A few interesting things regarding Syria lately.
First off, Russia says we're not allowed to use the F-16s and Patriot SAMs in Jordan to make an NFZ in Syria. International law or something. Which is of course a ridiculous argument. Lets say the UN decided it was NFZ time (for the sake of debate, ignoring whether the UN does anything productive). Jordan decides to play along. Well, then all those nice toys stockpiled over there become fair game. What Russia probably meant to say was that we can't do it unilaterally. Or, that they don't want us to do it unilaterally, that's more accurate. Then they have a point. I'm curious to know if the Vipers are CGs or CJs, because the latter would make covert NFZ plans more credible for reasons that should be obvious.
Second, Russia is at the G8 complaining about Syria. So are we, obviously. My favorite part is when they argue that "our" evidence of sarin use by Assad is not up to standards, or whatever they mean. Which is amusing, because where were the similar comments when France (and I think a UN arm?) made the same statements a short while ago? Oh, but this time it's the US, so it has to be wrong. A little consistency would be nice. At least it'd make them appear actually concerned and not just out to be on whatever side we're not.
At this rate, my "idiocy is bipartisan" mantra may have to be altered to "idiocy transcends borders."
And really, Russia, come on. If you're so gung-ho about Assad staying in charge (or at least keeping the US out of Syria (although that's already a fail)), plop an S-400 battery at your naval port. Or one of the extant S-300PM batteries that the S-400s are displacing in Russia. In fact an S-300PM could be a better idea, because then when everything cools off, you announce that by the way, the Syrians have been training for the past year and are keeping these.
Also, if I am off and on here in the next week or so, I'm having computer issues. I've got a Windows 7 laptop that I've been using for a while now, and it's been doing this random blue screen thing that was really starting to get annoying. So, system restore! An easy process when you save everything to an external drive. But if it starts up again, there may be further restoration/driving over it with my car. So don't worry, I'm "back" regardless, there just may be technical difficulties from time to time until I get this completely sorted out.
Showing posts with label S-400. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S-400. Show all posts
Monday, June 17, 2013
Monday, July 2, 2012
The Strong Get Stronger
Two recent events significantly increase the effectiveness of what is already the world's most capable air defense network. Simply put, the strong are getting stronger.
On 28 June, Ria Novosti reported that the new missile for the S-400 passed state trials, and would soon be delivered to operational S-400 batteries. Whether this is the rumored 40N6 or not is up for debate, as is the actual genesis of the 40N6, but the classification of the new weapon as "long range" seems to indicate that the S-400 will soon have it's full design range capability of 400 kilometers at its disposal. The "long-range" classification also appears to eliminate a 9M96 variant from consideration, a weapon long associated with the S-400 complex.
While mention of the potential 40N6 deployment has appeared in various sources, an earlier announcement seems to have largely been ignored. In January, reports stated that S-300PM batteries had completed upgrades to Favorit-S standard. This increases the maximum engagement range of the system from 150 to 200 kilometers, by incorporating the newer 48N6D missile. Although still short of the S-400's 250 kilometer range against most non-cooperative targets with the 48N6DM, the Favorit-S represents a solid increase in system effectiveness, blostered by the introduction of newer electronic components.
As the new S-400 continues to enter service, modernized Favorit-S systems present three possibilities. First, they can be used as gap-fillers, backing up S-400 batteries uploaded with the longer-range 40N6. This represents a useful role, given that the 40N6 likely possesses a reduced capability at range to engage non-cooperative targets. Additionally, modernized Favorit-S batteries displaced by the introduction of S-400 units can be redeployed around Russia as replacements for older S-300PT and S-300PS batteries. Lastly, Favorit-S batteries, displaced by S-400 batteries and not required elsewhere in the nation, could potentially represent a viable export target for a nation lacking the resources to acquire the more expensive S-400 but requiring an air defense upgrade. As such they could also be passed on to states such as Kazakhstan or Belarus as replacements for extant S-300PS and S-300PMU systems while awaiting delivery of S-400 batteries.
Regardless of the details, one thing is clear: the Russian air defense network is becoming increasingly potent.
Users of the SAM Site Overview file will see these changes reflected during the next update. S-300PM range rings will be altered to reflect a 200 kilometer range, and separate 400 kilometer range rings will be added for the S-400 to denote it's two-missile selection.
Monday, July 19, 2010
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
Kapustin Yar Imagery Update
Google Earth has provided updated imagery of Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range (KYMTR). The new imagery, uploaded on 12 January 2010, was captured in May of 2009. This new imagery highlights one of the more significant areas of the test range, the system checkout facility.
It should be noted that this facility is not explicitly known to be associated with research and development, although it could certainly perform tasks in that capacity. R&D is handled by various locations to the northeast, which remain obscured as they are only currently visible in medium resolution. This facility is tied to the preparation of tested systems for operational use, and as such any significant activity is a sign that new systems are going to be operational in the near future.
The SAM system checkout facility at KYMTR, seen in the image below, is an evaluation center used to ensure that newly-produced SAM systems are in full working order before delivery to operational units or export customers. Typically, SAM systems will arrive at KYMTR and be fully evaluated, to include test firings to gauge the performance of the radar systems. There are five primary areas or interest in the evaluation center. These consist of separate pads for battle management and EW radars, firing battery components, and target launch systems.
It comes as no suprise that most of the activity at the KYMTR evaluation center appears focused on the S-300P and S-400 strategic SAM systems. Various components of each system can be seen in the available imagery. S-400 components are likely being evaluated for the Russian military, while S-300P components may be being evaluated for Russia or an export customer.
The first area of interest is the battle management radar facility. This facility consists of four large isolation chambers, each capable of housing a 64N6 or 91N6 (BIG BIRD) radar system. The radars are placed in isolation chambers to preclude interfering with each other, allowing more than one radar to be evaluated at a time, increasing the productivity of the facility. As can be seen in the image below, there are three BIG BIRD-series radars occupying the isolation chambers, with one chamber being unoccupied.
Moving northwest, the next area of interest is the likely target launch facility. Multiple 5P71 and 5P73 launch rails can be seen. These launch rails can be fitted with the 9F841 or RM-5V27 target missiles. The target launch facility can be seen in the image below:
Continuing to the northwest, the SAM firing positions can be seen, separated by a pad housing battery-level EW assets. The EW pad appears to contain two 96L6 series radar systems, along with multiple 40V6-series mast assemblies for mounting either the 96L6 or 76N6 EW radars. Each SAM pad contains four isolation chambers for the engagement radars, along with space for multiple TELs, allowing for four batteries to be evaluated at each location simultaneously.
The northern SAM pad appears to be evaluating S-300P series systems, with 5P85SM and 5P85T TELs in residence. These systems may be overhauled Russian examples being returned to line service, or prepared for export.
The southern SAM pad contains 5P85T and 5P85T2 TELs. 5P85T2 TELs can be visually differentiated from 5P85T TELs at this resolution with relative ease as the spare tire mounting on the right side of the cabin can clearly be seen. The presence of the 5P85T2 indicates that an S-400 battery is being evaluated. While the 5P85TE2 has been exported to China as part of the S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE), all of China's batteries had been delivered by the time the imagery was captured. Taken in that light, these components are most likely belonging to a Russian S-400 battery. Russia will take delivery of S-400 batteries in 2010 to supplement the two batteries currently in service, and these components likely represent the first of those new batteries. The lack of any engagement radars at this location suggests that the TELs are being held pending the completion of production of other components, possibly including the engagement radar.
Given that there are three complete sets of TELs visible, one of which is likely for an S-400 battery, it is possible that one of the BIG BIRD radars visible at the battle management radar facility is a 91N6 variant.
The EW checkout pad can be seen in the image below:
The northern SAM checkout pad can be seen in the image below:
The southern SAM checkout pad can be seen in the image below:
It should be noted that this facility is not explicitly known to be associated with research and development, although it could certainly perform tasks in that capacity. R&D is handled by various locations to the northeast, which remain obscured as they are only currently visible in medium resolution. This facility is tied to the preparation of tested systems for operational use, and as such any significant activity is a sign that new systems are going to be operational in the near future.
The SAM system checkout facility at KYMTR, seen in the image below, is an evaluation center used to ensure that newly-produced SAM systems are in full working order before delivery to operational units or export customers. Typically, SAM systems will arrive at KYMTR and be fully evaluated, to include test firings to gauge the performance of the radar systems. There are five primary areas or interest in the evaluation center. These consist of separate pads for battle management and EW radars, firing battery components, and target launch systems.
It comes as no suprise that most of the activity at the KYMTR evaluation center appears focused on the S-300P and S-400 strategic SAM systems. Various components of each system can be seen in the available imagery. S-400 components are likely being evaluated for the Russian military, while S-300P components may be being evaluated for Russia or an export customer. The first area of interest is the battle management radar facility. This facility consists of four large isolation chambers, each capable of housing a 64N6 or 91N6 (BIG BIRD) radar system. The radars are placed in isolation chambers to preclude interfering with each other, allowing more than one radar to be evaluated at a time, increasing the productivity of the facility. As can be seen in the image below, there are three BIG BIRD-series radars occupying the isolation chambers, with one chamber being unoccupied.
Moving northwest, the next area of interest is the likely target launch facility. Multiple 5P71 and 5P73 launch rails can be seen. These launch rails can be fitted with the 9F841 or RM-5V27 target missiles. The target launch facility can be seen in the image below:
Continuing to the northwest, the SAM firing positions can be seen, separated by a pad housing battery-level EW assets. The EW pad appears to contain two 96L6 series radar systems, along with multiple 40V6-series mast assemblies for mounting either the 96L6 or 76N6 EW radars. Each SAM pad contains four isolation chambers for the engagement radars, along with space for multiple TELs, allowing for four batteries to be evaluated at each location simultaneously. The northern SAM pad appears to be evaluating S-300P series systems, with 5P85SM and 5P85T TELs in residence. These systems may be overhauled Russian examples being returned to line service, or prepared for export.
The southern SAM pad contains 5P85T and 5P85T2 TELs. 5P85T2 TELs can be visually differentiated from 5P85T TELs at this resolution with relative ease as the spare tire mounting on the right side of the cabin can clearly be seen. The presence of the 5P85T2 indicates that an S-400 battery is being evaluated. While the 5P85TE2 has been exported to China as part of the S-300PMU-2 (SA-20B GARGOYLE), all of China's batteries had been delivered by the time the imagery was captured. Taken in that light, these components are most likely belonging to a Russian S-400 battery. Russia will take delivery of S-400 batteries in 2010 to supplement the two batteries currently in service, and these components likely represent the first of those new batteries. The lack of any engagement radars at this location suggests that the TELs are being held pending the completion of production of other components, possibly including the engagement radar.
Given that there are three complete sets of TELs visible, one of which is likely for an S-400 battery, it is possible that one of the BIG BIRD radars visible at the battle management radar facility is a 91N6 variant.
The EW checkout pad can be seen in the image below:
The northern SAM checkout pad can be seen in the image below:
The southern SAM checkout pad can be seen in the image below:
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Kaliningrad's Strategic Air Defenses
INTRODUCTION
The Kaliningrad Oblast has historically been a significant strategic location for Russia. Home to the Baltic Sea Fleet and a number of other military units, the Kaliningrad Oblast provides Russia with a foothold in territory surrounded by NATO members. In light of recent worldwide events, the Kaliningrad Oblast may be undergoing a resurgence in terms of strategic importance to Russia. As such, the strategic air defense network of the Kaliningrad Oblast is a critical aspect of the region.
CURRENT STATUS
Currently deployed strategic air defense assets provide the Kaliningrad Oblast with a robust, modern air defense network. System deployment indicates that priority is clearly given to defending the western half of the Oblast, home to the majority of the significant military facilities and the Baltic Sea Fleet.
EW Coverage
Early warning coverage of the Kaliningrad Oblast is provided by six radar facilities. One of these facilities is home to a 300 km range 5N64S (BIG BIRD B) battle management radar controlling the Oblast's S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE) batteries. Four 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radar sites with detection ranges of 165 km are also present providing additional coverage, and a further EW site features legacy radar assets providing additional support to the network.
The following image depicts the locations of the Kaliningrad Oblast's EW sites. 36D6 sites are denoted by triangles, the 5N64S site is denoted by a hexagon, and the legacy EW site is denoted by a square.
The coverage of the 5N64S radar site provides the network with the ability to monitor the airspace over the entire Oblast, with coverage extending into Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. A significant portion of the Baltic Sea is also covered, extending to the shoreline of Sweden. The 36D6 sites, one of which being co-located with an S-300PS battery, are also situated to provide coverage of the entire Oblast as well as portions of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The 36D6 radars are also capable of monitoring an off-shore swath of airspace, albeit to a lesser degree than the longer-ranged 5N64S. The off-shore reach of the Kaliningrad Oblast's EW radars allows them to operate with SAM batteries to provide air defense for Baltic Sea naval vessels operating in the area.
The positioning of the various radar sites provides the network with a significant degree of overlapping EW coverage. The 36D6 radars can also provide targeting support to the S-300PS batteries should the 5N64S radar be rendered inoperable. While this would result in a loss of range with respect to target acquisition, the 36D6 sites are positioned in a manner that ensures that the engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries are not affected. The relatively low, flat terrain in the surrounding areas also ensures that a reliance on the less sophisticated 36D6 radar sets, which can be mounted on 40V6 mast assemblies for increased low-altitude detection capability in areas of rough terrain, would not result in a significant degradation of target acquisition functions.
The following image depicts the coverage of the Kaliningrad Oblast's 5N64S and 36D6 EW sites:
Active Sites
Strategic air defense of the Kaliningrad Oblast is provided by six SAM sites. Five of these sites are occupied by mobile S-300PS SAM systems with maximum engagement ranges of 90 km. The sixth site is the sole remaining S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) SAM site still actively serving with the Russian air defense network. The S-200 has a maximum engagement range of 300 km.
The following image depicts the operational SAM sites in the Kaliningrad Oblast. S-300PS sites are denoted by red diamonds, with the S-200 site being denoted by a purple diamond.
The S-300PS sites are all situated within 11 kilometers of the shoreline in the westernmost portion of the Oblast. Their proximity provides a layered air defense capability over the city of Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea home port. The multiple target engagement capability, 6 targets per battery, and effectiveness of the system against low RCS targets represents a significant threat to any potential airborne aggressor. The deployment of S-300PS batteries in lieu of more modern S-300PM (SA-20 GARGOYLE) batteries appears at first glance to be intended to protect the more advanced variants from being exploited by ELINT collection platforms in the area, potentially enabling vulnerabilities to be discovered that would put areas protected by S-300PM batteries at increased risk during times of war. However, following the delivery of the S-300PMU-1 to NATO member Greece and deployment of S-300PMU-1 batteries along the Chinese coastline, exposing them to EP-3 ELINT aircraft, it is more likely that the S-300PS was retained for air defense of Kaliningrad because deployment of the longer-ranged S-300PM was not deemed necessary to ensure adequate air defense coverage.
The S-200 battery is centrally located within the Oblast, but the system's 300 kilometer maximum range allows it to range targets inside of Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. The system also offers a significant off-shore capability. While the S-200 is no longer a reliable system for engaging maneuverable targets such as fighter aircraft, it remains a significant threat to ISR platforms. The significant reach of the system both offshore and into the surrounding NATO member states would provide Russian air defense commanders with the ability to threaten ISR platforms operating in close proximity to Kaliningrad but remaining outside the engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries.
The following image depicts the engagement zones of the Kaliningrad Oblast's strategic SAM batteries:
Imagery of the S-200 site, seen below, suggests that two of the three batteries remain active, allowing the system to potentially engage two targets simultaneously.
Inactive Sites
There are currently nine inactive strategic SAM sites that have been identified within the Kaliningrad Oblast. These sites are prepared S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-300P sites. One tactical 2K12 (SA-4 GANEF) deployment site has also been located and is included here although tactical SAM coverage is outside the scope of this article. During hostilities, these inactive sites could be exploited to provide dispersal sites for the Oblast's resident S-300PS batteries. While only two of the sites are operationally configured for the S-300P, all of the sites would at least provide a degree of protection for the components thanks to the presence of different revetment configurations. Alternatively, S-300P series batteries could be deployed to the area to take up residence at some or all of the sites to bolster the air defense capability of the Oblast.
It should be noted that the 5N83 battle management complex employed by the S-300PS, which includes the 5N64S battle management radar, is capable of supporting six S-300PS batteries. Were there to be multiple S-300P series batteries introduced into the region, one or more additional 5N83 complexes would be needed to be deployed as well.
The following image depicts the inactive SAM sites located in the Kaliningrad Oblast:
Overall Layout
The following image depicts the entirety of the strategic air defense related network of sites within the Kaliningrad Oblast:
The following image depicts the overall coverage areas of both the SAM and EW assets in the Kaliningrad Oblast. This image highlights the overlapping layout of the entire network, depicting how the EW and SAM sites are positioned to support and defend each other. The multiple target engagement capability of the S-300PS, combined with the expansive EW coverage, allows the Kaliningrad Oblast air defense network to effectively repulse a small-scale strike package, perhaps designed to target and eliminate nuclear missiles in the area. The S-300PS network could engage a total of 30 targets simultaneously, and would be backed up by an Su-27 (FLANKER-B) interceptor unit in the area. Anything less than a full-scale aerial invasion of the Oblast would be an extremely difficult operation to successfully accomplish without risking severe losses and potential failure, inviting a Russian response which could conceivably escalate into an environment where a nuclear exchange is a definite possibility.
MODERNIZATION
Modernization efforts for the Kaliningrad Oblast's air defense network have been discussed in the open press as far back as 2001. Russian officials have stated that the extant S-200 complex will remain operational until it is replaced by the new S-400 (SA-21). S-400 batteries are currently being assigned to the Moscow air defense network, and it could be assumed that it will be some time before a battery is available for assignment to the Kaliningrad Oblast given Moscow's higher strategic priority. However, given the deteriorating relationship between Russia and NATO, replacing the S-200 complex with the S-400 may take on an increased priority in the near term. It is also possible that 150 km range S-300PM batteries displaced by S-400 units around Moscow could be reassigned to the Oblast to replace the older S-300PS batteries.
Were the SAM units to be upgraded, upgrading the EW network would also be necessary, particularly to support the S-400. The 5N64S battle management radar and associated 5N83 battle management complex would need to be replaced by the newer 30K6 complex and 600 km range 91N6 (BIG BIRD E) radar. A one-for-one replacement of S-300PS batteries by S-300PM batteries would necessitate the presence of a single 30K6 complex, capable of handling up to six S-300P and/or S-400 series batteries. Replacement of the 36D6 radar systems with newer 300 km range 96L6 radar systems is also a possibility as these systems were designed to operate with S-300PM and S-400 batteries.
Postulating the replacement of 36D6, 5N64S, S-300PS, and S-200 units with 96L6, 91N6, S-300PM, and S-400 units respectively, the following image depicts the potential coverage of the future Kaliningrad Oblast air defense network. Two range rings are provided for the S-400, one depicting the 240 km engagement range of the 48N6DM missile currently deployed with the system and one depicting the 400 km engagement range of the future 40N6 missile.
As can clearly be seen, such a modernization of the air defense network would significantly enhance the coverage area. The detection range of the EW assets would enable targets to be detected over the entirety of Poland and the Baltic Sea. Increased engagement ranges allow the western-sited S-300PM sites to combine with the S-400 battery to provide overlapping fields of fire over the entirety of the Oblast, bringing the eastern portion of the territory under the protection of a modern SAM system allowing for potential surface-to-surface missile units to be dispersed over a greater expanse and still remain under the protective umbrella of the network. This capability would potentially allow SSM units to deploy without organic tactical air defense support, aiding in their concealment during wartime as there would not be nearby SAM units giving off tell-tale radar emissions. Increasing the difficulty of locating and targeting any such missile units would increase their effectiveness as a potential nuclear deterrent.
CONCLUSION
As relations between Russia and the NATO powers have progressively deteriorated for a number of factors, to include Western political opinion regarding Russian military action in the Caucasus, insinuations have been made that Russia may place nuclear-armed missiles inside the Kaliningrad Oblast as a counter to American missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. Regardless of whether or not this comes to pass, air defense of the Kaliningrad Oblast will continue to be a strategic priority for Russia, helping to ensure the continued security of its foothold inside territory dominated by NATO members.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
The range rings and site locations used in the imagery in this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark file here.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided by Google Earth and Kosmosnimki
S-200 Remains In Service
Russia Severs Military Ties With NATO
Nuclear Kaliningrad?
New Missiles in Kaliningrad?
The S-300P
NPO Almaz
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
The Kaliningrad Oblast has historically been a significant strategic location for Russia. Home to the Baltic Sea Fleet and a number of other military units, the Kaliningrad Oblast provides Russia with a foothold in territory surrounded by NATO members. In light of recent worldwide events, the Kaliningrad Oblast may be undergoing a resurgence in terms of strategic importance to Russia. As such, the strategic air defense network of the Kaliningrad Oblast is a critical aspect of the region.
CURRENT STATUS
Currently deployed strategic air defense assets provide the Kaliningrad Oblast with a robust, modern air defense network. System deployment indicates that priority is clearly given to defending the western half of the Oblast, home to the majority of the significant military facilities and the Baltic Sea Fleet.
EW Coverage
Early warning coverage of the Kaliningrad Oblast is provided by six radar facilities. One of these facilities is home to a 300 km range 5N64S (BIG BIRD B) battle management radar controlling the Oblast's S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE) batteries. Four 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radar sites with detection ranges of 165 km are also present providing additional coverage, and a further EW site features legacy radar assets providing additional support to the network.
The following image depicts the locations of the Kaliningrad Oblast's EW sites. 36D6 sites are denoted by triangles, the 5N64S site is denoted by a hexagon, and the legacy EW site is denoted by a square.
The coverage of the 5N64S radar site provides the network with the ability to monitor the airspace over the entire Oblast, with coverage extending into Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. A significant portion of the Baltic Sea is also covered, extending to the shoreline of Sweden. The 36D6 sites, one of which being co-located with an S-300PS battery, are also situated to provide coverage of the entire Oblast as well as portions of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The 36D6 radars are also capable of monitoring an off-shore swath of airspace, albeit to a lesser degree than the longer-ranged 5N64S. The off-shore reach of the Kaliningrad Oblast's EW radars allows them to operate with SAM batteries to provide air defense for Baltic Sea naval vessels operating in the area.The positioning of the various radar sites provides the network with a significant degree of overlapping EW coverage. The 36D6 radars can also provide targeting support to the S-300PS batteries should the 5N64S radar be rendered inoperable. While this would result in a loss of range with respect to target acquisition, the 36D6 sites are positioned in a manner that ensures that the engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries are not affected. The relatively low, flat terrain in the surrounding areas also ensures that a reliance on the less sophisticated 36D6 radar sets, which can be mounted on 40V6 mast assemblies for increased low-altitude detection capability in areas of rough terrain, would not result in a significant degradation of target acquisition functions.
The following image depicts the coverage of the Kaliningrad Oblast's 5N64S and 36D6 EW sites:
Active SitesStrategic air defense of the Kaliningrad Oblast is provided by six SAM sites. Five of these sites are occupied by mobile S-300PS SAM systems with maximum engagement ranges of 90 km. The sixth site is the sole remaining S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) SAM site still actively serving with the Russian air defense network. The S-200 has a maximum engagement range of 300 km.
The following image depicts the operational SAM sites in the Kaliningrad Oblast. S-300PS sites are denoted by red diamonds, with the S-200 site being denoted by a purple diamond.
The S-300PS sites are all situated within 11 kilometers of the shoreline in the westernmost portion of the Oblast. Their proximity provides a layered air defense capability over the city of Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea home port. The multiple target engagement capability, 6 targets per battery, and effectiveness of the system against low RCS targets represents a significant threat to any potential airborne aggressor. The deployment of S-300PS batteries in lieu of more modern S-300PM (SA-20 GARGOYLE) batteries appears at first glance to be intended to protect the more advanced variants from being exploited by ELINT collection platforms in the area, potentially enabling vulnerabilities to be discovered that would put areas protected by S-300PM batteries at increased risk during times of war. However, following the delivery of the S-300PMU-1 to NATO member Greece and deployment of S-300PMU-1 batteries along the Chinese coastline, exposing them to EP-3 ELINT aircraft, it is more likely that the S-300PS was retained for air defense of Kaliningrad because deployment of the longer-ranged S-300PM was not deemed necessary to ensure adequate air defense coverage. The S-200 battery is centrally located within the Oblast, but the system's 300 kilometer maximum range allows it to range targets inside of Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. The system also offers a significant off-shore capability. While the S-200 is no longer a reliable system for engaging maneuverable targets such as fighter aircraft, it remains a significant threat to ISR platforms. The significant reach of the system both offshore and into the surrounding NATO member states would provide Russian air defense commanders with the ability to threaten ISR platforms operating in close proximity to Kaliningrad but remaining outside the engagement zones of the S-300PS batteries.
The following image depicts the engagement zones of the Kaliningrad Oblast's strategic SAM batteries:
Imagery of the S-200 site, seen below, suggests that two of the three batteries remain active, allowing the system to potentially engage two targets simultaneously.
Inactive SitesThere are currently nine inactive strategic SAM sites that have been identified within the Kaliningrad Oblast. These sites are prepared S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-300P sites. One tactical 2K12 (SA-4 GANEF) deployment site has also been located and is included here although tactical SAM coverage is outside the scope of this article. During hostilities, these inactive sites could be exploited to provide dispersal sites for the Oblast's resident S-300PS batteries. While only two of the sites are operationally configured for the S-300P, all of the sites would at least provide a degree of protection for the components thanks to the presence of different revetment configurations. Alternatively, S-300P series batteries could be deployed to the area to take up residence at some or all of the sites to bolster the air defense capability of the Oblast.
It should be noted that the 5N83 battle management complex employed by the S-300PS, which includes the 5N64S battle management radar, is capable of supporting six S-300PS batteries. Were there to be multiple S-300P series batteries introduced into the region, one or more additional 5N83 complexes would be needed to be deployed as well.
The following image depicts the inactive SAM sites located in the Kaliningrad Oblast:
Overall LayoutThe following image depicts the entirety of the strategic air defense related network of sites within the Kaliningrad Oblast:
The following image depicts the overall coverage areas of both the SAM and EW assets in the Kaliningrad Oblast. This image highlights the overlapping layout of the entire network, depicting how the EW and SAM sites are positioned to support and defend each other. The multiple target engagement capability of the S-300PS, combined with the expansive EW coverage, allows the Kaliningrad Oblast air defense network to effectively repulse a small-scale strike package, perhaps designed to target and eliminate nuclear missiles in the area. The S-300PS network could engage a total of 30 targets simultaneously, and would be backed up by an Su-27 (FLANKER-B) interceptor unit in the area. Anything less than a full-scale aerial invasion of the Oblast would be an extremely difficult operation to successfully accomplish without risking severe losses and potential failure, inviting a Russian response which could conceivably escalate into an environment where a nuclear exchange is a definite possibility.
MODERNIZATIONModernization efforts for the Kaliningrad Oblast's air defense network have been discussed in the open press as far back as 2001. Russian officials have stated that the extant S-200 complex will remain operational until it is replaced by the new S-400 (SA-21). S-400 batteries are currently being assigned to the Moscow air defense network, and it could be assumed that it will be some time before a battery is available for assignment to the Kaliningrad Oblast given Moscow's higher strategic priority. However, given the deteriorating relationship between Russia and NATO, replacing the S-200 complex with the S-400 may take on an increased priority in the near term. It is also possible that 150 km range S-300PM batteries displaced by S-400 units around Moscow could be reassigned to the Oblast to replace the older S-300PS batteries.
Were the SAM units to be upgraded, upgrading the EW network would also be necessary, particularly to support the S-400. The 5N64S battle management radar and associated 5N83 battle management complex would need to be replaced by the newer 30K6 complex and 600 km range 91N6 (BIG BIRD E) radar. A one-for-one replacement of S-300PS batteries by S-300PM batteries would necessitate the presence of a single 30K6 complex, capable of handling up to six S-300P and/or S-400 series batteries. Replacement of the 36D6 radar systems with newer 300 km range 96L6 radar systems is also a possibility as these systems were designed to operate with S-300PM and S-400 batteries.
Postulating the replacement of 36D6, 5N64S, S-300PS, and S-200 units with 96L6, 91N6, S-300PM, and S-400 units respectively, the following image depicts the potential coverage of the future Kaliningrad Oblast air defense network. Two range rings are provided for the S-400, one depicting the 240 km engagement range of the 48N6DM missile currently deployed with the system and one depicting the 400 km engagement range of the future 40N6 missile.
As can clearly be seen, such a modernization of the air defense network would significantly enhance the coverage area. The detection range of the EW assets would enable targets to be detected over the entirety of Poland and the Baltic Sea. Increased engagement ranges allow the western-sited S-300PM sites to combine with the S-400 battery to provide overlapping fields of fire over the entirety of the Oblast, bringing the eastern portion of the territory under the protection of a modern SAM system allowing for potential surface-to-surface missile units to be dispersed over a greater expanse and still remain under the protective umbrella of the network. This capability would potentially allow SSM units to deploy without organic tactical air defense support, aiding in their concealment during wartime as there would not be nearby SAM units giving off tell-tale radar emissions. Increasing the difficulty of locating and targeting any such missile units would increase their effectiveness as a potential nuclear deterrent.CONCLUSION
As relations between Russia and the NATO powers have progressively deteriorated for a number of factors, to include Western political opinion regarding Russian military action in the Caucasus, insinuations have been made that Russia may place nuclear-armed missiles inside the Kaliningrad Oblast as a counter to American missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. Regardless of whether or not this comes to pass, air defense of the Kaliningrad Oblast will continue to be a strategic priority for Russia, helping to ensure the continued security of its foothold inside territory dominated by NATO members.
GOOGLE EARTH PLACEMARK DATA
The range rings and site locations used in the imagery in this article can be downloaded as a Google Earth placemark file here.
SOURCES
-Satellite imagery provided by Google Earth and Kosmosnimki
S-200 Remains In Service
Russia Severs Military Ties With NATO
Nuclear Kaliningrad?
New Missiles in Kaliningrad?
The S-300P
NPO Almaz
Jane's Land-based Air Defence, various editions
Tuesday, July 8, 2008
Sunday, January 6, 2008
Saturday, August 25, 2007
Samoderzhets Decloaked
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the S-400 strategic SAM system into the operational inventory of the Russian air defense network has resulted in increased speculation over the nature of the next-generation of Russian SAM systems. One of the most common misconceptions appears to be the belief that a new SAM system referred to as Samoderzhets is being prepared for front-line service.
RUSSIAN MODERN SAM DEVELOPMENT
The development of the next generation of Russian SAM systems can be traced back to 1979 when the first S-300PT batteries were accepted for service. Over the course of the S-300P's lifetime, various modifications have surfaced, each providing an incremental increase in capability over the last variant.
The principal S-300P variants were as follows:
S-300PT: Initial trailer-launched SAM system employing 5N63 (FLAP LID) target engagement radar (TER) and 5V55K missile.
S-300PS: Initial mobile SAM system with components mounted on 8x8 chassis, introduced 5N63S/30N6 (30N6E) TER and 5V55R missile.
S-300PM (export variant: S-300PMU): Introduced digital connectivity between components and 5V55RUD missile.
S-300PM-1 (export variant: S-300PMU-1): Introduced new 30N6-1 (30N6E1, TOMB STONE) TER, and 48N6 (48N6E) missile.
S-300PM-2 (export variant: S-300PMU-2): Introduced 48N6D (48N6E2) missile, as well as 9M96 (9M96E) and 9M96D (9M96E2) missiles, although there is no evidence that the latter two weapons have been fielded with Russian units.
S-300PM-3: developmental variant aimed at increased range with 48N6DM missile and new TER (GRAVE STONE). Evolved into the S-400 (SA-X-21).
As early as 1984, two other advanced SAM systems were stated to be in development, the S-500 and S-1000. The S-500 was a new long-range, mobile ATBM system, analogous to the American THAAD system currently in development. The S-1000 was described as a very long-range SAM designed to target air-breathing targets such as ISR platforms and other support aircraft. Where the S-300P was the successor to the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) in the Moscow air defense network, the S-1000 was possibly intended to be deployed as a partial replacement for the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON); S-300P units have replaced S-200 units in some areas, but only the most recent iterations can claim to have a range anywhere near that of the massive 300 kilometers attained by the S-200. Neither the S-500 nor the S-1000 were anywhere near operational service, as they only existed as concepts throughout the 1980s. Recent analysis would seem to suggest, however, that both systems will eventually be operationally employed, with at least one of them being mentioned by name as recently as August 2007.
It is likely that the S-1000 has actually been absorbed into the S-400. The intended capabilities of the S-1000 seem to match up with the S-400's 40N6 missile, a product of OKB Fakel, who has historically been responsible for the development of long-range strategic SAM missiles such as the 5V21 employed by the S-200 and the 48N6 employed by the S-300PM-1. The likely course of development could have seen the S-300PM-3 and S-1000 combined into a new system, the S-400, utilizing common system components and radars. This would explain the delays in fielding the S-400 as well as the current status of the 40N6 program. Radars would need to be suitably altered to support longer-range engagements, and the S-1000's weapon would need to be refined and complete development allowing it to function as part of the S-400 system.
ALMAZ-ANTEY MERGER
In May of 2002 the producer of the S-300P, the Almaz design bureau, was merged with the Antey design bureau, creator of the S-300V tactical SAM system, to form the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern. This effectively consolidated all of the long-range SAM and ATBM experience into one organization. The new association resulted in a whole new concept of thinking regarding the boundaries between tactical and strategic air defense.
SAMODERZHETS
Despite the merger of Almaz and Antey, projects which had previously been active did continue development. These included the Antey-2500/S-300VM (SA-X-23) and the latest S-300P iteration, the S-300PM-3, which had by then morphed into the S-400. Future projects, however, would need to take full advantage of the consolidated expertise offered by the new corporation. Enter Samoderzhets.
Samoderzhets was a program begun shortly after the merger of Almaz and Antey aimed at identifying the characteristics and capabilities of new SAM systems operating on a national level. The research effort was conducted by the Second Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. Deputy Defense Minister General of the Army Aleksey Moskovskiy, in a December 2004 interview for Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, described Samoderzhets as a project aimed at finding an "optimal solution" for the development of new air defense systems, systems capable of performing tasks for both the Army and PVO air defense, and operating within a national integrated air defense network framework:
"The name you mentioned, Samoderzhets, is not a system. It is a system project to look for an optimal solution."
General Moskovskiy goes on to state that an actual SAM system like the one outlined in the Samoderzhets project would most likely not be procured anytime soon as it would be "superfluous", as the S-400 was nearing service entry, but does state that modifying S-400 components to operate in such a manner (implying a national integrated network) was possible. The reason for integrating such systems would be to better coordinate air defense assets, and to better integrate the anti-missile capabilities of S-300V type systems (which are presently Russian Army assets, being tactical systems) into the national defense network. Ergo, the creation of an actual weapon system was not the goal of Samoderzhets, but rather the description and outlining of a new national framework to better control and integrate present and future systems to maximize their effectiveness, as well as the delineation and outlining of capabilities required by the individual systems serving in such a network. Official news regarding the Samoderzhets project virtually disappeared after 2004. There was a logical explanation for this, however: the research program was completed in 2004.
Samoderzhets was clearly never intended to result in the direct production of a new SAM system bearing the name, but it was a very important research endeavour, especially in the light of the new Almaz-Antey consortium. Future SAM systems will likely be designed around the system requirements and framework researched and outlined in the Samoderzhets project. In fact, early 2007 saw the mention of such a system. Sergey Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister, gave Almaz-Antey the task to develop a new air defense system capable for the first time of providing air defense, missile defense, and space defense. Such a project would seem to be revolutionary in concept, but seems perfectly logical as a next step given the results of the Samoderzhets project, and has been given until 2015 to produce hardware. 2015 may not seem that far off, especially given the delays associated with the S-400 system, but the new all-encompassing system has in fact been mentioned as early as 2005, and may have been in development before then.
It should be noted that the term "air defense system" does not necessarily imply one specific system such as the S-400, but could very well imply a series of systems, in this case the S-400 and S-500, integrated under a united national network, such as the kind outlined under the Samoderzhets project.
It is likely that the new system will build upon the S-400, using S-400 components for air defense. The missile defense component will likely be the aforementioned S-500 system, referred to in some sources as Vlastelin. The S-500 re-entered the public eye in August of 2007. On the 6th of August, Igor Ashurbeyli of Almaz-Antey was interviewed on Channel One TV in Russia regarding the first S-400 battery being activated near Elektrostal. Ashurbeyli stated that the next project for Almaz-Antey was the S-500, a mobile anti-missile system designed to function as part of the "unified system of Russia's air defense", a clear reference to Ivanov's statements in February and the concepts researched under Samoderzhets. Development of the S-500, according to some sources, had ended at one point in the past due to a lack of funding, but could easily have been restarted, saving Almaz-Antey from having to come up with a new anti-missile system from scratch. The S-500 is also believed to be related to the 45T6 anti-ballistic missile, which would certainly enable it to potentially perform exoatmospheric intercepts.
Confusion resulting from the appearance of the Samoderzhets name in press reporting did lead to the assumption that a new system was being developed, but as Samoderzhets was a project only, this is clearly not the case. There are a few reasons why certain assumptions about the potential new system were made, however, and they can be logically explained.
Samoderzhets is often claimed to be a SAM system integrating S-300P/S-400 and S-300V components. This is basically true, but not in a physical sense. Samoderzhets called for the integration of existing systems into a national level network, while designing new systems to operate in such a manner from the outset, regardless of whether or not they were employed by the Army or the Air Defense Troops. These systems would have, according to General Moskovskiy, included the S-300P and S-300V families. They would have been integrated, but not in a physical sense, as many have incorrectly assumed.
Samoderzhets was also described as combining the best aspects of previously developed SAM systems, and serving as the basis for a new standardized SAM system. This is partly correct; Samoderzhets would have integrated S-300V and S-300P/S-400 type systems, enabling their effectiveness to be maximized. Samoderzhets does also form the basis for new SAM development, as it outlined the framework under which new systems will operate, as well as their desired performance characteristics.
The main nail in the coffin of the Samoderzhets argument is the 2007 tasking to develop a new SAM system. Were Samoderzhets already a developed system by 2004, as some suggest, a new air and missile defense system would clearly not have been required. Furthermore, the Samoderzhets project was already three years past its completion date by 2007. As such the project initiated in 2007 would not have required a 2015 demonstration date; were Samoderzhets a true SAM system, completed in 2004, it would be ready for deployment far earlier than 2015. Lastly, the S-500 has been mentioned as the next SAM system to be developed for operational use, not Samoderzhets.
Some sources have claimed that Samoderzhets was proposed as an alternative to the S-400. In that light Samoderzhets may have been intended to result in a hybrid system, but the induction of the S-400 into front-line service would seem to be enough to put that theory to rest.
A final argument against the development of Samoderzhets as an actual SAM system is that it would represent both a waste of effort, given the S-500 development program for the anti-missile role, and a reduction in capability when compared to the S-400. In the anti-aircraft role the S-300VM's 9M83M missile has a range of 200 kilometers, a full 50 or 100 kilometers shy of the two range figures quoted for the 48N6DM employed by the S-400, even without considering the 400 kilometer range attained by the S-400's 40N6. Furthermore, Samoderzhets cannot be the new S-500 system, provided of course that both Ivanov and Ashurbeyli were referring to the same system. If, as many sources would have us believe, Samoderzhets represents a combination of S-300VM and S-400 systems, then the resultant system would fail to achieve the performance specified by Ivanov insofar as intercepting exoatmospheric targets is concerned.
Samoderzhets as a research endeavour is a far more logical explanation in light of the current evidence.
CONCLUSION
Samoderzhets was a very important project, one which will help to outline and govern the framework and interoperability of Russian air defense units for some time. But Samoderzhets was not a SAM system development effort, and no Samoderzhets system will be operating in Russia. The task of defending the skies and space over Russia will fall in the future to the S-400 and S-500 systems.
SOURCES
-New Russian SAM System Said Superior to Patriot, Has Multipurpose Capability (Moscow Vremya Novostey, 13 August 2004 p. 4)
-Russia approves Almaz-Antei merger (David Isby, Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 June 2002)
-Russian Defense Ministry to state performance specifications for new air defense system (Interfax, 4 October 2004)
-Russia to Develop New Air, Missile, Space Defense "Superweapon" (Vremya Novostey, 28 February 2007)
-Russian Channel One TV broadcast (6 August 2007)
-Russia looks to bolster air defence (James O'Halloran, Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March 2007)
-Advantages of Upgraded Versus New Technology (Vestnik Vozhdushnogo Flota, 31 December 2004)
-Second Central Scientific Research Institute of MoD Receives Pennant (Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 November 2005)
-Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems
The introduction of the S-400 strategic SAM system into the operational inventory of the Russian air defense network has resulted in increased speculation over the nature of the next-generation of Russian SAM systems. One of the most common misconceptions appears to be the belief that a new SAM system referred to as Samoderzhets is being prepared for front-line service.
RUSSIAN MODERN SAM DEVELOPMENT
The development of the next generation of Russian SAM systems can be traced back to 1979 when the first S-300PT batteries were accepted for service. Over the course of the S-300P's lifetime, various modifications have surfaced, each providing an incremental increase in capability over the last variant.
The principal S-300P variants were as follows:
S-300PT: Initial trailer-launched SAM system employing 5N63 (FLAP LID) target engagement radar (TER) and 5V55K missile.
S-300PS: Initial mobile SAM system with components mounted on 8x8 chassis, introduced 5N63S/30N6 (30N6E) TER and 5V55R missile.
S-300PM (export variant: S-300PMU): Introduced digital connectivity between components and 5V55RUD missile.
S-300PM-1 (export variant: S-300PMU-1): Introduced new 30N6-1 (30N6E1, TOMB STONE) TER, and 48N6 (48N6E) missile.
S-300PM-2 (export variant: S-300PMU-2): Introduced 48N6D (48N6E2) missile, as well as 9M96 (9M96E) and 9M96D (9M96E2) missiles, although there is no evidence that the latter two weapons have been fielded with Russian units.
S-300PM-3: developmental variant aimed at increased range with 48N6DM missile and new TER (GRAVE STONE). Evolved into the S-400 (SA-X-21).
As early as 1984, two other advanced SAM systems were stated to be in development, the S-500 and S-1000. The S-500 was a new long-range, mobile ATBM system, analogous to the American THAAD system currently in development. The S-1000 was described as a very long-range SAM designed to target air-breathing targets such as ISR platforms and other support aircraft. Where the S-300P was the successor to the S-25 (SA-1 GUILD) in the Moscow air defense network, the S-1000 was possibly intended to be deployed as a partial replacement for the S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON); S-300P units have replaced S-200 units in some areas, but only the most recent iterations can claim to have a range anywhere near that of the massive 300 kilometers attained by the S-200. Neither the S-500 nor the S-1000 were anywhere near operational service, as they only existed as concepts throughout the 1980s. Recent analysis would seem to suggest, however, that both systems will eventually be operationally employed, with at least one of them being mentioned by name as recently as August 2007.
It is likely that the S-1000 has actually been absorbed into the S-400. The intended capabilities of the S-1000 seem to match up with the S-400's 40N6 missile, a product of OKB Fakel, who has historically been responsible for the development of long-range strategic SAM missiles such as the 5V21 employed by the S-200 and the 48N6 employed by the S-300PM-1. The likely course of development could have seen the S-300PM-3 and S-1000 combined into a new system, the S-400, utilizing common system components and radars. This would explain the delays in fielding the S-400 as well as the current status of the 40N6 program. Radars would need to be suitably altered to support longer-range engagements, and the S-1000's weapon would need to be refined and complete development allowing it to function as part of the S-400 system.
ALMAZ-ANTEY MERGER
In May of 2002 the producer of the S-300P, the Almaz design bureau, was merged with the Antey design bureau, creator of the S-300V tactical SAM system, to form the Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern. This effectively consolidated all of the long-range SAM and ATBM experience into one organization. The new association resulted in a whole new concept of thinking regarding the boundaries between tactical and strategic air defense.
SAMODERZHETS
Despite the merger of Almaz and Antey, projects which had previously been active did continue development. These included the Antey-2500/S-300VM (SA-X-23) and the latest S-300P iteration, the S-300PM-3, which had by then morphed into the S-400. Future projects, however, would need to take full advantage of the consolidated expertise offered by the new corporation. Enter Samoderzhets.
Samoderzhets was a program begun shortly after the merger of Almaz and Antey aimed at identifying the characteristics and capabilities of new SAM systems operating on a national level. The research effort was conducted by the Second Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense. Deputy Defense Minister General of the Army Aleksey Moskovskiy, in a December 2004 interview for Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, described Samoderzhets as a project aimed at finding an "optimal solution" for the development of new air defense systems, systems capable of performing tasks for both the Army and PVO air defense, and operating within a national integrated air defense network framework:
"The name you mentioned, Samoderzhets, is not a system. It is a system project to look for an optimal solution."
General Moskovskiy goes on to state that an actual SAM system like the one outlined in the Samoderzhets project would most likely not be procured anytime soon as it would be "superfluous", as the S-400 was nearing service entry, but does state that modifying S-400 components to operate in such a manner (implying a national integrated network) was possible. The reason for integrating such systems would be to better coordinate air defense assets, and to better integrate the anti-missile capabilities of S-300V type systems (which are presently Russian Army assets, being tactical systems) into the national defense network. Ergo, the creation of an actual weapon system was not the goal of Samoderzhets, but rather the description and outlining of a new national framework to better control and integrate present and future systems to maximize their effectiveness, as well as the delineation and outlining of capabilities required by the individual systems serving in such a network. Official news regarding the Samoderzhets project virtually disappeared after 2004. There was a logical explanation for this, however: the research program was completed in 2004.
Samoderzhets was clearly never intended to result in the direct production of a new SAM system bearing the name, but it was a very important research endeavour, especially in the light of the new Almaz-Antey consortium. Future SAM systems will likely be designed around the system requirements and framework researched and outlined in the Samoderzhets project. In fact, early 2007 saw the mention of such a system. Sergey Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister, gave Almaz-Antey the task to develop a new air defense system capable for the first time of providing air defense, missile defense, and space defense. Such a project would seem to be revolutionary in concept, but seems perfectly logical as a next step given the results of the Samoderzhets project, and has been given until 2015 to produce hardware. 2015 may not seem that far off, especially given the delays associated with the S-400 system, but the new all-encompassing system has in fact been mentioned as early as 2005, and may have been in development before then.
It should be noted that the term "air defense system" does not necessarily imply one specific system such as the S-400, but could very well imply a series of systems, in this case the S-400 and S-500, integrated under a united national network, such as the kind outlined under the Samoderzhets project.
It is likely that the new system will build upon the S-400, using S-400 components for air defense. The missile defense component will likely be the aforementioned S-500 system, referred to in some sources as Vlastelin. The S-500 re-entered the public eye in August of 2007. On the 6th of August, Igor Ashurbeyli of Almaz-Antey was interviewed on Channel One TV in Russia regarding the first S-400 battery being activated near Elektrostal. Ashurbeyli stated that the next project for Almaz-Antey was the S-500, a mobile anti-missile system designed to function as part of the "unified system of Russia's air defense", a clear reference to Ivanov's statements in February and the concepts researched under Samoderzhets. Development of the S-500, according to some sources, had ended at one point in the past due to a lack of funding, but could easily have been restarted, saving Almaz-Antey from having to come up with a new anti-missile system from scratch. The S-500 is also believed to be related to the 45T6 anti-ballistic missile, which would certainly enable it to potentially perform exoatmospheric intercepts.
Confusion resulting from the appearance of the Samoderzhets name in press reporting did lead to the assumption that a new system was being developed, but as Samoderzhets was a project only, this is clearly not the case. There are a few reasons why certain assumptions about the potential new system were made, however, and they can be logically explained.
Samoderzhets is often claimed to be a SAM system integrating S-300P/S-400 and S-300V components. This is basically true, but not in a physical sense. Samoderzhets called for the integration of existing systems into a national level network, while designing new systems to operate in such a manner from the outset, regardless of whether or not they were employed by the Army or the Air Defense Troops. These systems would have, according to General Moskovskiy, included the S-300P and S-300V families. They would have been integrated, but not in a physical sense, as many have incorrectly assumed.
Samoderzhets was also described as combining the best aspects of previously developed SAM systems, and serving as the basis for a new standardized SAM system. This is partly correct; Samoderzhets would have integrated S-300V and S-300P/S-400 type systems, enabling their effectiveness to be maximized. Samoderzhets does also form the basis for new SAM development, as it outlined the framework under which new systems will operate, as well as their desired performance characteristics.
The main nail in the coffin of the Samoderzhets argument is the 2007 tasking to develop a new SAM system. Were Samoderzhets already a developed system by 2004, as some suggest, a new air and missile defense system would clearly not have been required. Furthermore, the Samoderzhets project was already three years past its completion date by 2007. As such the project initiated in 2007 would not have required a 2015 demonstration date; were Samoderzhets a true SAM system, completed in 2004, it would be ready for deployment far earlier than 2015. Lastly, the S-500 has been mentioned as the next SAM system to be developed for operational use, not Samoderzhets.
Some sources have claimed that Samoderzhets was proposed as an alternative to the S-400. In that light Samoderzhets may have been intended to result in a hybrid system, but the induction of the S-400 into front-line service would seem to be enough to put that theory to rest.
A final argument against the development of Samoderzhets as an actual SAM system is that it would represent both a waste of effort, given the S-500 development program for the anti-missile role, and a reduction in capability when compared to the S-400. In the anti-aircraft role the S-300VM's 9M83M missile has a range of 200 kilometers, a full 50 or 100 kilometers shy of the two range figures quoted for the 48N6DM employed by the S-400, even without considering the 400 kilometer range attained by the S-400's 40N6. Furthermore, Samoderzhets cannot be the new S-500 system, provided of course that both Ivanov and Ashurbeyli were referring to the same system. If, as many sources would have us believe, Samoderzhets represents a combination of S-300VM and S-400 systems, then the resultant system would fail to achieve the performance specified by Ivanov insofar as intercepting exoatmospheric targets is concerned.
Samoderzhets as a research endeavour is a far more logical explanation in light of the current evidence.
CONCLUSION
Samoderzhets was a very important project, one which will help to outline and govern the framework and interoperability of Russian air defense units for some time. But Samoderzhets was not a SAM system development effort, and no Samoderzhets system will be operating in Russia. The task of defending the skies and space over Russia will fall in the future to the S-400 and S-500 systems.
SOURCES
-New Russian SAM System Said Superior to Patriot, Has Multipurpose Capability (Moscow Vremya Novostey, 13 August 2004 p. 4)
-Russia approves Almaz-Antei merger (David Isby, Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 June 2002)
-Russian Defense Ministry to state performance specifications for new air defense system (Interfax, 4 October 2004)
-Russia to Develop New Air, Missile, Space Defense "Superweapon" (Vremya Novostey, 28 February 2007)
-Russian Channel One TV broadcast (6 August 2007)
-Russia looks to bolster air defence (James O'Halloran, Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 March 2007)
-Advantages of Upgraded Versus New Technology (Vestnik Vozhdushnogo Flota, 31 December 2004)
-Second Central Scientific Research Institute of MoD Receives Pennant (Krasnaya Zvezda, 22 November 2005)
-Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems
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