Iranian Silos Unveiled

So Iran is conducting another wargame, Great Prophet 6. No big deal, everybody does it. Apart from the military and political benefits, they present fun opportunities for politicians and military officials to make bold, asinine, and non-credible statements to the press. Plus, you often get nice videos showing things like missile firings.

Speaking of videos and Iranian exercises, here's a link to a Youtube video purportedly showing some of the Great Prophet 6 exercise footage:

Youtube


Pay attention to what shows up at the 15 second mark: that'd be the inside of an apparent Iranian missile silo. Iran claims that the silos are automated, allowing remote firing of the weapons.

For amusement, let's quote Lebanon's Daily Star:

"An officer in Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guard, which is in charge of the missile program, said Tehran has constructed “numerous” underground missile silos which satellites can’t detect."

Except, you know, for the ones near Tabriz.

Another Lebanese source, Al-Manar, claims that the silos were used on the 27th.

What does all of this mean? First off, it means that Iranian silo-based missiles should certainly be considered an operational element in the ballistic missile force. Additionally, it raises a few questions about Iranian silo-building capabilities. Why did it take this long for the capability to be revealed? Were there issues with the communication and control system? Will this prevent a more widespread deployment of silo-based weapons? Or was Iran merely taking its time to work everything out, prior to initiating a large-scale silo-based deployment system?

Whatever the answers, perhaps Iranian silo-based deployment concepts, including coffin-launched systems elsewhere in the nation, will now get more attention. Look for more on this to appear here in the future.

Saudi to Israel: Clear for takeoff?

One of the big stories that seems to have gone relatively quietly into the abyss this week is the fact that Saudi Arabia has apparently given Israel overflight clearance to strike Iranian targets believed to be involved in the development of nuclear weapons. Reports state that Saudi Arabia has even exercised the standing down of air defense units along its northern border to ensure that Israeli aircraft are able to pass through the region unmolested. Of course, Saudi Arabia has been quick to deny the reports, but their denials weren't all that convincing.

OK, since Israel seems hell-bent on blowing up whatever facilities they think are involved, even though the Western world has never actually proven that Iran is developing nuclear weapons (after all, such weapons are clearly meant to only be possessed by non-Muslim people in the Middle East, or at least that's the way they're being treated), I thought it might be interesting to analyze some of the potential factors related to such a strike.

Point 1: Iran will have to rely heavily on its fighter force to defend itself. Apart from the Tor-M1E (SA-15 GAUNTLET) TELARs sighted near Natanz, Iran lacks any credible SAM defenses capable of deterring a modern fighting force. That puts the onus on the Iranian Air Force to prove that it can defeat what Israel throws at it. Saudi Arabia may have already given Iran an unintentional (or intentional? That'd be amusing to consider...) signal as to when to expect such a strike: all they have to do is monitor the status of Saudi Arabia's air defense network. Bottom line: if you know its coming and you still can't stop it, you may need to reconsider a few things. Like, I don't know, buying Su-30s or J-10s instead of acting like the world's aeronautical laughingstock sticking twin tails on an F-5.

Point 2: One of the purported targets for Israeli fighters is the Bushehr reactor complex. Now, I'm not entirely sure of what they'd hit it with, or how much material is inside, but it seems to me like bombing a nuclear reactor sitting right on the Persian Gulf is a relatively stupid idea. There is a risk for contamination if it isn't done exactly right. That could make gas prices shoot into the stratosphere quicker than a SPRINT ABM (which is pretty damn fast for those of you wondering what the hell that thing is).

Point 3: Speaking of gas prices, if I'm Iran, I've got teams ready to mine the Strait of Hormuz the minute the first bomb hits. The point here is that anyone who thinks Iran is going to sit idly buy and get bombed is delusional. Yes, their air defense network doesn't really scare anyone, but you can bet they'll lash out in all kinds of interesting ways, most of which will probably have a negative impact on the price of gas. Israel gets away with a lot of stuff on the international stage, like pretending to be a US ally while shipping arms to China, but if they are perceived as the reason why people are getting hammered at the pump they might find themselves with fewer friends for a while. There's also the missile force to consider: a possible Iranian response would be to salvo a ton of ballistic missiles at Israel.

Point 4: This has the potential to backfire in epic fashion. I can think of two obvious ways in which this could explode in Israel's face. First off, let's say they aren't completely successful. Jets are shot down. Pilots are captured. Talk about a propaganda boon aircraft fragments bearing the Star of David paraded through Tehran would be for the extremist elements in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. Secondly, some of the potential targets might be hardened, but they aren't necessarily isolated hundreds of miles from civilization. When Iran and Israel bombed Iraq's reactor complex in 1980-81 (pretty ironic, huh), the site wasn't active. Iran's facilities are all believed to be active. This could possibly result in the spread of radioactive material after an attack. So, say Israel blows up all of the sites it wants to blow up, but then a lot of material gets spread around as a result. Does Israel really want to have to deal with the political fallout from that scenario?

Point 5: This could also explode in Iran's face in just as epic a fashion. Ahmadinejad talks a big game, but what happens to the way Iran, particularly its military capability, is perceived if Israel just flys in there and blows stuff up? "We will defeat any aggressors...we are ready to defend..."...yeah, but what if the Israelis prove that you can't, and you weren't? Then what?

Nobody really knows what's going on in Iran. Nobody really knows if Saudi Arabia will actually let the Israelis fly over to blow stuff up, although it certainly seems that way regardless of any political "denials". What we can state is that any military action is going to have some significant effects on that part of the world. Iran may have no choice militarily but to pretty much sit there and take it, but they won't sit there sulking after the bombs stop dropping.

Now, somebody who knows more about such things than I do chime in and tell me if blowing up all of these nuclear-related sites could actually spread nasty things around in Iran and into the Persian Gulf. Because at the end of the day, it would seem to me that mining the Persian Gulf or playing terrorist could turn out to be the least of the region's problems after this type of airstrike.

And why the hell doesn't Iran just leave the NPT and the UN and give everyone the finger anyway? Then they legally can do whatever they want with nuclear weapons, and it makes military action a lot tougher to justify.

Iranian Strategic SAM Deployment

INTRODUCTION

With the current attention being given to potential Iranian nuclear weapons development, it is prudent to examine the defensive posture of the Persian state in light of potential military action. This article will focus on Iran's strategic SAM deployment. Three different strategic SAM types, along with two tactical SAM types, provide sporadic, yet still potentially effective, SAM coverage throughout the nation. Unusual deployment strategies hint at what may be part of a serious deception campaign, possibly providing insight into the apparent lack of serious, integrated ground-based air defense coverage throughout most of the nation.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

The Iranian air defense network relies on a mixture of Soviet and Western SAM systems. This relatively unusual mix stems from both pre- and post-1979 acquisitions from the West and the Soviet Union, respectively. The following SAM systems are currently in service as part of the overall air defense network: HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE, a Chinese-produced S-75 derivative, employing the TIGER SONG engagement radar), HAWK, S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), 2K12 (SA-6 GAINFUL), and Tor-M1E (SA-15 GAUNTLET).

EW Coverage

Primary early warning and target track generation for the Iranian strategic SAM force is handled by a network of 24 EW radar sites, one of which is currently inactive. These sites are primarily situated along the periphery of the nation, with additional facilities located in the vicinity of Arak and Esfahan. A third of the facilities are located along Iran's strategically important Persian Gulf coastline.

The following image depicts the location of EW sites in Iran:
SAM Coverage

Currently, there are 41 active SAM sites inside of Iran. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, S-200 sites are purple, 2K12 sites are bright green, and Tor-M1E sites are faded green.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by Iranian air defense sites. Using the same color scheme applied in the previous image, HQ-2 sites are red, HAWK sites are orange, S-200 sites are purple, 2K12 sites are bright green, and Tor-M1E sites are faded green.
HQ-2

There are currently 7 active HQ-2 sites identified inside of Iran. The HQ-2 does not appear to be heavily relied upon, with only 7 of 21 sites remaining operational.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HQ-2 sites:
HAWK

There are currently 22 active HAWK sites identified inside of Iran. The HAWK has been a mainstay of Iranian strategic air defense since its acquisition before the Islamic Revolution. While numbers have dwindled, with roughly half of the Iranian HAWK sites currently active, the system is still widely deployed at numerous locations. The Iranian HAWK deployments are interesting as they represent a tactical SAM system deployed in a strategic capacity.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's HAWK sites:
S-200

There are currently 7 active S-200 sites identified inside of Iran. The S-200 represents the lognest-range strategic SAM asset operationally employed by the Iranian military.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's S-200 sites:
Tactical SAM Sites

There are currently 6 tactical SAM deployment locations identified inside of Iran. These systems are currently employed as strategic point defense assets. Two sites are occupied by 2K12 batteries, the remaining four being occupied by Tor-M1E TELARs.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by Iran's deployed tactical SAM systems:
Empty Sites

There are currently 31 unoccupied, prepared SAM sites inside of Iran. These sites have been identified as either HQ-2 or HAWK sites, based on their configurations. These empty SAM sites can perform multiple tasks within the overall air defense network. They can be employed as dispersal sites for existing air defense assets, complicating enemy targeting. They can also be used to deploy additional SAM systems currently held in storage if more air defense assets are deemed necessary in a given sector.

An overview of empty Iranian SAM sites is provided in the following image:
STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

National S-200 Coverage

The primary means of air defense in Iran, insofar as SAM systems are concerned, is the deployment of 7 S-200 firing batteries throughout the nation. The four northernmost sites are positioned to defend the northern border and the region surrounding the capital of Tehran. A fifth site is situated to defend facilities in and around Esfahan in central Iran, including the Natanz nuclear facility. The last two sites are situated at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr and provide coverage over the Straits of Hormuz and the northern half of the Persian Gulf, respectively.

The northern four S-200 sites, as well as the southern two sites, are well positioned to provide air defense outside Iran's borders to deter any inbound aggressor from approaching the ADIZ. The central site near Esfahan is a curiosity, however. The southern and western portions of the coverage area are limited due to the presence of a good deal of mountainous terrain, in some cases 10,000 feet or more higher than the terrain where Esfahan is located. This also affects the remaining six sites, but they are affected to a lesser degree due to the fact that they are positioned to defend outwards towards the border and beyond, not likely intended to defend against targets operating deep within Iranian airspace. The Esfahan site, in direct contrast, is apparently situated to defend a central portion of the nation, and as such is limited in its effectiveness by the aforementioned terrain considerations. The curiosity lies in positioning a long-range SAM system in such a fashion to apparently purposely limit its effectiveness. This can be overlooked to a small degree as the S-200 is not necessarily a choice system when it comes to engaging low-altitude targets, but the terrain in the area would seem to greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Esfahan site. The radar horizon is the key issue here, as each piece of terrain situated higher than the engagement radar will carve a significant portion out of the system's field of view and limit its ability to provide widespread coverage.

Iranian S-200 sites appear to be purposely limited in their composition. Each site consists, unusually, of one 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radar and two launch rails. For more information on this unusual practice, reference the following article on this site: S-200 SAM Site Analysis

Point Defense

The remainder of Iran's SAM sites are positioned in a point defense strategy to provide coverage of key areas in the nation. There are five key areas defended by shorter-range systems: Tehran, Esfahan, Natanz, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. All of these areas are also covered by S-200 sites, which are co-located in some instances, providing a degree of overlapping coverage in these locations.

The capital city of Tehran is defended by five HAWK sites, two HQ-2 batteries, and a 2K12 battery. There are four empty sites in the area. The southwestern two sites are prepared HQ-2 sites, while the northwest and southeast sites are prepared HAWK sites. Were the empty sites to be occupied, they would form an inner HAWK barrier and an outer HQ-2 barrier oriented to defend against threats from the west and south. This layout may be a legacy leftover from the Iran-Iraq War. Two S-200 sites are also in the vicinity, and the other two S-200 sites to the east and west also provide limited coverage of the capital.

The following image depicts SAM coverage of Tehran:
There are two HAWK sites and one HQ-2 site in the vicinity of Esfahan. One of the HAWK sites, as well as the S-200 site in the area, are located on the grounds of Esfahan AB, with the HAWK site likely situated to provide point defense of the airbase. The HQ-2 site and the remaining HAWK site are located south of Esfahan proper. An empty HAWK site is also located in Esfahan, likely representing a dispersal site for the battery at Esfahan AB.

The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Esfahan:
Nuclear related facilities near Natanz are afforded a layered defense by recently-deployed tactical and strategic SAM ssytems. Natanz is defended by one HQ-2 site, three HAWK sites, one 2K12 battery, and four Tor-M1E TELARs. The tactical systems were deployed between September 2006 and September 2009; the increased air defense posture may signify an increase in activity at the nuclear facility.

The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Natanz:
The Bushehr region, which contains a key nuclear facility, is defended by four HAWK sites and an HQ-2 battery. Two HAWK sites are located on the grounds of the Busheher military comples, with a third site being located offshore on Khark Island, while the HQ-2 battery is located further inland from the military complex nearer to Choghadak. Bushehr AB is also home to an S-200 battery. There are three unoccupied HQ-2 sites and a single unoccupied HAWK site in the area as well. Three unoccupied sites are situated around the nuclear complex, perhaps suggesting that any weapons-related work has been moved from the facility to one of the various inland nuclear research and development locations such as Natanz. This would appear to be a sensible course of action given the serious vulnerability of the coastal Bushehr nuclear facility to enemy activity approaching from the Persian Gulf region. The remaining unoccupied HQ-2 site is located on an islet northeast of Khark island.

The following image depicts SAM coverage in the vicinity of Bushehr:
Bandar Abbas, home to the bulk of the Iranian Navy including the deadly Kilo SSK fleet, is defended by one HQ-2 battery and one HAWK battery. There is an S-200 site in the region as well.

The following image depicts SAM coverage of Bandar Abbas:
Defending the Straits

The S-200 sites located in the vicinity of both Bushehr and Bandar Abbas provide Iran with a significant air defense capability over not only a good portion of the Persian Gulf, but also over the critical Straits of Hormuz. This SAM coverage, which can be further expanded thanks to the presence of unoccupied, prepared HAWK sites on the islands of Abu Musa and Lavan, allows Iran to provide increased air defense in conjunction with fighter aircraft to protect any naval operations in the region, including the potentially catastrophic mining of the Straits of Hormuz.

Air Defense Issues

The problem with Iran's strategic SAM deployment is the apparent over-reliance on the S-200 system to provide air defense over most of the nation. The S-200 is certainly a threat to ISR aircraft such as the U-2R or E-3, but the primary threat which Iran must consider is that of standoff cruise missiles and strike aircraft featuring comprehensive EW suites. Against these types of low-RCS or maneuverable targets, the S-200 cannot be counted upon to be effective. Libyan S-200 systems proved completely ineffective against USN and USAFE strike aircraft in 1986, and the Iranian S-200s would logically be expected to fare no better in a much more modern air combat environment.

As mentioned previously, the remainder of the SAM assets are primarily situated to provide point defense and as such do not represent a serious threat to a dedicated and sophisticated enemy. Even lesser-equipped nations would be able to explot the various gaps and vulnerabilities in the coverage zones provided the S-200s could be neutralized in some fashion, be it through ECM, technical capability, or direct attack. This raises the question of the importance of SAM systems to Iran's overall air defense network. Given the current deployment strategy, the small number of sites, and the capability of the systems themselves, it is likely that Iran places more importance on the fighter force as an air defense element. This would explain the continued efforts to retain an operational fleet of F-14A interceptors. The short range of the HQ-2 and HAWK systems, coupled with the ineffectiveness of the S-200 to deal with low-RCS targets, also explains reporting regarding Iranian attempts to purchase advanced SAM systems from Russia.

It is possible that Iran simply does not feel that a robust SAM network is necessary. Given the aforementioned terrain constraints in some areas of the nation, as well as the lack of a large number of what may be regarded by the Iranian government as potential critical targets inside of Iran, the Persian nation may have simply taken a minimalist posture, relying on the S-200 for long-range defense and the other systems as point defense weapons to defend Iran's critical military and political infrastructure.

Another reason for the lack of deployed SAM systems could be that the shorter-ranged HQ-2 and HAWK systems are no longer viewed as being effective enough to warrant widespread use. HQ-2 sites are currently 33% occupied, with HAWK sites being approximately 50% occupied, perhaps signifying more faith in the HAWK system but still demonstrating a potential overall trend of perceived non-reliability. Iran does have reason to suspect the reliability of the HAWK SAM system against a Western opponent, as the missile was an American product and has been in widespread use throughout the West for decades. The HQ-2, however, should be regarded as potentially more reliable, as it is not a standard (and widely exploited) S-75 but rather a Chinese-produced weapon with which the West should have a lesser degree of technical familiarity insofar as electronic performance, if not physical performance, is concerned.

A high ratio of unoccupied sites could be due to financial reasons (lack of operating funds may have resulted in a number of batteries placed in storage) or simple attrition (they may have been expended or destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War), of course, but those facets of the equation cannot be examined through imagery analysis alone. It should be mentioned that one possible source of attrition for the HQ-2 system is the conversion of many missiles to Tondar-69 SSMs to complement CSS-8 SSMs (HQ-2 derivatives) obtained from China. Many batteries may also be out of service for modification to Sayyad-1 standard, which represents a modification of the HQ-2 design with some indigenous components.

CONCLUSION

On the surface, Iran's ground-based air defense picture appears to be relatively robust thanks to the presence and reach of the seven S-200 batteries. However, a closer analysis reveals an overall coverage which is currently full of holes and vulnerabilities that a potential aggressor could exploit. The Iranian strategic SAM force is obviously in need of a serious upgrade, one which is more substantial than simply producing modified HQ-2 missiles. The presence of air interceptors and numerous terrain constraints do explain away some of the negative aspects of Iran's SAM network, but taken as a whole it represents a relatively ineffective form of defense against a modern agressor. Given the current political climate, it would be in the best interest of the Iranian military to proceed with a widespread upgrade, with the most effective option being the purchase of S-300PMU-2 or S-400 SAM systems for Russia, or perhaps the more cost-effective and similarly capable HQ-9 SAM system from China. Incorporating either purchase into a package deal with modern fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MK or J-10 would result in a much more robust air defense capability.

SOURCES

-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of Iran and may not represent the entire air defense network.

Iranian Military Guide

-Jane's Land Based Air Defence, various editions.

-All overhead imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth.

This article has been updated, the original version was published in September of 2007.

Nuclear Korea

INTRODUCTION

On the 25th of May, 2009, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted its second nuclear weapons test. Once again, the DPRK has become an area of focus for intelligence analysts and politicians as the next course of action for the West is determined. While it remains to be seen whether or not tensions between the DPRK, its southern neighbor, and the rest of the world will be mitigated, one fact remains: the DPRK is developing a nuclear arsenal.

NUCLEAR TESTING

The DPRK has detonated two nuclear devices in the past three years. The first test took place in October of 2006, with the second taking place in May of 2009. Seismic monitoring has provided analysts with a general location of both test events, along with a rough determination of the yield of both tests. The first test seems to have been a sub-kiloton event, with the second test falling in the 1-3 kiloton range. The test location is roughly 65 kilometers northwest of the Musudan-Ri missile test complex, in the isolated northeastern sector of the DPRK.

THE TEST SITE

The DPRK's nuclear test site consists of multiple areas. The isolated location is ideal for this type of testing; there is no civillian presence to speak of, and the terrain allows for UGFs to be employed at will to protect and mask sensitive activity. The bulk of the test area consists of three likely test locations, five unidentified locations, and a rail transfer point located south of Sumunnae, representing the only significant source of transportation into the area.

The locations of the identified facilities and areas in the DPRK's nuclear test area can be seen in the image below. Unidentified facilities are marked as red buildings.
Two of the possible test locations are similar, with the third site being of a wholly different configuration. Of the two similar sites, the northern site is commonly associated with the DPRK's nuclear testing. Whether this is due to intelligence sources leaking information or due to imagery interpretation, it is interesting to note that the southern site has escaped mention, as has the central site. Moreover, Globalsecurity offers before and after imagery of the northern site captured at the time of the 2006 nuclear test. While the imagery is not the highest quality, it should be pointed out that there does not appear to be any significant difference or change in activity at the northern site in either image. This begs the question: was this the actual site of the October 2006 test?

After the 2009 test event, the CTBTO provided coordinate data for the presumed test events of 2006 and 2009, along with probability ellipses indicating the area around the theorized detonation sites where the event was likely located. All three of the identified facilities in the test area fall within the boundaries of both the 2006 and 2009 probability ellipses.

While there is no firm evidence to suggest which site was the "host" to which event, some conclusions may be drawn. It is likely that at least one event took place at the northern site, given that all of the coordinates released by various agencies such as the USGS and the CTBTO for the epicenters of the 2006 and 2009 events are arrayed roughly in an east-west line just north of the northern site. This suggests that at least one, and perhaps both, of the test events took place at the northern site. The central site is not as expansive as the other facilities, and features an antenna farm of some sort, suggesting that it may represent a monitoring station for the two other facilities. The devices seen mounted atop the masts to the north of the facility may be atmospheric sampling devices meant to track the unintended release of radiation from the underground tests.

Details of the northern, central, and southern sites can be seen in the images below. The first image depicts the north site. A possible security checkpoint for entry into the test area can be seen, as well as the likely location of the test shaft itself.
Next, the central site can be seen. This site contains fewer structures than the north or south sites. In fact, the facilities on the western edge of the main area appear to possibly be in disrepair, suggesting that this may have been an existing facility partially converted to use for monitoring the nuclear testing grounds. To the north, the possible sensor masts can clearly be seen.
Finally, the southern site is depicted. Notice the similar layout to the northern site, with the buildings in the main area of the facility organized in a general "U" shape. There is also a possible security checkpoint, and a facility which may be housing the opening to the vertical test shaft. More likely, however, would be positioning the entrance to a vertical or horizontal shaft inside the main facility itself, given that it is situated in a valley between two ridges.
The remaining four unidentified facilities in the area likely perform administrative and support functions for the test range. One such facility, seen in the image below, contains a helipad and apparent housing structures.
The three remaining facilities may be abandoned or unoccupied military garrisons (the site was imaged in February of 2005), or further housing and support areas for nuclear technicians manning the site during a test cycle. The lack of activity at these locations in the available imagery suggests that the site may only be manned during a test period, and also raises a significant question: where did the bomb come from?

There are numerous UGFs in the area, a helipad, and a rail transfer point to the south. This suggests that range security and transport may be supported by helicopter, and that significant amounts of material and personnel arrive by rail, perhaps after arriving in the region by air. The UGFs and various unidentified facilities are the dark horses of the facility. It is possible that the components were delivered individually and then assembled on-site for a test. It is also possible that there is a nuclear weapons plant buried within one of the UGFs producing the weapons after nuclear material is delivered. A final option, one which has no real supporting evidence but which should nevertheless be considered, is that there is a facility in the region, likely inside of an UGF, that produces both the fissile material and the weapons. Enrichment facilities at Yongbyon would seem to refute this idea, but it does make for an interesting theory: while the world is distracted by the goings-on at Yongbyon, the DPRK quietly produces and tests nuclear weapons at a much more remote and lesser-known facility.

NUCLEAR GOALS

Many analysts have assumed that the DPRK is working towards a nuclear capability and has not as of yet fielded a weaponized bomb. There are two holes in this logic which should be pointed out immediately. Bear in mind that this is speculation, and should not necessarily be taken as pure fact, but rather a logical line of thought given the information at hand.

Firstly, a small detonation is a small detonation, not necessarily a fizzle or test failure. Current estimates indicate that the 2009 event was the result of a device no larger than three kilotons detonating underground. Rather than assuming that this is a step towards a multi-kiloton, or even megaton class nuclear or thermonuclear device, the possibility that the test was a complete success and the weapon performed as designed should not be overlooked. For that matter, the previous test in 2006 may have been a complete success as well, either testing a small-scale nuclear device or validating the performance of the components to be used for a later test.

With regard to the possibility of a small-scale nuclear weapon having been developed successfully, it is known that an armed conflict on the peninsula would result in the DPRK employing a large number of special operations forces. Small devices would be ideal weapons to smuggle into the Repiblic of Korea and detonate in advantageous locations. A small device detonating on the Han river in Seoul, for example, would not only destroy many of the bridges crossing the river, but would likely incite a mass panic, without obliterating a sizeable portion of the city itself. The resulting exodus of civillians, seeking shelter from future attacks or medical care for exposure to radiation, has the potential to interfere with the movement and resupply of military forces in the region. Small warheads would also be ideal for delivery by submarine or missile to targets such as air bases close to the coastline, and could be detonated inside the major port facilities to further complicate the ROK's resupply and civillian evacuation operations. From an asymmetric aspect, they could also be used after an outbreak of hostilities to environmentally cripple fishing grounds in the area which are important for both the ROK and Japan.

The second of the aforementioned holes in logic is that current analysis seems to be focusing on a nuclear-armed ballistic missile representing the end result of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. As demonstrated previously, this may not necessarily be the case. The standard explanation given is that the DPRK has designs on fielding a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. Testing a weapon and miniaturizing the warhead to fit atop an ICBM takes time. However, this assumes that the second test was another trial, and does not allow for the possibility that the device which detonated was a weapons-ready device. If that were to be the case, then it would be likely that the intended delivery vehicle is not in fact an ICBM.

If DPRK nuclear warheads do not progress much further in yield, they will not have much value atop the nations's largely inaccurate ballistic missiles over intercontinental ranges. This would make aerial delivery or delivery by other means far more likely as they can impart a greater degree of accuracy. Where the weapons would be valuable in terms of missile delivery would be as "terror weapons" meant to be fired at the ROK or Japan. In this capacity the accuracy of the delivery systems would be less important given the large metropolitan and industrial areas in each nation which would be far easier to target. Also, firing a small yield weapon into the ROK to cause panic among the populace as described previously would not result in a release of radiation on the scale found in detonating a much larger weapon. That would almost make it more logical for the DPRK to pursue smaller yield weapons as they could then be employed in select areas without causing a significant degree of ill effects for the DPRK's own military forces to contend with. Alternatively these small weapons could be deployed in artillery shells or battlefield rockets to pulverize US and ROK positions along the DMZ before an advance into the ROK.

However, a limited number of nuclear warheads, large or small yield, are still not logically destined to be fitted to ballistic missiles targeting facilities in or outside the Korean theater. The DPRK's leaders may be paranoid and misguided, but they are not stupid. The United States is fielding numerous ballistic-missile defense systems and has multiple PAC-3 batteries in theater. Japan is also fielding the PAC-3, and the ROK is beginning to field the Patriot system as well, albeit in the PAC-2 form. AEGIS ABM-tasked vessels could also be placed in-theater if needed. This would make relying on ballistic missiles as the delivery system for nuclear warheads a questionable proposition as there is no guarantee that the nuclear-armed missiles would reach their targets. That is not an acceptable proposition for such an important national asset, of which there would only be a limited quantity. In that respect, the asymmetric, naval, or airborne delivery methods begin to seem far more plausible, and more logical from the standpoint of the DPRK. Airborne delivery would not necessarily require any miniaturization of a weapon, making it seem like a decent enough solution, but many of the same air defenses which would be used to intercept ballistic missiles would also be able to target hostile aircraft in conjunction with allied fighters, making airborne delivery a dubious proposition as well. At the end of the day, unless a large number of warheads are fielded to mount atop ballistic missiles and the loss of a percentage is accepted, the most likely uses would seem to be naval or asymmetric.

There is still value to testing a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, even if a large scale deployment is not planned. This would force the US, the ROK, and Japan to divert more attention and resources to missile defense, potentially at the expense of other forces in-theater. Ergo, small-yield weapons testing and ballistic missile trials may not indicate that the DPRK is intending to operationally mate missiles and warheads to a significant degree.

FUTURE EFFORTS

The next question that must be answered is the future direction of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. It will be important to study the results of any future nuclear test events to answer some of these questions.

Further tests resulting in a yield in the same range seen in the 2009 test will indicate that this is likely the design yield of the weapon. Contrarily, testing of weapons with increasing yield will indicate that the DPRK has its sights set on large yield weapons, and perhaps on thermonuclear weapons. Future nuclear test events will also aid analysts in determining the potential uses for such a weapon. Large yield weapons would have the ability to strike hardened facilities using less-accurate delivery systems, but small yield weapons would have to be accurately delivered and may only have limited use until a time when the DPRK has fielded a ballistic missile with hard-target kill levels of accuracy. Also, an expanded test program with shorter intervals between events will likely indicate that the DPRK has neared deployment of an operational weapon. However, a lack of test events does not necessarily indicate that weapons are not being deployed; if, as theorized previously, the current test met the DPRK's goals, then future testing may not be required until such a time when a larger yield weapon is desired.

Missile testing and training operations will also provide insight into whether nuclear warheads are being developed or deployed. Chemical or biological weapons are more likely to be used given their comparative cheapness and the belief that the DPRK maintains a large stockpile of one or both of those weapons. As long as CBW handling operations are detected in missile units without a significant change in procedure, it can be assessed with a degree of accuracy that nuclear weapons are not present.

A final option to consider for the future is another weapon system that has been rendered partially ineffective by recent defensive systems testing by the West: a FOBS. The DPRK's continued efforts to develop the Taepo-dong 2 SLV/ICBM is potentially indicative of a desire to have a space launch capability. After the most recent test the DPRK declared that a satellite had been orbited, a point which Western analysts dispute. Nevertheless, as a nuclear-tipped TD-2 is a paper threat until the DPRK produces a warhead of significant size to overcome the inherent inaccuracy of the delivery vehicle and develops penetration aids to defeat any American ABM systems, if a satellite launch capability can be developed and demonstrated, a FOBS would be an interesting avenue to pursue.

CONCLUSION

It can be stated with certainty that the DPRK is developing a nuclear weapons capability. How far along the program is, how many weapons may be available, and the intended and actual yields of the developed systems are up for debate. But at the end of the day, it would seem that the world is going to have to make room for another member of the Nuclear Club. How the West approaches and deals with the DPRK will have a significant impact on other nations wishing to acquire the same capability, providing them with an idea of how far the West will go to get its way. In this light, the DPRK's nuclear program, should it reach operational status, may be an impetus for Iran to fully develop a similar capability. And as a final note, the effect of a nuclear DPRK in the Korean theater may have much more ominous implications; could this be the final straw which forces Japan to shake off its self-imposed shackles and become a nuclear and offensive power in its own right?

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

HYDESim
CTBTO on the DPRK's Nuclear Tests
The ROK's Patriots
DPRK Nuke Test
ISIS Online

Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force

A revised version of this article will be published in Jane's Intelligence Review during the summer of 2013.

Israel vs. SAM: Iran's S-300

INTRODUCTION

On Sunday it was reported that Russia has begun delivering advanced S-300 SAM systems to Iran. Iran has been after some of the advanced variants of the S-300P series for some time, and delivery of these systems would represent a significant upgrade to the Iranian air defense network.

IRANIAN SAMS, YES OR NO?

Iran has been rumored to be a customer or recipient of S-300P variants for some time. Last year it was reported by Jane's that Iran had received S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE) SAM systems from Belarus and was preparing them for service. These reports have yet to be confirmed or conclusively debunked, but Iranian persistance in attempting to order more advanced S-300PM (SA-20 GARGOYLE) variants from Russia does cast a degree of doubt on their accuracy.

Russia was quick to respond to Iran's allegation that the S-300's were being delivered. In October Israeli Prime Minister Olmert had met with Russian leaders in Moscow and was assured that Russia would not deliver advanced S-300P series SAM systems to Iran. Shortly after Iran made its announcement on Sunday, Russian officials denied the reports and stated that they were abiding by the agreement made with PM Olmert regarding the transfer of advanced air defense weapons to Iran.

If Russia is to be believed in this case, then it would seem that the Iranian government is attempting to force Russia's hand into abiding by whatever sale agreement may have been discussed in the past. Alternatively, this could be an effort to raise eyebrows on the international stage over Israel's interference in Iranian affairs. The other side of the coin is that Russia may be acting deceptively, intending on selling the system to Iran, aiding in its setup, and only announcing the sale once the system has been delivered and emplaced. This is not as likely however as the emplacement and activation of these systems would be visible through intelligence sources.

ISRAELI OPPOSITION

The reason for Israeli opposition to a Russian sale of S-300P series SAM systems, particularly late-model S-300PMU-1 or S-300PMU-2 variants, to Iran is clear. Israel is currently preparing for a potential military strike on Iran to thwart Iranian nuclear ambitions. Regardless of whether or not Iran's nuclear intentions are truly peaceful or not, Israel's position regarding the S-300P sale or transfer is understandable. The latest S-300P variants represent some of the most advanced and capable SAM systems in the world, and would represent a significant obstacle to any Israeli air campaign against Iran. One can debate the issue of Israel objecting to a sovereign nation procuring a defensive weapon system, but the fact remains that an S-300P brigade inside of Iran would cause air planners serious problems and potentially prevent them from acting out the wishes of their leadership.

THE EW ELEMENT

The interesting facet of this entire scenario is that Israel has claimed to have developed electronic warfare systems capable of defeating the S-300P series. Israel reportedly obtained the 5N63 (FLAP LID) guidance radar of an S-300PMU (SA-10B GRUMBLE) battery sold to Croatia in 1995. Israeli claims of being able to defeat the S-300P were widely publicised in Jane's Defense Weekly and other media outlets. Israel also exercised with Greece in May and June of this year to gain further expertise against the more modern S-300PMU-1 system and its 30N6 (TOMB STONE) guidance radar.

PATH TO WAR?

It would appear that Iran has not yet received any S-300P series SAM components. Russian officials would likely not make such a strong assertion were the opposite to be true, knowing that the tell-tale emissions from the system's radar systems would belie their presence to the world once activated inside of Iran. This would certainly eventually be true for two reasons: first, Iran would have to activate the systems in order to employ them in defense of key facilities or border regions, and second, the radar systems used by the S-300P series are not employed by any other SAM system, with the exception of the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) EW radar. The presence of the guidance and battle management radars inside of Iran cannot therefor be attributed to the sale of any other SAM system. Russia also cannot claim that an advanced S-300PM series system has been supplied by an outside user, as systems missing from China and Greece, being the only other users of the advanced versions, would be missed by American intelligence sources and such an allegation could be easily disproven.

The ultimate takeaway from Israel's negotiating with Moscow in October and its August 2008 claim that if such a system was delivered to Iran that Israel would be forced to develop a counter, is that Israel's efforts to defeat the S-300P series of SAM systems may not have been as succesful as once believed. Had Israeli efforts in exploiting Croatian and Greek systems been successful in developing adequate electronic warfare systems and countertactics, Israel would likely have sat by and watched the Iranian regime spend hundreds of millions of dollars on a missile system that they knew represented a limited threat. Given Israel's work in the field of electronic warfare it is possible that reports suggesting that the S-300P could be countered by new systems were a form of deception aimed at convincing Iranian leadership that the purchase of such a ssytem was a wasted effort. In that light, the potential for an eventual S-300P SAM sale to Iran may be the catalyst that finally pushes Israel into striking Iranian nuclear facilities. The Israeli military is rightfully very concerned over the potential of advanced S-300P series SAM systems taking up residence inside of Iran, and if political pressure on Moscow is not enough to prevent a transfer than military action may be the end result.

SOURCES

Iran Says Russia Delivering S-300 Air Defense Systems
Russia denies supplying Iran with missiles capable of repelling Israeli air strike
Israel develops countermeasures to S-300 system
'We'll neutralize S-300 if they're sold to Iran'
Greece assists Israel as war with Iran looms

The Avenue To Peace Runs Through...Piracy?

PEACE THROUGH PIRACY?

Right, I know I don't go off into the political side of things that often, but bear with me on this one.

Russia. The Ukraine. China. America. Iran.

What do all of these nations have in common?

The answer: as of today, all of them have dispatched warships to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. Some to interdict pirates, some merely to protect their own interests. The interesting issue in all of this is that most of these nations are not exceptionally fond of each other. Russia and the Ukraine are having problems. America and Iran have not had a friendly relationship since 1979. And China? The US political machine wants everyone to believe that they are the new Red Menace. Makes for good military sales figures, but not much else from a logical standpoint. But I digress.

Normally, when potentially belligerent nations are operating military hardware in close proximity to one another, bad things can happen. There is the potential for misidentification of intentions and an outbreak of hostilities. Which, plainly, is not really good for anyone.

That's why the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia represents a very interesting political avenue that should be exploited by the US government. This is an opportunity to reach out to all parties involved and establish a joint working group for combating the piracy issue. This may in turn help to break down some barriers in dealing with nations like Iran or Russia. A common goal can often be a good stepping stone to further cooperation and potentially improved relations down the line.

Sending a few warships into the Indian Ocean to eradicate pirate vessels is not going to result in the establishment of an American embassy in Tehran or the elimination of Russian opposition to all things NATO or missile defense. But in the long term establishing a good working relationship in this issue with the nations involved could at the very least break the ice and open doors previously locked should the need arise for further military or diplomatic dealings in the future. And if taking out a few pirate ships attacking Iranian cargo vessels or harassing Russian freighters means we are on the road to better relations with those nations, it would be in the best interests of the US government to open its arms to those nations in the spirit of joint cooperation.

Besides, five nations working together to obliterate pirate boats and shore positions would surely be far more effective than each nation plowing across the sea lanes looking for trouble on their own.

Nuclear Iran: Exposed In Imagery

Below is a link to a video, showing a presentation given by Dr. Frank Pabian at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. The concept behind Dr. Pabian's presentation was to depict the effect of open source imagery as an analysis tool in nonproliferation and the response of potentially hostile nations in the form of improved denial and deception. Dr. Pabian uses the ongoing nuclear issue with Iran to illustrate this issue, also briefly touching on the Syrian reactor complex struck by Israel, showing a number of commercial images from sources such as Digital Globe and Google Earth to depict various nuclear-related facilities and the efforts that Iran and Syria have gone to in order to hide the activities at a number of these locations. Great concept, and great presentation, but where this really scores is in the amount of historical and background data taken from various sources to spell out the scope of Iran's covert nuclear program. The video runs about an hour, but it's well worth a watch and is highly recommended for anyone interested in the nuclear issue, nuclear proliferation, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Dr. Pabian on Iran

Syria and North Korea: Nuclear Partners?

INTRODUCTION

On the 25th of April President Bashar Assad of Syria issued a rebuttal to US claims of a nuclear reactor program in Eastern Syria. The site in question was violently thrust into world view on the 6th of September, 2007 when an illegal Israeli air raid destroyed the facility. Israel has refused to comment on the action, ostensibly in order to refrain from having to admit to such a blatant violation of Syrian territorial sovereignty, and Syria showed great restraint by not justifiably retaliating against the naked aggression of its Jewish neighbor. Fast forward to the 24th of April of this year, and the United States released information describing the facility as a nuclear reactor being constructed with the assistance of North Korea.

POWER OR PLUTONIUM?

Syrian intentions for the reactor complex were unclear, but analysts have theorized that a lack of any major infrastructure in the area indicated that the reactor was not intended for power production. Coupled with the fact that there are no major population centers in the area to make use of any electricity generated by the complex, it would appear that the analysts have come to the correct conclusion. The obvious alternative, given the North Korean assistance in the matter, was to create a reactor able to produce weapons-grade plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon.

THE NORTH KOREAN CONNECTION

The reasoning behind the presence of a nuclear material production facility inside of Syria is not necessarily as clear-cut as it may seem. The obvious inference is that it was intended to produce nuclear material to support a Syrian nuclear weapons program. A Syrian nuclear weapons program would certainly have provided the impetus behind Israel's action of September, 2007. However, the reports of North Korean aid, bolstered by images released depicting a reactor complex startlingly similar to the one in place at Yongbyon, North Korea, may indicate a far more sinister purpose.

The North Korean government is currently negotiating with the United States under the framework of the Six Party Talks to halt nuclear proliferation activity in return for diplomatic and economic concessions from the West. The talks have currently reached an impasse, as the North Koreans are reluctant to reveal details regarding their past proliferation activities, including any aid to Syria in this regard. North Korea has made progress with regard to halting its own nuclear activity, including the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea still views the United States as a significant military threat on the peninsula, and their sudden agreement in February of 2007 to shut down the Yongbyon reactor facility raises serious questions. The reactor facility was inspected by the IAEA, who verified its shutdown in August of 2007. US intelligence officials have claimed that the Syrian complex may have been within weeks of becoming operational when it was destroyed in September of that year. The connection that seems to be eluding the intelligence services as well as the media outlets reporting on the incident is whether or not North Korea would have benefitted from the Syrian reactor's output of nuclear material. It is possible that the purpose of the Syrian reactor complex was to benefit both Syrian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Analysts have noted that there does not appear to have been any enrichment facilities located on-site, facilities which would have been needed in order to transform the reactor's plutonium output into true weapons-grade material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon. By placing the enrichment facilities at a separate location, Syria achieves two things. First, less attention is drawn to the facility. Second, the plutonium by-product must therefore be transported to an enrichment facility. It would not be difficult to mask the transfer of some or all of the plutonium to a ship or aircraft bound for North Korea, allowing the North Koreans to continue their nuclear weapon production while at the same time preserving an air of cooperation in the eyes of the world with the shutdown of their own reactor complex. Alternatively, North Korea may have simply intended to construct a separate weapons production facility inside of Syria with the intent of arming both nations. Given that North Korea has far greater knowledge on the subject of nuclear weapons design and production than Syria, enlisting their aid in that regard would be a logical maneuver.

LACK OF AIR DEFENSES

In his statement, President Assad claimed that the facility in question was an unused military complex, but he would not specify its purpose. Assad claimed that the site was obviously not a nuclear related facility, as it was not protected by any air defense systems. Unfortunately, Assad's claims, regardless of the true nature of the facility, are completely illogical. Eastern Syria would be a logical site for a covert nuclear facility. The location of the site is directly adjacent to a river, providing the necessary water source for cooling the reactor. Also, the site is not near any major military facilities, meaning that it was an unlikely target for surveillance. The lack of any air defense systems also aids the covert nature of the location. Any major SAM system, for example, would emit tell-tale signals from its radar systems, signals which would be tracked and identified by intelligence services. The appearance of air defense systems where none were present previously would only serve to attract unwanted attention to the area. Syria made the right strategic move by not defending the site with any significant military presence. Unfortunately, it would seem that their denial and deception efforts ultimately failed due to a human intelligence source on-site which is the likely source of the videotaped evidence shown by the US government to illustrate the nuclear nature of the facility.

CONCLUSION

This incident highlights the need for more significant diplomatic pressure to be palced on nuclear weapons states with regard to proliferation. Syria has a significant terrorist connection with Hizbullah and a significant diplomatic connection with Iran, two entities which could have benefitted from a Syrian nuclear weapons program, with potentially catastrophic results. While the unilateral decision of Israel to attack and destroy the facility cannot and should not be condoned, neither should the effort by Syria to construct a nuclear reactor under the nose of the IAEA in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, of which Syria is a signatory. Neither should bringing such an issue to the attention of the international community be screened on the basis of Israeli interests, as suggested by Senator Susan Collins of Maine.

SOURCES

Syria denies nuke allegations
IAEA reaction to US evidence
North Korean nuclear program timeline
6 Party Talks

Iran and the S-300PT

INTRODUCTION

Open-source reporting indicates that Iran has purchased the S-300PT SAM system from Belarus. The S-300PT will represent the most modern, advanced SAM system in Iran when it is operationally deployed.

IRANIAN S-300PT SYSTEMS

According to Jane's International Defence Review, Iran is now the owner of four S-300PT battalions. Two of these units were sourced from Belarus, and had been deployed as capital-area air defence units around Minsk. The other two units were sourced from an undisclosed nation and were recently refurbished by Belarussian technicians working at an IRGC facility in Iran, where the units were stored.

A typical Belarussian S-300PT battery consisted of twelve TELs, one 5N63 (FLAP LID) engagement radar, and one 5N66 (CLAM SHELL) low altitude detection radar. It is therefore logical to assume that the two "battalions" obtained from Belarus were in fact two complete firing batteries worth of equipment. Combined with the other two units refurbished in Iran, this gives Iran a total deployable force of approximately four S-300PT batteries.

Jane's goes on to state that both the 5V55K and 5V55R missiles were included in the deal with Belarus, implying that the systems were of the improved S-300PT-1 or S-300PT-1A variant. Baseline S-300PT systems lacked the ability to employ the SAGG-guided 5V55R weapon, and were limited to using the command-guided 5V55K only. It is possible that the extended-range 5V55RUD was also included.

The S-300PT provides Iran with a modern, complex, and very effective SAM system. Iran's current strategic SAM systems, the HQ-2 (CSA-1 GUIDELINE) and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), are limited by their single-target engagement capability. The S-300PT's 5N63 radar system can prosecute six targets simultaneously, while guiding a maximum of two missiles to each target.

The S-300PT is also a far more mobile system than its Iranian stablemates. It is not, however, a true mobile SAM system. The 5N63 radar system is not vehicle-borne, and is mounted on a towed trailer for transport. 40V6 mast assemblies are required to erect the 5N63 and 5N66 radar systems, although the 5N63 could remain on its trailer for operation if required. These factors lend the S-300PT to a fixed site layout rather than a mobile environment.

POSTULATED DEPLOYMENT

Four S-300PT batteries will result in a significant increase in overall capability, but are not enough to upgrade the entire Iranian air defense network. In order to maximize their effectiveness, Iran will likely adopt one of two deployment strategies. The systems will likely be deployed to protect either significant military facilities, or significant nuclear weapons research and production facilities, or a combination of the two.

Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend militarily significant sites, the following would be the likely locations:

-Tehran, home to Iran's military command
-Tabriz, home to Iran's silo-based missile deterrent
-Bushehr, home to an IrIAF fighter unit and S-200 battery covering much of the Persian Gulf region
-Bandar Abbas, Iran's primary naval facility in the Persian Gulf region and home to the Kilo submarine fleet

The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.


Should Iran choose to deploy its four S-300PT batteries to defend significant nuclear weapons research and development sites, the four likely locations are as follows:

-Tehran, home to the nuclear research center
-Bushehr, home to the contentious nuclear reactor program
-Natanz, home to a fuel enrichment facility
-Esfahan, home to a uranium conversion facility

The following image depicts the areas defended by S-300PT batteries at the aforementioned locations. The three range rings around each site denote the 47km 5V55K missile, the 75km 5V55R missile, and the 90km 5V55RUD missile.


To illustrate the limited effect that the S-300PT's presence will have in the context of the overall Iranian air defense picture, consider the following image. In this image, the S-300PTs have been deployed at the nuclear facilities. HQ-2, S-200, and HAWK engagement zones are also displayed, the HQ-2 being denoted by dark red rings, the S-200 by light purple, and the HAWK by orange.


As can be seen, the short-range of even the 5V55RUD-equipped S-300PT does not result in a significant increase in capability. The S-300PT does have a multiple target engagement capability advantage, and this is why the system is likely to be deployed as a point defense asset to protect various facilities. To create a more potent air defense network overall, either a longer-range system would be required, or an increased number of S-300PT batteries.

HARDENED DEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS

On occasion, Iran has turned to North Korea for military assistance. It is possible that North Korea could be called upon to aid in increasing the survivability of Iran's most modern strategic SAM system through the use of hardened launch sites. North Korea has been shown to employ significant hardening techniques at S-125 (SA-3 GOA) and S-200 sites, to include the use of silos used to house the engagement radars, which are ostensibly fitted to elevating platforms. Similar techniques, if employed by the Iranians, could help to make the S-300PT systems far more survivable. Iran has shown a degree of competence in the field of hardened facilities recently with the silo-based missile complex at Tabriz, and could certainly undertake a hardened deployment of the S- 300PT on its own, but North Korean assistance in this regard may still be worthwhile given their experience with hardened siting of SAM systems.

Given the nature of the system, the S-300PT could be deployed in two separate types of hardened facility. The first would feature underground garages for the complete TELs. The second would feature much simpler hardened silos for the individual, sealed launch canisters.

The first example of a hardened site concept for the S-300PT system involves a below-ground, concrete hardened garage. Inside this garage, the 5P85 TEL is mounted. When elevated for launch, a retractable skirt would join the missile tubes with the silo opening. The silo would be covered with quick-opening launch doors, likely covered with debris or dirt when closed to assist in keeping the location hidden. A control bunker would be provided for launch crews, and an entry door would allow the removal of the TEL for maintenance or reloading. Finally, an exhaust extraction fan would prevent the buildup of toxic gasses inside the garage bay.

An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:


The alternative to basing the entire TEL inside of a hardened facility is to simply mount the individual launch canisters inside of hardened silos. These silos would be far cheaper to develop and maintain, and would require far less time to construct given their smaller scale. These remote launch facilities would consist of a number of silos, each containing four 5V55-series launch tubes. As the 5V55 missile tubes are sealed until launch, they could remain inside the silo until they are launched. The only above-ground component required would be a communications antenna, allowing launch commands to be transmitted from the fire control facility. If the radar is located in close proximity, the launch silos could be connected via more secure cables. However, using radio commands would permit the launch sites to be dispersed over greater distances, potentially making them much harder to locate. Basing the missile canisters inside of silo complexes also allows the TELs themselves to be held in reserve in the event that the silo complexes are destroyed, allowing Iran to retain the ability to redeploy the system should the need arise.

An illustration of the concept described above is provided below:


LACK OF EW SUPPORT

The main problem with such a small number of deployable batteries is that they cannot be employed to maximum effect. Doing so would involve the use of EW assets such as the 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) or 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW radars to provide target acquisition data. the 5N63 engagement radar employed by the S-300PT can perform independent target acquisition functions, but the system is more effective with off-board cueing, providing quicker reaction times. A long-range radar system such as the 64N6 can also acquire targets at roughly twice the range of the 5N63, providing a greater degree of early warning and enhanced situational awareness.

As there is no evidence to suggest that Iran obtained either the 36D6 or the 64N6, it is likely that the batteries will, for the time being, be left to operate as independent units. In this regard, it is entirely possible that Iran may choose to keep its S-300PT batteries garrisoned, deploying them to predetermined locations when the need arises. The only issue with this strategy is that the S-300PT does require a semi-prepared site to operate from, and such sites, unless they are of the hardened, sub-surface variety described earlier, are easily located in overhead imagery.

CONCLUSION

The S-300PT represents the most advanced SAM system in the Iranian inventory. When the Belarussian systems are delivered, the four S-300PT batteries will represent a serious roadblock towards a limited incursion by an aggressor such as Israel seeking to destabilize the region by striking Iranian nuclear weapons production facilities. The S-300PT will not, however, close Iranian airspace to a large-scale aerial offensive. To achieve that goal, Iran must continue to pursue acquisition of more modern S-300PM-1/2 or S-400 SAM systems from Russia, and the EW systems to integrate them on a national level.

SOURCES

-All satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth
-SAM range data taken from Jane's Land-Based Air Defence
-"Iran set to acquire S-300PTs from Belarus" - Jane's International Defence Review, February 1, 2008

Current Developments

INTRODUCTION

Just a quick note to keep you all informed on the current goings-on related to this site and its content.

IMINT & ANALYSIS FEATURED IN JANE'S

As online subscribers have no doubt discovered, Jane's Missiles & Rockets has two articles in their February print edition featuring the work of this website. In "Iran may have lined up S-300 SAM systems", my work detailing Iran's air defense network is discussed. "China deploys KS-1A SAM" is a report detailing my discovery of the first KS-1A SAM site in China, featured first on this blog a month ago. Hopefully I can contribute more to Jane's and other industry-related publications in the future.

FORTHCOMING PROJECTS

The next three articles for this site are being prepared, and they are going to take a little bit of time, so bear with me. The most extensive is going to be an analysis of China's air defense network, with a good deal of future projection mixed in. Special attention will be given to air defenses along the Taiwan Strait. The other two articles are going to be a feature on Russian space surveillance facilities (inspired by my recent discovery of the Far East Krona site in Google Earth) and an analysis of the impact of the S-300PT in Iranian service.

SAM SITE PROJECTS

The SAM Site .kmz file for Google Earth is still updated on a regular basis whenever I have enough new locations to warrant uploading a new file. I am also looking at developing a document based on that data, something along the lines of a guide to worldwide SAM systems broken down by nation, and featuring location data and information on the numbers and types of individual components at each location.

THE S-300P

I am still preparing what should be the definitive look at the S-300P SAM system, to replace an earlier article on this site, as well as numerous other things. Smaller-scope articles will still be posted as time permits, but my current primary focus is on the Chinese article, so bear with me if the site appears stagnant for a week or so.

CONCLUSION

As always, comments are welcome and encouraged. I'd encourage visitors to post a comment to this thread to suggest ideas for future articles as well.