No NFZ for you!

A few interesting things regarding Syria lately.

First off, Russia says we're not allowed to use the F-16s and Patriot SAMs in Jordan to make an NFZ in Syria.  International law or something.  Which is of course a ridiculous argument.  Lets say the UN decided it was NFZ time (for the sake of debate, ignoring whether the UN does anything productive).  Jordan decides to play along.  Well, then all those nice toys stockpiled over there become fair game.  What Russia probably meant to say was that we can't do it unilaterally.  Or, that they don't want us to do it unilaterally, that's more accurate.  Then they have a point.  I'm curious to know if the Vipers are CGs or CJs, because the latter would make covert NFZ plans more credible for reasons that should be obvious.

Second, Russia is at the G8 complaining about Syria.  So are we, obviously.  My favorite part is when they argue that "our" evidence of sarin use by Assad is not up to standards, or whatever they mean.  Which is amusing, because where were the similar comments when France (and I think a UN arm?) made the same statements a short while ago?  Oh, but this time it's the US, so it has to be wrong.  A little consistency would be nice.  At least it'd make them appear actually concerned and not just out to be on whatever side we're not.

At this rate, my "idiocy is bipartisan" mantra may have to be altered to "idiocy transcends borders."

And really, Russia, come on.  If you're so gung-ho about Assad staying in charge (or at least keeping the US out of Syria (although that's already a fail)), plop an S-400 battery at your naval port.  Or one of the extant S-300PM batteries that the S-400s are displacing in Russia.  In fact an S-300PM could be a better idea, because then when everything cools off, you announce that by the way, the Syrians have been training for the past year and are keeping these.

Also, if I am off and on here in the next week or so, I'm having computer issues.  I've got a Windows 7 laptop that I've been using for a while now, and it's been doing this random blue screen thing that was really starting to get annoying.  So, system restore!  An easy process when you save everything to an external drive.  But if it starts up again, there may be further restoration/driving over it with my car.  So don't worry, I'm "back" regardless, there just may be technical difficulties from time to time until I get this completely sorted out.

Arming "rebels" is a great idea and never backfires!

So, now we're going to give more arms and support to Syria's "rebel" forces.  Somebody tell me just why this is a bright idea.  For one, this pretty much proves that whatever they're teaching in history class at a certain Ivy League school, they're leaving out the history of Al Qaeda bit.  You know, the part where "rebels" are given arms and support to overthrow an enemy, and then they later turn around and bite us in the ass.

I'm going to attribute this decision to a few different possible factors.

1.  We're going to fight a proxy war with Iran; we could care less about Syria, but what we want is to be able to engage Hezbollah inside of Syria.  Iran can't or won't do anything serious itself, so it relies on its Hezbollah proxy to fight for it, far enough away that it thinks we won't notice what's really going on.  Well, we see you, Iran, you and your photoshop missiles and hilarious "aircraft" designs.  We can't or won't do anything about Iran (and this is completely independent of the should we or shouldn't we argument so don't even start), so this will work instead.  Except that support and assistance has a way of turning into a massive debacle and sucking us in way too deep into something largely irrelevant, but I guess the plus side here is that Syria isn't covered in jungle?  Although why Hezbollah matters is another question, given that I haven't heard of them launching rockets across the Mexican border yet.

2.  It's Egypt all over again.  And no, not Egypt of a few years ago, Egypt of a few decades ago.  As in we're only picking this side because the "bad guys" (i.e. Russia and in Syria's case also China) are on the opposite side of the fence.  Which turned out to be such a stellar political decision back then. 

3.  We waited too long to do anything militarily productive.  I've been saying for a while now that relying on Soviet-era IADS components gets you bombed, apparently if you don't follow our rules.  See Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Libya.  Syria, with modern Chinese radars and modern Russian SAMs (even though Russia currently lacks the stones to just airlift S-300PMU-2 components using An-124s...at least I think they'd fit given that it could airlift Pioner), has moved away from the bombable model of air defense, which has given us pause.  Notice how a lot of the NFZ stuff disappeared with a quickness when all of the fun new toys started to be either delivered or reported in service, or it became obvious that Russia might eventually send the S-300PMU-2s that Syria ordered.  Which incidentially would mean the inclusion of Russian advisors and trainers, who might get bombed, and we don't want that...but aren't you supposed to want to bomb the "bad guys"?  Now I'm confused.

In reality, everyone should step back and let the situation play itself out.  Because I can't for the life of me see where this results in a "win" if we start trying to play nationbuilder again.  I understand that there is a certain need to play geopolitics and make it look like we're standing up to the "bad guys", but in reality none of us should be involved.  Why not engage Russia and China and get everyone to take a step back, because relations with those two are far more valuable and important in the long run than whatever happens to Syria.  If you want to look good to the international players, at least make yourself look good to the ones that actually matter.

Oh wait, I forgot...if they aren't the "bad guys", how can we justify billions of dollars for overpriced and unnecessary hardware like the F-35...

And before the inevitable question comes up, no, I am not necessarily against bombing things or sticking our nose into someone else's business when there's a definite endgame that will be to our benefit.  We have just as much right to act in our own national interest as anyone else does, despite what the rest of the world wants you to think.  But once again, someone really needs to explain to me how this one is in our national interest, because I'm just not seeing it.

...but there's also...

Nope.  Not going there.

Yet.

Current Events

One of the things I'll be trying to do here on a more regular basis is to actually comment on some worldwide military developments or events which I find interesting, amusing, or both.  Some things are relevant even if they don't come with nice overheads!  So with that in mind, here are a few topics that have appeared over the last few days (or weeks, or months...):

Russia to supply Syria with S-300s

Iraq:  mythically overrated by the media, massively bombed twice.  Syria, Libya, Iran, and the DPRK were all advised to take notice, given their reliance on the same supposedly mythical yet in reality old-technology weapon systems for air defense.  Looks like Syria is learning the lesson that Iran thinks can be solved by welding together oil cans.  Buk-M2E systems, Chinese JY-27 and Type 120 radars, and now, by 2014 apparently, some variant of the S-300.  Most likely the S-300PMU-2, the current production export model of the P series, although I could make an argument for the S-300VM for added ATBM capability against Israeli weapons.

This is the Russian government enacting a new type of "missile diplomacy", wherein they deploy their own or supply modern system components to someone else to ensure that the West stays out of some given situation/gets a message/etc.  And you know what?  Can't blame them for it.

The last time I checked, the S-300P was not a Kalashnikov or shoulder-fired SAM, and therefore not on the UN Arms Control Register.  Nor is it typically part of any sort of arms embargo, of which Syria is not under anyway.  And, despite ridiculous Turkish theories, the weapon is not a credible surface-to-surface threat.  So there is no reason for the sale not to proceed, unless of course the West really does have designs on entering Syria and sorting things out in the manner that it wants them sorted out.  

And if the EU can decide it's OK to sell weapons to the anti-Assad crowd in Syria, they've got no real leg to stand on when Russia actually conducts a formal, legal transaction on the state-to-state level.  Although in the EU's defense the idea of supporting a rebel force with light arms has never, ever blown up in anyone's face down the line.  

Oh, wait...

If you ask me, this will either 1) force the West to run in half-cocked without taking the time to think things through and end up creating a bigger mess in the long run (which we arguably did in Iraq despite having said time to think about it first), or 2) make everyone back off while the situation, uh...basically solves itself.

Harsh?  Yup.  But look at it this way.  Either the world wants/needs external actors to intervene in the internal affairs of states when things go awry, or it doesn't.  That's the question:  should we intervene because Assad is a bad guy?  Should we stay out of it because it's a situation precipitated internally by internal forces?  That's a whole different argument, which isn't the point here.

Or maybe Russia really does want us to intervene.  Because if the West does eventually go in there after the missiles are operational, Almaz-Antey will be able to sell them for a billion dollars per unit with all of the publicity they're going to get.  Or maybe this is all a really convoluted ploy to get Israel to bomb Syria again, claiming that sophisticated weapon systems that Hezbollah would not be able to operate or maintain in a million years are being...transferred to Hezbollah!

Really.  Buk-M2Es for Hezbollah?  That was the best argument they could come up with?

NEXT.

Saudi Arabia considering nukes, the DF-21

Now this is interesting.  Saudi Arabia procured the DF-3A in the mid-80s, and signed the NPT in 1988 to assure the US government that no, they weren't trying to go nuclear (although allegations of Pakistani and Iraqi nukes were made for years).  Now, with the Kingdom starting to be wary of Shi'a Iran's nuclear (alleged) ambitions, they might be reconsidering the world's most fatal mushrooms.  And replacing the DF-3A as the potential launch platform.  

The difference is that with the DF-3A, they had an inaccurate IRBM basically useful for nuclear warhead transport through the atmosphere.  The DF-21 is far more accurate, terminally guided in some versions, making it useable as a conventional strike weapon where the DF-3A is really not.  

The nuclear weapons acquisition is the best part of the story.  If they go this route, then they're breaching the NPT, provided they don't withdraw first.  If they don't withdraw, prepare for much hilarity as Iran and its supporters raise hell about the double standard.  Because you don't really think we'd actually sanction the almighty oil supplier, do you?

For more on Saudi, the DF-3A, and associated information, my next JIR article will be on this very topic.

NEXT.

Iran has a stealth fighter

Yeah, I'm not linking to that.  If you want a good laugh, go find the pictures yourself.  But this is why nobody takes Iran seriously:  they abuse the idea of deception to the point where all it does is make us laugh.  Plus, their supposedly legitimate programs are also either 1) abused by deception, or 2) just hilarious.  Remember the lawnmower engine powered "stealth" flying boat things?  The photoshopped missile launch salvoes?  The welded together oil cans allegedly holding SAMs inside?  This one beat all of them.  

Iran:  demonstrating a lack of aerodynamics, LO design, and cockpit ergonomics all at the same time!  Although, we really should've figured the first one out when their crowning aeronautical achievement was putting a second vertical fin on an F-5.

NEXT.

What I'm looking for this week:

-Where are Venezuela's S-300VM systems based?  Their Pechoras?

Azeri Favorit Located

In July of 2010, various media reports indicated that Russia was completing a sale of S-300PMU-2 Favorit (SA-20B GARGOYLE) SAM systems to Azerbaijan.  Something of an uproar ensued, with Russia and Azerbaijan denying the sale and Armenia expressing its displeasure.  Then, in June of 2011, two S-300PMU-2 TELs appeared in an Azeri military parade in Baku.  Clearly the sale had gone through, despite the denials from all parties involved.

Now, following an imagery update in May of 2013, the location of Azerbaijan's Favorit SAM systems can be disclosed.  Sited on the coastline northwest of Sumgait, the Favorit batteries appear sited to defend the capital area.  The 200 kilometer range of the Favorit's 48N6E2 (GARGOYLE mod 1) interceptor also provides the system with a degree of capability over western Azerbaijan, although the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains just out of reach.

Azerbaijan deploys two Favorit batteries and a single battle management complex.  Each battery possesses a 30N6E2 (TOMB STONE) engagement radar and a 96L6E acquisition radar, with four 5P85TE2 TELs.  The northern battery also possesses two 40V6 series mast assemblies adjacent to the two radar systems.  The central position employs the 64N6E2 (BIG BIRD D) battle management radar.

The southern site is emplaced on a reprofiled former S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE) position, with the northern site emplaced on a newly built semi-hardened position.  The site buildup suggests a permanent deployment location.  However, the mobility of the S-300PMU-2 allows it to redeploy in a very short period of time.

The S-300PMU-2 represents the most advanced SAM system in the region, and is easily the most capable air defense system in the Azerbaijani inventory.  The 200 kilometer engagement range is supported by 300 kilometer range surveillance and tracking capability from the associated 64N6E2 and 96L6E radars, systems capable of monitoring the bulk of both Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.  The six target engagement capability of the system, effectively doubled by deploying two batteries, effectively negates any aerial threat posed by the Armenian military.  Furthermore, the ATBM capability of the system removes Soviet-era SCUD missiles from the threat picture.

With the deployment of the S-300PMU-2, Azerbaijan has taken a significant step to upgrading its air defense capability.  The ability of the Favorit, coupled with the state of the Armenian military, significantly reduces the threat of an armed conflict between the two nations in the future, or at the very least enables Azerbaijan to remove the Armenian air and missile threat from the equation.

The Strong Get Stronger

Two recent events significantly increase the effectiveness of what is already the world's most capable air defense network.  Simply put, the strong are getting stronger.

On 28 June, Ria Novosti reported that the new missile for the S-400 passed state trials, and would soon be delivered to operational S-400 batteries.  Whether this is the rumored 40N6 or not is up for debate, as is the actual genesis of the 40N6, but the classification of the new weapon as "long range" seems to indicate that the S-400 will soon have it's full design range capability of 400 kilometers at its disposal.  The "long-range" classification also appears to eliminate a 9M96 variant from consideration, a weapon long associated with the S-400 complex.

While mention of the potential 40N6 deployment has appeared in various sources, an earlier announcement seems to have largely been ignored.  In January, reports stated that S-300PM batteries had completed upgrades to Favorit-S standard.  This increases the maximum engagement range of the system from 150 to 200 kilometers, by incorporating the newer 48N6D missile.  Although still short of the S-400's 250 kilometer range against most non-cooperative targets with the 48N6DM, the Favorit-S represents a solid increase in system effectiveness, blostered by the introduction of newer electronic components. 

As the new S-400 continues to enter service, modernized Favorit-S systems present three possibilities.  First, they can be used as gap-fillers, backing up S-400 batteries uploaded with the longer-range 40N6.  This represents a useful role, given that the 40N6 likely possesses a reduced capability at range to engage non-cooperative targets.  Additionally, modernized Favorit-S batteries displaced by the introduction of S-400 units can be redeployed around Russia as replacements for older S-300PT and S-300PS batteries.  Lastly, Favorit-S batteries, displaced by S-400 batteries and not required elsewhere in the nation, could potentially represent a viable export target for a nation lacking the resources to acquire the more expensive S-400 but requiring an air defense upgrade.  As such they could also be passed on to states such as Kazakhstan or Belarus as replacements for extant S-300PS and S-300PMU systems while awaiting delivery of S-400 batteries.

Regardless of the details, one thing is clear:  the Russian air defense network is becoming increasingly potent. 

Users of the SAM Site Overview file will see these changes reflected during the next update.  S-300PM range rings will be altered to reflect a 200 kilometer range, and separate 400 kilometer range rings will be added for the S-400 to denote it's two-missile selection.

Russian Strategic Air Defense

REMOVED PENDING PDF CONVERSION

The South Korean SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

With cross-border tensions between the two Koreas seeming to increase daily, the Republic of Korea's (ROK) SAM network is a significant element in protecting its citizens and infrastructure from hostile forces. Currently undergoing a deep modernization, the ROK's SAM network represents a significant facet of the nation's defense against air and missile attack.

ORGANIZATION

The ROK's SAM force is operated by the Air Defense Artillery Command. The Air Defense Artillery Command became part of the ROK Air Force in 1991, previously being subordinate to the ROK Army. The ROK Air Force also controls the EW radar facilities throughout the nation. EW radars report information to the ROK Air Force's Master Control Reporting Center, which is responsible for managing the airspace above and around the peninsula.Additional SAM assets available to defend ROK airspace are operated by the US Army.

EW NETWORK

Early warning coverage of the ROK is provided by seventeen identified EW sites. Five of these sites are positioned along the DMZ, with a further three positioned on the islands of Baegryeong-do to the west, Ullung-do to the east, and Cheju-do to the south. EW coverage will be bolstered in the near future with the introduction of four Boeing 737 PEACE EYE AEW&C platforms, the first of which was handed over to KAI at Sacheon in February 2010 for radar integration.

The locations of the ROK's EW sites can be seen in the image below:
HAWK

The most numerous SAM system employed in the ROK is the MIM-23 HAWK. The 40 kilometer range missile system is deployed at twenty three locations spread throughout the peninsula. While the HAWK is technically a mobile, tactical SAM system, it is employed in a strategic capacity by the ROK, being emplaced at fixed, hardened locations containing both the missile launchers and the guidance radars.

The locations and coverage zones of the ROK's HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
NIKE-HERCULES

The primary long-range strategic SAM system employed by the ROK is the Nike-Hercules. Six sites remain operational in available imagery, primarily situated in the northern third of the nation. Nike-Hercules batteries are each split between two locations, one hosting the guidance radars and another hosting the actual missile battery.

An example of the Nike-Hercules split site layout can be seen in the image below, which depicts a Nike-Hercules location near Yeoju, southeast of Seoul:
The locations and coverage zones of the ROK's Nike-Hercules batteries can be seen in the image below:
While the Nike-Hercules boasts a range of 155 kilometers, an impressive number, its effectiveness is in doubt. Recent incidents have suggested that the missile may no longer be a viable weapon system, causing the ROK to pursue other options. In fact, due to the varied dates of imagery available to analyze the individual battery locations, some (or all) of them may already have been withdrawn from use. However, as no reporting has been located to suggest that the Nike-Hercules has been fully withdrawn by the ROK, those sites which remain active in available imagery are noted here.

Nike-Hercules may remain a significant weapon in the ROK's arsenal following retirement from the air defense role. Two SSM variants have been developed, with ranges of 150 and 180-250 kilometers. These systems are referred to as Hyunmoo I and Hyunmoo II, and may be sited at existing Nike-Hercules facilities as they can employ the same launch systems. Interestingly, the northwestern Nike-Hercules site west of Inchon is 180 kilometers from P'yongyang, and does not appear to have a guidance radar facility nearby necessary for surface-to-air operations. This facility may represent an operational Hyunmoo SSM base, and was apparently constructed between 2004 and 2008. It is unlikely that the ROK would construct such a significant facility merely to support a SAM that was already overdue for replacement.

The Inchon Nike-Hercules site can be seen in the image below:
PATRIOT

To bolster the air defense of the ROK, the US Army began deploying Patriot strategic SAM batteries to the peninsula in the 1990's. US Army Patriot batteries began to be upgraded in 2003 with the addition of the PAC-3 missile, optimized for the ATBM role. The PAC-2 missile has a range of 160 kilometers, with the PAC-3 having a range of approximately 30 kilometers due to its significantly smaller airframe.

There are currently eight Patriot batteries assigned to the ROK, with active batteries located at Osan (two), Suwon (two), and Kunsan (one) airbases. A sixth active battery was briefly located at Gwangju airbase in October of 2004, but was relocated by December of 2006. Despite the protests from anti-American elements when the battery was sited at the Korean airbase, the US Army had never intended the relocation to be permanent. It relocated to Camp Carroll near Daegu, where it remains garrisoned with the other two batteries assigned to the ROK for future deployment when required. Each Patriot battery is typically deployed with eight TELs and a guidance radar.

A representative Patriot deployment at Osan AB can be seen in the iamge below:
The locations and coverage zones of US Army Patriot batteries deployed in the ROK can be seen in the image below. The Camp Carroll garrison facility is also annotated.
The ROK began to investigate purchasing its own Patriot missile systems in the 1990s. The SAM-X program was initiated in 1990 to find a successor to the Nike-Hercules. Due to financial and political reasons, the program did not bear fruit until 2007, when a decision was made to purchase second-hand German PAC-2 batteries. The first ex-German Patriots were delivered in 2008. They will serve in a trials capacity before being operationally deployed in 2012.

A SAM training facility southeast of Daegu was expanded between 2003 and 2007. The timing is significant as this was when the ROK government was still investigating its options for SAM-X, and by this stage had decided to focus on a variant of the Patriot system. This facility, which likely trains ROK SAM operators as evidenced by the presence of Nike-Hercules equipment, was hosting Patriot equipment in January of 2009. This likely represents the first sighting of ROK-operated Patriot equipment in imagery.

The ROK SAM training facility can be seen in the image below:
Unconfirmed reporting suggests that the ex-German Patriot systems have been deployed near Seosan, Suwon, Incheon, and Gangneung. This report first appeared in September of 2008, coinciding with the first deliveries of Patriots to the ROK. Sighting ROK Patriot equipment at the training facility near Daegu suggests that it was not deployed directly after delivery as the report suggests. With the exception of Suwon, these locations all feature Nike-Hercules batteries. While Patriot deployment has not been confirmed at these locations, they do represent logical deployment sites in the future once crews have been trained and the sites have been reconfigured to support Patriot batteries.

CAPABILITIES

On paper the ROK's SAM network appears to be relatively robust. Sites are organized in a logical fashion, often enjoying overlapping fields of fire. Terrain concerns, particularly in the areas closest to the DMZ, are largely alleviated by placing many of the sites at high altitude atop mountain ranges. The bulk of the ROK-operated sites are consolidated in the heavily populated northwestern sector.

The coverage zones of ROK-controlled SAM batteries can be seen in the image below:
US-operated Patriot batteries provide additional defense against both aircraft and ballistic missiles over a large portion of the nation. This added coverage can be seen in the image below, which adds range rings for PAC-2 missiles to those of the ROK's HAWK and Nike-Hercules batteries:
The main problem facing the ROK's SAM network is one of quality. Nike-Hercules and HAWK systems are both legacy systems better suited for museum display than battlefield use at this juncture. HAWK missile batteries likely retain a degree of effectiveness thanks to numerous upgrades being available during their service lives, but they lack the range to effectively protect the peninsula. Cognizant of the deficiencies of the HAWK system in the 21st Century, original plans called for the replacement of ROK HAWK batteries by 2010, a deadline which will not be reached. By 2012, Nike-Hercules batteries should be withdrawn in place of Patriot batteries, providing a significant upgrade to the ROK SAM network in terms of overall capability.

FUTURE PLANS

In the future, the ROK's SAM network will see significant changes. First and foremost, the ROK will no longer rely on the ineffective Nike-Hercules for long-range air defense, with Patriot batteries replacing these systems in 2012. Whether the withdrawl of Nike-Hercules SAM batteries will affect the Hyunmoo programs is not known at this time.

A replacement for the HAWK is being co-developed with the Russian Almaz design bureau, and is slated to complete development in 2011. This system, codenamed KM-SAM or Cheolmae-II, will employ a modified Fakel 9M96 active radar homing SAM along with a modern phased array radar. KM-SAM batteries will consist of a radar vehicle, a command post vehicle, and up to eight TELs, all mounted on wheeled vehicles for high mobility. Each TEL will carry eight cold-launch missile canisters. The modified 9M96 dispenses with the original Russian design's canard foreplanes, but retains the nose-mounted reaction control thrusters. It will also employ a directional warhead, and has an advertised range capability of over 40 kilometers.

The ROK also plans to create a missile defense network called KAMD, incorporating the Elta EL/M-2080 Green Pine BMEW radar, Patriot systems, and KDX-III AEGIS destroyers. Mention has also been made of an improved Cheolmae-II called K-THAAD forming part of this network. Creation of such a system is ironic given that protests over potential PAC-3 purchases were due in part to a feeling that the ROK would be drawn into a US-led anti-missile network.

CONCLUSION

The ROK currently fields a SAM network that would have been state of the art in the 1960s, and effective into the early 1980s. The modernization programs underway will correct many of its deficiencies and shortcomings, allowing the network to achieve technological parity with other nations in the region and provide capable and effective defense well into the 21st Century. Hopefully the ROK's citizens will find their government's desire to defend them acceptable.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Patriot moves to Camp Carroll
PEACE EYE Delivered
SAM-X
PAC-3 Deployed to Korea
German Patriots Delivered
Seoul Begins Deploying Patriot Missile Interceptors
Air Defense Artillery Command
Hyunmoo Ballistic Missiles
Korean Missile Defense

Site Analysis: The Ulan-Ude SAM Garrison

INTRODUCTION

The SAM garrison at Ulan-Ude is a significant military facility located in Russia's Siberian Military Zone. It represents one of the largest SAM garrisons inside of Russia, containing enough equipment to thoroughly modernize any lesser nation's air defense network.

OVERVIEW

The Ulan-Ude SAM garrison, sited roughly 28 kilometers ENE of Ulan-Ude, is an expansive facility composed of three main areas. Apart from the actual garrison and storage facility, there is an administrative and support area and a weapons storage area (WSA).

The general layout of the facility can be seen in the image below:
INFRASTRUCTURE

Various items of infrastructure can be identified at the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison. Power to the facility comes from external sources fed into the facility's substation by overland power lines. From the substation, power to the garrison itself is provided by a partially buried conduit. A POL storage facility is located south of the administrative and support complex, providing fuel for the garrison's vehicles as well as maintenance, security, and transportation vehicles serving the entire facility. While a network of minor paved and unpaved roads connect the complex with the outside world, the primary means of access is by rail. A rail transfer point for onloading and offloading equipment located adjacent to the garrison complex. A maneuver area is also located adjacent to the garrison complex, where wheeled and tracked vehicles can be put through their paces before dispersal to active units to pre-emptively identify any maintenance concerns.

The local infrastructure of the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison can be seen in the image below:
Regionally, there are numerous facilities which may serve to support the complex. 5 kilometers to the northwest, a power substation has been identified near the town of Onokhoy. This substation serves as the regional substation serving the SAM garrison. The garrison's power substation uses overland lines which lead directly to the Onokhoy substation. 6.5 kilometers to the west is a major rail transfer point. Equipment and cargo moved to and from the garrison complex travels down a dedicated rail spur which merges with the main line 2 kilometers east of the rail transfer point. Equipment being dispersed would travel down the rail spur, reach the rail transfer point, and likely either 1) continue along the main line, 2) be held for transfer to a different line, or 3) be offloaded and moved by road to an airfield in Ulan-Ude for airlift. Further to the southwest, at a distance of 9.5 kilometers from the main garrison complex, is a large POL storage facility. This facility could serve as the main holding area for POL in the region, with fuel being transferred by rail to the garrison when required to refill the complex's relatively minor capacity.

The regional infrastructure servicing the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison can be seen in the image below:
GARRISON DETAIL

The Ulan-Ude SAM garrison itself is a 530,000 square meter complex with numerous facilities designed to service, maintain, and disperse SAM equipment to operational units. The primary systems held at the facility are members of the S-300P series.

Apart from the holding areas and sheds, major identified locations include an equipment checkout pad, for verifying the operational status of equipment held at the facility before dispersal or during periodic maintenance, and a probable radar storage facility. The radar storage facility is the likely holding point for 64N6 (BIG BIRD) EW radar systems, as these systems have not been identified in open storage. The high-bay garage has an entrance at the northwest end of the building which has enough exterior clearance for a large vehicle such as the 64N6 transporter to maneuver out of the building and into the complex. No other buildings appear to have the necessary exterior clearance, suggesting that 64N6 components must be held in this facility.

Enough equipment for roughly fifteen S-300P series batteries can be seen in open storage at the facility. There are 68 5P85-1 TELs and 2 5N63 (FLAP LID A) radars associated with the S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE), and 56 5P85S/D TELs and 9 5N63S (FLAP LID B) radars associated with the S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE). Additionally, one 64N6 radar set and 9 40V6 mast assemblies can also be identified. SAM equipment is typically organized by battery, with the components for a complete battery being held in the same area. Apart from the S-300P series components, components for at least 4 S-125 (SA-3 GOA) batteries are also held at the facility, as well as numerous tactical SAM components.

The quantity of components held at the garrison is indicative of Russia's peacetime air defense posture. There are numerous inactive SAM sites in the nation, leading many casual observers to note that the network appears to be a shell of its former Cold War era self. This is not entirely accurate; the Russians have simply garrisoned a significant number of units, holding them in reserve until required. The equipment held at the Ulan-Ude garrison alone would be enough to significantly increase the effectiveness of any regional network. By holding these units in garrison, operating expenses can be saved while retaining the capability for future exploitation when required.

Identified areas and SAM components at the garrison complex can be seen in the image below. For the SAM components, which are identified by colored dots, the following color scheme has been used: S-300PT TELs are purple, S-300PS TELs are red, 5N63 radars are orange, 5N63S radars are yellow, 64N6 radars are blue, and 40V6 masts are green.
The garrison complex has numerous identifiable security measures to protect its holdings. The facility is entered using a primary entry control point which leads directly to the rail transfer point servicing the complex. A secondary entry control point likely serves as the entry for personnel and service vehicles. The complex is surrounded by a double fenceline, with an 18 meter dirt strip having been cleared between the fencelines. The exterior fenceline has lightposts placed every 32 to 35 meters, and four guard towers are situated at the corners of the fenceline in the dirt strip.

Security measures at the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison complex can be seen in the image below:
Located south of the main garrison is the weapons storage area for the complex. This facility serves as the primary holding area for the actual missiles to be employed by SAM systems held at the complex. Holding the weapons in a separate secure facility negates the possibility of a catastrophic explosion or fire damaging the SAM components. The WSA is accessed by a single road leading to an entry control point. Security is similar to that of the actual garrison complex, with a double fenceline separated by a defoliated dirt strip, various guard towers and lighposts surrounding the compound. The interior of the compound possesses numerous revetted holding areas, some of which contain storage buildings, others serving as open air holding pens.

Details of the Ulan-Ude WSA can be seen in the image below:
The following image depicts the likely steps for equipment to be dispersed from the garrison. First, equipment would be removed from holding areas and sent to the checkout pad. There, the equipment is spun up to determine its operational status. At this point minor maintenance would likely be conducted if required, and if enough discrepancies are noted it is likely that a different set of components would be removed from storage. Lastly, the components would be sent to the rail transfer point for transport.
CRITICAL NODES

The critical nodes for the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison are the main garrison complex and the rail transfer point. Eliminating the garrison complex itself removes the potential threat psoed by the garrisoned components, while eliminating the rail transfer point would make dispersal a far more time-consuming and tedious process. The WSA is not necessarily a critical node as there are sufficient holdings of missile rounds throughout the region and the nation to make up for any loss. Similarly, the power substation is not a critical node as its destruction would not cause any appreciable loss of ability to disperse equipment. The portable generators possessed by each individual battery could be used to power components for checkout.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS

The following intelligence gaps exist in the analysis of the Ulan-Ude SAM garrison complex:

1. The power station servicing the complex through the Onokhoy substation has not been identified.

2. Communications systems and facilities serving the complex have not been identified.

3. The source of potable water for the facility has not been identified.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

The North Korean SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea fields one of the most capable third-world strategic SAM networks on paper. However, despite the high concentration of strategic SAM batteries and EW sites, there are significant issues in the network which need to be addressed in the near future. If these issues are ignored, the DPRK will be placing itself at risk.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

The DPRK's strategic SAM assets are subordinate to the Air Force. The Air Force operates a variety of Soviet-era equipment. The following strategic SAM systems are currently in service: S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON).

EW Coverage

Thirty three active and one inactive EW sites provide the DPRK with early warning radar coverage, used for SAM system target acquisition and track handoff, and GCI control of fighter units. These EW sites are primarily consolidated in the southern half of the nation, providing substantial coverage of the capital and the DMZ. Identified EW radars operating in the DPRK are predominately Soviet-era systems, although the presence of a JY-8 (WALL RUST) radar indicates that Chinese hardware is also in use. How well the Chinese system integrates with the rest of the FSU-era equipment is not known, but it is potentially not a problem given that China operates a number of Soviet and Russian systems. The following systems have been identified in available imagery:

P-12/18 (SPOON REST)
P-14 (TALL KING)
P-35/37 (BAR LOCK)
P-80 (BACK NET)
36D6 (TIN SHIELD)
JY-8 (WALL RUST)

The US DoD reports that the following radars are also in service, but they have not been identified in available imagery at this time:

5N69 (BIG BACK)
P-8/10 (KNIFE REST)
P-15 (FLAT FACE)
P-15M (SQUAT EYE)
PRV-11 (SIDE NET)
PRV-13 (ODD PAIR)

The following image depicts the locations of identified EW radar sites in the DPRK:
The following image depicts a notional DPRK EW site. Most EW sites appear to be host to a single example of one radar type, in this case a P-14. Other radars, especially smaller units such as those of the P-12/18 series, may be present but not visible in available imagery. Alternatively, they may be held in reserve to expand the network when required, or may simply not be discovered yet. AAA sites, such as the battery seen here, are common at both EW and SAM sites to provide additional defense.
Interestingly, the only strategic SAM system which appears to possess an organic EW system is the S-200, with each battery containing a P-14 radar. The S-75 and S-125 batteries do not appear to field any organic EW elements, in which case they must rely on either the external network or the limited functionality of their engagement radars to provide target acquisition and track generation. It is possible that these SAM batteries do contain EW elements, but that they have not been located or are not visible in available imagery.

A further EW system available to the DPRK is the Ramona passive detection system. The advantage to the Ramona is that it does not radiate, allowing it to be relocated to complicate targeting with considerably more ease than a strategic SAM battery. The Ramona system has not been located in available imagery, but is believed to be a leftover Soviet system, emplaced and operated by the USSR.

SAM Coverage

There are currently fifty eight active strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. S-75 sites are red, S-125 sites are light blue, and S-200 sites are purple. As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of the deployed strategic SAM assets are located along the DMZ and the coasts.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by the identified DPRK strategic SAM sites. Using the same color scheme applied previously, SA-2 zones are red, S-125 zones are light blue, and S-200 zones are purple.
The S-75

There are currently forty six active S-75 sites inside of the DPRK, constituting the bulk of the strategic SAM force. According to SIPRI, a total of 45 S-75 Dvina systems were delivered to the DPRK from the USSR. 15 batteries were supplied between 1962 and 1964, with the remaining 30 batteries being supplied between 1966 and 1971. A total of 1950 missiles were reportedly supplied to arm the batteries. S-75 batteries are deployed to provide barrier air defense of the DPRK's coastlines and the DMZ, as well as coverage of the bulk of the DPRK's interior.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-75 batteries:
The S-125

There are currently ten active S-125 sites inside of the DPRK. Seven batteries are positioned to defend the capital of Pyongyang, with the other three situated to defend the nuclear research center at Yongbyon. The DPRK operates the S-125M Neva-M variant, with SIPRI reporting that eight batteries were supplied between 1985 and 1986.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-125 batteries:
Seven of the deployed S-125 batteries, six around Pyongyang and one near Yongbyon, are situated at sophisticated hardened facilities. These hardened sites contain three launch revetments for 5P73 4-rail launchers and a radar position for the RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) engagement radar. The launchers can be retracted into bunkers when not in use. Similarly, the engagement radar can be lowered into a bunker and protected by a retractable cover, which splits in half and slides open when the radar is exposed.

A hardened S-125 site near Pyongyang can be seen in the image below:
The S-200

There are currently two active S-200 sites inside of the DPRK. These sites are placed near the east and west coasts in the southern portion of the nation, allowing them to range far offshore and deep into the ROK. The S-200 represents the longest-range strategic SAM system in the DPRK's arsenal. Four S-200 batteries were supplied to the DPRK between 1987 and 1988, and two batteries are likely co-located at each location.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-200 batteries:
As with the S-125, the DPRK employs hardened facilities for the S-200. Elevators are provided for the two 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars at each location allowing them to be stowed undergroudn when not in use, and hardened bunkers are provided for the 5P72 launch rails.

Inactive Sites

There are currently twenty nine identified inactive strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK. There are twenty seven S-75 sites and two S-125 sites. The bulk of these sites are located in the vicinity of Pyongyang. As such, they may represent facilities available for bolstering capital area air defenses during a time of conflict. They may also be employed as relocation facilities, complicating targeting of active batteries. Some inactive locations, notably those near the northwest border with China and near Kuum-ni on the northeastern coast, are situated in coverage gaps in the SAM network, suggesting that they may have been labeled as inactive when last imaged due to their assets being relocated for training or maintenance purposes.

The following image depicts the locations of inactive strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK:
Support Facilities

Interestingly, there are no identified support facilities related to the strategic SAM force in the DPRK. Given that the DPRK employs a great deal of hardened and underground facilities, this is not necessarily suprising. Many of these facilities are identified in other nations due to the identifiable presence of SAM components in imagery. If these facilities are kept hidden in the DPRK, then their identification would be extremely difficult. However, it should be assumed that such facilities do exist, even if they have not yet been located or conclusively identified. These facilities would provide maintenance functions, store missile reloads, and garrison surplus equipment for future deployment.

STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

The DPRK appears to possess an intelligently designed, layered air defense network at first glance. S-75 sites are positioned to provide barrier air defense of the coastal and southern border regions, with the remaining S-75 and S-125 batteries bolstering inland defenses and protecting critical locations.

S-200 Coverage

Long-range air defense is provided by the DPRK's S-200 batteries. The S-200 is a significant threat to ISR and support aircraft operating in the theater, such as the USAF's U-2R based out of Osan AB in the ROK. The location and range of the S-200 would hold any such cooperative target at risk shortly following takeoff from most of the airfields in the ROK. Ergo, while the S-200 is not a serious threat to any non-cooperative, maneuverable targets such as fighter aircraft, it represents a significant problem for any potential aggressor.

Border Coverage

Many of the DPRK's S-75 batteries are positioned along the coastline and along the DMZ. These systems are placed to provide barrier air defense to deter any foreign intrusion into the DPRK's airspace. The majority of these systems are positioned to provide overlapping fields of fire to strengthen air defenses in these areas. The northern border with China and the northeastern border with Russia are left undefended, likely due to the DPRK not anticipating that either nation would be a party to hostilities against it.

Inland Coverage

The wide-ranging deployment of military facilities in the central part of the nation has precipitated the siting of S-75 and S-125 batteries to protect much of the DPRK's interior. S-125 batteries are specifically sited to protect two areas, Pyongyang and Yongbyon.

Air defense facilities and coverage zones near the capital of Pyongyang can be seen in the image below:
Air defense facilities and coverage zones near the Yongbyon nuclear research complex can be seen in the image below:
Interestingly, one location left udnefended is the underground nuclear test facility in the northeast. This may be due to the fact that if air defenses are present, analysts will assume that there is something there worth protecting. Similarly, the DPRK's rocket test sites at Musudan-ri and Changya-dong are also currently unprotected.

Denial and Deception Efforts

It is possible that many of the sites identified as active are not in fact legitimate SAM sites. With a number of camoflaged and underground facilities, the DPRK is clearly aware of the concept of denial and deception. Such practices may be in place in the strategic SAM network.

Consider the figures. It is reported that forty five S-75 batteries have been delivered, but forty six sites have been identified as operational. Many of these sites do not use traditional FSU site layouts, and are partially obscured by trees and other vegetation. The same numerical discrepancy exists in the S-125 force, with ten sites appearing active but only eight batteries reportedly being delivered. In addition, seven of the S-125 batteries have been provided with hardened facilities, begging the question of why the others have not. It is possible that the active S-125 batteries found at non-hardened facilities are in fact decoy sites. However, there is not sufficient evidence to conclusively prove this one way or the other.

The simplest method available to prove if a site is active or a decoy outside of having a personal ELINT system is to examine the imagery for the associated cable connections and other typical equipment found at active batteries. However, due to the aforementioned vegetation, many of these sites cannot be examined in this fashion. As such, if they contain what appears to be active equipment, they are assumed to be active batteries.

One mock S-125 site has been identified conclusively. This site, seen in the image below, contains a radar mockup and three launcher mockups. Note the southernmost launcher mockup. This launcher is clearly a mockup, having only two widely separated launch rails which are not parallel. Were this an actual 5P73 launcher, there would be four perfectly parallel rails. The imagery is of sufficient quality to discern that there are in fact only two rails. The spacing of the rails also indicates that this is not a 5P71 two-rail launcher. Further evidence of this site's true nature is found in the lack of any support equipment. None of the command and control vans are present, which would render this site unuseable even if it were fitted with operational equipment.
Air Defense Issues

The primary issue facing the DPRK's air defense network is one of age. While the equipment may still be serviceable, none of it is a major threat to a modern air arm. The DPRK desperately needs an infusion of modern air defense systems if it is to remain viable in the 21st Century.

The S-75 and S-125 have been faced multiple times by modern air arms since 1990 and have consistently been defeated by current tactics and electronic warfare techniques and systems. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia all possessed these systems and they were all defeated. The main victory claimed by these systems was the downing of an F-117A by a Yugoslavian S-125 battery in 1999, but this was due more to excellent intelligence support (they knew the F-117's route and whatever idiot planner was responsible used the same flight path over and over), outstanding site discipline (the site did not often radiate to give its position away), and the addition of an optical tracking system than the actual effectiveness of the system. In a conceivable conflict the DPRK would be facing American and ROK aircraft, and the USAF has exploited the S-75 and S-125 for decades. The S-200 may be marginally more credible as a threat, but as mentioned before it is only a significant threat to a cooperative (i.e. nonmaneuverable and slow) target. It has also been physically exploited based on the presence of equipment at the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range, but it is not known when this was acquired, meaning that the DPRK may have a more recent iteration of the system with a few tricks up its sleeve that remain undocumented. Given American reliance on ISR and IFR platforms during wartime air operations, it is likely that the S-200 batteries would be struck during the opening salvo of any conflict.

The other major obstacle to the DPRK's strategic SAM force is terrain. Much of the terrain in the DPRK is very varied, including that near the DMZ. Even a height difference of a few hundred feet can produce an exploitable blind zone in a SAM battery's coverage. More critically, many of the S-75 batteries along the DMZ are placed in positions of lower altitude than the surrounding terrain, restricting the fields of view of the SAM batteries. This is a significant error in the placement of these systems, as it denys them the ability to function to their maximum degree of effectiveness. The hardened S-125 and S-200 batteries were placed more logically at higher elevations than surrounding terrain, allowing them greater freedom of operation.

One further issue to address is the overreliance on AAA and MANPADS' in the DPRK. The DPRK possesses some of the highest AAA concentrations in the world. The general cocnept is that combat aircraft will fly at lower altitudes to more easily evade SAM batteries, making them susceptible to AAA or MANPADS'. What the DPRK has overlooked is the fact that its SAM defenses are inadequate in light of current ECM and SEAD systems, allowing combat aircraft to fly at higher altitudes to avoid the bulk of the AAA and the entirety of the MANPADS threat. AAA is comparatively cheap and can be very effective in the right environment, but the DPRK seems to have seriously erred in its judgement.

CONCLUSION

The DPRK is the new Iraq. During the lead-up to Operation DESERT STORM, the Iraqi air defense network was often described as being one of the world's most capable. This turned out to be an erroneous description, based in part due to Iraq's overreliance on dated technology and weapon systems. The same problems which plagued Iraq's air defense network in 1991 are evident in North Korea's current network, and must be rectified if the DPRK intends to field any sort of credible air defense in the 21st Century.

SOURCES

-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of North Korea and may therefore not represent the entire air defense network.

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

SIPRI
Ramona in the DPRK

North Korea Country Handbook, US DoD, 1997

The Ukrainian SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

Many individuals may be suprised to know the identity of the largest and most capable SAM network in Europe outside of Russia. The distinction goes to the Ukraine, the inheritor of numerous legacy Soviet SAM systems and facilities after the fall of the USSR. More importantly, many of these systems were top of the line during the 1980s, providing a very solid technology base on which the Ukraine would be able to rely going towards and into the 21st century.

AIR DEFENSE ASSETS

The Ukrainian Air Defense Force is responsible for operating the radar and SAM systems tasked with defending Ukrainian airspace. The force is subordinate to the Ukrainian Air Force, and operates S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON), S-300PT (SA-10A GRUMBLE), S-300PS (SA-10B GRUMBLE), S-300V1 (SA-12A GLADIATOR), and Buk (SA-11 GADFLY) SAM systems. The Ukrainian Army operates separate, subordinate SAM assets for providing battlefield air defense.

Over two hundred air defense related facilities have been identified in the Ukraine. There are a total of 35 active and 133 inactive SAM sites, as well as 106 supporting facilities. These locations are broken down as follows:

EW sites: 54
36D6 radar sites: 30
64N6 battle management radar sites: 9
SAM Garrisons: 1
S-300P Garrisons: 4
S-300V Garrisons: 3
9K37 Garrisons: 2
SAM Training Ranges: 3

Active S-125 sites: 2
Active S-200 sites: 4
Active S-300PT sites: 16
Active S-300PS sites: 11
Active S-300V sites: 2

Inactive S-75 sites: 77
Inactive S-125 sites: 19
Inactive 2K12 sites: 1
Inactive S-200 sites: 12
Inactive 9K37 sites: 1
Inactive S-300P sites: 23

SYMBOLOGY

The following icons will be used to depict air defense related sites within the Ukraine:

Squares: support facilities such as garrisons
Diamonds: EW radar sites
Circles: 36D6, 64N6 radar sites
Triangles: SAM sites

The icons will be color coded as follows:

Dark blue: general EW radar, 36D6 EW radar
Bright blue: S-125
Purple: S-200
Bright red: S-300PT, S-300PS, 64N6 battle management radar
Orange: S-300V
Faded green: 9K37
White: an unoccupied EW radar or SAM location
Brown: a SAM garrison (type-specific SAM garrisons are color coded as above based on their respective equipment)

Engagement zones will match the color of the icon for their respective system.

EW ASSETS

Early warning over the Ukraine is provided by various radar sites located throughout the nation. These sites typically host one or more types of EW radar, as well as height finding and IFF interrogation systems. There are forty-one active EW sites, with thirteen additional inactive sites available for network expansion or asset redeployment should the need arise. Note that this does not include organic EW radars deployed at SAM sites, which provide further coverage overlap.

Primary EW assets are a mixture of legacy FSU systems. These assets are commonly deployed at mixed-type EW sites, ostensibly to capitalize on the different capabilities of different radar systems. The most commonly identified system is the P-35/37 (BAR LOCK), with P-12/18 (SPOON REST), P-14 (TALL KING), P-19 (THIN SKIN), and P-80 (BACK NET) also scattered throughout the nation. The 1L13 BOX SPRING is deployed to support S-300V1 batteries to provide additional EW capability.

Thirty 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) and seven 64N6 (BIG BIRD) sites provide target identification and battle management functions for the Ukrainian SAM network. One 36D6 sites is co-located with an S-300PS unit, possibly providing direct support to the assigned batteries. The 36D6 and 64N6 radars are positioned to provide overlapping coverage. These systems are capable of monitoring virtually all of the Ukraine's airspace, as well as significant portions of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and as such the 36D6 radars may have a basic EW or GCI function as well.

The locations of the Ukrainian EW assets, including the 36D6 and 64N6 sites, can be seen in the image below:
The coverage zones of the 36D6 radar sites can be seen in the image below:
The coverage zones of the identified 64N6 battle management radar sites can be seen in the image below. A further 64N6 is likely positioned near L'viv, as there is an S-300PT battery deployed at a prepared site in the area. Likewise, 64N6 sites near Odessa and Sevastopol are not likely to remain inactive for an extended period as numerous S-300PS batteries are deployed in each area as well.
THE S-200V....D?

The S-200 is the longest-range SAM asset available to the Ukrainian Air Defense Force. Four active S-200 batteries provide air defense over all but the far eastern region of the nation between Kharkov and Lugansk. A further twelve inactive S-200 sites remain, although these are likely to be reused as homes for mobile assets such as the S-300PS if at all, due to the time required to redeploy an S-200 battery.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that the 250 kilometer range S-200V is in service, but the October 2001 shootdown of a Russian airliner over the Black Sea by an errant S-200 would seem to indicate that the 300 kilometer range S-200D is the variant operated by the Ukraine. The Russian airliner was reportedly no closer than 250 kilometers to the launch site and flying towards the Russian coastline. Hitting a crossing target at 250 kilometers would be nearly impossible with an S-200V, but would be within the capability of the S-200D.

The locations of the Ukraine's S-200 batteries, inactive S-200 sites, and relevant coverage zones for the active sites can be seen in the image below:
S-300P PROMINENCE

The S-200 is the longest-ranged Ukrainian-operated SAM system, but the S-300P variants represent the most capable and widely deployed systems. Twenty-seven S-300P series SAM batteries are in active service; sixteen batteries are equipped with the S-300PT, while eleven are equipped with the more capable S-300PS. Examining these sites in conjunction with the twenty-three inactive S-300P sites provides a great deal of insight into the deployment strategy of air defense assets within the Ukraine.

The S-300PT and S-300PS batteries are deployed to protect the most critical political, urban, military, and industrial areas in the nation. Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa were each defended by no fewer than six batteries at one point, while Nikolayev and Sevastopol were defended by no less than five apiece.

The following image depicts the locations of the Ukraine's S-300P series batteries, inactive S-300P series sites, and relevant coverage zones for the active sites:
Standard deployment practice deduced through imagery analysis indicates that a full-strength S-300PT battery has twelve TELs, while a full-strength S-300PS battery has eight TELs. Each battery is equipped with a 5N63 or 5N63S (FLAP LID) engagement radar, as well as a 5N66 or 5N66M (CLAM SHELL) low-altitude detection radar. 40V6 series mast assemblies are commonly employed for both radar systems.

The capital of Kiev is the most heavily defended location, with five S-300P series batteries. Of the five active sites, four operate the S-300PT and one operates the S-300PS. The sixth site was occupied by an S-300PS battery, but as of April 2009 the site was unoccupied. This could be due to scheduled maintenance, deployment to a training facility, or site relocation, suggesting that a full complement of six batteries may still be assigned to defend the capital.

Dnepropetrovsk (S-300PT), Kharkov (S-300PT), Nikolayev (S-300PT), Odessa (S-300PS), and Sevastopol (S-300PS) are currently defended by three active batteries apiece.

The following image depicts the layout of the S-300PT and S-300PS batteries around Kiev, along with other air defense associated sites in the area:
The following image depicts the coverage of the air defense assets deployed around Kiev. Note the significant degree of overlap present in the S-300PT and S-300PS batteries.
36D6 EW radars can be co-located with S-300PT and S-300PS batteries to take advantage of added target acquisition support should the need arise. An S-300PS battery near Pervomaysk, seen in the image below, currently possess an on-site 36D6 EW radar, indicating that this type of interoperability may be practiced within the Ukraine even if it is not widely utilized in peacetime. However, due to the presence of other EW assets, it is also possible that a dedicated EW unit is simply co-located at the site, which would indicate that interoperability between the 36D6 and S-300P series is not necessarily utilized.
Recent activity near Odessa suggests that the older S-300PT may be being phased out, or at the very least redeployed to less important regions. A site south of Odessa was imaged in 2004, and was seen to be home to both an S-300PT and an S-300PS battery. As can be seen in the image below, the S-300PT battery occupied the site proper, with the S-300PS battery being deployed along the southeastern periphery.
In 2007, the same site was reimaged, with the S-300PS battery seen to have taken over occupation of the site proper, with the S-300PT battery having been removed.
Evidence of this sort of realignment or redeployment can be seen at other locations in the Ukraine as well. S-300PT batteries are deployed predominantly at older-style S-300P sites, containing six revetments for two TELs apiece, or four revetments for three TELs apiece and a position for a mast-mounted 5N63 in the center. S-300PS batteries are deployed predominantly at newer-style sites, featuring four TEL revetments and a significant raised berm in the center for the mobile 5N63S engagement radar. It is likely that the S-300PT sites were built over old S-75 locations, perhaps explaining the similar launcher revetment placement. At any rate, an S-300PS battery northwest of Kiev is deployed at what would typically be a six-revetment S-300PT site. This likely indicates that the S-300PS replaced an S-300PT battery at this location at some point prior to 2003, when the earliest available imagery was captured. Furthermore, the native language website for the MoD no longer claims that the S-300PT is operated, only listing the S-300PS. It is therefore possible that the S-300PT is in fact being phased out. The latter case is interesting given that there are still numerous S-300PT batteries operational in imagery captured as late as September of 2009. This could indicate that the S-300PT is perhaps no longer serviced, and will be allowed to retire on a battery-by-battery basis as service lives are exhausted.

S-125....STILL SERVING ON?

One strategic-level SAM asset which may still be operated by the Ukrainian Air Defense Force is the S-125. The S-125 was imaged at two active locations in 2002 and 2003, but has not been mentioned in the Ukrainian MoD's annual White Book as far back as 2005. The latter fact indicates that the system is not currently being trained on or funded for service life extensions, occurrences which would be necessary for the system to remain viable into the future. Given that these events have not taken place, it is likely that the Ukrainian S-125 batteries were removed from service between 2003 and 2005. While further analysis is necessary to make a definitive statement to that extent, the evidence does suggest it to be the case.

"TACTICAL" SAMS

There are two tactical SAM systems which serve in the Ukrainian air defense network. The Ukraine operates both 9K37 Buk and S-300V1 systems, with a portion of these systems being subordinate to the Air Defense Force. The Ukrainian MoD claims that the Army operates the Buk-M variant, with the Air Defense Force operating the Buk-M1. The MoD also claims that the Army and Air Defense Force operates the S-300V1 (SA-12A GLADIATOR), indicating that the Ukraine may not be in possession of the S-300V2 (SA-12B GIANT) ATBM system.

The Buk issue is somewhat complicated, as there is no known specific "Buk-M" variant. The term has been used by Russia to refer to both Buk-M1 and Buk-M1-2 systems collectively. Alternatively, this may indicate a local modification of the original Buk system. The original Buk system was present in the Ukraine as late as 2005, as evidenced by the sighting of a 9S18 Kupol (TUBE ARM) target acquisition radar at a Buk-affiliated SAM garrison. This can be seen in the image below:
Two Buk garrisons and three S-300V1 garrisons have been identified, with S-300V1 components seen field deployed near two garrisons. The garrison affiliations cannot be effectively determined, as the Ukrainian Army and Air Defense Force each operate both systems, although the Zolotonosha garrison displaying the Kupol radar may be affiliated with the Ukrainian Army if the original Kupol radar was in fact retained in the Ukraine's "Buk-M" system.

SUPPORT FACILITIES

Identified support facilities for the Ukrainian Air Defense Force consist of numerous SAM garrisons and three SAM training facilities. Ukrainian SAM units have also been known to travel to Telemba in Russia to conduct missile firings. Identified SAM garrisons, including those potentially supporting Army assets, and SAM training ranges can be seen in the image below:
OVERALL COVERAGE

The Ukrainian SAM network was inherited from the USSR following the collapse of the latter nation. Air defense assets are organized to defend key population centers and geographic regions. The capital of Kiev, key industrial and urban centers Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Nikolayev, and Odessa, and the Crimean peninsula are home to the majority of the assets. Other assets are scattered throughout the nation and along the western border.

The following image depicts the locations of all air defense oriented sites, both active and inactive, throughout the nation:
The following image depicts the total coverage of identified EW and SAM assets deployed throughout the nation:
As can be seen in the images above, the Ukraine enjoys near-total nationwide EW coverage and boasts a layered SAM defense network around multiple key locations. While the network no longer faces the threat of a war against NATO, and has downsized significantly since the fall of the USSR as a result, the Ukraine remains very well equipped to defend itself from aerial attack.

The possible recent retirement of the S-300PT by the Air Defense Force will not necessarily impart a significant loss of capability in terms of overall coverage to the network. While the S-200 is not well suited for engaging maneuverable, non-cooperative, or low-RCS targets, it can deter any ISR platforms or other large combat aircraft from approaching Ukrainian airspace. Given that the S-300PS has a maximum engagement range of nearly double that of the S-300PT, 90 kilometers to 47, it would be possible to redeploy S-300PS batteries around key locations in a fashion which would allow S-300PT batteries to be retired. Having fewer batteries would certainly mean that fewer targets could be engaged at a given time, but the longer engagement range would alleviate some of this loss by allowing targets to be engaged further down range, with more targets engaged following intercept of the first wave. This would be a sensible redistribution of assets, allowing the capability to be virtually retained by only operating roughly half of the assets. This would result in an appropriate reduction in yearly operating and training costs as well. This course of action could necessitate removing and redeploying the solitary S-300PS batteries near Khakovka, Kherson, and Pervomaysk, and the resulting gaps in coverage would need to be assessed to ensure that they represent acceptable degradations of the overall network. Alternatively, S-300PS assets currently identified as being held in-garrison could be field deployed to counter the retirement of S-300PT batteries.

The potential gaps in the air defense network which would be caused by a redeployment of S-300PS assets could be filled by the Buk or S-300V1 batteries tasked with an Air Defense Force mission. These mobile units are capable of serving as effective "gap fillers" and complements to the longer-range strategic SAM systems. Buk or S-300V1 batteries could also be deployed to provide close-in defense of key facilities, taking some of the workload from S-300P series batteries. Alternatively, they could be deployed along the nation's periphery underneath known or potential ingress routes in an attempt to ambush inbound aircraft during wartime.

Mobile assets such as the S-300PS, Buk, and S-300V1 are capable of operating wherever they are required, virtually anywhere in the nation. 64N6 coverage and 36D6 deployment can provide these systems with battle management and target acquisition support wherever they may deploy, thanks to the robust EW network. As S-300PS SAMs are typically deployed at prepared sites, the large network of inactive SAM facilities in the nation represent potential deployment sites, or locations for field training exercises. There are over 100 inactive SAM sites of various configuration in the Ukraine, the locations of which can be seen in the image below:
It is interesting to analyze the former SAM locations in a historical sense. The Soviet military had placed two ICBM units in the Ukraine under the command of the 43rd Missile Army. These were the 19th Missile Division near Khmelnitskiy and the 46th Missile Division near Pervomaisk. It is interesting to note that, while numerous active and inactive SAM sites are located near Pervomaisk, no evidence of strategic SAM deployment near Khmelnitskiy has been found. This would seem to indicate that the defense of ICBM batteries was not a significant priority, or that this mission was primarily handled by aerial assets.

The locations of the Pervomaisk ICBM silos and nearby SAM sites can be seen in the image below:
FUTURE EFFORTS

Despite the modern, robust nature of the Ukrainian air defense network, it will require modernization in the future. The S-200 and S-300PS systems will likely require replacement in the 2015-2020 timeframe. Even without taking service life into account, both systems are likely nearing (S-300PS) or past (S-200) their prime, thanks to constant development of ECM and SEAD/DEAD systems and tactics throughout the world.

The simplest option would be to procure S-300PMU-2 Favorit (SA-20B GARGOYLE) or S-400 (SA-21) systems from Russia, as they would be able to operate within the existing EW and battle management networks. This could also be packaged together with Buk-M2E (SA-17 GRIZZLY) systems as Buk-M1 replacements. Current tensions with Russia regarding Ukrainian desires to join NATO and the nation's support of Georgia have been well-publicized, but may not be enough to impede an arms deal of this expense. The Ukraine is a member of the CIS Air Defense Network and has shared information in that capacity with Russia, continuing to do so through 2009, and participates in various multinational exercises related to the network as well. Russia and the Ukraine also do well over $10 billion USD in trade annually, demonstrating that while the governments do have issues they are still able to coexist and cooperate in other areas.

After the breakup of the USSR, the Ukraine began to research many indigenous missile systems, including the Grom/Sapsan SRBM and Korshun GLCM. An IR-guided AAM, the Izdelie 611 "Gran" is also under development, and could represent a stepping stone towards a new SAM design. No evidence of any BVR AAM development has surfaced in the Ukraine, but a viable WVR AAM could lead designers down that path in the future. A BVR system, particularly an active or passive radar missile, would certainly be a candidate for surface-launch as a SAM system. Such a weapon could potentially replace the Buk systems, as well as S-300PS systems in a boosted form for extended range. This option remains less attractive than pursuing Russian-made SAM systems, however, as indigenous radars may be required and development could consume a decade or more given that the Ukraine is basically starting from scratch. An alternative but more complicated solution would be to merely develop a SAM to replace the 5V55-series missiles employed by the S-300PS. This would enable the system to retain the guidance systems and components of the S-300PS, while rejuvenating its service life through the addition of a new missile with a new solid rocket motor.

The last option would be to purchase a foreign-made, non-Russian SAM system. NATO entry could theoretically open the doors necessary for a Patriot or MEADS purchase. While these systems would certainly be viable, they would potentially require a new EW network for support, further increasing the overall cost of modernization. This EW requirement stems from the issues many nations have had, particularly Greece with the S-300PMU-1 (SA-20A GARGOYLE) and Patriot, at getting Russian-made and Western-made SAM systems to operate cooperatively. In that light, a Russian-made SAM system purchase would be far more logical.

CONCLUSION

The Ukrainian Air Defense Force remains a very capable, modern SAM network. With a renewed focus on training and professionalism in the Ukrainian armed forces as a whole since 2005, the Air Defense Force stands ready to take on any regional aggressor and defend the citizenry underneath its umbrella. It will be very interesting to watch as the network evolves in the coming decade.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION

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SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Ukraine's Air Defense Force
Failed Firings in 2008
Ukraine and the S-200D
The Ukrainian Air Defense Force (in Ukrainian)

This article has been updated, the original version was published in July of 2009.