Showing posts with label Tu-22M3. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tu-22M3. Show all posts

Sunday, August 17, 2008

Russia, Georgia, & Disinformation

INTRODUCTION

Between 8 and 11 August the Georgian-Russian dispute over the separatist provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia came to a violent head. Regardless of who is more at fault, the separatists, Saakashvili's Georgian government, or the Medvedev/Putin government in Russia, the entire affair has been surrounded by massive amounts of disinformation thanks in no small part to an apparent total disregard for accurate reporting by the media.

ABHORRENT REPORTING

There is an absurd amount of inaccurate information being propagated throughout the media regarding the current conflict between Russia and Georgia. Supposedly professional and well-respected media outlets have been severely lacking with respect to fact checking and corroborating the news they have been reporting.

Oil Pipelines Were Not Struck

The Associated Press, among other sources, has been spreading the story that Russian warplanes were dropping bombs in close proximity to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which is the second longest oil pipeline in the world. Various media sources have claimed that there were attacks which in some cases resulted in bombs impacting within close proximity to the pipeline itself. The alleged pipeline attack was mentioned, for instance, in an 11 August Associated Press report. The date of the report itself tells any intelligent reader all they need to know about the fact-checking abilities of the Associated Press; on 9 August, Agence-France Presse reported that British Petroleum, one of the shareholders of the pipeline, was not aware of any such attack. An 11 August interview with BP officials published in The Telegraph indicated that BP workers had in fact inspected the pipeline and found absolutely no evidence of any bombing raids whatsoever. One would think that if the Russian air force had been attempting to bomb the pipeline, that evidence of impact craters would have been found. There was also an ironic incident where Russian Su-25s (FROGFOOT) bombed a factory near the Tbilisi airport, a factory which had at one time produced Su-25s! This was translated into a Russian attack on the airport itself, a claim which was even denied by the Georgian government.

Advanced Weapons?

In another example of erroneous reporting, New York Post columnist Ralph Peters stated that Russia was employing precision guided munitions (PGMs), in part of a 12 August column seemingly written with the sole intent to disparage the performance of Russian military units. Russian General Staff Deputy Chief General-Colonel Anatoly Nogovitsyn seemed to provide evidence to back up Peters' claim in an August 12 Kommersant report. General-Colonel Nogovitsyn claimed that Russia possessed "weapons allowing to hit only the facilities threatening our troops instead of fighting by carpet bombing", claiming that this is what the Russian military was doing. Here's the issue: Nogovitsyn did not necessarily specify that these were air-delivered weapons. Russia has employed the 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 SCARAB) SRBM against Georgian positions, and while the Tochka is not necessarily a PGM in the truest sense of the word, the 90 meter CEP does provide far more accuracy than other Russian SRBMs and battlefield support systems. Furthermore, there have been various images spread around the internet showing Russian Su-24 (FENCER) tactical bombers uploaded with weapons. Some of these images have depicted the Cyrillic script applied to the weapons by Russian aviators as messages to their intended targets. The weapons in question were all unguided gravity bombs of various sizes. If Russia was air dropping PGMs, what are these Su-24s doing toting standard dumb bombs? Various international media outlets are also carrying stories detailing Georgian claims that cluster bombs were employed by the Russians; cluster bombs are indiscriminate, inaccurate weapons designed to saturate a portion of the battlefield. Again, where are the PGMs?

Peters also claims that Russian pilots are flying their latest combat aircraft. This is patently false. The combat aircraft employed by Russia on bombing sorties over Georgia are Su-24s (FENCER-D) and Su-25s. Anyone with a basic knowledge of the Russian air force will be aware that both the Su-27SM and Su-34 are currently in service to varying degrees, both of which are far more capable air-to-ground platforms in most respects than their legacy Sukhoi counterparts. The Su-34 is in fact currently entering service, with five series-produced examples undergoing trials at Lipetsk. The Su-34 has been trialled in combat before over Chechnya while still in prototype form, so operational use over Georgia would certainly have been a possibility.

Peters' problem is an apparent desire to paint the Russian pilots as ill trained and incapable of performing simple combat tasks. By claiming that the Russian aircraft are employing PGMs he creates an illusion that the bombs being dropped are not being employed properly as they are not striking targets with a high degree of accuracy. By claiming that Russia is employing the most advanced aircraft in its arsenal, he creates an illusion that the Russian pilots are not competent enough to handle modern warplanes. Unfortunately the evidence simply does not support any of his ludicrous and obviously biased claims against the Russian Air Force. Peters has traveled through Georgia, and may therefore have a sympathetic view of their situation, but his (admittedly op-ed) piece does nothing to reinforce his credibility as an objective journalist.

RUSSIAN "PREPARATION"

One of the most propagated theories behind the Georgian conflict is that it was preplanned and prepared for in advance by the Russian military. Logically, this should of course be partly true. Any military worth its salt will always be preparing for likely future conflicts. Two American examples of warplanning are OPLAN 5027, outlining plans for a conflict on the Korean peninsula, and OPLAN 8044, dealing with nuclear warfighting. Given the recent history of the Georgian situation, it would be illogical to assume that Russia had not at least outlined plans for a military action against Georgia. Russian troops based in Georgia pre-conflict were described as peacekeepers; peacekeepers would not be necessary were it not for the potential for open conflict, and where there is potential there will most assuredly be a contingency plan. But does this mean that Russia purposely created an environment where such a contingency plan would be called into action?

The interesting aspect to this theory is that it can only survive in blind ignorance of the events leading up to the conflict. Prior to the outbreak of serious hostilities, South Ossetian separatists and Georgian military forces had begun trading fire as early as 1 August in response to separatist shelling of Georgian villages in South Ossetia. By 3 August Russia was warning Georgia that the conflict would escalate if it continued further. After declaring a cease-fire on August 7, Georgian forces began to assault South Ossetia during the early hours on August 8 in response to further shelling by separatist forces. By August 11, Russian forces were entering Georgia, seemingly to end the conflict on their own terms. The idea that Russia preplanned and provoked the entire operation is clearly absurd. There were multiple meetings within the framework of the UN and multiple talks regarding a ceasefire well before August 11, and in some cases even before August 8. The South Ossetian separatists do appear to have been the primary instigators of the conflict, but this was a full 10 days before any major Russian military involvement in the area.

The main evidence used to support the idea that Russia was behind the conflict as a means of invading Georgia was that the 58th Army or some other force was prepositioned near the Roki tunnel to allow them to advance into Georgia. A US defense official was quoted by AFP on 12 August as stating that there was no evidence to support a buildup of Russian forces prior to the invasion. Rather, American military officials were suprised with the rapidity with which Russian forces mobilized and deployed into the conflict zone. This should not necessarily have been much of a shock, as there were Russian troops in the area prepared to enter South Ossetia. These troops were taking part in the Kavkaz-2008 exercise in the region, and Russian Army spokesperson Igor Konashenkov claimed that they would in fact be reporting to South Ossetia in the near future as replacements for the current peacekeeping force stationed there. As a result, according to Konashenkov, part of the Kavkaz-2008 exercise would focus on that peacekeeping mission.

Kavkaz-2008 ran through the end of July and it is possible that the troops had not left for their garrisons when initial signs of conflict appeared on 1 August. Russia's warning of expanded conflict on August 3 may have led to many of the troops involved with Kavkaz-2008 remaining in the area. Of course, moving troops rapidly and with little warning has been a hallmark of former Soviet doctrine for a European war. Given Russia's knowledge and infrastructure, it is also just as likely that troops were mobilized on 3 August and moved towards the battlefield with lightning speed once Moscow decided to become seriously involved. The Russian 58th Army, for example, has been cited as being involved in the conflict. The 58th Army is based at Vladikavkaz in the North Caucasus Military District, less than 50 kilometers from the Georgian border. If mobilized on or about 3 August, moving elements of the 58th Army into South Ossetia by 11 August would not be a difficult task, particularly if they had been involved with Kavkaz-2008 and were therefore already at an increased state of readiness.

Returning to Ralph Peters' journalistic slaughtering of the facts surrounding the conflict, Peters claims that airstrikes were launched against pre-planned targets, citing this as an example of how Russia had clearly been planning for the conflict. This is both accurate, and absurd. Anyone remotely familiar with the concept of ISR will state that any area of potential conflict is monitored for enemy forces and scanned for potential targets. This is all part of the contingency planning process described earlier. Russia has likely searched the United States to derive aimpoints for its ballistic missile force, does this mean that Russia is also looking for an excuse to engage in a nuclear exchange with the United States? It is absurdity such as this that only serves to propagate the appearance of a decidedly anti-Russian bias throughout the West, a bias that will ultimately hinder continued relations between the US and Russia as it begins to affect the populations of both nations. Further demonstration of Peters' decidedly anti-Russian bias can be found in another New York Post column from 9 August. In this diatribe, Peters claims that the Russian 58th Army was incapable of short-notice combat operations due to readiness issues. Apparently he failed to make a journalistic inquiry to the US defense community, as they have a decidedly different opinion, and decidedly better sources.

Another piece of information used by the media to paint the picture that Russia decided to provoke a conflict was the April 2008 placement of artillery pieces in Abkhazia. This can be partly explained by referencing the UN Arms Register, which details the acquisition of mobile artillery pieces by the Georgian military well prior to this date. Once again, standard military practice rears its head. In a potential conflict zone, it is ludicrous not to be prepared to fight your enemy on at a minimum the same level. In the West, however, this must only mean that the Russians are planning a war.

NO S-200

Russian government officials and media outlets are not, of course, above fabricating their own news regarding the conflict. Russia claimed that a Ukrainian-supplied S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON) SAM system was used to down one of their aircraft. However, there is simply no evidence to support such a claim. Georgia did operate the S-200 at one point in time, an S-200 battery having been present under the USSR to defend Tbilisi. As of November 2006, however, the S-200 site sat unused, with all of the military equipment having been removed and many of the structures having been razed or fallen into disrepair. A satellite image of the S-200 site in question can be seen below:


Furthermore, the Georgian newspaper Kviris Palitra ran a story in June of 2008 detailing Georgian air defense assets. The assets mentioned included the S-125 (SA-3 GOA), Osa-AK (SA-8 GECKO), and Buk-M1 (SA-11 GADFLY). The Osa and Buk systems are known to have been sourced from the Ukraine, while the S-125s remained from Soviet times. A May 2008 article in the Kiev Kommentarii detailed numerous arms sales by the Ukraine to Georgia, and made mention of a Buk sale in 2005. A glance through the UN Arms Register shows that the Ukraine delivered Osa systems in 2006 and Buk systems in 2007 as well. No serious mention has ever been made of an S-200 sale by anyone except the Russians, and the Ukraine denies having provided such a system. Given the status of the S-200 facility in Georgia and the evidence provided by Kiev, Tbilisi, and the UN, there is no credible evidence to support the assertion that any S-200 was ever sold to Georgia. The S-200's role in Georgian air defense seems to have ended with the deactivation of the battery near Tbilisi.

MR, NOT M3

One final example of faulty reporting relates to the purported S-200 sale. Russia claimed that a Tu-22 was downed by the Ukrainian-supplied SAM system. This led to various media outlets reporting that a Tu-22M3 (BACKFIRE-C) was lost over Georgia. A Tu-22M-series aircraft was downed, but proper examination of the facts would suggest that it was not a Tu-22M3 but in fact a Tu-22MR (BACKFIRE-D) reconnaissance aircraft. In this case, deliberate misrepresentation or altering of the facts behind the story does not appear to have taken place (excluding the aforementioned S-200 report, of course). This would appear to be representative of the media's lack of knowledge and attention to detail rather than deliberate false reporting.

The crewmembers who were flying the Tupolev were recovered and hospitalized by Georgian forces, and have been interviewed by the media. The pilot claimed that the aircraft was on a reconnaissance mission, flying from Engels air base. Engels is not a Tu-22M operator, so any BACKFIRE operating from there would have been forward deployed. Furthermore, the basic Tu-22M3 is a sub-strategic bomber, capable of carrying a variety of weapons but not possessing any credible capability to conduct reconnaissance sorties. The Tu-22MR, on the other hand, is a dedicated reconnaissance aircraft. If the pilot of the aircraft is to be believed, then he must have been flying a Tu-22MR rather than a Tu-22M3.

CONCLUSION

Neither Georgia nor Russia are entirely without fault in the current conflict. Georgia escalated the conflict by attacking the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali following clashes with separatists. Russia took it to a wholly different level with a massive military campaign designed to deny Georgia the ability to inflict further damage to South Ossetia. However, misreporting and deliberate distortion of the facts by the worldwide media has led to a convoluted picture of the events that have taken place. The fact that so many of the most commonly reported news items can be disassembled piece by piece with a few minutes of research places doubts on the credibility and objectivity of these establishments. When dealing with Russia after the cessation of hostilities, it would be wise to remember that there is no evidence to suggest a preplanned and orchestrated campaign to allow Russia to invade South Ossetia and Georgia. Painting Russia as a resurgent Evil Empire is a sign of unsubstantiated bias and nothing more. After all, Russia did warn Georgia that escalation was possible, and Saakashvili chose to give them the excuse needed to ensure the integrity of South Ossetia, perhaps permanently. Arguing that Russia's methods were overkill is one thing, accusing them of trying to take over the Caucasus is another thing entirely.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Ralph Peters' claims of PGMs and advanced aircraft
Ralph Peters' claims of Russian buildup
Russia created the crisis
Russian pilot was flying a recon mission
OPLAN 5027
OPLAN 8044
Kavkaz-2008
Kavkaz-2008 (second source)
Did Russia use cluster bombs?
Artillery in Abkhazia
BP says pipeline not damaged
BP pipeline attacks disproven
Oil pipelines attacked
Russia hints at precision weapon use
The UN Arms Register
No evidence of Russian troop buildup

Georgia's Air Defense - Kviris Palitra, 14 July 2008
Ukraine acknowledges Buk sale - Kiev Kommentarii, 30 May 2008

Saturday, December 22, 2007

Russian Strategic Aviation - An Imagery Overview

INTRODUCTION

One of the primary missions of the Russian Air Force is that of strategic warfighting. To that end, there are various facilities and aircraft around the nation performing a variety of roles in support of the strategic warfighting mission. While there have been drawdowns and force reductions in recent years, the Russian military still maintains a very robust, capable, and varied strategic warfighting air arm.

AIRCRAFT

Russian strategic air assets fall into two categories: offensive and defensive. The offensive component consists of Tupolev bombers, primarily the Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE-C theater bomber and the Tu-95MS BEAR-H and Tu-160 BLACKJACK strategic missile carriers. The defensive component consists of MiG-31 FOXHOUND interceptors and Beriev A-50 MAINSTAY AEW&C platforms. A handful of Ilyushin Il-78 MIDAS aerial refueling platforms are also in service, primarily tasked with supporting the strategic aviation fleet.

Command and control assets such as the Il-86 CAMBER are also used to support strategic warfighting, but are not within the scope of this article. These assets are based at Moscow-Sheremetyevo.

Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE-C (Visible force: 171 aircraft)
The Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE-C is the primary theater strike aircraft for the Russian military. The Tu-22M3 is employed by both Long Range Aviation and the AV-MF. AV-MF aircraft are primarily tasked in an anti-shipping role. Both air arms employ the Kh-22 (AS-4 KITCHEN) standoff nuclear missile as the BACKFIRE-C's primary armament. Kh-15 (AS-16 KICKBACK) hypersonic strike missiles can also be employed, as well as unguided gravity bombs of various sizes.

Tu-95MS BEAR-H (Visible force: 39 aircraft)
The elderly Tu-95 remains one of Russia's most important combat assets. The Tu-95MS variant is employed as a cruise missile carrier, equipped with an internal rotary launcher for six Kh-55 (AS-15 KENT) ALCMs. Initially, the Tu-95MS was available in two versions, the Tu-95MS-6 and the Tu-95MS-16. The Tu-95MS-6 was armed with the internal rotary launcher, while the Tu-95MS-16 added two hardpoints under each wing allowing for the external carriage of a further ten Kh-55s. In accordance with the START agreement, the external carriage capability was removed, essentially resulting in a force of only Tu-95MS-6 variants. At least one Tu-95MS airframe has been active at Zhukovskiy as the Tu-95MA, being responsible for advanced weapons trials. This aircraft was responsible for launching the Kh-80 Meteorit supersonic ALCMs before that program was cancelled due to development problems.

Tu-160 BLACKJACK (Visible force: 16 aircraft)
The Tu-160 BLACKJACK remains the largest combat aircraft in the world. Approximately 25% larger than it's Western counterpart, the B-1B, the Tu-160 is a supersonic, intercontinental-range cruise missile carrier. Two internal rotary launchers allow for the carriage of twelve Kh-55 ALCMs. The USSR had planned on acquiring 100 Tu-160s, but the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in only a fraction of that number being completed, with 19 aircraft at Priluki AB being taken over by the Ukraine after the breakup. Eight Ukrainian aircraft eventually joined the six operational Russian examples at Engels AB via a debt repayment agreement, with a further aircraft being completed at the Kazan factory. Two or three other aircraft will still be completed at Kazan, and will join the operational fleet, along with two refurbished examples taken from the Tupolev test fleet at Zhukovskiy, one of which was delivered to Engels last year. One operational Tu-160 has been lost, leaving Russia with an eventual fleet of 18 or 19 aircraft, and a current strength of 15 aircraft.

MiG-31 FOXHOUND (Visible force: 213 aircraft)
The MiG-31 FOXHOUND is a strategic interceptor tasked with defending Russia's vast airspace from inbound strategic bombers, cruise missiles, or reconnaissance aircraft. The MiG-31's primary weapon is the R-33S (AA-9 AMOS B) long-range AAM. The R-33S, a SARH weapon, is an improved version of the initial R-33 (AMOS A). The R-33S was developed alongisde an avionics upgrade for the MiG-31 as a response to American espionage which compromised the initial systems, and has a maximum range of 160 kilometers. Three versions of the MiG-31 are presently fielded: the baseline MiG-31,the improved MiG-31B which added IFR capability, and the MiG-31BS, which is a MiG-31 upgraded to MiG-31B standard. Upgrades and overhauls are performed at the factory at Nizhny Novgorod.

A-50 MAINSTAY (Visible force: 19 aircraft)
Beriev's A-50 MAINSTAY is an AEW&C conversion of the Ilyushin Il-76 CANDID transport. Incorporating a Shmel' radar system in a rotodome above the rear fuselage, the A-50 is the airborne early warning component of the strategic defense network.

Il-78 MIDAS (Visible force: 19 aircraft)
The Il-78 MIDAS is an in-flight refueling tanker based on the Il-76 CANDID transport. Russia's Il-78 force is primarily tasked to support strategic aviation due to the small size of the fleet; when the USSR broke up, a good deal of the in-service Il-78s were in the Ukraine. Two versions exist, the Il-78 and Il-78M. The Il-78 is a single-point refueling platform incorporating a drogue system in the rear fuselage. The Il-78M is a three-point refueling platform, adding two additional drogues under the outer wings.

PRIMARY FACILITIES

Strategic aviation facilities are described in the following manner:
-Name (strategic aircraft assigned)
-Any relevant details in brief
-Location, in the form of geographic coordinates
-Visible ORBAT as of 20 December 2007; if the site is in low resolution, that is annotated and no visible ORBAT is listed
-Defenses are listed in the form of nearby SAM sites whose range rings overlap the airfield in question

Alekseyevka (Tu-22M3)
-Location: 49°14'09.85"N 140°11'31.40"E
-Visible ORBAT: 16 Tu-22M3
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Alekseyevka AB:
The following image depicts the Tu-22M3 parking area:
Bolshoye Savino (MiG-31)
-Location: 57°55'00.16"N 56°01'36.45"E
-Visible ORBAT: None (low resolution)
-Defenses: None

Engels (Tu-95MS, Tu-160)
-Location: 51°28'47.26"N 46°12'49.45"E
-Visible ORBAT: 13 Tu-95MS, 12 Tu-160
-Defenses: S-300P garrison 7 kilometers SSW

The following image depicts Engels AB:
The following image depicts the main parking ramp:
The following image depicts the north end of the parking ramp:
The following image depicts the eastern parking area:
Irkutsk Belaya (Tu-22M3)
-Location: 52°54'53.26"N 103°34'31.77"E
-Visible ORBAT: 26 Tu-22M3
-Defenses: S-300PM site 61 kilometers SSE

The following image depicts Irkutsk Belaya AB:
The following image depicts the Tu-22M3 parking area:
The following image depicts 2 Tu-22M3s in a possible maintenance area:
Ivanovo (A-50)
-Location: 57°03'28.62"N 40°58'51.91"E
-Visible ORBAT: 17 A-50
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Ivanovo AB:
The following image depicts the northern parking ramp:
The following image depicts the southern parking ramp:
Kansk (MiG-31)
-Location: 56°07'30.08"N 95°39'56.31"E
-Visible ORBAT: 27 MiG-31
-Defenses: S-300P garrison 49 kilometers W

The following image depicts Kansk AB:
The following image depicts the northeast parking area:
The following image depicts the southwest parking area:
The following image depicts five MiG-31s in a possible maintenance area:
Khotilovo (MiG-31)
-Location: 57°39'19.05"N 34°05'56.13"E
-Visible ORBAT: 15 MiG-31
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Khotilovo AB, apparently undergoing runway repairs:
The following image depicts the north parking area:
The following image depicts the central parking area:
Kotlas (MiG-31)
-Location: 60°59'42.35"N 46°52'04.65"E
-Visible ORBAT: 30 MiG-31
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Kotlas AB:
The following image depicts the north parking area:
The following image depicts the central parking area:
The following image depicts the south parking area:
The following image depicts two MiG-31s on a possible alert parking ramp:
The following image depicts a MiG-31 in a possible maintenance area:
Morshansk (MiG-31)
-Location: 53°26'18.15"N 41°44'13.72"E
-Visible ORBAT: None (low resolution)
-Defenses: None

Olenegorsk (Tu-22M3)
-Location: 68°09'06.94"N 33°27'55.42"E
-Visible ORBAT: 38 Tu-22M3
-Defenses: S-300PM-1 site 7 kilometers NW, S-300PM-1 site 99 kilometers N, S-300PM-1 site 119 kilometers N

The following image depicts Olenegorsk AB:
The following image depicts the northern parking area:
The following image depicts the southern parking area:
Omsk (MiG-31)
-Location: 54°58'25.86"N 73°33'20.49"E
-Visible ORBAT: None (low resolution)
-Defenses: None

Ostrov (Tu-22M3)
-Ostrov is home to the Tu-22M3 training unit.
-Location: 57°17'52.27"N 28°26'01.01"E
-Visible ORBAT: None (low resolution)
-Defenses: None

Petropavlovsk-Yelizovo (MiG-31)
-Location: 53°10'10.91"N 158°27'13.98"E
-Visible ORBAT: 29 MiG-31
-Defenses: S-300PM site 5.4 kilometers SW, S-300PM site 24 kilometers ESE, S-300PM site 25.5 kilometers S

The following image depicts Petropavlovsk-Yelizovo AB:
The following image depicts the northern parking area:
The following image depicts the southern parking area:
The following image depicts five MiG-31s in a possible maintenance area:
Ryazan (Il-78, Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS)
-Ryazan is home to the Tu-95MS training unit.
-Location: 54°38'44.53"N 39°34'18.49"E
-Visible ORBAT: 19 Il-78, 11 Tu-22M3, 9 Tu-95MS
-Defenses: S-300PM-1 site 130 kilometers NW

The following image depicts Ryazan AB:
The following image depicts the southwestern parking area:
The following image depicts the central parking area:
The following image depicts the northeastern parking area:
Sandagou (MiG-31)
-Location: 44°05'04.91"N 133°52'05.85"E
-Visible ORBAT: 20 MiG-31
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Sandagou AB:
The following image depicts the northwest parking area:
The following image depicts the northeast parking area:
The following image depicts two MiG-31s in a possible maintenance area:
Savasleyka (MiG-31)
-Savasleyka is home to the training unit for the MiG-31 fleet.
-Location: 55°26'30.13"N 42°18'42.75"E
-Visible ORBAT: None (low resolution)
-Defenses: None

Shaykovka (Tu-22M3)
-Location: 54°13'32.20"N 34°22'10.00"E
-Visible ORBAT: 25 Tu-22M3
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Shaykovka AB:
The following image depicts the southwestern parking area:
The following image depicts the southeastern parking area and a probable maintenance area:
-Soltsy (Tu-22M3)
-Location: 58°08'21.85"N 30°19'46.96"E
-Visible ORBAT: 20 Tu-22M3
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Soltsy AB:
The following image depicts the parking area:
Ukrainka (Tu-95MS)
-Location: 51°09'56.97"N 128°26'52.51"E
-Visible ORBAT: 16 Tu-95MS (airfield is partly low resolution)
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Ukrainka AB:
The following image depicts the visible parking area:
Ussuriysk (Tu-22M3)
-Location: 43°54'25.82"N 131°55'29.31"E
-Visible ORBAT: 27 Tu-22M3
-Defenses: S-300PM site 60 kilometers S

The following image depicts Ussuriysk AB:
The following image depicts the northern parking area:
The following image depicts the southern parking area:

STAGING FACILITIES

These locations are arctic air bases used to forward-deploy strategic aviation assets.

Anadyr
-Location: 64°44'08.67"N 177°44'34.02"E
-Visible ORBAT: None
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Anadyr AB:
Lakhta
-Lakhta AB is primarily used to support Tu-22M3 deployments.
-Location: 64°22'52.77"N 40°43'19.86"E
-Visible ORBAT: 2 Tu-22M3
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Lakhta AB:
The following image depicts the active parking ramp:
Tiksi
-Location: 71°41'51.07"N 128°54'12.69"E
-Visible ORBAT: None
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Tiksi AB:
Vorkuta East
-Location: 67°27'51.86"N 64°18'27.20"E
-Visible ORBAT: None (low resolution)
-Defenses: None

SUPPORT FACILITIES

These facilities provide a support role to the strategic aviation element.

Kazan
-Kazan is the location of the assembly halls which built the Tu-160, Tu-95, and Tu-22M3. Tu-160 airframes are still being completed here, and refurbishment work on Tu-95, Tu-160, and Tu-22M3 airframes is also conducted here.
-Location: 55°52'00.46"N 49°07'50.89"E
-Visible ORBAT: 1 Tu-160, 6 Tu-22M3

The following image depicts Kazan Airfield:
The following image depicts the parking area:
Nizhny Novgorod
-Nizhny Novgorod is the former location of the MiG-31 assembly line. MiG-31s are stored here as they await upgrade and/or refurbishment and a return to active service.
-Location: 56°19'09.49"N 43°47'55.64"E
-Visible ORBAT: 15 MiG-31

The following image depicts Nizhny Novgorod Airfield:
The following image depicts the western parking area:
The following image depicts the central parking area:
The following image depicts the eastern parking area:
Rzhev (MiG-31)
-Rzhev is a depot-level maintenance facility for the MiG-31 fleet. Many MiG-31s are stored here after being removed from service.
-Location: 56°15'34.72"N 34°24'31.07"E
-Visible ORBAT: 77 MiG-31
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Rzhev AB:
The following image depicts the western parking area:
The following image depicts the eastern parking area:
The following image depicts a MiG-31 taxiing out to the main runway:
Staraya Russa (A-50)
-Staraya Russa is a depot-level maintenance facility which serves various aircraft types, including the A-50.
-Location: 57°57'40.06"N 31°23'02.97"E
-Visible ORBAT: 2 A-50
-Defenses: None

The following image depicts Staraya Russa AB:
The following image depicts the parking area:
Zhukovskiy
-Zhukovskiy is the home of the primary flight test center for the Russian air forces. Each OKB maintains a flight test facility at Zhukovskiy for initial flight trials of prototype aircraft.
-Location: 55°33'11.07"N 38°08'57.53"E
-Visible ORBAT: 1 Tu-95, 3 Tu-160; 1 Tu-95 and 1 Tu-160 are present on the airfield but are in reality operational aircraft from Engels AB flown in for the 2007 Moscow Airshow.

The following image depicts Zhukovskiy AB:
The following image depicts the Tupolev OKB area at Zhukovskiy:

COMBAT PERFORMANCE

In order to fully appreciate the capability and reach of Russia's strategic air arm, the following images are provided depicting the combat radii of different aircraft types.

Tu-22M3 BACKFIRE-C
-The Tu-22M3 has a combat radius of 2,200 kilometers.

The following image depicts the coverage area of the Tu-22M3 in western Russia:
The following image depicts the coverage area of the Tu-22M3 in eastern Russia:
Tu-95MS BEAR-H
-The Tu-95MS has a maximum unrefueled range of 10,500 kilometers with six Kh-55SM ALCMs. Combat radius is notionally calculated at 5,000 kilometers. Bear in mind that range and/or endurance can be increased with in-flight refueling.

The following image depicts North America. Given that the Tu-95MS is a strategic weapons platform, two range depictions are given. Orange lines depict the radius of the Tu-95MS from the three primary BEAR-H airfields, showing the closest points of approach to North America. Red lines depict the inland reach of the 3,000 kilometer range Kh-55SM ALCM. Bear in mind that the inland reach of the Kh-55SM can be increased by forward deploying the Tu-95MS to one of the three Arctic staging bases:
Tu-160 BLACKJACK
-The Tu-160 has a maximum unrefueled range of 12,300 kilometers with twelve Kh-55SM ALCMs. Combat radius is notionally calculated at 6,000 kilometers. Bear in mind that range and/or endurance can be increased with in-flight refueling.

The following image depicts North America. Given that the Tu-160 is a strategic weapons platform, two range depictions are given. The Orange line depicts the radius of the Tu-160 from Engels AB, showing the closest points of approach to North America. The red line depicts the inland reach of the 3,000 kilometer range Kh-55SM ALCM. Bear in mind that the inland reach of the Kh-55SM can be increased by forward deploying the Tu-160 to one of the three Arctic staging bases:
MiG-31 FOXHOUND
-The MiG-31 has a combat radius with no external fuel of 1250 kilometers at Mach 0.8, or 720 kilometers at Mach 2.35. Bear in mind that range and/or endurance can be increased with in-flight refueling.

The following image depicts the coverage area of MiG-31 interceptors in western and central Russia, based on the subsonic 1250 kilometer combat radius:
The following image depicts the coverage area of MiG-31 interceptors in eastern Russia, based on the subsonic 1250 kilometer combat radius:

SOURCES

Satellite imagery is provided courtesy of Google Earth.

The following books were consulted:
-Mikoyan MiG-31 (Famous Russian Aircraft series), by Yefim Gordon
-Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, by Pavel Podvig
-Tupolev Tu-160 BLACKJACK (Red Star Series #9), by Yefim Gordon

-This article was updated on 22 December 2007 to account for newly available and updated overhead imagery; Dolinsk-Sokol and Morshansk were removed from the list of active MiG-31 bases as they have been found to have no aircraft present, airfield imagery has been updated in numerous places, and orders of battle have been updated accordingly.