome is the fact that kidnappings decrease in this region. The goal of this mission was to decrease kidnappings and make this region safer, so the outcome was achieved.

From a terrain perspective, many analysts provide data about the slope, vegetation, hydrography, cover and concealment, and location of roads that could play a major role in determining the ideal location of the enemy’s SCUD launchers and associated support vehicles. The “so what?” factor is that by correctly analyzing, interpreting, combining with other intelligence disciplines, and then disseminating this data, we can predict likely SCUD locations. Similar analysis can offer Primary, Alternate, and Supplementary positions for our own Field Artillery units or ideal Drop Zones and Helicopter Landing Zones.

These examples of providing actionable intelligence seem very intuitive, and one would expect these types of efforts to be commonplace. Unfortunately, they are not all that common. One of the driving issues behind this challenge is the myriad of available data.

In 2009, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) alone generated 24 years worth of video if watched continuously. In 2010, UAVs are expected to generate 30 times that amount of data—and military commanders are acknowledging the issue. According to Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, “We are going to find ourselves in the not-too-distant future swimming in sensors and drowning in data.” (1)

The other challenge is focusing only on relevant data. For example, many believe that the IC is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy in Afghanistan because the majority of our collection efforts and analytical prowess are focused on insurgent groups. As such, our vast intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to persuade. (2)

The “so what?” factor in Afghanistan is determining who the local powerbrokers are that need to be influenced, as well as how we can best engage with locals—whether they are villagers, aid workers, or Afghan soldiers—to gain the credible insights we need to help advance the mission. (2)

Now that he has been appointed the new Director of National Intelligence, one of the key challenges that retired Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper Jr. hopes to tackle is to unite the traditionally separate missions of intelligence collection and analysis and to shrink and flatten the intelligence bureaucracy. (3) Clapper has also created the position of Deputy Director for Intelligence Integration to unify the collection and analysis tasks, which is a significant step toward addressing this issue. (4)

It certainly seems that IC leaders are taking this issue very seriously, and a top-down effort could bring about true change. However, all levels of the IC must continually ask themselves “so what?” If they are unable to answer this question, their efforts may be wasting the time and resources of our troops and policymakers—and these are resources that we cannot afford to waste.

-Lt. Col. (Ret.) Marv Gordner, 2010

REFERENCES

(1) “Too Much Information: Taming the UAV Data Explosion,” Defense Industry Daily, May 16, 2010
(2) Greg Dunlap, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 9, 2009
(3) Ellen Nakashima, “New Intelligence Chief Clapper Brings Sense of Humor to Serious Job,” The Washington Post, August 21, 2010
(4) Pam Benson, “Director of National Intelligence Names Deputy to Boost Collaboration,” CNN, August 20, 2010

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The preceeding article was written for this site by Lt. Col. (Ret.) Marv Gordner, a former intelligence officer in the US Army. Mr. Gordner has twenty-one years of extensive leadership and management experience in the Department of Defense and intelligence collection field. His assignments included the 101st Airborne Division and Special Operations Forces including, 5th Special Forces, 3d Special Forces, and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). He now serves as the Program Manager, Intelligence Solutions Division, for MorganFranklin.

Sunday, June 13, 2010

Saudi to Israel: Clear for takeoff?

One of the big stories that seems to have gone relatively quietly into the abyss this week is the fact that Saudi Arabia has apparently given Israel overflight clearance to strike Iranian targets believed to be involved in the development of nuclear weapons. Reports state that Saudi Arabia has even exercised the standing down of air defense units along its northern border to ensure that Israeli aircraft are able to pass through the region unmolested. Of course, Saudi Arabia has been quick to deny the reports, but their denials weren't all that convincing.

OK, since Israel seems hell-bent on blowing up whatever facilities they think are involved, even though the Western world has never actually proven that Iran is developing nuclear weapons (after all, such weapons are clearly meant to only be possessed by non-Muslim people in the Middle East, or at least that's the way they're being treated), I thought it might be interesting to analyze some of the potential factors related to such a strike.

Point 1: Iran will have to rely heavily on its fighter force to defend itself. Apart from the Tor-M1E (SA-15 GAUNTLET) TELARs sighted near Natanz, Iran lacks any credible SAM defenses capable of deterring a modern fighting force. That puts the onus on the Iranian Air Force to prove that it can defeat what Israel throws at it. Saudi Arabia may have already given Iran an unintentional (or intentional? That'd be amusing to consider...) signal as to when to expect such a strike: all they have to do is monitor the status of Saudi Arabia's air defense network. Bottom line: if you know its coming and you still can't stop it, you may need to reconsider a few things. Like, I don't know, buying Su-30s or J-10s instead of acting like the world's aeronautical laughingstock sticking twin tails on an F-5.

Point 2: One of the purported targets for Israeli fighters is the Bushehr reactor complex. Now, I'm not entirely sure of what they'd hit it with, or how much material is inside, but it seems to me like bombing a nuclear reactor sitting right on the Persian Gulf is a relatively stupid idea. There is a risk for contamination if it isn't done exactly right. That could make gas prices shoot into the stratosphere quicker than a SPRINT ABM (which is pretty damn fast for those of you wondering what the hell that thing is).

Point 3: Speaking of gas prices, if I'm Iran, I've got teams ready to mine the Strait of Hormuz the minute the first bomb hits. The point here is that anyone who thinks Iran is going to sit idly buy and get bombed is delusional. Yes, their air defense network doesn't really scare anyone, but you can bet they'll lash out in all kinds of interesting ways, most of which will probably have a negative impact on the price of gas. Israel gets away with a lot of stuff on the international stage, like pretending to be a US ally while shipping arms to China, but if they are perceived as the reason why people are getting hammered at the pump they might find themselves with fewer friends for a while. There's also the missile force to consider: a possible Iranian response would be to salvo a ton of ballistic missiles at Israel.

Point 4: This has the potential to backfire in epic fashion. I can think of two obvious ways in which this could explode in Israel's face. First off, let's say they aren't completely successful. Jets are shot down. Pilots are captured. Talk about a propaganda boon aircraft fragments bearing the Star of David paraded through Tehran would be for the extremist elements in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. Secondly, some of the potential targets might be hardened, but they aren't necessarily isolated hundreds of miles from civilization. When Iran and Israel bombed Iraq's reactor complex in 1980-81 (pretty ironic, huh), the site wasn't active. Iran's facilities are all believed to be active. This could possibly result in the spread of radioactive material after an attack. So, say Israel blows up all of the sites it wants to blow up, but then a lot of material gets spread around as a result. Does Israel really want to have to deal with the political fallout from that scenario?

Point 5: This could also explode in Iran's face in just as epic a fashion. Ahmadinejad talks a big game, but what happens to the way Iran, particularly its military capability, is perceived if Israel just flys in there and blows stuff up? "We will defeat any aggressors...we are ready to defend..."...yeah, but what if the Israelis prove that you can't, and you weren't? Then what?

Nobody really knows what's going on in Iran. Nobody really knows if Saudi Arabia will actually let the Israelis fly over to blow stuff up, although it certainly seems that way regardless of any political "denials". What we can state is that any military action is going to have some significant effects on that part of the world. Iran may have no choice militarily but to pretty much sit there and take it, but they won't sit there sulking after the bombs stop dropping.

Now, somebody who knows more about such things than I do chime in and tell me if blowing up all of these nuclear-related sites could actually spread nasty things around in Iran and into the Persian Gulf. Because at the end of the day, it would seem to me that mining the Persian Gulf or playing terrorist could turn out to be the least of the region's problems after this type of airstrike.

And why the hell doesn't Iran just leave the NPT and the UN and give everyone the finger anyway? Then they legally can do whatever they want with nuclear weapons, and it makes military action a lot tougher to justify.

Monday, January 4, 2010

Iranian Strategic SAM Deployment

INTRODUCTION

With the current attention being given to potential Iranian nuclear weapons development, it is prudent to examine the defensive posture of the Persian state in light of potential military action. This article will focus on Iran's strategic SAM deployment. Three different strategic SAM types, along with two tactical SAM types, provide sporadic, yet still potentially effective, SAM coverage throughout the nation. Unusual deployment strategies hint at what may be part of a serious deception campaign, possibly providing insight into the apparent lack of serious, integrated ground-based air defense coverage throughout most of the nation.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

The Iranian air defense network relies on a mixture of Soviet and Western SAM systems. This relatively unusual mix stems from both pre- and post-1979 acquisitions from the West and the Soviet Union, respectively. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the overall air defense network: HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE, a Chinese-produced S-75 derivative, employing the TIGER SONG engagement radar), HAWK, S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), 2K12 (SA-6 GAINFUL), and Tor-M1E (SA-15 GAUNTLET).

EW Coverage

Primary early warning and target track generation for the Iranian strategic SAM force is handled by a network of 24 EW radar sites, one of which is currently inactive. These sites are primarily situated along the periphery of the nation, with additional facilities located in the vicinity of Arak and Esfahan. A third of the facilities are located along Iran's strategically important Persian Gulf coastline.

The following image depicts the location of EW sites in Iran:
SAM Coverage

Currently, there are 41 active SAM sites inside of Iran. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, S-200 sites are purple, 2K12 sites are bright green, and Tor-M1E sites are faded green.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Iranian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, S-200 sites are purple, 2K12 sites are bright green, and Tor-M1E sites are faded green.
HQ-2

There are currently 7 active HQ-2 sites identified inside of Iran. The HQ-2 does not appear to be heavily relied upon, with only 7 of 21 sites remaining operational.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HQ-2 sites:
HAWK

There are currently 22 active HAWK sites identified inside of Iran. The HAWK has been a mainstay of Iranian strategic air defense since its acquisition before the Islamic Revolution. While numbers have dwindled, with roughly half of the Iranian HAWK sites currently active, the system is still widely deployed at numerous locations. The Iranian HAWK deployments are interesting as they represent a tactical SAM system deployed in a strategic capacity.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HAWK sites:
S-200

There are currently 7 active S-200 sites identified inside of Iran. The S-200 represents the lognest-range strategic SAM asset operationally employed by the Iranian military.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's S-200 sites:
Tactical SAM Sites

There are currently 6 tactical SAM deployment locations identified inside of Iran. These systems are currently employed as strategic point defense assets. Two sites are occupied by 2K12 batteries, the remaining four being occupied by Tor-M1E TELARs.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's deployed tactical SAM systems:
Empty Sites

There are currently 31 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Iran. These sites have been identified as either HQ-2 or HAWK sites, based on their configurations. These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.

An overview of empty Iranian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

National S-200 Coverage

The primary means of air defense in Iran, insofar as SAM systems are concerned, is the deployment of 7 S-200 firing batteries throughout the nation. The four northernmost sites are positioned to defend the northern border and the region surrounding the capital of Tehran. A fifth site is situated to defend facilities in and around Esfahan in central Iran, including the Natanz nuclear facility. The last two sites are situated at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr and provide coverage over the Straits of Hormuz and the northern half of the Persian Gulf, respectively.

The northern four S-200 sites, as well as the southern two sites, are well positioned to provide air defense outside Iran's borders to deter any inbound aggressor from approaching the ADIZ. The central site near Esfahan is a curiosity, however. The southern and western portions of the coverage area are limited due to the presence of a good deal of mountainous terrain, in some cases 10,000 feet or more higher than the terrain where Esfahan is located. This also affects the remaining six sites, but they are affected to a lesser degree due to the fact that they are positioned to defend outwards towards the border and beyond, not likely intended to defend against targets operating deep within Iranian airspace. The Esfahan site, in direct contrast, is apparently situated to defend a central portion of the nation, and as such is limited in its effectiveness by the aforementioned terrain considerations. The curiosity lies in positioning a long-range SAM system in such a fashion to apparently purposely limit its effectiveness. This can be overlooked to a small degree as the S-200 is not necessarily a choice system when it comes to engaging low-altitude targets, but the terrain in the area would seem to greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Esfahan site. The radar horizon is the key issue here, as each piece of terrain situated higher than the engagement radar will carve a significant portion out of the system's field of view and limit its ability to provide widespread coverage.

Iranian S-200 sites appear to be purposely limited in their composition. Each site consists, unusually, of one 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radar and two launch rails. For more information on this unusual practice, reference the following article on this site: S-200 SAM Site Analysis

Point Defense

The remainder of Iran's SAM sites are positioned in a point defense strategy to provide coverage of key areas in the nation. There are five key areas defended by shorter-range systems: Tehran, Esfahan, Natanz, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. All of these areas are also covered by S-200 sites, which are co-located in some instances, providing a degree of overlapping coverage in these locations.

The capital city of Tehran is defended by five HAWK sites, two HQ-2 batteries, and a 2K12 battery. There are four empty sites in the area. The southwestern two sites are prepared HQ-2 sites, while the northwest and southeast sites are prepared HAWK sites. Were the empty sites to be occupied, they would form an inner HAWK barrier and an outer HQ-2 barrier oriented to defend against threats from the west and south. This layout may be a legacy leftover from the Iran-Iraq War. Two S-200 sites are also in the vicinity, and the other two S-200 sites to the east and west also provide limited coverage of the capital.

The following image depicts SAM coverage of Tehran:
There are two HAWK sites and one HQ-2 site in the vicinity of Esfahan. One of the HAWK sites, as well as the S-200 site in the area, are located on the grounds of Esfahan AB, with the HAWK site likely situated to provide point defense of the airbase. The HQ-2 site and the remaining HAWK site are located south of Esfahan proper. An empty HAWK site is also located in Esfahan, likely representing a dispersal site for the battery at Esfahan AB.

The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Esfahan:
Nuclear related facilities near Natanz are afforded a layered defense by recently-deployed tactical and strategic SAM ssytems. Natanz is defended by one HQ-2 site, three HAWK sites, one 2K12 battery, and four Tor-M1E TELARs. The tactical systems were deployed between September 2006 and September 2009; the increased air defense posture may signify an increase in activity at the nuclear facility.

The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Natanz:
The Bushehr region, which contains a key nuclear facility, is defended by four HAWK sites and an HQ-2 battery. Two HAWK sites are located on the grounds of the Busheher military comples, with a third site being located offshore on Khark Island, while the HQ-2 battery is located further inland from the military complex nearer to Choghadak. Bushehr AB is also home to an S-200 battery. There are three unoccupied HQ-2 sites and a single unoccupied HAWK site in the area as well. Three unoccupied sites are situated around the nuclear complex, perhaps suggesting that any weapons-related work has been moved from the facility to one of the various inland nuclear research and development locations such as Natanz. This would appear to be a sensible course of action given the serious vulnerability of the coastal Bushehr nuclear facility to enemy activity approaching from the Persian Gulf region. The remaining unoccupied HQ-2 site is located on an islet northeast of Khark island.

The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Bushehr:
Bandar Abbas, home to the bulk of the Iranian Navy including the deadly Kilo SSK fleet, is defended by one HQ-2 battery and one HAWK battery. There is an S-200 site in the region as well.

The following image depicts SAM coverage of Bandar Abbas:
Defending the Straits

The S-200 sites located in the vicinity of both Bushehr and Bandar Abbas provide Iran with a significant air defense capability over not only a good portion of the Persian Gulf, but also over the critical Straits of Hormuz. This SAM coverage, which can be further expanded thanks to the presence of unoccupied, prepared HAWK sites on the islands of Abu Musa and Lavan, allows Iran to provide increased air defense in conjunction with fighter aircraft to protect any naval operations in the region, including the potentially catastrophic mining of the Straits of Hormuz.

Air Defense Issues

The problem with Iran's strategic SAM deployment is the apparent over-reliance on the S-200 system to provide air defense over most of the nation. The S-200 is certainly a threat to ISR aircraft such as the U-2R or E-3, but the primary threat which Iran must consider is that of standoff cruise missiles and strike aircraft featuring comprehensive EW suites. Against these types of low-RCS or maneuverable targets, the S-200 cannot be counted upon to be effective. Libyan S-200 systems proved completely ineffective against USN and USAFE strike aircraft in 1986, and the Iranian S-200s would logically be expected to fare no better in a much more modern air combat environment.

As mentioned previously, the remainder of the SAM assets are primarily situated to provide point defense and as such do not represent a serious threat to a dedicated and sophisticated enemy. Even lesser-equipped nations would be able to explot the various gaps and vulnerabilities in the coverage zones provided the S-200s could be neutralized in some fashion, be it through ECM, technical capability, or direct attack. This raises the question of the importance of SAM systems to Iran's overall air defense network. Given the current deployment strategy, the small number of sites, and the capability of the systems themselves, it is likely that Iran places more importance on the fighter force as an air defense element. This would explain the continued efforts to retain an operational fleet of F-14A interceptors. The short range of the HQ-2 and HAWK systems, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the S-200 to deal with low-RCS targets, also explains reporting regarding Iranian attempts to purchase advanced SAM systems from Russia.

It is possible that Iran simply does not feel that a robust SAM network is necessary. Given the aforementioned terrain constraints in some areas of the nation, as well as the lack of a large number of what may be regarded by the Iranian government as potential critical targets inside of Iran, the Persian nation may have simply taken a minimalist posture, relying on the S-200 for long-range defense and the other systems as point defense weapons to defend Iran's critical military and political infrastructure.

Another reason for the lack of deployed SAM systems could be that the shorter-ranged HQ-2 and HAWK systems are no longer viewed as being effective enough to warrant widespread use. HQ-2 sites are currently 33% occupied, with HAWK sites being approximately 50% occupied, perhaps signifying more faith in the HAWK system but still demonstrating a potential overall trend of perceived non-reliability. Iran does have reason to suspect the reliability of the HAWK SAM system against a Western opponent, as the missile was an American product and has been in widespread use throughout the West for decades. The HQ-2, however, should be regarded as potentially more reliable, as it is not a standard (and widely exploited) S-75 but rather a Chinese-produced weapon with which the West should have a lesser degree of technical familiarity insofar as electronic performance, if not physical performance, is concerned.

A high ratio of unoccupied sites could be due to financial reasons (lack of operating funds may have resulted in a number of batteries placed in storage) or simple attrition (they may have been expended or destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War), of course, but those facets of the equation cannot be examined through imagery analysis alone. It should be mentioned that one possible source of attrition for the HQ-2 system is the conversion of many missiles to Tondar-69 SSMs to complement CSS-8 SSMs (HQ-2 derivatives) obtained from China. Many batteries may also be out of service for modification to Sayyad-1 standard, which represents a modification of the HQ-2 design with some indigenous components.

CONCLUSION

On the surface, Iran's ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the seven S-200 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals an overall coverage which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian strategic SAM force is obviously in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran's SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form of defense against a modern agressor. Given the current political climate, it would be in the best interest of the Iranian military to proceed with a widespread upgrade, with the most effective option being the purchase of S-300PMU-2 or S-400 SAM systems for Russia, or perhaps the more cost-effective and similarly capable HQ-9 SAM system from China. Incorporating either purchase into a package deal with modern fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MK or J-10 would result in a much more robust air defense capability.

SOURCES

-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of Iran and may not represent the entire air defense network.

Iranian Military Guide

-Jane's Land Based Air Defence, various editions.

-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

This article has been updated, the original version was published in September of 2007.

Monday, November 23, 2009

Taiwan Isn't Pleased

A Taiwanese news article posted online on November 21st had an interesting topic: an IMINT & Analysis forum member's article posted to militaryphotos.net detailing Taiwan's air defense facilities. In a roundabout way, this site was also mentioned, as the article stated that the air defense overview's author "was working with another that had previously worked on Taiwan air defense, and photos/imagery". Hey, that's me, referring to my May 2009 piece on Taiwan's Strategic SAM Network.

The news piece claims, by way of comments from ROCAF officials, that the sites detailed are public knowledge and not secret, and that the distribution of commercial satellite imagery makes it more difficult to keep such facilities concealed. That's all well and good, but they have to be privately annoyed, given the fact that a good deal of these sites are in fact censored in the most recent Google Earth imagery. If they weren't meant to remain hidden from public view, why bother censoring the sites?

Of course, that didn't stop me in the least from utilizing Google Earth's features to extract uncensored images of the sites and display the relevant imagery. Besides, if anyone thinks that the Chinese military doesn't know exactly where these facilities are located, they're deluding themselves. Taiwan may desire to hide these locations from the general public, perhaps to conceal their proximity as likely Chinese targets to major population centers, but talking about them on the internet is certainly not a serious security concern.

At the end of the day, I can take pride in one aspect of all of this apparent international annoyance: If I wasn't accurate, the ROCAF's responses would've been different.

Thursday, August 6, 2009

Burmese Nukes?

A few days ago, some news outlets began reporting on Burma's potential nuclear weapons program. I was contacted by Dr. Lewis over at ArmsControlWonk and asked to do some image interpretation of one of the potential sites. Check out what I came up with here.