The Saudi Arabian SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contains what is arguably some of the most valuable real estate on the face of the planet. The massive oil reserves have turned Saudi Arabia into an economic powerhouse in the late 20th Century. It should come as no suprise that a portion of the Kingdom's profits were spent on military systems to defend the Kingdom from regional aggressors.

ORGANIZATION

Encompassing a vast amount of relatively barren territory pockmarked by population centers primarily situated along the coastlines, Saudi Arabia employs a point-defense oriented SAM network. The bulk of Saudi Arabia's defensive assets have come from the United States and the United Kingdom via a series of multi-billion dollar weapons contracts.

Air defense assets are controlled by the Royal Saudi Air Defense forces. This service branch was separated from the Saudi Army in 1981, and is headquartered in the capital of Riyadh. The air defense forces operate the EW facilities and strategic SAM systems.

EW NETWORK

Twenty nine EW sites have been identified in Saudi Arabia, four of which were inactive in the most recently available imagery. The primary EW radars are the AN-TPS-43, AN-TPS-63, and AN/TPS-77, most of which were delivered in the 1980s. EW sites are situated along the border of the nation, with multiple sites providing additional coverage of the nation's interior. The only area devoid of significant EW coverage is the barren southeastern region, bordering the UAE and Oman.

The following image depicts the locations of Saudi Arabian EW sites:

PATRIOT

The MIM-104 PAC-2 Patriot represents the most capable strategic SAM system operated by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia initially ordered the Patriot system in 1990, and to date has received a total of twenty one batteries. Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in acquiring the ATBM-optimized PAC-3 ERINT system, but a contract has yet to be signed.

Saudi Arabia currently fields eleven operational Patriot batteries. A total of fifteen Patriot deployment sites have been identified, with four remaining unoccupied in the latest imagery. The majority of Saudi Arabian Patriot batteries are deplyed at prepared, hardened facilities. These facilities feature hardened revetments for the TELs and a raised berm for the AN/MPQ-53 engagement radar.

A Saudi Arabian Patriot site near Dhahran can be seen in the image below:

The locations and coverage zones of Saudi Arabian Patriot batteries can be seen in the image below. Note that the bulk of the systems are consolidated along the northeastern coastline, defending the major oil export facilities and the Dhahran metro area.

HAWK

HAWK missile systems have served in Saudi Arabia since the 1960s. Between the late 1970s and early 1980s, Saudi Arabia received the improved I-HAWK system and re-built ten HAWK batteries to the same standard.

There are currently eighteen active HAWK batteries in Saudi Arabia, with a further six inactive HAWK sites. HAWK batteries are typically deployed to provide close-in air defense for Patriot batteries.

The locations and coverage zones of Saudi Arabian HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:

CAPABILITIES

Overall Coverage

Arrayed in a point-defense layout, the Saudi Arabian strategic SAM network represents a formidable obstacle to any potential aggressor. The Kingdom has deployed strategic SAM systems in a manner designed to defend the most critical locations in the nation. Unsuprisingly, a large concentration of SAM systems are positioned in the northeastern portion of the nation, along the coastline facing Iran.

The following image depicts the nationwide strategic SAM coverage in Saudi Arabia:

Primary Locations

There are five primary SAM concentrations, with each location defended by no fewer than three active batteries. These locations are the capital of Riyadh, the metropilotan areas surrounding Dhahran and Mecca, and the military facilities at King Faisal AB and King Khalid Military Complex. HAWK batteries also protect other locations, such as King Khalid AB.

The following image depicts the deployment of air defense assets near the capital of Riyadh. Note the positioning of an active HAWK battery and an EW facility near the military complex southeast of Riyadh at Al Kharj.

The following image depicts the deployment of air defense assets near the city of Mecca. SAM assets are deployed along the western coastline to provide clearer fields of view for associated radar systems. While the HAWK batteries near the coastline cannot defend the skies directly over Mecca, the Patriot battery can range over both areas, including King Fahd AB to the east, which is also defended by a HAWK battery.

The following image depicts the deplyment of air defense assets near the city of Dhahran:

Given Dhahran's economic importance to the Kingdom, it is defended by the highest concentration of strategic SAM assets found in the nation. These SAM batteries, currently consisting of six active Patriot and four active HAWK batteries, are arrayed to provide overlapping fields of fire throughout the area. The multiple target engagement capability of the Patriot system makes this the best-defended piece of real estate in the entire nation.

The following image depicts the overlapping fields of fire of the deployed Patriot and HAWK batteries near Dhahran:

The following images depict the deployment of air defense assets near King Faisal AB and King Khalid Military Complex, respectively. Each location is defended by multiple SAM batteries.

The Air Element

With a high percentage of Saudi Arabia remaining sparsely populated, the Kingdom also relies on the Royal Saudi Air Force to defend its skies in conjunction with the deployed strategic SAM assets. Current air defense aircraft include the F-15C and EF-2000, with the multi-role F-15S also fully capable of performing the task if required.

Air defense capable aircraft are currently deployed at four locations. A fifth location, Prince Sultan AB near Riyadh, is home to the RSAF's E-3 AWACS fleet. These aircraft can serve as gap fillers in the air defense network's EW system, or can direct air defense aircraft to targets. In the same fashion, the air defense aircraft can serve to defend the Saudi skies unprotected by SAM systems.

The following image depicts the locations where air defense aircraft are based. Red icons indicate the presence of combat aircraft, while the blue icon represents the Saudi E-3 base.

LIMITATIONS

Combining strategic SAM systems and a capable air force ensures that Saudi Arabia is relatively well defended. However, there are certain limitations to the network. Reliance on the aging HAWK SAM system reduces the effectiveness of the network in certain areas, particularly those with the HAWK as the primary defensive system. A potential aggressor such as Iran, with acess to the HAWK in its own inventory, would be well-versed in the capabilities, limitations, and effective counters to the system.

Furthermore, the point-defense layout of the network leaves large portions of the nation undefended by strategic SAM assets. While aircraft can be called upon to defend these areas if required, the presence of large gaps in the nationwide air defense picture leaves numerous vulnerabilities open to exploitation by a foreign aggressor.

CONCLUSION

All things considered, the Saudi Arabian strategic SAM network is logically arrayed to defend key religious, industrial and military locations. With the potential acquisition of the PAC-3, the network will enhance its ability to intercept inbound tactical ballistic missiles, possibly forcing an aggressor to rely on airpower rather than missile strikes alone to engage targets. Considering the strength of the SAM network around likely targets, and the presence of the capable RSAF, this could turn out to be a losing proposition for all but the most capable air arms.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

SIPRI

The Indian SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

One of the most populous nations in the world, India has engaged in numerous regional conflicts in the past. The threat environment led to the creation of a point-defense oriented EW and SAM network designed not to protect the skies over India, but to protect the military units tasked with such a role. This ultimately led to the creation of a number of EW and SAM units within the Indian Air Force.

OVERVIEW

Indian air defense elements, to include EW assets, SAM systems, and interceptors, are subordinate to the Indian Air Force (IAF). This allows the IAF to coordinate both sensors and weapons, allowing for a maximum degree of target deconfliction. SAM units are organized as squadrons, with radar units being organized as either signal units or transportable radar units, depending on the assigned types. These units are in turn subordinate to the five operational commands in the IAF.

The Indian SAM network follows a point defense layout. The primary SAM system employed by the IAF is the S-125M (SA-3B GOA). These systems are deployed at various airbases in the northern and western portions of India. EW assets are deployed primarily along border regions, with the highest concentration being present along the northern and western borders with Pakistan.

EW ASSETS

Fifty four EW sites have been identified in India. The primary assets are THD-1955, P-12/18 (SPOON REST), and 36D6 (TIN SHIELD) radars. Thirteen THD-1955 radars arrayed primarily along the border region from Pakistan to Myanmar provide a significant amount of EW coverage. EW coverage is enhanced by fourteen 36D6 radar sites, arrayed primarily along the border with Pakistan. The 36D6 is significant as it can provide both target track data to SAM batteries as well as GCI support for Russian-origin fighter aircraft such as the MiG-29 (FULCRUM) or Su-30MKI (FLANKER-H). P-12/18 radar sites are scattered throughout the region, as are indigenous Indra-II radar units. The net result is an EW network that is heavily oriented towards potential threats.

The following image depicts the locations of identified Indian EW facilities. Dark blue diamonds represent basic EW sites, typically manned by P-12/18 or Indra-II radar systems, while light blue diamonds represent THD-1955 radar facilities. Blue circles represent 36D6 radar facilities. The range rings given for the 36D6 sites represent the 165 km acquisition range against a typical fighter-size target. Each radar system is capable of target detection at greater ranges depending on the target RCS and altitude, with the THD-1955 typically employing a range of 400 km.
The following image depicts a typical THD-1955 site. These large radars are sited atop dedicated structures. This site is located south of Shillong in eastern India.
The following image depicts a deployed 36D6 radar at Pune AB in western India. This radar likely serves as both an EW and GCI asset, given its co-location with Su-30MKI fighters.
India does possess the 40V6 series of masts for mounting the 36D6, although their use appears to be relatively infrequent. The following image from February 2008 depicts a 36D6 mounted atop a 40V6 mast assembly at Nal AB. Imagery captured four months later indicates that the 36D6 is still deployed but has been removed from the 40V6. Only thee 36D6 locations have an identifiable 40V6 series mast available for use.
Other EW assets include the A-50I AWACS based at Agra AB, and potentially an aerostat system found near the border with Pakistan. The aerostat system's purpose is unknown at this time, but could potentially be used to mount an air surveillance system. The facility can be seen in the image below.
THE S-125

India's primary strategic SAM system is the S-125M. These systems were delivered between 1973 and 1989 from the USSR, and thirty four batteries are currently active. These batteries provide point defense for key military installations, typically airbases, in the northern and western portions of India.

The locations of India's active S-125M batteries and their engagement zones can be seen in the image below:
The S-125M has two specific drawbacks: range and single-target engagement capability. The ability of the system to engage one target per battery is partially mitigated by placing multiple batteries at many locations, but the 25 km maximum range of the system effectively reduces its role to one of point defense only, lacking the range to provide long-range overlapping fields of fire necessary for a more robust air defense network.

IAF S-125M batteries are frequently relocated in their operating areas. This can be done to complicate targeting by enemy assets and to allow systems to be cycled through maintenance periods. The following image depicts the S-125M deployment area at Vadodara AB in western India. While only one location currently has an active battery, there are four other locations which have been active at some point in the past.
Numbering the S-125M locations 1 through 5 from west to east, the following information can be derived from available imagery:

Site 1
-Active from December 2005 to March 2010

Site 2
-Active from October 2000 to October 2002
-Active from June 2003 to November 2003
-Active from December 2003 to March 2010

Site 3
-Active from October 2000 to October 2002

Site 4
-Active from November 2003 to December 2005
-Currently active as of March 2010

Site 5
-Active from June 2003 to March 2010

All told, there are twenty one inactive or former S-125M positions identified throughout India that can be used as relocation sites should the need arise.

TACTICAL SYSTEMS

Tactical SAM systems are also operated as point defense assets in the IAF. The primary system is the Osa-AKM (SA-8 GECKO), a mobile system mounted on a wheeled TELAR. The 10 km range of the system allows it to serve as a layered short-range counterpart to co-located S-125M batteries.

An IAF Osa-AKM TELAR can be seen in-garrison near Ambala AB in the image below.
The Indian Army operates the 2K12 Kvadrat (SA-6 GAINFUL), which could be employed in a similar capacity to IAF Osa-AKM units if required. The Army also operates additional Osa-AKM units.

LIMITATIONS

Given that India has chosen to rely on a point-defense oriented air defense network, the lack of long-range SAM coverage is not a true limitation. Furthermore, the presence of significant numbers of fighter aircraft such as the Su-30MKI cpaable of acting in concert with the EW network to perform interception tasks can alleviate the lack of long-range SAM coverage. However, there are still some limitations to be addressed within the network as it is currently organized.

The primary limitation is one of terrain. Northern and eastern India contains very varied terrain, which can introduce significant blind spots in radar or SAM coverage, reducing the network's effectiveness. The issue of EW coverage has been addressed to a degree by the procurement of the A-50I AWACS platform.

The other significant limitation faced by the strategic SAM network is one of age. While many of the systems have been refurbished or modified to retain their effectiveness, the age of the systems is such that a potential aggressor has enjoyed a significant amount of time to discern weaknesses and develop ECM systems and countertactics to defeat the deployed systems. In truth, it is the age of many of these systems that has pushed India towards developing and procuring new SAM systems to replace the elderly systems currently in widespread use.

ABM DEVELOPMENTS

One significant aspect of Indian air defense that will become operational in the near future is an ABM capability. India began researching an ABM system in 1999, with the goal of fielding a two-tier system. The two-tier system would consist of the exoatmospheric PAD, a Prithvi SRBM derivative, and the endoatmospheric AAD. Where PAD employs a directional warhead, AAD employs a hit-to-kill kinetic warhead. It is now believed that a new weapon referred to as PDV will replace the PAD in the two-tier structure. This system is capable of engaging 1500 km range ballistic missiles, making it an ATBM rather than a true ABM system, but a separate system with a design goal of engaging 5000 km range weapons is underway to field a true ABM.

The radar syste employed by the PAD/AAD weapons is referred to as Swordfish and is in actuality a modified Israeli EL/M-2080 Green Pine radar system. Two of these radars were delivered to India in 2002. One is currently sited northeast of Bangalore, with the second being located near Konark on India's northeast coast. The radars are sited in protective domes. The inland facility can be seen in the image below:
FUTURE PROSPECTS

India is actively developing and acquiring new SAM systems to revitalize its air defense force for the 21st Century. There are three significant programs which should begin to bear fruit in the near term. The first is the Akash, being procured by the IAF to potentially replace S-125M systems. This is an indigenous mobile SAM system derived in part from the 2K12. Maitri is a short-range SAM being co-developed with France, employing technology used in the French Mica BVR AAM. The third program is a long-range SAM system. This system may build upon the aforementioned AAD weapon under the codename of Ashvin. Deployment of these weapon systems will eventually allow the IAF to retire the S-125M and Osa-AKM, replacing them with weapons more capable of performing effectively in the current environment.

CONCLUSION

While India's SAM network does not appear to be particularly robust or capable on paper, it is not intended to serve as the primary protector of the nation's airspace. However, even with its more limited role, modernization programs must continue if the network is to remain viable in the forseeable future.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

IAF Orbat
SIPRI
PAD Test

The Japanese SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

Japan is a heavily populated nation spread out over a series of islands in the Western Pacific. American and Japanese SAM systems have protected Japanese airspace since the early days of the Cold War. Aging systems and recent developments in the region have led Japan to begin fielding a modern air defense and anti-missile network.

OVERVIEW

Japanese SAM systems are subordinate to both the JGSDF and the JASDF. The JGSDF operates the HAWK and Chu-SAM systems, with Japanese Patriot batteries being operated by the JASDF. However, JASDF control networks provide targeting and EW support for all SAM systems in Japan, as the JASDF operates the Aircraft Control and Warning Wings manning Japan's EW sites. 5 JGSDF units and six JASDF units are equipped with HAWK or Patriot SAMs.

EW

24 active and one inactive EW site form the basis of Japan's early warning network. These sites are located around the periphery of Japan and provide support for both JASDF and JGSDF SAM units. The bulk of these locations operate the indigenous FPS-3 EW radar.

The locations of Japan's EW sites can be seen in the image below:
PATRIOT

In 1984 Japan chose the Patriot missile system to replace its aging Nike-Hercules batteries. The initial PAC-1 batteries were upgraded to PAC-2 standard. Six missile groups operate the Patriot in the JASDF, oriented throughout the nation. These batteries are primarily located on the grounds of former Nike-Hercules units, taking advantage of the hardened revetments already present to protect the TELs.

A representative Patriot battery can be seen in the image below. This site is located near Tokyo, and is a former Nike missile position. The main upgrade performed to Nike sites allowing Patriot operation is the inclusion of a raised berm for the AN/MPQ-53 engagement radar, which can clearly be seen. Amusingly, two of the site's former occupants remain as gate guards.
The locations and coverage zones of Japan's Patriot batteries can be seen in the image below. A portion of the Patriot batteries located on Okinawa are in fact operated by the US Army, but cannot sufficiently be differentiated based on the imagery available. As such, they are all included here.
HAWK AND CHU-SAM

The JGSDF has operated the HAWK missile system since 1965. Eleven batteries appear to remain active in available imagery, with other batteries held in-garrison at various locations.

The locations and coverage zones of Japan's active HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
Chu-SAM, the Mitsubishi Type 03, is Japan's indigenous replacement for the HAWK in JSGDF service. Chu-SAM was inducted in 2005, with the first training firings taking place at Fort Bliss, Texas in late 2006. The extent of Chu-SAM deployment is not currently known. Chu-SAM will offer a significant capability increase in terms of performance and mobility when compared to the HAWK.

Chu-SAM components can be seen in-garrison near Tokyo in the image below:
MISSILE DEFENSE

The increasing threat of DPRK ballistic missiles has led Japan to pursue a relatively robust BMD network. There are three primary components to the system: sensors, land-based PAC-3 missiles, and sea-based SM-3 missiles. The system began to be studied in 1995, with the first component, the PAC-3, becoming operational in 2007. PAC-3 systems were deployed to northern Japan in 2009 in anticipation of DPRK missile tests.

The BMD sensor network will consist of three radar types. Seven FPS-3 radars in the existing EW network have been modified to improve missile detection capabilities. In addition, four new FPS-5 phased-array radars (previously developed as the FPS-XX) will be built by 2012. In the interim, a US FBX-T radar system deployed to Japan in June of 2006 to provide BMEW capability. This system was deployed at Shariki in northern Japan. The US also began operating PAC-3 missiles at Kadena in late 2006.

Japan's projected land-based BMEW network can be seen in the image below. Modified FPS-3 sites are marked with light blue circles, FPS-5 radar site locations are marked with dark blue circles, and the FBX-T radar location is marked as a yellow circle.
The FBX-T radar system can be seen in the image below. This radar has been used to monitor DPRK missile tests. This is a temporary location, with a more permanent site being constructed approximately 1 kilometer to the south.
For the sea-based portion of the network, four Kongo-class AEGIS destroyers will be upgraded and equipped to fire the SM-3. Work on these four vessels, the Kongo, Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishima, will be complete by the end of 2010. Kongo completed modifications in 2007 and conducted Japan's first AEGIS missile intercept in December of that year.

Modification of Japan's command and control networks to incorporate the new BMD capabilities and mission will be completed by 2012

CONCLUSION

The changing threat environment, coupled with the age of legacy systems such as the HAWK, have led Japan to develop one of the most modern air defense networks found in the world. When the BMD network is fully operational after 2012, Japan will have provided its citizens with a robust defensive capability to repel both air and missile attacks on its soil.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

PAC-3 deployed
PAC-3 flight test
Chu-SAM
Chu-SAM testing

Japan's Missile Defense, March 2007
Overview of Japan's Defense Policy, Japanese MoD
Defense White Paper, Japanese MoD, 2009

Russian Strategic Air Defense

REMOVED PENDING PDF CONVERSION

The South Korean SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

With cross-border tensions between the two Koreas seeming to increase daily, the Republic of Korea's (ROK) SAM network is a significant element in protecting its citizens and infrastructure from hostile forces. Currently undergoing a deep modernization, the ROK's SAM network represents a significant facet of the nation's defense against air and missile attack.

ORGANIZATION

The ROK's SAM force is operated by the Air Defense Artillery Command. The Air Defense Artillery Command became part of the ROK Air Force in 1991, previously being subordinate to the ROK Army. The ROK Air Force also controls the EW radar facilities throughout the nation. EW radars report information to the ROK Air Force's Master Control Reporting Center, which is responsible for managing the airspace above and around the peninsula.Additional SAM assets available to defend ROK airspace are operated by the US Army.

EW NETWORK

Early warning coverage of the ROK is provided by seventeen identified EW sites. Five of these sites are positioned along the DMZ, with a further three positioned on the islands of Baegryeong-do to the west, Ullung-do to the east, and Cheju-do to the south. EW coverage will be bolstered in the near future with the introduction of four Boeing 737 PEACE EYE AEW&C platforms, the first of which was handed over to KAI at Sacheon in February 2010 for radar integration.

The locations of the ROK's EW sites can be seen in the image below:
HAWK

The most numerous SAM system employed in the ROK is the MIM-23 HAWK. The 40 kilometer range missile system is deployed at twenty three locations spread throughout the peninsula. While the HAWK is technically a mobile, tactical SAM system, it is employed in a strategic capacity by the ROK, being emplaced at fixed, hardened locations containing both the missile launchers and the guidance radars.

The locations and coverage zones of the ROK's HAWK batteries can be seen in the image below:
NIKE-HERCULES

The primary long-range strategic SAM system employed by the ROK is the Nike-Hercules. Six sites remain operational in available imagery, primarily situated in the northern third of the nation. Nike-Hercules batteries are each split between two locations, one hosting the guidance radars and another hosting the actual missile battery.

An example of the Nike-Hercules split site layout can be seen in the image below, which depicts a Nike-Hercules location near Yeoju, southeast of Seoul:
The locations and coverage zones of the ROK's Nike-Hercules batteries can be seen in the image below:
While the Nike-Hercules boasts a range of 155 kilometers, an impressive number, its effectiveness is in doubt. Recent incidents have suggested that the missile may no longer be a viable weapon system, causing the ROK to pursue other options. In fact, due to the varied dates of imagery available to analyze the individual battery locations, some (or all) of them may already have been withdrawn from use. However, as no reporting has been located to suggest that the Nike-Hercules has been fully withdrawn by the ROK, those sites which remain active in available imagery are noted here.

Nike-Hercules may remain a significant weapon in the ROK's arsenal following retirement from the air defense role. Two SSM variants have been developed, with ranges of 150 and 180-250 kilometers. These systems are referred to as Hyunmoo I and Hyunmoo II, and may be sited at existing Nike-Hercules facilities as they can employ the same launch systems. Interestingly, the northwestern Nike-Hercules site west of Inchon is 180 kilometers from P'yongyang, and does not appear to have a guidance radar facility nearby necessary for surface-to-air operations. This facility may represent an operational Hyunmoo SSM base, and was apparently constructed between 2004 and 2008. It is unlikely that the ROK would construct such a significant facility merely to support a SAM that was already overdue for replacement.

The Inchon Nike-Hercules site can be seen in the image below:
PATRIOT

To bolster the air defense of the ROK, the US Army began deploying Patriot strategic SAM batteries to the peninsula in the 1990's. US Army Patriot batteries began to be upgraded in 2003 with the addition of the PAC-3 missile, optimized for the ATBM role. The PAC-2 missile has a range of 160 kilometers, with the PAC-3 having a range of approximately 30 kilometers due to its significantly smaller airframe.

There are currently eight Patriot batteries assigned to the ROK, with active batteries located at Osan (two), Suwon (two), and Kunsan (one) airbases. A sixth active battery was briefly located at Gwangju airbase in October of 2004, but was relocated by December of 2006. Despite the protests from anti-American elements when the battery was sited at the Korean airbase, the US Army had never intended the relocation to be permanent. It relocated to Camp Carroll near Daegu, where it remains garrisoned with the other two batteries assigned to the ROK for future deployment when required. Each Patriot battery is typically deployed with eight TELs and a guidance radar.

A representative Patriot deployment at Osan AB can be seen in the iamge below:
The locations and coverage zones of US Army Patriot batteries deployed in the ROK can be seen in the image below. The Camp Carroll garrison facility is also annotated.
The ROK began to investigate purchasing its own Patriot missile systems in the 1990s. The SAM-X program was initiated in 1990 to find a successor to the Nike-Hercules. Due to financial and political reasons, the program did not bear fruit until 2007, when a decision was made to purchase second-hand German PAC-2 batteries. The first ex-German Patriots were delivered in 2008. They will serve in a trials capacity before being operationally deployed in 2012.

A SAM training facility southeast of Daegu was expanded between 2003 and 2007. The timing is significant as this was when the ROK government was still investigating its options for SAM-X, and by this stage had decided to focus on a variant of the Patriot system. This facility, which likely trains ROK SAM operators as evidenced by the presence of Nike-Hercules equipment, was hosting Patriot equipment in January of 2009. This likely represents the first sighting of ROK-operated Patriot equipment in imagery.

The ROK SAM training facility can be seen in the image below:
Unconfirmed reporting suggests that the ex-German Patriot systems have been deployed near Seosan, Suwon, Incheon, and Gangneung. This report first appeared in September of 2008, coinciding with the first deliveries of Patriots to the ROK. Sighting ROK Patriot equipment at the training facility near Daegu suggests that it was not deployed directly after delivery as the report suggests. With the exception of Suwon, these locations all feature Nike-Hercules batteries. While Patriot deployment has not been confirmed at these locations, they do represent logical deployment sites in the future once crews have been trained and the sites have been reconfigured to support Patriot batteries.

CAPABILITIES

On paper the ROK's SAM network appears to be relatively robust. Sites are organized in a logical fashion, often enjoying overlapping fields of fire. Terrain concerns, particularly in the areas closest to the DMZ, are largely alleviated by placing many of the sites at high altitude atop mountain ranges. The bulk of the ROK-operated sites are consolidated in the heavily populated northwestern sector.

The coverage zones of ROK-controlled SAM batteries can be seen in the image below:
US-operated Patriot batteries provide additional defense against both aircraft and ballistic missiles over a large portion of the nation. This added coverage can be seen in the image below, which adds range rings for PAC-2 missiles to those of the ROK's HAWK and Nike-Hercules batteries:
The main problem facing the ROK's SAM network is one of quality. Nike-Hercules and HAWK systems are both legacy systems better suited for museum display than battlefield use at this juncture. HAWK missile batteries likely retain a degree of effectiveness thanks to numerous upgrades being available during their service lives, but they lack the range to effectively protect the peninsula. Cognizant of the deficiencies of the HAWK system in the 21st Century, original plans called for the replacement of ROK HAWK batteries by 2010, a deadline which will not be reached. By 2012, Nike-Hercules batteries should be withdrawn in place of Patriot batteries, providing a significant upgrade to the ROK SAM network in terms of overall capability.

FUTURE PLANS

In the future, the ROK's SAM network will see significant changes. First and foremost, the ROK will no longer rely on the ineffective Nike-Hercules for long-range air defense, with Patriot batteries replacing these systems in 2012. Whether the withdrawl of Nike-Hercules SAM batteries will affect the Hyunmoo programs is not known at this time.

A replacement for the HAWK is being co-developed with the Russian Almaz design bureau, and is slated to complete development in 2011. This system, codenamed KM-SAM or Cheolmae-II, will employ a modified Fakel 9M96 active radar homing SAM along with a modern phased array radar. KM-SAM batteries will consist of a radar vehicle, a command post vehicle, and up to eight TELs, all mounted on wheeled vehicles for high mobility. Each TEL will carry eight cold-launch missile canisters. The modified 9M96 dispenses with the original Russian design's canard foreplanes, but retains the nose-mounted reaction control thrusters. It will also employ a directional warhead, and has an advertised range capability of over 40 kilometers.

The ROK also plans to create a missile defense network called KAMD, incorporating the Elta EL/M-2080 Green Pine BMEW radar, Patriot systems, and KDX-III AEGIS destroyers. Mention has also been made of an improved Cheolmae-II called K-THAAD forming part of this network. Creation of such a system is ironic given that protests over potential PAC-3 purchases were due in part to a feeling that the ROK would be drawn into a US-led anti-missile network.

CONCLUSION

The ROK currently fields a SAM network that would have been state of the art in the 1960s, and effective into the early 1980s. The modernization programs underway will correct many of its deficiencies and shortcomings, allowing the network to achieve technological parity with other nations in the region and provide capable and effective defense well into the 21st Century. Hopefully the ROK's citizens will find their government's desire to defend them acceptable.

SOURCES

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

Patriot moves to Camp Carroll
PEACE EYE Delivered
SAM-X
PAC-3 Deployed to Korea
German Patriots Delivered
Seoul Begins Deploying Patriot Missile Interceptors
Air Defense Artillery Command
Hyunmoo Ballistic Missiles
Korean Missile Defense

The North Korean SAM Network

INTRODUCTION

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea fields one of the most capable third-world strategic SAM networks on paper. However, despite the high concentration of strategic SAM batteries and EW sites, there are significant issues in the network which need to be addressed in the near future. If these issues are ignored, the DPRK will be placing itself at risk.

THE STRATEGIC SAM FORCE

The DPRK's strategic SAM assets are subordinate to the Air Force. The Air Force operates a variety of Soviet-era equipment. The following strategic SAM systems are currently in service: S-75 (SA-2 GUIDELINE), S-125 (SA-3 GOA), and S-200 (SA-5 GAMMON).

EW Coverage

Thirty three active and one inactive EW sites provide the DPRK with early warning radar coverage, used for SAM system target acquisition and track handoff, and GCI control of fighter units. These EW sites are primarily consolidated in the southern half of the nation, providing substantial coverage of the capital and the DMZ. Identified EW radars operating in the DPRK are predominately Soviet-era systems, although the presence of a JY-8 (WALL RUST) radar indicates that Chinese hardware is also in use. How well the Chinese system integrates with the rest of the FSU-era equipment is not known, but it is potentially not a problem given that China operates a number of Soviet and Russian systems. The following systems have been identified in available imagery:

P-12/18 (SPOON REST)
P-14 (TALL KING)
P-35/37 (BAR LOCK)
P-80 (BACK NET)
36D6 (TIN SHIELD)
JY-8 (WALL RUST)

The US DoD reports that the following radars are also in service, but they have not been identified in available imagery at this time:

5N69 (BIG BACK)
P-8/10 (KNIFE REST)
P-15 (FLAT FACE)
P-15M (SQUAT EYE)
PRV-11 (SIDE NET)
PRV-13 (ODD PAIR)

The following image depicts the locations of identified EW radar sites in the DPRK:
The following image depicts a notional DPRK EW site. Most EW sites appear to be host to a single example of one radar type, in this case a P-14. Other radars, especially smaller units such as those of the P-12/18 series, may be present but not visible in available imagery. Alternatively, they may be held in reserve to expand the network when required, or may simply not be discovered yet. AAA sites, such as the battery seen here, are common at both EW and SAM sites to provide additional defense.
Interestingly, the only strategic SAM system which appears to possess an organic EW system is the S-200, with each battery containing a P-14 radar. The S-75 and S-125 batteries do not appear to field any organic EW elements, in which case they must rely on either the external network or the limited functionality of their engagement radars to provide target acquisition and track generation. It is possible that these SAM batteries do contain EW elements, but that they have not been located or are not visible in available imagery.

A further EW system available to the DPRK is the Ramona passive detection system. The advantage to the Ramona is that it does not radiate, allowing it to be relocated to complicate targeting with considerably more ease than a strategic SAM battery. The Ramona system has not been located in available imagery, but is believed to be a leftover Soviet system, emplaced and operated by the USSR.

SAM Coverage

There are currently fifty eight active strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK. The following image depicts the locations of these sites. S-75 sites are red, S-125 sites are light blue, and S-200 sites are purple. As can be seen, the overwhelming majority of the deployed strategic SAM assets are located along the DMZ and the coasts.
The following image depicts the overall SAM coverage provided by the identified DPRK strategic SAM sites. Using the same color scheme applied previously, SA-2 zones are red, S-125 zones are light blue, and S-200 zones are purple.
The S-75

There are currently forty six active S-75 sites inside of the DPRK, constituting the bulk of the strategic SAM force. According to SIPRI, a total of 45 S-75 Dvina systems were delivered to the DPRK from the USSR. 15 batteries were supplied between 1962 and 1964, with the remaining 30 batteries being supplied between 1966 and 1971. A total of 1950 missiles were reportedly supplied to arm the batteries. S-75 batteries are deployed to provide barrier air defense of the DPRK's coastlines and the DMZ, as well as coverage of the bulk of the DPRK's interior.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-75 batteries:
The S-125

There are currently ten active S-125 sites inside of the DPRK. Seven batteries are positioned to defend the capital of Pyongyang, with the other three situated to defend the nuclear research center at Yongbyon. The DPRK operates the S-125M Neva-M variant, with SIPRI reporting that eight batteries were supplied between 1985 and 1986.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-125 batteries:
Seven of the deployed S-125 batteries, six around Pyongyang and one near Yongbyon, are situated at sophisticated hardened facilities. These hardened sites contain three launch revetments for 5P73 4-rail launchers and a radar position for the RSN-125 (LOW BLOW) engagement radar. The launchers can be retracted into bunkers when not in use. Similarly, the engagement radar can be lowered into a bunker and protected by a retractable cover, which splits in half and slides open when the radar is exposed.

A hardened S-125 site near Pyongyang can be seen in the image below:
The S-200

There are currently two active S-200 sites inside of the DPRK. These sites are placed near the east and west coasts in the southern portion of the nation, allowing them to range far offshore and deep into the ROK. The S-200 represents the longest-range strategic SAM system in the DPRK's arsenal. Four S-200 batteries were supplied to the DPRK between 1987 and 1988, and two batteries are likely co-located at each location.

The following image depicts the coverage provided by the DPRK's active S-200 batteries:
As with the S-125, the DPRK employs hardened facilities for the S-200. Elevators are provided for the two 5N62 (SQUARE PAIR) engagement radars at each location allowing them to be stowed undergroudn when not in use, and hardened bunkers are provided for the 5P72 launch rails.

Inactive Sites

There are currently twenty nine identified inactive strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK. There are twenty seven S-75 sites and two S-125 sites. The bulk of these sites are located in the vicinity of Pyongyang. As such, they may represent facilities available for bolstering capital area air defenses during a time of conflict. They may also be employed as relocation facilities, complicating targeting of active batteries. Some inactive locations, notably those near the northwest border with China and near Kuum-ni on the northeastern coast, are situated in coverage gaps in the SAM network, suggesting that they may have been labeled as inactive when last imaged due to their assets being relocated for training or maintenance purposes.

The following image depicts the locations of inactive strategic SAM sites located in the DPRK:
Support Facilities

Interestingly, there are no identified support facilities related to the strategic SAM force in the DPRK. Given that the DPRK employs a great deal of hardened and underground facilities, this is not necessarily suprising. Many of these facilities are identified in other nations due to the identifiable presence of SAM components in imagery. If these facilities are kept hidden in the DPRK, then their identification would be extremely difficult. However, it should be assumed that such facilities do exist, even if they have not yet been located or conclusively identified. These facilities would provide maintenance functions, store missile reloads, and garrison surplus equipment for future deployment.

STRATEGIC SAM FORCE CAPABILITY

The DPRK appears to possess an intelligently designed, layered air defense network at first glance. S-75 sites are positioned to provide barrier air defense of the coastal and southern border regions, with the remaining S-75 and S-125 batteries bolstering inland defenses and protecting critical locations.

S-200 Coverage

Long-range air defense is provided by the DPRK's S-200 batteries. The S-200 is a significant threat to ISR and support aircraft operating in the theater, such as the USAF's U-2R based out of Osan AB in the ROK. The location and range of the S-200 would hold any such cooperative target at risk shortly following takeoff from most of the airfields in the ROK. Ergo, while the S-200 is not a serious threat to any non-cooperative, maneuverable targets such as fighter aircraft, it represents a significant problem for any potential aggressor.

Border Coverage

Many of the DPRK's S-75 batteries are positioned along the coastline and along the DMZ. These systems are placed to provide barrier air defense to deter any foreign intrusion into the DPRK's airspace. The majority of these systems are positioned to provide overlapping fields of fire to strengthen air defenses in these areas. The northern border with China and the northeastern border with Russia are left undefended, likely due to the DPRK not anticipating that either nation would be a party to hostilities against it.

Inland Coverage

The wide-ranging deployment of military facilities in the central part of the nation has precipitated the siting of S-75 and S-125 batteries to protect much of the DPRK's interior. S-125 batteries are specifically sited to protect two areas, Pyongyang and Yongbyon.

Air defense facilities and coverage zones near the capital of Pyongyang can be seen in the image below:
Air defense facilities and coverage zones near the Yongbyon nuclear research complex can be seen in the image below:
Interestingly, one location left udnefended is the underground nuclear test facility in the northeast. This may be due to the fact that if air defenses are present, analysts will assume that there is something there worth protecting. Similarly, the DPRK's rocket test sites at Musudan-ri and Changya-dong are also currently unprotected.

Denial and Deception Efforts

It is possible that many of the sites identified as active are not in fact legitimate SAM sites. With a number of camoflaged and underground facilities, the DPRK is clearly aware of the concept of denial and deception. Such practices may be in place in the strategic SAM network.

Consider the figures. It is reported that forty five S-75 batteries have been delivered, but forty six sites have been identified as operational. Many of these sites do not use traditional FSU site layouts, and are partially obscured by trees and other vegetation. The same numerical discrepancy exists in the S-125 force, with ten sites appearing active but only eight batteries reportedly being delivered. In addition, seven of the S-125 batteries have been provided with hardened facilities, begging the question of why the others have not. It is possible that the active S-125 batteries found at non-hardened facilities are in fact decoy sites. However, there is not sufficient evidence to conclusively prove this one way or the other.

The simplest method available to prove if a site is active or a decoy outside of having a personal ELINT system is to examine the imagery for the associated cable connections and other typical equipment found at active batteries. However, due to the aforementioned vegetation, many of these sites cannot be examined in this fashion. As such, if they contain what appears to be active equipment, they are assumed to be active batteries.

One mock S-125 site has been identified conclusively. This site, seen in the image below, contains a radar mockup and three launcher mockups. Note the southernmost launcher mockup. This launcher is clearly a mockup, having only two widely separated launch rails which are not parallel. Were this an actual 5P73 launcher, there would be four perfectly parallel rails. The imagery is of sufficient quality to discern that there are in fact only two rails. The spacing of the rails also indicates that this is not a 5P71 two-rail launcher. Further evidence of this site's true nature is found in the lack of any support equipment. None of the command and control vans are present, which would render this site unuseable even if it were fitted with operational equipment.
Air Defense Issues

The primary issue facing the DPRK's air defense network is one of age. While the equipment may still be serviceable, none of it is a major threat to a modern air arm. The DPRK desperately needs an infusion of modern air defense systems if it is to remain viable in the 21st Century.

The S-75 and S-125 have been faced multiple times by modern air arms since 1990 and have consistently been defeated by current tactics and electronic warfare techniques and systems. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia all possessed these systems and they were all defeated. The main victory claimed by these systems was the downing of an F-117A by a Yugoslavian S-125 battery in 1999, but this was due more to excellent intelligence support (they knew the F-117's route and whatever idiot planner was responsible used the same flight path over and over), outstanding site discipline (the site did not often radiate to give its position away), and the addition of an optical tracking system than the actual effectiveness of the system. In a conceivable conflict the DPRK would be facing American and ROK aircraft, and the USAF has exploited the S-75 and S-125 for decades. The S-200 may be marginally more credible as a threat, but as mentioned before it is only a significant threat to a cooperative (i.e. nonmaneuverable and slow) target. It has also been physically exploited based on the presence of equipment at the Tolicha Peak Electronic Combat Range, but it is not known when this was acquired, meaning that the DPRK may have a more recent iteration of the system with a few tricks up its sleeve that remain undocumented. Given American reliance on ISR and IFR platforms during wartime air operations, it is likely that the S-200 batteries would be struck during the opening salvo of any conflict.

The other major obstacle to the DPRK's strategic SAM force is terrain. Much of the terrain in the DPRK is very varied, including that near the DMZ. Even a height difference of a few hundred feet can produce an exploitable blind zone in a SAM battery's coverage. More critically, many of the S-75 batteries along the DMZ are placed in positions of lower altitude than the surrounding terrain, restricting the fields of view of the SAM batteries. This is a significant error in the placement of these systems, as it denys them the ability to function to their maximum degree of effectiveness. The hardened S-125 and S-200 batteries were placed more logically at higher elevations than surrounding terrain, allowing them greater freedom of operation.

One further issue to address is the overreliance on AAA and MANPADS' in the DPRK. The DPRK possesses some of the highest AAA concentrations in the world. The general cocnept is that combat aircraft will fly at lower altitudes to more easily evade SAM batteries, making them susceptible to AAA or MANPADS'. What the DPRK has overlooked is the fact that its SAM defenses are inadequate in light of current ECM and SEAD systems, allowing combat aircraft to fly at higher altitudes to avoid the bulk of the AAA and the entirety of the MANPADS threat. AAA is comparatively cheap and can be very effective in the right environment, but the DPRK seems to have seriously erred in its judgement.

CONCLUSION

The DPRK is the new Iraq. During the lead-up to Operation DESERT STORM, the Iraqi air defense network was often described as being one of the world's most capable. This turned out to be an erroneous description, based in part due to Iraq's overreliance on dated technology and weapon systems. The same problems which plagued Iraq's air defense network in 1991 are evident in North Korea's current network, and must be rectified if the DPRK intends to field any sort of credible air defense in the 21st Century.

SOURCES

-The aforementioned data is based on analysis of the available open-source satellite imagery of North Korea and may therefore not represent the entire air defense network.

-Satellite imagery provided courtesy of Google Earth

SIPRI
Ramona in the DPRK

North Korea Country Handbook, US DoD, 1997