No NFZ for you!

A few interesting things regarding Syria lately.

First off, Russia says we're not allowed to use the F-16s and Patriot SAMs in Jordan to make an NFZ in Syria.  International law or something.  Which is of course a ridiculous argument.  Lets say the UN decided it was NFZ time (for the sake of debate, ignoring whether the UN does anything productive).  Jordan decides to play along.  Well, then all those nice toys stockpiled over there become fair game.  What Russia probably meant to say was that we can't do it unilaterally.  Or, that they don't want us to do it unilaterally, that's more accurate.  Then they have a point.  I'm curious to know if the Vipers are CGs or CJs, because the latter would make covert NFZ plans more credible for reasons that should be obvious.

Second, Russia is at the G8 complaining about Syria.  So are we, obviously.  My favorite part is when they argue that "our" evidence of sarin use by Assad is not up to standards, or whatever they mean.  Which is amusing, because where were the similar comments when France (and I think a UN arm?) made the same statements a short while ago?  Oh, but this time it's the US, so it has to be wrong.  A little consistency would be nice.  At least it'd make them appear actually concerned and not just out to be on whatever side we're not.

At this rate, my "idiocy is bipartisan" mantra may have to be altered to "idiocy transcends borders."

And really, Russia, come on.  If you're so gung-ho about Assad staying in charge (or at least keeping the US out of Syria (although that's already a fail)), plop an S-400 battery at your naval port.  Or one of the extant S-300PM batteries that the S-400s are displacing in Russia.  In fact an S-300PM could be a better idea, because then when everything cools off, you announce that by the way, the Syrians have been training for the past year and are keeping these.

Also, if I am off and on here in the next week or so, I'm having computer issues.  I've got a Windows 7 laptop that I've been using for a while now, and it's been doing this random blue screen thing that was really starting to get annoying.  So, system restore!  An easy process when you save everything to an external drive.  But if it starts up again, there may be further restoration/driving over it with my car.  So don't worry, I'm "back" regardless, there just may be technical difficulties from time to time until I get this completely sorted out.

Arming "rebels" is a great idea and never backfires!

So, now we're going to give more arms and support to Syria's "rebel" forces.  Somebody tell me just why this is a bright idea.  For one, this pretty much proves that whatever they're teaching in history class at a certain Ivy League school, they're leaving out the history of Al Qaeda bit.  You know, the part where "rebels" are given arms and support to overthrow an enemy, and then they later turn around and bite us in the ass.

I'm going to attribute this decision to a few different possible factors.

1.  We're going to fight a proxy war with Iran; we could care less about Syria, but what we want is to be able to engage Hezbollah inside of Syria.  Iran can't or won't do anything serious itself, so it relies on its Hezbollah proxy to fight for it, far enough away that it thinks we won't notice what's really going on.  Well, we see you, Iran, you and your photoshop missiles and hilarious "aircraft" designs.  We can't or won't do anything about Iran (and this is completely independent of the should we or shouldn't we argument so don't even start), so this will work instead.  Except that support and assistance has a way of turning into a massive debacle and sucking us in way too deep into something largely irrelevant, but I guess the plus side here is that Syria isn't covered in jungle?  Although why Hezbollah matters is another question, given that I haven't heard of them launching rockets across the Mexican border yet.

2.  It's Egypt all over again.  And no, not Egypt of a few years ago, Egypt of a few decades ago.  As in we're only picking this side because the "bad guys" (i.e. Russia and in Syria's case also China) are on the opposite side of the fence.  Which turned out to be such a stellar political decision back then. 

3.  We waited too long to do anything militarily productive.  I've been saying for a while now that relying on Soviet-era IADS components gets you bombed, apparently if you don't follow our rules.  See Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Libya.  Syria, with modern Chinese radars and modern Russian SAMs (even though Russia currently lacks the stones to just airlift S-300PMU-2 components using An-124s...at least I think they'd fit given that it could airlift Pioner), has moved away from the bombable model of air defense, which has given us pause.  Notice how a lot of the NFZ stuff disappeared with a quickness when all of the fun new toys started to be either delivered or reported in service, or it became obvious that Russia might eventually send the S-300PMU-2s that Syria ordered.  Which incidentially would mean the inclusion of Russian advisors and trainers, who might get bombed, and we don't want that...but aren't you supposed to want to bomb the "bad guys"?  Now I'm confused.

In reality, everyone should step back and let the situation play itself out.  Because I can't for the life of me see where this results in a "win" if we start trying to play nationbuilder again.  I understand that there is a certain need to play geopolitics and make it look like we're standing up to the "bad guys", but in reality none of us should be involved.  Why not engage Russia and China and get everyone to take a step back, because relations with those two are far more valuable and important in the long run than whatever happens to Syria.  If you want to look good to the international players, at least make yourself look good to the ones that actually matter.

Oh wait, I forgot...if they aren't the "bad guys", how can we justify billions of dollars for overpriced and unnecessary hardware like the F-35...

And before the inevitable question comes up, no, I am not necessarily against bombing things or sticking our nose into someone else's business when there's a definite endgame that will be to our benefit.  We have just as much right to act in our own national interest as anyone else does, despite what the rest of the world wants you to think.  But once again, someone really needs to explain to me how this one is in our national interest, because I'm just not seeing it.

...but there's also...

Nope.  Not going there.

Yet.

Comments, Current Events

Comments are still OK, don't worry.  Just to reiterate a few old "rules" though:

1.  Say whatever you want.  I'm not a censor.  I'll even usually reply.  I bring this up because sometimes I get comments that do sit in the box for a day or two.  The reason behind that is usually because it's a piece of information that is interesting or relevant and I want to examine it, and the comment inbox is a safe place to store it so I don't forget where it was posted and then lose it.

2.  That being said, comments are still moderated.  This means I have to hit a button that says 'publish" for your comment to show up.  Why?  Because I get way too many spam comments.  Spam I will censor.  Pretty much anything else is fair game.

Here's a good spam comment that showed up right after I posted this:  "I'm impressed, I have to admit. Seldom do I encounter a blog that's both educative and engaging, and let me tell you, you've hit the nail on the head. The problem is an issue that too few people are speaking intelligently about. I'm very happy I came across this during my hunt for something relating to this. Also visit my blog legal amphetamines"

See what I mean?  There has to be some sort of comment generator these idiots are using, because I'll get the same one multiple times with the only difference being the website they want you to visit.  They're smart about it too, they only post on older articles, very rarely the most current feature.

Anyway, I assume nobody really wants legal amphetamines.  Although it'll be interesting to see what the words legal amphetamines do to my incoming traffic for the next few days.  I wonder if anyone monitors websites looking for the words legal amphetamines because I'm relatively certain spam comment websites are not really pointing you to legit legal amphetamines.  There might be a search engine designed to find the phrase legal amphetamines on websites to track people who are after said legal amphetamines.

LEGAL AMPHETAMINES!

Fun over, on to the news.

S-300s not in Syria yet

Well this should be self-explanatory.  The contract doesn't have to be fulfilled until about this time next year, so there's no rush.  You do have to wonder why Russia is still dragging their feet, though.  If you're trying to avoid the West going in and screwing up one of your export markets, why would you present them with what amounts to a "bomb by this date" ultimatum?  

This may be the result of Russia both wanting to finalize the deal, while at the same time giving the West time to think about what blowing up a Syrian S-300P series site would mean.  Because it'd probably be host to Russian advisors and trainers for 6 months or so after delivery, you know.  It could also be that Syrian crews just haven't started training or completed the training course yet.  In which case delivering the systems would make them amount to really expensive bombing targets.

Speaking of which, Israel is still barking about blowing the things up if they're delivered because of the threat.  I.E. the Syrian IADS would be credible for the first time since about, oh, 1986 or so.  What I still want to know is what happened to their countermeasures that they were so sure would defeat an S-300P series system?  If the system represents no real threat (and assuming they haven't drank whatever the Turks did in the 90s), why go to the effort of locating and striking them, especially if you're blatantly risking irritating Russia in the process by potentially killing Russian nationals?  Isn't it better to sit back and laugh as Assad spends himself into a hole?

Wait, I know.  Clearly Russia upgraded to Windows 8, rendering the Israeli electronic countermeasure and intrusion stuff irrelevant.

France:  Assad's guys used sarin gas

France claims that analysis proves that sarin gas, which is a chemical weapon and therefore a WMD, was used somewhere in Syria on more than one occasion.

And of course France isn't telling which side used the stuff...which was what I was going to say when the first report came out and they weren't talking.

Now, however, they're claiming that it was Assad's forces and/or regime supporters (diplomat speak for Hezbollah).  Said claims conveniently being made as I was in the process of typing here.  Stupid media.  If they're not blowing things way out of proportion, they're being inconveniently timely with their reporting.

Well, now we're really going to see what the "proper" interpretation of terms like "game changer" and "red line" is, aren't we?  Not that I do or don't think we should be bothering with the non-Assad guys (like I mentioned in another post, supporting such types has worked out so famously for us in the past...), but if I say there will be bombs if you do X, and you go and do X, then it can be argued that there should be bombs.  Otherwise why should anyone take me seriously?

Not that I'm sure anyone should in the first place.

Probably shouldn't take me seriously either.

Current Events

One of the things I'll be trying to do here on a more regular basis is to actually comment on some worldwide military developments or events which I find interesting, amusing, or both.  Some things are relevant even if they don't come with nice overheads!  So with that in mind, here are a few topics that have appeared over the last few days (or weeks, or months...):

Russia to supply Syria with S-300s

Iraq:  mythically overrated by the media, massively bombed twice.  Syria, Libya, Iran, and the DPRK were all advised to take notice, given their reliance on the same supposedly mythical yet in reality old-technology weapon systems for air defense.  Looks like Syria is learning the lesson that Iran thinks can be solved by welding together oil cans.  Buk-M2E systems, Chinese JY-27 and Type 120 radars, and now, by 2014 apparently, some variant of the S-300.  Most likely the S-300PMU-2, the current production export model of the P series, although I could make an argument for the S-300VM for added ATBM capability against Israeli weapons.

This is the Russian government enacting a new type of "missile diplomacy", wherein they deploy their own or supply modern system components to someone else to ensure that the West stays out of some given situation/gets a message/etc.  And you know what?  Can't blame them for it.

The last time I checked, the S-300P was not a Kalashnikov or shoulder-fired SAM, and therefore not on the UN Arms Control Register.  Nor is it typically part of any sort of arms embargo, of which Syria is not under anyway.  And, despite ridiculous Turkish theories, the weapon is not a credible surface-to-surface threat.  So there is no reason for the sale not to proceed, unless of course the West really does have designs on entering Syria and sorting things out in the manner that it wants them sorted out.  

And if the EU can decide it's OK to sell weapons to the anti-Assad crowd in Syria, they've got no real leg to stand on when Russia actually conducts a formal, legal transaction on the state-to-state level.  Although in the EU's defense the idea of supporting a rebel force with light arms has never, ever blown up in anyone's face down the line.  

Oh, wait...

If you ask me, this will either 1) force the West to run in half-cocked without taking the time to think things through and end up creating a bigger mess in the long run (which we arguably did in Iraq despite having said time to think about it first), or 2) make everyone back off while the situation, uh...basically solves itself.

Harsh?  Yup.  But look at it this way.  Either the world wants/needs external actors to intervene in the internal affairs of states when things go awry, or it doesn't.  That's the question:  should we intervene because Assad is a bad guy?  Should we stay out of it because it's a situation precipitated internally by internal forces?  That's a whole different argument, which isn't the point here.

Or maybe Russia really does want us to intervene.  Because if the West does eventually go in there after the missiles are operational, Almaz-Antey will be able to sell them for a billion dollars per unit with all of the publicity they're going to get.  Or maybe this is all a really convoluted ploy to get Israel to bomb Syria again, claiming that sophisticated weapon systems that Hezbollah would not be able to operate or maintain in a million years are being...transferred to Hezbollah!

Really.  Buk-M2Es for Hezbollah?  That was the best argument they could come up with?

NEXT.

Saudi Arabia considering nukes, the DF-21

Now this is interesting.  Saudi Arabia procured the DF-3A in the mid-80s, and signed the NPT in 1988 to assure the US government that no, they weren't trying to go nuclear (although allegations of Pakistani and Iraqi nukes were made for years).  Now, with the Kingdom starting to be wary of Shi'a Iran's nuclear (alleged) ambitions, they might be reconsidering the world's most fatal mushrooms.  And replacing the DF-3A as the potential launch platform.  

The difference is that with the DF-3A, they had an inaccurate IRBM basically useful for nuclear warhead transport through the atmosphere.  The DF-21 is far more accurate, terminally guided in some versions, making it useable as a conventional strike weapon where the DF-3A is really not.  

The nuclear weapons acquisition is the best part of the story.  If they go this route, then they're breaching the NPT, provided they don't withdraw first.  If they don't withdraw, prepare for much hilarity as Iran and its supporters raise hell about the double standard.  Because you don't really think we'd actually sanction the almighty oil supplier, do you?

For more on Saudi, the DF-3A, and associated information, my next JIR article will be on this very topic.

NEXT.

Iran has a stealth fighter

Yeah, I'm not linking to that.  If you want a good laugh, go find the pictures yourself.  But this is why nobody takes Iran seriously:  they abuse the idea of deception to the point where all it does is make us laugh.  Plus, their supposedly legitimate programs are also either 1) abused by deception, or 2) just hilarious.  Remember the lawnmower engine powered "stealth" flying boat things?  The photoshopped missile launch salvoes?  The welded together oil cans allegedly holding SAMs inside?  This one beat all of them.  

Iran:  demonstrating a lack of aerodynamics, LO design, and cockpit ergonomics all at the same time!  Although, we really should've figured the first one out when their crowning aeronautical achievement was putting a second vertical fin on an F-5.

NEXT.

What I'm looking for this week:

-Where are Venezuela's S-300VM systems based?  Their Pechoras?

Going "Live"

UPDATE:  No word yet as to the time, so it may be pushed to early next week.  I assume that the BBC might be paying a lot of attention to that Andy Murray guy right about now...

Either tonight or tomorrow I'll be doing a live radio interview with the BBC on 5 Live.  You can listen in online at the link, it'll be sometime between 2000 and 2200 (that's 8PM - 10PM in US Eastern Time).  I should have a bit more info regarding the schedule later today, at which point I'll post an update.

The topic will be the Syrian air defense situation, including the Turkish RF-4E shootdown.

BBC on Syria; July I&A

Here's something from the BBC that you all might find interesting:  CLICK 

In other news, the topics for July's I&A are shaping up as follows:

-A look at BDA of Libyan SAM sites struck in 2011, with an eye to what this represents as far as current SEAD/DEAD tactics go (seems like this might be relevant in the near future)

-A look at the ROK's ADD complexes

-A follow-on to the I&A special report published over the weekend examining the coverage of Chinese-sourced EW assets located in Syria

Those are all well on their way to being done, and I'm still looking at a few other ideas.  One idea is to explain the problems with this article.

I'm also re-working the layout for the imagery template I use in I&A.  The big one, like the one I posted here for the captured Syrian Type 120 EW site.  I currently have two issues to resolve, and one idea to incorporate.  First, I need to shrink the upper border a bit, to give more space to the image.  And maybe add a surrounding border as well.  Secondly, I need to figure out how to save the finished images properly so that they don't screw up the color.  Look at any of the big images in I&A, including the maps.  Any time I use red (which is a lot), the red parts look ugly in the saved image.  Nice and bright on-screen during creation, not so much after the save.  This is an image issue, not an issue converting to PDF, as it does this to the saved image before I do anything else with it.  The idea I'll be including at some point is to generate a system of identifiers for each location I show.  This can then be cross-referenced with the SAM Site Overview placemarks. 

And now I have a nice six-day weekend for the holiday, to spend working on my next IHS Jane's feature and some of July's I&A.

I&A Special Report: Chinese Radars in Syria

Interested readers can download an I&A special report on Chinese radars in Syria here:  CLICK

There are, at present, three different Chinese radar types identified:  the Type 120, the JY-27 (WIDE MAT), and the JYL-1.  The last identification is the least conclusive but appears accurate based on imagery analysis and examination of various photographs of Chinese radar systems.



Captured Syrian Radar Position

UPDATE:  thanks to PS860 posting in the comments, the unidentified array is a 1RL23 (SCORE BOARD) IFF system.  It's also a very small unit, and due to the size I misidentified the position in the imagery below.  It actually sits east of the domed structure, and does not appear visible in the imagery.  At least I got the IFF interrogator part right!

Rebel forces recently captured a radar site in northwestern Syria on 26 June, and subsequently released a video showing various radar systems.  The image below depicts the radar site as it appeared in August of 2011.  The site is located among the Sheikh Barakat ruins roughly 2.5 kilometers west of Dar Ta izzah in northwestern Syria, roughly 12 kilometers from the Turkish border.

The site is noteworthy as it contains both FSU and Chinese EW sensors.  An FSU P-12/18 (SPOON REST) radar system is present alongside a newer Chinese Type 120 2D surveillance radar.  A third as yet unidentified array also appears in the video, and may represent either an additional radar array or an IFF interrogator.

The Type 120, along with JY-27 (WIDE MAT) radars noted at two other EW complexes east of Damascus, highlight the Chinese industry's connection with Syria.  Given that the Type 120 represents a target acquisition sensor for SAM support in Chinese service, it is prudent to speculate as to whether Syria has acquired modern Chinese SAM systems to improve its air defense network. 

The Type 120 first appeared in imagery of the Dar Ta izzah EW complex in June 2010, with the JY-27 present at one of the southern EW sites as early as August of 2009.  It is therefore likely that the arms shipment containing these sensors was delivered no later than early 2009.

Syrian Strategic SAM Deployment

INTRODUCTION

Of all the Middle Eastern nations, Syria has one of the most robust SAM networks. Multiple SAM sites provide redundancy, allowing for overlapping coverage in many critical areas. It should come as no suprise that evidence of an illegal incursion into Syrian airspace by Israel was found in an area largely undefended by SAM systems.

STRATEGIC SAM DEFENSES

The Syrian strategic SAM network relies primarily on Soviet-era systems. The following strategic SAM systems are currently in service as part of the fixed air defense network: S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON). The 2K12 (SA-6 GAINFUL) tactical SAM systems is also employed at a number of fixed sites to provide additional support to the purpose-built strategic systems.

Currently, there are 131 active SAM sites inside of Syria. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. S-75 sites are red, S-125 sites are blue, S-200 sites are purple, and 2K12 sites are green.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Syrian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, S-75 range rings are red, S-125 rings are blue, S-200 rings are purple, and 2K12 rings are green.
EW Coverage

Early warning for the Syrian air defense network is handled by 22 EW radar sites. One of these sites possesses a 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) EW radar system. The majority of the remaining EW sites employ standard FSU EW systems, including the P-35/37 (BAR LOCK), P-12/18 (SPOON REST), P-19 (THIN SKIN), P-80 (BACK NET), and P-14 (TALL KING).

The following image depicts the locations of Syria's EW radar facilities:
S-75

There are currently 37 active S-75 sites within Syria. With one third of Syria's S-75 sites being operational, it would be simple to conclude that the S-75 is no longer heavily relied upon. However, given that the S-75 is still deployed in various key areas, this would seem to be an illogical conclusion. The more likely scenario is that early systems have exceeded their service lives and been withdrawn, and other systems have perhaps been stored for future use or simply withdrawn to downsize the network into a more financially manageable operation.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's S-75 sites:
S-125

There are currently 39 active S-125 sites within Syria. The S-125 appears to be an extremely active system. 16 prepared S-75 and S-125 sites have seen S-125 batteries come and go since 2001, demonstrating Syria's ability to periodically adjust its SAM deployments. Approximately half of Syria's S-125 batteries are currently sited on prepared S-75 locations, a fact which demonstrates the importance of not only identifying site layouts but the systems occupying said locations.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's S-125 sites:
S-200

There are currently 5 active S-200 sites within Syria. The S-200 provides long-range barrier air defense along the western border and into the Mediterranean.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's S-200 sites:
2K12

There are currently 50 active 2K12 sites within Syria. Despite being a tactical SAM system, emplacing 2K12 batteries at prepared sites allows them to function as part of the overall strategic SAM network. Due to their inherent mobility, these systems could be rapidly relocated should the need arise.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Syria's SA-6 sites:
Empty Sites

There are currently 120 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Syria. These sites have been identified as either S-75, S-125, S-200, or 2K12 sites, based on their configurations, and can be broken down as follows: 80 S-75 sites, 16 S-125 sites, 2 S-200 sites, and 22 2K12 sites.

These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.

An overview of empty Syrian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

Syrian strategic SAM deployment is concentrated in six areas. These areas are around the cities of Hims, Halab, and Damascus, Tiyas air base, the Mediterranean coastal area, and the area adjacent to the Golan Heights. These SAM concentrations are emplaced to defend against obvious potential threat ingress routes. The largest perceived threat to Syrian sovereign airspace is Israeli air force activity. Syria enjoyed a relatively equitable relationship with Iraq, and as such likely did not see a need to deploy air defense assets in the eastern part of the nation. This "empty" airspace could easily be patrolled by MiG-23, MiG-25, or MiG-29 interceptors if the need arose.

There are important issues with the Syrian SAM network that need to be addressed. The main issue is the nature of the SAM systems themselves. All of the SAM systems in the Syrian inventory have a single-target engagement capability. Some of the S-200 sites have been noted with multiple 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars, allowing those sites to engage multiple targets (one per engagement radar), but the S-75, S-125, and 2K12 sites can only engage one target per site. This leaves the Syrian air defense network open to saturation.

Another issue is the employment of the 2K12 in a strategic role tied to fixed sites to provide close-in defense. The 2K12 has been exploited thouroughly by both the American and Israeli militaries and as such cannot be counted on to reliably defend against an airborne threat. The same could be said of the S-75 and S-125 SAM systems as well, of course, but the 2K12 suffers from the additional drawback of being constrained to a fixed location. The 2K12 is most effective on the move, whereby it can catch opposing aircraft off-guard by appearing in new locations that were previously undocumented. This may be a part of the Syrian strategy, but for now, the 2K12 remains a stationary target insofar as how it is currently deployed.

Syrian reliance on aging and well-known Soviet-era SAM systems is a serious defensive liability. This is certainly part of the impetus behind Syria's current drive to purchase more advanced SAM systems from Russia.

Another important issue to address is the fact that there are two noticeable gaps in Syrian SAM coverage. While these areas are in fact covered by S-200 sites, they lack any sort of low-altitude coverage or close-in defense. Approximately midway between Damascus and Hims, and midway between Al Lathqiyah and Halab, are large gaps in the SAM coverage, areas where there are not even identified empty sites where fixed systems such as the S-75 or S-125 could be emplaced if needbe. These gaps are not necessarily an invitation to invasion, however, as key targets such as the capital are still heavily defended.

Damascus

The first area to be examined is the area surrounding the capital of Damascus. Damascus is defended by ten S-75 sites, eight S-125 sites, and twenty-eight 2K12 sites. Two of Syria's five active S-200 sites are also located in close vicinity to the capital, as well as twelve EW sites, including the 36D6 site. Forty-eight empty dispersal sites are also in the area, providing for an increase in defensive capabilities should the need arise. SAM coverage of the capital is relatively robust even without the addition of further SAM sites, and careful placement of S-125 and 2K12 batteries provides overlapping close-in defense in conjunction with the longer-range S-75 sites.

The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Damascus:
The Southwest

Apart from the capital, the most important piece of real estate in Syria may be that in the southwest, adjacent to the Golan Heights. This area is defended by seven S-75 sites, six S-125 sites, and nine 2K12 sites, and supported by one identified EW site. One of the S-200 sites located south of Damascus also can provide coverage of this area. There are sixteen identified dispersal sites in the area, but the large concentration of SAM systems provides a very well put together air defense network over southwestern Syria without any further increases. The large number of 2K12 sites is clearly meant to counter the threat posed by Israeli air force fighter aircraft, the 2K12 being more maneuverable and better suited to engaging fast jets than the more strategic-oriented S-75 and S-125 systems.

The following image depicts the SAM coverage of southwestern Syria:
Mediterranean Coast

The Golan-area SAM network is clearly oriented to provide barrier air defense against airborne threats ingressing from the west. The same sort of barrier air defense network can be found along Syria's Mediterranean coastline to the north. Extending from Al Lathqiyah to Tartus, five S-75 and twelve S-125 sites provide air defense along Syria's northwestern border with the sea, supported by two EW sites. There are also two S-200 sites in the area to provide long-range air defense over open water. Sixteen dispersal sites in the area are situated to provide an increase in defensive capability.

The following image depicts the SAM coverage of Syria's northwestern coastline:
Hims-Halab Line

There is a second SAM barrier behind the coastal defenses, protecting the area from Hims in the south to Halab in the north. The barrier consists of eleven S-75 sites, ten S-125 sites, and eleven 2K12 sites, supported by three EW sites. An S-200 battery is positioned southeast of Hims, and there are thirty dispersal sites along the line, mostly concentrated in the south around Hims.

The following image depicts the SAM coverage of the Hims-Halab belt:
Tiyas AB

Tiyas AB is defended by four S-75 and three S-125 sites, supported by an EW site, and surrounded by seven dispersal sites available if necessary. Air defenses surrounding Tiyas are not particularly robust when compared to the rest of the network, but they do provide a heightened degree of security and are overlapping and redundant to a limited degree.

The following image depicts the SAM coverage around Tiyas AB:
CONCLUSION

Syria's SAM network is very robust on paper, and would appear to offer a significant degree of protection at first glance, but this is not necessarily the case. Against a limited incursion, the Syrian air defense network remains capable, despite the reliance on aging Soviet-era systems. This is one likely factor which drove the Israeli Air Force to circumvent SAM-defended areas when striking the Dayr az Zawr suspect nuclear facility in 2007. Said reliance on Soviet-era SAM systems will provide a serious handicap when facing a major air incursion by a modern opponent. It is time for Syria to modernize its strategic SAM defenses if it desires to retain the ability to defend its airspace in the 21st Century.

SOURCES

-SAM ranges taken from Jane's Land Based Air Defence.

-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

Syria and North Korea: Nuclear Partners?

INTRODUCTION

On the 25th of April President Bashar Assad of Syria issued a rebuttal to US claims of a nuclear reactor program in Eastern Syria. The site in question was violently thrust into world view on the 6th of September, 2007 when an illegal Israeli air raid destroyed the facility. Israel has refused to comment on the action, ostensibly in order to refrain from having to admit to such a blatant violation of Syrian territorial sovereignty, and Syria showed great restraint by not justifiably retaliating against the naked aggression of its Jewish neighbor. Fast forward to the 24th of April of this year, and the United States released information describing the facility as a nuclear reactor being constructed with the assistance of North Korea.

POWER OR PLUTONIUM?

Syrian intentions for the reactor complex were unclear, but analysts have theorized that a lack of any major infrastructure in the area indicated that the reactor was not intended for power production. Coupled with the fact that there are no major population centers in the area to make use of any electricity generated by the complex, it would appear that the analysts have come to the correct conclusion. The obvious alternative, given the North Korean assistance in the matter, was to create a reactor able to produce weapons-grade plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon.

THE NORTH KOREAN CONNECTION

The reasoning behind the presence of a nuclear material production facility inside of Syria is not necessarily as clear-cut as it may seem. The obvious inference is that it was intended to produce nuclear material to support a Syrian nuclear weapons program. A Syrian nuclear weapons program would certainly have provided the impetus behind Israel's action of September, 2007. However, the reports of North Korean aid, bolstered by images released depicting a reactor complex startlingly similar to the one in place at Yongbyon, North Korea, may indicate a far more sinister purpose.

The North Korean government is currently negotiating with the United States under the framework of the Six Party Talks to halt nuclear proliferation activity in return for diplomatic and economic concessions from the West. The talks have currently reached an impasse, as the North Koreans are reluctant to reveal details regarding their past proliferation activities, including any aid to Syria in this regard. North Korea has made progress with regard to halting its own nuclear activity, including the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea still views the United States as a significant military threat on the peninsula, and their sudden agreement in February of 2007 to shut down the Yongbyon reactor facility raises serious questions. The reactor facility was inspected by the IAEA, who verified its shutdown in August of 2007. US intelligence officials have claimed that the Syrian complex may have been within weeks of becoming operational when it was destroyed in September of that year. The connection that seems to be eluding the intelligence services as well as the media outlets reporting on the incident is whether or not North Korea would have benefitted from the Syrian reactor's output of nuclear material. It is possible that the purpose of the Syrian reactor complex was to benefit both Syrian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Analysts have noted that there does not appear to have been any enrichment facilities located on-site, facilities which would have been needed in order to transform the reactor's plutonium output into true weapons-grade material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon. By placing the enrichment facilities at a separate location, Syria achieves two things. First, less attention is drawn to the facility. Second, the plutonium by-product must therefore be transported to an enrichment facility. It would not be difficult to mask the transfer of some or all of the plutonium to a ship or aircraft bound for North Korea, allowing the North Koreans to continue their nuclear weapon production while at the same time preserving an air of cooperation in the eyes of the world with the shutdown of their own reactor complex. Alternatively, North Korea may have simply intended to construct a separate weapons production facility inside of Syria with the intent of arming both nations. Given that North Korea has far greater knowledge on the subject of nuclear weapons design and production than Syria, enlisting their aid in that regard would be a logical maneuver.

LACK OF AIR DEFENSES

In his statement, President Assad claimed that the facility in question was an unused military complex, but he would not specify its purpose. Assad claimed that the site was obviously not a nuclear related facility, as it was not protected by any air defense systems. Unfortunately, Assad's claims, regardless of the true nature of the facility, are completely illogical. Eastern Syria would be a logical site for a covert nuclear facility. The location of the site is directly adjacent to a river, providing the necessary water source for cooling the reactor. Also, the site is not near any major military facilities, meaning that it was an unlikely target for surveillance. The lack of any air defense systems also aids the covert nature of the location. Any major SAM system, for example, would emit tell-tale signals from its radar systems, signals which would be tracked and identified by intelligence services. The appearance of air defense systems where none were present previously would only serve to attract unwanted attention to the area. Syria made the right strategic move by not defending the site with any significant military presence. Unfortunately, it would seem that their denial and deception efforts ultimately failed due to a human intelligence source on-site which is the likely source of the videotaped evidence shown by the US government to illustrate the nuclear nature of the facility.

CONCLUSION

This incident highlights the need for more significant diplomatic pressure to be palced on nuclear weapons states with regard to proliferation. Syria has a significant terrorist connection with Hizbullah and a significant diplomatic connection with Iran, two entities which could have benefitted from a Syrian nuclear weapons program, with potentially catastrophic results. While the unilateral decision of Israel to attack and destroy the facility cannot and should not be condoned, neither should the effort by Syria to construct a nuclear reactor under the nose of the IAEA in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, of which Syria is a signatory. Neither should bringing such an issue to the attention of the international community be screened on the basis of Israeli interests, as suggested by Senator Susan Collins of Maine.

SOURCES

Syria denies nuke allegations
IAEA reaction to US evidence
North Korean nuclear program timeline
6 Party Talks