The Japanese SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

Japan is a heavily populated nation spread out over a series of islands in the Western Pacific. American and Japanese SAM systems have protected Japanese airspace since the early days of the Cold War. Aging systems and recent developments in the region have led Japan to begin fielding a modern air defense and anti-missile network.

OVERVIEW

Japanese SAM systems are subordinate to both the JGSDF and the JASDF. The JGSDF operates the HAWK and Chu-SAM systems, with Japanese Patriot batteries being operated by the JASDF. However, JASDF control networks provide targeting and EW support for all SAM systems in Japan, as the JASDF operates the Aircraft Control and Warning Wings manning Japan's EW sites. 5 JGSDF units and six JASDF units are equipped with HAWK or Patriot SAMs.

EW

24 active and one inactive EW site form the basis of Japan's early warning network. These sites are located around the periphery of Japan and provide support for both JASDF and JGSDF SAM units. The bulk of these locations operate the indigenous FPS-3 EW radar.

The locations of Japan's EW sites can be seen in the image below:
PATRIOT

In 1984 Japan chose the Patriot missile system to replace its aging Nike-Hercules batteries. The initial PAC-1 batteries were upgraded to PAC-2 standard. Six missile groups operate the Patriot in the JASDF, oriented throughout the nation. These batteries are primarily located on the grounds of former Nike-Hercules units, taking advantage of the hardened revetments already present to protect the TELs.

A representative Patriot battery can be seen in the image below. This site is located near Tokyo, and is a former Nike missile position. The main upgrade performed to Nike sites allowing Patriot operation is the inclusion of a raised berm for the AN/MPQ-53 engagement radar, which can clearly be seen. Amusingly, two of the site's former occupants remain as gate guards.
The locations and coverage zones of Japan's Patriot batteries can be seen in the image below. A portion of the Patriot batteries located on Okinawa are in fact operated by the US Army, but cannot sufficiently be differentiated based on the imagery available. As such, they are all included here.
HAWK AND CHU-SAM

The JGSDF has operated the HAWK missile system since 1965. Eleven batteries appear to remain active in available imagery, with other batteries held in-garrison at various locations.

The locations and coverage zones of Japan's active HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
Chu-SAM, the Mitsubishi Type 03, is Japan's indigenous replacement for the HAWK in JSGDF service. Chu-SAM was inducted in 2005, with the first training firings taking place at Fort Bliss, Texas in late 2006. The extent of Chu-SAM deployment is not currently known. Chu-SAM will offer a significant capability increase in terms of performance and mobility when compared to the HAWK.

Chu-SAM components can be seen in-garrison near Tokyo in the image below:
MISSILE DEFENSE

The increasing threat of DPRK ballistic missiles has led Japan to pursue a relatively robust BMD network. There are three primary components to the system: sensors, land-based PAC-3 missiles, and sea-based SM-3 missiles. The system began to be studied in 1995, with the first component, the PAC-3, becoming operational in 2007. PAC-3 systems were deployed to northern Japan in 2009 in anticipation of DPRK missile tests.

The BMD sensor network will consist of three radar types. Seven FPS-3 radars in the existing EW network have been modified to improve missile detection capabilities. In addition, four new FPS-5 phased-array radars (previously developed as the FPS-XX) will be built by 2012. In the interim, a US FBX-T radar system deployed to Japan in June of 2006 to provide BMEW capability. This system was deployed at Shariki in northern Japan. The US also began operating PAC-3 missiles at Kadena in late 2006.

Japan's projected land-based BMEW network can be seen in the image below. Modified FPS-3 sites are marked with light blue circles, FPS-5 radar site locations are marked with dark blue circles, and the FBX-T radar location is marked as a yellow circle.
The FBX-T radar system can be seen in the image below. This radar has been used to monitor DPRK missile tests. This is a temporary location, with a more permanent site being constructed approximately 1 kilometer to the south.
For the sea-based portion of the network, four Kongo-class AEGIS destroyers will be upgraded and equipped to fire the SM-3. Work on these four vessels, the Kongo, Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishima, will be complete by the end of 2010. Kongo completed modifications in 2007 and conducted Japan's first AEGIS missile intercept in December of that year.

Modification of Japan's command and control networks to incorporate the new BMD capabilities and mission will be completed by 2012

CONCLUSION

The changing threat environment, coupled with the age of legacy systems such as the HAWK, have led Japan to develop one of the most modern air defense networks found in the world. When the BMD network is fully operational after 2012, Japan will have provided its citizens with a robust defensive capability to repel both air and missile attacks on its soil.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

PAC-3 deployed
PAC-3 flight test
Chu-SAM
Chu-SAM testing

Japan's Missile Defense, March 2007
Overview of Japan's Defense Policy, Japanese MoD
Defense White Paper, Japanese MoD, 2009

Underground Airfields: The DPRK

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact nations erected numerous hardened aircraft shelters (HASs) to protect their multi-million dollar combat aircraft during wartime. Over time, this practice spread throughout the world's conflict zones, with similar structures being found in many Middle Eastern and Asian nations. Some nations, however, took this practice one step further: they began building full underground facilities (UGFs) to store aircraft.

UGFs are commonly used in many nations to store and protect military hardware, but only a few nations have used them to protect their combat aircraft. These nations include the DPRK, China, and Taiwan in Asia, and Albania, the FRY, Sweden, and Switzerland in Europe. In this feature, the facilities used by the DPRK will be examined.

THE DPRK

Twenty major airfields in the DPRK feature significant UGFs for storing combat aircraft. In addition, two locations feature unique runway layouts incorporating UGFs, and seven airfields feature no UGF storage facilities. The locations of these facilities can be seen in the image below. The airbases incorporating UGFs are marked in red, those lacking UGFs are marked in blue/white, and those incorporating hardened airfields are marked in yellow.
UGF DESIGN

There are two basic UGF layouts employed by the DPRK to protect and house combat aircraft. These facilities are either positioned close to the main runway, facilitating ease of movement between the UGF and the operations area, or further afield, suggesting their use primarily for long-term storage. In addition, they are connected to their assigned facilities using two different taxiway styles. Some UGFs are connected by simple taxiways which wind their way through bulidings and terrain to reach the runways, while others appear to have a more interesting purpose, that of a backup launching strip for concealed assets. This information, combined with an analysis of the types stationed at each location, can give an indication as to the employment strategy or readiness level of aircraft contained within. Three airbases will be examined in detail to provide an overview of the DPRK's UGF design, layout, and potential use.

Sunchon AB

Sunchon AB is arguably the DPRK AF's most important installation. Situated approximately 40 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang, it is home to the most advanced combat aircraft in the DPRK. Sunchon AB is home to the DPRK's MiG-29 (FULCRUM) and Su-25 (FROGFOOT) fleets. The MiG-29 represents the DPRK's only true modern, 4th generation fighter aircraft. The Su-25 is likewise the only true survivable, modern ground attack aircraft in the DPRK. Sunchon's MiG-29 unit also makes up roughly half of the BVR-capable combat aircraft in the DPRK, with Pukchang's MiG-23 (FLOGGER) unit being the only other BVR shooters in the AF's inventory. Despite widely published claims to the contrary (including a thoroughly ludicrous Wikipedia article), whereby the MiG-29 fleet is believed to be based at a host of other locations, Sunchon is the only facility where the MiG-29 has been imaged inside of the DPRK.

An overview of Sunchon AB is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:
Sunchon's UGF is situated in close proximity to the airfield itself. There are three main entrances, with two entrances likely leading to the storage area for operational aircraft. The third entrance may be for long-term storage of derelict or obsolete aircraft, or for entrance into a dedicated maintenance or GSE storage area. Sunchon's UGF is connected by a series of taxiways to the main apron area.

An overview of the UGF at Sunchon AB can be seen in the image below:
Sunchon AB has ramp space for roughly 34 combat aircraft, with HASs for four more aircraft. There is also an alert or arming/dearming pad at the north end of the runway which can easily park two aircraft. Open ramp space is therefore provided for at least 38 aircraft. 66 modern aircraft, discounting possible attrition since delivery, are based at Sunchon AB, indicating that at least half of them are stored in the UGF at any point in time. 36 Su-25s and 24 MiG-29s were delivered from the USSR, including 4 UB/UBK training versions of each type, as well as 6 MiG-29S (FULCRUM-C) SKD kits assembled in the DPRK. It was the MiG-29S that was used to intercept a USAF RC-135 in 2003.

Analysis of imagery of Sunchon AB provides insight into a number of factors. First, while between 19 and 29 Su-25s are visible depending on the date, only 5 to 9 MiG-29s are visible. This may indicate a much lower readiness level in the far more technologically complicated MiG-29 fleet. Second, it would appear that aircraft are moved from the UGF to the parking ramps for operations, before being re-stored. The image below depicts an open UGF, and an Su-25 being towed from the apron back to its underground hangar:
Furthermore, analyzing the layout of Sunchon AB in relation to the UGF illustrates an interesting feature. A 1350 meter taxiway extends from the UGF to a point beyond the main parking aprons. This taxiway may in fact be an auxiliary runway, allowing aircraft to be prepared for flight while concealed within the UGF and then launched with little or no warning for a strike against the ROK. While the MiG-29 would likely be employed to defend the skies above Pyongyang, the Su-25 is certainly a credible platform for use in this capacity given its relative survivability (compared to other available air to ground platforms in the inventory) and its high payload. Alternatively, this may facilitate the storage of armed, combat-ready MiG-29s in an alert status, protecting them from the elements while other airframes are removed for training flights as needed.

Sunan AB

Sunan AB, situated just north of Pyongyang, is the primary home to the DPRK AF's air transport assets. Assigned aircraft include the DPRK's Il-76 (CANDID) fleet. It also serves as the major international air terminal for the DPRK.

An overview of Sunan AB is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:
There are no identified combat aircraft at Sunan AB, but the UGF can be used to illustrate a different layout than that of Sunchon AB. In the case of Sunan AB, the UGF is situated a much greater distance from the main operating area, likely indicating that aircraft stored therein are not operational or are being held in storage. Also, the UGF is not connected by a taxiway suitable for use as an auxiliary runway, reducing the chance that assets contained in the UGF are suitable for rapid deployment.

An overview of the UGF at Sunan AB can be seen in the image below:
Hwangju AB

Hwangju AB, approximately 40 kilometers south of Pyongyang, is home to a DPRK AF MiG-21 (FISHBED) unit.

An overview of Hwangju AB is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:
Hwangju's overall layout is similar in many respects to that of Sunchon AB. Hwangju features three ramp areas and four HASs for housing its assigned aircraft. It also features a UGF complex for storing MiG-21s, which is connected to the main facility by an auxiliary runway similar to that found at Sunchon AB. The primary difference in the two facilities is the distance. Sunchon AB features a UGF in relatively close proximity to the main airfield, suggesting that combat aircraft may be stored there on a regular basis. Analysis of the available imagery would seem to validate this theory. In contrast, the UGF complex at Hwangju AB is much further removed from the main airbase. Imagery indicates that a consistent number of MiG-21s, around 20, is parked on the main ramp space of the airfield. This suggests that the UGF is not used for primary storage of aircraft, as it appears to be for Sunchon AB's MiG-29 fleet. This illustrates the relationship between UGF location and storage activity in the DPRK AF.

An overview of the UGF at Hwangju AB can be seen in the image below:
HAS Use

As operational fighter bases, both Sunchon AB and Hwangju AB possess four HASs in close proximity to the main runway. These facilities are likely employed for alert aircraft, enabling them to be protected to a degree from a preemptive strike. While aircraft parked on open ramp areas are soft targets, those contained in HASs would potentially be available for airbase defense or counterstrike sorties in cooperation with aircraft retained within the UGFs.

HARDENED RUNWAYS

Onchon airbase in the west and Kang Da Ri airfield in the east feature unique hardened facilities. These airbases incorporate large UGFs for storage, maintenance, and operations work, with runway surfaces exiting the UGFs in multiple directions. No information is available as to the purpose for, use of, or units assigned to these facilities. The most probable use for these unique airbases is as dispersal sites for combat aircraft. They represent very survivable hardened structures, and could potentially house a significant number of aircraft. The only drawback is that deploying a significant number of aircraft to each facility would be a potential identifiable indicator of forthcoming hostile action. To mask such activity, the DPRK would likely establish routine training deployments to each location.

An alternative use for the hardened airbases has nothing to do with aircraft and at this time represents pure speculation. Given that air activity at either location has never been publicly disclosed or identified in imagery, an interesting concept would be to employ the facilities as hardened SSM bases. The facilities resemble airfields in their layout, but a concrete SSM launch pad is little different from a runway surface. Ergo, the DPRK could stockpile SSMs in these facilities, using the "runways" as mass launching areas. In this scenario, transporting SSMs to the facilities would be far easier to mask than the deployment of combat aircraft. The facilities could represent logical storage and mating points for nuclear or chemical warheads, allowing them to remain protected prior to use. Furthermore, what better way to hide an SSM base than by designing it as an airfield? The only serious additional expense would be the additional concrete used to create a "runway" rather than a number of SSM launch pads. In this vein, given the security and survivability of these facilities, they could also represent launch points for UAVs or drone conversions of obsolete aircraft armed with nuclear warheads. At this point in time, however, the facilities are assumed to be exactly what they appear to be: hardened airfields.

Onchon AB

Onchon AB is unique in the DPRK as it possesses both a traditionally designed airfield and a separate hardened airbase facility. The airfield itself is home to a number of old, outdated combat aircraft including the MiG-19/J-6 (FARMER).

An overview of Onchon AB depicting its location relative to the hardened airbase can be seen in the image below:
The hardened airbase at Onchon consists of a single massive UGF with multiple entrances, and three runway surfaces. The facility was noted as being complete in January of 2004. The two primary runway surfaces lead directly into the massive UGF. A third surface useable as an auxiliary runway is connected to the main facility through a taxiway leading to one of the primary runways and to two secondary, secured UGF entrances. These secured entrances may lack the clearance for combat aircraft to use them to gain access to the UGF, but may provide entrance and exit points for GSE or other necessary equipment. A small exterior parking ramp is also provided, possibly for alert aircraft.

Details of the Onchon AB hardened airfield can be seen in the image below:
Kang Da Ri AB

As of 2007, Kang Da Ri AB was still under construction. It is a hardened airbase similar in concept to that found at Onchon. Kang Da Ri AB consists of a large UGF with two separate entrances leading directly to runway surfaces. There is a separate external runway surface, but unlike Onchon it does not lead directly to a UGF portal. Instead, it leads to one of the main runway surfaces via a taxiway still under construction in the latest imagery.

Details of the Kang Da Ri hardened airfield can be seen in the image below:
STRIKE OPTIONS

Employing UGFs to store aircraft does not necessarily mean they will remain viable combat assets. There are numerous options available for negating the impact of these facilities. While penetrating weapons may not be able to access the UGFs themselves from above, PGMs could be used in an attempt to destroy the access doors to the facilities, collapsing the entrances and sealing the aircraft inside for a period of time. Taxiways and auxiliary runways could also be cratered and seeded with bomblets from cluster munitions. The value of the UGFs therefore depends on the ability of DPRK personnel to clear and repair runway and taxiway surfaces and gain access to the facilities to allow the assets held within to be deployed.

CONCLUSION

The DPRK employs a number of UGFs throughout the nation to house various types of military equipment. The DPRK's Air Force is no exception, and the employment of UGFs will ensure that a portion of the air element remains viable after a first series of strikes by the ROK or USA.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

The South Korean SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

With cross-border tensions between the two Koreas seeming to increase daily, the Republic of Korea's (ROK) SAM network is a significant element in protecting its citizens and infrastructure from hostile forces. Currently undergoing a deep modernization, the ROK's SAM network represents a significant facet of the nation's defense against air and missile attack.

ORGANIZATION

The ROK's SAM force is operated by the Air Defense Artillery Command. The Air Defense Artillery Command became part of the ROK Air Force in 1991, previously being subordinate to the ROK Army. The ROK Air Force also controls the EW radar facilities throughout the nation. EW radars report information to the ROK Air Force's Master Control Reporting Center, which is responsible for managing the airspace above and around the peninsula.Additional SAM assets available to defend ROK airspace are operated by the US Army.

EW NETWORK

Early warning coverage of the ROK is provided by seventeen identified EW sites. Five of these sites are positioned along the DMZ, with a further three positioned on the islands of Baegryeong-do to the west, Ullung-do to the east, and Cheju-do to the south. EW coverage will be bolstered in the near future with the introduction of four Boeing 737 PEACE EYE AEW&C platforms, the first of which was handed over to KAI at Sacheon in February 2010 for radar integration.

The locations of the ROK's EW sites can be seen in the image below:
HAWK

The most numerous SAM system employed in the ROK is the MIM-23 HAWK. The 40 kilometer range missile system is deployed at twenty three locations spread throughout the peninsula. While the HAWK is technically a mobile, tactical SAM system, it is employed in a strategic capacity by the ROK, being emplaced at fixed, hardened locations containing both the missile launchers and the guidance radars.

The locations and coverage zones of the ROK's HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
NIKE-HERCULES

The primary long-range strategic SAM system employed by the ROK is the Nike-Hercules. Six sites remain operational in available imagery, primarily situated in the northern third of the nation. Nike-Hercules batteries are each split between two locations, one hosting the guidance radars and another hosting the actual missile battery.

An example of the Nike-Hercules split site layout can be seen in the image below, which depicts a Nike-Hercules location near Yeoju, southeast of Seoul:
The locations and coverage zones of the ROK's Nike-Hercules batteries can be seen in the image below:
While the Nike-Hercules boasts a range of 155 kilometers, an impressive number, its effectiveness is in doubt. Recent incidents have suggested that the missile may no longer be a viable weapon system, causing the ROK to pursue other options. In fact, due to the varied dates of imagery available to analyze the individual battery locations, some (or all) of them may already have been withdrawn from use. However, as no reporting has been located to suggest that the Nike-Hercules has been fully withdrawn by the ROK, those sites which remain active in available imagery are noted here.

Nike-Hercules may remain a significant weapon in the ROK's arsenal following retirement from the air defense role. Two SSM variants have been developed, with ranges of 150 and 180-250 kilometers. These systems are referred to as Hyunmoo I and Hyunmoo II, and may be sited at existing Nike-Hercules facilities as they can employ the same launch systems. Interestingly, the northwestern Nike-Hercules site west of Inchon is 180 kilometers from P'yongyang, and does not appear to have a guidance radar facility nearby necessary for surface-to-air operations. This facility may represent an operational Hyunmoo SSM base, and was apparently constructed between 2004 and 2008. It is unlikely that the ROK would construct such a significant facility merely to support a SAM that was already overdue for replacement.

The Inchon Nike-Hercules site can be seen in the image below:
PATRIOT

To bolster the air defense of the ROK, the US Army began deploying Patriot strategic SAM batteries to the peninsula in the 1990's. US Army Patriot batteries began to be upgraded in 2003 with the addition of the PAC-3 missile, optimized for the ATBM role. The PAC-2 missile has a range of 160 kilometers, with the PAC-3 having a range of approximately 30 kilometers due to its significantly smaller airframe.

There are currently eight Patriot batteries assigned to the ROK, with active batteries located at Osan (two), Suwon (two), and Kunsan (one) airbases. A sixth active battery was briefly located at Gwangju airbase in October of 2004, but was relocated by December of 2006. Despite the protests from anti-American elements when the battery was sited at the Korean airbase, the US Army had never intended the relocation to be permanent. It relocated to Camp Carroll near Daegu, where it remains garrisoned with the other two batteries assigned to the ROK for future deployment when required. Each Patriot battery is typically deployed with eight TELs and a guidance radar.

A representative Patriot deployment at Osan AB can be seen in the iamge below:
The locations and coverage zones of US Army Patriot batteries deployed in the ROK can be seen in the image below. The Camp Carroll garrison facility is also annotated.
The ROK began to investigate purchasing its own Patriot missile systems in the 1990s. The SAM-X program was initiated in 1990 to find a successor to the Nike-Hercules. Due to financial and political reasons, the program did not bear fruit until 2007, when a decision was made to purchase second-hand German PAC-2 batteries. The first ex-German Patriots were delivered in 2008. They will serve in a trials capacity before being operationally deployed in 2012.

A SAM training facility southeast of Daegu was expanded between 2003 and 2007. The timing is significant as this was when the ROK government was still investigating its options for SAM-X, and by this stage had decided to focus on a variant of the Patriot system. This facility, which likely trains ROK SAM operators as evidenced by the presence of Nike-Hercules equipment, was hosting Patriot equipment in January of 2009. This likely represents the first sighting of ROK-operated Patriot equipment in imagery.

The ROK SAM training facility can be seen in the image below:
Unconfirmed reporting suggests that the ex-German Patriot systems have been deployed near Seosan, Suwon, Incheon, and Gangneung. This report first appeared in September of 2008, coinciding with the first deliveries of Patriots to the ROK. Sighting ROK Patriot equipment at the training facility near Daegu suggests that it was not deployed directly after delivery as the report suggests. With the exception of Suwon, these locations all feature Nike-Hercules batteries. While Patriot deployment has not been confirmed at these locations, they do represent logical deployment sites in the future once crews have been trained and the sites have been reconfigured to support Patriot batteries.

CAPABILITIES

On paper the ROK's SAM network appears to be relatively robust. Sites are organized in a logical fashion, often enjoying overlapping fields of fire. Terrain concerns, particularly in the areas closest to the DMZ, are largely alleviated by placing many of the sites at high altitude atop mountain ranges. The bulk of the ROK-operated sites are consolidated in the heavily populated northwestern sector.

The coverage zones of ROK-controlled SAM batteries can be seen in the image below:
US-operated Patriot batteries provide additional defense against both aircraft and ballistic missiles over a large portion of the nation. This added coverage can be seen in the image below, which adds range rings for PAC-2 missiles to those of the ROK's HAWK and Nike-Hercules batteries:
The main problem facing the ROK's SAM network is one of quality. Nike-Hercules and HAWK systems are both legacy systems better suited for museum display than battlefield use at this juncture. HAWK missile batteries likely retain a degree of effectiveness thanks to numerous upgrades being available during their service lives, but they lack the range to effectively protect the peninsula. Cognizant of the deficiencies of the HAWK system in the 21st Century, original plans called for the replacement of ROK HAWK batteries by 2010, a deadline which will not be reached. By 2012, Nike-Hercules batteries should be withdrawn in place of Patriot batteries, providing a significant upgrade to the ROK SAM network in terms of overall capability.

FUTURE PLANS

In the future, the ROK's SAM network will see significant changes. First and foremost, the ROK will no longer rely on the ineffective Nike-Hercules for long-range air defense, with Patriot batteries replacing these systems in 2012. Whether the withdrawl of Nike-Hercules SAM batteries will affect the Hyunmoo programs is not known at this time.

A replacement for the HAWK is being co-developed with the Russian Almaz design bureau, and is slated to complete development in 2011. This system, codenamed KM-SAM or Cheolmae-II, will employ a modified Fakel 9M96 active radar homing SAM along with a modern phased array radar. KM-SAM batteries will consist of a radar vehicle, a command post vehicle, and up to eight TELs, all mounted on wheeled vehicles for high mobility. Each TEL will carry eight cold-launch missile canisters. The modified 9M96 dispenses with the original Russian design's canard foreplanes, but retains the nose-mounted reaction control thrusters. It will also employ a directional warhead, and has an advertised range capability of over 40 kilometers.

The ROK also plans to create a missile defense network called KAMD, incorporating the Elta EL/M-2080 Green Pine BMEW radar, Patriot systems, and KDX-III AEGIS destroyers. Mention has also been made of an improved Cheolmae-II called K-THAAD forming part of this network. Creation of such a system is ironic given that protests over potential PAC-3 purchases were due in part to a feeling that the ROK would be drawn into a US-led anti-missile network.

CONCLUSION

The ROK currently fields a SAM network that would have been state of the art in the 1960s, and effective into the early 1980s. The modernization programs underway will correct many of its deficiencies and shortcomings, allowing the network to achieve technological parity with other nations in the region and provide capable and effective defense well into the 21st Century. Hopefully the ROK's citizens will find their government's desire to defend them acceptable.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Patriot moves to Camp Carroll
PEACE EYE Delivered
SAM-X
PAC-3 Deployed to Korea
German Patriots Delivered
Seoul Begins Deploying Patriot Missile Interceptors
Air Defense Artillery Command
Hyunmoo Ballistic Missiles
Korean Missile Defense

The North Korean SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea fields one of the most capable third-world strategic SAM networks on paper. However, despite the high concentration of strategic SAM batteries and EW sites, there are significant issues in the network which need to be addressed in the near future. If these issues are ignored, the DPRK will be placing itself at risk.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

The DPRK's strategic SAM assets are subordinate to the Air Force. The Air Force operates a variety of Soviet-era equipment. The following strategic SAM systems are currently in service: S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON).

EW Coverage

Thirty three active and one inactive EW sites provide the DPRK with early warning radar coverage, used for SAM system target acquisition and track handoff, and GCI control of fighter units. These EW sites are primarily consolidated in the southern half of the nation, providing substantial coverage of the capital and the DMZ. Identified EW radars operating in the DPRK are predominately Soviet-era systems, although the presence of a JY-8 (WALL RUST) radar indicates that Chinese hardware is also in use. How well the Chinese system integrates with the rest of the FSU-era equipment is not known, but it is potentially not a problem given that China operates a number of Soviet and Russian systems. The following systems have been identified in available imagery:

P-12/18 (SPOON REST)
P-14 (TALL KING)
P-35/37 (BAR LOCK)
P-80 (BACK NET)
36D6 (TIN SHIELD)
JY-8 (WALL RUST)

The US DoD reports that the following radars are also in service, but they have not been identified in available imagery at this time:

5N69 (BIG BACK)
P-8/10 (KNIFE REST)
P-15 (FLAT FACE)
P-15M (SQUAT EYE)
PRV-11 (SIDE NET)
PRV-13 (ODD PAIR)

The following image depicts the locations of identified EW radar sites in the DPRK:
The following image depicts a notional DPRK EW site. Most EW sites appear to be host to a single example of one radar type, in this case a P-14. Other radars, especially smaller units such as those of the P-12/18 series, may be present but not visible in available imagery. Alternatively, they may be held in reserve to expand the network when required, or may simply not be discovered yet. AAA sites, such as the battery seen here, are common at both EW and SAM sites to provide additional defense.
Interestingly, the only strategic SAM system which appears to possess an organic EW system is the S-200, with each battery containing a P-14 radar. The S-75 and S-125 batteries do not appear to field any organic EW elements, in which case they must rely on either the external network or the limited functionality of their engagement radars to provide target acquisition and track generation. It is possible that these SAM batteries do contain EW elements, but that they have not been located or are not visible in available imagery.

A further EW system available to the DPRK is the Ramona passive detection system. The advantage to the Ramona is that it does not radiate, allowing it to be relocated to complicate targeting with considerably more ease than a strategic SAM battery. The Ramona system has not been located in available imagery, but is believed to be a leftover Soviet system, emplaced and operated by the USSR.

SAM Coverage

There are currently fifty eight active strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. S-75 sites are red, S-125 sites are light blue, and S-200 sites are purple. As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of the deployed strategic SAM assets are located along the DMZ and the coasts.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by the identified DPRK strategic SAM sites. Using the same color scheme applied previously, SA-2 zones are red, S-125 zones are light blue, and S-200 zones are purple.
The S-75

There are currently forty six active S-75 sites inside of the DPRK, constituting the bulk of the strategic SAM force. According to SIPRI, a total of 45 S-75 Dvina systems were delivered to the DPRK from the USSR. 15 batteries were supplied between 1962 and 1964, with the remaining 30 batteries being supplied between 1966 and 1971. A total of 1950 missiles were reportedly supplied to arm the batteries. S-75 batteries are deployed to provide barrier air defense of the DPRK's coastlines and the DMZ, as well as coverage of the bulk of the DPRK's interior.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-75 batteries:
The S-125

There are currently ten active S-125 sites inside of the DPRK. Seven batteries are positioned to defend the capital of Pyongyang, with the other three situated to defend the nuclear research center at Yongbyon. The DPRK operates the S-125M Neva-M variant, with SIPRI reporting that eight batteries were supplied between 1985 and 1986.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-125 batteries:
Seven of the deployed S-125 batteries, six around Pyongyang and one near Yongbyon, are situated at sophisticated hardened facilities. These hardened sites contain three launch revetments for 5P73 4-rail launchers and a radar position for the RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) engagement radar. The launchers can be retracted into bunkers when not in use. Similarly, the engagement radar can be lowered into a bunker and protected by a retractable cover, which splits in half and slides open when the radar is exposed.

A hardened S-125 site near Pyongyang can be seen in the image below:
The S-200

There are currently two active S-200 sites inside of the DPRK. These sites are placed near the east and west coasts in the southern portion of the nation, allowing them to range far offshore and deep into the ROK. The S-200 represents the longest-range strategic SAM system in the DPRK's arsenal. Four S-200 batteries were supplied to the DPRK between 1987 and 1988, and two batteries are likely co-located at each location.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-200 batteries:
As with the S-125, the DPRK employs hardened facilities for the S-200. Elevators are provided for the two 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars at each location allowing them to be stowed undergroudn when not in use, and hardened bunkers are provided for the 5P72 launch rails.

Inactive Sites

There are currently twenty nine identified inactive strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK. There are twenty seven S-75 sites and two S-125 sites. The bulk of these sites are located in the vicinity of Pyongyang. As such, they may represent facilities available for bolstering capital area air defenses during a time of conflict. They may also be employed as relocation facilities, complicating targeting of active batteries. Some inactive locations, notably those near the northwest border with China and near Kuum-ni on the northeastern coast, are situated in coverage gaps in the SAM network, suggesting that they may have been labeled as inactive when last imaged due to their assets being relocated for training or maintenance purposes.

The following image depicts the locations of inactive strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK:
Support Facilities

Interestingly, there are no identified support facilities related to the strategic SAM force in the DPRK. Given that the DPRK employs a great deal of hardened and underground facilities, this is not necessarily suprising. Many of these facilities are identified in other nations due to the identifiable presence of SAM components in imagery. If these facilities are kept hidden in the DPRK, then their identification would be extremely difficult. However, it should be assumed that such facilities do exist, even if they have not yet been located or conclusively identified. These facilities would provide maintenance functions, store missile reloads, and garrison surplus equipment for future deployment.

STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

The DPRK appears to possess an intelligently designed, layered air defense network at first glance. S-75 sites are positioned to provide barrier air defense of the coastal and southern border regions, with the remaining S-75 and S-125 batteries bolstering inland defenses and protecting critical locations.

S-200 Coverage

Long-range air defense is provided by the DPRK's S-200 batteries. The S-200 is a significant threat to ISR and support aircraft operating in the theater, such as the USAF's U-2R based out of Osan AB in the ROK. The location and range of the S-200 would hold any such cooperative target at risk shortly following takeoff from most of the airfields in the ROK. Ergo, while the S-200 is not a serious threat to any non-cooperative, maneuverable targets such as fighter aircraft, it represents a significant problem for any potential aggressor.

Border Coverage

Many of the DPRK's S-75 batteries are positioned along the coastline and along the DMZ. These systems are placed to provide barrier air defense to deter any foreign intrusion into the DPRK's airspace. The majority of these systems are positioned to provide overlapping fields of fire to strengthen air defenses in these areas. The northern border with China and the northeastern border with Russia are left undefended, likely due to the DPRK not anticipating that either nation would be a party to hostilities against it.

Inland Coverage

The wide-ranging deployment of military facilities in the central part of the nation has precipitated the siting of S-75 and S-125 batteries to protect much of the DPRK's interior. S-125 batteries are specifically sited to protect two areas, Pyongyang and Yongbyon.

Air defense facilities and coverage zones near the capital of Pyongyang can be seen in the image below:
Air defense facilities and coverage zones near the Yongbyon nuclear research complex can be seen in the image below:
Interestingly, one location left udnefended is the underground nuclear test facility in the northeast. This may be due to the fact that if air defenses are present, analysts will assume that there is something there worth protecting. Similarly, the DPRK's rocket test sites at Musudan-ri and Changya-dong are also currently unprotected.

Denial and Deception Efforts

It is possible that many of the sites identified as active are not in fact legitimate SAM sites. With a number of camoflaged and underground facilities, the DPRK is clearly aware of the concept of denial and deception. Such practices may be in place in the strategic SAM network.

Consider the figures. It is reported that forty five S-75 batteries have been delivered, but forty six sites have been identified as operational. Many of these sites do not use traditional FSU site layouts, and are partially obscured by trees and other vegetation. The same numerical discrepancy exists in the S-125 force, with ten sites appearing active but only eight batteries reportedly being delivered. In addition, seven of the S-125 batteries have been provided with hardened facilities, begging the question of why the others have not. It is possible that the active S-125 batteries found at non-hardened facilities are in fact decoy sites. However, there is not sufficient evidence to conclusively prove this one way or the other.

The simplest method available to prove if a site is active or a decoy outside of having a personal ELINT system is to examine the imagery for the associated cable connections and other typical equipment found at active batteries. However, due to the aforementioned vegetation, many of these sites cannot be examined in this fashion. As such, if they contain what appears to be active equipment, they are assumed to be active batteries.

One mock S-125 site has been identified conclusively. This site, seen in the image below, contains a radar mockup and three launcher mockups. Note the southernmost launcher mockup. This launcher is clearly a mockup, having only two widely separated launch rails which are not parallel. Were this an actual 5P73 launcher, there would be four perfectly parallel rails. The imagery is of sufficient quality to discern that there are in fact only two rails. The spacing of the rails also indicates that this is not a 5P71 two-rail launcher. Further evidence of this site's true nature is found in the lack of any support equipment. None of the command and control vans are present, which would render this site unuseable even if it were fitted with operational equipment.
Air Defense Issues

The primary issue facing the DPRK's air defense network is one of age. While the equipment may still be serviceable, none of it is a major threat to a modern air arm. The DPRK desperately needs an infusion of modern air defense systems if it is to remain viable in the 21st Century.

The S-75 and S-125 have been faced multiple times by modern air arms since 1990 and have consistently been defeated by current tactics and electronic warfare techniques and systems. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia all possessed these systems and they were all defeated. The main victory claimed by these systems was the downing of an F-117A by a Yugoslavian S-125 battery in 1999, but this was due more to excellent intelligence support (they knew the F-117's route and whatever idiot planner was responsible used the same flight path over and over), outstanding site discipline (the site did not often radiate to give its position away), and the addition of an optical tracking system than the actual effectiveness of the system. In a conceivable conflict the DPRK would be facing American and ROK aircraft, and the USAF has exploited the S-75 and S-125 for decades. The S-200 may be marginally more credible as a threat, but as mentioned before it is only a significant threat to a cooperative (i.e. nonmaneuverable and slow) target. It has also been physically exploited based on the presence of equipment at the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range, but it is not known when this was acquired, meaning that the DPRK may have a more recent iteration of the system with a few tricks up its sleeve that remain undocumented. Given American reliance on ISR and IFR platforms during wartime air operations, it is likely that the S-200 batteries would be struck during the opening salvo of any conflict.

The other major obstacle to the DPRK's strategic SAM force is terrain. Much of the terrain in the DPRK is very varied, including that near the DMZ. Even a height difference of a few hundred feet can produce an exploitable blind zone in a SAM battery's coverage. More critically, many of the S-75 batteries along the DMZ are placed in positions of lower altitude than the surrounding terrain, restricting the fields of view of the SAM batteries. This is a significant error in the placement of these systems, as it denys them the ability to function to their maximum degree of effectiveness. The hardened S-125 and S-200 batteries were placed more logically at higher elevations than surrounding terrain, allowing them greater freedom of operation.

One further issue to address is the overreliance on AAA and MANPADS' in the DPRK. The DPRK possesses some of the highest AAA concentrations in the world. The general cocnept is that combat aircraft will fly at lower altitudes to more easily evade SAM batteries, making them susceptible to AAA or MANPADS'. What the DPRK has overlooked is the fact that its SAM defenses are inadequate in light of current ECM and SEAD systems, allowing combat aircraft to fly at higher altitudes to avoid the bulk of the AAA and the entirety of the MANPADS threat. AAA is comparatively cheap and can be very effective in the right environment, but the DPRK seems to have seriously erred in its judgement.

CONCLUSION

The DPRK is the new Iraq. During the lead-up to Operation DESERT STORM, the Iraqi air defense network was often described as being one of the world's most capable. This turned out to be an erroneous description, based in part due to Iraq's overreliance on dated technology and weapon systems. The same problems which plagued Iraq's air defense network in 1991 are evident in North Korea's current network, and must be rectified if the DPRK intends to field any sort of credible air defense in the 21st Century.

SOURCES

-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of North Korea and may therefore not represent the entire air defense network.

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

SIPRI
Ramona in the DPRK

North Korea Country Handbook, US DoD, 1997

Burmese Nukes?

A few days ago, some news outlets began reporting on Burma's potential nuclear weapons program. I was contacted by Dr. Lewis over at ArmsControlWonk and asked to do some image interpretation of one of the potential sites. Check out what I came up with here.

Nuclear Korea

INTRODUCTION

On the 25th of May, 2009, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted its second nuclear weapons test. Once again, the DPRK has become an area of focus for intelligence analysts and politicians as the next course of action for the West is determined. While it remains to be seen whether or not tensions between the DPRK, its southern neighbor, and the rest of the world will be mitigated, one fact remains: the DPRK is developing a nuclear arsenal.

NUCLEAR TESTING

The DPRK has detonated two nuclear devices in the past three years. The first test took place in October of 2006, with the second taking place in May of 2009. Seismic monitoring has provided analysts with a general location of both test events, along with a rough determination of the yield of both tests. The first test seems to have been a sub-kiloton event, with the second test falling in the 1-3 kiloton range. The test location is roughly 65 kilometers northwest of the Musudan-Ri missile test complex, in the isolated northeastern sector of the DPRK.

THE TEST SITE

The DPRK's nuclear test site consists of multiple areas. The isolated location is ideal for this type of testing; there is no civillian presence to speak of, and the terrain allows for UGFs to be employed at will to protect and mask sensitive activity. The bulk of the test area consists of three likely test locations, five unidentified locations, and a rail transfer point located south of Sumunnae, representing the only significant source of transportation into the area.

The locations of the identified facilities and areas in the DPRK's nuclear test area can be seen in the image below. Unidentified facilities are marked as red buildings.
Two of the possible test locations are similar, with the third site being of a wholly different configuration. Of the two similar sites, the northern site is commonly associated with the DPRK's nuclear testing. Whether this is due to intelligence sources leaking information or due to imagery interpretation, it is interesting to note that the southern site has escaped mention, as has the central site. Moreover, Globalsecurity offers before and after imagery of the northern site captured at the time of the 2006 nuclear test. While the imagery is not the highest quality, it should be pointed out that there does not appear to be any significant difference or change in activity at the northern site in either image. This begs the question: was this the actual site of the October 2006 test?

After the 2009 test event, the CTBTO provided coordinate data for the presumed test events of 2006 and 2009, along with probability ellipses indicating the area around the theorized detonation sites where the event was likely located. All three of the identified facilities in the test area fall within the boundaries of both the 2006 and 2009 probability ellipses.

While there is no firm evidence to suggest which site was the "host" to which event, some conclusions may be drawn. It is likely that at least one event took place at the northern site, given that all of the coordinates released by various agencies such as the USGS and the CTBTO for the epicenters of the 2006 and 2009 events are arrayed roughly in an east-west line just north of the northern site. This suggests that at least one, and perhaps both, of the test events took place at the northern site. The central site is not as expansive as the other facilities, and features an antenna farm of some sort, suggesting that it may represent a monitoring station for the two other facilities. The devices seen mounted atop the masts to the north of the facility may be atmospheric sampling devices meant to track the unintended release of radiation from the underground tests.

Details of the northern, central, and southern sites can be seen in the images below. The first image depicts the north site. A possible security checkpoint for entry into the test area can be seen, as well as the likely location of the test shaft itself.
Next, the central site can be seen. This site contains fewer structures than the north or south sites. In fact, the facilities on the western edge of the main area appear to possibly be in disrepair, suggesting that this may have been an existing facility partially converted to use for monitoring the nuclear testing grounds. To the north, the possible sensor masts can clearly be seen.
Finally, the southern site is depicted. Notice the similar layout to the northern site, with the buildings in the main area of the facility organized in a general "U" shape. There is also a possible security checkpoint, and a facility which may be housing the opening to the vertical test shaft. More likely, however, would be positioning the entrance to a vertical or horizontal shaft inside the main facility itself, given that it is situated in a valley between two ridges.
The remaining four unidentified facilities in the area likely perform administrative and support functions for the test range. One such facility, seen in the image below, contains a helipad and apparent housing structures.
The three remaining facilities may be abandoned or unoccupied military garrisons (the site was imaged in February of 2005), or further housing and support areas for nuclear technicians manning the site during a test cycle. The lack of activity at these locations in the available imagery suggests that the site may only be manned during a test period, and also raises a significant question: where did the bomb come from?

There are numerous UGFs in the area, a helipad, and a rail transfer point to the south. This suggests that range security and transport may be supported by helicopter, and that significant amounts of material and personnel arrive by rail, perhaps after arriving in the region by air. The UGFs and various unidentified facilities are the dark horses of the facility. It is possible that the components were delivered individually and then assembled on-site for a test. It is also possible that there is a nuclear weapons plant buried within one of the UGFs producing the weapons after nuclear material is delivered. A final option, one which has no real supporting evidence but which should nevertheless be considered, is that there is a facility in the region, likely inside of an UGF, that produces both the fissile material and the weapons. Enrichment facilities at Yongbyon would seem to refute this idea, but it does make for an interesting theory: while the world is distracted by the goings-on at Yongbyon, the DPRK quietly produces and tests nuclear weapons at a much more remote and lesser-known facility.

NUCLEAR GOALS

Many analysts have assumed that the DPRK is working towards a nuclear capability and has not as of yet fielded a weaponized bomb. There are two holes in this logic which should be pointed out immediately. Bear in mind that this is speculation, and should not necessarily be taken as pure fact, but rather a logical line of thought given the information at hand.

Firstly, a small detonation is a small detonation, not necessarily a fizzle or test failure. Current estimates indicate that the 2009 event was the result of a device no larger than three kilotons detonating underground. Rather than assuming that this is a step towards a multi-kiloton, or even megaton class nuclear or thermonuclear device, the possibility that the test was a complete success and the weapon performed as designed should not be overlooked. For that matter, the previous test in 2006 may have been a complete success as well, either testing a small-scale nuclear device or validating the performance of the components to be used for a later test.

With regard to the possibility of a small-scale nuclear weapon having been developed successfully, it is known that an armed conflict on the peninsula would result in the DPRK employing a large number of special operations forces. Small devices would be ideal weapons to smuggle into the Repiblic of Korea and detonate in advantageous locations. A small device detonating on the Han river in Seoul, for example, would not only destroy many of the bridges crossing the river, but would likely incite a mass panic, without obliterating a sizeable portion of the city itself. The resulting exodus of civillians, seeking shelter from future attacks or medical care for exposure to radiation, has the potential to interfere with the movement and resupply of military forces in the region. Small warheads would also be ideal for delivery by submarine or missile to targets such as air bases close to the coastline, and could be detonated inside the major port facilities to further complicate the ROK's resupply and civillian evacuation operations. From an asymmetric aspect, they could also be used after an outbreak of hostilities to environmentally cripple fishing grounds in the area which are important for both the ROK and Japan.

The second of the aforementioned holes in logic is that current analysis seems to be focusing on a nuclear-armed ballistic missile representing the end result of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. As demonstrated previously, this may not necessarily be the case. The standard explanation given is that the DPRK has designs on fielding a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. Testing a weapon and miniaturizing the warhead to fit atop an ICBM takes time. However, this assumes that the second test was another trial, and does not allow for the possibility that the device which detonated was a weapons-ready device. If that were to be the case, then it would be likely that the intended delivery vehicle is not in fact an ICBM.

If DPRK nuclear warheads do not progress much further in yield, they will not have much value atop the nations's largely inaccurate ballistic missiles over intercontinental ranges. This would make aerial delivery or delivery by other means far more likely as they can impart a greater degree of accuracy. Where the weapons would be valuable in terms of missile delivery would be as "terror weapons" meant to be fired at the ROK or Japan. In this capacity the accuracy of the delivery systems would be less important given the large metropolitan and industrial areas in each nation which would be far easier to target. Also, firing a small yield weapon into the ROK to cause panic among the populace as described previously would not result in a release of radiation on the scale found in detonating a much larger weapon. That would almost make it more logical for the DPRK to pursue smaller yield weapons as they could then be employed in select areas without causing a significant degree of ill effects for the DPRK's own military forces to contend with. Alternatively these small weapons could be deployed in artillery shells or battlefield rockets to pulverize US and ROK positions along the DMZ before an advance into the ROK.

However, a limited number of nuclear warheads, large or small yield, are still not logically destined to be fitted to ballistic missiles targeting facilities in or outside the Korean theater. The DPRK's leaders may be paranoid and misguided, but they are not stupid. The United States is fielding numerous ballistic-missile defense systems and has multiple PAC-3 batteries in theater. Japan is also fielding the PAC-3, and the ROK is beginning to field the Patriot system as well, albeit in the PAC-2 form. AEGIS ABM-tasked vessels could also be placed in-theater if needed. This would make relying on ballistic missiles as the delivery system for nuclear warheads a questionable proposition as there is no guarantee that the nuclear-armed missiles would reach their targets. That is not an acceptable proposition for such an important national asset, of which there would only be a limited quantity. In that respect, the asymmetric, naval, or airborne delivery methods begin to seem far more plausible, and more logical from the standpoint of the DPRK. Airborne delivery would not necessarily require any miniaturization of a weapon, making it seem like a decent enough solution, but many of the same air defenses which would be used to intercept ballistic missiles would also be able to target hostile aircraft in conjunction with allied fighters, making airborne delivery a dubious proposition as well. At the end of the day, unless a large number of warheads are fielded to mount atop ballistic missiles and the loss of a percentage is accepted, the most likely uses would seem to be naval or asymmetric.

There is still value to testing a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, even if a large scale deployment is not planned. This would force the US, the ROK, and Japan to divert more attention and resources to missile defense, potentially at the expense of other forces in-theater. Ergo, small-yield weapons testing and ballistic missile trials may not indicate that the DPRK is intending to operationally mate missiles and warheads to a significant degree.

FUTURE EFFORTS

The next question that must be answered is the future direction of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. It will be important to study the results of any future nuclear test events to answer some of these questions.

Further tests resulting in a yield in the same range seen in the 2009 test will indicate that this is likely the design yield of the weapon. Contrarily, testing of weapons with increasing yield will indicate that the DPRK has its sights set on large yield weapons, and perhaps on thermonuclear weapons. Future nuclear test events will also aid analysts in determining the potential uses for such a weapon. Large yield weapons would have the ability to strike hardened facilities using less-accurate delivery systems, but small yield weapons would have to be accurately delivered and may only have limited use until a time when the DPRK has fielded a ballistic missile with hard-target kill levels of accuracy. Also, an expanded test program with shorter intervals between events will likely indicate that the DPRK has neared deployment of an operational weapon. However, a lack of test events does not necessarily indicate that weapons are not being deployed; if, as theorized previously, the current test met the DPRK's goals, then future testing may not be required until such a time when a larger yield weapon is desired.

Missile testing and training operations will also provide insight into whether nuclear warheads are being developed or deployed. Chemical or biological weapons are more likely to be used given their comparative cheapness and the belief that the DPRK maintains a large stockpile of one or both of those weapons. As long as CBW handling operations are detected in missile units without a significant change in procedure, it can be assessed with a degree of accuracy that nuclear weapons are not present.

A final option to consider for the future is another weapon system that has been rendered partially ineffective by recent defensive systems testing by the West: a FOBS. The DPRK's continued efforts to develop the Taepo-dong 2 SLV/ICBM is potentially indicative of a desire to have a space launch capability. After the most recent test the DPRK declared that a satellite had been orbited, a point which Western analysts dispute. Nevertheless, as a nuclear-tipped TD-2 is a paper threat until the DPRK produces a warhead of significant size to overcome the inherent inaccuracy of the delivery vehicle and develops penetration aids to defeat any American ABM systems, if a satellite launch capability can be developed and demonstrated, a FOBS would be an interesting avenue to pursue.

CONCLUSION

It can be stated with certainty that the DPRK is developing a nuclear weapons capability. How far along the program is, how many weapons may be available, and the intended and actual yields of the developed systems are up for debate. But at the end of the day, it would seem that the world is going to have to make room for another member of the Nuclear Club. How the West approaches and deals with the DPRK will have a significant impact on other nations wishing to acquire the same capability, providing them with an idea of how far the West will go to get its way. In this light, the DPRK's nuclear program, should it reach operational status, may be an impetus for Iran to fully develop a similar capability. And as a final note, the effect of a nuclear DPRK in the Korean theater may have much more ominous implications; could this be the final straw which forces Japan to shake off its self-imposed shackles and become a nuclear and offensive power in its own right?

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

Feel free to discuss the content of this article at the IMINT & Analysis Forum in the discussion thread found here.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

HYDESim
CTBTO on the DPRK's Nuclear Tests
The ROK's Patriots
DPRK Nuke Test
ISIS Online

Syria and North Korea: Nuclear Partners?

INTRODUCTION

On the 25th of April President Bashar Assad of Syria issued a rebuttal to US claims of a nuclear reactor program in Eastern Syria. The site in question was violently thrust into world view on the 6th of September, 2007 when an illegal Israeli air raid destroyed the facility. Israel has refused to comment on the action, ostensibly in order to refrain from having to admit to such a blatant violation of Syrian territorial sovereignty, and Syria showed great restraint by not justifiably retaliating against the naked aggression of its Jewish neighbor. Fast forward to the 24th of April of this year, and the United States released information describing the facility as a nuclear reactor being constructed with the assistance of North Korea.

POWER OR PLUTONIUM?

Syrian intentions for the reactor complex were unclear, but analysts have theorized that a lack of any major infrastructure in the area indicated that the reactor was not intended for power production. Coupled with the fact that there are no major population centers in the area to make use of any electricity generated by the complex, it would appear that the analysts have come to the correct conclusion. The obvious alternative, given the North Korean assistance in the matter, was to create a reactor able to produce weapons-grade plutonium for use in a nuclear weapon.

THE NORTH KOREAN CONNECTION

The reasoning behind the presence of a nuclear material production facility inside of Syria is not necessarily as clear-cut as it may seem. The obvious inference is that it was intended to produce nuclear material to support a Syrian nuclear weapons program. A Syrian nuclear weapons program would certainly have provided the impetus behind Israel's action of September, 2007. However, the reports of North Korean aid, bolstered by images released depicting a reactor complex startlingly similar to the one in place at Yongbyon, North Korea, may indicate a far more sinister purpose.

The North Korean government is currently negotiating with the United States under the framework of the Six Party Talks to halt nuclear proliferation activity in return for diplomatic and economic concessions from the West. The talks have currently reached an impasse, as the North Koreans are reluctant to reveal details regarding their past proliferation activities, including any aid to Syria in this regard. North Korea has made progress with regard to halting its own nuclear activity, including the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea still views the United States as a significant military threat on the peninsula, and their sudden agreement in February of 2007 to shut down the Yongbyon reactor facility raises serious questions. The reactor facility was inspected by the IAEA, who verified its shutdown in August of 2007. US intelligence officials have claimed that the Syrian complex may have been within weeks of becoming operational when it was destroyed in September of that year. The connection that seems to be eluding the intelligence services as well as the media outlets reporting on the incident is whether or not North Korea would have benefitted from the Syrian reactor's output of nuclear material. It is possible that the purpose of the Syrian reactor complex was to benefit both Syrian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. Analysts have noted that there does not appear to have been any enrichment facilities located on-site, facilities which would have been needed in order to transform the reactor's plutonium output into true weapons-grade material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon. By placing the enrichment facilities at a separate location, Syria achieves two things. First, less attention is drawn to the facility. Second, the plutonium by-product must therefore be transported to an enrichment facility. It would not be difficult to mask the transfer of some or all of the plutonium to a ship or aircraft bound for North Korea, allowing the North Koreans to continue their nuclear weapon production while at the same time preserving an air of cooperation in the eyes of the world with the shutdown of their own reactor complex. Alternatively, North Korea may have simply intended to construct a separate weapons production facility inside of Syria with the intent of arming both nations. Given that North Korea has far greater knowledge on the subject of nuclear weapons design and production than Syria, enlisting their aid in that regard would be a logical maneuver.

LACK OF AIR DEFENSES

In his statement, President Assad claimed that the facility in question was an unused military complex, but he would not specify its purpose. Assad claimed that the site was obviously not a nuclear related facility, as it was not protected by any air defense systems. Unfortunately, Assad's claims, regardless of the true nature of the facility, are completely illogical. Eastern Syria would be a logical site for a covert nuclear facility. The location of the site is directly adjacent to a river, providing the necessary water source for cooling the reactor. Also, the site is not near any major military facilities, meaning that it was an unlikely target for surveillance. The lack of any air defense systems also aids the covert nature of the location. Any major SAM system, for example, would emit tell-tale signals from its radar systems, signals which would be tracked and identified by intelligence services. The appearance of air defense systems where none were present previously would only serve to attract unwanted attention to the area. Syria made the right strategic move by not defending the site with any significant military presence. Unfortunately, it would seem that their denial and deception efforts ultimately failed due to a human intelligence source on-site which is the likely source of the videotaped evidence shown by the US government to illustrate the nuclear nature of the facility.

CONCLUSION

This incident highlights the need for more significant diplomatic pressure to be palced on nuclear weapons states with regard to proliferation. Syria has a significant terrorist connection with Hizbullah and a significant diplomatic connection with Iran, two entities which could have benefitted from a Syrian nuclear weapons program, with potentially catastrophic results. While the unilateral decision of Israel to attack and destroy the facility cannot and should not be condoned, neither should the effort by Syria to construct a nuclear reactor under the nose of the IAEA in direct violation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, of which Syria is a signatory. Neither should bringing such an issue to the attention of the international community be screened on the basis of Israeli interests, as suggested by Senator Susan Collins of Maine.

SOURCES

Syria denies nuke allegations
IAEA reaction to US evidence
North Korean nuclear program timeline
6 Party Talks