Showing posts with label Google Earth Placemark. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Google Earth Placemark. Show all posts
Monday, July 19, 2010
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
SAM Site Overview Alteration
I've been exploiting Terra Server, Bing Maps, and a few other amusing online imagery sources to examine some areas of Google Earth that are either 1) not covered in high resolution, or 2) have not been updated with newer imagery for quite some time. I've discovered a number of things that will be included in the SAM Site Overview, beginning with the next update. This might be a little confusing at first glance. For example, I've found imagery from 2009 showing that the 64N6E site in China near Dalian is now active. I will be changing the placemarks in the file to reflect this, as Google Earth's imagery of that region is still a bit dated. So, you'll see an empty 64N6E location, but have a placemark telling you that it is active. No, I haven't lost my mind, I'm just beginning to incorporate other sources into the database on a larger scale. Anything potentially weird like that example will always be explained in the Notes section of the placemark. Just thought I'd give everyone a heads-up before I start doing something potentially confusing.
Thursday, December 17, 2009
Upgrading the SAM Site Overview File
Want to see what the SAM Site Overview will eventually look like?
Download this: Right-click, Save As.
Notice that you can click on every single icon and the relevant info, such as I have been able to determine it, will pop up.
Eventually every single icon will work this way. Eventually. There are a buttload of them to process through.
Starting with the next update, you'll now be able to click in the Places screen where it says "SAMS by country" and get a menu titled "Fully interactive nations". There you'll see a list of all nations that are completed.
A few caveats:
-Any puffball radar sites will likely remain labeled, simply, EW site. Unless I have info definitively proving what's inside, I won't speculate.
-Some icons will eventually have another listing for Notes. This is where anything amusing or interesting that doesn't fit within the framework of the basic stuff you see in Algeria will go, such as extra components lying around, or whatnot.
-Some icons will be headed with a line called Site layout. This will be where an S-300P battery residing on a prepared S-75 site will be labeled.
-As seen in a lot of Algeria's EW sites, if I can't determine or have no information stating what specific variant of a radar or other piece of equipment is used, I'll list a generic descriptor, like P-35/37 BAR LOCK. That tells you that the radar is either a P-35 or a P-37, and the Western name for the family is BAR LOCK.
Feel free to leave any feedback here, or in the SAM Site Overview thread on the IMINT & Analysis Forums.
Download this: Right-click, Save As.
Notice that you can click on every single icon and the relevant info, such as I have been able to determine it, will pop up.
Eventually every single icon will work this way. Eventually. There are a buttload of them to process through.
Starting with the next update, you'll now be able to click in the Places screen where it says "SAMS by country" and get a menu titled "Fully interactive nations". There you'll see a list of all nations that are completed.
A few caveats:
-Any puffball radar sites will likely remain labeled, simply, EW site. Unless I have info definitively proving what's inside, I won't speculate.
-Some icons will eventually have another listing for Notes. This is where anything amusing or interesting that doesn't fit within the framework of the basic stuff you see in Algeria will go, such as extra components lying around, or whatnot.
-Some icons will be headed with a line called Site layout. This will be where an S-300P battery residing on a prepared S-75 site will be labeled.
-As seen in a lot of Algeria's EW sites, if I can't determine or have no information stating what specific variant of a radar or other piece of equipment is used, I'll list a generic descriptor, like P-35/37 BAR LOCK. That tells you that the radar is either a P-35 or a P-37, and the Western name for the family is BAR LOCK.
Feel free to leave any feedback here, or in the SAM Site Overview thread on the IMINT & Analysis Forums.
Saturday, October 31, 2009
Polish Strategic Air Defense: A Cold War Case Study
INTRODUCTION
Poland's countryside is dotted with numerous abandoned SAM sites, a lasting legacy of its Cold War role as part of the Warsaw Pact's air defense network. Numerous strategic SAM batteries played key roles in the Cold War, securing the Warsaw Pact's northern border and defending Polish and Soviet military units.
GENERAL LAYOUT
The Polish strategic SAM network operated five different SAM types during the Cold War: the SA-75 Dvina and S-75 Volkhov (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 Neva and S-125M Neva-M (SA-3 GOA), and S-200VE Vega (SA-5 GAMMON). The network was arranged in accordance with both barrier and area air defense concepts, with a contiguous SAM network along the northern coastline and clustered sites inland protecting key areas such as the capital. At first the strategic SAM forces were under the control of the Polish Army, but in 1962 they transitioned to the control of a new service branch, the Air Defense Army. The Polish Army would, however, operate the 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF) and 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) tactical SAM systems.
Engagement ranges of the strategic SAM systems employed by Poland are as follows:
SA-75 Dvina: 34 km
S-75 Volkhov: 43 km
S-125 Neva: 15 km
S-125M Neva-M: 25 km
S-200VE Vega: 240 km
In the imagery contained within this article, SAM systems will be identified as follows: SA-75 sites are marked with yellow triangles and range rings, S-75 series sites are marked with red triangles and range rings, S-125 series sites are marked with blue triangles and light blue range rings, and S-200 series sites are marked with purple triangles and range rings. Soviet SAM sites are identified using the same color scheme but are marked with stars in place of triangles.
BUILDING THROUGH THE YEARS
Poland's strategic SAM network was born in a 1959 government decree determining that air defense units would be equipped with SAM systems. Crew training on the SA-75 Dvina began in 1960, with 26 batteries available by the end of 1963. The decision to obtain the S-75 Volkhov was also made in 1963, with training beginning in 1964. Nine SA-75 units would reequip with the S-75 and twelve new units would form by the end of 1971. In 1968 the S-125 was acquired and crew training initiated, progressing to the S-125M in 1978. Ultimately, 17 S-125 batteries would form, as well as nine S-125M batteries. 8 S-125M batteries would replace older SAM systems, in some cases even the shorter-ranged S-125. Poland's last Cold War strategic SAM acquisition was the S-200VE. Work towards that end began in 1985, with the battery becoming operational in 1987.
The following image depicts the layout of SAM facilities around Poland. It should be noted that not all of these sites were operational at any given time, this image merely illustrates the overall deployment strategies. Note the coastal barrier extending east from the DDR border to Gdansk, and the clustered arrangement of SAM batteries around major cities. Scattered around the nation are red icons denoting Soviet SAM sites, primarily S-125Ms tasked to defend Soviet airfields. Also of note is Bemowo Piskie, in the northeastern sector. This was the facility responsible for training Polish SAM operators and units.
OVERALL COVERAGE
Due to the constant upgrades and expansion present within the Polish strategic SAM network, chronological analysis provides the most convenient method for viewing the network's status and capability at a given point in time. The following images will depict the SAM network as it existed for a given time period, accompanied by a brief analysis where appropriate. Soviet SAM batteries will not be included here as there is no documentation regarding their deployment timelines.
1966: SA-75 deployment had completed, providing the nation's first SAM network. At this point the sites were positioned to defend key locations, being deployed in a quasi-circular pattern around their areas of interest.
1970: S-75 deployment was nearly complete. By this time, the framework for the coastal SAM barrier was in place, and select SA-75 batteries near Gdansk and Warsaw had been upgraded with the newer S-75.
1976: By this time S-75 deployment was completed, and S-125 deployment had begun. The coastal SAM barrier was complete. S-125 batteries were used to supplement the SA-75 and S-125 batteries, providing enhanced low-altitude coverage.
1977: By 1977 a solitary S-75 battery near Skwierzyna had been deactivated. This battery, the sole strategic SAM battery operated by the Polish Army, was reequipped with the 2K11.
1978: By the end of 1978, S-125 deployment was expanded around Katowice, and the first S-125M batteries had entered service. Warsaw S-125 batteries were reequipped with the newer, longer-ranged S-125M.
1984: By this time, S-125 deployments had taken place around Poznan, supplementing the SA-75 batteries already in place.
1986: S-125M deployment had been completed by 1986, with the system replacing select SA-75 and S-75 batteries near Mrzezyno along the northern coastline, Poznan, and Katowice.
1987: The Polish SAM network saw its last Cold War alteration by 1987, with the deployment of the S-200VE near Mrzezyno.
SOVIET FORCES
Soviet SAM units deployed to Poland during the Cold War were established primarily to provide air defense for Soviet troop locations. Most commonly, S-125M batteries were emplaced on or near military airfields occupied by the Soviet military. Identified Soviet air defense deployments included two S-75M batteries and four S-125M batteries.
Soviet air defense deployments and coverage in Poland can be seen in the image below:
Soviet air defense deployments in Poland were apparently far less robust than they were to the west in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The reason behind this is likely due to the fact that high-performance Su-27 (FLANKER-B) air superiority fighters were based at Soviet-occupied airfields, providing a far more capable air defense asset than any S-75 or S-125 variant. Also, it was likely believed that any attacking force having penetrated through the GDR and Polish SAM and interceptor nets would be more readily dispatched by available air assets.
An apparent S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE) emplacement near Warsaw provides the only indication that the system was considered for deployment to Poland. Given that there is no evidence to suggest that the Polish government has attempted to purchase the system in the past, the likely operator would have been the Soviet military. The site was in use as recently as 2002 by the Polish military, most likely to support EW assets which would be able to take advantage of the raised berms initially constructed to enhance the fields of view of the S-300PS's 5N63S (FLAP LID B) engagement and 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW/battle management radar systems.
The Warsaw S-300PS site can be seen in the image below:
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
As designed, the Polish strategic SAM network was fairly robust and during later years did provide relatively layered coverage zones where systems were deployed. Consider the following image, depicting SAM deployments and coverage zones circa 1989 of both Polish and Soviet strategic SAM units:
While the network appears at first glance to contain a significant number of open areas, particularly in the southwestern, central, and eastern portions of the nation, the network must be analyzed in the context of the entire Warsaw Pact air defense network. The GDR was likely to serve as the front line of any conflict with NATO, and as such enjoyed a much more contiguous SAM network.
The following image depicts the strategic SAM deployments in the western Warsaw Pact circa 1989:
The majority of the Warsaw Pact's SAM defenses were consolidated in the GDR, and in western Czechoslovakian territories closest to the West German border. Polish airspace was therefore protected by these networks, their presence acting as an external SAM buffer zone. This may in part explain why Poland continued to rely on the older SA-75 Dvina in greater numbers throughout the Cold War; Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for example, had phased the system out by 1989.
The limitations inherent in the Polish strategic SAM network were ultimately the same shared by its allied states: reliance on outdated Soviet weapon systems. The SA-75, S-75, and S-125 were all single-target command-guided systems, able to engage one target per engagement radar and vulnerable to ECM interference with either the engagement radar or missile guidance command link. However, even these limitations should be taken in context; the Warsaw Pact did not see itself fighting a defensive battle for an extended period and as such the limitations of Polish systems deployed well behind the predicted front lines would have been mitigated by Soviet Army advances into the heart of NATO.
Ultimately, Poland's strategic SAM network was well designed to serve its purposes, even if the systems themselves became more susceptible to Western electronic combat systems as the Cold War continued.
THE 90S AND BEYOND
Following the end of the Cold War, the Polish strategic SAM network began to see a number of changes. In 1990, the SA-75 was finally removed from service, with the S-75 following in 2001. Poland has relied almost solely on the S-125 family since 2001, developing a mobile variant dubbed the Neva-SC featuring truck mounted engagement radars and tank mounted launch rails. The only other holdover from the Cold War period is the S-200VE.
CONCLUSION
Poland's strategic SAM network played a critical role for the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. The coastal SAM barrier guarded against NATO incursion into one of the Warsaw Pact's main resupply and logistical areas, and would have aided in protecting naval units transiting from the Baltic Sea. Although its strength waned following the Cold War, at strength it was a critical component in the Warsaw Pact's overall air defense strategy.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
A Google Earth file containing the placemarks and range rings used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
SAM range data taken from various editions of Jane's Land-based Air Defence, and from Fakel's Missiles, an unclassified Fakel publication detailing the bureau's missile development.
I have chosen to pretty much ignore unit subordination for this piece, not because the data is unavailable, but because it can be read in much more depth at the following link:
Polish Air Defense, 1959-1985
Poland's countryside is dotted with numerous abandoned SAM sites, a lasting legacy of its Cold War role as part of the Warsaw Pact's air defense network. Numerous strategic SAM batteries played key roles in the Cold War, securing the Warsaw Pact's northern border and defending Polish and Soviet military units.
GENERAL LAYOUT
The Polish strategic SAM network operated five different SAM types during the Cold War: the SA-75 Dvina and S-75 Volkhov (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 Neva and S-125M Neva-M (SA-3 GOA), and S-200VE Vega (SA-5 GAMMON). The network was arranged in accordance with both barrier and area air defense concepts, with a contiguous SAM network along the northern coastline and clustered sites inland protecting key areas such as the capital. At first the strategic SAM forces were under the control of the Polish Army, but in 1962 they transitioned to the control of a new service branch, the Air Defense Army. The Polish Army would, however, operate the 2K11 Krug (SA-4 GANEF) and 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) tactical SAM systems.
Engagement ranges of the strategic SAM systems employed by Poland are as follows:
SA-75 Dvina: 34 km
S-75 Volkhov: 43 km
S-125 Neva: 15 km
S-125M Neva-M: 25 km
S-200VE Vega: 240 km
In the imagery contained within this article, SAM systems will be identified as follows: SA-75 sites are marked with yellow triangles and range rings, S-75 series sites are marked with red triangles and range rings, S-125 series sites are marked with blue triangles and light blue range rings, and S-200 series sites are marked with purple triangles and range rings. Soviet SAM sites are identified using the same color scheme but are marked with stars in place of triangles.
BUILDING THROUGH THE YEARS
Poland's strategic SAM network was born in a 1959 government decree determining that air defense units would be equipped with SAM systems. Crew training on the SA-75 Dvina began in 1960, with 26 batteries available by the end of 1963. The decision to obtain the S-75 Volkhov was also made in 1963, with training beginning in 1964. Nine SA-75 units would reequip with the S-75 and twelve new units would form by the end of 1971. In 1968 the S-125 was acquired and crew training initiated, progressing to the S-125M in 1978. Ultimately, 17 S-125 batteries would form, as well as nine S-125M batteries. 8 S-125M batteries would replace older SAM systems, in some cases even the shorter-ranged S-125. Poland's last Cold War strategic SAM acquisition was the S-200VE. Work towards that end began in 1985, with the battery becoming operational in 1987.
The following image depicts the layout of SAM facilities around Poland. It should be noted that not all of these sites were operational at any given time, this image merely illustrates the overall deployment strategies. Note the coastal barrier extending east from the DDR border to Gdansk, and the clustered arrangement of SAM batteries around major cities. Scattered around the nation are red icons denoting Soviet SAM sites, primarily S-125Ms tasked to defend Soviet airfields. Also of note is Bemowo Piskie, in the northeastern sector. This was the facility responsible for training Polish SAM operators and units.
OVERALL COVERAGEDue to the constant upgrades and expansion present within the Polish strategic SAM network, chronological analysis provides the most convenient method for viewing the network's status and capability at a given point in time. The following images will depict the SAM network as it existed for a given time period, accompanied by a brief analysis where appropriate. Soviet SAM batteries will not be included here as there is no documentation regarding their deployment timelines.
1966: SA-75 deployment had completed, providing the nation's first SAM network. At this point the sites were positioned to defend key locations, being deployed in a quasi-circular pattern around their areas of interest.
1970: S-75 deployment was nearly complete. By this time, the framework for the coastal SAM barrier was in place, and select SA-75 batteries near Gdansk and Warsaw had been upgraded with the newer S-75.
1976: By this time S-75 deployment was completed, and S-125 deployment had begun. The coastal SAM barrier was complete. S-125 batteries were used to supplement the SA-75 and S-125 batteries, providing enhanced low-altitude coverage.
1977: By 1977 a solitary S-75 battery near Skwierzyna had been deactivated. This battery, the sole strategic SAM battery operated by the Polish Army, was reequipped with the 2K11.
1978: By the end of 1978, S-125 deployment was expanded around Katowice, and the first S-125M batteries had entered service. Warsaw S-125 batteries were reequipped with the newer, longer-ranged S-125M.
1984: By this time, S-125 deployments had taken place around Poznan, supplementing the SA-75 batteries already in place.
1986: S-125M deployment had been completed by 1986, with the system replacing select SA-75 and S-75 batteries near Mrzezyno along the northern coastline, Poznan, and Katowice.
1987: The Polish SAM network saw its last Cold War alteration by 1987, with the deployment of the S-200VE near Mrzezyno.
SOVIET FORCESSoviet SAM units deployed to Poland during the Cold War were established primarily to provide air defense for Soviet troop locations. Most commonly, S-125M batteries were emplaced on or near military airfields occupied by the Soviet military. Identified Soviet air defense deployments included two S-75M batteries and four S-125M batteries.
Soviet air defense deployments and coverage in Poland can be seen in the image below:
Soviet air defense deployments in Poland were apparently far less robust than they were to the west in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The reason behind this is likely due to the fact that high-performance Su-27 (FLANKER-B) air superiority fighters were based at Soviet-occupied airfields, providing a far more capable air defense asset than any S-75 or S-125 variant. Also, it was likely believed that any attacking force having penetrated through the GDR and Polish SAM and interceptor nets would be more readily dispatched by available air assets.An apparent S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE) emplacement near Warsaw provides the only indication that the system was considered for deployment to Poland. Given that there is no evidence to suggest that the Polish government has attempted to purchase the system in the past, the likely operator would have been the Soviet military. The site was in use as recently as 2002 by the Polish military, most likely to support EW assets which would be able to take advantage of the raised berms initially constructed to enhance the fields of view of the S-300PS's 5N63S (FLAP LID B) engagement and 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW/battle management radar systems.
The Warsaw S-300PS site can be seen in the image below:
CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONSAs designed, the Polish strategic SAM network was fairly robust and during later years did provide relatively layered coverage zones where systems were deployed. Consider the following image, depicting SAM deployments and coverage zones circa 1989 of both Polish and Soviet strategic SAM units:
While the network appears at first glance to contain a significant number of open areas, particularly in the southwestern, central, and eastern portions of the nation, the network must be analyzed in the context of the entire Warsaw Pact air defense network. The GDR was likely to serve as the front line of any conflict with NATO, and as such enjoyed a much more contiguous SAM network. The following image depicts the strategic SAM deployments in the western Warsaw Pact circa 1989:
The majority of the Warsaw Pact's SAM defenses were consolidated in the GDR, and in western Czechoslovakian territories closest to the West German border. Polish airspace was therefore protected by these networks, their presence acting as an external SAM buffer zone. This may in part explain why Poland continued to rely on the older SA-75 Dvina in greater numbers throughout the Cold War; Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for example, had phased the system out by 1989.The limitations inherent in the Polish strategic SAM network were ultimately the same shared by its allied states: reliance on outdated Soviet weapon systems. The SA-75, S-75, and S-125 were all single-target command-guided systems, able to engage one target per engagement radar and vulnerable to ECM interference with either the engagement radar or missile guidance command link. However, even these limitations should be taken in context; the Warsaw Pact did not see itself fighting a defensive battle for an extended period and as such the limitations of Polish systems deployed well behind the predicted front lines would have been mitigated by Soviet Army advances into the heart of NATO.
Ultimately, Poland's strategic SAM network was well designed to serve its purposes, even if the systems themselves became more susceptible to Western electronic combat systems as the Cold War continued.
THE 90S AND BEYOND
Following the end of the Cold War, the Polish strategic SAM network began to see a number of changes. In 1990, the SA-75 was finally removed from service, with the S-75 following in 2001. Poland has relied almost solely on the S-125 family since 2001, developing a mobile variant dubbed the Neva-SC featuring truck mounted engagement radars and tank mounted launch rails. The only other holdover from the Cold War period is the S-200VE.
CONCLUSION
Poland's strategic SAM network played a critical role for the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. The coastal SAM barrier guarded against NATO incursion into one of the Warsaw Pact's main resupply and logistical areas, and would have aided in protecting naval units transiting from the Baltic Sea. Although its strength waned following the Cold War, at strength it was a critical component in the Warsaw Pact's overall air defense strategy.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
A Google Earth file containing the placemarks and range rings used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
SAM range data taken from various editions of Jane's Land-based Air Defence, and from Fakel's Missiles, an unclassified Fakel publication detailing the bureau's missile development.
I have chosen to pretty much ignore unit subordination for this piece, not because the data is unavailable, but because it can be read in much more depth at the following link:
Polish Air Defense, 1959-1985
Monday, October 12, 2009
Chinese Military Airfields
CHINESE MILITARY AIRFIELDS
Latest update: 12 October 2009
A Google Earth placemark file detailing Chinese military-affiliated airfields can be downloaded here. There are five folders available, one each for PLAAF bases, PLANAF bases, PLA bases, manufacturer & test facilities, and bases whose affiliation is currently unidentified. The locations are color coded, with PLAAF bases being green, PLANAF bases being blue, PLA bases being orange, manufacturer & test locations being red, and unidentified bases being yellow. Each folder is also divided where appropriate into subfolders based on military region. This file will be updated as more current information becomes available.
If anyone has any information regarding the locations in the "Unidentified Affiliation" folder, please let me know!
SOURCES
Globalsecurity.org
Sinodefense.com
Scramble
Latest update: 12 October 2009
A Google Earth placemark file detailing Chinese military-affiliated airfields can be downloaded here. There are five folders available, one each for PLAAF bases, PLANAF bases, PLA bases, manufacturer & test facilities, and bases whose affiliation is currently unidentified. The locations are color coded, with PLAAF bases being green, PLANAF bases being blue, PLA bases being orange, manufacturer & test locations being red, and unidentified bases being yellow. Each folder is also divided where appropriate into subfolders based on military region. This file will be updated as more current information becomes available.
If anyone has any information regarding the locations in the "Unidentified Affiliation" folder, please let me know!
SOURCES
Globalsecurity.org
Sinodefense.com
Scramble
Thursday, July 9, 2009
Non-Google Earth Imagery Finds
INTRODUCTION
Sometimes, Google Earth, useful as it is, is just not enough. In many cases it is necessary to refer to another imagery source to locate current imagery of a given location, or perhaps imagery of a location not covered in Google Earth. There are many other online browsers which can be consulted, such as Microsoft's Bing Maps (formerly known as Windows Live Local), but many of these sources only focus on the most popular (usually meaning populated) areas. This can leave an analyst quite irritated, especially given the fact that procuring imagery from an external supplier can be a tedious and restrictive process. Not to mention expensive. Fortunately, there is an answer.
TERRA SERVER
Terra Server is an imagery provider, a relatively inexpensive and uncomplicated source of imagery from suppliers such as Digital Globe. And for those of you who have been browsing online imagery for quite some time now, no, Terra Server is not related to the former Microsoft endeavor bearing the same name. By far the best feature of Terra Server is the ability to browse imagery online. This allows any potential purchaser to preview exactly what is being offered, even to the point where images of a given target captured on different dates can be browsed.
Terra Server is not meant to be a free imagery viewing service, and as such the imagery is watermarked and the preview window is not that large (although for a monthly fee you can get a larger, non-watermarked viewer). Even with the aforementioned restrictions to viewing, the "service" provided is bascally free of charge for unlimited use. This makes it very valuable to analysts, especially those on a budget! The value is further emphasized when the volume of imagery available for viewing is examined. Many areas not covered by high-resolution imagery in Google Earth are clearly visible, and many other areas feature very recent imagery captured at various points in 2009. In short, any analyst who has not yet browsed through Terra Server's holdings is missing out on a fantastic resource.
WHAT'S BEEN FOUND
The following placemark file for use in Google Earth depicts the locations of a number of interesting facilities identified through Terra Server's imagery browser: Right click, save as.
There are three folders in the file, as well as three other placemark files. The folders include updates for the Chinese 2nd Artillery file, the SAM Site Overview, and interesting sights at Kapustin Yar.
The other three placemarks depict a Tu-144D on display in Germany, the 53T6 testing grounds at Sary Shagan, and the Voronezh-DM BMEW radar at Armavir.
By clicking on each placemark, a window will open containing a link to the Terra Server imagery depicting these locations. Hopefully this will demonstrate the usefulness of Terra Server's service, as well as providing analysts with insight into some of the facilities identifiable using the Terra Server viewer.
SOURCES
-Placemark locations compiled by browsing Terra Server imagery, or Google Earth historical imagery
Sometimes, Google Earth, useful as it is, is just not enough. In many cases it is necessary to refer to another imagery source to locate current imagery of a given location, or perhaps imagery of a location not covered in Google Earth. There are many other online browsers which can be consulted, such as Microsoft's Bing Maps (formerly known as Windows Live Local), but many of these sources only focus on the most popular (usually meaning populated) areas. This can leave an analyst quite irritated, especially given the fact that procuring imagery from an external supplier can be a tedious and restrictive process. Not to mention expensive. Fortunately, there is an answer.
TERRA SERVER
Terra Server is an imagery provider, a relatively inexpensive and uncomplicated source of imagery from suppliers such as Digital Globe. And for those of you who have been browsing online imagery for quite some time now, no, Terra Server is not related to the former Microsoft endeavor bearing the same name. By far the best feature of Terra Server is the ability to browse imagery online. This allows any potential purchaser to preview exactly what is being offered, even to the point where images of a given target captured on different dates can be browsed.
Terra Server is not meant to be a free imagery viewing service, and as such the imagery is watermarked and the preview window is not that large (although for a monthly fee you can get a larger, non-watermarked viewer). Even with the aforementioned restrictions to viewing, the "service" provided is bascally free of charge for unlimited use. This makes it very valuable to analysts, especially those on a budget! The value is further emphasized when the volume of imagery available for viewing is examined. Many areas not covered by high-resolution imagery in Google Earth are clearly visible, and many other areas feature very recent imagery captured at various points in 2009. In short, any analyst who has not yet browsed through Terra Server's holdings is missing out on a fantastic resource.
WHAT'S BEEN FOUND
The following placemark file for use in Google Earth depicts the locations of a number of interesting facilities identified through Terra Server's imagery browser: Right click, save as.
There are three folders in the file, as well as three other placemark files. The folders include updates for the Chinese 2nd Artillery file, the SAM Site Overview, and interesting sights at Kapustin Yar.
The other three placemarks depict a Tu-144D on display in Germany, the 53T6 testing grounds at Sary Shagan, and the Voronezh-DM BMEW radar at Armavir.
By clicking on each placemark, a window will open containing a link to the Terra Server imagery depicting these locations. Hopefully this will demonstrate the usefulness of Terra Server's service, as well as providing analysts with insight into some of the facilities identifiable using the Terra Server viewer.
SOURCES
-Placemark locations compiled by browsing Terra Server imagery, or Google Earth historical imagery
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
Taiwan's SAM Network
INTRODUCTION
The island of Taiwan sits less than 200 kilometers from the coast of the People's Republic of China. Faced with a potential threat consisting of over a thousand ballistic missiles and swarms of strike fighters, Taiwan's strategic SAM network is a significant element of the island's defense.
2/71 AND NIKE
Strategic air defense of Taiwan began in the 1950's during a highly classified US military deployment to the island. Soldiers and equipment from Fort Bliss deployed to Taiwan as the 2nd Battalion, 71st Artillery, forming a four battery MIM-14 Nike-Hercules SAM network along the northwestern edge of the island. The deployment of US Army personnel only lasted for a year, but the seeds were sown for Taiwan's strategic air defense network. Not only did Taiwan retain the four Nike-Hercules batteries previously operated by the US Army, but a further four batteries had been procured at some point before the mid 1970s. These systems represented the first significant strategic air defense network to appear in the cross-strait conflict zone, and were retired in 1996.
GENERAL LAYOUT
Taiwan's present-day strategic air defenses are oriented logically with respect to the perceived primary threat to the nation's security: the People's Republic of China. The bulk of the air defense assets are located on the northern and western sides of the island, with their sensors illuminating the cross-strait environment to monitor for any unauthorized inbound traffic. Air surveillance is provided by eleven EW facilities, and engagements are prosecuted by twenty two fixed missile batteries, occupied by HAWK, Patriot, and Tien Kung SAM systems. These systems have engagement ranges of 40 kilometers, 160 kilometers, and 200 kilometers, respectively. A further twenty two Skyguard facilities are located to provide close-in defense of key population centers and military facilities, some of which are equipped with 18 kilometer range RIM-7M Sparrow missiles.
The following image depicts the general layout of Taiwan's strategic air defense network. EW sites are marked with blue diamonds, the CSIST Missile Test Facility is marked with a brown square, and SAM sites are marked as follows:
HAWK: Orange triangle
Patriot: Yellow triangle
Tien Kung: Red triangle
Sparrow: Green triangle
Inactive: White triangle
HAWK
Taiwan acquired the MIM-23 HAWK SAM system in the 1960s. Thirteen prepared HAWK sites are currently occupied by active batteries. One battery is located offshore in the Penghu island group. The remaining sites wrap around the western coast of Taiwan at intervals of roughly 65 kilometers. Taipei and Kaohsiung, Taiwan's largest population centers, are defended by three sites and two sites respectively, with closer spacing to provide a greater degree of overlap in their fields of fire. Three sites are present on the eastern shore of the island, situated to defend the three main population centers in that region.
The locations and coverage of Taiwan's HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
TIEN KUNG
CSIST began to develop the Tien Kung SAM system in the early 1980s, envisioning a replacement for Taiwan's aging HAWK batteries. The system has been produced and deployed in two variants, the Tien Kung I (TK-I) and the improved Tien Kung II (TK-II). An ATBM Tien Kung III is in development. The TK-I was originally fielded in both static and mobile variants, with the TK-II only being deployed in a static variant. In 2006 it was announced that the TK-I was being retired and replaced by the TK-II. It was not specified if the TK-Is were only being replaced in the static launchers, or if the mobile TK-Is would be withdrawn as well.
The TK-I was deployed on a trial basis in 1989 and declared fully operational in 1993. The TK-II was deployed in 1996. The TK-I had an engagement range of 100 kilometers, with the TK-II having a range of 200 kilometers and adding an active radar terminal homing seeker. The TK-I, in contrast, relied on SARH for terminal homing. Both systems receive target acquisition and midcourse guidance support from an ADAR-1 Chang Bei LPAR. In the TK-I, a CS/MPG-25 continuous wave illuminator provides the necessary target illumination during terminal homing for the SARH guidance method.
The static SAM systems are deployed in silo launchers at six fixed sites, two sites being located offshore. One is located in the Penghu island group, and the other is located in the Dongyin island group. These silo launch facilities are unique in the field of air defense; no other active land-based SAM system in the world uses a silo-based launch method. Each silo launch complex consists of two separate areas: a silo launch facility and a radar facility.
The silo launch facility consists primarily of five underground launch complexes. These complexes each house four four-round vertical launch cells for TK-I or TK-II missiles, for a total of 80 missiles per complex. Two CS/MPG-25 CW illuminators are present at each complex.
The image below depicts a silo launch facility constructed on the grounds of a former Nike Hercules launch site.
Mobile TK-I systems may be deployed at these fixed launch facilities in some capacity, either to augment the silo-mounted TK-IIs or simply to utilize the garrison facilities before being field deployed as required. It is possible that mobile ADAR-1 LPARs could also be employed at silo launch facilities to increase the target engagement capacity of a single battery. Whatever the case, CS/MPG-25 illuminators were still emplaced at static launch complexes imaged at various points in 2006, implying that TK-Is were possibly still present in some capacity and had at the very least not yet been fully removed from silo launchers.
The radar facility consists of a fixed, hardened ADAR-1 LPAR. One radar facility is attached to each silo launch facility. The two facilities are separated by a distance of between one and four kilometers and are treated as a single complex. Separating the complexes allows for the hardened radars to be built into bunkers which are at a higher elevation than the launch facility. This allows the radars to have a less cluttered field of view without employing far more vulnerable mast-mounted antennas, and to mitigate the effects of the radar horizon on the system's engagement envelope.
The image below depicts an ADAR-1 radar facility:
Both of the above images are interesting in that they are both censored in the default Google Earth imagery set. They can only be accessed through the historical imagery feature. Various Tien Kung associated facilities can only be viewed in this fashion.
While the Tien Kung SAM system has a maximum range of 200 kilometers with the latest TK-II variant, the engagement zones of these fixed launch sites are oriented in specific directions. The fixed ADAR-1 LPAR has a 120 degree field of view in azimuth, able to scan 60 degrees to the left and right of center. This determines the engagement zone available to a missile fired from the associated fixed launch site. Mobile radars could theoretically be employed to increase the coverage zones, but it is not known if the TK-I's mobile ADAR-1 sets are compatible with the silo-launched TK-II missile. It would seem likely that they are, or could be with minimal modification, given that the hardened ADAR-1 radars are still employed by the TK-II system.
The locations and engagement zones of the five southern fixed launch sites can be seen in the image below. The zones are oriented to match the likely fields of view of the hardened ADAR-1 LPARs and correspond to the 200 kilometer TK-II system. A TK-I fired by a fixed launch site would engage a target within the same zone, but only to half the range. The Dongyin island group Tien Kung site is not included as the LPAR field of view cannot be determined due to a lack of high-resolution imagery.
PATRIOT
In 1993 Taiwan purchased three MIM-104 Patriot SAM batteries from the United States, receiving PAC-2 standard weapons. Taiwan's three Patriot batteries became operational in 1998 and were deployed at prepared sites near Taipei for capital area air defense, focusing on an ATBM role. The AN/MPQ-65 radar, when emplaced, has a field of view of 120 degrees in azimuth. The radar is not rotating for full 360 degree coverage, rather it is aligned in the direction of a potential threat axis when deployed. While the radars can be repositioned and realigned when needed, historical imagery indicates that these three batteries have remained aligned in the same general direction since at least 2000.
The locations and coverage zones of Taiwan's Patriot batteries, as currently imaged, can be seen below:
SKYGUARD-SPARROW
The final component of Taiwan's strategic air defense network are the close-in, point defense RIM-7M Sparrow SAM systems integrated with Skyguard batteries. The locations of identified Skyguard installations, along with the coresponding engagement zones for the Sparrow-equipped batteries, can be seen in the image below:
OVERALL COVERAGE
The main issue facing Taiwan is numerical. With an estimated 1300-1500 ballistic missiles and hundreds of strike aircraft targeting the island from the People's Republic of China, it would appear that Taiwan simply cannot afford to procure and deploy enough land-based SAM systems to guarantee clear skies in a time of crisis. That is not entirely true, however, given a complete understanding of a potential conflict. The People's Republic of China wishes to reintegrate Taiwan with the mainland, not acquire a new bombed-out target range for its military forces. Logically speaking, while certain targets are likely to be struck during a military engagement, and likely struck multiple times to increase the chances of oversaturating the air and missile defenses, it is not likely that the PLA will simply bombard the island into submission. Simply speaking, that would completely defeat the point of any military confrontation designed to reintegrate Taiwan. Therefore, when faced with a numerically superior force desiring to eliminate key military facilities rather than to obliterate the entire island, the logical approach would be to employ strategic SAM assets and air interceptors in an integrated air defense system (IADS).
In an integrated warfighting environment, TK-II SAMs could be employed beyond a certain range to thin out inbound formations, while air interceptors remain on station to combat the remaining inbound aircraft. Any cruise missiles or aircraft penetrating the combat air patrol zones could be engaged by HAWK SAMs, as well as SHORAD systems such as Skyguard. Naval SAM systems could also be employed offshore to provide further assistance in thinning out any inbound aggressors. While this strategy would likely still result in a number of successful strikes, it represents a logical, organized use of the assets at hand when faced with a numerically superior threat.
Taken as a whole, the strategic SAM network on Taiwan is well organized. Engagement zones have a significant degree of overlap, allowing targets to be shared by multiple systems, and HAWK batteries are logically deployed as both a closer-in defensive line and a gap filler to eliminate holes in the network created by the azimuth limitations of the hardened ADAR-1 LPAR facilities.
The overall coverage zones of Taiwan's strategic SAM systems can be seen in the image below. As mentioned previously, the Dongyin island group Tien Kung site is not illustrated.
It should be pointed out that the eastern side of the island is relatively undefended in terms of SAM coverage. This should not necessarily be seen as a weakness in the overall network, as the bulk of the military and political targets likely to be struck during a conflict are not in this region.
It has been reported that Taiwan possesses eighteen or twenty HAWK batteries, but there have only been thirteen HAWK sites identified. The remaining batteries are likely held in reserve for attrition replacement and training purposes. They are also potentially available to be field deployed during a crisis to reinforce air defenses in certain sectors. Likewise, existing HAWK batteries could be removed from their fixed locations and deployed to field firing positions, as could Patriot or extant mobile TK-I units.
There is evidence suggesting that plans may exist for redeploying Patriot and/or TK-I batteries during a crisis. The following image represents a Patriot or TK-I mobile SAM site constructed on the grounds of a former MIM-14 battery. The image was captured in late 2004, when Taiwan only possessed three PAC-2 Patriot batteries. These batteries were all intended primarily for ATBM defense of Taipei, as previously mentioned, and were already sited in that region. Ergo, this unoccupied facility was likely not intended to house a permanent Patriot battery, as the only Patriot batteries in Taiwan were already positioned according to their intended role. It is, of course, possible that this facility was home to a mobile TK-I battery which has since been deactivated, but that does not preclude the site from being used as a deployment site in the future.
One oddity that stands out when analyzing the coverage zones of Taiwan's strategic SAM network is the presence of a corridor north of the Penghu island group, heading roughly north towards the Chinese mainland, which is only defended by a single Tien Kung fixed launch site. This is unusual because care has apparently been taken to ensure a degree of overlap in most of the network. This corridor could simply be an aberration of geography meant to be filled by a naval SAM system, it could be a purposely less-defended corridor for civillian traffic meant to be filled by a mobile TK-I battery in the Penghu islands, or it could represent a "safe zone" for outbound strike aircraft. The latter example is noteworthy; as the corridor passes over the Chinese mainland, it is flanked on either side by a Chinese S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) SAM battery. This could have been identified by the People's Republic as a potential ingress route for Taiwanese strike aircraft desiring to enter the Chinese mainland and attack ballistic missile launch positions and garrisons. The PLA's DF-11A garrisons at Xianyou and Yong An, along with the DF-15 garrison at Nanping, would likely be within reach of such a strike package. This is, however, pure speculation, but does draw attention to the types of data which could potentially be revealed by analyzing an air defense network.
FUTURE PROSPECTS
In the future, Taiwan's goal is to greatly increase the effectiveness of its strategic air defense network against ballistic missiles. To that end, CSIST has been developing the TK-III, an ATBM off-shoot of the TK-II. The Taiwanese government has also been in negotiations with the United States to procure PAC-3 series Patriots with their associated ERINT ATBMs.
The ERINT ATBM has a range of 20 kilometers against a ballistic target, and is designed as a hit-to-kill weapon with very high accuracy. An enhanced variant is being developed which would increase the ATBM range to 45 kilometers. In January of 2009 it was reported that Taiwan had received approval for a contract with Raytheon to upgrade the three existing PAC-2 batteries to PAC-3 standard, enabling them to support the ERINT missile. Taiwan is still negotiating the sale of 330 ERINT missiles as well as four AN/MPQ-65 radars and other Patriot components to deploy three or four additional Patriot batteries.
The footprint of the Taipei PAC-2 sites, when upgraded and equipped with PAC-3 ERINT weapons in an ATBM capacity, can be seen in the image below:
Taiwan is also developing a new SHORAD system based on the Tien Chien II (TC-2) BVR AAM, to be integrated with the Antelope SHORAD system as a Skyguard replacement.
STEALTH OFFENSE
No discussion involving the TK-II SAM system would be complete without a brief mention of the Tien Chi surface-to-surface missile derivative. This weapon is a 320 kilometer range system fired from static TK-II launch sites. It is believed that the system is deployed in two locations, and that one of them is the Tien Kung facility in the Dongyin islands. The other is likely the Tien Kung facility in the Penghu islands, as offshore basing does allow for greater inland reach of mainland China.
The following image depicts some of the potential targets for the Tien Chi missiles, assuming that they are based at the two aforementioned locations. The missile locations and their associated ranges are indicated in white. Do note that not only is one of China's OTH-SW systems within range of the Dongyin site, but that it can also reach the two S-300PMU-1 batteries mentioned previously. The main drawback of the system, however, is short range; the image depicts the PLA's 52nd Division ballistic missile units, and only two of them are within range of the Tien Chi system. Given the sheer number of Chinese ballistic missiles available in the theater, it is more likely that the Tien Chi is intended for high-value targets such as the OTH-SW system.
CONCLUSION
Taiwan's strategic SAM network has been arranged logically given the potential threat it has been designed to counter. As more ATBM systems are developed, the network will continue to evolve into a more modern, capable system, in much the same manner that the network of Taiwan's cross-strait rival has evolved. While the SAM network is not capable of deterring a massed, large scale attack, it is modern and credible enough to act as a potential deterrent against small-scale incursions or attacks, and therefore is a stabilizing force in the region.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
A Google Earth file containing the placemarks used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.
SOURCES
-Special thanks to IMINT & Analysis forum members Planeman and BryanC for acting as sounding boards and discussion partners during the creation of this article
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
2nd Missile battalion, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association
Taiwan: Missile Profile
Taiwan to Upgrade to Tien Kung-2 SAM
Taiwan switches from Tien Kung I to Tien Kung II
Tien Chi
The AN/MPQ-65
Raytheon welcomes PAC-3 deal
FMS: Taiwan Seeks 330 Patriot PAC-3 Missiles and Four MPQ-65 Radar Sets
The island of Taiwan sits less than 200 kilometers from the coast of the People's Republic of China. Faced with a potential threat consisting of over a thousand ballistic missiles and swarms of strike fighters, Taiwan's strategic SAM network is a significant element of the island's defense.
2/71 AND NIKE
Strategic air defense of Taiwan began in the 1950's during a highly classified US military deployment to the island. Soldiers and equipment from Fort Bliss deployed to Taiwan as the 2nd Battalion, 71st Artillery, forming a four battery MIM-14 Nike-Hercules SAM network along the northwestern edge of the island. The deployment of US Army personnel only lasted for a year, but the seeds were sown for Taiwan's strategic air defense network. Not only did Taiwan retain the four Nike-Hercules batteries previously operated by the US Army, but a further four batteries had been procured at some point before the mid 1970s. These systems represented the first significant strategic air defense network to appear in the cross-strait conflict zone, and were retired in 1996.
GENERAL LAYOUT
Taiwan's present-day strategic air defenses are oriented logically with respect to the perceived primary threat to the nation's security: the People's Republic of China. The bulk of the air defense assets are located on the northern and western sides of the island, with their sensors illuminating the cross-strait environment to monitor for any unauthorized inbound traffic. Air surveillance is provided by eleven EW facilities, and engagements are prosecuted by twenty two fixed missile batteries, occupied by HAWK, Patriot, and Tien Kung SAM systems. These systems have engagement ranges of 40 kilometers, 160 kilometers, and 200 kilometers, respectively. A further twenty two Skyguard facilities are located to provide close-in defense of key population centers and military facilities, some of which are equipped with 18 kilometer range RIM-7M Sparrow missiles.
The following image depicts the general layout of Taiwan's strategic air defense network. EW sites are marked with blue diamonds, the CSIST Missile Test Facility is marked with a brown square, and SAM sites are marked as follows:
HAWK: Orange triangle
Patriot: Yellow triangle
Tien Kung: Red triangle
Sparrow: Green triangle
Inactive: White triangle
HAWKTaiwan acquired the MIM-23 HAWK SAM system in the 1960s. Thirteen prepared HAWK sites are currently occupied by active batteries. One battery is located offshore in the Penghu island group. The remaining sites wrap around the western coast of Taiwan at intervals of roughly 65 kilometers. Taipei and Kaohsiung, Taiwan's largest population centers, are defended by three sites and two sites respectively, with closer spacing to provide a greater degree of overlap in their fields of fire. Three sites are present on the eastern shore of the island, situated to defend the three main population centers in that region.
The locations and coverage of Taiwan's HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
TIEN KUNGCSIST began to develop the Tien Kung SAM system in the early 1980s, envisioning a replacement for Taiwan's aging HAWK batteries. The system has been produced and deployed in two variants, the Tien Kung I (TK-I) and the improved Tien Kung II (TK-II). An ATBM Tien Kung III is in development. The TK-I was originally fielded in both static and mobile variants, with the TK-II only being deployed in a static variant. In 2006 it was announced that the TK-I was being retired and replaced by the TK-II. It was not specified if the TK-Is were only being replaced in the static launchers, or if the mobile TK-Is would be withdrawn as well.
The TK-I was deployed on a trial basis in 1989 and declared fully operational in 1993. The TK-II was deployed in 1996. The TK-I had an engagement range of 100 kilometers, with the TK-II having a range of 200 kilometers and adding an active radar terminal homing seeker. The TK-I, in contrast, relied on SARH for terminal homing. Both systems receive target acquisition and midcourse guidance support from an ADAR-1 Chang Bei LPAR. In the TK-I, a CS/MPG-25 continuous wave illuminator provides the necessary target illumination during terminal homing for the SARH guidance method.
The static SAM systems are deployed in silo launchers at six fixed sites, two sites being located offshore. One is located in the Penghu island group, and the other is located in the Dongyin island group. These silo launch facilities are unique in the field of air defense; no other active land-based SAM system in the world uses a silo-based launch method. Each silo launch complex consists of two separate areas: a silo launch facility and a radar facility.
The silo launch facility consists primarily of five underground launch complexes. These complexes each house four four-round vertical launch cells for TK-I or TK-II missiles, for a total of 80 missiles per complex. Two CS/MPG-25 CW illuminators are present at each complex.
The image below depicts a silo launch facility constructed on the grounds of a former Nike Hercules launch site.
Mobile TK-I systems may be deployed at these fixed launch facilities in some capacity, either to augment the silo-mounted TK-IIs or simply to utilize the garrison facilities before being field deployed as required. It is possible that mobile ADAR-1 LPARs could also be employed at silo launch facilities to increase the target engagement capacity of a single battery. Whatever the case, CS/MPG-25 illuminators were still emplaced at static launch complexes imaged at various points in 2006, implying that TK-Is were possibly still present in some capacity and had at the very least not yet been fully removed from silo launchers.The radar facility consists of a fixed, hardened ADAR-1 LPAR. One radar facility is attached to each silo launch facility. The two facilities are separated by a distance of between one and four kilometers and are treated as a single complex. Separating the complexes allows for the hardened radars to be built into bunkers which are at a higher elevation than the launch facility. This allows the radars to have a less cluttered field of view without employing far more vulnerable mast-mounted antennas, and to mitigate the effects of the radar horizon on the system's engagement envelope.
The image below depicts an ADAR-1 radar facility:
Both of the above images are interesting in that they are both censored in the default Google Earth imagery set. They can only be accessed through the historical imagery feature. Various Tien Kung associated facilities can only be viewed in this fashion.While the Tien Kung SAM system has a maximum range of 200 kilometers with the latest TK-II variant, the engagement zones of these fixed launch sites are oriented in specific directions. The fixed ADAR-1 LPAR has a 120 degree field of view in azimuth, able to scan 60 degrees to the left and right of center. This determines the engagement zone available to a missile fired from the associated fixed launch site. Mobile radars could theoretically be employed to increase the coverage zones, but it is not known if the TK-I's mobile ADAR-1 sets are compatible with the silo-launched TK-II missile. It would seem likely that they are, or could be with minimal modification, given that the hardened ADAR-1 radars are still employed by the TK-II system.
The locations and engagement zones of the five southern fixed launch sites can be seen in the image below. The zones are oriented to match the likely fields of view of the hardened ADAR-1 LPARs and correspond to the 200 kilometer TK-II system. A TK-I fired by a fixed launch site would engage a target within the same zone, but only to half the range. The Dongyin island group Tien Kung site is not included as the LPAR field of view cannot be determined due to a lack of high-resolution imagery.
PATRIOTIn 1993 Taiwan purchased three MIM-104 Patriot SAM batteries from the United States, receiving PAC-2 standard weapons. Taiwan's three Patriot batteries became operational in 1998 and were deployed at prepared sites near Taipei for capital area air defense, focusing on an ATBM role. The AN/MPQ-65 radar, when emplaced, has a field of view of 120 degrees in azimuth. The radar is not rotating for full 360 degree coverage, rather it is aligned in the direction of a potential threat axis when deployed. While the radars can be repositioned and realigned when needed, historical imagery indicates that these three batteries have remained aligned in the same general direction since at least 2000.
The locations and coverage zones of Taiwan's Patriot batteries, as currently imaged, can be seen below:
SKYGUARD-SPARROWThe final component of Taiwan's strategic air defense network are the close-in, point defense RIM-7M Sparrow SAM systems integrated with Skyguard batteries. The locations of identified Skyguard installations, along with the coresponding engagement zones for the Sparrow-equipped batteries, can be seen in the image below:
OVERALL COVERAGEThe main issue facing Taiwan is numerical. With an estimated 1300-1500 ballistic missiles and hundreds of strike aircraft targeting the island from the People's Republic of China, it would appear that Taiwan simply cannot afford to procure and deploy enough land-based SAM systems to guarantee clear skies in a time of crisis. That is not entirely true, however, given a complete understanding of a potential conflict. The People's Republic of China wishes to reintegrate Taiwan with the mainland, not acquire a new bombed-out target range for its military forces. Logically speaking, while certain targets are likely to be struck during a military engagement, and likely struck multiple times to increase the chances of oversaturating the air and missile defenses, it is not likely that the PLA will simply bombard the island into submission. Simply speaking, that would completely defeat the point of any military confrontation designed to reintegrate Taiwan. Therefore, when faced with a numerically superior force desiring to eliminate key military facilities rather than to obliterate the entire island, the logical approach would be to employ strategic SAM assets and air interceptors in an integrated air defense system (IADS).
In an integrated warfighting environment, TK-II SAMs could be employed beyond a certain range to thin out inbound formations, while air interceptors remain on station to combat the remaining inbound aircraft. Any cruise missiles or aircraft penetrating the combat air patrol zones could be engaged by HAWK SAMs, as well as SHORAD systems such as Skyguard. Naval SAM systems could also be employed offshore to provide further assistance in thinning out any inbound aggressors. While this strategy would likely still result in a number of successful strikes, it represents a logical, organized use of the assets at hand when faced with a numerically superior threat.
Taken as a whole, the strategic SAM network on Taiwan is well organized. Engagement zones have a significant degree of overlap, allowing targets to be shared by multiple systems, and HAWK batteries are logically deployed as both a closer-in defensive line and a gap filler to eliminate holes in the network created by the azimuth limitations of the hardened ADAR-1 LPAR facilities.
The overall coverage zones of Taiwan's strategic SAM systems can be seen in the image below. As mentioned previously, the Dongyin island group Tien Kung site is not illustrated.
It should be pointed out that the eastern side of the island is relatively undefended in terms of SAM coverage. This should not necessarily be seen as a weakness in the overall network, as the bulk of the military and political targets likely to be struck during a conflict are not in this region.It has been reported that Taiwan possesses eighteen or twenty HAWK batteries, but there have only been thirteen HAWK sites identified. The remaining batteries are likely held in reserve for attrition replacement and training purposes. They are also potentially available to be field deployed during a crisis to reinforce air defenses in certain sectors. Likewise, existing HAWK batteries could be removed from their fixed locations and deployed to field firing positions, as could Patriot or extant mobile TK-I units.
There is evidence suggesting that plans may exist for redeploying Patriot and/or TK-I batteries during a crisis. The following image represents a Patriot or TK-I mobile SAM site constructed on the grounds of a former MIM-14 battery. The image was captured in late 2004, when Taiwan only possessed three PAC-2 Patriot batteries. These batteries were all intended primarily for ATBM defense of Taipei, as previously mentioned, and were already sited in that region. Ergo, this unoccupied facility was likely not intended to house a permanent Patriot battery, as the only Patriot batteries in Taiwan were already positioned according to their intended role. It is, of course, possible that this facility was home to a mobile TK-I battery which has since been deactivated, but that does not preclude the site from being used as a deployment site in the future.
One oddity that stands out when analyzing the coverage zones of Taiwan's strategic SAM network is the presence of a corridor north of the Penghu island group, heading roughly north towards the Chinese mainland, which is only defended by a single Tien Kung fixed launch site. This is unusual because care has apparently been taken to ensure a degree of overlap in most of the network. This corridor could simply be an aberration of geography meant to be filled by a naval SAM system, it could be a purposely less-defended corridor for civillian traffic meant to be filled by a mobile TK-I battery in the Penghu islands, or it could represent a "safe zone" for outbound strike aircraft. The latter example is noteworthy; as the corridor passes over the Chinese mainland, it is flanked on either side by a Chinese S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) SAM battery. This could have been identified by the People's Republic as a potential ingress route for Taiwanese strike aircraft desiring to enter the Chinese mainland and attack ballistic missile launch positions and garrisons. The PLA's DF-11A garrisons at Xianyou and Yong An, along with the DF-15 garrison at Nanping, would likely be within reach of such a strike package. This is, however, pure speculation, but does draw attention to the types of data which could potentially be revealed by analyzing an air defense network.FUTURE PROSPECTS
In the future, Taiwan's goal is to greatly increase the effectiveness of its strategic air defense network against ballistic missiles. To that end, CSIST has been developing the TK-III, an ATBM off-shoot of the TK-II. The Taiwanese government has also been in negotiations with the United States to procure PAC-3 series Patriots with their associated ERINT ATBMs.
The ERINT ATBM has a range of 20 kilometers against a ballistic target, and is designed as a hit-to-kill weapon with very high accuracy. An enhanced variant is being developed which would increase the ATBM range to 45 kilometers. In January of 2009 it was reported that Taiwan had received approval for a contract with Raytheon to upgrade the three existing PAC-2 batteries to PAC-3 standard, enabling them to support the ERINT missile. Taiwan is still negotiating the sale of 330 ERINT missiles as well as four AN/MPQ-65 radars and other Patriot components to deploy three or four additional Patriot batteries.
The footprint of the Taipei PAC-2 sites, when upgraded and equipped with PAC-3 ERINT weapons in an ATBM capacity, can be seen in the image below:
Taiwan is also developing a new SHORAD system based on the Tien Chien II (TC-2) BVR AAM, to be integrated with the Antelope SHORAD system as a Skyguard replacement. STEALTH OFFENSE
No discussion involving the TK-II SAM system would be complete without a brief mention of the Tien Chi surface-to-surface missile derivative. This weapon is a 320 kilometer range system fired from static TK-II launch sites. It is believed that the system is deployed in two locations, and that one of them is the Tien Kung facility in the Dongyin islands. The other is likely the Tien Kung facility in the Penghu islands, as offshore basing does allow for greater inland reach of mainland China.
The following image depicts some of the potential targets for the Tien Chi missiles, assuming that they are based at the two aforementioned locations. The missile locations and their associated ranges are indicated in white. Do note that not only is one of China's OTH-SW systems within range of the Dongyin site, but that it can also reach the two S-300PMU-1 batteries mentioned previously. The main drawback of the system, however, is short range; the image depicts the PLA's 52nd Division ballistic missile units, and only two of them are within range of the Tien Chi system. Given the sheer number of Chinese ballistic missiles available in the theater, it is more likely that the Tien Chi is intended for high-value targets such as the OTH-SW system.
CONCLUSIONTaiwan's strategic SAM network has been arranged logically given the potential threat it has been designed to counter. As more ATBM systems are developed, the network will continue to evolve into a more modern, capable system, in much the same manner that the network of Taiwan's cross-strait rival has evolved. While the SAM network is not capable of deterring a massed, large scale attack, it is modern and credible enough to act as a potential deterrent against small-scale incursions or attacks, and therefore is a stabilizing force in the region.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
A Google Earth file containing the placemarks used in the generation of this article can be downloaded here.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.
SOURCES
-Special thanks to IMINT & Analysis forum members Planeman and BryanC for acting as sounding boards and discussion partners during the creation of this article
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
2nd Missile battalion, 71st Artillery (Taiwan) Association
Taiwan: Missile Profile
Taiwan to Upgrade to Tien Kung-2 SAM
Taiwan switches from Tien Kung I to Tien Kung II
Tien Chi
The AN/MPQ-65
Raytheon welcomes PAC-3 deal
FMS: Taiwan Seeks 330 Patriot PAC-3 Missiles and Four MPQ-65 Radar Sets
Monday, April 6, 2009
SAM Site Overview Mailing List
I've figured out how to solve the amusing problem of the SAM Site Overview constantly not being available for download. From this point forward, the file will not be available for download. Instead, anyone interested in receiving the updated file when changes are made should send an e-mail to imintandanalysisATgmail.com, with SAM SITE UPDATE in the subject line. I will create a mailing list and send everyone the file when it is altered. I will still post the update information here in the normal fashion, but you'll get the file in your inbox instead of from a download link. All you need to do is make sure you can receive a file that is around 6 megabytes in size. This will solve the problems we've been having, and it'll give me an idea of how many people are using the file as well. Those of you who have been sending me updates or questions and whatnot at my other e-mail address, continue using that address for those purposes. All I want to use the above address for is managing the SAM site file mailing list. When the file is updated next, I'll also include these instructions in the main post as well, but go ahead and send me your information now so I can start building the mailing list. This should take care of our problem, and save the download bandwidth for the (considerably smaller) placemark files which are provided with some of my articles. Those of you interested in receiving the current SAM Site Overview file now should send me an e-mail at the above address with SAM SITE FILE in the subject line. I'll then send you the current file, and I'll still add you to the mailing list for updates.
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Monday, December 22, 2008
Blackbirds In Imagery
INTRODUCTION
One of the few aircraft to capture the attention of serious aviation buffs, casual fans, historians, and everyone else who has held it in their vision if only for a second is the Lockheed Blackbird, alternatively known to its pilots as the Sled. Born out of a requirement for a faster, higher-flying, more survivable replacement for the CIA's U-2, the Blackbird has become an aviation legend. In the spirit of the holidays, this article will detail the locations of Blackbird survivors and depict the locations of those visible in Google Earth. It's Sledding, Google Earth style!
THE BLACKBIRD
The Blackbird, also known as the Sled, the Habu, the Beast, and the Titanium Goose in its various incarnations, was created to fulfill a CIA requirement for a successor to the U-2. As the U-2 flew deep into the USSR on intelligence gathering sorties, advances in Soviet air defenses were threatening to make the CIA's original high flyer obsolete. Something more survivable was needed, and the result was the Lockheed A-12, designed for high speed and high altitude overflight of denied teritory. As it would turn out, the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers on the first day of May, 1960, ended manned overflight of the USSR. Seemingly an aircraft without a mission, the A-12 evolved into one of the mainstays of USAF Cold War intelligence gathering, the SR-71A, and had a productive intelligence gathering career in its own right.
OXCART
Out of 13 A-12s built for the CIA, only 8 remain. Two of these airframes, Articles 128 and 132, are currently on display indoors at the Central Intelligence Agency and Battleship Memorial Park in Mobile, Alabama, respectively. The rest of the surviving OXCARTs are on display outdoors and can be seen clearly in Google Earth imagery.
The first prototype of the A-12 family, Article 121, can be seen on display at Blackbird Airpark in Palmdale, California, in company with SR-71A Article 2024 and a D-21 drone:
The second A-12, also employed as a flight test airframe and the A-12 used for pole tests of the aircraft's radar cross section, is now on display at the USS Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space museum in New York City. This is the only Blackbird to be displayed on a carrier deck, and doubled as a tee box for Will Smith in the movie I Am Legend.
An image of the USS Intrepid in 2002 can be seen below, followed by an image from 2007 while the carrier was docked at Staten Island undergoing refitting and refurbishment.
A photograph of Article 122 on the deck of the USS Intrepid can be seen below:
Article 124, the fourth A-12 airframe and the only two-seat trainer, is on display at the California Science Center in Los Angeles. This aircraft, designated AT-12, was nicknamed Titanium Goose and never received the overall black paint scheme found on most other A-12s later in their flying careers.
Article 127 is on display at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Hutsville, Alabama. This aircraft is one of three OXCARTs to perform operational reconnaissance sorties out of Kadena AB, Japan. Amusingly, at one point Article 127 featured the characteristic yellow NASA fin stripe on its vertical tail surfaces. Suffice it to say that NASA never operated an A-12, the existance of which remained classified into the 1980's!
Article 128 was previously displayed at the Minnesota ANG Museum in Minneapolis before being removed for display at the CIA. An image of the aircraft on display outdoors in Minnesota is provided below.
Article 130 is on display in San Diego at the San Diego Aerospace Museum.
Article 131, the other surviving A-12 to have performed operational reconnaissance sorties (06932, the third aircraft, was lost during a training flight), is currently on display at the Birmingham Museum of Flight in Birmingham, Alabama. With three A-12s on display, Alabama currently possesses more than a third of the surviving OXCART fleet!
KEDLOCK
While the A-12 program was progressing, Lockheed realized that the airframe might be suitable for tasks other than reconnaissance. Project KEDLOCK produced an interceptor variant for the USAF, with three prototypes being constructed. The YF-12A prototypes were arguably the most advanced interceptors of their era, featuring long-range pulse-doppler AN/ASG-18 radar sets, and carrying three XAIM-47A air to air missiles.
Three YF-12As were constructed by modifying three A-12 airframes on the production line. These were aircraft 60-6934, 60-6935, and 60-6936, referred to as Articles 1001, 1002, and 1003 respectively. The first and third prototypes were written off in accidents, leaving Article 1002 as the sole survivor of the type. After a career as a flight test aircraft with NASA following the cancellation of the USAF F-12 program, Article 1002 was retired to the USAF Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio, where it resides to this day. The aircraft is currently situated in the R&D Hangar at the museum's annex facility.
The following photograph depicts the USAF Museum's YF-12A on display:
TAGBOARD
With the cancellation of manned overflights over Soviet territory, Lockheed began developing ideas for continuing a reconnaissance mission over these territories. The result was the M-21, a two-seat version of the A-12 specially configured to carry and launch a D-21 drone mounted above the rear fuselage. Despite being able to claim status as the world's fastest biplane, the M-21/D-21 combination ultimately proved to be unsuccessful, with the D-21 being modified for launch from two specially outfitted B-52H carriers under the SENIOR BOWL program. The two A-12s modified into M-21 standard were Articles 134 and 135.
06941 was lost during the fourth launch attempt of a D-21 drone, an accident which can be seen here. This video is very interesting from a historical standpoint. Apart from depicting a Mach 3 collision between two formerly classified intelligence gathering platforms, the video tears down one of the assumptions made about the D-21. It had been believed due to photographic evidence available that the leading edge probes seen on operational D-21Bs carried by the B-52H launch platforms had been added as part of the D-21B program. This can be seen to be completely untrue, as the D-21 launched from the back of 06941 possesses these same leading edge probes.
The surviving M-21 resides indoors at the Seattle Museum of Flight, complete with a mounted D-21.
A photograph of a D-21 on display at the USAF Museum can be seen below:
SENIOR CROWN
The SR-71A evolved out of the CIA's A-12 to provide the USAF with a twin-seat strategic reconnaissance aircraft capable of carrying multiple sensor fits to gather complex photographic and electronic intelligence. Operational SR-71As were based at Beale AFB in California. Not only did the SR-71A replace the CIA's A-12 at the Kadena AB operating location, but it served at RAF Mildenhall in England, gathering intelligence on Soviet and Warsaw Pact activity in Europe. Mildenhall-based Blackbirds also conducted reconnaissance over Libya in support of Operation ELDORADO CANYON, to cite a specific example of non-Communist directed operations.
19 SR-71s remain out of a total of 31 built, not including the technologically amusing SR-71C. This includes the remaining SR-71B, one of two built for pilot training. 11 SR-71s are displayed indoors, including the surviving SR-71B and SR-71C examples. These include Articles 2002, 2007 (SR-71B), 2009, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2022, 2023, 2027, and 2000 (SR-71C). Article 2013 is unique in that it is the only Blackbird on display outside the United States, residing at the Imperial War Museum in Duxford, England. The other aircraft displayed indoors reside at the following locations:
Article 2002: Pima Air Museum, Tuscon, Arizona
Article 2007: Kalamazoo Air Zoo, Battle Creek Airport, Michigan
Article 2009: Warner Robins Museum of Aviation, Warner Robins AFB, Georgia
Article 2012: Kansas Cosmosphere, Hutchinson, Kansas
Article 2015: Strategic Air Command Museum, Ashland, Nebraska
Article 2022: Evergreen Aviation Museum, McMinnville, Oregon
Article 2023: National Air & Space Museum, Udvar-Hazy annex, Washington, DC
Article 2027: USAF Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
Article 2000: Hill Aerospace Museum, Hill AFB, Utah
The following photograph depicts Article 2023 on display in the National Air & Space Museum's Udvar-Hazy annex:
The following photograph depicts Article 2027 on display in the USAF Museum's Cold War hangar:
Article 2006 was employed almost exclusively by Lockheed for flight test work supporting USAF SR-71 operations. It operated out of Palmdale, California and is currently on display at the Air Force Flight Test Center Museum at Edwards AFB, California, and can be seen in the image below:
Article 2010 was used between 1975 and 1976 to test the Big Tail modification, featuring an extended tail assembly housing various sensor fits. The aircraft was retired from service following the Big Tail test program and can currently be seen on display at the USAF Armament Museum at Eglin AFB, Florida, complete with Big Tail assembly. An image of the aircraft on display is provided below. Note that the extended tail fitting can clearly be seen.
Article 2011 is on display at the Castle Air Museum at Castle AFB, California.
Article 2014 is on display at Beale AFB, California, in company with a D-21 drone. The aircraft is mounted on a replica of one of the patches worn by SR-71 crewmembers.
Article 2018 is on display at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana but is not currently visible in Google Earth imagery. It is, however, visible in Microsoft Virtual Earth, as seen below:
Article 2019 is on display at the Virginia Aviation Museum, Richmond, Virginia.
A photograph of Article 2019 on display can be seen below:
Article 2024 can be seen on display at Blackbird Airpark as mentioned previously.
Article 2026 is on display at the March Field Air Museum, March AFB, California.
Article 2030 is on display at Heritage Field, Lackland AFB, Texas.
Article 2031 is on display at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards AFB, California.
RELATED AIRCRAFT
Three aircraft formerly involved with the Blackbird program in some capacity still exist today, and one can be seen in overhead imagery. The two B-52Hs modified to support D-21B drone launches, 60-0036 and 61-0021, are still in use. The former aircraft serves at the USAF flight test facility at Edwards AFB, while the latter is in operational service at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. A B-58 Hustler was modified to serve as a test aircraft for the AN/ASG-18 and AIM-47 combination used by the YF-12A. This aircraft was originally supporting the F-108 program, the aircraft for which the weapon systems originated before it was cancelled. This B-58, 55-665, was nicknamed Snoopy due to its long, drooping radome fitted for the AN/ASG-18. It currently resides on the range at Edwards AFB as a photographic target and can be seen in the image below:
CONCLUSION
I hope everyone has enjoyed this "holiday-themed" aviation topic. The Blackbird is one of the most interesting aircraft to ever exist, and more information on CIA A-12 operations is declassified each year, ensuring that the complete story has yet to be written. In the meantime, take note of the locations of these high performance aircraft, and take the time to go see one close to you if possible. You won't be disappointed!
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
A placemark file containing the locations of Blackbirds both indoors and outdoors can be downloaded here. This placemark also containst the locations of Snoopy and various D-21s visible at various locations not mentioned in this article.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided by Google Earth and Microsoft Virtual Earth
-Digital photographs taken by the author and may not be re-used without permission
Lockheed's SR-71 'Blackbird' Family, James Goodall and Jay Miller, Aerofax, 2002.
One of the few aircraft to capture the attention of serious aviation buffs, casual fans, historians, and everyone else who has held it in their vision if only for a second is the Lockheed Blackbird, alternatively known to its pilots as the Sled. Born out of a requirement for a faster, higher-flying, more survivable replacement for the CIA's U-2, the Blackbird has become an aviation legend. In the spirit of the holidays, this article will detail the locations of Blackbird survivors and depict the locations of those visible in Google Earth. It's Sledding, Google Earth style!
THE BLACKBIRD
The Blackbird, also known as the Sled, the Habu, the Beast, and the Titanium Goose in its various incarnations, was created to fulfill a CIA requirement for a successor to the U-2. As the U-2 flew deep into the USSR on intelligence gathering sorties, advances in Soviet air defenses were threatening to make the CIA's original high flyer obsolete. Something more survivable was needed, and the result was the Lockheed A-12, designed for high speed and high altitude overflight of denied teritory. As it would turn out, the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers on the first day of May, 1960, ended manned overflight of the USSR. Seemingly an aircraft without a mission, the A-12 evolved into one of the mainstays of USAF Cold War intelligence gathering, the SR-71A, and had a productive intelligence gathering career in its own right.
OXCART
Out of 13 A-12s built for the CIA, only 8 remain. Two of these airframes, Articles 128 and 132, are currently on display indoors at the Central Intelligence Agency and Battleship Memorial Park in Mobile, Alabama, respectively. The rest of the surviving OXCARTs are on display outdoors and can be seen clearly in Google Earth imagery.
The first prototype of the A-12 family, Article 121, can be seen on display at Blackbird Airpark in Palmdale, California, in company with SR-71A Article 2024 and a D-21 drone:
The second A-12, also employed as a flight test airframe and the A-12 used for pole tests of the aircraft's radar cross section, is now on display at the USS Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space museum in New York City. This is the only Blackbird to be displayed on a carrier deck, and doubled as a tee box for Will Smith in the movie I Am Legend.
An image of the USS Intrepid in 2002 can be seen below, followed by an image from 2007 while the carrier was docked at Staten Island undergoing refitting and refurbishment.
A photograph of Article 122 on the deck of the USS Intrepid can be seen below:
Article 124, the fourth A-12 airframe and the only two-seat trainer, is on display at the California Science Center in Los Angeles. This aircraft, designated AT-12, was nicknamed Titanium Goose and never received the overall black paint scheme found on most other A-12s later in their flying careers.
Article 127 is on display at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Hutsville, Alabama. This aircraft is one of three OXCARTs to perform operational reconnaissance sorties out of Kadena AB, Japan. Amusingly, at one point Article 127 featured the characteristic yellow NASA fin stripe on its vertical tail surfaces. Suffice it to say that NASA never operated an A-12, the existance of which remained classified into the 1980's!
Article 128 was previously displayed at the Minnesota ANG Museum in Minneapolis before being removed for display at the CIA. An image of the aircraft on display outdoors in Minnesota is provided below.
Article 130 is on display in San Diego at the San Diego Aerospace Museum.
Article 131, the other surviving A-12 to have performed operational reconnaissance sorties (06932, the third aircraft, was lost during a training flight), is currently on display at the Birmingham Museum of Flight in Birmingham, Alabama. With three A-12s on display, Alabama currently possesses more than a third of the surviving OXCART fleet!
KEDLOCK
While the A-12 program was progressing, Lockheed realized that the airframe might be suitable for tasks other than reconnaissance. Project KEDLOCK produced an interceptor variant for the USAF, with three prototypes being constructed. The YF-12A prototypes were arguably the most advanced interceptors of their era, featuring long-range pulse-doppler AN/ASG-18 radar sets, and carrying three XAIM-47A air to air missiles.
Three YF-12As were constructed by modifying three A-12 airframes on the production line. These were aircraft 60-6934, 60-6935, and 60-6936, referred to as Articles 1001, 1002, and 1003 respectively. The first and third prototypes were written off in accidents, leaving Article 1002 as the sole survivor of the type. After a career as a flight test aircraft with NASA following the cancellation of the USAF F-12 program, Article 1002 was retired to the USAF Museum at Wright-Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio, where it resides to this day. The aircraft is currently situated in the R&D Hangar at the museum's annex facility.
The following photograph depicts the USAF Museum's YF-12A on display:
TAGBOARD
With the cancellation of manned overflights over Soviet territory, Lockheed began developing ideas for continuing a reconnaissance mission over these territories. The result was the M-21, a two-seat version of the A-12 specially configured to carry and launch a D-21 drone mounted above the rear fuselage. Despite being able to claim status as the world's fastest biplane, the M-21/D-21 combination ultimately proved to be unsuccessful, with the D-21 being modified for launch from two specially outfitted B-52H carriers under the SENIOR BOWL program. The two A-12s modified into M-21 standard were Articles 134 and 135.
06941 was lost during the fourth launch attempt of a D-21 drone, an accident which can be seen here. This video is very interesting from a historical standpoint. Apart from depicting a Mach 3 collision between two formerly classified intelligence gathering platforms, the video tears down one of the assumptions made about the D-21. It had been believed due to photographic evidence available that the leading edge probes seen on operational D-21Bs carried by the B-52H launch platforms had been added as part of the D-21B program. This can be seen to be completely untrue, as the D-21 launched from the back of 06941 possesses these same leading edge probes.
The surviving M-21 resides indoors at the Seattle Museum of Flight, complete with a mounted D-21.
A photograph of a D-21 on display at the USAF Museum can be seen below:
SENIOR CROWN
The SR-71A evolved out of the CIA's A-12 to provide the USAF with a twin-seat strategic reconnaissance aircraft capable of carrying multiple sensor fits to gather complex photographic and electronic intelligence. Operational SR-71As were based at Beale AFB in California. Not only did the SR-71A replace the CIA's A-12 at the Kadena AB operating location, but it served at RAF Mildenhall in England, gathering intelligence on Soviet and Warsaw Pact activity in Europe. Mildenhall-based Blackbirds also conducted reconnaissance over Libya in support of Operation ELDORADO CANYON, to cite a specific example of non-Communist directed operations.
19 SR-71s remain out of a total of 31 built, not including the technologically amusing SR-71C. This includes the remaining SR-71B, one of two built for pilot training. 11 SR-71s are displayed indoors, including the surviving SR-71B and SR-71C examples. These include Articles 2002, 2007 (SR-71B), 2009, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2022, 2023, 2027, and 2000 (SR-71C). Article 2013 is unique in that it is the only Blackbird on display outside the United States, residing at the Imperial War Museum in Duxford, England. The other aircraft displayed indoors reside at the following locations:
Article 2002: Pima Air Museum, Tuscon, Arizona
Article 2007: Kalamazoo Air Zoo, Battle Creek Airport, Michigan
Article 2009: Warner Robins Museum of Aviation, Warner Robins AFB, Georgia
Article 2012: Kansas Cosmosphere, Hutchinson, Kansas
Article 2015: Strategic Air Command Museum, Ashland, Nebraska
Article 2022: Evergreen Aviation Museum, McMinnville, Oregon
Article 2023: National Air & Space Museum, Udvar-Hazy annex, Washington, DC
Article 2027: USAF Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
Article 2000: Hill Aerospace Museum, Hill AFB, Utah
The following photograph depicts Article 2023 on display in the National Air & Space Museum's Udvar-Hazy annex:
The following photograph depicts Article 2027 on display in the USAF Museum's Cold War hangar:
Article 2006 was employed almost exclusively by Lockheed for flight test work supporting USAF SR-71 operations. It operated out of Palmdale, California and is currently on display at the Air Force Flight Test Center Museum at Edwards AFB, California, and can be seen in the image below:
Article 2010 was used between 1975 and 1976 to test the Big Tail modification, featuring an extended tail assembly housing various sensor fits. The aircraft was retired from service following the Big Tail test program and can currently be seen on display at the USAF Armament Museum at Eglin AFB, Florida, complete with Big Tail assembly. An image of the aircraft on display is provided below. Note that the extended tail fitting can clearly be seen.
Article 2011 is on display at the Castle Air Museum at Castle AFB, California.
Article 2014 is on display at Beale AFB, California, in company with a D-21 drone. The aircraft is mounted on a replica of one of the patches worn by SR-71 crewmembers.
Article 2018 is on display at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana but is not currently visible in Google Earth imagery. It is, however, visible in Microsoft Virtual Earth, as seen below:
Article 2019 is on display at the Virginia Aviation Museum, Richmond, Virginia.
A photograph of Article 2019 on display can be seen below:
Article 2024 can be seen on display at Blackbird Airpark as mentioned previously.
Article 2026 is on display at the March Field Air Museum, March AFB, California.
Article 2030 is on display at Heritage Field, Lackland AFB, Texas.
Article 2031 is on display at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards AFB, California.
RELATED AIRCRAFT
Three aircraft formerly involved with the Blackbird program in some capacity still exist today, and one can be seen in overhead imagery. The two B-52Hs modified to support D-21B drone launches, 60-0036 and 61-0021, are still in use. The former aircraft serves at the USAF flight test facility at Edwards AFB, while the latter is in operational service at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. A B-58 Hustler was modified to serve as a test aircraft for the AN/ASG-18 and AIM-47 combination used by the YF-12A. This aircraft was originally supporting the F-108 program, the aircraft for which the weapon systems originated before it was cancelled. This B-58, 55-665, was nicknamed Snoopy due to its long, drooping radome fitted for the AN/ASG-18. It currently resides on the range at Edwards AFB as a photographic target and can be seen in the image below:
CONCLUSION
I hope everyone has enjoyed this "holiday-themed" aviation topic. The Blackbird is one of the most interesting aircraft to ever exist, and more information on CIA A-12 operations is declassified each year, ensuring that the complete story has yet to be written. In the meantime, take note of the locations of these high performance aircraft, and take the time to go see one close to you if possible. You won't be disappointed!
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
A placemark file containing the locations of Blackbirds both indoors and outdoors can be downloaded here. This placemark also containst the locations of Snoopy and various D-21s visible at various locations not mentioned in this article.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided by Google Earth and Microsoft Virtual Earth
-Digital photographs taken by the author and may not be re-used without permission
Lockheed's SR-71 'Blackbird' Family, James Goodall and Jay Miller, Aerofax, 2002.
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
Wednesday, October 1, 2008
Hungarian Strategic Air Defense: A Cold War Case Study
INTRODUCTION
The Hungarian strategic SAM network provided an important piece of the Warsaw Pact's air defense picture during the Cold War. Modernization efforts in the early 1980s expanded the coverage of the network ensuring the defense of both the capital and the most significant industrial area in the nation. As a regionally structured air defense organization, the Hungarian strategic SAM network provides an interesting study of air defense deployment during the Cold War.
GENERAL LAYOUT
The Hungarian strategic SAM network operated four SAM systems at various points in its history, the SA-75 Dvina and S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 Neva (SA-3 GOA), and S-200VE Vega (SA-5 GAMMON). Tactical air defense was likely provided by 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) units, but garrison locations for these units have yet to be discerned. Strategic SAM assets were initially assigned to three different anti-aircraft regiments, or PLRPs. Engagement ranges of the strategic SAM systems are as follows:
SA-75 Dvina: 34 km
S-75M Volkhov: 43 km
S-125 Neva: 25 km
S-200VE Vega: 240 km
In the imagery contained within this article, SAM systems will be identified as follows: SA-75 and S-75 series sites are marked with triangles and red range rings, S-125 series sites are marked with stars and light blue range rings, and S-200 series sites are marked with hexagons and purple range rings.
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT
The deployment of strategic SAM assets in Hungary began in 1959 with the introduction of the first SA-75 Dvina SAM batteries. Between 1959 and 1983, the Dvina system provided the bulk of Hungarian strategic air defense, with a maximum of 14 sites being operational through 1976. The Dvina batteries were subordinate to three PLRPs, the 11th, 104th, and 105th.
Budapest
The Hungarian capital of Budapest was initially defended by SA-75 Dvina batteries of the 11th and 104th PLRPs. Each PLRP controlled five Dvina sites. The 11th PLRP's Dvina sites were organized along the western side of the capital, with the 104th PLRP's sites being located along the eastern side. Taken in total, the 11th and 104th PLRP's sites formed an ellipse, with Budapest being situated as the northern focus.
The following image depicts the Dvina site locations and engagement zones around Budapest. 11th PLRP sites are blue, 104th PLRP sites are orange.
Miskolc
The 105th PLRP controlled four SA-75 Dvina sites situated around Miskolc. Miskolc is Hungary's second largest city and has been the nation's center of industry since the end of the Second World War. It is therefore logical that a third PLRP would be tasked to provide strategic air defense of the area.
The following image depicts the Dvina site locations and engagement zones around Miskolc:
REORGANIZATION
Between 1977 and 1986 the Hungarian strategic SAM network underwent a significant modernization. The SA-75 Dvina was replaced with the longer-range S-75M Volkhov from 1977 to 1983. 6 Dvina sites were retained and re-equipped with the new system, while 7 new sites were constructed to house the remainder of the Volkhov batteries. By 1983 the Dvina had been completely phased out in Hungarian service, and the Volkhov system would serve until 1995. 1978 saw the introduction of the S-125M Neva SAM system, which would take residence at seven locations, serving until 1995. In 1986 the S-200VE Vega long-range SAM system was introduced at a single location. The Vega would outlast its shorter-range counterparts, serving until 1997. All of these new systems were subordinate to the same regiments that had operated the Dvina system under the old air defense architecture, the 11th, 104th, and 105th PLRPs.
Budapest
The 11th PLRP assumed responsibility for defense of the Hungarian capital under the reorganized air defense network. The 11th PLRP saw the number of batteries under its control swell under the reorganization, with seven Volkhov and six Neva sites being subordinate to the regiment. All batteries were operational until 1995 with the exception of a single Neva battery located near Piliscsaba, which left the inventory in 1994.
The following image depicts the sites and engagement zones of batteries subordinate to the 11th PLRP after the reorganization, circa 1981:
Dunaujvaros
Following the reorganization, the area of responsibility for the 104th PLRP moved southwest of Budapest to the area surrounding the city of Dunaujvaros. By 1986 the 104th PLRP contained three Volkhov batteries and Hungary's sole Vega site. The 104th PLRP's Volkhov batteries were among the first to be deactivated, leaving the inventory in 1990, at which time a Neva battery was emplaced on the grounds of the Vega site to provide close-in air defense for the system.
The following image depicts the sites and engagement zones of batteries subordinate to the 104th PLRP after the reorganization, circa 1986. The engagement zone for the Vega is omitted in this graphic.
Miskolc
The 105th PLRP survived the reorganization largely unscathed. The area of responsibility remained the same, the territory surrounding Miskolc, and only the northeastern site did not receive the Volkhov as it had been deactivated in 1965. The remaining three locations were reequipped with the S-75M in 1983 and served until 1990.
The following image depicts the sites and engagement zones of batteries subordinate to the 105th PLRP after the reorganization, circa 1983:
SOVIET AIR DEFENSES
Soviet forces stationed in Hungary during the Cold War included eight air defense units manning S-125M Neva batteries. These Neva batteries were located at airfields around the nation to provide air defense for deployed Soviet Air Force units. One advantage to having the Soviet Neva batteries in-country was that they were often situated in areas not covered by any other air defense assets.
The following image depicts the Soviet Neva sites in Hungary and their corresponding engagement zones:
OVERALL COVERAGE
Given the extreme fluidity of the Hungarian strategic SAM network, the overall coverage should be examined chronologically. The following images will depict the SAM network for a given point in time. Each image will be preceded by a brief line of text denoting the time period depicted and the number and type of systems operational for that time period. Soviet S-125M Neva batteries will not be included as there is no historical documentation of their deployment dates.
1959 to 1960: 1 Dvina
1961: 9 Dvina
1962 to 1965: 14 Dvina
1966 to 1976: 12 Dvina
1977: 9 Dvina, 3 Volkhov
1978: 3 Neva, 8 Dvina, 4 Volkhov
1979: 6 Neva, 7 Dvina, 5 Volkhov
1980: 6 Neva, 6 Dvina, 6 Volkhov
1981 to 1982: 6 Neva, 5 Dvina, 7 Volkhov
1983 to 1985: 6 Neva, 13 Volkhov
1986 to 1989: 1 Vega, 6 Neva, 13 Volkhov
1990: 1 Vega, 7 Neva, 12 Volkhov
1991 to 1994: 1 Vega, 7 Neva, 7 Volkhov
1995: 1 Vega, 6 Neva, 7 Volkhov
1996 to 1997: 1 Vega
LIMITATIONS
The primary limitation of the Hungarian strategic SAM network during the Cold War was one of coverage. Portions of the central and northeastern parts of the nation were typically well covered by Dvina, Volkhov, and Neva batteries, but no attention was paid to the remainder of the nation. In particular, the western border with Austria was ignored. The southern border was less significant as Yugoslavian air defense units would have been initially responsible for targets ingressing from that direction during a conflict with NATO. Yugoslavia was not a Warsaw Pact member state but would likely have not been allied with NATO during a conflict, providing a degree of security. Hungary's position in Central Europe also likely aided its security as NATO's primary focus would have been Soviet Army units located in East Germany and support facilities located in Poland. Hungary was a significant location of Soviet tactical air power during the Cold War, but fortunately for the Hungarians the majority of the fighting would likely have been elsewhere.
It should be noted that unlike East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Hungary relied upon older strategic SAM systems. The S-300PMU, supplied to both of the aforementioned nations, was not delivered to Hungary. As a result, Hungarian strategic SAM units were limited by the characteristics of their weapon systems. Each strategic SAM battery of the Dvina, Volkhov, and Neva variety was only capable of engaging a single target at a time due to the command guidance methods employed. Only the single Vega battery enjoyed something of a multiple target capability, thanks to the presence of two firing positions, each controlled by a separate engagement radar. Even with this added capability introduced with the Vega in 1986, the Hungarian strategic SAM network was still vulnerable to saturation with very little effort. From 1986 to 1989 when the network was at its maximum strength with 20 operational SAM sites, the overall network still only provided the ability to engage 21 simultaneous targets.
CONCLUSION
Despite being located away from most of the significant military facilities and units with which the Warsaw Pact would have employed to wage war against NATO, the Hungarian strategic SAM network provided an important piece of Warsaw Pact air defense during the Cold War. While the network was initially relatively pedestrian, modernization efforts would transform the overall network into a much more robust and layered organization. Despite these efforts, however, the strategic SAM network was ultimately incapable of repelling am assed air attack by the air forces of NATO.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss this feature at the IMINT & Analysis Forum discussion thread found here.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
The range rings used to create this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark file here.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Hungarian SAM sites by Google Earth user LeX2
Hungarian air defense units
Hungarian air defense units
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
The Hungarian strategic SAM network provided an important piece of the Warsaw Pact's air defense picture during the Cold War. Modernization efforts in the early 1980s expanded the coverage of the network ensuring the defense of both the capital and the most significant industrial area in the nation. As a regionally structured air defense organization, the Hungarian strategic SAM network provides an interesting study of air defense deployment during the Cold War.
GENERAL LAYOUT
The Hungarian strategic SAM network operated four SAM systems at various points in its history, the SA-75 Dvina and S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 Neva (SA-3 GOA), and S-200VE Vega (SA-5 GAMMON). Tactical air defense was likely provided by 2K12 Kub (SA-6 GAINFUL) units, but garrison locations for these units have yet to be discerned. Strategic SAM assets were initially assigned to three different anti-aircraft regiments, or PLRPs. Engagement ranges of the strategic SAM systems are as follows:
SA-75 Dvina: 34 km
S-75M Volkhov: 43 km
S-125 Neva: 25 km
S-200VE Vega: 240 km
In the imagery contained within this article, SAM systems will be identified as follows: SA-75 and S-75 series sites are marked with triangles and red range rings, S-125 series sites are marked with stars and light blue range rings, and S-200 series sites are marked with hexagons and purple range rings.
INITIAL DEPLOYMENT
The deployment of strategic SAM assets in Hungary began in 1959 with the introduction of the first SA-75 Dvina SAM batteries. Between 1959 and 1983, the Dvina system provided the bulk of Hungarian strategic air defense, with a maximum of 14 sites being operational through 1976. The Dvina batteries were subordinate to three PLRPs, the 11th, 104th, and 105th.
Budapest
The Hungarian capital of Budapest was initially defended by SA-75 Dvina batteries of the 11th and 104th PLRPs. Each PLRP controlled five Dvina sites. The 11th PLRP's Dvina sites were organized along the western side of the capital, with the 104th PLRP's sites being located along the eastern side. Taken in total, the 11th and 104th PLRP's sites formed an ellipse, with Budapest being situated as the northern focus.
The following image depicts the Dvina site locations and engagement zones around Budapest. 11th PLRP sites are blue, 104th PLRP sites are orange.
MiskolcThe 105th PLRP controlled four SA-75 Dvina sites situated around Miskolc. Miskolc is Hungary's second largest city and has been the nation's center of industry since the end of the Second World War. It is therefore logical that a third PLRP would be tasked to provide strategic air defense of the area.
The following image depicts the Dvina site locations and engagement zones around Miskolc:
REORGANIZATIONBetween 1977 and 1986 the Hungarian strategic SAM network underwent a significant modernization. The SA-75 Dvina was replaced with the longer-range S-75M Volkhov from 1977 to 1983. 6 Dvina sites were retained and re-equipped with the new system, while 7 new sites were constructed to house the remainder of the Volkhov batteries. By 1983 the Dvina had been completely phased out in Hungarian service, and the Volkhov system would serve until 1995. 1978 saw the introduction of the S-125M Neva SAM system, which would take residence at seven locations, serving until 1995. In 1986 the S-200VE Vega long-range SAM system was introduced at a single location. The Vega would outlast its shorter-range counterparts, serving until 1997. All of these new systems were subordinate to the same regiments that had operated the Dvina system under the old air defense architecture, the 11th, 104th, and 105th PLRPs.
Budapest
The 11th PLRP assumed responsibility for defense of the Hungarian capital under the reorganized air defense network. The 11th PLRP saw the number of batteries under its control swell under the reorganization, with seven Volkhov and six Neva sites being subordinate to the regiment. All batteries were operational until 1995 with the exception of a single Neva battery located near Piliscsaba, which left the inventory in 1994.
The following image depicts the sites and engagement zones of batteries subordinate to the 11th PLRP after the reorganization, circa 1981:
DunaujvarosFollowing the reorganization, the area of responsibility for the 104th PLRP moved southwest of Budapest to the area surrounding the city of Dunaujvaros. By 1986 the 104th PLRP contained three Volkhov batteries and Hungary's sole Vega site. The 104th PLRP's Volkhov batteries were among the first to be deactivated, leaving the inventory in 1990, at which time a Neva battery was emplaced on the grounds of the Vega site to provide close-in air defense for the system.
The following image depicts the sites and engagement zones of batteries subordinate to the 104th PLRP after the reorganization, circa 1986. The engagement zone for the Vega is omitted in this graphic.
MiskolcThe 105th PLRP survived the reorganization largely unscathed. The area of responsibility remained the same, the territory surrounding Miskolc, and only the northeastern site did not receive the Volkhov as it had been deactivated in 1965. The remaining three locations were reequipped with the S-75M in 1983 and served until 1990.
The following image depicts the sites and engagement zones of batteries subordinate to the 105th PLRP after the reorganization, circa 1983:
SOVIET AIR DEFENSESSoviet forces stationed in Hungary during the Cold War included eight air defense units manning S-125M Neva batteries. These Neva batteries were located at airfields around the nation to provide air defense for deployed Soviet Air Force units. One advantage to having the Soviet Neva batteries in-country was that they were often situated in areas not covered by any other air defense assets.
The following image depicts the Soviet Neva sites in Hungary and their corresponding engagement zones:
OVERALL COVERAGEGiven the extreme fluidity of the Hungarian strategic SAM network, the overall coverage should be examined chronologically. The following images will depict the SAM network for a given point in time. Each image will be preceded by a brief line of text denoting the time period depicted and the number and type of systems operational for that time period. Soviet S-125M Neva batteries will not be included as there is no historical documentation of their deployment dates.
1959 to 1960: 1 Dvina
1961: 9 Dvina
1962 to 1965: 14 Dvina
1966 to 1976: 12 Dvina
1977: 9 Dvina, 3 Volkhov
1978: 3 Neva, 8 Dvina, 4 Volkhov
1979: 6 Neva, 7 Dvina, 5 Volkhov
1980: 6 Neva, 6 Dvina, 6 Volkhov
1981 to 1982: 6 Neva, 5 Dvina, 7 Volkhov
1983 to 1985: 6 Neva, 13 Volkhov
1986 to 1989: 1 Vega, 6 Neva, 13 Volkhov
1990: 1 Vega, 7 Neva, 12 Volkhov
1991 to 1994: 1 Vega, 7 Neva, 7 Volkhov
1995: 1 Vega, 6 Neva, 7 Volkhov
1996 to 1997: 1 Vega
LIMITATIONS
The primary limitation of the Hungarian strategic SAM network during the Cold War was one of coverage. Portions of the central and northeastern parts of the nation were typically well covered by Dvina, Volkhov, and Neva batteries, but no attention was paid to the remainder of the nation. In particular, the western border with Austria was ignored. The southern border was less significant as Yugoslavian air defense units would have been initially responsible for targets ingressing from that direction during a conflict with NATO. Yugoslavia was not a Warsaw Pact member state but would likely have not been allied with NATO during a conflict, providing a degree of security. Hungary's position in Central Europe also likely aided its security as NATO's primary focus would have been Soviet Army units located in East Germany and support facilities located in Poland. Hungary was a significant location of Soviet tactical air power during the Cold War, but fortunately for the Hungarians the majority of the fighting would likely have been elsewhere.
It should be noted that unlike East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Hungary relied upon older strategic SAM systems. The S-300PMU, supplied to both of the aforementioned nations, was not delivered to Hungary. As a result, Hungarian strategic SAM units were limited by the characteristics of their weapon systems. Each strategic SAM battery of the Dvina, Volkhov, and Neva variety was only capable of engaging a single target at a time due to the command guidance methods employed. Only the single Vega battery enjoyed something of a multiple target capability, thanks to the presence of two firing positions, each controlled by a separate engagement radar. Even with this added capability introduced with the Vega in 1986, the Hungarian strategic SAM network was still vulnerable to saturation with very little effort. From 1986 to 1989 when the network was at its maximum strength with 20 operational SAM sites, the overall network still only provided the ability to engage 21 simultaneous targets.
CONCLUSION
Despite being located away from most of the significant military facilities and units with which the Warsaw Pact would have employed to wage war against NATO, the Hungarian strategic SAM network provided an important piece of Warsaw Pact air defense during the Cold War. While the network was initially relatively pedestrian, modernization efforts would transform the overall network into a much more robust and layered organization. Despite these efforts, however, the strategic SAM network was ultimately incapable of repelling am assed air attack by the air forces of NATO.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Feel free to discuss this feature at the IMINT & Analysis Forum discussion thread found here.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
The range rings used to create this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark file here.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
Hungarian SAM sites by Google Earth user LeX2
Hungarian air defense units
Hungarian air defense units
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
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